FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE THOUSAND AND SIXTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 1 December 1959, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. MATSCH (Austria)

Question of Algeria \( ^{59} \) (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e. the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.1068. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.

59-61677
AGENDA ITEM 59

QUESTION OF ALGERIA (A/4140) (continued)

Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia): Of all the items before the United Nations, the problem of Algeria, more than any other problem, calls for a preface. With all its magnitude, with the human suffering it entails and with the brutal war going on, the problem of Algeria seems always in need of an introduction. This is because the other party is France, and the sensibilities of France are involved. In the past, the United Nations has tackled many a problem in its fourteen regular sessions -- Korea in the crisis, Hungary in the climax and Sinai in the peak. Though tense and strained to the utmost, all these problems went normally. But when France is brought before the bar of the United Nations for the problem of Algeria, the sirens go screaming in the halls of the United Nations: France is very sensitive, France is upset, this is intolerable to France, it is inimical to France, he who votes against France is the enemy of France, France might leave the United Nations, France would walk out of the United Nations. These and similar threats have always been sounded here in the United Nations every time the question of Algeria has come before the United Nations.

These warnings, although unheeded in the past, are not entirely devoid of intelligence, and intelligence on the part of France. France knows its dignified position in the history of mankind. France knows the glories of the French Revolution. France knows the fineness of its art, the beauty of its poetry and the wealth of its traditions. France knows its charm and attraction. And it is with this treasure, with this magnificent capital, that France seeks to resist being called to account, to be questioned, and sometimes even to be requested, as was in the case of nuclear testing.

All this we know about France, and at times we are tempted to surrender to the sensibilities of France. But it so happens, too, that the issue with France is pregnant with sensibilities. It has its emotions and passions. It has its trials and ordeals. It has its human yearnings, agony and anguish, deeply rooted in the cause of freedom, peace and justice. It has its history, a history of 150 years, characterized by war, bereavement, destruction, exile, repression, and torture. All these are there, with the grief, the anger, the vengeance, the hatred that they generate, not only for Algeria but also for the people of France.
But I should like to assure you, Mr. Chairman, from the very beginning that for this session of ours, we came to debate the question of Algeria with no files of the past, with no recriminations and with no indictment. The situation in Algeria, up to this moment, is hair-raising in more than one respect. But this we shall arrest. In August, or to be more precise, in the first week of September, in the meeting of the Arab League at Casablanca, we decided to place a case of genocide against France and to request a United Nations Commission of Enquiry. We had contemplated that and more than that. But now we declare that for the moment, we should desist from this course. We shall fold rather than unfold a number of aspects relative to the present situation in spite of its moving events. We shall confine ourselves within the very confines as set up by President de Gaulle in his statement of September last.

But here again I feel I must make a preface too before I speak about the statement of President de Gaulle. For President de Gaulle, as a Frenchman and as a great hero of our time, is not without sensibilities of his own. But the Algerian problem has its own sensibilities. And the United Nations, conscious of its responsibilities, also has its sensibilities. This is a United Nations problem which has been considered by the Assembly at each of its regular sessions since 1955. At the eleventh and twelfth sessions the United Nations unanimously adopted two resolutions which expressed the concern of the United Nations at the continuance of the Algerian conflict and urged that the problem be solved in conformity with the principles of the Charter. But France appeared neither concerned at the concern of the United Nations, nor did it respond to the appeal of the United Nations for the solution of the problem in conformity with the principles of the Charter. Hence, it is the United Nations and not France that can rightly claim that its dignity has been offended.

But this is no time to settle accounts, although the debt due is a heavy accumulation of a tragic legacy. We prefer to look ahead -- we prefer to look for a future that will fold the memories of the past, that will heal the wounds, and that will build confidence and friendship. With this in mind, we shall therefore start from 16 September, the day President de Gaulle declared this statement of policy, recognizing for the people of Algeria the right of self-determination on the basis of a free choice.
Brushing aside for a moment its monstrous framework and its subversive terms, this policy, in principle, should be welcomed as a victory for the cause of freedom. Should it materialize -- and I repeat, should it materialize -- this triumph would belong to three parties. It goes first to the Government of Algeria, second to the United Nations, and third to President de Gaulle. Each party did play its own role. The Algerian people, with the highest toll they have paid, the dearest sacrifices they have offered, and the struggle of 150 years they have shouldered, are second to none in this battle for liberty. The Government of Algeria, right from the moment they assumed their responsibilities, have declared their readiness for a negotiated settlement in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

As to the United Nations, I assume all Member States have spared no effort to call for a peaceful and honourable solution in accordance with the principles of the Charter. At its last session, this Political Committee of ours, by a majority vote, urged for negotiations between the two parties to reach a solution based on the principles of the Charter.
President de Gaulle, freed from his rage against independence, has a share in the achievement, and not without reason. He has a share in this victory in the battle for freedom. President de Gaulle, as a hero of liberation, cannot for long withhold his admiration for the Algerians in their struggle to achieve their independence. After all, President de Gaulle is tied in a comradeship of arms with the Algerian fighters. In the two world wars, let us remember, the Algerians have redeemed the honour of France, regained its liberty and indeed restored its unity. Last, but not least, President de Gaulle as a great soldier knows with the certainty of fate that, no matter how long it lasts, the battle will end in a victory for Algeria.

All these factors have brought about what good is to be found in the statement of 16 September. Yet what bad it contains, and it does contain a lot, is of the making of neither the Algerian Government nor the United Nations. It is of the making of Paris, whose streets are murmuring under the muddy boots of militarism and colonialism. It becomes our duty, therefore, to examine the statement of 16 September of President de Gaulle, to see how far it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and to what degree it will satisfy the wishes of the international community in its quest for a just and peaceful solution to the problem.

In his introductory words, President de Gaulle has referred to the solution of the Algerian problem in the following words:

"We will solve it as a great nation should do, choosing the only path worthy of being followed. I mean the free choice which the Algerians themselves will make for their future."

These words of President de Gaulle should go into our record with esteem, tribute and high regard for him. Nothing could be nobler and more honourable than these noble and honourable words. France would really be a great nation as President de Gaulle has said, should the people of Algeria be enabled to determine their own future in accordance with their free choice -- a choice free from any intimidation or inducement. Also, President de Gaulle would go down in his lifetime in the annals of history -- and rarely do people go down in history in their lifetimes -- as the greatest Frenchman who won freedom for France and recognized freedom for Algeria.
We can even go a step further in evaluating the statement of President de Gaulle. No doubt merit can be found when merit is there. Not only do we admit but we have to praise the merit whenever and wherever it may be.

In outlining the different alternatives for this free choice, President de Gaulle declared that three conceivable solutions will be put to the vote: first, independence; second, integration; and, third, federation. With this specification, too, no one can quarrel with President de Gaulle. On the contrary, should these alternatives be voted freely by the people of Algeria, President de Gaulle would be the hero of another French revolution -- with all its glories and without its anarchy, bloodshed and destruction. These are the striking features of the picture seen from afar -- too far.

But let us come closer to the picture: let us read the statement of 16 September with more intelligence, more patience and more scrutiny. Let us see how far the free choice, offered by President de Gaulle, is a genuine choice and how far it is free.

