Twenty-eighth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD MEETING

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Chairman: Mr. BORCH (Denmark)
Rapporteur: Mr. de SOTO (Peru)

- Economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security /22/ (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /32/ (continued)
- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /33/ (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General /34/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE AND ITS EXTREMELY HARMFUL EFFECTS ON WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY

WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (A/8990 and Add.1, A/9033, A/9041, A/9228)


(a) REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (A/9141);
(b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9200)

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2935 (XXVII) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF Tlatelolco):

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/9137, A/9209; A/C.1/L.654)

DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (A/9029)

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): In considering an item such as agenda item 37 of the current session of the General Assembly, there are some basic facts that the Committee must keep very much in mind although stating them inevitably implies a certain amount of repetition of what has been said on earlier occasions.

As far as the Treaty of Tlatelolco is concerned -- to which so many representatives have alluded in such complimentary terms in our debates -- it is worth-while recalling that it was the first and, to date, continues to be the only Treaty whereby it has been possible to establish a régime
of complete absence of nuclear weapons applicable to densely inhabited territories; moreover, it was the first multilateral Treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament to establish an international system of control with its own permanent bodies, in addition to making full use of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

With regard to the Latin American free zone established under the Treaty which, once it covers all the territories falling within its scope of application, will encompass an area of something more than 20 million square kilometres, in which, at the present level of population density, approximately 280 million human beings will be living, it is desirable to point out that, as of today, it covers an area of over 8 million square kilometres and a population exceeding 140 million inhabitants.

The United Nations was right when, upon presentation of the Treaty in 1967, it proclaimed, in its resolution 2286 (XXII), that the Treaty "... constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security...".

As regards Additional Protocol II of the Treaty, I should like once again to state clearly that its essential purpose is to ensure that the nuclear Powers observe and respect the status of military demilitarization of the States Parties defined in the Treaty and undertake not to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against those States. In this connexion, there are two points that it is worthwhile emphasizing. On the one hand, is the fact that the obligations embodied in the Protocol are far from representing anything difficult with which to comply since, as stated by the General Assembly in its resolution 2666 (XXV), "... these obligations are entirely in conformity with the general obligations assumed under the Charter of the United Nations, which every Member of the Organization has solemnly undertaken to fulfil in good faith, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter". 
On the other hand, as stated and reaffirmed emphatically by the General Assembly itself in several of its resolutions — in particular resolutions 2830 (XXVI) and 2935 (XXVII), the last two resolutions adopted on the subject,

"... for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol." (General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI))
In the light of the facts that I have just outlined, it is easy to understand why the General Assembly in the five successive resolutions it has adopted since the Treaty of Tlatelolco was opened for signature on 14 February 1967 -- 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2830 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 and 2935 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972 -- felt it necessary to include exhortations to nuclear weapons States concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II.

My delegation which, as representative of the Depository Government of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has always endeavoured to keep the General Assembly duly informed of any new event connected with that Treaty, is happy today to confirm before this Committee news that we do not hesitate to qualify as encouraging and stimulating, since it represents the signature by France and by the People's Republic of China of Additional Protocol II, in fulfilment of the undertaking that their respective Governments assumed in the course of the President of Mexico's visit to those countries in the spring of this year.

Upon proceeding to the signature of the Protocol on 15 July last, the French Government made an interpretative declaration, the text of which I shall now read out:

"(1) The French Government interprets the commitment contained in article 3 of the Protocol in the sense that it does not hinder the full exercise of the right of legitimate defence enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

"(2) The French Government takes note of the interpretation of the Treaty given by the Preparatory Committee and reproduced in the Final Act, according to which the Treaty does not apply to transit, the authorization or prohibition of which falls within the exclusive competence of each State in accordance with the norms and relevant principles of international law.

"(3) The French Government considers that the application of the legislation referred to in article 3 of the Treaty relates to legislation that is in keeping with international law."
"(4) The provisions contained in articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol apply to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as it exists at the time of signature of the Protocol by the French Government. Consequently, no amendment to the Treaty, that would enter into force in accordance with the provisions of article 29 of the Treaty, could be imposed on the French Government without the latter's express consent.

"In the event that this interpretative declaration of the French Government should be challenged in full or in part by one or several of the Contracting Parties to the Treaty or to Protocol II, these instruments would cease to have effect in the relations between the French Republic and the challenging State or States."

The Government of the People's Republic of China, which subscribed to the Protocol one month later, on 21 August, likewise gave an interpretative declaration the main paragraphs of which read as follows:

"The Chinese Government has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and maintained that, as the first step, all nuclear countries should first of all undertake not to use nuclear weapons, particularly not use them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Chinese Government has repeatedly declared that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. On behalf of the Chinese Government, China's Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei gave a specific undertaking in regard to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America on 14 November 1972. The Chinese Government will now reiterate this undertaking: China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone; nor will China test, manufacture, produce, stockpile, install or deploy nuclear weapons in these countries or in this zone, or send her means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons to cross the territory, territorial sea or air space of Latin American countries."
"It is necessary to point out that the signing of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America by the Chinese Government does not imply any change whatsoever in China's principled stand on the disarmament and nuclear weapons issue and, in particular, does not affect the Chinese Government's consistent stand against the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the partial nuclear test ban treaty ..." (A/9137, page 2)
"... The Chinese Government holds that, in order that Latin America may truly become a nuclear-weapon-free zone, all nuclear countries, and particularly the super-Powers which possess huge numbers of nuclear weapons, must first of all undertake earnestly not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, and they must be asked to undertake to observe and implement the following: (1) dismantling of all foreign military bases in Latin America and refraining from establishing any new foreign military bases there; (2) prohibition of the passage of any means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons through Latin American territories, territorial sea or air space." (A/9137, pages 2 and 3)

That, as I say, was from the text of the statement of interpretation of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

With the signature of Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty by France and the People's Republic of China, the number of nuclear-weapon States signatories to that Treaty has risen to four, since, as you may recall, the Protocol had already gone into effect for the United Kingdom and the United States in 1969 and 1971, respectively.

The fact that the two new Governments signatories to the Protocol should have deemed it necessary to give their interpretation of several of the provisions of the Tlatelolco Treaty and of the Protocol itself --- as, incidentally, had been done earlier by the United Kingdom and United States Governments upon subscribing to and ratifying the instrument in question --- appears to us to indicate to the fifth nuclear Power, which has remained completely isolated in its negative attitude, the path that it might desirably follow. In fact, the formulation of so broad and detailed a statement of interpretation as that Government might wish to make regarding those points whose meaning and scope may not appear sufficiently clear would enable it finally to turn into a reality, regarding the only existing nuclear-free zone which comprises densely-populated territories, the theoretical support for all such zones so often advocated by their representatives in all international forums, and in particular in the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
The summary statement I have just made in this intervention sufficiently explains, we believe, the reasons that have prompted the delegations of Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico to formulate the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.654, which I have the honour to submit to the Committee on behalf of its co-sponsors and whose operative part reads as follows:

"1. Takes note with satisfaction that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which entered into force for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in 1969 and 1971, respectively, has been signed in 1973 by France and by the People's Republic of China;

"2. Invites the French and Chinese Governments to ratify Additional Protocol II as soon as possible;

"3. Deplores that one of the five nuclear-weapon States has not yet heeded the repeated calls of the General Assembly and urges it once again to sign and ratify without further delay Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

"4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session an item entitled 'Implementation of General Assembly resolution .... (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)';

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the nuclear-weapon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session of any measure adopted by them in order to implement it."

(A/C.1/L.654)
The delegations sponsoring this draft resolution trust that it will command the enthusiastic support of the Committee, as has been the case in past years with all of the draft resolutions relating to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).
Mr. DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish):

New resolutions on the items before us were adopted at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly. They have served to add to the already abundant list of requests that have fallen on fallow ground and have only left despair and frustration in their wake.

Last year we stated in this same hall that it seemed to us as if we had become accustomed to hearing each other in this Byzantine dialogue, this apparently sterile dialogue, as if it were a sort of mental pastime within a programme of annual festivities. This year we have even had a new element to make those dialogues more interesting, a new item which, for our greater amusement, we shall be dealing with not in the context of these discussions on disarmament but in an even more formal forum ... as if it were a television programme through which attempts are made to induce us to take a drink without bothering about its bad taste which our palate rejects. Advertising experts have shown us that the greater the deceit the easier it is to have people swallow something, provided it is repeated systematically and insistently. Even those who invent the lie end up by believing that it is the truth. We should like to hope, however, that the debates that are to take place in the General Assembly will yield something more effective than a repetition of the astronomical figures spent on armaments, propaganda statements and false promises. The proposal to which we are referring is important and therefore deserves to be considered
in all seriousness and with keen interest, in order that, with reference to such a promising undertaking, we may not have to say, like Horace, "desinit in piscem". However, the only new element that we have noticed in the year that has elapsed since the last session of the General Assembly is the statement of a truth, if such a statement were necessary.

The recent armed conflict has clearly shown the incalculable arsenal of the super-Powers, which oppose even the mere preparation of a world disarmament conference. In a few hours, and by the most rapid means of transport, weapons of every kind and for every possible use in war, to a value of millions and millions of dollars, were handed over to the belligerents. But that is not all. If in the past it was possible to speak of "armed peace" and if in the present, after the second and devastating world war, we can speak of the "balance of terror", we might say that today we live under a new modality, that of managed warfare -- managed by the super-Powers. It is a dual commercial venture. Surplus or obsolete war material is sold for cash. Thus hard currency is obtained for other commercial operations, and the war is allowed to go on but no further than the limits that the Powers seeking to exercise hegemony over the remainder of mankind will permit, because at that point they feel that their interests or even their security are in danger. They then put an end to the conflict on their own initiative.

They do not even take the trouble to consult the other members of the Security Council, the only body entrusted by the international community with fulfilling the functions of maintaining international peace and security -- as if they were great executives, whose only function was to watch over the interests of the shareholders in their respective companies.

