Twenty-eighth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 23-November 1973, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:
Mr. BORCH
(Denmark)

Rapporteur:
Mr. de SOTO
(Peru)

- World Disarmament Conference (continued)
- General and complete disarmament (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (continued)
- Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace (continued)

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73-71236/A
AGENDA ITEMS 32, 33, 34, 35 AND 38 (continued)

WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE
(A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2)
CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS (A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1)
DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE (A/C.1/L.655)

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has before it draft resolutions relating to agenda items 33, 34, 35 and 38. I would suggest that we deal with those texts today in accordance with the following procedure:

The draft resolutions would be taken up in the numeral order of the agenda items to which they relate, and, within that order, in the numerical order of the symbol numbers of the documents in which they are contained. Each draft resolution would first be introduced by one of its sponsors and then any representatives wishing to speak on it could do so. The debate on each draft resolution would continue until we reached the stage of voting, that is, until we arrived at the purview of rule 130 of the rules of procedure.

I think that that procedure would enable us to conclude -- or at least almost conclude -- the debate on the draft resolutions at this meeting today, leaving only the voting and the explanations of vote for the meetings tomorrow.

I know that some representatives are not prepared to vote today on some of the draft resolutions before us, but it may be possible to proceed to the vote on one or two of them -- in particular, the draft in document A/C.1/L.655, relating to agenda item 38, Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

If I hear no objections, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with the procedure I have suggested.
Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): I should like to raise just one question. I think that the revised text of the draft resolution on chemical weapons has not been introduced, and I understand that it may not be introduced. We should like to speak to that revised draft resolution before it reaches the stage provided for under rule 130, and other delegations too may wish to do so, even though there may be no formal introduction of the revised text.

The CHAIRMAN: That is my understanding too. I would also point out that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.655, relating to the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, was introduced on 12 November. Needless to say, representatives may address themselves to it today if they so wish.

I should like to make two announcements before we start the debate on the draft resolutions.

First, Ireland has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2; and Nepal has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2, L.662, L.663 and L.665.

Secondly, the symbol number of the document containing the draft resolution dealing with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, under agenda item 33 on general and complete disarmament, should be A/C.1/L.665 and not A/C.1/L.655.

Under the procedure we have decided to follow, the first draft resolution to be introduced today would be the one in document A/C.1/L.662. I understand, however, that the sponsors would prefer to postpone the introduction of that draft resolution, and I therefore now call on the representative of Mexico to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.663, under agenda item 33, General and complete disarmament.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Six years ago Arnold Toynbee stated:

"The truth is that the threat to man's survival has been far greater since 1945 than it was during the first million years of history."

The slightest glance at the hair-raising situation confronting the world today by the threat inherent in nuclear weapons fully proves the accuracy of that far sighted statement.

In a little more than the 25 years that have elapsed since two Japanese cities were annihilated by the only two atomic bombs in existence at the time, the power lying in the nuclear arsenals has increased a millionfold, to such an extent that today that power is assessed at 15 tons of dynamite per inhabitant of the earth. The bomb which today we regard as normal -- the 20 megaton bomb is itself a thousand times more powerful than that dropped on Hiroshima; in other words, its power is equal to that of 20 million tons of the most powerful of conventional explosives. Today, no one doubts that the accumulated nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy the major part of the planet and to make the entire globe uninhabitable. The only question still to be settled is whether that capacity amounts to four or five times what would be required, in accordance with the most conservative estimates, or to forty or fifty times, in accordance with less optimistic views.

In a mere 11 years the precarious balance of terror in which the world has lived has been darkened by two major crises in which the extreme point has been arrived at: in one a general nuclear alert was sounded, in 1962 during the period of the cold war; and the second, which we witnessed as surprised and impotent spectators, took place a few weeks ago during this period of the oft-vaunted détente.

We are convinced that were we to feed the data that I have just outlined into a computer, bearing in mind that they are imbued with the irrefutable objectivity of true higher mathematics and can be complemented by other information regarding the possibilities of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, the inevitable reply of the electronic computer would be that if nuclear weapons were not entirely eliminated within a reasonable period of time, the survival of mankind could be set at approximately 50 years at most.
The crossroads at which the world finds itself, therefore, is this: to go either towards the destruction of nuclear weapons or towards resignation to our own disappearance.

Naturally, what I have just said is not an invention of ours. To the opinion of one of the greatest contemporary authorities in the art of interpreting the lessons of history, Arnold Toynbee, whom I quoted at the beginning of my statement, we might add the similar views of hundreds of others. However, I shall refer to only one of them. As in the previous case, this opinion was voiced by someone who was particularly capable of judging the question.
I refer to Dr. Fred Charles Iklé, whom certainly no one could charge with the usual reproach of being a defender of "utopian pacifism", because, in addition to having served for a number of years as a Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and, from 1968 to 1973, as Head of the Social Science Department of the Rand Corporation, he has, since the spring of this year, occupied no less a post than that of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States.

Just before Dr. Iklé was appointed to the high post that he now occupies, he published, in the magazine *Foreign Affairs*, in its issue of last January, an article entitled "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?". The author's answer to that question was a categorical no, and the analysis he made of the subject is one that warrants a very careful and attentive reading of the entire article. As an illustration of its timely and pithy content, I have selected at random a few paragraphs from among those most closely related to the question we are considering.

Dr. Iklé starts by saying:

"... the destructiveness of nuclear arsenals ... has sunk into human consciousness like man's knowledge of his mortality.

'We all turn away, however, from the thought that nuclear war may be as inescapable as death, and may end our lives and our society within this generation or the next.'"

He goes on later to say:

'An almost exclusive emphasis on deterrence could be defended as a satisfactory long-term policy if it could be convincingly argued that successful deterrence was tantamount to prevention of nuclear war. There exists no rational basis for such an argument. No matter how cataclysmic the threatened 'assured destruction', those calculated decisions which our deterrent seeks to prevent are not the sole processes that could lead to nuclear war. We simply cannot know which of the various potential causes is most probable — whether it be a coherently calculated decision to attack, or an 'irrational' decision, or technical accident."
Dr. Iklé goes on to say:

"But nobody can predict that the fatal accident or unauthorized act will never happen. The hazard is too elusive. It is inherent not only in the ineradicable possibility of technical defects, but also in the inevitable vulnerability to human error of all command and operational procedures -- during periods of high alert as well as during the many years of quiet waiting."

Later on Dr. Iklé concludes this section of his study with the following comment:

"Given that occasional incompetence or malfessance is predictable in large institutions -- whether military or civilian -- the safety of nuclear armaments remains a constantly pressing uncertainty. Given the huge and far-flung missile forces, ready to be launched from land and sea on both sides, the scope for disaster by accident is immense."
Facts and considerations such as those I have just cited can stand by themselves, I believe, as the best explanation for the reasons that led the so-called Group of 12 of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to prepare the draft resolution appearing in document A/C.1/L.663, which, on behalf of the co-sponsors, I have the honour to present to this Committee. The list of its co-sponsors is as follows: Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

The preamble begins by recalling resolution 2602 A (XXIV), in which the General Assembly, in 1969, barely a month after the beginning of the bilateral negotiations known as SALT, sought to draw the attention of the two super-Powers participating in those talks to the necessity of creating conditions favourable to the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures. The preamble further recalls the result of the first phase of those negotiations and reaffirms the appeal and the invitation made by the General Assembly last year in its resolution 2932 B (XXVII).

The preambular part of the draft ends by referring to the new agreement arrived at by the two super-Powers on 21 June 1973, and also to the fact that the Assembly has been officially informed of that agreement by a note addressed to the Secretary General on 6 November 1973, which, as you know, was reproduced, together with the text of the agreement, in document A/9293, circulated two days later.
(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Following our example of 1972, the sponsors have preferred not to stint their appreciation of the progress represented by that new agreement, however modest that progress may be. That is why we have proposed that the General Assembly note that agreement with satisfaction. But at the same time we have felt it imperative to stress the urgent need for the application of basic principles contained in the agreements now being used in order to ensure the adoption by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union of measures -- and I cite the terms used in operative paragraph 1 of the draft:

"on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament".

