Twenty-eighth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 12 November 1973, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. BORCH (Denmark)
Rapporteur: Mr. de SOTO (Peru)

- Economic and social consequence of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security [29] (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference [32] (continued)
- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [33] (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General [34] (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [35] (continued)

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The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.
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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMAMENTS RACE AND ITS EXTREMELY HARMFUL EFFECTS ON WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY

WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/8990 and Add.1, A/9033, A/9041, A/9228)

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NAPALM AND OTHER INCENDIARY WEAPONS AND ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE:

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(a) REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9141)
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DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (A/9029; A/C.1/L.555)

THE CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce that Kuwait, Iran, Yugoslavia, and the Philippines have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.655 on agenda item 38 - Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

I now call on the representative of Sri Lanka to introduce that draft resolution.

MR. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): Despite the short notice, Mr. Chairman, I have decided to accede to your wish and to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.655 this morning on behalf of its 14 co-sponsors.
Before coming to the draft resolution itself, I should like to dwell — I hope briefly — on the issues involved in the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, as that will enable representatives to appreciate the purpose of the draft resolution which we have presented today and which is essentially a procedural one.

The principal issues which are involved in the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and on which there should be some measure of agreement primarily among the littoral and hinterland States for the purpose of consultations and negotiations with the permanent members of the Security Council and the other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean as contemplated in an earlier resolution are the following.

First, are all the essential elements of the Declaration acceptable to the littoral and hinterland States and, if not, what modifications are required? The essential elements of the Declaration as contained in resolution 2832 (XXVI) are twofold: first, the content of the concept; and secondly, the means of translating it into reality. As regards the content of the concept, it would require that

"Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations." (General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), para. 3 (a))

Subject to that limitation and the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations should remain unaffected, as is stated in operative paragraph 3 (b) of resolution 2832 (XXVI). By inference, therefore, the free and unrestricted passage, or even presence, of warships and military aircraft through and in the Indian Ocean is permitted, provided there is no threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States. The realization of the concept requires, first, the acceptance of a system of universal collective security without military alliances; and, secondly, the strengthening of international security through regional and other co-operation. The main question that arises is whether those two principles are acceptable, and if so, what conditions, if any, should be stipulated.
The second question that we are faced with is: what system of international security through regional and other co-operation would induce the parties concerned to accept the concept of the peace zone. In regard to the means of translating this concept into reality, we have to deal with those means by which the area is to be transformed into a zone of peace: namely, first of all by the halting of further escalation and further expansion of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean and, secondly, the elimination from the area of all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. That is clearly stated in operative paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 2632 (XXVI).

If these two means of realizing the concept and bringing it to fulfilment are agreed upon, there would also have to be agreement on the necessity for the following steps: first of all, the assumption by the littoral and hinterland States of a commitment to a policy of denuclearization, the renunciation of the nuclear weapon option -- and I emphasize the word "renunciation", because the verbatim record of my statement had "the denunciation of the use of force", so I hope "renunciation" will not be confused with "denunciation" on this occasion -- and the assumption of the obligation to deny the use of our territories -- that is, the territories of the littoral and hinterland States -- to the nuclear weapons of other States.

Secondly, this responsibility must be accepted, in our opinion as an earnest of the good faith of the littoral and hinterland States, if they are to be considered justified in calling upon the nuclear Powers to assume the obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in the area. There again, as an earnest of good faith and genuine commitment to the peace zone concept, the littoral and hinterland States should agree to renounce the threat or use of force against any other State in the region, without any limitation on the right of self-defence.
In the absence of such a commitment on the part of the littoral and hinterland States there would be no reason for any State in the region to place any reliance on the system of universal collective security or to renounce its right to ensure its security through a military alliance with a great Power.

Next, the freedom of the high seas for peaceful purposes must be unconditionally guaranteed. We must ask ourselves the question whether the military or naval presence of any great Power would be necessary to ensure freedom of navigation if the concept of peace zones is accepted by all.

Next, the elimination of all foreign bases and foreign military installations from the area should be the ultimate objective. As a first step, all outsiders must be called upon not to establish new bases or expand or enlarge existing ones.

Another question that arises is whether the presence of establishments and installations, as technological devices designed solely to detect the existence or presence of nuclear submarines or any other armaments of mass destruction, but incapable themselves of being used for offensive purposes, is consistent with the concept of the peace zone. The devices we have in mind are sea-bed installed sonar devices.

In regard to definitions, we must ask ourselves how the peace zone should be defined, both in territorial and in geographical terms. Should the first stage be to declare a certain area of the Indian Ocean -- for example, the area outside the agreed width of the territorial sea, such as 12 miles -- to be the peace zone, and to proceed later with attempts to extend the peace zone to cover the entire Indian Ocean in the cartographical sense? Would the definition adopted in the sea-bed denuclearization Treaty for a denuclearized zone serve as a working basis or starting point, with or without modifications? We must also find definitions for terms and expressions such as "foreign military bases" and "context of great Power rivalry".

