VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE THOUSAND AND FIFTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 19 November 1959, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:
Mr. VEIGAZUEZ (Vice-Chairman) (Uruguay)

Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e. the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.1059. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEM 69

SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS (A/4186; A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, L.237/Rev.1, Add. 1) (continued)

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation fully identifies itself with the view expressed here by a number of delegations that the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests belongs to the most urgent partial objectives in the field of disarmament and that further delays in its solution may not be tolerated.

Even though the main and immediate task in the disarmament issue is the comprehensive consideration and implementation of the proposals of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on complete and general disarmament, it is equally desirable to embark without delay upon the solution of all partial questions pertinent to disarmament which are now ripe for a solution. Among these partial questions related to disarmament, the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests ranks first.

The countries of the entire world ever more resolutely demand complete and permanent cessation of all types of tests of nuclear weapons. Such a measure would put an end to the evolution of ever-more destructive types of atomic and hydrogen weapons which represent a great threat to the whole of mankind. Such a step would eliminate the growing danger to the health of the present and succeeding generations which is presented by the continued contamination of the atmosphere by radioactive fall-out which is produced as a consequence of the nuclear weapons tests.
The signing of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests would at the same time create favourable conditions for the forthcoming negotiations about the realization of the proposals of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for general and complete disarmament.

An agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests together with the establishment of effective controls would therefore be a very significant step towards the easing of international tension and danger of a nuclear war.

The people of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Government are following very carefully the proceedings of the Geneva talks of the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the drafting of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The Czechoslovak delegation expresses the hope that these talks, which have now been in progress for almost thirteen months, will very soon terminate with the signing of a treaty on the permanent cessation of all tests with nuclear weapons. The conference has no doubt accomplished useful and commendable work. The Czechoslovak delegation assumes, however, that the results of the conference would have been better if all the participating States had shown, as did the Soviet Union, sufficient goodwill and understanding in the talks for reaching an agreement.

The present Geneva talks of the representatives of three Powers was preceded in the summer of 1958 by the Geneva conference of experts of eight countries which worked out a draft of control measures for the future treaty on the cessation of nuclear testing. That conference was also attended by Czechoslovak experts and its final report, which along with the other participants was signed also by the experts from the United States, states unequivocally that all types of nuclear weapons explosions can effectively be detected. The repeated attempts of the Western delegations to accomplish a revision of the conclusions reached by the Geneva Conference of Experts, such as, for example, in the question of detecting underground nuclear explosions and in other questions, can therefore hardly be considered as a contribution to the negotiations or as genuine efforts to make the talks progress.
The Czecho-Slovak delegation maintains the view that in the interest of an early conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests the delegations of Western Powers should abandon their attempts to sidetrack the proceedings of the conference into new, protracted technical talks on problems which have already been fully and satisfactorily discussed by scientists. And moreover, as is well known, the respective article of the future treaty stipulates that the entire control system to the treaty will be regularly subject to revision, which means that revision would be carried out of the ways of detecting nuclear explosions, that measuring instruments would be replaced by perfected apparatus, and so on. It follows from this that the articles of the future treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests already agreed upon guarantee that the control system will constantly be perfected in the light of the constant progress of science and technology. From this point of view, the attempts of the Western Powers to start new technical talks may lead to nothing but further undesirable protraction in the schedule of the conference.
The Geneva Conference has already succeeded in attaining agreement on a number of significant questions as, for example, the purpose and scope of the validity of the future treaty, the establishment of a control organization, the duration of the treaty, periodic review of the system, the co-operation of the parties with the system and others.

The Czechoslovak delegation believes that the remaining problems in dispute may be solved to the general satisfaction, namely, the question of an on-site inspection related to the detection of underground explosions, the system of voting in the control organ and the system of the composition of the personnel of the control posts and the mobile inspection teams. The Government of Czechoslovakia fully supports the well known position and proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union on these still outstanding questions since it is convinced that they constitute a real basis for reaching such agreement that would take account of the interests of all countries.

In this connexion the Czechoslovak delegation would like to devote particular attention to the question of dispatching mobile inspection groups to locations which are suspected as sites of a nuclear explosion. This question is still a prominent disputable issue in the talks although the Government of the Soviet Union, as early as last April, proposed a practical and acceptable solution of this question.

The core of the Soviet proposal, which is based on the conception of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, suggests that each year a definite number of inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom would be decided upon, which would be performed anytime immediately upon request of any party up to the determined limit. The Western Powers have not yet in any way responded to this proposal of the Soviet Government although, together with the conclusions reached by the Conference of Experts of eight countries, it would guarantee an effective way of detecting all underground nuclear explosions.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has pointed out many times in the past that it stood for the introduction of effective control measures in the treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. However,
the demand for "effective controls", so often stressed by the Western Powers, has nothing in common with the request for the dispatching of several hundreds of mobile inspection teams which would tour across and around the territories of the socialist countries. It is understandable that from the point of view of their security the socialist countries cannot agree to demands of this kind.

The Soviet Union, which in the course of the Geneva Conference has shown many a proof of its goodwill and readiness to reach agreement, recently expressed agreement with the establishment of a working technical group which, in terms of the conclusions reached by the Geneva Conference of experts, would within a given time study technical data relevant to the conditions of dispatching mobile inspection groups to sites suspected as the location of nuclear explosions. The ways of detecting seismic waves would be examined and recommendations could be made as to the appropriate measuring instrumentation. The Soviet Government also expressed its agreement with the arrangement that the technical working group would take into account the technical data contained in the report of the so-called Berkner Committee.

The Czechoslovak delegation believes that nothing should be done at the present time that would render the reaching of an agreement in the Geneva talks difficult, and I wish to stress that the tests of nuclear weapons should not be resumed until such time as the respective treaty on their cessation is signed.

The Czechoslovak people, as well as all those who cherish the idea of the maintenance of world peace, welcomed the declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union of 29 August 1958 that the Soviet Union would not resume the nuclear weapons tests unless this is done by the Western Powers. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which has striven for years that the discontinuance of the nuclear weapons tests should be effected, and which as early as 1958 unilaterally stopped its own nuclear tests, showed by its declaration a new evidence of its sincere efforts to relieve mankind from the danger that is represented by the tests of nuclear weapons.

It is necessary that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom also should respond to the appeal of the Government of the Soviet Union and not resume nuclear weapons tests. If these Governments also display sufficient goodwill and understanding for the justified demands of peoples that
all nuclear weapons tests be discontinued completely and forever, these tests shall not be resumed anymore.

However, it is a well known fact that certain influential circles exist in the West which hope by all means to prevent further relaxation of international tension and the attainment of far-reaching agreements in the field of disarmament, including the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The representatives of these circles have based their post-war foreign policy and their military and strategic plans on weapons of mass destruction. They have attempted to justify their nuclear armaments by the alleged necessity for the defence of the West and have openly advocated the resumption of nuclear weapons tests.