It has been said here that the détente in the relations between the two hegemonic Powers has established a propitious climate for disarmament discussions during this twenty-eighth session. We wish we were convinced of this. Only the actions of the two super-Powers designed to extend that climate to the rest of mankind and for the benefit of all, and not for the benefit of their own limited interests, will convince us of the good faith with which they are ready to comply with the terms of the United Nations Charter. The beginnings have not been very promising.
(Mr. Díaz González, Venezuela)

The international community, in our view, cannot resign itself to acceptance of the fact that war or peace can depend only on the will of those two super-Powers, however powerful they may be, or precisely because they are so powerful. The United Nations Charter provides the necessary machinery for the maintenance of peace, just as it provides the necessary machinery for the prevention of war.
That machinery was not created to enthrone the hegemony of any country to the detriment of the other States Members of the Organization. For that reason, ever since the consideration of these items began in the General Assembly we have been in favour of the search for adequate means and formulas to halt the arms race and try to achieve adequate control over weapons through effective United Nations supervision. For that reason, too, we felt that the best way to achieve those aims was through the convening of a World Disarmament Conference, to be carefully prepared. We believe that it is quite obvious that in the preparation of such a Conference -- in which all States must participate on an equal footing, as laid down in the Charter -- the first to co-operate actively must be the Powers possessing the monopoly over nuclear weapons. It is those Powers, moreover, that possess the largest quantity of weapons and occupy permanent seats in the Security Council. It would be futile to speak of disarmament, or even arms control, in respect of the majority of the remaining members, which possess barely the means necessary for their own defence.

The developing countries, with very few exceptions, do not agree -- nor could they agree -- with an unbridled arms race, for they know that it is tantamount to a race for power and predominance. As stated by President Boumedienne of Algeria at the most recent Conference of the non-aligned countries in Algiers, they would again be the vanquished of history.

For countries like Venezuela, the maintenance of a climate of peace and security is essential if man is to develop freely and fully. What we want is that poverty should not be accentuated; that there should be a better, more equitable and more just distribution of wealth among all peoples; that international peace and security should be maintained with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, as laid down in the Charter; that the astronomical sums devoted to the production of means of destruction and the imposition of the rule of terror should be used to help peoples to emerge from poverty and the physical and moral stagnation in which they find themselves by reason of their under-development: in a word, that the balance of terror and "managed" or "administered" warfare should be replaced by international social justice.
In any event, priority must be given to the limitation of the production, development and multiplication of nuclear weapons, while, at the same time, reducing to a minimum the constant danger of an atomic war. This position of my delegation is substantiated by the Charter of the United Nations itself. While it is true that the Charter does not recognize that the maintenance of peace requires disarmament, it is equally true that two of its Articles deal specifically with this problem of an unbridled arms race. Article 11, paragraph 1, establishes that:

"The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both."

That concerns the competence of the General Assembly. But the main emphasis in the Charter is on the responsibility that falls on the members of the Security Council. In accordance with the provisions of Article 26 of the Charter,

"In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."

While the responsibility devolves on the Security Council as a whole, we must admit that given the position of the five nuclear Powers permanent members of the Security Council they bear a special responsibility, as a counterpart to which they have a special obligation to lend their co-operation to any discussion designed to prepare the way for disarmament.
We have always believed, and continue to believe, that such action could begin with the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. We supported the establishment of that Committee. For well known reasons that Committee, which was undermined *ab initio*, could not but perish without ever beginning to function, or be left paralysed – which would amount to the same thing.

The position of my delegation regarding this question was explained fully in the letter addressed on 2 February 1973 to the Secretary-General by the Chairman of the Latin American Group on behalf of that Group. That letter has been reproduced as an official document of the General Assembly, document A/9041 of 5 February 1973. This prevents our having to dwell at length on this point. But I do wish to express our sincere admiration for Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran for the able, diplomatic and effective manner in which he discharged what he himself described as a perilous undertaking, and for the wonderful manner in which he complied with the mandate in his non-mandate. We still believe that the Committee should be maintained.

The non-report of Ambassador Hoveyda shows that all the delegations which participated in the exchange of views were agreed on the need to convene the World Disarmament Conference, with the participation of all States and after the necessary preparation. Similarly, there was general acknowledgment of the fact that an increase in the membership of the Special Committee was an essential condition if it was to comply with the terms of reference laid down in resolution 2930 (XXVII).
It is obvious, as we have already indicated, that for the Committee to function properly it is essential to have the five nuclear Powers participate in its deliberations. It is to be hoped that the negative attitude of four of these Powers may change this time and become a truly positive and constructive attitude.

We must admit that a perusal of the different reports leads us to the conclusion that as far as disarmament is concerned very little, if any, progress has been achieved since the last General Assembly session, when we dealt with the items that we are considering again today. However, I would not wish to conclude this statement on so pessimistic a note. We welcome the announcement by France and the People's Republic of China that they have subscribed to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which we hope they will soon ratify. We regret, however, that one of the five nuclear-weapon Powers should not as yet have heeded the repeated appeals of the General Assembly to sign and ratify that important regional instrument, despite the fact that that Power comes before us as a champion of disarmament.

We are convinced, today more than ever, that there is urgent need to convene the World Disarmament Conference as the only possible means of devising adequate formulas and procedures that will lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

As regards priorities, no one can deny that first place is taken by the question of the limitation and control over the production, development, multiplication and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The position of Venezuela in this connexion has been stated not only in official declarations of Venezuela's President but also in international documents signed this year and in agreements adopted at the National Congress condemning nuclear tests. As a result of a recent visit to my country by His Excellency Mr. Nicolas Ceausescu, President of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania, a joint communiqué was issued, signed by Mr. Ceausescu and the President of Venezuela, Dr. Rafael Caldera, wherein both Governments undertook to:
"Co-operate at the international level in the adoption of effective measures designed to end the arms race and thus prepare the way for disarmament; in the creation of demuclearized zones in various regions of the world, based on firm commitments by the nuclear States not to use atomic weapons against countries in those zones and to respect the demuclearization statute." (A/C.1/1037, para. 2, of 22 October 1973)

In similar terms, the President of Venezuela, together with His Excellency Mr. Misael Pastrana, President of Colombia, in a declaration signed in Maracaibo on 24 July 1973 formulated a frank protest against nuclear tests in the Pacific that constitute a danger to the populations and the living resources of the area, and disregard world public opinion and the principles enunciated by the United Nations against the continuation of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field.

Finally, during his official tour of six South American countries in February of this year the President of Venezuela, in a communiqué issued in Lima jointly with His Excellency General Juan Velasco Alvarado, the President of Peru, condemned nuclear weapon tests, especially those carried out in the atmosphere in the South Pacific, because they inevitably threaten the life and resources of the nations.

My delegation is one of the co-sponsors of three draft resolutions, two concerning the need to suspend nuclear and thermonuclear tests (item 36 of the agenda) and the third on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco (item 37 of the agenda) which has just been introduced by the representative of Mexico (A/C.1/L.651, A/C.1/L.652 and A/C.1/654). My delegation hopes that delegations will support these draft resolutions and that they will be adopted by acclamation.

We reserve the right to speak again during the consideration of the draft resolutions relating to the items under discussion in the general debate, if my delegation deems it necessary.
The CHAIRMAN: I would inform the Committee that Mauritius has asked to be added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.652 and A/C.1/L.653.

Mr. DeSOUZA (Jamaica): The question of disarmament, in all its different aspects and with its numerous ramifications, is a topic which has been before the General Assembly of the United Nations for almost as long as this Organization has been in existence. That this is so is understandable, as the very Charter of the United Nations concerns itself with questions of peace and security and it is difficult to conceive of these in realistic terms without also conceiving of disarmament in its many aspects. What is not understandable, even if one takes into account geopolitical and strategic considerations, is the fact that so little progress has been made towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

Let us consider the question of the proposed World Disarmament Conference. That Soviet initiative has much to commend it, and we cannot but note, with regret, that the Special Committee set up to consider this important question has met with such difficulties. Indeed, a tribute must be paid to the Ambassador of Iran for the tact and diplomatic skill that he displayed in guiding so-called non-meetings of the Special Committee, and in later reporting on those proceedings to this Committee.

When we consider the question of the World Disarmament Conference what we are in fact considering is a double stalemate. In the first instance there is the stalemate between the nuclear Powers on the very question of general and complete disarmament and, secondly, there is the stalemate between the nuclear Powers on the question of whether or not preparations for a World Disarmament Conference should be set in train.
We deplore this perpetuation of great-Power stalemate on questions relating to disarmament, and, while recognizing the need for each State to protect its own political and military interests, we urge that a renewed effort should be made at breaking the existing stalemate in these important disarmament questions which so vitally affect the peace, security and development of all the world's citizens and not just those of the nuclear States. We would, in this context, particularly wish to draw the attention of this Committee to the Georgetown Declaration of 1972 and the Algiers Declaration of 1973, both emanating from non-aligned summit meetings. It is the opinion of my delegation that a careful and detailed preparatory process should be engaged in before the convening of a world disarmament conference, and it is furthermore our hope that provision will be made for the widest representation possible at such a conference. We hope that some measure of progress towards establishing a machinery for achieving these goals will be arrived at before the conclusion of the present session.

The urgent demand for a suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests is of course the paramount consideration and most pressing need in the field of general and complete disarmament. However, here one must again note that the nuclear States, neither by word nor by deed, provide us with much hope for the immediate future.

We note, however, with considerable satisfaction that France and the People's Republic of China have signed the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and we would here express the hope that their ratification of the Additional Protocol will be forthcoming shortly. Conversely, we must express our grave concern at the continuing failure of one of the five nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty.