In other words, we believe that the second stage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks must in no way be a mirror of the first. We analysed the results of the first phase last year in this Committee when, again on behalf of the Group of Twelve, we submitted the draft resolution which later became resolution 2932 B (XXVII). It will be recalled that at that time we drew attention to the fact that the bilateral instruments that resulted from the first stage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

"regardless of their beneficial political and psychological consequences on the international level, have a very modest scope as disarmament measures. On the one hand, the quantitative limitations provided for in those documents apply to the already disturbing level existing at the time they were signed, and in some cases they even allow for a higher level. Regarding the qualitative aspect -- which is perhaps the most dangerous -- if we set aside a few unimportant limitations regarding defensive weapons, the agreements not only include no restrictions on this matter but, on the contrary, seem to have been interpreted by the super-Powers as encouraging unlimited competition in that specific field."

(1891st meeting, p. 27)

Thus we are calling on the two super-Powers to make a maximum effort, in the words of the draft resolution, to take "a positive step towards nuclear disarmament", which process they themselves have very well defined in the preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, where they mention
"the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery". (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), Annex)

Apart from that goal, which is the fundamental objective of our text, our draft is also intended to repeat the courteous invitation issued by the General Assembly last year to inform that body in good time of the results of their negotiations.

As members will have noted, this year we have added the expression "in good time", because although we appreciate the progress inherent in the fact that it was not necessary for an outside delegation -- as was the case for Mexico in 1972 -- to request the circulation of the bilateral instruments as documents of the Assembly, we also wish to express our desire that in future such circulation of a document -- carried out, as this time, on the initiative of the two contracting parties -- should not have to wait, as was the case this time, until almost five months after the publication of the news in the world Press before those documents are made available to all of us. We believe that according to the Charter the responsibility falling to the United Nations justifies our request.

In the light of what I have endeavoured to sum up in this statement, and particularly bearing in mind the fact that our draft resolution is intended to contribute to the disappearance of what we can never sufficiently repeat --namely, today's greatest threat to the survival of mankind-- we the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.663 venture to hope that all members of the First Committee will be able to support it unreservedly. We believe we are justified in that hope, particularly with regard to the two States participating in the SALT negotiations, since the first basic principle of their agreement of 21 June states that both parties will continue actively to negotiate the elaboration of a permanent agreement on more complete measures governing the limitation of offensive strategic weapons and their ultimate reduction and in the third principle they provide that the limitations to be established on offensive strategic weapons can refer to both the quantitative aspect and their qualitative improvement.
As I said, we venture to hope that the vote of the two super-Powers in support of our draft resolution will constitute the best proof that that solemn commitment after which so many peoples of the world have been hungering for so long will finally become a fact.

The CHAIRMAN: As no representative has asked to be allowed to speak on the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.663) that has just been introduced, I take it that the debate on it is concluded and that Members agree that future statements on it will be confined to explanations of vote before or after the vote.

We turn now to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.662, and I call upon the representative of Yugoslavia.

Mr. JAZIC (Yugoslavia): I have the honour to introduce -- on behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Sweden, Zaire, Zambia and my own delegation -- the draft resolution on general and complete disarmament contained in document A/C.1/L.662.

General and complete disarmament is one of basic long-term objectives of the United Nations. This objective must be attained if a lasting and just peace and equal security for all are to be ensured. The road leading to the realization of this goal is, of course, neither simple nor rapid. However, it is possible to achieve this objective gradually through the joint efforts of all countries, through patient, persistent and planned work. It is quite certain that our Organization will be in a position to fulfil this task to the extent to which all of its Members contribute towards its achievement and, primarily, the great Powers which have special responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The achievement of substantive measures of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, is of vital interest to all peoples and countries and, for this reason, elaborating them, as well as the principles underlying disarmament negotiations, should be placed on a universal basis, so
as to ensure that no sovereign State, shall be prevented from taking part in decision-taking on the most essential questions of international peace and security. In our view, these universal interests can best be secured through the United Nations. The non-aligned countries, in particular, are constantly exerting efforts towards this end. By saying this we do not want to diminish the importance of some of the results achieved so far, which represent initial steps towards disarmament -- results achieved either under the auspices of, or outside, the United Nations -- while some other negotiations are still under way. However, we feel that the United Nations is interested in these negotiations and their results and that, consequently, should be kept informed. That is one of the fundamental principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament adopted at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. It is also the basic aim of this draft resolution.

May I now refer to some of its provisions. In its preamble the draft resolution refers to some of the important resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, it refers to resolution 1722 (XVI) of 1961, in which, the General Assembly welcomed the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations submitted by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one of the basic principles being that no State or group of States should gain military advantages as a result of disarmament measures, and to resolutions 2602 (XXIV), 2661 (XXV) and 2825 (XXVI) on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Further, stress is laid on the responsibility that the General Assembly has under the Charter with regard to the principles governing disarmament and with respect to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. It is emphasized that the questions of disarmament are of the greatest concern to all peoples and countries of the world as they affect their vital interests. And attention is drawn to the importance and urgent need to achieve effective disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction.

Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution reaffirms the responsibility of the United Nations with regard to all matters pertaining to disarmament, and, in particular, to general and complete disarmament under effective international
control. Operative paragraph 2 invites the States parties to disarmament negotiations to ensure that the disarmament measures adopted in one region should not result in increasing armaments in other regions, thus upsetting their stability. Operative paragraph 3 invites the governments of all countries to keep the General Assembly suitably informed of their disarmament negotiations, while operative paragraph 4 requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Member States as well as all other governments and States and to include the item entitled "General and Complete Disarmament" in the provisional agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

In presenting the draft resolution on general and complete disarmament to the Committee I wish to express, on behalf of the co-sponsors, the hope that it will meet with the widest support in this Committee and in the General Assembly.

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): I wish to address a question to the representative of Yugoslavia who has spoken on behalf of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.662. Operative paragraph 3 invites the governments of all States to keep the General Assembly "suitably" informed of their disarmament negotiations. I wonder what the significance of that adverb "suitably" is? I am not aware of any "unsuitable" means of informing governments. Perhaps the representative of Yugoslavia could explain what the special meaning of that term is.

Mr. JAZIC (Yugoslavia): The word "suitably" was used just to indicate in a general way that governments should inform the General Assembly about disarmament negotiations, without seeking to prescribe the exact manner in which they should do so. It is meant in fact as an invitation to governments to choose the way of informing the General Assembly. But if the representative of Sri Lanka has another better word to suggest we would, of course, be willing to consider it.
Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): I have only one suggestion to make, and that is that the word should be omitted.

The CHAIRMAN: I understand that the representative of Sri Lanka's suggestion was not a formal proposal.

As no other representative wishes to speak on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.662 I take it that the debate on it is concluded and that members agree that future statements should be confined to explanations of vote before or after the vote.

We turn now to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665, also under agenda item 33, "General and Complete Disarmament".

Mr. ECKERBERG (Sweden): On behalf of the 23 co-sponsors I should like to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665 on a conference in 1975 of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. This draft resolution is procedural in nature and is not intended to prejudice in any way the deliberations of the preparatory committee mentioned in its operative paragraph 1, or of the non-proliferation Treaty review conference itself.

The background of the draft resolution is set forth in its preamble, the first paragraph of which recalls the General Assembly's resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 which commended the non-proliferation Treaty and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty.
As noted in the second paragraph of the preamble,
"... article VIII(3) of the Treaty provides that 'Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a Conference of the Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized'."

The final paragraph of the preamble recalls the General Assembly's expectation that the review conference will take place soon after 5 March 1975, that is, five years after the entry into force of the Treaty.

It is obviously essential in order to ensure the success of the Conference that it should be well prepared. With this in mind, operative paragraph 1 indicates that a preparatory committee has been formed, comprised of those parties to the non-proliferation Treaty which are serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or are represented at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). That was agreed upon during recent consultations among the parties, including a meeting two days ago held in this very room. The use of the IAEA Board and the CCD appeared to the participants in those consultations to be the most appropriate as a basis for objective criteria.

Much of the negotiating work for the non-proliferation Treaty was done in the CCD and that body is still the only existing multilateral forum for further disarmament measures in the nuclear field. The IAEA is conducting the vital safeguards work, which is part of the implementation of the Treaty. The parties to the non-proliferation Treaty serving on the IAEA Board or in the CCD taken together -- the number is 24 -- seem to provide a satisfactory representation, both geographically and politically, of the non-proliferation Treaty membership as a whole.