In the first place, President de Gaulle, while admitting the free choice as a principle, denies the existence of the people to whom the choice is offered. He also denies the territorial integrity of the land in respect of which the free choice is to be exercised. To President de Gaulle the people do not exist as one entity, and the territory is not admitted as one unity. In the statement of 16 September, President de Gaulle speaks of the Algerians as individuals, and not as a people. He speaks of the Algerian territory, invaded by all but belonging to none. I can find no clearer words to convey these confused ideas than the words of President de Gaulle himself, and permit me to use the word "confused" because I cannot find a softer word to describe these ideas.

President de Gaulle states:

"The question, obviously, will be put to the Algerians as individuals."

This is what President de Gaulle emphasizes, that he will put it to the Algerians as individuals. "For since the beginning of the world there has never been any Algerian unity, far less any Algerian sovereignty. The Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Syrian Arabs, the Cordova Arabs, the Turks, the French have, one after the other, penetrated the country without there being -- at any time, under any shape or form -- an Algerian State."
With this premise, I am afraid, the principle of self-determination is reduced to a fiction. Self-determination is a right which belongs to the people. It does not belong to communities; neither does it belong to individuals. The Charter of the United Nations proclaimed the right of self-determination in relation to peoples, large and small, and not to individuals. Thus, if France is genuine and sincere in its readiness to recognize the right of self-determination, the nationhood, the peoplehood of Algeria must first be recognized as the basis and the only basis upon which to build the solution of the Algerian question. The second would be the Algerian unity. President de Gaulle has referred to the Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Syrian Arabs, the Cordova Arabs, the Turks, and the French, one after the other, penetrating the country without there being any Algerian State. This is nothing but poor history and perhaps poor political science. This is no occasion to go into the records of history to show how and when there was an Algerian State. It is a fact of history which cannot be seriously questioned in a serious deliberation such as ours in this Committee.
Neither do we have to be reminded that the notion of statehood in its present form is as recent as nationalism which in turn has only started to emerge after the disintegration of the system of empires. The peoples of the world are as ancient as the world, but States as we have them today are as modern as any invention. Of all the United Nations Members represented in this Committee, no less than seventy were not States at all two hundred years ago. A mere glance at history will demonstrate the facts. The Netherlands achieved independence in 1579, Belgium in 1830, the United States in 1776, Brazil in 1822, and South American States in 1810. The Balkan States, as well as many of the Asian and African States, only won their independence in the first half of our century, and after successive liberation wars and movements.

After its foundation, the United Nations has admitted into its membership a number of States that were never States in the past, and few of which were, until recently, under the direct rule of France itself. As to the invasions of Algeria, as enumerated by President de Gaulle, this is no point to be raised against the statehood of Algeria. Wars and invasions were the history of human relations everywhere in the world. The history of Europe, with France included, is one of invasions and counter-invasions all along the centuries. As a matter of fact, all the invaders mentioned by President de Gaulle, in respect to Algeria, have also invaded France. The Arabs, one of those cited by President de Gaulle, had penetrated into France as far as Bordeaux. But this is not to deny the statehood of France, the unity of its people or the integrity of its territory.

So it is with Algeria, invaded by many, but still maintaining its Arab character. Its territory is part and parcel of the Arab homeland, and its people are part and parcel of the Arab people. The truth is that Algeria is as Arab as France is French, and it is only on this basic truth, that a real friendship can be built, a friendship not only between Algeria and France, not only between North Africa and France, but between all the Arab States and France.

But to achieve this end, for which we sincerely stand, it is necessary that the statement of 16 September and the policy embodied therein should be sincere too. We must be sure that the choice offered is sincere, genuine and free.
What do we find upon serious scrutiny? We find that the choice offered is made of a feeble fiber. It suffers from debility, let alone lack of clarity. In explaining the three alternative solutions, President de Gaulle, I would say, has distilled, so to speak, in a process of distillation, the free choice from its essence. He offered three solutions in theory, but in effect he denounced the first, independence, with vehemence, and advocated the other two with applause. Of independence, he said:

"...France would then leave the Algerians who had expressed their wish to become separated from her. They would organize, without her, the territory in which they live, the resources which they have at their disposal, the government which they desire. I am convinced personally that such an outcome would be incredible and disastrous. Algeria being what it is at the present time, and the world what we know it to be, secession would carry in its wake the most appalling poverty, frightful political chaos, widespread slaughter, and soon after, the war-like dictatorship of the Communists. But this demon"--it is the word used by President de Gaulle --"must be exorcised, and this must be done by the Algerians themselves....It goes without saying that, on this assumption, those Algerians regardless of origin, who might wish to remain French would do so in any case, and that France would arrange, if need be, for their regrouping and resettlement. On the other hand, everything would be arranged so that the operation of oil wells, the handling and shipping of Saharan oil -- which is the result of French efforts and which is of interest to the whole western world -- would be ensured in any event."

I beg your indulgence. You need a great deal of restraint and patience to judge calmly -- and I say "calmly" with all sincerity and seriousness -- the statement of President de Gaulle. It is a threat, a masterpiece of intimidation. The independence of Algeria, declares President de Gaulle, is incredible and disastrous. Demon and independence, to President de Gaulle, are one and the same. Following the threats of President de Gaulle, independence would bring chaos, slaughter and the dictatorship of the Communists. Nothing is further from the truth than these assertions. Independence never brings chaos and
slaughter. Independence, apart from leading to prosperity and progress, satisfies the greatest of national aspirations. These warnings against independence have been re-sounded in all colonial problems here in this Committee. But the moment independence emerged, those warnings have melted away. If the colonos in Algeria behave as decent citizens or as peaceful residents, nothing of the sort will take place. The situation would be as peaceful and normal as it is now in Tunisia and Morocco, which were hurdled with the same threats when a few years ago we were discussing their independence in this very same Committee. As to the charge of communist dictatorship, this has become out of fashion and outmoded; it does not hold water. It is too flimsy to call for any refutation here in the United Nations. Nationalism has always been identified with communism, but by whom? By imperialism. That has been the slogan all throughout. It is an outmoded defence not worthy of our consideration. But the serious threat is not this communist dictatorship; it arises from another direction. It is the scourge of poverty with which Algeria is terrorized in case it should cast its choice for independence.

This plea of poverty is a very poor argument. The majority of the United Nations Members, we need not be ashamed to declare, although poor, are fully sovereign and independent. Ours would be a poor Charter if we did not admit poor states. Many of the United Nations Members represented here in this Committee are receiving various forms of assistance -- economic, technical and otherwise -- and France is not an exception. France now breathes in loans and financial assistance. Poverty is not a worthy point to raise here in the United Nations. But Algeria is not a poor country. A country is not poor that has endured the cost of this sacred war for the last six years -- preceded by a struggle a century old -- with neither loans nor assistance, from the United Nations, or from any organization, national or international. Algeria is a rich country with its natural resources. We have no better authority on this matter than Mr. Jacques Soustelle, the French Minister for the Saharan Affairs.
In an article in *Foreign Affairs* of July 1959, Mr. Soustelle spoke of the great reserves of oil and natural gas in the Sahara. In his estimation, the Hasi R'Mel natural gas field is one of the largest in the world. It can provide cheap power to Algeria and to the whole continent of Europe. Mr. Soustelle also referred to the mineral resources in the Sahara, mentioning manganese, iron, copper, and uranium too. In his speech to the Senate on 21 July, Mr. Soustelle predicted that France would be self-sufficient in oil by 1963 -- the oil of the Sahara, the Sahara of Algeria. With such resources, Algeria cannot be described as a poor country. If France could become self-sufficient by the oil of Algeria, can Algeria be classified as a poor country? I wonder which one is poor. Is it France or Algeria? I would not offer an answer.

