United States was clearly looking for a way, preferably a back door, to supply nuclear weapons to some of its allies. It might well be that the United States needed its military alliance with West Germany in order to maintain tension in Europe and exert its influence in European affairs. Apparently, that was its chief reason for encouraging the West German revanchists to think that they would have access to nuclear weapons. An attempt was also being made to encourage the belief that a treaty on non-proliferation did not exclude active participation in nuclear groupings with military aims, but world public opinion would not be so easily deceived.

4. The United States efforts to mislead world public opinion, including American opinion, on such an important question as non-proliferation could be discerned also in the manoeuvres employed by the highest United States authorities in order to spread the idea that the United States war in Viet-Nam was designed to secure peace. At the Manila Conference, held on 24–25 October 1966, the United States had tried to mobilize the efforts of its allies in its war against the Viet-Namese people and at the same time had spoken of its desire to achieve peace by escalating the war.

5. What the United Kingdom representative had said (1432nd meeting) about the delicate and fragile nature of goodwill in international relations applied not only to questions of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also to the disastrous consequences of the war in Viet-Nam. United States efforts to break the resistance of the Viet-Namese people were doomed to failure. But unless manoeuvres to allow the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in nuclear arrangements were brought to an end, and unless the United States abandoned the idea that it could allow nuclear weapons to proliferate in its own alliances but not in other alliances, it would be difficult, indeed impossible, to conclude a treaty on non-proliferation. Although on the one hand the United States had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution on the renunciation of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the other hand it was trying to hamper the conclusion of such an agreement by its implied promise that access to nuclear weapons would be left open to the German revanchists.

6. The German Democratic Republic, for its part, had solemnly declared that it was prepared to assume the obligation, under international law, of renouncing nuclear weapons if the Federal Republic of Germany would do the same. A similar declaration by the Federal Republic of Germany would be of great help in securing the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from German territory and in banning such weapons
from German territory. If the United States genuinely desired a treaty on non-proliferation without loopholes, it should support the Soviet draft, which had no loopholes. Its repeated assertions that the Soviet draft was directed against United States alliances and might lead to their dissolution were tantamount to saying that the United States wished to continue with its military alliances at the cost of disarmament and, in particular, at the cost of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

7. The non-nuclear Powers wanted guarantees that the nuclear Powers would respect the territory of any country where there were no nuclear weapons or installations. Nevertheless, some Governments were straining to offer their territory to the nuclear forces of other Governments. In a message from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Eighteen-Nation Committee dated 1 February 1966, the Soviet Government had declared its willingness to include in the draft treaty an article banning the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries parties to the treaty which had no nuclear weapons in their territory. That was an adequate safeguard. It would be too much to expect a ban on the use of nuclear weapons against countries which had such weapons on their territory, even though those weapons were at the disposal of a military alliance.

8. Adoption of the draft resolution would contribute to the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation and would thereby improve the prospects for more rapid progress toward disarmament.

9. Mr. AZNAR (Spain) said that in the quarter of a century since man had achieved mastery over the atom, international relations had increasingly felt the harsh impact of the nuclear weapon. In the era of the balance of terror, much had been said and written on the subject of disarmament. Dozens of disarmament plans had been prepared, but to no avail. The world still echoed with the appeal of Pope Paul VI to end the arms race which was leading mankind toward an abyss. The United Nations was faced with a severe challenge and it must not fail in its supreme task of building peace.

10. The conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation was perhaps the most urgent first step towards general and complete disarmament. The principles contained in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) were accepted, but the debates in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had revealed disagreement on three important questions: first, the exact scope of the term "proliferation" and the direct or indirect forms that it might take; secondly, the relationship between a treaty on non-proliferation and collateral measures leading to general and complete disarmament; and, thirdly, the guarantees non-nuclear States required for their security.

11. A treaty on non-proliferation must take into account the divergent interests of States and two fundamental considerations: first, however important and urgent it was, a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself but a means to achieve general and complete disarmament; and, secondly, the nuclear Powers must accept a discipline of self-limitation and refrain from directly or indirectly disseminating nuclear weapons, while non-nuclear Powers, for their part, must undertake not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.