As an addition, the sponsors have in mind a broad interpretation of those criteria: any party that meets the criteria at any future time before the Conference takes place in 1975 -- for example, by election to the
IAEA Board in September 1974 -- could then join the preparatory committee. Those retiring from the Board would also be able to continue to serve on the committee.

I should also like to underline that the sponsors wish to ensure that all interested countries should be able to communicate their views, suggestions or proposals to the preparatory committee. For practical reasons the Committee is not very large, but the intention is definitely not to make it exclusive. At the recent meeting of Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty it was understood that when the Committee sets up its working procedures there will be an arrangement for all parties to the Treaty also to present their views directly in the Committee when they have a particular interest in the matter being discussed.

Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution

"Requests the Secretary-General to render ... assistance and provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the review conference and its preparation."

Along the same lines, the preparatory committee will probably wish to invite the IAEA to provide assistance -- perhaps in the form of memoranda -- both during the preparatory work and during the Conference itself.

As I said at the outset, this is a procedural draft resolution on which the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty have agreed.

I should also like, before I conclude, to say a few words on behalf of my own delegation to underline the importance that the Swedish Government attaches to the institution of review conferences generally and, as Mrs. Myrdal made clear when she spoke in this Committee some weeks ago, to a non-proliferation-Treaty review conference especially.

The task of the review conferences will be to examine how the relevant disarmament treaties are working, to repair any flaws that may exist in them and, above all, to try to improve the implementation where needed. The non-proliferation Treaty deals with the most important of all disarmament issues: nuclear weapons. The Treaty has a double function: it is designed to stop the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but
it is also meant to stop the vertical proliferation, that is, the continued nuclear arms race. The non-proliferation Treaty has not been implemented in that second respect. The nuclear-weapon Powers have failed to live up to the pledge in the Treaty to negotiate effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

That makes it all the more important for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to that Treaty to make use of the opportunity which the review conference will offer them. It is with this in view that the Swedish delegation expresses the hope that the draft resolution before us in document A/C.1/L.665 will receive wide support in the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce that Austria has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2 and that Egypt has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.662.

Does any other representative wish to participate in the debate on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665?

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): The United States delegation is happy to co-sponsor the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665 on the non-proliferation Treaty review conference. We attach importance to the Conference and we consider it to be in the general interest to ensure that the Conference is carefully prepared and that appropriate facilities and services are provided. These purposes are served by the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665.

Operative paragraph 2

"Requests the Secretary-General to render ... assistance and provide necessary services..."
Operative paragraph 1 takes note that a preparatory committee has been formed, comprised of parties to the non-proliferation Treaty serving on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board or at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).

We believe that those criteria represent the best practical solution to the problem of constituting a committee that is fully representative of the interests of all parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

We favour a wide interpretation of those criteria, so that any party meeting them at a later time will be free to join the Committee.

We also think that the Committee should be ready to receive suggestions by interested countries concerning its work.

Early in its deliberations the Committee will, no doubt, wish to consider inviting the IAEA to provide assistance for the substantive preparation of the Conference, as well as to send experts to participate in the Conference.
we think that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665 merits the support of all delegations that approve the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For our part, we look forward to co-operating actively in ensuring that the conference in 1975 will result in a serious and constructive review of the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. MAINWORTH (United Kingdom): The representative of Sweden has provided an admirably comprehensive introduction to the draft resolution before us and I have already in my statement of 30 October in the general debate made known my delegation's views on the importance that the United Kingdom attaches to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I can therefore be very brief.

As Mr. Eckerberg has said, the draft resolution is a purely procedural one. It will, of course, be for the Preparatory Committee to agree on an agenda for the review conference itself, which will no doubt include all those matters of substance dealt with in the text of the Treaty.

In the context of remarks made by some delegations during the course of formulating the draft resolution, I would stress that it is not the intention of the co-sponsors that any party to the Treaty should be debarred from contributing to the work of preparing for the review conference. For practical reasons, as has been said, it is necessary to keep the Committee relatively small, but we would expect the Committee to make arrangements to receive suggestions from any party. It seems to us that to choose as the qualification for serving on the Preparatory Committee membership of either the International Atomic Energy's Board of Governors or of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is both fair and objective. As has been noted already, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament did much of the original work for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the representative of Ireland pointed out in his statement of 6 November, has already carried out important work in connexion with the negotiation of safeguards agreements and should be closely associated with the proceedings of the review conference.
It will be evident from what I have said that my delegation attaches great importance to the objectives of this draft resolution. I would urge all delegations to lend their support to it in order to give the Preparatory Committee the strongest possible encouragement in its work.

The CHAIRMAN: As no other representative wishes to speak on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665 I take it that the debate on it has been concluded and that members agree that future statements should be confined to explanations of vote before or after the vote.

We turn now to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2, on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. This draft resolution relates to agenda items 33 and 34.

I call on the representative of Sweden to introduce the draft resolution.

Mr. ECKERBERG (Sweden): I wish to introduce the second revision of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650, concerning napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. This draft resolution is now sponsored by 20 delegations. During the time which has elapsed since 5 November, when Mrs. Myrdal, on behalf of the co-sponsors, introduced the draft resolution in its first revision, consultations have taken place with a number of delegations outside the group of co-sponsors. The XXIInd International Conference of the Red Cross last week concluded its session in Teheran and among the issues discussed there was that of humanitarian laws in times of war, which is closely related to the questions we are considering here under item 34 of the agenda.

The changes which have been made in the second revision of the draft resolution have been made for three main reasons. Some take into account concerns which have been expressed by delegations that shared the wish of the co-sponsors that the diplomatic conference should consider the question of the use of these weapons but felt that some of the wording in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 created difficulties for them. One addition to the text is a direct result of the Teheran conference and one change has been made after consultations with representatives of the Swiss Government and of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
In order to facilitate the reading of the new text I should like to point out that minor changes have been made in the fourth, sixth, ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs in response to suggestions which have come from other delegations. A new final preambular paragraph has been added, which takes note of the invitation issued last week by the XXIIInd International Conference of the Red Cross to the International Committee of the Red Cross to convene a conference of government experts next year in order to study in depth the question of prohibition or restriction of use of conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. I understand that the International Committee of the Red Cross has already declared that such an expert conference will be convened. The Swedish Government welcomes that, and intends to send experts to the conference in order to do all it can to contribute to the work there. A report from the expert conference will be transmitted to governments participating in the diplomatic conference.

It was also agreed in Teheran that the second session of the diplomatic conference, which we hope will be convened early in 1975, should have such a report from the conference of experts. The experts' report will obviously be of great value in the consideration of the important question of prohibition or restriction of use of the weapons described in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution and will assist the diplomatic conference in its task of seeking agreement on rules concerning such prohibition or restriction.

Finally, operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the first revision of the draft resolution have now been combined into a new paragraph in the second revision. There is no change of substance here. The new wording simply takes into account the fact that the Secretary-General has been invited by the Swiss Government to attend the conference.

In conclusion, I express the hope of the co-sponsors that the draft resolution in its revised form will receive wide support in the First Committee.
The CHAIRMAN: As no other representative wishes to speak on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2 I take it that the Committee agrees that the debate on it has been concluded and that members agree that future statements should be confined to explanations of vote before or after the vote.

I wish to inform the Committee that Liberia has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665.

We now turn to agenda item 35 and to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1, which was submitted on 16 November.

I call upon the representative of Yugoslavia to introduce the draft resolution.
Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): The representative of Yugoslavia has already had the privilege of introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653 -- the revised text of which is before the Committee -- on behalf of the 28 co-sponsors, who have been joined in the meantime by Ghana. In view of the fact that the revised text contains only some insignificant changes, I have nothing to add to the statement made by the Yugoslav representative concerning the substance of the draft resolution at the 195th meeting of the First Committee.

The only changes contained in the text are the following. The word "bacteriological", which was inadvertently omitted, has been added in the first line of the fourth preambular paragraph, while the word "biological" is, as is customary, placed between brackets. In the ninth preambular paragraph, after "1973", the following words have been added:

"... and the working paper on the main points of an international agreement of 21 August 1973",
as well as the word "that" after the word "and" in the same line.