I wish at this juncture to draw this Committee's attention to the statement made by Jamaica's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs before the 1698th meeting of the Security Council, held in Panama earlier this year. In that statement, Mr. Thompson, inter alia, expressed
"... the desire of my country that all impediments be removed, to enable every independent country in this region to become a party to this Treaty, so that all of Latin America can become potential beneficiaries of the protection that we have sought for ourselves. It does seem tragic that while some great Powers, by not signing the Treaty and its Protocol, have refused to support this umbrella of peace for millions in this region, there are within our midst young nations which are ready and willing to give it their support but which are not yet qualified to do so, as some of us have not yet made up our mind to give them full membership in this brotherhood of peace."

(S/PV.1698, p. 12)

The Jamaican delegation hopes that all signatories to the Treaty will make renewed efforts to ensure that no Latin American State continues to be denied membership of the Treaty régime of Tlatelolco because of the exclusionary provisions of article 25, paragraph 2, of that Treaty.

We noted with particular interest the statement of the Ambassador of Argentina in this Committee on 26 October, in which he suggested a possible reorganization of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and suggested that it might well be time for the creation of a new negotiating body. We endorse these ideas and publicly express the hope that this Committee will find the necessary political will to address itself to this important question at this session. Action should not be delayed. The co-chairmanship system has outlived whatever validity or usefulness it might ever have had, and the absence of two nuclear States — China and France — from the CCD negotiations is neither realistic or conducive to meaningful and valid negotiations. How can we in all seriousness speak of negotiations on the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, when two of the nuclear Powers, to which any agreement arrived at would in theory apply, are in fact non-participants in the negotiations, and accordingly and justifiably are unlikely to feel bound by any agreements concluded? My delegation shares the view, set forth in document CCD/396, that the non-participation of two of the nuclear-weapon States in the work of the CCD should
not prevent it from discharging its obligations. However, it is our belief, and indeed it seems clear, that the CCD as presently constituted and operating is incapable of effectively discharging its obligations by undertaking valid negotiations, and this would appear to be in part the cause of the lack of progress in the Committee’s negotiations. It is for these very reasons that we endorse the Argentinian proposal for a reorganization of the CCD. It is our belief and firm hope that such a reorganization could facilitate the participation of all five nuclear-weapon States in international disarmament negotiations based on a concrete disarmament programme.

I would now turn to the question of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As is well known, that Treaty was signed in 1968 and entered into force in March of 1970. However, the fact remains that a considerable number of militarily significant and near-nuclear States are as yet not parties to that Treaty. We appreciate, of course, that the negotiations on safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency designed to preclude the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to non-peaceful uses have been watched carefully by a number of States. The fact is that these negotiations have now been satisfactorily completed for well over a year, and we had hoped that this would have provided greater impetus to new ratifications and accessions to the Treaty. Now that the safeguards negotiations have been successfully completed, we hope that paragraph 2, article 3, of the non-proliferation Treaty will rapidly become effective. It will be recalled that that paragraph contains the proviso that all sources and supplies of fissionable material should be restricted to the non-nuclear-weapon States which have concluded safeguards agreements.

My delegation also looks forward to the implementation of article 5 of the non-proliferation Treaty, which provides for international agreements concerning potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. It is clear that much ground remains to be covered in order to obtain wider adherence to the terms of that Treaty, and also in order to obtain an increasing number of accessions and ratifications. It is for these reasons, amongst others, that my delegation is already looking to the Conference of Parties to the Treaty, which will be convened in Geneva in two years' time, to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purpose of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
We wish now to turn briefly to the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons and to consider concomitantly napalm and other incendiary weapons. Our delegation must express its great concern and dissatisfaction with the lack of progress that has been made on the elaboration of a treaty banning chemical and bacteriological weapons. We are well aware that the apologists for this lack of progress will point to the complexity of the subject area and the difficulty of precise definition and will plead for some form of partial agreement akin to that already arrived at concerning toxic weapons. It is our view that the United Nations already has a partial agreement which is admittedly better than no agreement at all concerning toxic weapons. However, in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons my delegation hopes that the negotiations, no matter how lengthy they may be, will eventually provide for a total and comprehensive ban.

Historically there never has been any moral or legal justification for the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and, with the passage of time, the very knowledge of their existence becomes increasingly obnoxious. We must here echo the view of the representative of Canada who, when addressing the 1935th meeting of this Committee, pointed out that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is already widely accepted as a norm of international law, and that the CND's negotiations on the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons are merely seeking to reinforce the existing Protocol by a treaty which will, through effective verification, provide a better international instrument.

We are aware that in many instances States have long since desisted from the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, the very existence of stockpiles of these weapons is an offence to the sensibilities of mankind. This is so because, as is well known, the most lethal of chemical agents include nerve agents, choking agents and blood agents which are capable, in relatively small doses, of inducing mortality. Let us also note that chemical weapons can be more effective than equivalent weights of high explosives when directed against densely populated targets. What is therefore necessary is the destruction of existing stockpiles, and a convention which will, in addition, preclude the possibility of any production at a later date.
My delegation has studied with great care the working papers presented at the recent sessions of the CCD and the deliberations at those sessions. While taking note of those papers and those deliberations, we deplore the fact that there has been virtually no progress towards the conclusion of an international agreement on this vital subject. We are particularly interested in the non-aligned working paper in document CCD/400 presented by Sweden and others, and the working paper in document CCD/413 presented by the delegation of Japan. It is our belief that the Japanese working paper in document CCD/413, the working paper in document CCD/400 submitted by Sweden and others, and the Canadian working paper in document CCD/414 on the problem of defining chemical substances in a chemical weapons treaty, together provide the basis for serious negotiations on the elaboration of a draft chemical and bacteriological weapons convention. There can be no excuse for the failure of the CCD to proceed with this issue without delay, and if it continues to fail to do so, such failure would only lend credence to our view that the CCD should be reorganized with the least possible delay, in order that it may function efficiently.

On the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons, my delegation notes with satisfaction that this important question has now been made a full item on the agenda of the General Assembly. We condemn the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in civil or international warfare and in our view not only is their use inhuman but, in addition, any use of these weapons brings into focus the ongoing question of human rights and warfare.

My delegation endorses the draft resolution on the subject at present before the Committee and proposes to vote for it.

In concluding, we wish to turn our attention to the question of the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security. At the outset we must, as other delegations have done, pay a tribute to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and to the valuable and continuing work it is doing. This work is not limited to the area of economic and social consequences of disarmament, but it is in this area perhaps more than in any other that the developing countries have found the Institute's work to be an invaluable research and resource asset.
There is a definite link between disarmament and development. We of course do not believe that were an agreement on general and complete disarmament to occur tomorrow morning, all the funds spent on military research and the development of armaments would automatically become available in the form of development assistance to the developing countries and for the development projects within the developed countries themselves. However, there can be no gainsaying the statistics that in excess of $25,000 million a year is spent on military research and development, and that in contrast only some $4,000 million is spent annually on medical research in the world. To put this even more in context, let us remember that the developing countries, with approximately half of the world's total population, account for only some 6 per cent of the world's military spending. It has been estimated by experts that a reduction of only 20 per cent in the world's military expenditure would contribute to meeting the urgent economic needs of both the developed and the developing countries, and would also reduce the economic gap between the two groups if development assistance were raised globally by the same proportion. We do not consider a disarmament dividend of this proportion as being adequate. In our view, general and complete disarmament could be accompanied by a disarmament dividend of an appreciably larger size, with a concomitantly larger benefit for both the developed and the developing countries.

As is well known, the report of the Group of Experts on the economic and social consequences of disarmament has indicated that most of the resources released by disarmament, total or partial, would be readily transferable to other uses, such as manpower, food, clothing, transport, fuel and products of the metal and engineering industries. In addition, let us think of the tremendous benefits that could derive from a large increase in peaceful research fed by the resources previously devoted to military work.
Mr. MISHRA (India): Before beginning my statement, I should like to refer to the fact that tomorrow is the last day that the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, will be with us in her official capacity. I should like to join the numerous speakers before me in paying tribute to her devotion to the cause of disarmament. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the First Committee of the General Assembly will not be the same without her presence. We do hope, however, that her great contribution to the cause of disarmament will not only continue, but will develop further and attract even more adherents to this noble cause.

Despite the comparatively relaxed atmosphere and some measure of détente, despite the conclusion of the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), despite phase one of the European Security Conference and the recent opening of negotiations on the reduction of forces in central Europe, it is disheartening to note that there has been very little progress in the field of disarmament. What is taking place today is not disarmament but management of power and arms by the most powerful States of the world.

The delegation of India believes that détente will remain unstable without disarmament. The key to the problem of ending the arms race and making progress in disarmament lies in the field of nuclear weapons. And it is obvious that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility in this regard. It is only they who can exercise self-restraint and bring about a reduction in their nuclear arsenals and thus facilitate the elimination of all nuclear weapons. This is and must remain a primary objective.

It is to be deplored, therefore, that no agreement has yet been reached on a comprehensive test ban. The delegation of India would like to reiterate the view that, in order to achieve a comprehensive test ban, it is essential that four main considerations should be kept in mind. In the first instance, the provisions of the partial test-ban Treaty should be fully observed, and those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet adhered to that Treaty should do so without any further excuse or delay. Second, whatever be the differences on the issue of verification of a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests, and notwithstanding any other considerations, all testing of nuclear weapons in all environments must be immediately suspended. Third, a comprehensive test ban
has two aspects: first, all nuclear-weapons tests in all environments should be prohibited; and second, all nuclear-weapon States should be parties to it. Fourth, negotiations should be undertaken for a separate treaty to prohibit all nuclear-weapon tests in the underground environment, and attention should be focussed simultaneously on the need to conclude an agreement on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

At the last General Assembly session, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) was asked to accord priority consideration to this subject and submit a special report. The CCD has done so without registering any progress, although a number of working papers were presented and discussed and four informal meetings were held. The working papers and the discussions in the CCD have further strengthened the view that there is no excuse for any country to conduct any nuclear-weapons tests anywhere and in any environment.