However, similar voices have been completely lost in the call of world public opinion for an immediate cessation of nuclear tests. The convincing evidence of the unanimously negative stand of a large majority of countries against the continuation of nuclear weapons tests, as well as against nuclear weapons in general, was offered also by the discussion in our Committee on the item of "General and complete disarmament" and by our current consideration of the issue entitled "Cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests". The advocates of the continuation of nuclear weapons tests, both latent and open, are in an obvious minority.
It is desirable that the United Nations should raise its voice in favour of such a highly important question as is the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, the United Nations should urge the Powers conducting negotiations in Geneva to intensify their efforts toward the attainment of an agreement and not to resume their tests until the signing of the treaty on the permanent and complete cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

In conclusion, I wish to express the conviction of the Czechoslovak Government that the efforts of peaceful forces will be conducive to an early conclusion of the treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests as a first step toward a complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which would be an effective contribution toward the strengthening of peace in the entire world.

Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon): One need not really begrudge the time taken in the discussion of this item as well as other items included in the general subject of disarmament. It is true that we have taken a great deal of time in discussing the varied aspects of the question of disarmament, but as my delegation had the opportunity of pointing out in the course of our statement in the general debate, the whole of the agenda before the fourteenth session contains the subject of disarmament and the subject of economic development as two of the most important items. If the Assembly devotes a great deal of time to the consideration of the question of disarmament in all its aspects, that time will certainly not be wasted. We are very glad indeed that quite apart from this, the tone of the discussion has been maintained at a level which will certainly assist the discussions that are taking place elsewhere and which will take place elsewhere in the future. Therefore the discussion may prove to be fruitful.

The question which we have before us arises in the two draft resolutions which are contained in documents A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1. My delegation is one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1. We co-sponsored the draft resolution because we fully and strongly believe in the absolute necessity of the complete cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests at the present time.
We speak of "suspension" in our draft resolution, but what we really mean -- and there can be no doubt about this -- is that we would like to see the complete cessation of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests. I should like to say, in passing, that the United Nations, in this Committee and elsewhere, has consistently maintained its position that these tests are a danger to the people of the world and that action should be taken at the earliest possible opportunity to refrain from carrying out these tests.

That is a conviction which has been expressed over and over again in this Committee. We are particularly thankful, therefore, to the delegation of India for the consistency and the firmness with which they have kept this subject alive, and to those who supported them in this Committee and in the United Nations as a whole. We are glad to be associated with the Indian delegation in supporting the draft resolution that is before us.

With regard to the two draft resolutions before us, I should like to say that at first glance it might appear to some of us as if the draft resolutions were contradictory instead of complementary. It has been urged very strongly that they are indeed complementary. My delegation also had this difficulty, but after full consideration and examination of the two texts, we are in agreement with the view that was expressed previously by several representatives, that if they are not complementary, they are certainly not contradictory and they can be treated as two distinct draft resolutions.

In the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, the sponsors urge the three nuclear Powers, who are recognized today as the existing nuclear Powers, to continue the great work that they have themselves voluntarily undertaken to bring about suspension first and then a cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. That draft resolution, while commending the Powers for what they have done, urges them, therefore, to continue in this good work. We feel that we are in a position to agree with that expression of hope. We also join the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution in strongly supporting the hope that this good and great work which has been undertaken will be continued and that it will have a happy and successful ending soon.
We must not forget that it was the united voice of the United Nations in the first instance, and the united expression of view from all parts of the world, in the second instance, that brought the conviction to the three great Powers as to the urgent need for action which will prevent a nuclear outbreak at some time in the future. They felt so convinced and their goodwill to the rest of the world is indicated by the action which they themselves have agreed to take.

We can do no more on this occasion than to express our gratitude to them and to give them the feeling that they have our confidence and, certainly, our hopes and prayers that in the not-too-distant future the efforts they are now making to overcome the few difficulties that still remain before an agreement can be signed, will be completed and that such agreement will be an accomplished fact in the very near future.

Therefore, we can support that draft resolution for the reasons I have given. When we come to the consideration of the other draft resolution, of which we ourselves are co-sponsors, we feel that we can perhaps support it with a little greater pleasure because we extend the operation of that draft resolution beyond the existing three nuclear Powers and, in all good faith and with all goodwill, call upon other countries who may become possessed of the nuclear weapon not to carry out nuclear tests but to do everything possible to bring about a suspension and a cessation of nuclear weapons tests.
Therefore, all we do in our resolution is to expand the area to which our appeal is directed. We expand the area outside the three nuclear Powers and tell them, in addition, that we feel we should like them, even if they have the power and ability to conduct, and are on the threshold of, a nuclear test, to refrain from doing so for the very good reasons we have urged at different times and on different occasions.

Before I conclude, I would like to say one word about the reasons why we take this action. We have explained our position very fully in the course of the disarmament debate which took place in this very Committee. We have added to it in the course of the discussion of the proposed atomic tests in the Sahara. There is really very little new to be said, but I think the subject is so important, especially in view of what is emerging by way of public world opinion today, that I should say once again that there are two very important reasons why we should press strongly this attitude of ours in the United Nations toward a cessation and suspension of nuclear weapons.

In the first place, although this question is debated still, and although some people do doubt it, I think it can be said that there is a general acceptance throughout the world amongst all peoples that nuclear and thermonuclear tests do no good to the health and welfare of the people of the world. If one were even to grant that there is not that degree of established proof that there is sufficient danger at the present time as a result of the tests that have already taken place, there can be no doubt with regard to the danger that can arise in the future if these tests continue unabated. And if they remain unabated, they will continue with renewed vigour and greater pressure. Therefore, I think it is unnecessary to debate the question whether the health and welfare of the peoples of the world will be injured and deleteriously affected, and will cause untold suffering and harm not only to the present generation but also to future generations. Therefore, that is one good reason.

Quite apart from that, we have established in this Committee on previous occasions that there are scientists of great repute in very large numbers who have risked their whole reputations on clear statements indicating that there is a definite danger to the health and welfare of the peoples of the world. These statements have been made by scientists of no mean repute. They are scientists
who have no axe to grind. They are people who are mindful of the responsibility which their profession imposes upon them, and are people who are anxious to see the world freed from this grave danger. Therefore, we should take what they say as a fact and accept it as such at the present time. Even if the present contamination caused by radioactivity is insufficient to affect harmfully the lives of all of us here, there is danger in the future to unborn generations. Therefore, it is a curious state of affairs that, in the light of all this, there are people who even today will stoutly espouse the cause of increased armament, a continuation of the race in armaments, and, indeed, even a continuation of nuclear and thermonuclear testing. There are some, of course, who say that this testing could be carried out underground; but the patent fact is that there are some who are still unmindful of the danger to the health and welfare of people.