Be that as it may, Algeria can do well with her own resources if those resources are left only to Algeria. Algeria's wealth can best be developed by its own people. Their national economy is their own concern. It is they who can best build up their national economy to the best of their judgement and to the best of their interests. This is not to say that Algeria will not seek the assistance and co-operation of other nations more advanced in the field of science and technology, and more equipped with capital and experience. And what nation -- and I would repeat the question publicly -- would be nearer to Algeria than France, should France recognize the independence of Algeria? Take it from me, as one who is described, wrongly, as the enemy of France, that none would be more friendly to France than Algeria should France leave Algeria to the people of Algeria.

Yet the most devastating threat to independence is this danger of partition of Algeria, of which President de Gaulle has spoken so frankly and so clearly. I want to pay tribute on this occasion to President de Gaulle on this score, for it has alerted the Government of Algeria, and the United Nations too, to the dangers lurking in the policy of President de Gaulle. Should the Algerians choose independence, they would have to face, in accordance with the statement of President de Gaulle, two disasters. Firstly, the partition of Algeria; secondly, the abduction of the Sahara.

President de Gaulle spoke of a process of regrouping and resettlement of those who wish to remain French in Algeria. Thus, President de Gaulle offers in one hand independence to the people of Algeria, and in the other, he brandishes a
sword of partition, the greatest pest ever to visit a people in their homeland. Thus, free choice, in theory and in practice, loses its very morale, its very ethics, and indeed its very essence. It ceases to be free, it ceases to be a choice, if we are to think in the minimum of logic and reason and if we are to speak the common language of the United Nations.

Nevertheless, President de Gaulle does not confine himself — and I say this with full meaning and purpose — to punish, to penalize, the choice of independence, but he proceeds further. He extends rewards for the choice of the other solutions, namely, integration and federation. With regard to integration, President de Gaulle offers the following rewards, and I would invite the attention of the Committee to those rewards. This is what he said:

"... Algerians can accede to all political, administrative and judicial functions of the State and have free access to the public service. They would benefit, as regards salaries, wages, social security, education and vocational training, from all measures provided for in Metropolitan France; they would live and work wherever they saw fit, throughout the Territory of the Republic; in other words, they would be living, from every point of view, regardless of their religion or the community to which they belonged, by and large on the same footing and at the same level as other citizens, and become part and parcel of the French people who would then, in effect, spread from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset."

With these sweet terms, the Algerians would find at last "the paradise lost". They would live in the "republica" of Plato, for which the world is still yearning in vain.

As to Federation — this is the third alternative — President de Gaulle offers the following rewards in the following words:

"... the government of Algerians by Algerians, backed up by French help and in close relationship with her, as regards the economy, education, defence and foreign relations. In that case, the internal regime of Algeria should be of the federal type, so that the various communities — French, Arab, Kabyle, Mozabite — who live together in the country would find guarantees for their own way of life and a framework for co-operation."
These, too, are very sweet and tempting words. I do not want to dwell at length on this point; but all these words of President de Gaulle are sufficient by themselves to vitiate the free choice he has offered. They are sufficient to squeeze from the free choice whatever freedom it contains. To be free, the choice must not be accompanied with threats, or with rewards if you please. Of the three alternatives offered by President de Gaulle, independence was outlawed by President de Gaulle. It was cast off; indeed, I would say beheaded. On the other hand, integration and federation were applauded, cherished and rewarded. If President de Gaulle were an Algerian himself, it would be his right to campaign for one alternative or the other. This is the right of every citizen in a democracy. But as a Head of State proclaiming his intention to liquidate a colonial issue, it is unthinkable that he should extend these rewards and threats and still claim that the choice is free. Should it be alleged that such choice is free, it is really free but from being free.

In this regard, may I be allowed a moment's digression to show what a free choice means under the British legal system; it is an interesting point. In English law, as in any legal system, a confession by an accused, to be admissible, must be made -- and I am quoting the authority -- "of his own free choice". This is the term used in English courts in respect of admissions taken from an accused.
It had happened in a well-known criminal case that the prosecutor said to the suspect: "You better make a statement". That was pure, simple and innocent advice made by the prosecutor to the suspect, telling him "you better make a statement". Surely it was simple, innocent and pure advice. But the court, the highest in the United Kingdom, ruled that this advice by itself excluded the free choice of the suspect and the admission he made was rejected because it was improper for the prosecutor even to tell the suspect that he better make a statement. Just imagine, if an English court rules that it is no free choice to advise simply, to advise the suspect to make a statement, what would you consider the free choice offered by President de Gaulle when it is accompanied with threats of disaster, with threats of partition and what not? I do not wish to answer the question, for these evils themselves provide the most eloquent answer.

But brushing aside all these evils for a moment, there remains another devastating danger. I refer not to a prerequisite to the free choice -- we have dealt with that -- but I refer, if you please, to an after-requisite, so to speak, after the Algerians have cast their choice. President de Gaulle has stipulated another requisite. President de Gaulle in his statement has made it a condition that the choice of Algeria must be endorsed, and I invite your attention to this point, by all Frenchmen. I trust you will not shudder at this anomaly. In his statement President de Gaulle made it clear that after asking "...the Algerians... what they wish to be ...", he will ask "...all Frenchmen to endorse that choice". This is tantamount to a veto against the will of Algeria. As a permanent member of the Security Council, France no doubt has a right of veto to be exercised under certain conditions. But I am not aware of any provision of the Charter that extends this veto against the choice of the people of Algeria on their own right. If all Frenchmen are to endorse the choice taken by Algeria, then the destiny of Algeria would fall under the mercy of France. And we know the outcome of this mercy. But what is the war for? What is the war in Algeria for? The war is waged for self-determination to be decided by Algeria and not by France. By now the United Nations knows that much, at least. We know beforehand, and the statement of 16 September is the testimony, and President de Gaulle is the witness, that France would not agree to the independence of Algeria, if the question is to be decided by the votes of all Frenchmen. Never, never, has a colonial issue been decided with the votes of the ruling inhabitants. It is the people under colonial
rule whose votes we must seek. What choice would be this choice if the last word must fall from the lips of France, lips that resist pronouncing independence. And what if France, as expected, refuses the choice made by Algeria? Where do we go, where do we stand? The whole operation of free choice with all its processes would become null and void. Algeria would continue under the heels of France. The cease-fire France is urging will have served the surrender of Algeria. Indeed the war with its sacrifices would appear as though waged simply to offer Algeria to France as a free choice for France to choose. It is only in French that such a dilemma can be described: _c'est trop_. It is too much to offer self-determination to Algeria and vest France with the right to its strangulation. For Algeria this is nothing but self-termination, not self-determination.

Next comes the question of the timing of the free choice. Referring to this question, President de Gaulle said:

"I will decide upon it in due course, at least, four years after the actual restoration of peace; that is to say, once a situation has been established whereby not more than 200 a year will lose their lives..."