My delegation inclines to the view that in the initial stages there is no need to attempt to seek agreement upon legal definitions, which would be necessary only at the treaty stage, if, it is to be hoped, that is reached, but certainly not in the earlier, consultative stages.
It might be noted, for instance, that the whole policy of non-alignment is founded on the concept of the avoidance of military alliances conceived in the context of great Power rivalry; and if that expression could have been used without a more precise definition for the purpose of establishing the foundations of the foreign policy of that large group of countries which constitute the non-aligned group, there should be no need for us to aim at more explicit definitions of the term "context of great Power rivalry" for our present purpose.

The position of islands under colonial domination would need special attention. We should ask ourselves whether the use of such dependent Territories or even areas of land in the Indian Ocean where there is no permanent or indigenous population should be ruled out for the military purposes of the metropolitan or ruling Power. Finally, we must ask ourselves how far the States of the region are prepared to go as an earnest of their good faith to accede to existing international conventions on arms control, such as the non-proliferation Treaty and the sea-bed denuclearization Treaty, despite all their limitations.

May I now come to the draft resolution itself.

The preambular paragraphs merely recall the earlier resolutions and reaffirm the conviction that action in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security, and refer to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which is before this Committee.

Operative paragraph 1:

"Urges all States to accept the principles and objectives contained in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (resolution 2832 (XXVI)) (resolution 2832 (XXVI)), as a constructive contribution to the strengthening of regional and international security;". (A/C.1/L.655)

We thought it necessary to introduce this paragraph because the Declaration itself did not secure full acceptance by the Committee, or acceptance by the whole Committee.
Operative paragraph 2:

"2. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work, to carry out consultations in accordance with its mandate and to report with recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session;". (Ibid.)

This follows a very sound precedent -- that of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, which was first asked to make a study, and then asked to make recommendations.
Operative paragraph 3:

Urges all States and especially the major Powers to extend their cooperation to the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions.

(\textit{ibid.})

We hope this time that this appeal will not fall on deaf ears as it has in the past.

Operative paragraph 4:

Requests the Secretary General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee. (\textit{ibid.})

Operative paragraph 5 supplies an omission that has hampered the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during the first year of its existence, that is, it decides to provide summary records of its proceedings.

Next, I come to the most important operative paragraph of all, operative paragraph 6, which:

"Requests the Secretary General to prepare a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, and with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry." (\textit{ibid.})

This is really a repetition of the sense of the concept as set out in resolution 2632 (XXVI).

Operative paragraph 7 suggests how the Secretary General should set about this task and:

"Recommends that the statement should be based on available material and prepared with the assistance of qualified experts and competent bodies selected by the Secretary General." (\textit{ibid.})

Operative paragraph 8:

"Requests that the statement be transmitted to the Ad Hoc Committee at an early date, and, if possible, by 31 March 1974; as the Ad Hoc Committee will need to have it by that date if it is to consider it carefully and make recommendations in time for consideration by the next session of the General Assembly."
Finally, operative paragraph 9:

"Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session the item entitled 'Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace'" (ibid.)

The factual statement must be as comprehensive as possible. We need to have a clear picture of the military, including the naval situation in the area. Here I should state that shore establishments cannot be ignored, but there is no question of any attempt at limiting the sovereignty of any country in the maintenance of such establishments as it considers necessary for its own security, but not for offensive or aggressive purposes. Naval deployments are necessarily the major problem and their rapid expansion in recent times is a principal concern of our anxiety. They are a manifestation of the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean. The Declaration was designed essentially to arrest that development and perhaps to reverse it. The Declaration refers to foreign military bases. If the peace zone concept is to become a reality, littoral and hinterland States must not allow foreign military bases to be established within their territories under the cloak of the host country's security and defence requirements.

As I have said earlier, a comprehensive study is necessary if we are to take the correct decisions. It would not commit any nation, any Member, to any part of its contents, but is merely intended to serve as a guide to the Organization in determining what should or should not be permitted within the concept of the peace zone.

The Secretary General is authorized to rely on available material and on the assistance of qualified and competent bodies selected by him. This may appear to be an unduly heavy and invidious responsibility. But I would suggest that Members which are interested should lighten the Secretary-General's burden and relieve him of any embarrassment that might be caused by the choice of any particular body as competent or any particular expert as qualified, by proffering him advice with regard to the selection of experts and competent bodies.
We would also expect the Secretary General to consult the Governments concerned as necessary. We did not make express reference to this in the draft resolution as we felt it would be redundant in the light of operative paragraph 3, which:

"Urges all States and especially the major Powers to extend their co-operation to the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions" (ibid.)

As the preparation of the study is intended to help the Committee to discharge its functions, it follows by inference that States and especially major Powers are being called upon to extend their co-operation to the Secretary-General in the preparation of the study.