12. The aim was to establish a balance of sacrifices by all groups of States requiring adequate guarantees for their security. A non-nuclear Power would not achieve security simply by becoming a nuclear Power or even by means of the guarantees which it might receive from one or several members of the "nuclear club". The only possible security lay in a disarmed world.

13. There were today a score of countries, any of which could become a nuclear Power by political decision. Moreover, there were unresolved political conflicts which might take a tragic course if one of the parties concerned became a nuclear Power. To avert that potential tragedy, prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons was both imperative and urgent. The non-nuclear States must sacrifice their future nuclear capability while the nuclear Powers, for their part, must put an end to the arms race to which they were driven by the same reasons which impelled a non-nuclear State to acquire nuclear weapons. In so doing, both nuclear and non-nuclear States would have to accept certain limitations of sovereignty in the matter of disarmament and agree to follow regulations to be established by the United Nations.

14. His delegation welcomed the draft resolution and the very interesting draft submitted by Pakistan (A/C.1/L.372) under agenda item 26.

15. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that certain great Powers, particularly two of them, had tried to secure the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through secret negotiations, pressure on other Governments, and manoeuvres at international conferences or in the United Nations and its organs. The proposal to include the item "Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" and the draft resolution sponsored by the two super-Powers (A/C.1/L.358/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-5) were part of the same effort and had the same aim. The Albanian Government was firmly opposed to that dangerous plan, in keeping with its policy of peace and steadfast struggle against all the dangerous machinations of the United States and its collaborators, its determination to do all in its power for the cause of peace and the freedom of peaceful peoples and nations, and its devotion to the principles of the sovereignty and sovereign equality of all States, great or small.

16. Today, as in the past, Albania favoured general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, the complete destruction of nuclear weapons, and complete and definitive prohibition of their production and testing. Such a prohibition would provide an immediate solution to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

17. Since Albania had always denounced the dangerous plans of the United States to provide nuclear weapons to West Germany through a "multilateral force" or any other means, it could appreciate the views of
some peaceful countries on the question of a treaty on non-proliferation. However, such a treaty would not meet the aspirations of the peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples and countries. On the contrary, it was aimed at perpetuating the nuclear monopoly of certain Powers, for use as a threat and a blackmail weapon against the social and national liberation struggle of peoples and against all countries fighting to safeguard and consolidate their sovereignty and national independence.

18. The representatives of the nuclear Powers had advanced identical views and arguments in the Committee to persuade other countries to support their draft resolution, but the arguments were completely unconvincing. For example, no one could take seriously their claim that the aggravation of international tension and the threat of a nuclear war were caused by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was well known that the true cause could be found in the policy of certain Powers, chiefly the United States, which was constantly intensifying the arms race, brandishing atomic weapons, and attempting to suppress the national liberation movements of oppressed peoples by such acts of aggression as its barbarous war against the Viet–Norse people.

19. While the United States policy of world domination and the nuclear weapons monopoly of two great Powers were creating anxiety and tension in the world, the possession of nuclear weapons by peaceful countries, on the other hand, reduced the ability of the super-Powers to blackmail other countries and actually constituted an important factor for peace by deterring the potential aggressor. All peaceful countries and countries had enthusiastically hailed the recent explosion of a nuclear missile by the People’s Republic of China. That success had greatly encouraged the heroic Viet–Norse people, who knew well that the possession of nuclear weapons and rockets by the Chinese people was a great victory for the forces of peace. The People’s Republic of China was developing its nuclear armaments solely for defensive purposes; in its communiqué of 27 October 1966 concerning the guided missile–nuclear weapon test, it had pledged once again that it would under no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.

20. The claim that the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation would be an important step towards settling the problems of disarmament was empty and hollow. Such a treaty could only ensure the nuclear monopoly of certain Powers. The proposed texts said nothing about existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and did not prohibit the utilization, production or further improvement of such weapons. A treaty on non-proliferation would no more halt the nuclear arms race than the ill-famed Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer and under water, signed at Moscow in 1963, had halted nuclear testing.

21. So long as the United States, the most aggressive Power in the world, held huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and continued to maintain nuclear rockets and weapons on foreign soil, the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation could not ease international tensions or serve the cause of peace. Furthermore, such a treaty would seriously endanger the sovereignty of States and, in particular, their supreme prerogative of national defence.