Here again the schedule for the referendum defeats the principle of self-determination down to the root. I shall not deal with the formula of 200 killed a year. I resent this figure and its consequences, for this is a miserable detail that is not worth the space it occupies in the glorified and dignified statement of President de Gaulle. But the point which should be a cause for alarm for us here in the United Nations is this period of four years. We do not expect the referendum to be carried overnight nor does the Algerian Government expect a referendum to be carried overnight. But the idea of four years is most dreadful and most frightful. Who knows what would take place during the four years in the international arena? Who knows what will take place in France in French affairs?

In his press conference of 10 November, President de Gaulle himself, speaking on the problem of disarmament, but referring to this point of years, asked a question. He posed a question to himself. President de Gaulle asked President de Gaulle what was the question: who would know whether the United States and the Soviet Union would not unite and divide the world amongst themselves? This is not my question. It is a question posed by President de Gaulle, and scores of such questions may be asked about what might happen within these four years. It is not only idle on the part of the Algerians, but it would be an act
of betrayal to their sacred cause to lay down their arms and go their way, awaiting the destiny of four years to come -- awaiting the unknown with its hazards, with its surprises and with its upheavals, some of which have been mentioned by President de Gaulle himself.

This is a general bird's-eye view of the policy of France, and the question arises: what about the attitude of the Algerian Government toward that policy? The answer is simple to state and is to be found in the statement of 28 September issued by the provisional Government of Algeria. The attitude of the Government of Algeria is precise, is simple and is clear. It is precise because the cause of Algeria is just and justice does not require lengthy argumentation. It is simple because there is nothing simpler than the right to liberty and freedom. And lastly, it is clear, for the right of self-determination is so glaring that neither force of eloquence nor force of arms can confuse or make ambiguous this attitude. This statement of the Government of Algeria from the date at the top of the statement down to the signet, to the seal, is a masterpiece of statesmanship, of imagination and of realism. I say from the date to the signet because they have significance too. The Algerian statement was issued on 28 September, twelve days after President de Gaulle's statement -- a period during which the whole problem was examined by the Algerian Government with cold calculation, only warm in its quest for peace. It was not a rash statement, accepting everything or rejecting everything. As to the signet, to the seal, the provisional Government meant what it said -- that is was a provisional Government until such time when the State of Algeria can have a Government of its own elected by the people under conditions of freedom and democracy.
Farhat Abbas and his colleagues in the Provisional Government do not desire to impose themselves and they do not want to be dictators. They want to enable their countrymen to express their will as human beings, to exercise their rights as a people and to live as a sovereign State. This is what the Government of Algeria stands for, first and last. Its wish is not to be able to govern, but to enable Algeria to govern Algeria in the best interests of Algeria.

This goes to explain why the statement of the provisional Government of Algeria has made a balanced judgement of all the factors of the situation. The Algerian Government could have rejected, and with reason, the statement of President de Gaulle. It could have insisted -- since that is its right -- on the immediate recognition of the Algerians' right to independence. It could have insisted on a round-table conference, with full recognition of the Algerian Government, to conclude a peace treaty between Algeria and France. It could have insisted on a neutral land in which to hold the peace conference. All these and many other matters could have been rightly raised and demanded by the Government of Algeria.

But the Algerian Government has chosen to pursue a constructive path, not because it declines its national aspirations, but because it is sure of the equities of its case; it is sure of the validity and morality of its position. Also, the Algerian Government is sure of the final result if genuine processes and guarantees are provided for and are carried out in a climate of freedom and democracy. And what is more, the Algerian Government, as stated in its Declaration, "will not neglect any occasion which may improve chances for peace".

Thus, the Algerian Government, after stating its readiness to accept the principle of self-determination on the basis of the unity of the people and the integrity of the territory, has declared that it is ready -- and I quote here the words of the statement of the Provisional Government of Algeria -- "to enter into pourparlers" -- it has used this word -- with the French Government to discuss the political and military conditions of the cease-fire, as well as the conditions and the guarantees for the application of self-determination.

The Algerian Government has thus not only displayed wisdom and statesmanship, but has made every effort to accommodate the sensibilities of France; and we must accommodate the sensibilities of France. It must have been noticed that, in its
statement, the Government of Algeria used the French term "pourparlers" in the meaning of that term with regard to the dignity of France. These pourparlers would have to be centred on the guarantees for the application of self-determination.

In this regard let me assure the Committee that these guarantees are a necessity. France and the Government of Algeria should discuss these guarantees and should agree on their scope and application. They are a "must" if we are seeking peace. I say a "must" because agreement is necessary between the parties on the principle of self-determination. It is not only an agreement with regard to the outcome. The Algerian Government is not now insisting on anything with regard to the outcome because the outcome will appear itself if the conditions are free. But they must agree with France on the operation of the principle as a concept and as a method.

As to the concept, we are not sure that we have a common language with France up to this moment. Self-determination, in accordance with the official statements of France, is attached to certain strings by means of which self-determination could virtually be hanged to death. These are not figurative expressions, but justified apprehensions, apprehensions that can only be removed and uprooted through direct discussions between the Governments of Algeria and France. Such legitimate fears must be removed once and for all if we are eager, in all solemnity and earnestness, to realize peace in Algeria -- an everlasting peace.

In a statement on 30 April 1959, President de Gaulle was asked about the significance of the expression "the integration of Algeria with France", and no doubt the Committee would be interested to know what answer President de Gaulle gave to this question. This was his answer:

"As for the political significance of the word, what does it mean?

That Algeria is French? Is it necessary to say so, since that is the fact?"

He was asked a question about the signification of integration. He answered it with two questions and one answer. His first question was: "What does it mean?" His second question was: "Is Algeria French?" and then he replied thus to the two questions: "Is it necessary to say so, since that is the fact?"
President de Gaulle, as a good soldier, is a great strategist and a great tactician. He answered the question about integration by another question: "Is it necessary to say so?" -- and then he continued until he gave the answer. But these answers have been translated into actual reality. They were not simply a verbal utterance for the record.

Recently the French National Assembly passed, by a large majority, two bills providing for budgetary and monetary union of France and Algeria. On 3 August the Prime Minister of France, Michel Debré, had stated in Parliament that "the Departments of Algeria and the Sahara are part of the Republic in the same way as the metropolitan Departments". This statement was made by the second responsible person in France only a few weeks before the policy of President de Gaulle was declared. Anyone among us is entitled, with full justification, to ask: how has the position of France been converted overnight from a policy of integration into one of self-determination? This is one reason why the Government of Algeria is eager to know, through political negotiations, whether the statement of 16 September represents the thinking of General de Gaulle, or of President de Gaulle. Is is the tactics of a great soldier for the purpose of winning the battle, or is it the policy of a president determined to settle a problem? It is only through the pourparlers urged by Algeria that such matters can be examined and can be clarified to the last point of clarity.
But someone might say that this French position obtained only before the policy of 16 September, and that the past is past. This may be a valid explanation, but only if after 16 September nothing to the contrary was said or done. But the regrettable fact should be placed on record. From 16 September up to this moment everything has been said and done to undermine the free choice, to damage the principle of self-determination and to dim the prospects of peace. This is not a verdict without testimony. Let us see the record and follow the track of events after 16 September. On 28 October, only six weeks after he declared the policy of self-determination, President de Gaulle addressed a message to the Administration and the armed forces in Algeria which was entirely repugnant to his declared policy. That message betrays nothing but the loyalty of France to a policy of integration saturated in integration. I would like to put on record these words spoken by President de Gaulle after 16 September. In a message to Algeria, where free choice is to be applied and implemented, President de Gaulle said:

"At the present time, it is a question of completely and humanely pacifying this land of trial, to promote economic and social development, to give Algerians of the various communities every moral and material reason" -- what for? -- "to want to be united with France."