In the third operative paragraph a linguistic correction has been made, so that "of the problem" has been replaced by "on the problem".

Consequently, the substance of the draft resolution has remained unchanged, and I wish to express once again, in the name of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1, the hope that it will meet the unanimous approval of the Committee.

Mr. BARTON (Canada): We feel, like the previous speaker, that it should be our goal to have a unanimous resolution on this subject, as indeed we did last year. It may be recalled that in my statement in the general debate earlier in this discussion I referred in some detail to the difficulties that my delegation had encountered in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament regarding the negotiation of effective arrangements for achieving a ban on chemical weapons.
I said that, for our part, we had yet to be satisfied
"that any of the proposals so far envisaged will provide the necessary
security guarantees for a treaty to be generally acceptable and effective."
(1935th meeting, p. 22)

and that, in the circumstances, we believed that
"the CCD should proceed with all deliberate speed in its search for the
elements of a treaty, and to this end ... should continue its meticulous
examination of the complex issues involved." (ibid, p. 26)

As I indicated a moment ago, it has been our hope that in giving a mandate
to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue its work, the
General Assembly would ensure that its resolution would find the widest possible
degree of acceptance. Last year we succeeded in this aim, and my delegation was
pleased to be one of the many co-sponsors of resolution 2933 (XXVII). It is our
earnest hope that before we adopt the text of a resolution on this subject
today or tomorrow we can achieve a similar level of common support. Before
this can happen, however -- at least so far as my delegation is concerned --
we must appeal to the co-sponsors of the draft resolution to consider making
two small but very important revisions. Those revisions will not affect the
purpose or the direction of the draft resolution, but without them the resolution
would constitute a significant departure from the formulation used previously.

The first point which causes us concern is in the preambular paragraph
which asks us to reaffirm General Assembly resolution 2603 (XXIV) rather than
resolution 2603 B (XXIV), as was the case last year and, I think, in previous
years. Resolution 2603 B (XXIV) received the general support of the Assembly
and is germane to the issue under discussion. Resolution 2603 A (XXIV) was
highly controversial and a substantial number of countries, including Canada,
abstained on it. Furthermore, it is not directly relevant to the subject matter
of the resolution.

Second, I appeal to the co-sponsors to consider modifying the language of
operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. The resolutions adopted in the
past have used language derived directly from Article IX of the biological
weapons Convention, and notably the solemn commitment that the parties would
undertake
"to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for the destruction of chemical weapons..." (resolution 2826 (XXVI), Annex, Article IX)

Nearly 100 States have subscribed to the undertaking in that Convention and have reaffirmed it in subsequent resolutions. My delegation believes strongly that we should keep to the agreed language, and certainly it is with a view to fulfilling precisely that undertaking that my delegation has been negotiating and will continue to negotiate actively in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

In the light of the explanations I have given, I again appeal to the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1 to make the further change I have indicated so that we may have a resolution which reflects our common purpose.

Sir Laurence McIntyre (Australia): In a statement on 6 November my delegation, after reviewing progress in regard to chemical and biological weapons during this year, concluded that further study would be necessary of the technical problems that were still delaying the conclusion of an acceptable and effective agreement on chemical weapons. We said that we believed that the best service the Assembly could do this year would be to approve a resolution taking note of the stage the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had reached, and asking it to continue the work with an appropriate sense of urgency in 1974. By its nature, such a resolution would be of an essentially procedural kind and one that would preserve intact the positions of the States Members of the United Nations on this important subject, pending its further detailed consideration.
My delegation considers that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1 now before us substantially meets those requirements and that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be able to take up without delay in 1974 where it left off in 1973.

Like the delegation of Canada, however, we have some doubts nevertheless about the formulation of operative paragraph 3 which, it might be argued, could bear upon the commitment that many States represented here have accepted or will accept, pursuant to the biological weapons Convention. We refer to Article IX of that Convention, by which parties undertake with reference to chemical weapons: "... to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling ...". (Ibid)
Now that is a treaty commitment. It is also the objective reproduced in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2933 (XXVII), which is the predecessor of the draft resolution we are considering. Obviously, prohibitions on chemical weapons must be embodied in effective measures: otherwise they are not likely to achieve their objective.

As a State which is moving towards ratification of the biological weapons Convention, Australia believes that it is important to proceed in the manner set out in the Convention towards the end, which we believe to be agreed, of effective measures for prohibitions on chemical weapons, thereby maintaining the integrity of the Convention.

We would hope strongly, therefore, that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1 could make the minor adjustment to their draft resolution which would be necessary to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding of their objective. If they do not find it possible to do this, my delegation will still vote for the draft resolution, but our favourable vote would be on the basis that operative paragraph 3 does not detract from, and indeed accords with, the provisions of the biological weapons Convention and the goal of effective measures for prohibitions on chemical weapons.

Mr. HAINWORTH (United Kingdom): As I believe is well known to members of the Committee, the United Kingdom has over the years been amongst the more active delegations involved in negotiations on chemical and biological weapons. Delegations may recall the United Kingdom initiative which led to the biological weapons Convention. One of the principal arguments that motivated my delegation in seeking to deal separately with biological weapons and chemical weapons was the fact that measures for chemical weapons, unlike those considered sufficient for biological weapons, must include genuinely effective measures for verification. These deadly weapons exist in large quantities; they have been used; and they are relatively easy to manufacture.

The need for effective verification of any agreement dealing with chemical weapons was recognized by the negotiators of the biological weapons Convention in Geneva and was reflected in the formulation finally negotiated as article IX
of the biological weapons Convention. I may say that the final version of this language itself represented a compromise. The biological weapons Convention, as we have been reminded by the representatives of both Canada and Australia, has now been signed by about 100 States — the great majority represented here. The same language has been reflected in resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly. Likewise, these resolutions have been adopted with the approval of the great majority of the United Nations membership.

My delegation had accordingly supposed that this year too the First Committee would try to work out a broadly acceptable resolution which would build on the agreements of the past and encourage the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to make really substantial progress in its deliberations next year.

It has been explained to my delegation that a number of countries felt that they ought to submit a document this year which would reflect their own point of view in public before behind-the-scenes negotiations started the search for a consensus. Although this is not my own delegation's preferred method of proceeding, I can understand the motives for it. What my delegation finds it hard to understand is the insistence by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1 on dropping language to which many of them have subscribed in a treaty commitment and in support of which most of them have voted in past years.

There is an unfortunate implication in the refusal of the co-sponsors to consider proposals for operative paragraph 3 which would have restored the words "effective measures" before the words "for the prohibition". The words "effective measures" are, as is widely known, a commonly understood shorthand meaning that any chemical weapons agreement must be effectively verified. The omission of these words carries, it seems to my delegation, the clear implication that the co-sponsors do not consider that measures for chemical weapons need be effectively verified.

But in all the discussions of this subject, in Geneva and in New York, delegations, whether from the West or from the East or from the non-aligned countries, have been agreed that effective verification will be necessary.
I have another point also connected with operative paragraph 3 of this draft resolution. In Geneva my delegation took the opportunity on 27 February this year, following a press rumour that we were in favour of partial measures, to say in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that the desired aim of the United Kingdom delegation remained an effective comprehensive ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. That is still the position of my delegation.

Despite this view on the substance of the matter, however, my delegation cannot agree that the United Nations General Assembly should be asked to adopt a resolution whose effect would be to try to direct the CCD to reach a single agreement, perhaps without effective verification, on the full range of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

As I have said, my Government favours the comprehensive approach. But it cannot agree that the CCD's hands should be tied any more than it can agree that the fundamental principle of effective verification should be put in question. My delegation will accordingly have no alternative but to abstain on the draft resolution.

I must at the same time mention a point already raised this morning and say that my delegation could not accept the reference in the first preambular paragraph to reaffirmation of resolution 2603 (XXIV). My delegation abstained on resolution 2603 A (XXIV) for reasons which were fully explained to the Committee at the time in Mr. Porter's statement on 10 December 1969 and which I need not repeat today.

Mr. Martin (United States of America): The United States will have to abstain if this draft resolution is put to the vote in its present form.