22. Some States, recognizing the gravity of the commitments and concessions they would be making by signing a treaty on non-proliferation, had proposed that the treaty should include a clause prohibiting the nuclear Powers from using nuclear weapons against countries which did not possess such weapons. Such a clause could not be truly effective. It would constitute tacit acquiescence in, and encouragement of, the use of nuclear weapons by one nuclear Power against another. It was unthinkable that in the event of a nuclear war the peaceful non-nuclear countries would escape the consequences. Such a clause would promote neither the safety of the non-nuclear States nor international peace and security.

23. Albania believed that the only valid solution to the problem of nuclear weapons was a radical solution involving all the countries of the world and leading to the prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons. To that end, his Government reiterated its complete support for the Chinese Government’s proposal for a summit conference, in which all countries would take part, to examine the question of the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.

24. The adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1–6 would have serious consequences even for those Member States which wished to preserve their freedom of action with regard to the treaty itself. The fact was that, since the nuclear Powers concerned would have had great difficulty in persuading the peaceful States to sign a treaty, they had preferred the devious route of first securing the adoption of that draft resolution by the General Assembly. Once that serious limitation of the non-nuclear States’ freedom of action was secured, the nuclear Powers could proceed further toward their goal of a treaty on non-proliferation.

25. The peoples of the world needed measures that would permanently eliminate the danger of nuclear war. The draft treaties submitted by the nuclear Powers were designed instead to secure their nuclear monopoly. Adoption of the drafts would entail many dangers, including that of lulling the peoples into illusions that would weaken their vigilance against the aggressive policies and plots of the imperialists and their collaborators. His delegation firmly opposed any treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and would therefore vote against the draft resolution.

26. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) said that prospects for the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation appeared to be better today than in earlier years, thanks to a better understanding of the need to reconcile differing viewpoints, to the mutual desire of the principal nuclear Powers to reach agreement and to a fuller recognition of the views and security interests of the non-nuclear Powers. Nevertheless, a number of obstacles remained: the growing international tensions in several areas, an intensification of the nuclear arms race, conventional arms races in some regions, and differences of opinion on European security.

27. A treaty on non-proliferation must not be an end in itself but a means for achieving higher objectives,
the most important of which was general and complete nuclear disarmament. For that reason, the treaty should be accompanied or immediately followed by other measures, such as the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. All concerned should make a commitment to take such measures, a number of which had been mentioned during the debate by the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and many other States. Those steps were not limited to the nuclear field but included other areas having a direct bearing on the prospects for nuclear disarmament.

23. Unfortunately, there was still a strong trend towards the perpetuation of disputes rather than their peaceful settlement. Renewed and vigorous efforts must be undertaken to break existing deadlocks, to reduce dangerous tensions and to achieve a wider measure of international accommodation, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had indicated in his message of 1 February 1966 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

29. The eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had stressed the idea of the mutual obligations and responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, and the nuclear Powers themselves had recognized the need for giving consideration to the security problems of the non-nuclear Powers. While those problems might require different solutions, depending on the specific situation, a suitably formulated agreement on non-proliferation could itself provide a certain measure of reassurance. It should include an article by which the signatories pledged themselves to refrain from the threat or use of force, to settle disputes by peaceful means, and to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of all States.

30. He hoped that the variety of specific measures proposed for balancing the responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers would be favourably considered by the Eighteen-Nation Committee when it reconvened at Geneva. In particular, his delegation endorsed the Japanese proposal to include a provision for review.

31. One of the most serious problems mentioned in connexion with the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation was the existence of conventional arms races in various parts of the world, as both the Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report (A/630/1/Add.1), and the President of the United States, in his message of 27 January 1966 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, had pointed out. His delegation was gratified to note that President Johnson's suggestion for the limitation of regional arms races on the initiative of the countries concerned had been included in the four-point programme submitted to the First Committee by the United States representative (1341st meeting, para. 28).

32. The draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-6) would help to create the kind of international climate needed for the success of the Geneva disarmament negotiations. His delegation therefore supported it.