These directives of President de Gaulle disclose a clear objective diametrically opposed to the policy he declared on 16 September for the free choice of the Algerians. What free choice would it be and what self-determination would it be if President de Gaulle called for the creation of conditions -- and he has the authority to create those conditions -- which would make the Algerians "want to be united with France". Unity with France becomes no choice, it becomes the goal for which France is striving. Probably this explains why President de Gaulle has specified a period of four years during which the Algerians can be "made". They will be made to make the choice of unity with France, as President de Gaulle wants it to be.

In the concluding words of this message, President de Gaulle falls back upon the old trenches. He speaks of _la mission sacrée_ which France should assume not only in Algeria, but in Africa. He said:
"All of you who are serving the State in Algeria know more than anyone else that this task is capital. It is capital for Algeria itself. It is also for France in its entirety, in its African mission, for national unity, and for its international situation."

With this statement in mind, one wonders what African mission there is for France in Algeria if France is sincere in applying the principle of self-determination. Self-determination for Africa means the absence of an African mission for France. Africa becomes lord and master, and any African mission in Africa belongs to none except Africa. But it seems that the sub-conscious of France is still charged with integration as against self-determination. And it is such a contradiction and conclusion which the Algerian Government seeks to remove once and for all, by pourparlers, or any parlers France chooses to accept; because with this confusion the Algerian Government would not know where it stood.

But this is not the end. The sub-conscious of France has spoken again, and recently. In his tour of some provinces of France, President de Gaulle spoke on 23 November -- just two weeks ago -- in the following terms:

"We wish peace in Algeria first, by the road that we have chosen, to maintain France in Algeria, but obviously in different conditions than before."

"To maintain France in Algeria, but in different conditions than before."

Those are the words of President de Gaulle. Thus, it is only with different conditions that President de Gaulle is determined to maintain France in Algeria. To President de Gaulle, the goal is to maintain France; the goal remains the same, although the conditions are different. We can rightly ask, although we regret the absence of France because we cannot put this question for France to answer, although I hope it will find some occasion to answer: is the policy of President de Gaulle one of tactics or is it, in the core, intended just to maintain France in Algeria? And what about the free choice? What if the Algerians choose, as they are entitled to, not to maintain France in Algeria? These are questions, valid questions, for France to answer, if it cares to answer.
This betrayal of self-determination, however, has become contagious, because such a betrayal is like a disease. It has contaminated the official thinking in France, as well as in Algeria. On this count, we are not without a record too. On 15 October, in the course of a debate on the question of Algeria, Mr. Debré, the French Prime Minister, gave details about this question. In referring to Algeria and the free choice of being exercised in Algeria by the people in Algeria, the process was described by the Prime Minister as "on French land" and "only France will conduct elections". Well, you may or may not conduct elections, but if they are to be conducted in your conception on French land, what is the significance of this free choice, since what you have in mind is to make the Algerians choose Algeria to be a French land.

Again, in that debate the Prime Minister of France put a question to himself. It seems that these distinguished friends of ours are very much interested in putting questions to themselves and then answering their own questions. That is not a bad way because it really discloses the innermost thinking of these statesmen. In the National Assembly, Mr. Debré put the following question to himself: Where lies the success of law?". This is a very significant and valid question, and the Prime Minister answered his own question as follows:

"It is in the refusal of secession, because secession -- leading the Algerians toward dictatorship, arbitrary rule and racialism -- would be the negation of law."

Thus the Prime Minister describes independence as the negation of law and asks where is the success. What success would it be? Thus the Prime Minister of France condemns the choice of independence as the negation of law. I know of no provision in the United Nations Charter which condemns independence as a conception of the negation of law. Possibly all of us representing our States here do represent the conception of the negation of law because we are fully sovereign and fully independent.
How could the French administration, with such a negation, carry out a referendum of which one alternative is against the law? If independence is outlawed, if it is such an immoral and heinous crime, how can the Algerian Government -- and we must here speak the mind of the Algerian Government -- have trust in the French administration to give effect to free choice and to put teeth in the principle of self-determination? How can the Algerian Government expect that when the second most responsible man in France describes that to be a negation of law?

I have put the question not for any purpose of interrogation. I have put it simply to stress that the Government of Algeria, in seeking proper guarantees, does not intend to impose a solution but to guarantee that the solution is born under normal conditions -- conditions of complete freedom and complete equality and impartiality. The alternative solutions stated by President de Gaulle must receive equal treatment. Effective guarantees must be agreed upon between the Governments of Algeria and France to ensure freedom of choice. So far, France is setting conditions and guarantees against the choice of independence.

On 26 October, the Prime Minister of France, in his directives addressed to the Delegate-General of the French Assembly in Algeria -- directives to be distributed among the chiefs of services and responsible military authorities, all those who are supposed to conduct this process of referendum -- unleashed a war, so to speak, against independence. Mr. Debré made the following final directive:

"Therefore, the essential point ... is to work in every possible way so that the free choice of minds will be made against secession for the triumph of a close union with France. There will be time afterwards to debate one or another of the conceivable solutions for this union.
I insist particularly" -- this is the order of the Prime Minister to the military and civilian authorities in Algeria in connexion with the conduct of the process of referendum -- "upon the precise instructions which this second paragraph contains."
And what does it contain? A war against independence and a war for union. This directive is self-explanatory. The French authorities in Algeria, whether military or civilian, are ordered by their Prime Minister to mobilize all their forces to fight a free choice, to curb self-determination and to defeat independence.

In effect, the French authorities in Algeria -- as they might be expected to do -- have responded to the order of their Prime Minister with zeal and determination. For the idea is not Greek to them; it is French. And here again we are not without testimony.

On 30 October, the Delegate-General of the French Government, who is the highest authority in Algeria, in referring to the offers of President de Gaulle, spoke as follows:

"This war" --

a war of what? What war is it? --

"of secession must be ended by a negotiated cease-fire or by the completion of pacification. In one way or the other, it will mean victory by our arms, for we are fighting for French Algeria."

Speaking on another occasion, the Delegate-General said:

"We are fighting first of all for France ... We are fighting also for Europe" --

I wonder whether Europe will endorse such a fight --

"on a territory which is included in the North Atlantic Pact" --

and I wonder whether the North Atlantic Pact would endorse the suppression of a people's struggle for its liberation.

"In offering the choice, the Chief of State did not make a bet" --

and this is the point: that President de Gaulle was not making a bet.

"Who can doubt the result?"

As usual, the gentleman has put in a question.

"On one side there is misery ... on the other is France ... With her army always present ... Between the two, the great majority of the Algerians have already chosen ... let those who want a French future for Algeria ... reassemble and unite ... the Army remains and will remain. France remains and will remain."
President de Gaulle, freed from his rage against independence, has a share in the achievement, and not without reason. He has a share in this victory in the battle for freedom. President de Gaulle, as a hero of liberation, cannot for long withhold his admiration for the Algerians in their struggle to achieve their independence. After all, President de Gaulle is tied in a comradeship of arms with the Algerian fighters. In the two world wars, let us remember, the Algerians have redeemed the honour of France, regained its liberty and indeed restored its unity. Last, but not least, President de Gaulle as a great soldier knows with the certainty of fate that, no matter how long it lasts, the battle will end in a victory for Algeria.