This, quite frankly, is a matter of great concern and regret to us. The subject of chemical weapons is one on which we should like to believe that there can be active and productive negotiations in the near future. And we believe that it would be extremely desirable if this Assembly were to adopt a resolution that would be conducive to bringing about these negotiations and not perhaps to harming them.
If we had had the opportunity to participate in the formulation of this draft resolution, there are quite a number of changes we would have liked to make. At least four or five paragraphs would have been substantially changed. But after considering the matter and getting right down to it, we have found that we could vote "yes" on the draft resolution if two small changes were made, and these are the changes that have been discussed by previous speakers — the representatives of Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.

The first preambular paragraph reaffirms resolution 2603 (XXIV). Now that resolution, as everybody knows, contains two parts. The first part is resolution 2603 A. There are a great many persons in this room who participated in the debate on resolution 2603 A and they will recall that it was one of the most bitter and contentious debates we have had in the disarmament field in the past few years.
My country voted "no" on resolution 2603 A (XXIV), as did a number of other countries. About 30 abstained. It seems to us very difficult to understand why, after several years of referring only to resolution 2603 B (XXIV), which is non-contentious and which we can vote for, all of a sudden we are called upon to reaffirm section II of resolution 2603 (XXIV). Obviously, the United States is in no position to reaffirm a resolution upon which it took such a strong stand only such a short time ago.

The second small change that we should like to see made is the one that has again been referred to by the three previous speakers. We think that paragraph 3 should reflect the wording of the biological convention. We feel -- and I know personally -- that this language was negotiated in Geneva with great difficulty, involved compromises on both sides, and was intended to set the framework for future negotiations on this subject. I believe that if that formula is retained, negotiations will be speeded, not impeded.

I think that we ought to ask ourselves why the co-sponsors may have wanted to change the formulation, and I wish to be perfectly frank. I think that one of the reasons -- at least this is one of the reasons that I have heard -- is that the United States, during the past session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, did not present any concrete formula for negotiating a treaty on chemical weapons. I confess that that is true, and I shall tell this Committee what I told the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We have not presented a concrete proposal because, quite frankly, we have been unable to develop one which we thought would be to the advantage not only of ourselves but also of all the other countries that are concerned about chemical weapons. This is a difficult subject; smarter people than we have been working on it for over 75 years without finding a solution, and we hope that, as we continue to work as we have been working in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, solutions will become apparent. I have no apologies to make for not finding a solution, but I have great hopes that if we continue to work in the spirit in which we have worked we shall begin to find solutions.
I have full respect and sympathy for the motives of the co-sponsors of this draft resolution. I know that they are aiming at the same objectives that my delegation is pursuing. I wonder, however, if in trying to get resolutions we may not be giving up results, and I think that all of us in this room are more interested in results than in resolutions.

Let me conclude by joining the previous speakers in respectfully requesting the co-sponsors to continue to negotiate with us to see if we cannot achieve the unanimity which I think we all want and without which I think we may actually damage what we are trying to do rather than help it.

Mr. GUERREIRO (Brazil): Last year my delegation co-sponsored the draft resolution that was finally adopted on this subject. On that occasion we, and all the other co-sponsors, gave a certain weight to the advantage of having a unanimous decision being reached by the Assembly, and the text that was then drafted, of course, did not go as far as many of the co-sponsors would have wished. Even in this case we, as the delegation of Brazil, could go beyond the text that was then submitted. But we thought that there was an advantage, and no real loss, in trying to present a text that could command the support of the entire membership.

This year our approach as a delegation would be the same. However, I must analyse the present text of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1 as submitted. For the Brazilian delegation this text presents no significant difficulty. In fact, the only paragraph in which there are more substantial changes is operative paragraph 3, to which preceding speakers have referred. The most significant changes that appear this year in this paragraph are acceptable to the Brazilian delegation, as they would have been even last year. In fact, when the text now says 'an early agreement', giving the impression of one convention or, as is technically possible, different instruments simultaneously approved and interrelated, it expresses the position that we took last year in our statements in this Committee.
Also, in the mention in the paragraph of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, the inclusion of the word "all", which should be understood as a comprehensive ban on development, production and stockpiling and the destruction of stockpiles, similarly creates no difficulties for my delegation. And in my statement last year this preference for a comprehensive ban was indicated.

However, there is one omission this year concerning which we have very considerable doubts, and that is the omission of a reference to effective measures. In the fourth line of operative paragraph 3 we would like to have inserted between the words "early agreement" and "for the prohibition" the words "on effective measures". Or, in parallel with the wording in operative paragraph 1, it could read "early agreement for the effective prohibition of the development", and so on. The idea is that even if we had the kind of agreement the Brazilian delegation favours, that is to say, simultaneous prohibition on all aspects of the processes of production, stockpiling and so on, and even if we have a prohibition of all chemical weapons -- and a comprehensive prohibition should be understood in that way -- it would still be very important not to omit the emphasis on the aspects of verification.
(Mr. Guerreiro, Brazil)

As this Committee may recall, our statements in the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva were perhaps even more concise on that point. We consider that the destruction of existing stockpiles is of great importance, particularly for non-nuclear-weapon States, and that such destruction should be verified appropriately; otherwise we should have a situation of discrimination between those who have stockpiles and those who have not.

The Brazilian delegation would very much like the co-sponsors to consider the possibility of accepting the addition of "Effective measures", or, in a weaker form, the use of the word "effective" before "prohibition", which would still give emphasis to the aspect of verification without changing the main points that the co-sponsors want to put into their draft resolution this year -- I mean the indication of one instrument, one agreement, and a comprehensive prohibition.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): The sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1 have held extensive consultations about the substance of the draft resolution, among themselves as well as with representatives of other groups. An attempt was made to meet some of the requests, which resulted in the draft resolution, as I explained a few minutes ago. However, in the light of the appeals made by the representatives of Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Brazil, my delegation is willing to reconsider their requests, with the understanding, of course, that all the sponsors of the draft resolution will have to decide jointly on any eventual changes. I shall be able, Mr. Chairman, to advise you about this after we have had the proper consultations among the co-sponsors.

The CHAIRMAN: Under those circumstances we shall not conclude today the debate on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1, and, since the Committee has been adhering to its time-table, it is not absolutely vital that we conclude the debate and vote on this draft resolution tomorrow either, if that does not allow enough time for agreement to be reached on a final text. I hope, however, that the sponsors will meet at the earliest possible moment to see whether a compromise can be worked out on the draft resolution.
All the draft resolutions before the Committee have now been introduced. At the beginning of the meeting, I stated that it might be possible to put to the vote today the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.655, under agenda item 38, Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. However, that draft resolution has financial implications and the statement by the Secretary-General of those financial implications is not yet available in written form. It will be available in that form tomorrow morning, and I therefore think it would be preferable to postpone the voting on the draft resolution until then.

It appears that some representatives would also prefer not to vote today on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.662, under agenda item 33, General and complete disarmament.

Are there any objections to our proceeding to the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.663, also under agenda item 33? As there appear to be none, and as no representative wishes to explain his vote before the voting, I now put that draft resolution to the vote.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.663 was adopted by 79 votes to 1, with 18 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who have asked to be allowed to explain their votes after the voting.
Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): We understand and welcome the interest shown by the world community in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. We believe that the earliest adoption of further limitations of strategic arms could be a major contribution to reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and strengthening international peace and security.

For our part, we intend to do everything possible to work out the provisions of a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms as well as their subsequent reduction.

By abstaining on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.663, therefore, we merely reaffirmed our conviction that the SALT negotiations should proceed along lines set down by the parties themselves.

Mr. SCALABRE (France) (interpretation from French): As we indicated in the course of previous meetings, the French Government is following with great attention the Soviet-United States talks on limitations of strategic weapons, and we can only be gratified at what progress may be achieved in those negotiations, particularly if they show a favourable development of détente, to the fragility of which the representative of Mexico this morning made particular reference.

However, we believe the talks are purely bilateral and outside the purview of our Assembly and that perhaps the Assembly’s interventions may not be timely. Furthermore, we believe that the present stage of those negotiations at least does not fall within the competence or framework of the strict meaning of the word "disarmament". It could have been different had their effect been to reduce the destructive capacity of the existing systems of strategic weapons. However, that is not the case, and therefore we do not believe we can do anything but set for the more sophisticated weapons a certain ceiling which the parties themselves have not as yet achieved, which leaves them, if an agreement is arrived at, in possession of arsenals the destructive possibilities of which are frightening.