33. Mr. RAMANI (Malaysia) said that his delegation had always urged that a treaty on non-proliferation should include specific commitments by the non-nuclear Powers not to develop nuclear weapons and not to acquire or accept them from other States. He therefore welcomed the fact that many non-nuclear Powers had joined the nuclear Powers in sponsoring the draft resolution. He was confident that the Committee would adopt it, but its adoption would evidently create new and urgent problems for the non-nuclear Powers. For that reason, Malaysia whole-heartedly supported the Pakistan draft resolution (A/C.1/L.372) submitted under agenda item 26, recommending the convening of a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States not later than July 1967.

34. The members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had urged Members of the United Nations, and even others outside the Organization, to refrain from a build-up of nuclear weapons; yet, paradoxically, members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee were continuing to test, improve and stockpile nuclear weapons. In spite of the complex problems of inspection and verification, it was vital that the nuclear Powers should be required to call a halt to that process. He suggested that each of the nuclear super-Powers should make an immediate and solemn pledge to do so on a specified date, say 31 December 1966. Any arguments about the conditions that must be satisfied could continue after, rather than before, that commitment was made.

35. He was deeply concerned about the prospect that nuclear explosives might be made available to non-nuclear Powers for peaceful purposes. Some nuclear States had said that they might, at some future time, provide other States with the benefits of nuclear explosives technology, but that they would continue to retain control over the nuclear devices themselves; representatives of other States had criticized that suggestion on the ground that knowledge, whether nuclear or any other kind, could not be contained within geographical boundaries. General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) cautioned against loop-holes in a treaty on non-proliferation. But the proposition that nuclear explosives technology should be disseminated without restriction in the name of freedom of scientific knowledge was not a mere loop-hole but a wide-open door for the direct proliferation of nuclear weapons knowledge. According to the London newspaper The Observer of 30 October 1966, for example, the recent nuclear missile explosion in China had been made possible by the unrestricted publication of vital information on missile technology in United States technical journals. Malaysia therefore believed that the dissemination of such knowledge to non-nuclear-weapon Powers should be prevented, like the dissemination of nuclear weapons themselves. If the nuclear-weapon Powers were to be required not only to refrain from the further production of nuclear weapons, but also to destroy their existing stockpiles, it was entirely fair to require the non-nuclear-weapon Powers, in the name of the "acceptable balance" mentioned in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), to refrain from acquiring the knowledge required for the production of nuclear weapons.

36. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) said that his delegation had already indicated its strong support
for the draft resolution, which appeared also to meet with general approval. The appeal in the draft resolution was addressed to all States, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. As had been stated by the United States representative at the 1431st meeting, on 20 October, his Government felt that all should refrain from any action that could jeopardize a treaty on non-proliferation, from arrangements contrary to the spirit of the treaty, from raising extraneous political issues, and from any delaying tactics. Virtually every speaker in the foregoing discussion had welcomed the hopeful prospect offered by the discussions which his country and the Soviet Union had undertaken with a view to overcoming the remaining obstacles to agreement, and most speakers had shown restraint in referring to past differences and obstacles. He did feel obliged, however, to refute certain charges against his Government's policy and against the Federal Republic of Germany which some representatives had repeated. The Czechoslovak and Hungarian representatives, in particular, had followed the Soviet representative's example in implying that the rapidly growing civilian nuclear programme in West Germany might ultimately be diverted to military purposes. As those representatives were well aware, the truth was that the Federal Republic was the only country which had by treaty forsworn the production of nuclear weapons. Every peaceful nuclear installation in the Federal Republic was—likewise under a solemn treaty obligation—subject to effective international safeguards and inspection by the European Atomic Energy Community. On 25 March 1966 the Government of the Federal Republic had stated that it intended to require IAEA safeguards on its exports of nuclear equipment outside the Euratom area.

37. It was strange that the representatives of certain Eastern European countries should make charges of that kind when their own nuclear installations were not as yet subject to any international safeguards at all. The charges were all the more regrettable in the light of the assurance given on 26 October 1966 that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was, in collaboration with the other member States of the European Atomic Energy Community, giving very serious consideration to the recent Polish-Czech proposal to place nuclear facilities in Poland and Czechoslovakia under IAEA safeguards, provided that the Federal Republic agreed to do the same.