All these factors have brought about what good is to be found in the statement of 16 September. Yet what bad it contains, and it does contain a lot, is of the making of neither the Algerian Government nor the United Nations. It is of the making of Paris, whose streets are murmuring under the muddy boots of militarism and colonialism. It becomes our duty, therefore, to examine the statement of 16 September of President de Gaulle, to see how far it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and to what degree it will satisfy the wishes of the international community in its quest for a just and peaceful solution to the problem.

In his introductory words, President de Gaulle has referred to the solution of the Algerian problem in the following words:

"We will solve it as a great nation should do, choosing the only path worthy of being followed. I mean the free choice which the Algerians themselves will make for their future."

These words of President de Gaulle should go into our record with esteem, tribute and high regard for him. Nothing could be nobler and more honourable than these noble and honourable words. France would really be a great nation as President de Gaulle has said, should the people of Algeria be enabled to determine their own future in accordance with their free choice -- a choice free from any intimidation or inducement. Also, President de Gaulle would go down in his lifetime in the annals of history -- and rarely do people go down in history in their lifetimes -- as the greatest Frenchman who won freedom for France and recognized freedom for Algeria.
We can even go a step further in evaluating the statement of President de Gaulle. No doubt merit can be found when merit is there. Not only do we admit but we have to praise the merit whenever and wherever it may be.

In outlining the different alternatives for this free choice, President de Gaulle declared that three conceivable solutions will be put to the vote: first, independence; second, integration; and, third, federation. With this specification, too, no one can quarrel with President de Gaulle. On the contrary, should these alternatives be voted freely by the people of Algeria, President de Gaulle would be the hero of another French revolution -- with all its glories and without its anarchy, bloodshed and destruction. These are the striking features of the picture seen from afar -- too far.

But let us come closer to the picture: let us read the statement of 16 September with more intelligence, more patience and more scrutiny. Let us see how far the free choice, offered by President de Gaulle, is a genuine choice and how far it is free.

In the first place, President de Gaulle, while admitting the free choice as a principle, denies the existence of the people to whom the choice is offered. He also denies the territorial integrity of the land in respect of which the free choice is to be exercised. To President de Gaulle the people do not exist as one entity, and the territory is not admitted as one unity. In the statement of 16 September, President de Gaulle speaks of the Algerians as individuals, and not as a people. He speaks of the Algerian territory, invaded by all but belonging to none. I can find no clearer words to convey these confused ideas than the words of President de Gaulle himself, and permit me to use the word "confused" because I cannot find a softer word to describe these ideas.

President de Gaulle states:

"The question, obviously, will be put to the Algerians as individuals."

This is what President de Gaulle emphasizes, that he will put it to the Algerians as individuals. "For since the beginning of the world there has never been any Algerian unity, far less any Algerian sovereignty. The Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Syrian Arabs, the Cordova Arabs, the Turks, the French have, one after the other, penetrated the country without there being -- at any time, under any shape or form -- an Algerian State."
Just recently the Minister of War in France has planted a time-bomb, so to speak, at the very base of the referendum, apparently to be exploded at the crucial moment. In a message addressed in November last to the Commanding General of the Armed Forces, the Minister of War said the following:

"In a more distant future, once the political future of Algeria is regulated" -- that is, after the whole process of the referendum is completed -- "the army will remain present in order to assure its permanent mission -- the common defence of France and Algeria against any danger."

These are very clear words. They mean that the French army will remain in Algeria and will remain in Algeria even after the political future of Algeria is determined. The Minister of War states with ease and confidence that the French army has a permanent mission in Algeria. All this, I submit, is a negation of free choice. To say assertively that the French army will remain permanently in Algeria is a direct threat to the people of Algeria, and subjects their free choice to negation; because if the people of Algeria are told beforehand that the army in Algeria will continue to remain in Algeria, what freedom of choice can there be in the minds and hearts of the people of Algeria in casting their vote? And what if the choice of the Algerians, as is expected, calls for independence, which means the evacuation of French troops and the dismantling of all military bases? I admit that such matters will have to be negotiated with the Government of Algeria -- not the Provisional Government now existing, but the Government of Algeria which will be set up as a result of the elections; but how is it conceivable here and now for the Minister of War to say that France will take upon herself the eternal task, the permanent task, of defending Algeria? Should France continue to insist on such a claim for defending Algeria, Algeria then will have to be defended against this French defence -- and the time may not be too far away for such an emergency.

I turn now to the question of negotiations, which is the subject-matter of the moment. The Government of Algeria has expressed its readiness to enter into negotiations with France for agreement upon the political and military conditions of a cease-fire. They do not seek any recognition from France. They do not seek a specific solution. They do not intend to discuss the political future of Algeria. What more fairness, constructiveness and objectivity could
there be? They seek only the establishment of free, democratic and genuine conditions under which the people of Algeria can express their will freely, democratically and genuinely. This is all that they ask for; and all this can be discussed and agreed upon only through pourparlers, or negotiations.

France, on the other hand, has taken a position which I do not desire to describe lest I stir up an unnecessary commotion. It is sufficient to say that it is simply a French position, and this is enough to indicate what sort of position it is. In a speech made on 15 October before the National Assembly, the Prime Minister of France denounced negotiations in the following words:

"There exists a total incompatibility between political negotiations and the freedom of choice given to the Algerians -- juridically, politically and morally; it is impossible that there be anything else but a negotiation on cease-fire. There cannot be a political negotiation."

I do not want to expose at length these fallacies of the Prime Minister of France. The Prime Minister of France would do better not to invoke the juridical, political and moral considerations in the Algerian question, for it is exactly because of these considerations that the entire case of France falls shattered on the ground. There is no incompatibility, as is claimed by the Prime Minister of France, between political negotiations and freedom of choice. The Algerian Government is the first not to interfere with the freedom of choice. They do not urge that the future of Algeria be negotiated; they want to negotiate conditions which will guarantee freedom of choice, and that is all.

The Prime Minister, however, has transplanted to Algeria this intransigent confusion about political negotiations. In a directive dated 26 October and addressed to the Delegate-General in Algeria, the Prime Minister of France expressed himself as follows:

"...there is no question of political negotiations between the Government and the rebel organization... Political negotiation...would be in contradiction with our very principles: that is, that the solution lies in the free choice of the Algerians.

"In any case, there would not be discussion with the rebels except concerning the practical problems which a cease-fire would pose: end of the combat, the fate of the rebel fighters, their arms and organization..."
These are the matters which are to be negotiated between the rebels -- if you choose -- and France. This statement on the part of the Prime Minister is another French position devoid of reason -- I say this with all due respect -- and devoid of sense and logic. To the Prime Minister of France, cease-fire has become an end, not a means. Cease-fire under every system of jurisprudence and practice is a prelude to another stage. It is a prerequisite for a peaceful settlement through negotiation and agreement, under normal conditions. The Government of Algeria, motivated by moderation, has excluded a political settlement from the negotiations, leaving the problem to the destiny of free choice. But the Government of Algeria is not a bunch of traitors who will accept the invitation of France only to discuss the fate of the fighters, their arms and organization. The issue is not the arms; the issue is not the organization, not even the safety of the fighters or the safety of the Provisional Government of Algeria. The issue is the safety of the measures for free choice that the Government of Algeria is seeking. And it is high time for France to cease speaking of contradictions, to speak no more of incompatibility and the so-called political, moral and juridical considerations. If the Government of Algeria were to stick to these considerations, they would have to prosecute the war to the end; they would refuse negotiations before evacuation.