One thing we wish to make absolutely clear is that we would not hold the Secretary-General and the Secretariat responsible in the least degree for the opinions stated and the facts furnished by experts and competent bodies. If any Member has any doubts on that point I should like to disabuse him with regard to it. It is for the General Assembly to decide what value should be attached to any portions of the study and what use is to be made of it.

We trust that this draft resolution will be accepted for what it is intended to be, namely, a purely procedural one.

I should like at this point to draw attention to paragraph 65 of the Political Declaration of the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Algiers in September of this year. It reads as follows:

"The Heads of State or Government welcome the adoption by the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and the setting up by the United Nations of an ad hoc committee to consider the measures aimed at implementing the Declaration. They consider that action designed to promote the objectives of the Declaration will contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. They urge all Powers to co-operate in order to achieve the objectives of the implementation of this resolution."

We trust, therefore, that at least the non-aligned nations will appreciate that our present course of action is completely consistent with that part of the non-aligned political Declaration and will have no difficulty in supporting it. We also expect support, naturally, from others.
The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the Committee that Guyana, Nepal, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.655, and Guyana has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653.

I have also been asked to announce that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 will meet at 4 p.m. today in Conference Room 1.
I hope that members of the Committee will agree that my efforts have been directed towards enabling the Committee to adhere as strictly as possible to the time-table that was drawn up at the beginning of the session. Under that time-table, our consideration of the disarmament items was to be concluded by 13 or 14 November. It might appear that the old diplomatic saying 'Surtout point de salle' was rather à propos here, but I think we all realize that, apart from the discussions in this conference room, extensive consultations have been going on all the time in regard to draft resolutions that have not yet been presented, as well as on those that are already before the Committee.

Hence, I think we shall now have to revise our programme of work somewhat, and for that purpose I should like to sum up the position, as I see it, on each of the agenda items now before us.

On agenda item 29, 'Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security', I am informed that a draft resolution has been submitted this morning and that the co-sponsors will be ready to introduce it at the meeting this afternoon. Unless some members feel that they need more than 24 hours to study the text, we could proceed to vote on it tomorrow.

On agenda item 32, 'World Disarmament Conference', and agenda item 33, 'General and complete disarmament', negotiations and consultations are still going on with regard to draft resolutions that might be submitted to the Committee, and it therefore appears that it will not be possible to conclude our consideration of those items by either 13 or 14 November.

On agenda item 34, 'Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use', there is a draft resolution before the Committee in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1. As I have announced, the co-sponsors of that text will be meeting this afternoon, and it is possible that they will wish to make some changes in the text. If they are not extensive changes, it may still be possible to vote on the draft resolution tomorrow and conclude our consideration of this item. In that connexion I should be glad to hear the views of the co-sponsors.
On agenda item 35, 'Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons', the Committee has before it the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.653. I have, however, been informed that negotiations are continuing on that text and it appears unlikely that we shall be able to proceed to vote by either 13 or 14 November.

On agenda item 36, 'Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests', two draft resolutions -- in documents A/C.1/L.651 and A/C.1/L.652 -- are before the Committee and have been formally introduced by their co-sponsors. I had thought it would be possible to put both of those texts to the vote today, but some members have requested that the one in document A/C.1/L.652 should not be voted on today. I should therefore like to hear the opinion of members on how we should proceed with regard to this item.

On agenda item 37, 'Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco)', the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.654 is before the Committee and has been formally introduced. The co-sponsors have requested that it not be put to the vote today, but I would hope that we can proceed to the vote tomorrow.

On agenda item 38, 'Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace', the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.655 has just been introduced by Ambassador Amerasinghe. I do not know how much time will be needed to discuss it and, furthermore, it has financial implications that will have to be put before the Committee by the Secretariat. Hence, in this case too, it does not appear likely that we shall be able to conclude our discussion and proceed to the vote by 13 or 14 November.

From the foregoing it appears obvious that we shall not be able to conclude our consideration of the majority of the disarmament items by either 13 or 14 November. I should therefore like to suggest that we suspend our debate on the outstanding disarmament items at the end of the meeting tomorrow afternoon, 13 November, and that we start our consideration of the Korean question on Wednesday, 14 November. We would devote the meetings from 14 to 21 November to the Korean question. During that time the disarmament experts -- who, I assume will not be participating in the discussions on the Korean question -- could finalize the draft
resolutions on the outstanding disarmament items, and we would then revert to those disarmament items at the meetings on Thursday morning, 22 November (that is Thanksgiving Day and there will be no meeting in the afternoon) and Friday, 23 November. Once we had concluded the consideration of the outstanding disarmament items, we would of course take up the Korean question where we had left off on Wednesday, 21 November.

I should be glad to hear any comments that members might wish to make on that suggested programme of work.
Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that your proposal to postpone the voting until 22 November is the most advisable approach. Delegations would then have sufficient time to hold the necessary consultations, and they would be prepared on 22 November to vote on all the draft resolutions that were presented. I think your approach is the most practical and advisable one.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, we regret that at times we seem to have to complicate your problems. We are very aware of the magnificent way in which you have run the Committee and we are very appreciative. However, unfortunately, we are not ready to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652. We hope to have instructions by tomorrow. This obviously is a most important item -- it is certainly very important for my Government -- and we would appreciate it greatly if the consideration of the item could be deferred until we are prepared to vote. We also feel that the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.651 and A/C.1/L.652 should be considered together. They are on the same subject. Many of the explanations of vote will deal with both draft resolutions and I think that it would be more orderly to consider them together.