That is one aspect. The second aspect which influences us is that, apart from the health of the people, nuclear testing will mean the continuance of the nuclear race. If the countries of the world which are powerfully equipped and have the resources to do so continue nuclear testing, they can manufacture new and more dangerous weapons which will cause greater destruction to the world than even those weapons which have hitherto been produced. Once nuclear testing is resumed you cannot stop the nuclear race; it will go on, and the result will be that nuclear armaments will be produced in large numbers. One country will outpace another in the race in production of the more destructive weapons, and a dangerous point will be reached.

Today, fortunately, the nuclear weapon is a deterrent. We are very glad of that fact, at any rate at present. But how long will it be a deterrent? If a race develops and the other countries which are now waiting to test and produce these weapons -- another ten, fifteen or twenty countries -- join in that race, then there can indeed be no safety for the world, and the danger of a nuclear conflagration, by design or by accident, cannot be in any way minimized.

Those are the two reasons which compel us to support this resolution; namely, to safeguard the health of the people now and in the future by preventing a race in nuclear armaments production, and to bring about, by this means of agreement, an understanding between the great Powers which has resulted in the accomplishment
of a treaty, which in turn may expand and grow, like the waves that expand when you drop a pebble in the water. These waves of good will which will result from a suspension of nuclear weapons will spread into other disarmament regions, and the whole question of disarmament will be assisted through the stoppage of nuclear testing. But this cannot be accomplished without agreement, and all we can do is to express the hope that the attempt to arrive at an agreement will be successful. We know the difficulties, and the less said about them here, the better. We know the difficulties of control; we know the difficulties of giving adequate assurances to all countries that a suspension now will not lead to a continuation in the future.

Those are questions which these Powers will be able to tackle themselves, and we gladly join, in both of these resolutions, in an expression of our great hope and belief that a treaty will be an accomplished fact soon. We believe that what we ask in these resolutions will be granted us in the near future; namely, firstly a continuation of the suspension of nuclear tests among the three great Powers of today, not only until December of this year but also until an adequate agreement is reached, and secondly, that a treaty will be signed banning completely the testing of these dangerous weapons.
Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): This is not the first time that our Assembly is dealing with the question of cessation of nuclear weapons tests. It was on the agenda of the tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth sessions of the General Assembly. In so doing, the Assembly has emphasized the urgent importance of this problem and likewise the Assembly’s own responsibility, inasmuch as the question of the suspension of tests touches most directly not only on the interests of the three nuclear Powers but also on the interests of all States, large and small alike.

As distinct from past sessions, which took place to the rather sinister obligato of nuclear explosions, we are now examining this question in a setting of a marked reduction of international tension and of a moratorium on nuclear tests, which has been going on for more than one year. I have in mind, of course, such States as the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. We have not forgoned the hope that this de facto suspension will be maintained throughout the Geneva negotiations until an agreement is signed to halt test explosions for all time.

With respect to the Soviet Union, it has already made a statement which supports our hopes. On 29 August 1959, the Soviet Government decided not to resume nuclear tests if the Western Powers do not resume the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The Soviet Union has come out as an active and consistent champion of the complete cessation of nuclear tests, regarding this as an important step toward the elimination of nuclear armaments and the removal of this threat to the life and health of millions of human beings.

As is well known, the United States Government has announced that its suspension of tests will be continued to the end of this year. The United Kingdom Government, for its part, has indicated that it will not resume tests so long as the useful discussions at the conference on the discontinuance of nuclear tests continue.

It would be preferable if these statements told us more unequivocally that the United States and the United Kingdom would not resume nuclear tests. As regards this vagueness, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, Mr. Under, had some apt comments to make in this Assembly. He said that there was every ground for the assertion that it depends on the Western Powers whether the end of tests has in fact arrived.
The current rather unquiet suspension of nuclear tests is quite inadequate. It is necessary to persevere with patience and fortitude in these efforts to place the solution of this problem on a sound and reliable basis. Such a basis can only be an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests for all time, with the establishment of a reliable system of control.

Permit me, in this connexion, to recall the following statement of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita S. Khrushchev, who stated, among other things, in a speech to the General Assembly on 18 September 1959:

"The Soviet Government believes that the elaboration of a programme of general and complete disarmament should not hold up the solution of such an acute and fully mature question as that of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests for all time. All the prerequisites for such a solution are now at hand. We hope that the appropriate agreement on the discontinuance of tests will be concluded and put into effect without delay." (A/PV.799, page 31)

For its part, the Government of the Ukrainian SSR wholeheartedly shares this hope, convinced as it is that an agreement on the cessation of tests would constitute the first step, and a significant one, toward the solution of a most important problem of the contemporary period, the problem of general and complete disarmament. The achievement of such an agreement would, in our opinion, constitute genuine confirmation of the resolution unanimously adopted by the Political Committee which expresses the aspirations of all States Members of the United Nations that "the armaments race which places a heavy burden on mankind" should be stopped "completely and forever" and that the resources thus released should be used for the benefit of mankind.

Having heard the statements of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in this Committee, we may note with gratification that there are hopeful indications as to the favourable prospects of the Geneva Conference. We take it that the remaining differences, even though not unsubstantial, are nevertheless of such a nature as not to constitute a serious obstacle to further progress in these negotiations.
At the same time, however, the Ukrainian SSR delegation deems it essential to voice some concern in connexion with artificial attempts to delay the conclusion of an agreement at Geneva. In the past the Western Powers took the position that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests was to depend on progress made in the field of atomic disarmament, in the field of conventional disarmament and in the field of the prevention of surprise attack. In the last analysis, this fallacious and utterly inconsistent position was cast aside, and this has surely enhanced the chances of the success of the negotiations.

However, even as agreement on individual articles was achieved, various reservations appeared, new artificial hurdles were created whose obvious inconsistency was revealed very convincingly in the statement made yesterday by the head of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Kuznetsov. Attempts were made and are still being made to argue that effective control was impossible in view of the imperfection of technical devices for the detection of nuclear explosions or, on the contrary, in view of the appearance of new difficulties in connexion with the advancing techniques and the progress of scientific thought. It seems entirely clear to us, however, that there are no obstacles of a scientific or technical character for the cessation of tests under effective control.

In this connexion, I should like to quote a passage from a very important and timely statement by the American Federation of Scientists, of which 2,300 scientific workers are members: "It is possible to set up a system which would ensure the prevention of any serious violation" -- presumably of the agreement on the cessation of tests, because this is what they have in mind -- "A further development of instrumentation and of the techniques of detection may be expected, and therefore the risk as regards evasion of compliance with the agreement will in the future be further reduced."
It is hardly possible to find any objection against these well founded and carefully weighed words.