The CCD was also able to have a thorough discussion on the question of chemical weapons but again without any substantive result. The difficulty does not lie in the lack of ideas or working papers. The CCD has before it a draft convention and a number of working papers. The problem is the lack of agreement on whether there should be a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons accompanied by the destruction of the existing stockpiles, or the international community should content itself with banning some types of chemical agents without touching the weapons that are ready for use now. It is the duty of this deliberative forum to give clear guidelines to the negotiating body in Geneva, bearing in mind the objective of a comprehensive ban both in respect of scope and activities. Obviously, an agreement which does not satisfactorily tackle the question of stockpiles is unlikely to be acceptable to a number of nations, since such a measure would, like the Non-Proliferation Treaty, discriminate against countries that so far have not stockpiled chemical agents or weapons. Further, a chemical weapons convention that is not universally acceded to would be hard to sustain, as has been pointed out by the representative of Canada, Ambassador Barton.

The lack of progress in disarmament negotiations has led some people to question the usefulness of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It
is difficult to understand this. The problem of disarmament is of vital concern to all nations. It is also recognized that it raises highly complicated issues. The most practical way to deal with them is to tackle them at two levels. All nations should be able to have their say and make their contribution to the progress of disarmament through discussions held in deliberative forums where suitable guidelines could be developed. The United Nations has provided such deliberative forums as the General Assembly, the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission. In order that all countries without exception should have the possibility of expressing their views on the problem of disarmament, it has been proposed that a World Disarmament Conference should be convened and we have welcomed this proposal. However, it has been widely recognized that there should be a small negotiating body that could take up the guidelines developed in the deliberative forums and conduct serious and detailed discussions on specific problems and issues with a view to exploring the possibility of negotiating internationally binding instruments for achieving progress towards the realization of global security based on disarmament. It is also recognized that the Committee on Disarmament needs to attract the participation of two nuclear weapon States, so that it can become a better and more effective instrument of disarmament negotiations. But it would be difficult, if not impossible, to hold meaningful disarmament discussions if a proven forum were to be destroyed or changes made in it on the basis of pre-conceived expectations and wishful anticipation. The real reason for the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations is the deep-seated suspicion and mistrust among nations -- each trying to preserve what it considers to be its vital security interests. Unless there is a change in this attitude -- and the change must begin with the militarily powerful States possessing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction -- the negotiations will follow a tardy pace. This is one of the very important reasons why the successive non-aligned conferences have called for the convening of a World Disarmament Conference which could demonstrate the great urgency of a speedy movement on the part of nuclear-weapon States.
Our views on the World Disarmament Conference are as follows:

First, it could be effective if it attracts the participation of all States, particularly the militarily significant ones.

Second, it should be held after adequate preparation.

Third, it should be organized by and held under the auspices of the United Nations.

Fourth, as regards its main objective, since the World Disarmament Conference would provide a forum for the expression and exchange of views of all States, the discussion should naturally cover the entire range of disarmament problems including partial and collateral measures, keeping in view the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. But obviously its main emphasis must be on nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.
We are disappointed at the lack of progress towards this objective in the deliberations of the Special Committee which was set up by the General Assembly last year for this purpose — and this happened despite the tact and diplomatic skill with which Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran carried out his duties with regard to the Special Committee under very difficult circumstances. A way must soon be found, however, out of this deadlock. Various suggestions have been made in this regard. If the nuclear-weapon States show a certain measure of cooperation and understanding, it should not be difficult to get over this hurdle. We keep an open mind on this issue as long as the proposed course of action will take us nearer the desired objective of convening a World Disarmament Conference.

A few words about the goal of general and complete disarmament. While we are engaged in working out partial and collateral measures through bilateral and multilateral forums, it is essential to bear in mind that such measures should be conceived only as steps leading towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

We believe, firstly, that partial measures can be broadly classified into three categories: first, measures to prevent armaments; second, measures to limit armaments; and third, measures of disarmament. It is imperative that an appropriate balance be maintained among these various categories of partial measures, with particular stress being laid on measures of actual disarmament.

Secondly, in the light of the various developments which have since taken place and the many suggestions which have been put forward, we maintain that it would be useful if the Soviet Union and the United States were to submit revised versions of their respective draft treaties on general and complete disarmament which they presented in 1962.

Thirdly, the Joint Statement on Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations drawn up by the Soviet Union and the United States on 20 September 1961, and commended by the General Assembly in its resolution 1722 (XVI), should be the main basis for concrete work.
So as to maintain a sense of direction, the utmost attention should be focused on two main objectives: first, the highest priority should be given to measures of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction; and, second, savings from measures of disarmament should be channelled to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. We look forward with interest to the discussion of the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security. We feel that the Soviet proposal for a 10 per cent reduction in the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and the diversion of part of it for the benefit of the developing countries deserves careful consideration.

Before I conclude this statement, I should like briefly to refer to the subject of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971 designated the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace for all time and called upon the great Powers and the littoral and hinterland States to consult each other on the elimination of great-power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great-power rivalry.

At the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly another resolution was adopted appointing an Ad Hoc Committee of 15 countries to study the implications of the proposal, with special reference to practical measures that could be taken in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration, having regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. The Ad Hoc Committee has made some progress and there has been a good exchange of views on this important, but delicate, subject. In our view, the very useful work of the Ad Hoc Committee should continue in order to enable all countries concerned to make a collective effort to achieve concrete results.

The Government of India is, however, of the view that without the active co-operation and participation of the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean the work of the Committee is unlikely to get off the ground. We would therefore urge that such States be associated at all stages with the task of the creation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.
The CHAIRMAN: I wish to announce that Sierra Leone has been added to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.652.

Mr. KAMARAKE (Sierra Leone): I have been debating with myself, Mr. Chairman, whether I should address congratulations to you or whether the time had come for congratulations to be replaced by expressions of condolence. I should like, however, to congratulate you not only as Chairman of the First Committee, but on the way you have managed to transform this Committee into a punctual, well-organized body -- and this actually gives meaning to its name of the "First Committee".

The First Committee of the General Assembly is again faced with the problem of discussing disarmament. Disarmament is about the most pressing issue in the world at a time when we are witnessing an unprecedented hysteria in arms build-up, nuclear Powers are spending more in arms than could be imagined.

The big questions now are: To what will all this lead? Of what benefit will arms, particularly nuclear arms, be to mankind? Those are the simple but intriguing questions which are yet to be answered by the nuclear Powers. It is possible that those nations which engage in the arms race have at the back of their minds self-preservation and the preservation of those destructive weapons that they already possess; or perhaps the preservation of the position they already hold in world politics.

According to Thomas Hobbes,

"The controlling factor in human life is that 'inner force' which compels man to seek his own self-interest, especially to avoid injury."

Hobbes continued:

"... the chief object of man's desire is self-preservation, and what man wants to avoid is loss of life."

Man wants to be sure of his life and possessions.
According to the nuclear Powers, however, security is obtained only through the possession of power. But the unfortunate thing is that no man ever has enough power; he will always seek more in order to protect that which he already has. In effect, man's desire for power is unlimited, while the supply of such power is very limited -- and here lies the major source of conflict among men.

That is exactly the situation in which the nuclear Powers have found themselves. Their main concern now is to preserve that which they already have and, in the process of such preservation, they find themselves engulfed by several other factors which serve as incentives to create more weapons, and this invariably leads to an escalation of the arms race. The nuclear-Power States' struggle for prominence in international politics is further complicated by their relative equality in the means to that end.

Even though developing nations attach great importance to self-preservation, we do not think that the only way to achieve it is through the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. We think that the most effective weapon in protecting what we already have is peace. That is why the developing nations welcome the new spirit of international political détente which now prevails, even though détente is still in its "take-off" stage.

My delegation feels, however, that "moral détente" should have preceded political détente. The nuclear Powers think that they are in the process of creating an atmosphere which they believe will eventually convince the developing world that the arms build-up era is drawing to a close and giving way to economic co-operation. But how sincere they are is still and will for a long time continue to be, an unanswered question. The developing countries are yet to be convinced that the big Powers will practise what they preach. This is what some political thinkers call "moral suasion". Let them prove to us, by their moral behaviour, that what they say is what they will do.
My delegation supports the convening of the World Disarmament Conference particularly at this time when the world is witnessing a seeming improvement in the international political climate. It is our hope that such a conference will promote further the spirit of détente between the nuclear Powers and the normalization of international relations. The developing world attaches great significance to the convening of the World Disarmament Conference because, we believe -- perhaps erroneously -- that only through such a conference could the world enjoy a long period of peace even though it may not be lasting.

My delegation commends all those which have made statements on the present disarmament crisis and assures all Member States that, in accordance with the pronouncement of my Foreign Minister during the general debate at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Sierra Leone Government pledges its continued interest in seeking feasible measures towards the achievement of complete disarmament.

This is why my delegation urges all States, and nuclear States in particular, to take an active part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The fact is that any agreement on disarmament may be approved by the rest of the world but such approval will be of little value unless it is supported by those who possess the nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction.

We would also call upon all nuclear weapon States to end all nuclear weapon tests in all environments. My Government is deeply concerned and disappointed that, in spite of the opposition by numerous States as expressed in the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and in various other pronouncements by other world bodies, nuclear weapons tests continue to take place. My delegation would advise these States that are still engaged in such tests ignoring at the same time, the danger of radioactive contamination, to refrain from making such tests outside their own territories. We are of the opinion that what is good for their security will somehow prove good for their health as well.

My delegation also supports the proposal that there should be a ban on the further development, improvement, stockpiling and possible use of chemical weapons.
My delegation is concerned about the production and use of such weapons because it seems that the developing world is almost always the testing ground for newly developed and improved weapons. The unfortunate incident in the past few weeks in the Middle East is a pointer to what the world situation would be like if a ban on the use of such weapons is not negotiated.