Once again, I apologize to you, Mr. Chairman, for the trouble that we are having, but this is an extremely important matter and we hope that our instructions will make possible a constructive result.

I think that your suggestion about voting on 22 and 23 November is a very wise one, and the United States would be delighted to go along with your ideas on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to ask the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.654, under agenda item 37, whether that text will be ready for a vote tomorrow. I do not think it will be possible to start our debate on the Korean question until Wednesday, since the representatives who will be participating in that debate probably will not be prepared to speak until then. I therefore hope that we shall be able to use the meetings this afternoon and tomorrow to good purpose by proceeding to vote at least on those draft resolutions on which members are prepared to take a decision.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I think that it might be ready by tomorrow afternoon. If the result of the conversations that are being held at the moment by the co-sponsors and a number of other delegations would indicate the need to circulate a revision, I can assure the Committee, however, that the changes would be somewhat slight as far as the substance is concerned. Of that I can assure you, Mr. Chairman. I doubt whether any delegation would necessarily invoke the 24-hour rule for them. My impression would be that that document could be ready by tomorrow afternoon. Furthermore, as the Committee knows full well, in these cases it is very difficult at times to set oneself up as a prophet. I could, of course, not guarantee that that would be the case.
The CHAIRMAN: I would ask the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 whether my hope is well founded that any revisions which may be made will be for the purpose of gaining greater support in the Committee. If that is the case and if the text could be finalized today, perhaps we could dispense with the 24-hour rule.

Mr. ECKERBERG (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, as you yourself announced a few minutes ago, the co-sponsors of that draft resolution are supposed to meet at 4 o'clock this afternoon. It is very difficult for me to say in advance what the result of that meeting will be and whether we will present a revision. But I can inform the Committee that intensive consultations are going on about this draft resolution with a view to meeting some points of view that delegations outside the circle of the co-sponsors have presented; in other words, our purpose is to try to gain as wide adherence as possible to the draft resolution.

In the view of the Swedish delegation, it is rather unlikely that the draft resolution would be ready for a vote tomorrow morning. But, again, the reason for this would be very constructive, I hope.

The CHAIRMAN: Are there any representatives who feel strongly about having a vote on the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.651 and A/C.1/L.652 today or tomorrow? I would also ask the co-sponsors whether they are ready to accept a postponement of the vote. As representatives have heard, there has been one request for the postponement of the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652, at least for today.

Mr. BARTON (Canada): We are prepared to accept a delay. On the other hand, if by tomorrow we are in a position to report that there is no reason for not voting, then perhaps we could consider that as a possibility tomorrow afternoon. I would not want to rule out the possibility if it should prove feasible.

My second question relates to the suggestion which you, Mr. Chairman, made about voting on the 22nd and 23rd. My only question is that if, as
happened, in our own debate, there are slack periods in the Korean debate that would permit us to schedule this earlier, I would hope that we would take advantage of that opportunity if we were ready to proceed at that time.

The CHAIRMAN: I am quite aware of the special composition of the First Committee when we discuss disarmament, and I should not like to hold any of the representatives in New York longer than is absolutely necessary. Therefore, if there should be a pause before 22 November because of a lack of speakers on the question of Korea, and if there is no objection by those most interested in that question, we can certainly hold a meeting on the disarmament items and dispose of any draft resolutions that are ready to be voted upon.

There is one representative whose name is on the list of speakers for this meeting. He wishes to address himself to two of the draft resolutions. I suggest that we hear him and then finalize our deliberations on the programme of work.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The purpose of my statement -- which is going to be very brief -- is to refer to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652, which is one that we would very much like to support. However, we should like to point out what we feel is some inconsistency in it. It gives a sense of urgency, no doubt, in its preambular part. The co-sponsors are "distressed" with the situation, complaining that although the intent expressed in the partial test-ban Treaty, which was reiterated in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to carry out negotiations to this end, the nuclear-weapon States party to these Treaties have not yet engaged in the active negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and that States party to these Treaties continue to test nuclear weapons underground".

Therefore, this is really of great concern, the fact that no negotiations have been started at all or carried out, that nuclear tests underground continue, with all the consequences of which we are aware. And this, according
to this draft resolution -- I know nothing apart from this draft resolution -- has been going on for 10 years. Meanwhile, atmospheric testing continues, because the underground tests are going on.

This draft resolution, with a sense of legitimate urgency also, calls upon the 'nuclear-weapon States to seek, as a matter of urgency, the end of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments' and "insists" -- and I join them in insisting -- "that the nuclear-weapon States which have been carrying out nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere discontinue such tests forthwith". This is a consistent sense of urgency. Then it "Urges States which have not yet adhered to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to do so without further delay".