38. Several representatives, and in particular the Bulgarian representative, had repeated allegations that the Federal Republic was anxious to exploit collective nuclear defence arrangements in NATO as a means of acquiring nuclear weapons of its own. He did not intend to follow the example of those representatives by introducing extraneous political issues into the discussion; but he wished to stress again the conviction of all members of NATO, including the Federal Republic, that, while non-nuclear members of the alliance were entitled to express their views on their collective nuclear defence, as they were on their conventional defence, such an arrangement need not and must not involve or lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

39. Finally, some representatives had portrayed the Federal Republic's policies as an obstacle to normal relations and lasting security in Europe. Such misguided attempts to equate the West German people's desire for peaceful reunification with revanchism were particularly out of place in the United Nations, where the right of all peoples to self-determination occupied so much of the Assembly's attention. The main obstacles to harmonious relations and lasting security in Europe were, surely, being created by Governments which persisted in denying that right to the German people and sought to maintain old enmities for anachronistic ideological reasons. The Federal Republic had, in fact, taken important initiatives to improve its relations with the peoples of Eastern Europe; and that movement towards reconciliation and normalization would be given further impetus by the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. The Committee should therefore concentrate its attention on constructive ways of facilitating agreement and should not waste any more time on recriminations.

40. The Albanian representative, by opposing the views of the overwhelming majority, had himself provided the most convincing refutation of his irresponsible charges.

41. Mr. ROTH (South Africa), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, recalled that the Syrian representative had alleged that there had been no international verification of assurances that nuclear development in South Africa was being pursued exclusively for peaceful purposes.

42. In fact the research reactor at Pelindaba, together with its fuel, was subject to IAEA safeguards, which called for one inspection a year. The first inspection had been made in November 1965 and the second was to be made soon. In addition, the South African Atomic Energy Board reported periodically to IAEA on the operation of the Pelindaba reactor in accordance with the IAEA safeguards requirements. It was clear from a report by the Director-General of IAEA for the period 1 November to 31 December 1965, which contained a statement on the November 1965 inspection, that the Inspector and the Director General had been fully satisfied that the reactor in South Africa was not furthering any military purposes. That information, of course, was available to all the members of IAEA, including Syria.

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.1/L.366/REV.1 AND REV.1/ADD.1-6)

43. Mr. Orhan ERLAP (Turkey) said that, in order to understand the significance of the appeal in the draft resolution, it was essential to consider the desires and anxieties of non-nuclear States such as his own, as expressed in the joint memorandum of 19 August 1966 submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, side by side with the positions of the nuclear Powers as outlined by their representatives in the First Committee's current discussion. The non-nuclear States, for their part, were anxious that a treaty on non-proliferation should, as recommended in General Assembly reso-

olution 2028 (XX), paragraph 2 (b), embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. As the eight non-aligned countries had stated in their memorandum, the treaty should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce and eliminate stocks of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear Powers were concerned, too, about the question of the guarantees to be accorded them in return for their undertaking not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, and they also hoped to benefit from the peaceful uses and potentials of nuclear energy after a treaty on non-proliferation had been signed. A sharing of the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology would call for the application of international safeguards; and he was glad to note the new trend towards universal acceptance of IAEA controls. All those issues required further negotiation and consideration, but they did not raise any insurmountable obstacles to the conclusion of a treaty. The clarification of issues, which had been recognized as the most important achievement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at its last series of meetings, might indeed have proceeded far enough to bring agreement within reach already.

44. In the meantime, pledges by the non-nuclear Powers—and particularly by key States which were technically capable of producing nuclear weapons—that they would refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons and that they would accept IAEA control without unjustified conditions, would further improve the encouraging atmosphere in which the Committee's discussion had begun. He welcomed the unilateral pledges to that effect given by Canada, Japan and other States.

45. He had been greatly encouraged by the conciliatory statements of the Soviet and the United States representatives, who had both assured the Committee that their countries did not regard a treaty on non-proliferation as an end in itself, but as a step towards the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament. The United Kingdom representative had made a declaration of his Government's intent to consolidate the area of agreement after the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, and the representatives of the two major nuclear Powers had said that their countries had no intention of perpetuating a nuclear monopoly.