My delegation associates itself with statements of appreciation by several delegations on the Chinese proposals that nuclear-Power States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and should also undertake never to use such weapons against non-nuclear-Power States. It is our view that such an undertaking will provide a spring-board towards total disarmament.

Sierra Leone has always supported the view that the Indian Ocean should be declared a zone of peace. In fact, it is my delegation's hope that all oceans and seas should be declared zones of peace. My delegation will therefore support any draft resolution or resolutions submitted or to be submitted in this Committee that will coincide with the views expressed by my delegation in relation to disarmament and the strengthening of international security.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Kamarake for his generous words to me.

Mr. REYES (Philippines): Mr. Chairman, with some reluctance we are intervening briefly at the end of this debate on disarmament for two reasons.

First, because silence may be mistaken for complacency or indifference. Man does tend to become inured to danger, even to mortal danger. Therefore -- notwithstanding countless frustrations, regardless of repeated rebuffs, despite the evidence that has piled-up on this fateful question, the vast majority proposes and a handful of nuclear Powers dispose -- we must speak, if only to mark our place in the ranks of the concerned.

Second, we have a duty to indicate our position, laconically as befits our status as a small non-nuclear Power, on various aspects of the disarmament question in which we had shown interest in the past.

First, on the proposed World Disarmament Conference. We are still in favour of this idea. Without illusions about the power of any conference to persuade great Powers to disarm, we feel nevertheless that it would be useful to focus world attention on the most dangerous item in the lengthy catalogue of mankind's unsolved problems.
But we agree that the Conference should be held, with universal participation, under United Nations auspices, only after thorough preparation, and that it should not be allowed to serve as a mere propaganda forum. The co-operation of all nuclear Powers is obviously essential and if the cost of securing it is a little more time, a little more care, a little more sincerity and fairness in setting up a preparatory committee, then we should pay that price.

In any event, let us spare our esteemed and brilliant colleague, Ambassador Hoveyda, from the ordeal of presiding again over non-meetings wrestling with phantom issues.

Second, on nuclear weapons testing. The real need as we see it is for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. In fairness we must admit that the mushroom clouds of atmospheric tests, particularly in high-visibility sites in the Pacific, have obscured the equally dangerous subterranean tests, which have intensified the qualitative arms race and resulted in greatly increased over-kill capacity.

What we find difficult to accept is the claim that new nuclear arsenals are justified because older ones are already in existence. It seems to us that two wrongs do not add up to one right.
As for the suggestion that there are "smart" nuclear missiles which can be "taught" to point in self-defence at super-Powers, we need only note that there is nothing to prevent these same missiles from "learning" to turn around and become instruments of undue political influence with respect to non-nuclear-weapon Powers. There is such a thin line between deterrence and domination; moreover, we have to consider the possible chain-reaction effect in countries that are on the threshold of becoming nuclear Powers. It goes without saying that the increased proliferation of nuclear weapons can only mean increased danger for mankind.

Thirdly, on the dividends from disarmament, at present this expectation is no more than a gleam in the eyes of the poor countries. The realistic prospect is not massive direct transfers of savings from disarmament, if and when such savings are realized, but rather a modest spin-off in the form of increased aid for development -- and only after domestic priorities shall have been attended to. As for proposals to make poor countries the beneficiaries of part of the envisaged reductions in armaments budgets, they are of course welcome, but in our view they are destined to be of limited significance to the poor nations so long as they remain in the realm of good intentions. Speedy implementation is the acid test for such proposals. If they prove to be impractical and beyond the possibility of early realization, they will be of marginal interest and, in the last analysis, irrelevant to the hopes of the people they are supposed to benefit. Of more immediate concern to them is the attainment, now, of development aid and trade targets stipulated in the International Development Strategy for the Second Development Decade, adopted in 1970.

Fourthly, on nuclear-free zones, we congratulate Latin America for the accession of all but one of the nuclear Powers to Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, about which the representative of Mexico made such an instructive statement this afternoon. We are glad for our Latin American friends and, we must confess, also are slightly envious. We cannot help wishing, like the representative of New Zealand, that we could have a nuclear-free Pacific and, in due course, even a nuclear-free Asia. This may seem
unrealistic, until we are reminded that our professed goal is a nuclear-free world.

Finally, on general and complete disarmament, some have rightly pointed out that mutual confidence is indispensable to real progress towards this goal. But for its actual achievement something more is required: nothing less than full acceptance of the kind of world depicted in the Charter -- a world of interdependent nations under an inescapable necessity to live in peace because they are bound together inextricably by common interests and a common destiny.

Does that sound Utopian? Perhaps. But the nuclear sword hanging over our heads is a sharp reminder that we really have no viable choice. The alternative, which is no longer so unthinkable in the light of recent events, is an Armageddon in which death, the only victor, makes no distinction between great Powers and small, between the weak and the strong, between the rich and the poor.

Mr. FURBERG (Norway): Since the General Assembly last year stated its views on disarmament, there has been, unfortunately, little evidence of concrete new achievements in this field. This prompts me to make some remarks of a general character.

Firstly, a high level of military armaments will continue to exist in the world until all States feel confident that they will be able to pursue their legitimate interests through peaceful means. The relationships between States will, however, vary from those of mutual trust to a state of armed conflict. Along this continuum various arms control measures might be agreed upon. Precisely because nations are still armed, such measures -- although they do not represent disarmament -- do serve a useful purpose, inasmuch as they contribute to a relaxation of political tension. For that reason my Government finds it important that the efforts towards further détente in Europe through the Conference on Security and Co-operation should include a search for an agreement on certain measures in the military field which may build greater confidence. Such measures would be open not only to the major Powers but to
all States, and they should not be overlooked as effective measures in the continuous struggle to come to grips with major problems of how to control and reduce arms.

The second remark of a general nature which I would like to make is that, in spite of certain setbacks, prospects for progress in arms control and towards disarmament have generally improved. This belief is supported by the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have set a target date for reaching a permanent agreement on more extensive measures for the limitation of strategic arms, as well as for their subsequent reduction. Furthermore, prospects for general disarmament and arms control have also improved by virtue of the fact that negotiations have started among the States concerned on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe.

The most that we can prudently hope for as an immediate result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) still seems to be that the pace of the so-called action reaction cycle in the strategic arms race will become more moderate, and that this will contribute to strategic and hence political stability. However, this would in itself be no small gain. My Government appreciates the agreements reached so far under SALT and the efforts to widen the strategic arms control agreements, but finds it discouraging that the strategic arms build-up still continues with its inherent and obvious dangers.
As for the negotiations on mutual reductions of forces in central Europe, the immediate results will probably be limited, but there is hope that such initial reductions may in turn trigger further reductions. It is my Government's sincere hope that the present negotiations will lead to a continuous effort to reduce forces and armaments in Europe with undiminished security for all States.

The use of any weapon, whether conventional or not, should never be allowed to become conventional. The use of any weapon on human beings causes suffering and destruction. There are, however, weapons that are given special attention within the context of arms control. I am referring here to a more and more important aspect of the arms control problem where the prime incentive is of a humanitarian nature: to avoid unnecessary suffering or indiscriminate wounding and killing of combatants and non-combatants.

In this respect there are three main considerations I should like to emphasize.

First, when there is a strong opinion in favour of restricting the use of weapons that cause more human suffering than is militarily justified or that strike indiscriminately, this opportunity should be seized to strengthen the barrier against the use of such weapons. In this connexion I should like to refer to the very useful report, prepared under the auspices of the Secretary-General, about "Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use". In their comments on this report most Member States seem to agree that one should consider how to prevent the use of such weapons. It would, however, be wrong to concentrate our efforts in this area exclusively on incendiary weapons.

My Government is of the opinion that these weapons should be dealt with in the broader context of all weapons apt to cause unnecessary suffering or strike indiscriminately. A related problem, which my Government thinks deserves active consideration, is that of weapons which cause irreparable damage to the environment.
The second main consideration is that the mainspring of the will to build barriers against the use of the kind of weapons we are dealing with here is a revolt against the means of warfare that are more brutal than any armed conflict in itself needs to be. These and related questions have for a considerable time been discussed within the framework of the International Committee of the Red Cross. My Government believes that for the reasons just given the question of banning the use of particularly cruel and indiscriminate weapons should continue to be dealt with in that Committee and should be thoroughly discussed at the forthcoming diplomatic conference in Geneva.

The third consideration is that priority should be given to the prohibition of the use of these weapons. This position of my Government is motivated by the fact that the use of these weapons is always relatively easy to verify, while, on the other hand, many of these weapons are easy to manufacture and/or store clandestinely, which makes it difficult to ensure adequate verification of a prohibition on development, production and stockpiling of these weapons. Consequently, prohibitions on development, production and stockpiling may -- if ever agreed upon -- easily create an illusory safeguard. Furthermore, experiences from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament indicate that, precisely for this reason, it would be extremely difficult to reach agreement on such prohibitions. If, on the other hand, a complete ban on the use of weapons that are particularly painful and strike indiscriminately is agreed on, the question of prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of such weapons might subsequently, over a period of time, be tackled with greater hopes of success.

These considerations -- and a strong wish to see progress towards the elimination of some of the worst excesses in the ways wars are fought -- are the reasons why we have co-sponsored the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650. We hope that this proposal will receive favourable consideration by other delegations and that Governments will be ready to make the efforts it calls for.

We have on previous occasions stated our principal views on chemical weapons, and therefore I shall limit myself to repeating that we prefer a comprehensive and effective ban on the development, production and stockpiling
of chemical weapons, and destruction of existing stocks. If the control problems are too difficult to solve, we should aim at a strengthening of the ban on the use of chemical weapons, lethal or non-lethal, in armed conflicts.