Then we go to paragraph 5, which "Reminds the States Members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, especially those which are nuclear-weapon States and parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, etc.", "of their particular responsibility immediately to start negotiations for elaborating a treaty designed to achieve, etc.".

Therefore, it is a consistent urgency to do these things immediately and to bring them to a conclusion, of course, immediately, not merely to start them and go on for ever.

Then in paragraph 6 it "Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament", the body which is responsible for this, "to continue, as a matter of highest priority, its deliberations". But at the end, to do what? "... and to submit a special report". That is what we asked them last year, what we asked them the year before, and nothing more. Therefore, the whole sense of urgency drops into almost nothingness because, if we just ask them for a special report, they can go on elaborating and presenting reports indefinitely.
Therefore, my suggestion is this. We realize and appreciate the interest shown by the co-sponsors and we also realize the genuine interest of the nuclear Power States parties to the partial test ban Treaty. There is no doubt that they want to have a treaty. They know the consequences of not having a comprehensive test ban treaty and they must want it. But we find that for some reason or other this General Assembly has to instil a sense of urgency and urge them, as far as possible, to do it quickly. Therefore my submission is that operative paragraph 6, which requests the Conference to continue its deliberations and then to submit a special report, should be reworded to read: 'to submit with a sense of urgency a draft treaty to the General Assembly'. That will be consistent with the previous parts of this draft resolution and would really mean something, namely that this year there is a little more sense of urgency than in previous years.

I do not submit this as a formal amendment at this juncture but I should like to submit it as a proposal to the parties concerned and to the sponsors of the draft resolution.

Mr. AMRASINGHE (Sri Lanka): My delegation, too, wishes to make some observations on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.652.

Last year we took up the position that condemnation of atmospheric testing alone ignored the main problem, which is the means of avoiding the threat of nuclear annihilation. We abstained on resolution 2934 (XXVII) on that occasion because it called upon all States which had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and meanwhile to refrain from testing in the environments covered by the Treaty, that is, the atmosphere, outer space and under water. But it gave those who were conducting underground tests the option of either suspending those tests or curtailing them. We considered, and still consider, such a distinction to be unjustifiable, and for that reason we withheld our support from that resolution.

Let me state quite clearly that we are not indifferent to the threat of radioactive contamination, but the distinction that continues to be drawn between underground testing and atmospheric testing ignores the political and strategic
Implications that are involved. In introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652 of 7 November 1973, the representative of Canada stated that the draft had been criticized on the ground that it was discriminatory and that it placed the emphasis on atmospheric tests. He sought to rebut the argument. It is rarely that we find ourselves in disagreement with our Canadian friends, but this is one of those unfortunate occasions where we cannot accept his explanation or his disclaimer. The form of words used in regard to underground testing, on the one hand, and atmospheric testing, on the other, may be different but the difference does not conceal the fact that there are some delegations which are content with expressing concern over underground testing and with making remonstrances over such testing but which accept it as inevitable and therefore seem to resign themselves to it, even on the tenth anniversary of the unfulfilled pledge of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

At the same time these very delegations adopt a most peremptory tone in their attitude towards atmospheric testing. In the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652, operative paragraph 2 calls anew for the end of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, while in operative paragraph 3 it singles out atmospheric testing and insists that it be discontinued forthwith. Why is there no insistence on the cessation of underground tests? Is it because there is a test-ban Treaty which does not prohibit underground testing but outlaws atmospheric testing? This difference in emphasis and approach is, in our opinion, blatantly discriminatory.

The fact that the partial test-ban Treaty does not prohibit underground tests does not absolve us of our clear duty to make an equally peremptory demand for the immediate cessation of all underground testing. We are required by the draft resolution to be insistent with regard to the cessation of atmospheric testing, but to be almost apologetic and definitely complacent in our approach to those who conduct underground tests, the results of which are manifested in the astronomical proportions of their nuclear arsenals and their destructive capacity. The legal argument—if that is what it claims to be—for not insisting on the cessation of underground testing is totally untenable and at best a lame excuse. It legitimizes and condones an omission which was deliberately designed
by certain major Powers to reserve to themselves the unqualified and unrestricted right to carry out underground nuclear tests and to establish thereby an overwhelming superiority over all others so that the rest of the world would be subservient to their combined will -- whenever they could combine -- and bow to their joint arbitrament. This is not the royal road to a stable world order.

The fate of mankind is no safer because it depends on two buttons than it would be if it depended on three or four. It will be safe only if all the buttons were destroyed. The reasoning of those who discriminate between the two types of testing is dangerously faulty and fallacious. The partial test-ban Treaty has proved to be a snare from which we can escape only by petition and prayer addressed to the most powerful nations. The two architects of that Treaty have found unwitting accomplices in a policy of perpetuating their special privilege. The intentions and motives of the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/6.1/L.552 are unquestionably impeccable. Many of them have worked tirelessly and conscientiously to secure an end to all nuclear and thermonuclear tests, but we are compelled to disagree with their approach.