But the Government of Algeria, rather than war, has preferred to seize the occasion and explore the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. Their insistence upon discussing with France the guarantees -- I repeat, the guarantees -- that provide real freedom for the exercise of free choice, is no intransigence. None of you, at heart, would want the Algerian Government to cease fire before these guarantees are provided, and adequately provided. This involves the destiny of a whole people, and no one with a sense of justice would think for a moment that under the present French administration any choice could be exercised except one for unity and integration with France. Our experience in the past provides ample illustration.
Since President de Gaulle came to power -- and I am not referring to the past simply because I want to condemn, no; the past illuminates the way for the referendum which is to be carried out by the French authorities -- three elections have taken place in Algeria: the first in September 1958 for the referendum on the new French constitution; the second in November 1958 to elect deputies to the French Parliament; and the third in April 1959 to elect members of the municipal councils. All these elections were a fraud. They were to the taste and appetite of the French authorities in Algeria.

I do not propose to place on record the details of this wholesale fabrication of elections. It is sufficient to note that former French Prime Minister Mendes France described those elections when President de Gaulle came to power as being dangerous for civil peace, dangerous for democracy and of no real value. Mr. Mendes France asked with reason, "Can anyone believe in the veracity of an election in a pre-conditioned Algeria?" The Government of Algeria wants to be sure that Algeria is not still pre-conditioned for such elections as it was pre-conditioned in the former elections. Mr. Gaston Defferre, former French Minister of Overseas Territories, commenting on those elections said, "There will be no choice, no referendum, merely a decision imposed." The Christian Science Monitor said, "No one in Algeria or in France had really doubted that Algeria could vote anything but yes." The Washington Post declared, "It would be tragic if President de Gaulle interpreted the heavy vote of approval in Algeria as a willing endorsement of continued French domination."

All this, with a swollen file of testimony, proves beyond any shred of doubt that under the present French administration no freedom of choice can be entertained. Elections in Algeria have become proverbial for their fraud, as Paris has become proverbial for its parfum. If you want to condemn fraudulent elections you need only say "élection à l'algérienne", and that would be enough.

It is to avoid this fraud -- I have not cited this record to condemn, but simply to show the intention of avoiding a repetition of "élection à l'algérienne"-- that the Government of Algeria has constantly urged that negotiations with France should embrace the question of guarantees for the free exercise of choice by the people of Algeria.
Recently the Government of Algeria declared the appointment of a five member delegation to start parleys with the French Government. The delegation consisted of Ahmed Ben Bella, the Vice Premier, and four others, Ministers of State. It is a fact not to be denied that these Algerian leaders are all now detained by France, but this is the more to make it easy for France to start immediate talks if they want immediate talks. But France, instead of accepting the Algerian offer, has chosen to reject it on the ground that Ben Bella and his colleagues are all prisoners. France seemed to wish to remind the world again of the international piracy -- and I say that with great deal of hesitation, because there is no term to describe that act except the term piracy -- which she committed when the Algerian leaders were abducted from the air while on their way to Tunis on a mission of peace on the question of Algeria. I do not desire to embitter the Committee with the details. Suffice it to state that King Mohammed V of Morocco, one of the world heroes of our generation, declared upon the arrest of these gentlemen that this act by France was a worse blow to his honour than his dethronement by the French in August 1953. The King described this act as worse than his dethronement, which was the most tragic chapter of his history in the liberation movement of his country.

France, however, I say with all sincerity, had no legitimate reason to reject this Algerian delegation. France is not entitled to appoint the representatives of the Algerian Government in the same way as the Algerian Government has no say with regard to the appointment of the French delegation. The fact that they are in French detention is no impediment. In all liberation movements negotiations have started with leaders rushed form the prison to the conference hall -- Mr. Nehru, Mr. Nkrumah, Archbishop Makarios, Mr. Zaghloul, are all vivid illustrations of leaders who were rushed from their prisons to the conference hall. With France, too, there is a memorable precedent. His Majesty the King of Morocco and His Excellency the President of Tunisia had been invited to negotiate with France when they were held in French hands. This is not a unique procedure for France to start negotiations in this manner, particularly since the first gentleman is the Vice Premier and the others are Ministers of State in the provisional Government.
I do not wish to engage the Committee on the question that these gentlemen are prisoners of war -- they are not normal offenders.

Neither is it a joke with a bad taste, as some French quarters have preferred to describe the Algerian representation. When the list of those delegates was submitted, some French quarters stated that this was a joke in bad taste. The Algerians are not at leisure to make a joke either in bad or in good taste. They have no time to joke. They are engaged in the most sacred mission to liberate their country. They cannot afford to be joking when their country is the stage of the war and when their people are the ammunition and the fuel of the war. They seek a peaceful settlement, but under honourable and just conditions, and there is no joke about it.

But what role can the United Nations play at this session? For the past sessions the United Nations should be congratulated on its endeavours to bring moral pressure to bear on France to solve the question of Algeria in accordance with the principles of the Charter, and the Government of Algeria respects those efforts and is very grateful to the United Nations for its efforts at past sessions.
At this session, we can feel we are almost at the last phase of the problem. We can say that the dawn is almost here. We, all of us, only need to pull together. Whether in our speeches or in the resolution we shall adopt, and I hope we shall adopt it, we must speak our mind in support of the cause of liberty. We do not want to condemn France, or even to offend France. We stand for principles, and principles we must never fail to support.

In the first place, we have to view the problem as belonging to a people, not to individuals; and to a territory forming one unity. We should not agree to divide the people or to partition their homeland. In the second place, the United Nations must voice unreserved support for the principle of self-determination as an inherent right of the people of Algeria. Third, the United Nations must urge the two parties to enter without delay into negotiations or pourparler if you please, with a view to agreeing on the political and military terms of a cease-fire. Fourth, the United Nations should urge that the two parties must reach agreement on the guarantees that will enable the people of Algeria to express their will under conditions of complete freedom and democracy.

With these principles upheld, we can take pride that the United Nations has discharged its responsibility objectively, and with even justice to both France and Algeria. As for Algeria, its Government has never wavered to accept the stand taken by the United Nations on this question. It is now for France to respond to the United Nations. President de Gaulle has rightly pointed out the road, but the road is still full of stumbling blocks, impediments, checkposts and wire entanglements, and it is up to France to clear the way if it desires the representatives of Algeria to go along.

In fact, France now has one of two alternatives to break the deadlock. France could either agree with the Government of Algeria on the guarantees for the freedom of choice, or leave the processes to be worked out and implemented under the auspices of the United Nations. Our Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, commands universal confidence and respect, let alone ability and vision. Under his arrangements the choice of the people of Algeria is bound to be free, honest and democratic. It should not be a choice "a l'algerienne" like l'élections algériennes. It would be a choice on the Hammarskjold style -- and that is gratifying enough.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, allow me, from this Committee and at this historic moment, to address an appeal through you to President de Gaulle. In fact, it is an appeal that echoes the wishes of all peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples in the world.