I shall for a moment deal with the question of nuclear arms control. The various partial elements of nuclear arms control so far agreed upon constitute an unfinished structure. With regard to the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to which my Government attaches great importance, it must be admitted that it does not yet fully serve its intended purpose. My Government is ready to support all suitable efforts to remedy this situation. Similarly, the test ban Treaty of 1963, however important, is only a partial one. Although we value its existence and should like to see more States becoming parties to it, it cannot be denied that a main obstacle to further progress in the field of nuclear arms control has been the failure to reach agreement on a complete and effective ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

As a result of the scientific progress made in the field of seismological detection during recent years, the problems of technical verification should no longer be a real hindrance to the concluding of a comprehensive test ban treaty. What we are faced with is basically a question of political will, and in our view the major Powers have a special responsibility for making progress in this field.

In this connexion I wish to say a few words about the Norwegian seismic array --- NORSAR --- which Norway and the United States operate together.

NORSAR is today registering seismic data of a high quality and carries out continuous research and development work with a view to improving the global detection and verification capability of the array.

My Government has always wished that seismologists from other countries would visit NORSAR, and in fact many have already been working there. To stimulate such visits, financial resources have been made available to offer scholarships for visiting seismologists. In this way, it may be possible to
strengthen research activities and thus, it is hoped, render further contributions to a better understanding of the technical problems related to seismological verification of a test ban agreement.

When the data management system -- which the United States is building and to which NORSAR will be connected -- is completed, researchers at NORSAR will be able to exchange data with other participants. These and future participants may then use data from the Central Data Bank, for example, for seismological verification studies. My Government regards these developments as a great improvement of the possibilities for verifying a test-ban agreement.
The lack of agreement on a complete test ban does not, however, excuse continued testing in any environment. It is particularly unfortunate that some countries still carry on nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in spite of the partial test-ban Treaty. We all remember with horror the large amounts of radioactive fall-out produced by the nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in the nineteen fifties and sixties. My Government therefore fully shares the concern of those countries which today are the most exposed to fall-out from atmospheric tests, and joins in the general protest against all tests in all environments.

We still have a long way to go in arms control, and an even longer way to strive to curb the arms build-up, not to speak of real reductions. We have favoured, and still favour, the convening of a World Disarmament Conference. We are all too well aware of the conflicting views on these complicated questions, and what we need is the emergence of a consensus which will make it possible to make progress towards arms control and disarmament. We therefore share the view of those who maintain that such a conference must be thoroughly prepared in the sense that one has a reasonable assurance that it will lead to positive results. This is to a large extent dependent upon the main military Powers, in particular the nuclear weapon States — which, as permanent members of the Security Council, have special responsibilities. Their active co-operation is therefore essential.

While we welcome the adherence of more States to existing arms control and disarmament agreements, we must keep urging all States to adhere to them.

While work goes on in these forums, we must continue to encourage all States to do their proper share in this work. While we are still endeavouring on all fronts to create a world in which all States together will reduce the level of armaments, we must look for progress in the existing, but not always perfect, forums for arms control and disarmament negotiations.
Mr. WODAJO (Ethiopia): The spectre of total destruction created by modern armaments has changed man's perspective of himself and his future. For the first time in history man has acquired the technical capability to commit collective suicide. In the wake of this achievement, doubt has arisen about the prospect of his continued survival. True, this doubt may very often have been born of excessive and foreboding pessimism with his ability always to act with rationality but, not too infrequently, it has also come from a realistic appraisal of the possible dangers in which the world finds itself at this juncture. This situation is characterized by the acquisition by at least two countries of an ever increasing lethal power to destroy each other and, in the process, others too. If present trends continue, there is a distinct possibility that others might join their ranks soon.

Against this background, a rising crescendo of demands for disarmament has echoed far and wide in the last quarter of a century. Never before in history have disarmament issues been discussed so widely, nor have they been followed so keenly by an anguished mankind.

But can we say that the progress so far achieved in arms control and disarmament reflects this universal anguish?

Judging by the impasse of the early post-war years, the recent agreements between the two super-Powers to limit defensive and offensive missiles, the non-proliferation Treaty and the bacteriological weapons agreement, may well be significant. They can even be expected to pave the way for some of the pressing disarmament measures the world has been crying for. However, their significance should not be over-estimated. Important as they may be for confidence building, these accomplishments should not be allowed to lull us into a false sense of security -- into a belief that the worst is over and the trend of the arms race has been reversed. As Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, reminded us in this Committee, there has not been in the last decade any significant disarmament in the strict sense of the term; that is, disarmament involving real sacrifices of military significance by any of the big Powers. Instead of a reduction of armaments, the capacity of the major military Powers to inflict death and destruction has increased several fold.
In such circumstances, the best way of gauging progress in arms control and disarmament is not by isolating those tentative forward steps and comparing them with the total immobility that had characterized the early disarmament talks. To do so would give a false picture. Their significance should rather be assessed in the dynamic context of a highly sophisticated technological arms race, which is creating ever more lethal weapons of destruction and which, as some suspect, is also reducing the chances of eventual disarmament by rendering the problem of control and detection more difficult.

The time-frame within which significant measures of disarmament should be accomplished before it is too late is thus very important. The present level of weapons technology provides certain unique opportunities for disarmament which might be lost irretrievably if we do not seize them immediately.

Five years ago, in his report to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, former Secretary-General U Thant, reminded us that:

"The world is standing at what may be regarded in the perspective of history as one of the decisive moments in the grim challenge of the nuclear arms race." (A/7601/Add.1, para. 26)

He then went on to ask the nations of the world to designate the 1970s as the Decade of Disarmament and to work for the accomplishment of certain specific disarmament objectives.

What Secretary-General U Thant wanted the international community to be aware of was that, in the search for disarmament, time was running out on us, and that all of us had better be advised to proceed with deliberate speed and with a time-frame in mind.
It has always been the fervent hope of my delegation that in all the disarmament discussions -- be they here or in the Conference of the Committee Disarmament or elsewhere -- we would endeavour to focus our attention on specific problems with a view to seeking specific agreements, while always remaining mindful of the time available before some of the trends become irreversible.

It is not always a helpful posture to regard agreements on arms reduction only as a consequence of agreements in other areas, especially in big Power relations. While no doubt improvement in relations among the big Powers will particularly help to facilitate disarmament agreements -- and for this and also as a useful and commendable end in itself every effort should therefore be made in this direction -- we should also consider agreements in the disarmament field as a means of building international confidence and improving relations among States.

Timely action before an opportunity is lost and the end to which we wish to pursue the search for agreements on interim and partial disarmament measures should be the guiding considerations in all disarmament discussions, especially in direct negotiations involving the big Powers.

There is no more urgent matter today than the need to arrest the highly sophisticated arms race, which involves principally the two super-Powers. The belief by the big Powers that a potential adversary might succeed in making technological break-through, thus immediately endangering their security, is the driving force of the arms race. It is because of that fear that even those countries which have the capacity to destroy each other several times over keep pouring out money and much needed talent in an endless and illusory search for new and better weapons that would ensure their permanent superiority.

The recent agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, and perhaps the additional agreements that may emerge out of the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) will no doubt go some way towards arresting the "mad momentum" of this technological arms race. For that reason those agreements, limited as they may be in their immediate impact, should be welcomed
and supported. At the same time, however, we should not lose sight of the fact
that the SALT agreements have not placed any restrictions on the improvement of
the quality of missiles and their launching vehicles. The qualitative arms
race still goes on, with all its uncertainties for the future. Who can say for
certain whether such qualitative improvements in armaments may in the end
facilitate eventual disarmament by also improving the technology of detection
and control, which are crucial to the acceptability of any partial or
comprehensive disarmament agreement? It may perhaps be a prudent assumption,
but conventional wisdom now on this score seems to point to the possibility that
the qualitative arms race is increasingly making the problem of detection and
control more difficult.

Unless the two front-runners in the technological arms race take resolute
and timely action to halt that absurd race, a race which has no finishing line
in sight, they simply cannot realistically hope to prevail upon those who are
immediately behind them to stop. Unless they themselves stop first, the
front-runners will simply not have the moral authority for their pleas to be
heeded, nor will they be able to create a political incentive to their immediate
followers to abandon the race.

The urgency of moving forward with all deliberate speed in halting the
technological arms race cannot therefore be overemphasized. As long as the
qualitative arms race goes on at the pace at which it has proceeded in recent
years, even if some disarmament measures involving the reduction of forces are
taken, those measures may prove in the end to be illusory, because such
reductions would not result in the reduction of the capacity of some States
to inflict mass destruction, nor would they eliminate the present danger of
thermonuclear war.

Nowhere does the failure to seize an opportunity when it presents itself
seem more evident than with respect to the negotiations within the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament to reach a comprehensive test ban agreement.
Ten years after the partial test ban agreement we still have not succeeded in
halting both underground and atmospheric testing. Why is that so, despite
repeated and insistent demands by the United Nations, the latest being last year's
General Assembly resolution 2934 C (XXVII), which urged all nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt all nuclear weapon tests not later than 5 August 1973.

Part of the reason is no doubt the continuation of underground testing. That has provided partial justification to those who feel, in the interests of not compromising their sovereignty, that they should undertake testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. It is not difficult to understand, even if one does not agree with them, those who say that a situation that allows some nuclear-weapon States to go on perfecting and strengthening their nuclear defence system should not be used to deprive them from achieving what they consider a necessary deterrent.

By the same token it may be pointed out that if those who do not now consider themselves bound by the partial test ban agreement were to abstain from further testing in the atmosphere that in itself could constitute strong pressure for the immediate halting of all underground test explosions.

Be that as it may, there is no question that the halting of underground testing, either through a permanent agreement or through a moratorium, would slow down the technological arms race and also contribute to the kind of preconditions necessary for starting a meaningful process of nuclear disarmament.