As we object to this discriminatory approach we shall call for a separate vote on operative paragraph 3 and abstain on it but we shall support the draft resolution as a whole because we share and respect the almost universal concern over atmospheric testing. We must repeat that nothing short of a four point programme with regard to the production and use of nuclear weapons will eliminate the menace that we are trying to avert.
As we stated both in the general debate in the General Assembly and in the disarmament debate here on 8 November, this four-point commitment must be: first, a total and unqualified renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons and here I must point out that the verbatim record in document A/C.1/PV.1953 on page 91 of the English version, reports me as having mentioned "a total and unqualified denunciation of the use of nuclear weapons". That is a most unfortunate error which changes the whole meaning of my proposal; an error more serious than another one that appears on that same page where the verbatim record refers to part of a quotation and mentions "a fishmonger's lap" where it should have said "a fishmonger's slab". It would take a very solid lap to accommodate a fish while it was being cut, and if it were so solid it could serve a much better purpose.

The other three measures proposed by us as part of this four-point programme were: secondly, a comprehensive test-ban treaty; thirdly, a total cessation of the manufacture of all nuclear weapons; and finally the dismantling of the nuclear arsenals of all those who possess them.

We would commend this programme to the non-aligned group in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and hope that others outside the non-aligned group will see their way to promoting its acceptance.

Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (interpretation from French): I have just listened carefully to the statements made by the representatives of Cyprus and Sri Lanka. In turn I too should like to speak to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652 before us. Some continue to carry out underground tests, others carry out tests in the atmosphere. The advantages or disadvantages of each type give rise to discussions into which I do not at the moment wish to enter. However, the draft resolution on which we will have to vote uses quite different terms when qualifying the types of tests, and with regard to each of these provides equally different steps. The previous speakers, the representatives of Cyprus and Sri Lanka, have also stressed how these formulations also have appeared to them as discriminatory and I believe I too should make some comments.
My first comment is that the techniques used to carry out experimental explosions have to be placed upon a scrupulously equal footing if we think of what the aim of our work on disarmament ought to be, namely, the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the cessation of all tests. May I recall that the States that co-sponsored the Moscow Treaty were fully aware of the difficulty in which they were placed by the fact that they would preserve their technological progress, and even increase it, through underground testing. They themselves admitted that there would still exist an urge to produce nuclear weapons so long as a treaty on complete and controlled nuclear disarmament was not signed. In doing so they recognized that the equality of means of defence was still the main principle underlying international relations. But what have they done for 10 years? They have not been able even to bring together the five nuclear Powers, as France had proposed, or to arrive at an equality in disarmament that might be the only decisive type of progress achieved.

In my previous statement of 1 November I said, and you will forgive me if I repeat myself:

"... France is thinking only of its own defence. However, it does not see how anyone could ask it to make a unilateral sacrifice. It does not see why something which was good for some only a short while ago should now have become bad for others. Any renunciation in this area would be tantamount to encouraging the over-armed nations to govern the world and to assume themselves the destiny of mankind -- an eventuality which they themselves reject and which we must help them to reject."

(1943rd meeting, pages 41 and 42)

I believe that this is the rule with which we must comply: whether it is a question of the stocks of weapons or the tests preparing for the manufacture of the arms.

But to go back to the two types of tests that are mentioned in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652, I wish to say that these two types of tests are in exactly the same situation as regards what science says or omits to say. A number of speakers have admitted that the perfectly clear conclusions of the Scientific Committee on the effects of atomic radiation should be taken into account. Others contend that these conclusions are insufficient. According to them, there may be unknown dangers which the experts have not as yet been able to detect. To
those who adduce this argument I would ask them whether we might not say the same about underground testing, testing which science today also declares to be not dangerous. Are not the mysterious structures of the earth as little known as are those of the atmosphere, if not more so? Who is to guarantee what science tomorrow will say regarding these matters or regarding the release of gases that accompany underground testing. Incidentally, I should add that present-day underground explosions are by far the most powerful and the most numerous and that they allow the perfecting of offensive weapons of increasing power. There have been 394 since 5 August 1963, as against 43 tests in the atmosphere -- that is to say, approximately a ratio of 10 to 1. Surely that proves the intensive competition on which the technologically advanced countries have embarked.

In my statement of 1 November I also stated that the nuclear policy of France was not a question of prestige or status, and even less a gratuitous assertion of national pride. Today I add that in as serious a matter as that of our defence we are not imbued by the pride of a pioneer. Our experts are not the inventors of what Oppenheimer called the "technological hypnosis" in which he saw the very expression of the essential immorality of research applied to the development of weapons of mass destruction.
The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652 that we have before us, and
on which I shall now speak in greater detail, is incomplete and partial.
Unnecessarily different terms are used when discussing two undertakings that are
in principle identical. Its preamble invokes the danger of radio-active
contamination when speaking of atmospheric tests, but does not at any moment
refer to the work of the Scientific Committee. It passes over in silence,
in conditions that I fail to explain to myself, the reports of an important
and highly respected body of our Organization of which some of the co-sponsors
are active and very well-informed members. Could it be because those reports
too obviously contradict the stories that many have believed and that some are still
invoking?