Recently in the United States we have witnessed an intensive campaign in which the Press, prominent political leaders, official governmental organs, the United States Atomic Energy Commission, various military authorities, and so forth, have taken part. The purpose of this campaign is to eliminate and discard the conclusions of the Geneva experts and to argue for the necessity of a partial approach to the problem of the cessation of tests, a phased approach. In this connexion the Ukrainian delegation would like to note that the representative of the United States in this Committee on 14 October again repeated the proposal of the United States of 13 April and 5 May of this year. What is the substance of that proposal? Mr. Lodge said:

"In his letter of 5 May the President wrote that, if it proved impossible to reach early agreement on all aspects of a comprehensive test ban, we need not allow this to result in complete failure of the negotiations." (A/C.1/PV.1027, page 11)

That is our profound conviction. We hope that this view is shared by many representatives in this Committee, that such an approach is not calculated to solve the problem before us. To agree to this would be tantamount to sanctioning de facto the continued testing of atomic devices underground and in outer space. It is conceivable that a limited agreement of this kind would lead to some sort of reduction of the contamination of the atmosphere with radioactive fall-out, but we would not be achieving the main aim -- the prevention of the production and development of new and more destructive types of nuclear weapons.

I cannot fail to express the particular alarm which is felt by our delegation in connexion with the unceasing demands made in some countries by influential political leaders for the resumption of underground nuclear tests, which are said to be essential for the strengthening of national security. In particular, the American press has published reports -- and it is characteristic that they were not refuted or denied in any official quarters -- concerning the preparation of such test explosions. We have been told that in the State of Nevada tunnels and other facilities are being built for the carrying-out of underground nuclear
explosions. We were told that a proving-ground is being prepared in the
Pacific ocean on Eniwetok Atoll. The New York Times on 16 November of this year
stated that in United States military circles there is increasing alarm at the
continued suspension of atomic tests, because this prevents the development of
new weapons. Another important factor, in the opinion of American officials,
is that the continued temporary suspension of tests undermines the reliability
of present stock-piles of atomic weapons, on which the whole military strategy
of the United States is based.

All this, in our opinion, does not contribute to the successful conclusion
of the Geneva Conference. Our delegation is profoundly convinced that if the
United States and the United Kingdom display as much good-will, as much eagerness
for agreement, as the Soviet Union, then a solution to hitherto unsolved questions
would be found in short order, and in this manner the door would be opened to
the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests of nuclear and hydrogen
weapons, a goal toward which the peoples of the world have been striving for such
a long time.

In conclusion, the Ukrainian delegation would like to dwell briefly on the
draft resolutions on this item presented by the delegations of Austria, Japan
and Sweden and contained in document A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, and by the delegation of
India, together with twenty-two other delegations, contained in document
A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1 and Add.1. In our opinion, in addition to expressing mere
gratitude to the States concerned participating in the Geneva negotiations for
the efforts which they have made, the General Assembly should more fully and
explicitly set forth its own recommendations. It is in this spirit that the draft
resolution co-sponsored by India and twenty-two other States is formulated. It
takes account of the profound concern evinced by the peoples of all countries with
regard to the tests; it also notes with appreciation the de facto suspension of
such tests by the three nuclear Powers. It further contains an appeal to the
States concerned in the Geneva discussions to continue their present voluntary
suspension of tests, and likewise -- and we are profoundly convinced that this
is highly important -- it appeals to all other States to desist from carrying out
any such tests of their own. The Ukrainian delegation recently voted in favour
of the resolution which called upon France to refrain from carrying out its nuclear tests in the Sahara. We consider that our Committee's resolution on this item should likewise contain an appeal to all non-nuclear States which have the capability of becoming nuclear, to renounce the carrying-out of any tests. Even though the draft resolution of Austria, Japan and Sweden, A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, contains nothing that would be unacceptable to my delegation, it nevertheless fails fully to express the aspirations of the peoples and the temper of the majority of the delegations in this Committee.

Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Speaking cr. this item of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests which has been included in our agenda by the delegation of India, I am reminded of the very felicitous expression of the illustrious President of the fourteenth session, Dr. Belaunde, who in his inaugural statement said that this Assembly, he hoped, would be the "Assembly of peace". And certainly, if any question is directly related to the consolidation of peace, it is this question of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Every since 1954, with great perseverance the delegation of India at the United Nations has sought to achieve the suspension of these tests, constantly pointing out the dangers that nuclear tests could entail to humanity and expressing its hope that these tests would be suspended. Today the fears expressed by the delegation of India have been confirmed by the opinions voiced by experts and scientists, and the hopes of the Indian delegation have been satisfied by the admission on the part of the great Powers of the need to come to an agreement for the final cessation of those tests. We should, I believe, express our appreciation to the delegation of India for its indefatigable struggle to achieve this end, and our gratitude should also go to the great Powers for their understanding and their sense of responsibility.
The question of the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests is of double importance -- firstly, as a decisive step toward disarmament and the relaxation of international tension, and, secondly, as an indispensable measure for the protection of present and future generations.

There can be no doubt whatever that we are living through moments decisive in the history of mankind and that, for the first time since the Second World War, optimism is being reborn in regard to a possible understanding between the great Powers which will bring as its corollary disarmament and the reduction of international tension. Among the events which have given rise to this hope we must obviously include the recent personal contact between the heads of State of the principal Powers, and I believe that importance must be attached to the establishment of the committee of ten to undertake a serious study of the problem of disarmament and also to our Committee's unanimous resolution on general and complete disarmament. But, above all, there is the concrete and tangible fact of the voluntary suspension of nuclear tests. As far as the people of the world are concerned, this concrete and tangible fact is the best proof of the peace-loving intentions of the great Powers. That proof must be cherished and that hope must not be destroyed.

That is why we wish to reaffirm our hope that that voluntary suspension of nuclear tests will remain in force and that very soon an agreement will be reached, once and for all, calling for the total cessation of such tests. The renewal of nuclear tests would, without any doubt, constitute a step backward on the road leading to disarmament and therefore a step backward as far as the possibilities of consolidating peace are concerned.

The other aspect of the problem -- on which I shall not dwell at the moment, since it has been fully discussed at other times in this same Committee -- is that of the danger represented for humanity by the increase of radioactivity coming from nuclear explosions.

In a recent statement before this Committee, I referred to the final conclusion on this matter contained in the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. At that time, I said -- and I think I can repeat it here -- that the delegation of Venezuela was in favour of a suspension
of nuclear tests no matter what their origin and no matter which country tried to carry out such tests. The position of my delegation on this point has been extremely clear. Last year, in the debate on disarmament, the suspension of nuclear tests and the reduction of military forces, which were items that were discussed together, I put before this Committee on 17 October, when I referred to nuclear tests, the point of view of my delegation. At that time, I spoke of the immediate cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons and said that a draft resolution on the subject "could deal with effective international control so that such a suspension of testing might ultimately be made definitive." (A/C.1/PV.953, page 37-40)

For this reason, we were extremely pleased to observe the voluntary suspension of nuclear tests by the great Powers during the course of the year 1959.

My delegation has always espoused the idea of disarmament under effective international control and, as stages on the road to disarmament, we were in favour of the suspension of nuclear tests and measures to avoid a greater dissemination of nuclear weapons -- all this, naturally, with the understanding that it be carried out under effective international control.