It is for those reasons that my delegation abstained in the vote on the draft in document A/C.1/L.633.

We do wish to make it clear that our position cannot and must not be construed as disapproval in principle of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks but only as expressing our position on the exact meaning and scope of those negotiations.
Mr. LIN (China) (interpretation from Chinese): In accordance with our consistent position on SALT, the Chinese delegation did not participate in the voting on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.663.

The CHAIRMAN: I take it that the Committee has concluded its deliberations on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.663.

With regard to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665, which also concerns general and complete disarmament, I wish to inform the Committee that it has financial implications. The statement on those financial implications is not yet available. However, I have been assured that it will be available at tomorrow morning's meeting.

We now turn to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2, concerning napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. It is my understanding that the Committee is ready to vote on that draft resolution, and I shall now call upon those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote before the vote.

Mr. ROSCHIM (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to make known its views regarding the vote about to be taken on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2.

The Soviet Union has always supported and continues to support the United Nations efforts to prohibit the use of particularly cruel and indiscriminate weapons. Our position of principle on that matter is determined by our participation in international agreements dealing with armed conflict, including The Hague Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Protection of victims of warfare and other international agreements on the matter.
The prohibition of the use of particularly dangerous weapons is already included in a resolution adopted at the twenty-fourth session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and I would refer to the communiqué that was issued at the time of the Swedish visit of Mr. Kosygin in April. In that communiqué it is stated that it is necessary to support the United Nations efforts to prohibit the use of particularly cruel means of warfare.

With regard to the specific question of napalm, the position of the Soviet Union has been reflected in the Secretary-General's report on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. As we know, a Soviet expert participated in the preparation of that report.

The question of napalm and other incendiary weapons is not a simple one. It has many technical and military aspects which are linked to the consideration and study of all facets of the problem. The question of deciding what measures can be adopted regarding napalm and other incendiary weapons calls for very thorough examination on the part of experts. It also calls for a thorough examination regarding the limitation of the use of those weapons from the standpoint also of the stemming of the arms race. Particular note must be taken of the observations that were made by States in response to the questions of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2932 A (XXVII).

The question of the prohibition of the use of types of conventional weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or the use of which is indiscriminate and which can be used to attack military as well as civilian targets should not be dealt with within the context of the problem of the limitation and prohibition of weapons.

The Soviet Union believes that the referral of that question for examination by the conference on humanitarian law, as proposed in the draft resolution before us, would not be entirely useful since in principle the question does not substantially enter the competence of that conference.
Its examination at such a conference might hinder their work and it might also jeopardize the work of those bodies that are dealing specifically with disarmament. We believe the most appropriate body to study this important question would be the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, which has acquired sufficient experience in studying this type of question to entitle it to study these particular matters since they are all linked to the question of the limitation of arms and to general and complete disarmament.

For the reasons I have just adduced the Soviet delegation will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2.

Mr. LIN (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese delegation would like to express the following views on the draft resolution on napalm and other incendiary weapons:

First, we have always held that there is a distinction between just wars and unjust wars; we firmly oppose wars of aggression and support just wars. It is entirely proceeding from the righteous position of opposing wars of aggression and defending the right of the oppressed nations to self-defence that we favour the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons. We have reservations on the vague wording in the draft resolution

"... the widespread use of many weapons and the emergence of new methods of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering or are indiscriminate...", which makes no distinction between just and unjust wars, and between aggression and the victim of aggression.

Secondly, the main source of contemporary wars is imperialism and social-imperialism. It is perfectly just for the people of various countries to demand opposition to all wars of aggression and the defence of their national independence and State sovereignty. However, this aim cannot be attained by relying only on the prohibition of one or two types of modern weapons of mass destruction. We must firmly oppose the policies of aggression and war pursued by imperialism and social-imperialism.
Thirdly, our attitude towards the use of incendiary weapons is the same as our attitude towards the use of other weapons of mass destruction: that is, first we are against it; and secondly we are not afraid of it. We strongly condemn the imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists for their crimes of using incendiary weapons in wars of aggression to slaughter the people. We especially condemn the Israeli Zionists for their crimes of using napalm bombs against Arab countries in the recent Middle East war. However, incendiary weapons are nothing terrible, nor are they invincible. Despite the use of a large amount of incendiary weapons by the United States in its aggressive wars in Viet Nam, by the Portuguese colonialists in their colonial wars in Africa, and by Israel in its war of aggression against Arab countries causing the destruction of a large number of cities, towns and villages and the deaths of countless peaceable inhabitants, the Viet-Namese people have won great victories in their war of resistance against United States aggression and for national salvation, the armed struggle of the African people is surging forward, the Arab people are emerging ever stronger in the course of their fight, and they all will win final victories. The historical facts will prove that like other weapons of mass destruction, incendiary weapons are a paper tiger.

Fourthly, with the foregoing explanation, we will vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2.

Mr. HAINSWORTH (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom delegation would like to explain its vote before the vote on the draft resolution before us.

When I spoke on 30 October in the general debate on disarmament items, I referred to the need to avoid doing anything at the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law to be held in Geneva next year that might put at risk the successful conclusion of negotiations on two draft protocols to the Geneva Conventions which will be the subject of that Conference. In phrasing the statement that way, my delegation deliberately prepared the ground for a softening of the view held in previous years and reflected only shortly beforehand in the British Government’s reply to the Secretary-General that the subject of napalm and other incendiary weapons was not an appropriate one to be
discussed at the Humanitarian Law Conference but might appropriately be referred
to an arms control body such as the Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament.

The implication of my statement of 30 October was that my delegation was
prepared to contemplate that the Humanitarian Law Conference should discuss
the subject of napalm and other incendiary weapons provided that the draft
protocols were not prejudiced. May I say at this point that my delegation
has noted with appreciation that the revised version of the draft resolution
makes this point clearly and explicitly. We felt however that it should have
been made equally clear that while the Humanitarian Law Conference should
consider these subjects, we should not, in the General Assembly, presume to
direct a plenipotentiary conference, such as the Humanitarian Law Conference
will be, as to what it should do. It should also have been made clear, in
our view, that the Assembly could not attempt to prejudge the outcome of
discussions at the Conference, or indeed elsewhere. These points however
are not taken into account in operative paragraph 1, which invites the
diplomatic Conference itself to consider the subject and to seek agreement on
international rules.

The wisdom of our approach appeared to my delegation to be confirmed
when, less than two weeks ago at a meeting in Teheran of the Commission
preparing for the Humanitarian Law Conference, agreement was reached on a
resolution inviting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to
convene a group of government experts to undertake a study in depth of the
question of the prohibition, or restriction of use, of conventional weapons
which might cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. The
resolution went on to call on the International Committee of the Red Cross
to transmit a report on the work of the expert group to all governments
participating in the Humanitarian Law Conference with a view to assisting them
in their further deliberations. Finally, the resolution urged the Humanitarian
Law Conference to begin consideration in 1974 of the question of the prohibition
and restriction of the use of the weapons in question.
My delegation considered that the Teheran resolution not only represented the full consensus on the matter — not merely a compromise — but was also the proper way to proceed. In other words, the Diplomatic Conference should begin work on the subject, but should take into account the work done by the Government experts under ICRC auspices.
Unfortunately, for some reason which my delegation still finds it hard to understand, the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2 seem unable to incorporate language into their draft in New York to reflect the view that some of their number themselves sponsored and voted for in Teheran less than two weeks ago.

My delegation is not asking the sponsors not to have the subject discussed in the Diplomatic Conference next year. Quite the contrary. We have already agreed that the subject might be discussed there. What my delegation cannot agree is that while the Diplomatic Conference should be invited in Teheran to take into account the work of government experts on this very topic, a parallel resolution in New York should deliberately omit this view. My delegation will accordingly abstain in the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2.

Mr. FACK (Netherlands): My delegation supports the main ideas in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2 which is before us, particularly the invitation to the Conference on humanitarian law in armed conflicts to consider the question of napalm and other specific weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. We regret, however, that it has not been possible to specify in more detail the procedure for the study of this complicated question.