But let us look at the operative part. Here again we find the same imbalance
perhaps somewhat disguised by the first two paragraphs which cover all tests,
and the second of which Calls anew upon all nuclear-weapon States to seek, as
a matter of urgency, the end of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments." But
why does it say 'to seek, as a matter of urgency, the end' and not 'put an
immediate stop to'? The reply is given us in paragraph 3 that deals with
atmospheric tests. It is these tests that must be discontinued forthwith. The
underground tests are dealt with entirely differently in paragraph 5, where it
merely reminds the two States responsible "of their particular responsibility
immediately to start negotiations."

The co-sponsors of the draft resolution justify this discrimination by
the fact that the Powers carrying out underground tests are already parties to
a treaty prohibiting those that have adhered to it from carrying out atmospheric
tests. But this purely juridical reasoning does not convince me. As I said
before, it cheapens the hopes expressed in the text itself and according to
which non-signatory States would still be urged to undertake atmospheric tests
as long as an end has not been put to all testing. But primarily it overlooks
the political conditions in which the agreement, or should I call it the
bilateral compromise, was concluded between the two main signatories. Our
Committee deals with political questions, and therefore we are led to ask
ourselves whether the super-Powers have a political will to put an end to
tests which, as far as they are concerned, would appear today to be superfluous.
If we believe this political will to be lacking, if we find that the Powers I am referring to adapt themselves very easily to a situation that in fact consolidates their domination, then the disappointment expressed in the draft resolution is a very weak word. Other provisions could be imagined, thus, for example, those calling upon them once and for all to put an end to their testing, to be ready to negotiate immediately the final régime that is to be applied in the matter. Although the draft resolution submitted by Mexico on this point did not go into the subject-matter any further than does the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652, it does at least possess the merit of logic, balance and, I would say, courage.

I have just spoken of the subject-matter. What is the subject-matter? Would it not have been more normal for the criticism of the dangers and the responsibilities to follow the logical course of events? The cause of the tests and of nuclear weapons, that is to say, of the threats facing mankind, is due clearly to the fact that, at a certain moment in history, two Powers decided to endow themselves with nuclear weaponry. France has done nothing but draw conclusions from their conduct. We are in no way responsible for the appearance of what has been termed the balance of terror. We do not wish to catch the immoral fever of which I have spoken. But, aware of the profound truth of the principle according to which you only find what you seek, we constantly call for research, and human inventiveness to cease to be oriented along such terrifying lines as those that develop atomic weaponry. The States that were first to enter this infernal circle cannot be freed of their primary responsibilities. Therefore it is to them that the most urgent appeals should have been addressed. I am sorry that the sponsors of the draft resolution before us did not observe the necessary priorities, and I trust that we shall not be the only ones not to approve a text that gives an inaccurate picture of our present problems and dangers.

Mr. NISHIBORI (Japan): I would have wished to postpone my statement until a later date, but having heard the interventions of the representatives of Cyprus Sri Lanka and France, I have changed my mind. I would now like to offer a brief explanation of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652, of which my country is a co-sponsor, under agenda item 36, 'Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests".
Japan has consistently first, opposed all nuclear weapon tests by any country, and second, striven to realize a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date.

Regarding point one, I wish to point out that Japan expressed the strongest objections to the atmospheric tests which have recently been conducted, one after the other, by two of the nuclear-weapon States, and requested these two States to discontinue their tests immediately and to accede to the partial test-ban Treaty. I would also point out that a resolution was adopted in the Japanese Diet last July expressing opposition to all nuclear weapons tests, in accordance with the unmistakable sentiments of the Japanese Government and people.

As for the second point, my country has been making efforts, through the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the frequent tripartite meetings of experts from Canada, Sweden and Japan, to overcome the unavoidable problem of verification. I use the word "unavoidable" because of a certain country which, in the case of the non-proliferation Treaty, insisted on on-site inspection of non-nuclear weapon States, but, in the case of the proposed comprehensive test-ban Treaty, refused to accept the same on-site inspection on its territory.
The verification problem is a major obstacle to the realization of a comprehensive test ban. However, Japan is seeking to improve the level of detection of underground tests by means of seismological readings outside the territory of the Government concerned. During the spring session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation proposed the holding of informal meetings of delegates, with experts participating, to expedite the solution of verification problems. These meetings took place during the summer session, and their usefulness has been acknowledged in this Committee by many representatives. I would point out also that the United Kingdom and the United States, that are nuclear-weapon States, delegated experts to participate, and that they made valuable contributions to the success of the informal meetings.

Statements made in this Committee by many representatives indicate that their countries share our views on this very important item, the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, and I feel much encouraged. The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652, which is before the Committee, has been submitted by a number of countries, including Canada, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, and represents the views of a great many others.