Last year, we voted in favour of the resolution on disarmament, suspension of nuclear tests and reduction of military effective, and this year we have voted in favour of the resolution on general and complete disarmament, the resolution recommending that no nuclear tests be carried out in the Sahara, and the resolution calling for the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

I should now like to refer to the two draft resolutions before us. The first of them was submitted by the delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden and the second by the delegations of India and twenty-two other countries. Both of these draft resolutions express the hope that the States participating in the Geneva negotiations will come to an agreement at an early date on the suspension of tests under effective international control, and both of them urge the States concerned to continue their present voluntary suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons. The only important difference lies in the fact that the twenty-three-Power draft also appeals to other States to desist from carrying out such tests.
My delegation is of the opinion that the twenty-three-Power draft resolution is more complete and more logical because, if we want an effective suspension of nuclear tests, we cannot limit it to the great Powers which have already carried out such tests but must make it apply to all other States. The dangerous consequences of such tests, whether from the point of view of their constituting a step backward on the road to disarmament and the relaxation of international tensions or from the point of view of their danger to the health of humanity, do not change with a change in the identity of the country carrying out the tests.

For the reasons already explained, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by India and twenty-two other States contained in document A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1.

My delegation will also vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden, contained in document A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, because that draft resolution seeks the same end as the other one and does not contradict the other one in any way.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): Obviously, I do not in this debate wish to set myself up as the defender of a proliferation of nuclear test explosions, but I do wish to set myself up as the defender of truth in the face of exaggerations and misinterpretations.

Before developing this thesis, I should like to state that I did appreciate certain words which were uttered a while ago by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR. If the interpretation was correct, he said, in effect: "Is it possible to prohibit only atmospheric tests? This would surely reduce radioactive fall-out, but that is not the principal danger. One must, first of all, limit the production and perfecting of weapons."

That is a position whose objective to me seems perfectly reasonable, especially when it comes from a man whose country has already carried out fifty-five test explosions. If he and I differ as to the consequences to be drawn from these premises, we are nevertheless in agreement as regards the starting point, to wit, that the cessation of tests is not a beginning of disarmament.
I endorse the statement by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR to the effect that what is necessary first of all is to limit the production and development of nuclear weapons. I would add that they must be prohibited under control. This is the view which I have consistently upheld this year as in past years.

This brings me to the few observations that I wanted to present. Yesterday I was waiting with interest for the speech by the representative of Sweden a country that is rich in scientists, wealthy in electric power and well endowed with factories. Within a few years that country could back up its neutrality with nuclear weapons. It could do so within a period of time approximately that set recently in Congress by the party in power in Sweden.

I willingly acknowledge that the scientific facts cited by the representative of Sweden are perfectly accurate; they are, in fact, borrowed from the highly reliable sources from which I myself have drawn large-scale documentation. Without seeking to involve him directly -- he knows perfectly well that such has never been and will not be my design -- I shall simply use his argument in order to warn everybody here against misinterpretations of scientific facts. I shall offer three examples of these.

The first of these obliges me to repeat once again that, as far as radioactivity is concerned, the word "unknown" is not synonymous with "dangerous", notwithstanding the contrary views expressed here. There are effects which are unknown but about which it can be stated reliably that they are still within a non-dangerous limit. One may read in the report of the Joint Committee of the United States Congress, as Mr. Sandler pointed out:

"...the biological significance of low levels of radioactivity is still largely unknown. No solution was reached on whether or not a threshold level of radiation exposure exists below which effects such as cancer and leukemia do not result." (A/C.1/1057, page 27)

What is the meaning of these words? Clearly, if there is no threshold level on radiation exposure for the production of ill effects, any dose can produce such effects. If there is a threshold, the ill effects will appear only if the dose exceeds the threshold level.
It must be stated again that the international authors of the documents in our possession, like the French experts, have precisely and systematically selected the most pessimistic hypotheses as working hypotheses. Therefore the facts can only diminish, and not increase, the effects which they have chosen to attribute to small doses of radiation.

The report of the Joint Committee, in another passage, attests that all the conclusions utilized results obtained for high levels of radiation. In other words, the pessimistic thesis was used that the effects were proportional to the exposure dose, and this presupposes the absence of any threshold.

This approach of the scientists must be approved, provided it is not forgotten that it leads to results which are certainly exaggerated, greater than the reality of the facts, and that therefore a calm judgement must be maintained. Even now, recent discoveries seem to indicate that a dose applied slowly -- which is the case that concerns us -- has much less effect than the same total dose of exposure applied instantaneously, such as was used to compute the maximum effects announced. These discoveries are likewise mentioned in the report of the Joint Committee. But scientific prudence, which must not breed alarm, makes it clear that confirmation must be expected to support the current approach.

At the risk of prolonging these observations, which I hoped to keep short, I shall quote another extract from the same document relating to these new discoveries:

"These results, if corroborated by subsequent research, would suggest that the estimates made hitherto of the genetic effects of radiation may have been overestimated by a factor of at least four, and this applies also to the other effects mentioned here."

There is no need for me to emphasize the importance of this remark, especially in the context of the preceding passage: that is, that we might have to divide by four the effects which we now discover were four times too large. I am speaking for the sake of scientific accuracy and in an eagerness to return to the facts.

The second example I might mention is that of large particles, likewise mentioned by the representative of Sweden, which some of our colleagues have found striking. We know, thanks to the researches of Swedish scientists, that
radioactivity sometimes is unequally distributed as regards various grades of
dust suspended in the atmosphere. This is a microscopic effect, and the global
effect of radioactivity is in no way modified thereby. According to the experts,
this creates no new type of risk, nor does it increase the existing risks.

I do not wish to dwell on this any further, because I should have to speak
on the effects on the various cells within a living body. We have heard
statements about collision between a particle of dust and a cell. But, after
all, there are billions of cells in any living organism among the higher types
of beings and, of course, many cells normally die off every minute.

Here is a third fact, which may perhaps be the most important of all I
have mentioned. Mr. Sandler mentioned what might happen if there were
continued indefinitely -- that is, without any time-limit -- test explosions
at the same rate as 1955-1958, that is, at the rate of tens of millions of tons
of TNT annually.
At this rate, he said, one would at the end of these innumerable years approach the permissible dose -- and as far as that is concerned I previously pointed out that this must not be confused with a dangerous dose. At the end of many years the dose of strontium that is, if explosions continue at the rate of tens of millions of tons of TNT per annum, would reach 48 units, while the admissible dose is 67 units. I agree completely with Mr. Sandler who has thus proved that now, luckily, we are far removed from any dangerous situation since, if explosions were continued indefinitely at an excessive pace and at an excessive power yield, the permissible dose would not yet be reached, and that in itself, is at least 100 times less than the dangerous dose.