In this respect my delegation has always been mindful of the problem of detection and verification, which has remained unsolved in the negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. For one thing, it is claimed that underground nuclear test explosions under a certain range cannot be conclusively detected. For another, it is contended that as national verification systems could conceivably be adequate to ensure the fair working of a comprehensive test ban agreement there would be no need for an international system of verification. While my delegation cannot underestimate the scientific and technological problems involved in establishing an acceptable verification system, it is not always free from doubt that there might not be, somewhere along the line, certain political misgivings that are compounding the technical difficulties.
My Government continues to believe that a combination of national and international systems of verification could be devised to ensure, without serious risk to the security of any party, a workable comprehensive test ban agreement. The risk involved in such a system would not, at any rate, be greater than the risk involved in the continuation of underground testing. What is required, therefore, is to summon the necessary political will, to dare to seize an opportunity that might be lost.
As provided for in the non-proliferation Treaty, the review after five years of operation approaches and the most obvious question to ask is whether all States have lived up to their commitments under its terms. Despite the fact that not all States that should have adhered to the Treaty have done so, it remains a matter of significance that the great majority of United Nations Members have become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. An increasing number of countries are also concluding the safeguard agreements required by the Treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It cannot, however, be said that all States have lived up to the full measure of their commitments under the Treaty, especially the commitment to arrest the nuclear-arms race.

I have already pointed out that this should not detract from the significance of the SALT agreements and the continuing SALT negotiations. It must be pointed out that a beginning, albeit a tentative one, has been made in the SALT agreements in this direction. However, the commitment under the Treaty to reach an early agreement on a comprehensive test ban remains conspicuously unfulfilled. Here again, the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement may provide some States with an incentive to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty. The continuing survival of the non-proliferation Treaty and its ability to attract more adherents will, in the final analysis, depend on how early the nuclear Powers begin a meaningful process of nuclear disarmament.

The increasing capacity to scale down nuclear weapons for possible tactical use poses an immediate danger to the non-proliferation Treaty. If this trend is allowed to continue, there is no question that sooner or later the threshold between nuclear and conventional fire-power will be lost. If that comes to pass, it would certainly put the non-nuclear Powers in a more discriminatory position than they are now in under the non-proliferation Treaty, probably destroying, for some at least, whatever incentive they might have had to continue adhering to it. The need for a moratorium on the development of tactical nuclear weapons therefore cannot be overemphasized.

As a victim of the unrestricted use of chemical weapons on the eve of the Second World War, the Ethiopian people know too well the horrors of chemical warfare and have since emerged from that experience stronger in their conviction that the use of all weapons of mass destruction should be outlawed.
It was precisely this experience that prompted the Ethiopian delegation to propose to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly that the use of nuclear weapons be declared to be against the laws of nations. As a result of this initiative, the well-known General Assembly Declaration has emerged. However, the task of raising these declaratory rules to the level of a legally binding convention still remains unfulfilled.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 established legal rules by banning the use of all chemical means of warfare. Its prohibition is comprehensive and does not allow any exception. Its main drawback has been that quite a number of countries, some with the proven ability to produce chemical weapons, have not adhered to it. Another problem is that the parties to the Treaty have entered only into a commitment not to use chemical weapons against each other. The Protocol conceivably allows the parties to stock chemical weapons as a deterrent against use by non-signatories. Under these circumstances, it was not possible to bring about the elimination of chemical weapons from the arsenals of the major military Powers and to ban their development and stockpiling.

Despite this serious defect, and considering the high point of achievement the Geneva Protocol represents in men's efforts to mitigate the horrors of war, it is the fervent hope of my delegation that the present effort to eliminate and ban chemical weapons should not detract from it, but, by building further, should on the contrary strengthen the Geneva agreement.

The draft treaty that will, it is hoped, emerge from the CCD should therefore be one that is comprehensive in its prohibition. We know that this is easier said than done. We are quite aware of the difficulties involved in providing for the prohibition of all sorts of chemicals that could conceivably be used in warfare. Still more, we realize the enormous difficulties such a blanket prohibition would create for the establishment of a verification system in which all States would have reasonable faith in a treaty that seeks to eliminate and ban chemical weapons.
On the other hand, to allow exceptions based on the degree of toxicity or on other criteria would, in effect, be inviting those that are intent on developing a capacity in chemical warfare to apply their ingenuity to the search for certain chemicals that might not have been covered by the Treaty. Such exceptions could be so numerous as to make the entire effort illusory and useless.

My delegation agrees with those who maintain that the scope of the prohibition in any eventual agreement on the elimination and banning of chemical weapons should be defined by purpose. Once the general scope is established by purpose, it is always possible to engage in the supplementary exercise of drawing up lists of chemicals that may or may not be covered by the Treaty. Obviously, such an exercise has to be undertaken on very practical and detailed considerations, especially with regard to avoiding hindrance to the peaceful uses of certain chemicals.

Central to any treaty to eliminate and ban chemical weapons is the question of verification. Great as are the technical difficulties in this respect, it is our hope that they are not insurmountable. No one can suggest that it is possible to develop a fool-proof verification system. We therefore cannot afford to lose a practical solution while searching for an ideal one. It seems to us that the possible solution in this respect could also be effective in practice. It could also be one that would involve a minimum of risk to all. The best approach in this respect is one that combines a national system of verification with an international one.

Again, time is not with us in our effort to seek a solution to the danger posed by chemical weapons. It is conceivable that scientific developments might overtake our efforts. Only yesterday, Mrs. Myrdal reminded us of the difficulty that the introduction of binary chemical weapons could pose.

There is no question that our preoccupation with the immediate danger posed by the arms race has relegated to a secondary position the question
of general and complete disarmament. This is unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable. On whatever priorities we may agree in our disarmament discussions, we should all realize that, in the final analysis, the problems of disarmament are intertwined. Surely, we cannot hope to see significant progress in nuclear disarmament as long as some nuclear States may feel threatened by an overwhelming superiority in conventional armaments that a potential adversary may possess.
There is need, therefore, to carry forward the initiatives undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States in submitting proposals for general and complete disarmament. Perhaps it might be useful at this juncture to encourage those two countries to submit new proposals in this area which would take into account recent developments.

We also express our sincere hope that the European conference on security and co-operation and the conference for the mutual reduction of forces in central Europe will make a significant contribution in this respect by making progress in this area possible.

Ethiopia has consistently supported all efforts directed at creating nuclear-free zones. Ethiopia is among those countries that initiated efforts within the Organization of African Unity to make Africa a nuclear-free zone. We hope that these efforts will reach fruition soon.

We believe that the non-nuclear Powers can make no greater contribution to international security than by taking initiatives to indicate their desire to keep nuclear weapons out of their regions. Once they do that, it is reasonable to expect that the nuclear Powers will respond to the wishes of the non-nuclear Powers by undertaking a commitment to them not to introduce nuclear weapons into their areas.

Ethiopia also supports the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. We hope that both the littoral and the major naval Powers will co-operate in carrying out the intent of the Assembly's declaration. We also hope that an eventual agreement in this regard will prohibit the establishment in the area, by any of the major Powers, of naval or other military bases.

Ethiopia continues to support the convening of a World Disarmament Conference. My Foreign Minister, speaking in the General Assembly on 25 September, made this clear by stating that Ethiopia considers that "a carefully prepared and properly convened ... conference could be a useful exercise". (A/PV.2127, p. 61) We are all familiar with the problem that developed with regard to participation. We can only express the hope that even at this late hour some sort of accommodation can be worked out to ensure the widest possible participation, should we decide to hold the conference in the very near future.
Finally, by way of conclusion I should like to address a few remarks on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a forum for disarmament negotiations. Having been a member of the CCD right from its inception, we can testify to the fact that there is no intrinsic flaw in its mechanism. We believe that its methods of work have been realistic enough to allow the major nuclear Powers to engage in direct negotiations and to take the most important initiatives while, at the same time, enabling the small non-nuclear Powers to make a contribution. It is also significant to emphasize that the non-nuclear countries on the CCD have always acted as a surrogate to the great majority of the non-nuclear States Members of the United Nations that are not represented on it. In that capacity, they have acted as a transmission belt in carrying to the CCD the concern and the ideas emanating from this large group of United Nations Members. If we have not been able to achieve the progress that we had hoped for, certainly it is not because of any defect in the CCD mechanism. The problem, as we all realize, is in the lack of will to make those crucial decisions to move forward. The non-participation in the CCD of two nuclear Powers has also proved a serious drawback, but, as we also realize, the problem in this respect is not with the CCD as a forum. The non-participation of those Powers is motivated by other considerations as well.

As I close my remarks, I wish to emphasize a point that I made at the outset, namely, the time factor that we should keep in mind in all disarmament negotiations. Time certainly is not with us. Time in some important instances is, in fact, running out on us. It is therefore necessary in all discussions concerning disarmament that we keep an eye on certain specific time frames for the initiation of a forward process of disarmament. Once such opportunities are lost, they might not be retrieved.

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): I am sure I shall not win a popularity contest by entering the list at this late stage and at this late hour, but I was under the mistaken impression that the general debate would continue until Monday. It is certainly a tribute to the Chairman's leadership that we are finishing it today.
Having participated in the disarmament debate already for six years, I felt that the record was beginning to show pronounced signs of scratch and that what might once have had the effect of high fidelity was likely to produce the contrary effect of monotony. But I fear that my silence would be construed as indifference to the problem or as a supine acceptance of the present misguided approach to this terrible problem as reflected primarily in the attitude of the major Powers.

My delegation heard with the deepest regret that one of the most intrepid and most vocal crusaders in the cause of disarmament will not be participating hereafter in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I refer to Mrs. Myrdal of Sweden. The CCD will be even less effective and less representative of the conscience of humanity without someone of her sincerity and tenacity of purpose. We salute her for her unique contribution to a worthy but apparently, and regrettably, lost cause.