46. As the draft resolution appeared to embody all the elements required for facilitating the early conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, his delegation had joined in sponsoring it and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

47. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that his delegation would vote for the draft resolution not because proliferation endangered the security of States—which might indeed be endangered by other developments as well—but because proliferation was the greatest threat to mankind and its survival. At the present stage he had no intention of submitting a formal amendment; but the sponsors might have done well to add the words "and immeasurably increase the threat of a nuclear confrontation" after the words "the security of States" in the second preambular paragraph. Further, in the operative part of the draft resolution, States were urged to refrain from certain actions, not to renounce any specific rights or claims. The use of the words "renunciation by States" in the title of the draft resolution was therefore rather inappropriate.

48. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the forty-five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-6).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Finland, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia.

Against: Albania.

Abstaining: Cuba.

The draft resolution was adopted by 100 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.

49. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation was deeply satisfied that the Committee had adopted the draft resolution and was grateful to all delegations which had joined the Soviet Union in sponsoring it.

50. Though the question of non-proliferation had been discussed in the General Assembly and the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for several years, no treaty had been concluded. Adoption of the draft resolution, with its appeal for renewed efforts to reach agreement on non-proliferation and for the conclusion of a treaty which would close all loop-holes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and pave the way for further nuclear disarmament measures, was a major contribution towards a final solution of the problem. The appeal in the draft resolution was all the more relevant in view of the fact that the forces which declared themselves opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but were trying by hook or by crook to obtain access to such weapons, showed no signs of abandoning their policies. As those forces would in all probability try to reduce the resolution to a mere plious expression of hope, it was vitally important for all States to adhere strictly to the provisions of the resolution in deed as well as
in word. Time was not standing still, and the danger of proliferation should be banished without delay.

51. The CHAIRMAN called on those representatives who wished to explain their votes.

52. Mr. TINE (France) said that, though his delegation had voted for the draft resolution, its vote did not signify any change in its position on General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), on which it had abstained.

53. Mr. MALITZA (Romania) said that, by voting for the draft resolution, his delegation had wished to express once again its conviction that the unprecedented power of nuclear weapons constituted an immeasurable danger for all mankind, and that nuclear disarmament was therefore the most urgent of all disarmament measures. A treaty on non-proliferation might not lead directly to the elimination of the nuclear threat, but it would contribute to an improvement in international relations, provided that it were followed by a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. To guarantee the security of all countries and peoples and to attract the largest possible number of accessions, the treaty should establish an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. An agreement imposing unilateral obligations on the non-nuclear Powers alone would not be in keeping with the legitimate demands of all peoples for equal rights to peace and security. As the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in the General Assembly on 14 October 1966 (1442nd plenary meeting), a provision in the treaty requiring nuclear Powers never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries would encourage the latter to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons and would facilitate agreement on non-proliferation.

54. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania) said that his delegation was not satisfied with mere declarations of intent, such as those in the resolution just adopted. It was high time for the Committee to tackle the whole question of non-proliferation in a realistic manner. The exclusion of one nuclear Power—the People’s Republic of China—from the Committee’s deliberations because of the political motives of certain Powers, the constant enlargement of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear Powers and the fact that France was not participating in the disarmament negotiations were all grounds for serious apprehension.

55. For the sake of unanimity however, his delegation had voted for the draft resolution.

56. Mr. SARIF (Indonesia) said that, as a signatory to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, his country was greatly concerned by the continuance of nuclear tests and the nuclear armaments race. In the belief that every effort should be made to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, his delegation had voted for the draft resolution. His Government was not unaware of the political difficulties confronting some States regarding the conclusion of a treaty, but it hoped that all States would refrain from any actions conducive to proliferation while negotiations were in progress. A treaty on non-proliferation was urgently needed as a first step on the way to nuclear disarmament in particular, and general and complete disarmament in general.

57. His country was pursuing an active independent foreign policy, and was not committed to any particular collective defence arrangements; and his delegation had been able to agree with most of the main points made by the representatives of Brazil, India and Pakistan in their statements. Particular consideration should be given to the problem of the security of the non-nuclear States, to which the representative of Pakistan had referred. Co-operation between the non-nuclear Powers themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be encouraged; and suitable arrangements should be made for the use of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.

58. He hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would be able to complete its first task—the drafting of an agreement on non-proliferation—as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.