On 11 November I rejected this hypothesis when I stated in a preceding speech:
"... it is unthinkable to continue nuclear tests at the rate at which they were carried out in 1958." (A/C.1/FV.1051, p. 46)

Today I must press this essential and reassuring fact that even in the event that this excessive pace were indefinitely prolonged, the dangerous limit in the most pessimistic of all hypotheses would still be far from being reached.

I know how difficult it is to row against the stream and to seek to calm the waves of collective panic. I am, therefore, grateful to my old friend, the former Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Sandler, for having offered complete confirmation of the thesis, which on the basis of expert researchers and with the co-operation of one of them directly -- the co-operation of one of the experts, that is, I have unceasingly defended here.

The saying is correct that while we have to study the situation seriously, there is nothing that forces us to take it tragically. All that remains is to state our attitude concerning the proposals before us and the votes that are to be cast. I shall state our attitude right away in order not to have to speak again. In the French delegation we are scarcely inclined to accept modified texts which oppose each other without opposing each other since they modify each other without opposing each other. It is a matter perhaps of the sponsorship of delegations; some delegations have said so. We prefer clear-cut positions rather than half-shades; forthright positions rather than the parliamentary
lobbying game transported to the international scale or scene. In this subtle strategy we find mere tactics and perhaps ulterior motives which are not directly linked with the matter involved.

We shall abstain from voting on the three-Power draft resolution for the very simple reason that it does not apply to us but merely addresses itself to the States now engaged in the negotiations in Geneva.

On the other hand, even though we may be the only ones to do so, we shall vote against the twenty-three- or twenty-four-Power draft resolution for reasons which I need no longer develop. Everything that I said in the course of my preceding statements accounts for my opposition to a text which would render official and dramatize alarms and fears that now strike us as being unfounded and which contain an appeal addressed, without naming it, to my country even though I have already stated that such an appeal cannot at this time be heeded. These are clear reasons which induce me to adopt this attitude, an attitude which I submit is totally devoid of ambiguity.

Mr. BUDO (Albania) (interpretation from French): The Political Committee is now called upon to discuss the question of the suspension of test explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons, a question of primordial interest to the entire world owing to its urgent character in view of the immediate and grave danger posed by these tests for the health and life of present peoples and future generations. The overwhelming majority of representatives who have discussed the items already dealt with by our Committee, such as the question of general and complete disarmament and the question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara, spoke at great length of the anxiety felt by the peoples and of the danger which faced the peoples in view of the fact that this question has not yet been properly resolved.

There is no need in the circumstances to discuss at length the urgent need at arriving at an agreement on a definitive discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. All the peoples of the globe urgently demand the total and permanent cessation of test explosions of nuclear weapons with a view to eliminating once and for all the danger created by these explosions. It is
manifest that the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of these tests would constitute a very important step towards international relaxation of tension and would clear the way to the destruction and elimination of all nuclear weapons as well as for the solution of the fundamental problem of our period, that is, general and complete disarmament.

The Geneva conference has registered appreciable progress in working out the provisions of an agreement on the cessation of tests. Important issues, on which there were previously some divergencies, have been disposed of, the text of the preamble and of a substantial number of articles have been agreed upon, and we can only express gratification at these developments. The important fact should also be borne in mind that for more than a year the globe has not been contaminated any further by radioactive fall-out owing to the mutual consent of the three atomic Powers to suspend voluntarily their nuclear test explosions.
Moreover, the American and British Governments have announced their intention not to resume tests. As far as the American Government is concerned, this would hold true until the end of the year. As far as the British Government is concerned, this would apply so long as useful negotiations continue. At the same time, the Government of the USSR decided as early as 29 August last formally not to be the first to resume such tests.

Doubtless all these favourable facts -- the progress made by the Geneva Conference and the provisional suspension of tests -- are worthy of being kept in mind. But we cannot help realizing that these are mere provisional measures which will not solve the problem and that, despite the results already registered in the negotiations at Geneva, the final agreement has not as yet been worked out. Quite apart from the progress made at the Geneva Conference, there still are substantial divergencies at that Conference which result from positions adopted by the Western Powers, especially from the position of the United States of America concerning detection of underground explosions. However, the conclusions of the Conference of Experts held in Geneva from 1 July to 20 August 1958, the report of which was approved by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, indicate that control over the observance of the agreement on the cessation of tests would not present any unsurmountable difficulties. The report of the Technical Working Group which held its proceedings last summer in the framework of the three-Power Conference furnished confirmation of this as regards the detection of high altitude explosions.

According to these conclusions, it is technically quite possible to detect nuclear tests with the aid of appropriate instrumentation and techniques whether they take place in the atmosphere or at high altitudes or in the depths of the oceans or on the ground and to ensure control of the strict observance of the agreement on the cessation of tests. Certain divergencies -- for example, in the composition and staffing of control posts -- are on the way to a solution due to the constructive efforts of the Soviet delegation.

As far as the detection of underground explosions is concerned, the three Powers have already agreed to set up inspection teams which, in the rare event of a suspected explosion being registered at any control post, would go to the site where the suspected phenomenon has taken place in order to verify
whether a violation of the agreement has occurred. It must be recognized that
this is already an important step towards the solution of this particular
aspect of the problem. Nevertheless, the question of the very dispatching of
inspection teams to the site of suspected phenomena constitutes, if I may so
express myself, the touchstone of all these proceedings.

The Soviet delegation, during the discussions on this problem, made
continuing efforts to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, but the United
States and the United Kingdom delegations pressed for conditions which were
bound to be unacceptable to any sovereign State which is seriously concerned for
its own security. In order to contribute to breaking this impasse, the Soviet
Government proposed on 23 April last that the question should be settled on
the basis of the idea suggested by Prime Minister Macmillan during his visit
to Moscow, to the effect that there should be fixed in advance the annual
number of inspections to be carried out in the territory of each of the three
Powers in the event the reports of the control posts register the existence of
phenomena suspected of being nuclear explosions. One might thus fix in advance
a sufficient number of inspections to guarantee the protection of any violation
of the agreement, all the more so as it is provided by the clauses of the
agreement that the question of the number of inspections may be periodically
revised or reviewed. It is to be hoped that the other Powers will accept this
reasonable and realistic proposal instead of entering upon the complex and
unpromising task of establishing some sort of proportion between the number of
inspections to be carried out and the number of the suspected phenomena.

It should be noted that, guided by the same spirit of overcoming all
difficulties and eliminating differences on the question of underground
explosions, the Soviet Union has proposed the establishment of a technical
working group with a view to studying within a given time data concerning and
relevant to this question and making appropriate recommendations.

The Geneva negotiations -- and I am referring both to the difficulties
already overcome and the progress already registered -- have made it plain that
it is altogether possible to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement on the
definitive cessation of test explosions. One cannot, however, fail to point out
that in the course of these negotiations the American and British delegations have not invariably displayed the necessary goodwill and understanding in order to speed up the work. The contrary was true. They raised a great many objections as to the system of control and they protracted the negotiations. Some representatives here, even though indirectly, and the American Press, which seeks to confuse and delude public opinion as did The New York Times on 15 November 1959, have sought to shift the blame for the delays at Geneva upon the USSR. Such allegations are entirely at variance with reality and it is the duty of all the Member States of the United Nations to recognize the facts as they are in order better to contribute to the swift progress of the work and to the conclusion of an agreement.