The most penetrating examination of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament contained in document A/9141 of 7 September 1973, gives little cause for anything but general and complete disenchantment over the progress made in that body. In section II, part A of the report, under the title "Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament", certain views expressed by Members have been reported which do not get to the heart of the problem. For example, the failure of two nuclear Powers to participate in the Committee's discussions has been deemed regrettable as it has prevented progress in regard to the most important issue of all, namely, a comprehensive test-ban treaty.
Again, the early ratification of or accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by all States, and first of all by those possessing the material and technical capabilities for developing nuclear weapons, has also been urged as if it were of paramount importance. Another view expressed was that nations have a common stake in preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that no one could gain by taking action that would weaken the Treaty. Nothing could undermine more seriously the non-proliferation Treaty and diminish the already faint hopes of real disarmament than the present policy of the two most powerful nuclear nations that are engaged in a completely unrestrained and irrational expansion and refinement of their nuclear armories.

Expressions of the conviction that the Treaty could and would continue to be a constructive and positive course in international relations and that something should be done for continuing fulfilment of the Treaty's fundamental purposes -- I am referring to the non-proliferation Treaty -- balks the main problem, and that was -- as stated by the representative of Egypt, whose observations are recorded -- the interest of the whole of mankind to ensure a replacement of the current precarious and dangerous state of affairs by a system of true nuclear disarmament, banning tests, development, manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. The tactics of those who evade the main issues by drawing attention to subsidiary problems are diversionary and not constructive.

With regard to the question of the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and their destruction, the opinion continues to be expressed that the Treaty in regard to biological weapons was a stupendous achievement, while as regards the banning of chemical weapons there has been a tedious repetition of the excuses given in the past. The international community was persuaded by the major Powers to accept the draft Convention on bacteriological (biological) weapons by an assurance, seemingly made in good faith, that it would be followed immediately by a convention on chemical weapons. The failure to agree on a convention with regard to chemical weapons constitutes as perverse a breach of faith as has been experienced with regard to the 10-year-old assurance that the partial test-ban Treaty would soon be followed by a comprehensive test-ban treaty.
As we have stated in the past, the only arms control measures which have so far been adopted have consisted of the renunciation of methods and weapons of warfare which have become obsolete, and the world is supposed to applaud this achievement. Another achievement cited with great pride as an advance towards general and complete disarmament is the sea-bed denuclearization Treaty, adopted in 1971, that became effective from 18 May 1972. Here is another example of an almost perfectly useless treaty. The reason for saying so is that it outlaws nuclear weapon systems fixed on the sea-bed only; but as there is hardly any military interest of value in such systems, because of the existence of alternative methods even more effective that are not prohibited by the Treaty, it serves no purpose whatsoever. The world must not allow itself to continue to be duped into accepting these instruments as positive contributions to nuclear disarmament or to international peace and security.

In the past the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would come to the General Assembly with a Christmas gift in the form of one convention or another. Both last year and this year we have had no season's greetings from the cozy and exclusive club which fields a team with two captains and several non-playing members. It is not surprising, therefore, that questions should be raised as to the utility of this body and whether it has not now become a museum piece, denied the capacity to influence progress towards disarmament, while the two most powerful nuclear nations reserve to themselves the right to discuss and determine what they consider to be measures of disarmament but what, in effect, amount to an agreement to preserve their overwhelming superiority and to arrive at arrangements that would deter them from attacking each other. Such an understanding could easily lend itself to the sinister interpretation that they are free to attack others with their phenomenal arsenal of nuclear weapons.

It has been stated that, for a gradual approach to the problem of chemical warfare, there must be an essential relationship between the scope of activities to be prohibited and the possibilities of verification. It has been claimed by one major nuclear Power that it is exercising restraint in its programme for the development of chemical weapons. When you have exceeded all reasonable
limits of production and accumulation of stockpiles of chemical weapons, restraint is neither a virtue, a discipline nor a sacrifice. It is no sacrifice to continue to feed oneself when one is sated.

We are asked to believe that détente between the two super Powers improves the prospects for disarmament. On the contrary, it would appear that all that it has established is an understanding between the two to set limits far beyond all reasonable or practical requirements. We agree with the representative of France that détente is not effective in the field of disarmament. As the same representative asked, which is the greater danger, testing or the possession of nuclear weapons? Let us face that question and give an honest answer. We would serve the cause of humanity and peace better, and perhaps avert the threat of nuclear annihilation, if we stopped badgering only those who conduct atmospheric tests. While demanding that the atmosphere should not be polluted, we should consider seriously and in a scientific way the effects of those tests and realize that the problem should not be considered in isolation from the gravest of all dangers -- that of nuclear war -- and the gravest of all problems -- the means of its prevention. During the years when certain Powers were developing a nuclear capability through atmospheric testing, little was heard of the threat to the environment. It is noteworthy that those who conduct underground tests have been prudently silent and have not joined in the chorus of denunciation of the Mururoa tests.
It is here that I feel some sympathy with the British Foreign Secretary's attitude to the Maruroa tests, an attitude that was described most appropriately and with superb disdain by the Labour Party's Shadow Foreign Secretary as "having the glacial coolness of a Scotch salmon on a fishmonger's lap".

We appreciate the fact that those who, like us in Sri Lanka, are remote from the area in which these atmospheric tests are being conducted do not experience the same sense of apprehension and anxiety as the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Fijians and those who live close to the area and in the very shadow of those tests. We do not want to be in the position of Kipling's butterfly on the road which preached contentment to the toad that was under the harrow. But those protests against atmospheric tests should be accompanied by an equally strong denunciation of underground tests. In saying this, we do not feel that we are dissociating ourselves entirely from the protests against atmospheric testing.

We have always maintained that four steps must be taken concurrently and four commitments assumed concurrently if nuclear weapons are to be banned and eliminated: first of all, a total and unqualified denunciation of the use of nuclear weapons; secondly, a comprehensive test-ban treaty; thirdly, the total cessation of the manufacture of all nuclear weapons; and, finally, the dismantling of the nuclear arsenals of all those who possess them.

On this occasion we have dealt only in general terms with the question; we shall be more specific when the draft resolutions under these items come up for consideration. Our interest, needless to say, is concentrated on the question of the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal, which we do not regard as a disarmament question.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has now concluded the general debate on agenda items 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38.

Before I make some comments concerning our future work, I call on the representative of Portugal who wishes to exercise his right of reply.
Mr. LOPES da FONSECA (Portugal): The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said in his statement this morning that my country is using napalm weapons in its provinces of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique. I want firmly to deny that accusation. Portugal is not using and will not use such weapons -- as a matter of principle, as a matter of fact; and, if anything needed to be added, even our troops are deprived of such weaponry. That accusation is part of a demagogic propaganda machinery against my country. For the effects of such a policy the accusation of the use of napalm weapons is itself a sensible weapon in that regrettable demagogic arsenal; but I am sure it will not have any effect on people of good faith.
The CHAIRMAN: Representatives now have before them the following
draft resolutions: document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 on agenda item 34, Napalm and
other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use; documents
A/C.1/L.651 and L.652 on agenda item 36, Urgent need for suspension of
nuclear and thermonuclear tests; document A/C.1/L.653 on agenda item 35,
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons; and document A/C.1/L.654
on agenda item 37, Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII)
concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of
Tlatelolco).

Of those draft resolutions, the ones under agenda items 34 and 37
have already been introduced in the Committee; the others have not, and I
hope that they will be introduced at our meeting tomorrow morning.

In addition, I understand that a draft resolution on agenda item 38,
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, may be ready for
introduction in the Committee tomorrow, although possibly not before the
afternoon meeting.

Thus, three disarmament items remain under which no draft resolutions
have so far been submitted: item 29, Economic and social consequences of
the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects; item 32, World Disarmament
Conference; and item 33, General and complete disarmament. I hope that members
who intend to submit draft resolutions on those items will do so very soon.

At our meeting yesterday afternoon, the representative of Belgium
asked whether it was my intention to put any of the draft resolutions to
the vote tomorrow. Several members of the Committee have indicated to me
that they would be reluctant to proceed to the vote tomorrow, and I certainly
would not wish to place anyone in an embarrassing position in that regard.
I believe, however, that there is one draft resolution -- that in document
A/C.1/L.654, on the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- on which the Committee could
vote tomorrow and, if no member raises any objection during the morning
meeting, I propose to put it to the vote during the afternoon meeting.
To sum up: during our meetings tomorrow, members of the Committee will have an opportunity to speak on the draft resolutions which have already been introduced or which, as I hope, will be introduced either in the morning or in the afternoon. As I said yesterday, in principle it would be better to discuss the draft resolutions in the numerical order of the agenda items to which they apply, but since that will obviously be impossible tomorrow, I think that in order not to waste any of our time we shall have to have a "pell-mell" discussion, as it were.

At the afternoon meeting, as I have said, I propose to put to the vote the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.654.

I think that on Monday we shall be able to proceed in a more orderly fashion, taking up each of the outstanding draft resolutions, concluding the discussion on it and then proceeding to vote on it.

As members know, we have the option of concluding our consideration of the items on disarmament and the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace either on 13 November or on 14 November. I believe that we should take a decision in that regard at the meeting on Monday morning. If we are to do that, we shall have to set that meeting also as the time-limit for the introduction of draft resolutions -- at least on all those items whose consideration we are sure we can conclude on 14 November at the latest.

I understand that there is a strong possibility that the work on draft resolutions on items 32 and 33 will not be sufficiently advanced to enable us to conclude our discussion of them and to vote by 14 November. In that case, it would be necessary to postpone action on those two items until later in the session. Of course if it were possible to conclude our consideration of those items -- or at least one of them -- by 14 November that would be very desirable. If that cannot be done, then we may
find it possible to deal with all the other disarmament items by the end of the day on 13 November -- suspending our discussions on the remaining ones until later in the session -- and to proceed to the Korean question on 14 November. But we can wait to decide on that until the end of the meeting on Monday morning.

As there appear to be no comments, I take it that members agree that we should follow the procedure I have outlined.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.