The Red Cross Conference in Teheran invited the International Committee of the Red Cross to call in 1974 a conference of government experts to study in depth the question of prohibition or restriction of the use of certain conventional weapons. We would have liked to see an operative paragraph in the text inviting the humanitarian law Conference in Geneva, at its first session in 1974, to promote the study in depth of those questions by government experts, with the purpose of seeking agreement on possible rules prohibiting or restricting those weapons.

The result of the new draft is that several important countries will not vote in favour of the text, although those countries have made constructive
efforts in trying to find an acceptable solution. Those countries have now accepted the idea that the question of napalm and other weapons will be handled in the context of the Red Cross conference, but in the preparation of texts the required spirit of compromise has, unfortunately, not always been shown.

My delegation is not happy about this way of handling extremely complicated arms control and disarmament problems. Disarmament can be pursued with effect only if the States involved participate constructively in the negotiations and if the results can be generally acceptable.

In spite of those considerations, my delegation will vote in favour of the text in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): We particularly regret that the United States cannot vote for this draft resolution (A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2), since there had seemed to be hope that the extensive discussions between the sponsors and a number of interested delegations, including my own, would result in a very broadly acceptable text. Unfortunately, that was not possible despite the considerable adjustments we made in our previous position. Therefore, we are compelled to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution now before the Committee for consideration. Let me explain why.

Little substantive work has been done so far in connexion with the possible prohibition or limitation of the use of specific conventional weapons. My delegation regards this as a sensitive field in which many difficult and complex questions will have to be studied in depth before any basis for a possible agreement can realistically be expected.

We think that the XXIInd International Conference of the Red Cross, which met earlier this month at Teheran, set guidelines for a proper approach to the next stage of consideration of the matter when it adopted a resolution inviting the International Committee of the Red Cross to call in 1974 a
conference of government experts to study the question in depth and to produce a report to assist Governments in their further deliberations. My Government would expect to participate in the proposed study, which seems to us to be projected on the basis appropriate for the complexity of the issues involved. In contrast, there is a risk that the draft resolution before this Committee might create unrealizable expectations regarding the possibility of achieving agreement at the humanitarian law Conference, scheduled to convene early next year in Geneva.

In our view, the draft resolution does not adequately reflect the widely shared understanding that, until qualified experts have carefully and thoroughly examined the broad range of problems concerning specific conventional weapons restrictions, these questions cannot usefully be made the subject of actual negotiations.

We understand the wide-spread desire that the Diplomatic Conference should discuss those issues, but we believe that the language of the draft resolution is somewhat ambiguous on how far such discussions may lead. Again, the United States does not consider it realistic to suggest that their end result could be agreement on specific rules. In this connexion, I would add that my delegation is gratified that the draft resolution does acknowledge that the primary business at the Diplomatic Conference should be to consider the two draft protocols on laws of war submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross. It would be truly unfortunate if other issues actually impeded that consideration.

**Mr. WETTERNICH (Federal Republic of Germany):** In spite of certain reservations with regard to the language of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2, in particular operative paragraph 1, we have decided to vote for it because we support the aims expressed in it.

The Federal Government does not, however, think it is possible that the Diplomatic Conference for the purpose of reafirming and developing the international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, to be held in 1974,
will be able to elaborate regulations for the prohibition or restriction of arms that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. This issue is too complicated and requires further analysis by experts. We think that the conference of government experts, mentioned in the eleventh preambular paragraph of the draft, to be called by the International Committee of the Red Cross, will be most suitable for the purpose.

**Mr. LOPES DA FONSECA** (Portugal): The Portuguese delegation desires to explain its vote before the vote. Incidentally, I have heard again in this Committee a reference made by one delegation which is the fruit of, to say the least, an ignorance of realities. I am not exercising the right of reply, but since that statement was made during an explanation of vote I am taking the opportunity to refer to it as well during this period devoted to explanations of vote and to recall once again the position of my country with respect to the kind of weapons condemned by the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2, on which my delegation will cast its vote in favour.
Mr. KRUTSCH (German Democratic Republic): Our delegation shares the view that the question of the prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons and, furthermore, the possible complete prohibition of such weapons deserves close attention within the framework of negotiations concerning arms control and disarmament. As far as that general aim is concerned, our delegation appreciates the intentions of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2, but we cannot associate ourselves with the idea put forward in the draft resolution concerning the methods and ways in which that aim should be achieved. We have doubts that it would be appropriate to entrust the forthcoming Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which is to be held in Geneva next year, with this highly complicated task. That Conference has already a number of important questions to resolve, and the question of the prohibition of the use of a specific category of weapons could hardly be regarded as a task within its competence. Taking into account the opinions of governments with regard to resolving the question of the prohibition of these weapons, our delegation deems it more appropriate that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should include that question on its agenda. Our delegation cannot therefore support the draft resolution and will abstain in the voting.

The CHAIRMAN: Since no other representatives wish to explain their vote before the voting, I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2. A roll-call vote has been requested.
A vote was taken by roll-call.

Sweden, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour:
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan

Against:
None

Abstaining:
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Poland, South Africa.

The draft resolution was adopted by 89 votes to none, with 16 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call upon those representatives who wish to explain their vote after the voting.
Mr. Jaroszek (Poland): The Government of Poland attaches considerable importance to, and takes an active interest in, working out effective measures for the prohibition -- or, as a first step, restriction of the use and eventual total elimination -- of napalm and other incendiary weapons from the arsenals of all States. In fact, the Polish delegation was a co-sponsor of the resolution on the subject adopted by the General Assembly last year; I refer to resolution 2932 A (XXVII).

The views of my Government were reiterated in its reply to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General concerning comments on his report (A/9207) on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use. The reply stated:

"... that the report can serve as a suitable basis for further consideration of the direction and manner of negotiating with a view to reaching an agreement on the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons and, subsequently, their total elimination from military arsenals."

(A/9207, p. 17)

That attitude of my Government stems from its devotion to the cause of promoting disarmament in general, as well as from its assessment that progress in banning napalm and similar weapons is becoming a distinct possibility. My delegation therefore welcomed the initiative of Sweden and other sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2. As I stated in my intervention two weeks ago:

"We certainly share their intention of achieving an early prohibition or restriction of the use of napalm and similar weapons." (1952nd meeting, p. 17)

We differ, however, with the sponsors of the said draft resolution as to the best way and procedure for achieving such a prohibition. My delegation considers, as I stressed in my statement of 8 November -- and I take the liberty of quoting myself again:

"... that the proper forum to negotiate agreement or agreements on such prohibition is the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and not the Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law ...". (Ibid.)
We are of the opinion that the matter should be thoroughly prepared and discussed. The comparatively short diplomatic Conference cannot ensure this. Moreover, the setting up of a special committee or sub-committee that would work between the sessions of the Conference — and we do not know at present whether and when a second session of the Conference will be held — would mean a duplication of the functions and tasks of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that would lead to the undermining of its authority. On the other hand, entrusting the work to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would enhance its prestige and, in the opinion of the Polish delegation, would create much better chances of success.

It was for those reasons that the Polish delegation abstained from voting on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2.

The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to announce that Uganda would have voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2 had been present.

Mr. STRUCKA (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): Czechoslovakia has consistently favoured the prohibition both of the use and of the production of napalm and other incendiary weapons. Nevertheless, we were unable to support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2, principally because it unfortunately does not reflect the views of many delegations that the discussion of the question of prohibiting napalm and other incendiary weapons should be entrusted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, which is the competent organ for conducting concrete talks on the various matters connected with disarmament.

The Czechoslovak delegation therefore abstained from voting.

Mr. PALEWSKI (France) (interpretation from French): It was not without hesitation and even, I would say, without some pangs of conscience that my delegation contemplated the idea of dissociating itself from the majority of the members of this Committee by abstaining on the draft resolution which has just been adopted, on napalm and other incendiary weapons. Is there anyone who is not
convinced of the need to achieve the prohibition of the use of those weapons, which have particularly horrifying effects?

The French Government, for its part, is convinced of this and is quite ready to take part in talks the purpose of which would be the preparation of an international convention banning the use of napalm and certain types of incendiary weapons in time of war.