We cannot question the sincerity of the USSR in its eagerness to arrive at a definitive and complete cessation of all atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. This has in fact been confirmed time and again. The repeated statements of the Soviet Government, its efforts and its successive proposals with a view to overcoming the difficulties and contributing to the swift progress of the Geneva negotiations, the concrete measures taken on this problem -- for example, the unilateral suspension of tests in March 1958 -- the haste with which the reports of the Conference of Experts and of the Technical Working Group were approved and similar other facts on record constitute so much irrefutable proof of the sincere willingness of the Soviet Union to solve this problem as quickly as possible. Let us recall the formal decision of 29 August last, under which the Government of the Soviet Union undertook "not to resume nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union if the Western Powers do not resume theirs." The importance of this decision is such as to require no comment. If the Western atomic Powers had adopted a similar commitment, which they could have done as early as March 1958, the problem would have been solved ipso facto.
As we have emphasized, the possibilities are at hand for arriving at an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests under appropriate international controls and in such a manner as to guarantee the verification and checking of the strict observance of the obligations assumed by the parties. If all the atomic Powers displayed equal goodwill, the final result would not be delayed. The importance and urgency of the conclusion of such an agreement cannot be overemphasized. The peoples of the world are anxiously awaiting the time when they will be freed, once and for all from this danger. A definitive and total cessation of tests would help to apply a brake to the armaments race, since it would prevent the development and testing of new types of nuclear weapons more destructive than the present ones. This would likewise prevent an increase in the number of States capable of producing atomic weapons.

The Albanian delegation considers that it is highly important for the United Nations to watch closely the work of the Geneva Conference. It is important for the United Nations to exert its influence in favour of the swift conclusion of an agreement before the situation as regards the dissemination of nuclear weapons becomes more complicated. It is also essential for the General Assembly to call upon all States not to resume tests before an agreement on the total and permanent cessation of test explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons is arrived at.

Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): In the general debate in the General Assembly I expressed the hopes of my country that the efforts being made in Geneva in technical and political negotiations which are unique in history, negotiations between the three nuclear Powers, to whom we wish to pay tribute because of their devoted and consistent efforts, will be concluded as soon as possible with an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests under an adequate system of international control. In the general debate we also expressed our satisfaction at the fact that, as a result of the voluntary suspension of nuclear tests announced by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, no tests of nuclear weapons have been carried out since November 1958.
In the discussion of the previous item of the agenda of this Committee, we stated the fundamental principle that the delegation of Ecuador has constantly put before the General Assembly, that is, that in the exercise of its powers and functions and in fulfilment of its duties under the Charter, the General Assembly must make a recommendation to all States that they should take no step which might renew the arms race, the human and political consequences of which might be incalculable. The brief although extremely interesting debate held in this Committee yesterday and today on the present item has only intensified our fears of a possible increase in the danger of radiation as a result of further tests and a return to the atmosphere of international tension. It has only reaffirmed our conviction that the General Assembly must stand firm in favour of a continuation on a universal level of the suspension of nuclear testing which is already in force.

This debate has brought forward very interesting elements with regard to the dangers of radioactivity and has confirmed the dangers which are inherent in nuclear testing, dangers which hang over the human species. We must state our appreciation to a number of delegations and especially to that of Sweden, a country whose scientific authority is respected by all.

In the political field, the reports placed before us by the Powers negotiating in Geneva reveal the importance of the present suspension of nuclear tests and how this suspension has created an indispensable psychological atmosphere conducive to progress in the negotiations. Also on the political level, an analysis of the declarations made in the last few days by representatives from all regions of the world shows that there is a strong current of public opinion which condemns the initiation of a new race in nuclear and thermonuclear test explosions.

Therefore, although the fundamental question is the setting up of an agreement to prohibit tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, it is also of vital interest that, as a first step towards such an agreement and as a first step in the programme of disarmament, there should be a continuation of the moratorium on nuclear explosions and that this moratorium should be respected not only by the present nuclear Powers but also by those countries which, scientifically, industrially and economically, might become nuclear Powers.
The Committee has before it two draft resolutions, one presented by the
delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden and the other presented by twenty-two
countries. The delegation of Ecuador wishes to express its appreciation to both
groups of delegations for having presented draft resolutions which correctly
reflect the disquiet of the moment. Far from being exclusive, the two drafts
are, we believe, complementary since they seek a common purpose and a common goal.

The draft resolution presented by Austria, Japan and Sweden has a restricted
objective. It is restricted to the negotiations in Geneva, but although it is
restricted, we believe it is of maximum importance. When it expresses to those
negotiating in Geneva the satisfaction of the General Assembly with regard to their
efforts to arrive at an agreement, and when it expresses the hope that they will
intensify their efforts to reach an agreement and further urges those States to
continue their voluntary discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing, then the
General Assembly is giving the negotiations in Geneva the backing that they
warrant and is doing so from the independent point of view that all delegations
must have with regard to the different problems related to the same question.

The draft resolution of the twenty-two Powers has, as I have already said,
a wider scope. It is addressed not only to those negotiating in Geneva, but also
to other States which may have the scientific, industrial and economic capacity
to become nuclear Powers. An appeal is made to these States also that they
desist from nuclear testing.

Therefore, approval of the three-Power draft resolution does not exclude
approval of the twenty-two-Power draft resolution, and the delegation of Ecuador
will vote in favour of both.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (interpretation from French): The initiative of
the Moroccan Government in asking the United Nations to deal with the question
of the French nuclear tests in the Sahara might be regarded as sufficient indication
of our attitude on this problem of the suspension of nuclear tests. We have not
spoken before in this debate because we thought we had taken enough of the
Committee's time in examining the item which we brought forward, but in the general
debate we set forth clearly our attitude with regard to continued nuclear testing
and we expressed hope that the Geneva conversations would make progress.
In the present short explanation of my vote, I would like again to condemn the continuance of nuclear tests. I should like to express our hope that the Geneva negotiations will arrive at the results which we all hope for. Morocco is co-sponsoring the twenty-two Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1) because we feel that its supplements the one which we co-sponsored with some other Powers in connexion with the French nuclear tests in the Sahara. In co-sponsoring this draft resolution, we fully support the forte and language of the text.

There is also before us another draft resolution (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1) sponsored by Austria, Japan and Sweden and my delegation will vote in favour of it because we consider that even though it does not fully express our thoughts on the matter, it does make a positive contribution to the problem and to its solution. To be sure, the draft resolution is not altogether satisfactory. It minimizes the concern and feelings expressed in our speeches and in the resolution which was approved in connexion with French nuclear tests in the Sahara. But we should like to endorse the ideas and hopes expressed therein and it is with this frame of mind that we shall support the three-Power draft resolution as well.