I shall appeal to you from your words and deeds, President de Gaulle. In your words, President de Gaulle, you have always wondered why this futile warfare exists in Algeria. Your deeds, in the liberation of your country, are by themselves an appeal to you to recognize the right of the people of Algeria to independence and sovereignty. Those who led their people to liberty, as you have, President de Gaulle, are not few. They are heroes, but only national heroes, as you are. But the history of this age is open for an international hero to emerge -- an international hero who brings liberty not only to his people but to other peoples as well. And from the heart of our heart, we wish President de Gaulle to be that international hero -- to recognize the independence of Algeria, and thereafter to sponsor its membership in the United Nations.

I address this appeal not because of any weakness or fatigue of the Algerian Government or of the Algerian people. If there should be no agreed settlement, which we would regret, Algeria stands ready to prosecute the war until the last French soldier is driven out from Algerian soil. But the appeal I make is intended only to silence war, the destiny of which is too obvious. I would not say it would be a defeat to France. I would prefer to say it would be a victory to Algeria.

Finally, let no one make a mistake about the fact that Algeria stands today as ever with unshaken determination to realize its national aspirations. Algeria today, as ever, is ready for war, a sacred war to regain its freedom and restore its liberty, but if negotiation can be the substitute, Algeria will not fail to arrest the war.

It is our hope and prayer that France, for its part, will silence the rattling of arms and heed the voice of freedom and liberty.

We trust that at our next session we can congratulate the Republic of France, and the Republic of Algeria, through their delegations seated here in this
Committee, on the success of their negotiations. That would be another United Nations Day -- a day for which we are waiting with joyful tears -- that will consecrate a real friendship not only between Algeria and France, but also between all the Arab States and France. And for this we pray and we shall continue to pray.

Mr. VAKIL (Iran) (interpretation from French): My delegation is among those to whom the Algerian question presents a very delicate problem. On the one hand, a traditional friendship several centuries old originating from a community of thought and an affinity of mind bind us to France. On the other hand, we share with the Algerian people not only the same faith but also an intellectual patrimony which goes back to the most remote times. In these circumstances, one may well wonder why we joined with twenty-four other delegations in asking once again for the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the General Assembly. Here are the reasons.

On the one hand, the sincere friendship we have for both parties involved does not relieve us of the duty scrupulously to fulfil our obligations as a Member of the Organization. On the other hand, the efforts made within this Organization for a number of years now have no purpose other than assisting the parties involved to settle by friendly means a bloody dispute which has already cost so many human lives. When faced with so noble a task, can true friendship impose silence on itself? Surely not. For this two-fold reason, it is our duty to redouble our efforts to get the two parties to the point where they will find a solution of the dispute, which pits them against each other, on the basis of the principles of the Charter.

Is it necessary still to ask whether the Organization is entitled to deal with this question? The two resolutions adopted unanimously by the General Assembly at the eleventh and twelfth sessions in which the Assembly expressed the concern caused by the continuation of the Algerian conflict provide in our opinion a sufficient answer to this question. We deplore the fact that France has once again decided not to take part in the debate. Its participation this year would have been particularly valuable. The clarification it might have contributed
concerning some aspects of the problem which remain vague for some parties would have expedited the final solution considerably. The debate on the Algerian question therefore resumes in France's absence. We would wish the debate to develop on a constructive level. There should be used a suitable tone capable of swiftly bringing us closer to the objective we had in mind rather than pulling us further away from it.
What is the point reached by the Algerian conflict as the Assembly resumes discussion on it? Hostilities continue unremittingly. Combat has not diminished in intensity and blood continues to flow. But as far as principles are concerned, I would say as far as the substance of the problem is concerned, agreement seems in fact to have been achieved. The President of the French Republic has already solemnly acknowledged the principle of self-determination. He declared:

"The Algerians will have to decide themselves on their destiny. Their choice will be entirely free."

General de Gaulle has guaranteed to the Algerians, whoever they may be, no matter where they come from and whatever their programme, that they will be able to take part freely and without any coercion, not only in the voting but also in the deliberations that will precede it so as to settle the modalities of the vote. On the other hand, the Algerian leaders have already responded to the statements of the President of the French Republic. They have signified their agreement to the point that the final decision belongs to the Algerian people alone. How can this people have its voice heard? Through representatives to be chosen by that people in free elections. But the elections cannot take place so long as hostilities continue. It will therefore be necessary first to negotiate a cease-fire.

All this seems to be settled, if I interpret correctly the statements made by the President of the French Republic and by the Algerian leaders alike. The difficulties which remain to be disposed of relate to modalities of implementation and the establishment of a time sequence -- a calendar. But to settle these problems of procedure it is necessary to leave the battlefield and to sit down around a conference table. Once contact is established, these problems might yield to the normal exchange of proposals and ideas on both sides.

On the Algerian side, however, it is felt that some preliminary clarifications are necessary so that contact may be established. Is it unreasonable on their part to demand such clarifications? We read in the Koran that Abraham asked the Lord to let him see how the dead were revived. And the Lord said to him: "Why? Dost thou not believe?" "Yes," said Abraham, "but it is so that my heart may be at ease."
The Lord met his own prophet's wish that his heart might be at ease. Why should men not draw inspiration from this example to reassure each other mutually? If France had taken part in the debate, France might have contributed to the necessary clarifications. France might have dispelled what qualms have remained and the public debate might have closed on a unanimous note.

The principle difficulty which still prevents true pourparlers from beginning can be dealt with through clarifications to be given to the Algerian leaders, assuring them that the implementation of the agreement as to principle which has already been reached will be coupled with the necessary conditions of impartiality and objectivity. The war which has been waged for five years has given rise to mistrust. Everything must be done to eliminate that. Confidence must be made to revive so that the conversations may develop in the desired direction, that is, in a direction of fruitful co-operation among the parties concerned. Now that the dispute is settled as to substance, it is paradoxical that war should continue in full force and should bring with it its train of suffering and of devastation, and above all, loss of human life.

We wish that the debates in this Committee should be marked by complete serenity, that they should resolutely but in a friendly manner be devoted to the disposing of whatever misgivings remain so that pourparlers may be undertaken immediately.

The problem is surely complex, but in our opinion, it has arrived at a stage in which traditional diplomacy has more of a chance to succeed.

The two adversaries are holding out their hands to each other, but at a distance. Let us endeavour to bring them closer together so that they can speak to each other with open hearts and by common agreement lay the groundwork on which to build harmonious co-operation in keeping with their aspirations, and also in keeping with the principles of the Charter.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair is now inquiring whether any member will be ready to speak this afternoon. It does not seem to be the case.
The Chair is greatly concerned about the slow pace of the debate on this item. Two days have already passed and we have heard only three speakers. There are a few names inscribed for the other days of this week, but not enough to organize a full programme of meetings. I had firmly hoped, and I am sure that many delegations share this view, that the Committee could conclude this item this week, even if it should mean some extra meetings in the evening or on Saturday. Therefore, I urge all delegations to spur their preparations for intervening in the debate, and especially to indicate their intentions as regards the speakers list.

As there are no speakers for this afternoon, the meeting is cancelled for this afternoon. The Committee will reconvene tomorrow morning at 10.30.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.