If my delegation was unable to agree with the draft resolution, it was because it appeared to it that the methods advocated for achieving that objective are not effective, and they even present some danger. The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, to be held upon the invitation of the Swiss Government next year, will refer to the work and reports of the International Red Cross, and the French delegation would like to pay a particular tribute to that remarkable institution and to its work. The Diplomatic Conference will have a very long agenda and will have to consider many very difficult problems, all concerning making warfare more humane and the duty of belligerents towards non-combatants, the treatment of prisoners of war. All those and many other questions are within its competence. This is already a very heavy task, and my delegation considers that the first duty of our Organization in these circumstances should have been not to make that task even more difficult, particularly by introducing into its work sources of conflict on problems which should not be within its competence.

Therefore was it desirable to ask this Conference to deal also with the problem of napalm and that of other incendiary weapons? From the modest Molotov Cocktail and the flame-thrower there have come a whole range of phosphorous bombs of all kinds, strategic or tactical shells, grenades, rockets and an infinity of other incendiary devices, going right up to the most explosive weapons. And as if that were not enough, we are asking this Conference to study other conventional weapons, among other things high-speed projectiles with delayed action effect or with fragmentary effects. Is that really reasonable?
Frankly, we do not think so. But what seems even more serious to us is that we are asking the international conference to do work which should not belong to it for the essential reason that it is really ours. Certainly, the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons and that of the use of certain conventional weapons systems liable to cause possibly unnecessary suffering present humanitarian aspects. But, above all else, they do pose problems of a political and military nature. It is not with the simple desire to inflict unnecessary suffering on enemy combatants that States have developed the types of weapons with which we are concerned today: it is because these weapons meet certain imperatives of a strategic or tactical nature. Among these weapons we find both battlefield weapons and weapons designed to be used against industrial or sensitive targets. Depending on the circumstances, the character of these arms can be both defensive and offensive, and some of them are essentially defensive weapons.

Hence, the discussions which are to take place will bring into play ideas which States have of their own national self-defence. Consequently, it is a political and military problem the solution for which should be in our own competence because we are responsible for it.

It is really desirable for a conference whose primary purpose is obviously humanitarian to have before it a problem -- whose political aspects and even military techniques I have just stressed -- which would require a whole complex of studies that only specialists can really undertake? By referring the study of this question to the international Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, we have taken the responsibility of jeopardizing its functioning by the introduction of grave political differences with all their possible implications in a field which, in the view of my delegation, there should be if not tranquillity at least the single-minded will to seek on a strictly humanitarian basis solutions capable of attenuating as far as possible the horrors attendant upon all armed conflicts. We shall be asking the experts of the conference questions on problems which are not within their province, which cannot be within their province, because we shall have been incapable of resolving them ourselves or because we have refused to do so even though that is the fundamental role of our Organization.
The organization of the use in time of war of napalm and other weapons is, because of its political consequences, essentially a disarmament problem and as such it is within the competence of our Organization, as stressed in Article 11 of the Charter.

My delegation appreciates the motives which prompted our Committee to vote the way it did. Certainly, these motives are honourable and perfectly understandable. No doubt many delegations considered that if there was any chance -- however slight -- of settling such a serious problem, this opportunity should be taken. They thought that a diplomatic conference in one or two sessions might prove itself more effective on this subject than our Organization over several years; however, there is no ground for thinking that this is true and I myself fear that an error fraught with serious consequences has been committed.

The referral of this matter to an international conference is the expression of a feeling of renunciation -- I would even say abdication -- on the part of our Organization, into which I should not like to go any further. During the general debate in this Committee several delegations echoed this thought. Should not the only conclusion to be drawn from this situation be that, rather than to refer to others the tasks we should be concerned to undertake ourselves, we should seek to resolve the present deadlock by finally creating for ourselves a special body of research and negotiation for disarmament matters, a body which we would have no fear of seeing become bogged down permanently when we entrusted it with the study of a project?

Particularly in the light of the interest which the developing countries show in the problem we have just mentioned, should not our Organization have contemplated the creation of -- and even have created -- an ad hoc committee where these countries would have been broadly represented? That committee could have been entrusted with the task of pursuing, with the assistance of qualified experts, the necessary studies for the preparation of a genuine draft convention. That, at least, is the feeling of my delegation, which considers that such a procedure would have been preferable to the one voted upon by the Committee, because it is more logical and, in our view, much more effective.
Mr. DI BERNARDO (Italy): The question of napalm and other incendiary weapons, and all the horrible effects of such weapons, which rightly attracts the attention of world opinion represents one of the most complex problems before us.

For its part the Italian Government has expressed its point of view on the question on various occasions. We believe that if it is right and opportune that certain aspects, the humanitarian ones, of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons be discussed in an appropriate forum such as that of the next Diplomatic Conference to be held in Geneva under the auspices of the International Conference of the Red Cross, it is however highly desirable that the other aspects of this question -- that is, the ones relating to an effective disarmament -- be examined by other more suitable organs specialized in the study of disarmament problems.

For these reasons we have repeatedly stressed the opportunity of discussing in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the aspects of the napalm question relating to disarmament problems. Now an agreement reached on this point at the recent Conference of the Red Cross in Teheran suggests entrusting the matter of napalm and other incendiary weapons to a special commission of experts. We could therefore have accepted this solution. However, we have some reservations on the point of respective competence of the General Assembly and the appropriate organs of the United Nations, on the one hand, and the Diplomatic Conference of the Red Cross, on the other.
Furthermore, the text of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2 does not seem to us to reflect fully and satisfactorily the language of the Teheran Agreement.

For those reasons the Italian delegation abstained from voting on the draft resolution.

Mr. GUVEN (Turkey) (interpretation from French): I simply wish to say that we wholeheartedly share the hesitation expressed by many delegations with regard to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2. Nevertheless, in a spirit of conciliation, we voted in favour of it.

The CHAIRMAN: We have now concluded our consideration of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650.

I call on the representative of Sweden in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. ECKERBERG (Sweden): I have asked for the floor only because I should like to express the deep regret of the Swedish delegation that the representative of the Netherlands feels that the co-sponsors of this draft resolution have shown no spirit of compromise. We regret to hear this after several weeks of consultations in which the delegation of the Netherlands participated and which resulted in two revised texts of this draft resolution, containing a number of changes.

With regard to the decision taken in Teheran, referred to here by many representatives, I should like to point out again that a new preambular paragraph has been inserted which refers to, and in fact quotes part of, that decision, and if the co-sponsors did not introduce that very wording in the operative paragraph it was because the Diplomatic Conference is a sovereign conference which will decide on its own procedures and we wished to leave it to that conference to determine its own programme of work.
Finally, while I have this opportunity, I should like to express the satisfaction of the Swedish delegation that so many of those delegations which felt obliged to abstain from voting on this draft resolution have made explanations of vote today in which they have declared their positive interest in this important issue and their intention to participate in the consideration of it during the forthcoming Diplomatic Conference.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of the Netherlands in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. WEDERBURG (Netherlands): In regard to the statement just made by the representative of Sweden, my delegation must express its deep apologies. His delegation indeed showed a real spirit of compromise during the long negotiations on the draft resolution on napalm. It brought forward the draft resolution which has been accepted by the great majority in the Committee and for which we were pleased to vote. If the text had been somewhat better, we would have co-sponsored it.

We really must thank the Swedish delegation for its activities in bringing this very important problem before the Committee. When our delegation spoke of some lack of willingness on the part of the group of co-sponsors to move towards the view of some important countries here, we were certainly not thinking of Sweden or of many of the other co-sponsors, and I sincerely regret that we did not make this clearer in our explanation of vote.

The CHAIRMAN: The position with regard to our programme of work for tomorrow is the following.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.662, on which a postponement of the vote was requested, should be ready to be voted upon tomorrow.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.665 has financial implications, and the Secretariat has assured me that the statement on those financial implications will be ready tomorrow. I take it, therefore, that we shall be able to vote on the draft resolution tomorrow.

There are to be further consultations on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653/Rev.1. I hope that by tomorrow it will be clearer whether it will be possible to arrive at a compromise text, and, if so, when. In that connexion, I would inform members that the Committee could continue its consideration of disarmament items on Monday, 6 November.
The statement on the financial implications of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.655 will be available tomorrow, and it should therefore be possible to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution.

Item 32 concerning the World Disarmament Conference is still outstanding and it will have to be taken up at a later stage.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.