The draft resolution, among other things:

"Calls anew upon all nuclear-weapon States to seek, as a matter of urgency, the end of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments;
"Insists that the nuclear-weapon States, which have been carrying out nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, discontinue such tests forthwith; and
"Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of highest priority, its deliberations on /a comprehensive test ban treaty." (A/C.1/L.652)

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652 expresses the desires of a great number of countries, including my own, in a restrained manner.

The co-sponsors of this draft resolution include such countries as Australia, New Zealand and Fiji, and this shows that the two draft resolutions of last year have been merged into a single draft resolution. This success is due mainly to the tireless efforts of the Canadian delegation, headed by Ambassador Barton, and I wish to pay that delegation my highest tribute. This success shows the results
that quiet and persistent efforts may bring about. Having said that, I wish to repeat and join in the statement by Ambassador Barton, when he said in this Committee on 9 November:

"... may I express our hope that the vote on this draft resolution will provide a convincing demonstration of the will of the General Assembly on this important issue." (1954th meeting, p. 13-15)

Mr. BARTON (Canada): I had not expected to speak again this morning, but it seems, on the basis of what we have heard, that some of the explanations that I thought I had conveyed when I introduced the draft resolution on Friday were not understood, and I would like just to go over again the points that I made.

Ten years ago, this Assembly and most of the nations of the world recognized that even if the five nuclear Powers could not find agreement on terms to stop all testing, there was a pressing need to protect the atmosphere, and it was on the basis of that understanding and that comprehension that we negotiated the Partial Test-Ban Treaty.

We believe that that judgement is still correct. We want all tests to stop, and we want all nuclear Powers to reach agreement on a treaty to that end. But we have learned that, although 130 nations may propose, the other five do the disposing.

In the meantime, we still believe atmospheric pollution should stop and that the testing programmes of those countries that now carry them out in the atmosphere have gone on long enough, and, if they insist on carrying them on, should be able to go underground too. This does not mean we want underground testing to go on, but if the nuclear Powers cannot be persuaded to agree on how this can be stopped, at least the danger of atmospheric tests can be removed.
The CHAIRMAN: As no delegation has pressed for a vote today on the draft resolutions before us, I take it that the members of the Committee agree that our programme of work should be the following:

That we should hold no meeting this afternoon or tomorrow morning -- and here I would add the pious hope that the time will be utilized instead to hasten the work on the draft resolutions;

That we should schedule a meeting for tomorrow afternoon, at which we would hope -- and I think with some confidence -- that we might be able to conclude our discussion of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.654, relating to the Treaty of Tlatelolco;

That we should look into the possibility of voting tomorrow afternoon on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650, in its latest revised form, without of course pressing for a vote if any delegation should not desire it;

That, in the same manner and on the same understanding, we should see whether we can bring the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.651 and 652 to a final decision;

That we should, in any case, then postpone the consideration of agenda items 29, 32, 33, 35 and 38,

That we should try to take up draft resolutions -- when they are ready and when sponsors express to the Secretariat or to me a desire for a decision -- whenever there is a pause in the deliberations on the question of Korea;

That if that should prove not to be possible we should, in any case, suspend the debate on Korea by the evening of 21 November, taking up the disarmament questions on the morning of 22 November and, if necessary, continuing the deliberations on those items and the Indian Ocean item on the morning and afternoon of 23 November.

This last suggestion is based, of course, on the supposition that members will be ready to vote by the 22nd or 23rd. I hope it is clearly understood that that is the expectation, at least of the Chairman.
Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, with regard to the order in which you have proposed to take up the draft resolutions to be voted upon, my delegation would like to make one comment.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 is one on which we would be ready to vote tomorrow, as you proposed; but since negotiations are to take place today on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2, it is not possible for us to know whether we will be able to vote tomorrow, since we will not have the text in its newly revised form today. Could you therefore take that into account because of the 24-hour rule with regard to voting?
The CHAIRMAN: I assure the representative of the Soviet Union that nobody will be expected to vote tomorrow on A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2 unless everybody agrees.

Mr. MISHRA (India): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is very appreciative of your efforts to expedite our work on disarmament items and the item on the Indian Ocean. Being one of those who has come from outside New York to take part in the debate, I should like to say a special word of thanks to you on this score.

May I make a suggestion, not a proposal, on the lines of the statement that you have been making, namely, that if we are to take up voting on 22 November then there should be some time limit for the submission of final versions of draft resolutions, say, perhaps, 20 November, which would give us eight days or so. As I said, this is not a formal proposal. Perhaps we can think about it and take a decision on these lines, if it is acceptable to the whole Committee, by tomorrow afternoon when we meet here again.

The CHAIRMAN: I believe that Ambassador Mishra has made a constructive suggestion. Let us think about it and take it up tomorrow afternoon.

As there are no further remarks, I take it that the Committee agrees to the revised programme of work.

The next meeting of the Committee will be held tomorrow afternoon at 3. o'clock.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.