Mr. Michalowski (Poland): It seems to me that there is hardly any need today to underscore more extensively the necessity of the cessation of the nuclear test explosions, for the nefarious effects on the health and security of human beings of man-made radiation are becoming more and more widely recognized. They evoke every greater concern and protest on the part of world public opinion and many Governments as well. Nobody could take seriously today the fairy tales comparing fall-out radiation with the effects of wrist-watches or the risks of living at a higher altitude.

Recent statements by scientists and the results of their research work point ever more clearly to the increasing danger to health and human lives from radioactive fall-out. They offer new information on other products of atomic fission. Already today, besides strontium-90, we know about the still more dangerous barium-140, iodine-131 and carbon-14. The latter is a long-lived radioactive substance. It could be expected to produce genetic damage comparable to that from other fall-out material, but the damage would be spread over a thousand years, thus bringing much graver biological consequences.
We also know today that fall-out material shot into the stratosphere is not uniformly deposited over the earth's surface, but is distributed in uneven concentrations, and the so-called "hot spots" have a radiation level three times as large as other areas. These new results of scientific research evoke ever greater concern in world public opinion, ever greater apprehension, in the face of the still unknown and therefore multiplied dangers which can threaten humanity in the future.

As far as genetic consequences of radiation are concerned, the scientists are more and more frequently voicing the opinion that there is no such thing as a safe radiation level below which it is possible to avoid detrimental effects on human beings. Responsible scientists do admit that our knowledge is still too modest in order to establish such a level. As far back as 1956, five professors of Yale University stated the following:

"The effects produced by radiation are not reversible. If we were to find ten years from now that the people of this country have received too much radiation, we would be at an impasse because the residual effects would already have been produced. If we were to find that the population of this country or of any country, or of the world for that matter, had received too much radiation, it would be too late to do anything about it."

According the statement published a few days ago by Mr. Bogorow, head of the Soviet Hydrographic Expedition which examined the water of the Indian Ocean, the dumping of radioactive waste into oceans causes a high degree of pollution of waters and poisoning of plankton, fish and, indirectly, of men.

The contamination of food as a result of radioactive fall-out is another aspect of the matter now under discussion. The report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress of August 1959 states clearly that the concentrations of radioactive materials in food and man have increased rapidly since 1957 and will probably go higher.

In conditions where two thirds of the world's population suffer from malnutrition, not only have large sums of money been spent on atomic test explosions, but, what is more, this has caused the contamination of food especially in the regions where food shortage is particularly acute.
There is no need for me to give any more examples to show the dangers involved in atomic radiation. We had ample opportunity to hear statements to this effect during the debate on the last two items on the agenda of this Committee, as well as with regard to the question of radiation in plenary meeting. The discussions that we have had and the results of the voting on the draft resolutions that were presented to us clearly indicate that peoples and their Governments see the dangers connected with the existence of nuclear weapons and their testing.

But the problem now under discussion is also closely connected with the issue of our time: the problem of disarmament. A number of speakers, both in the Committee and in the general debate before the Assembly, gave expression to their conviction -- which is shared by the Polish delegation -- that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear test explosions could become the first step on our road towards disarmament. Before we take more substantive steps concerning the armaments race, we should first bring it to a halt. We should counteract the creation of all faits accomplis which can only hinder our efforts towards reaching an agreement.

The suspension of nuclear tests, which we should demand in clear and unequivocal terms, will prevent further testing of such weapons, will make their further improvement impossible and will prevent their becoming still more lethal than they are now.

The question of the suspension of nuclear tests is being discussed now in a better international atmosphere, which creates a better chance for reaching an agreement than ever before. The atomic test explosions are now suspended. Our aim should be that they be never resumed. So far only the Soviet Union has stated that it will not resume its tests as long as the Western Powers will refrain from doing so. Unfortunately, the suspension of test explosions by the other two atomic Powers is of a temporary character. We should do our utmost to have the present moratorium on explosions transformed into a generally binding international agreement. Any resumption of test explosions would constitute only a step backwards, a retreat from the idea of relaxation and strengthening of peace throughout the world.
That is why we wish to believe that the Geneva negotiations will result in an agreement on this issue. The statement of the Soviet representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, which we heard yesterday, clarified the problems connected with the Geneva negotiations and will undoubtedly contribute to their further progress.

The draft resolution which we are going to adopt should support all efforts towards the reaching an agreement at the Geneva conference. All countries represented here and our Organization as a whole should give the three Powers a clear mandate to this effect.

In view of the above considerations, the Polish delegation will vote for the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1) presented by India and twenty-two co-sponsoring nations. We will also vote for the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1) because it substantially expresses nearly all the same ideas, although in less effective and complete manner.
Mr. Sandler (Sweden) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, I asked for the floor merely because I wanted to refer to the procedure with regard to the vote which is to take place after this debate has concluded. But, first of all, having listened to the speech this afternoon of the representative of France -- and I gave his speech all the attention that Mr. Moch's competence requires of me -- I must express my appreciation to him for all the special interest he showed, as well as other speakers, with regard to the statement made yesterday on behalf of Sweden. Especially do I cordially wish to thank him for the very kind words he was good enough to address to my country and to myself. I shall take very much to heart the remarks made by such a competent speaker.

Now, I can limit myself to saying that I noted that all the information and facts contained in my statement of yesterday were based upon conclusions arrived at by Swedish scientists, on the basis of their scientific research; and I have had the satisfaction of hearing today, through my friend Mr. Jules Moch of France, that those facts were perfectly accurate. But I feel obliged to correct a certain misunderstanding, an unwitting one I am sure, regarding the source of a certain passage in that statement. I refer to the passage which says that the risk to the world could continue for a certain period. I think Mr. Jules Moch attributed to me something that was said in the passage I read out, but it was not I who said this. I quoted this passage, which I took from the summary record of the Special Sub-Committee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the Congress of the United States; that is the source of this remark, and therefore I felt this misunderstanding should be clarified.

Mr. Moch also spoke of the uncertainty that still reigns regarding many of the important aspects of the problem which we are discussing here, as did I when I spoke. I agree with this uncertainty, but the conclusions we draw are not the same. As far as I am concerned, it is this very uncertainty itself that was the reason for raising the question yesterday, which I also raised in January 1957, and which I raise again today, even after having heard Mr. Jules Moch. The question is: How can we be sure of neutralizing the ill that we may be causing today? Mr. Chairman and my dear colleagues, this question has so far remained unanswered.
I now go back to my original intention. I am very happy to go along with the idea expressed by the representative of Austria, namely, that we have a double vote on each of the resolutions. In the present circumstances it is extremely important that all members of the Committee be allowed to make known their views on the question without any possibility of misunderstanding. It is not a question of picking out one or other aspect from one or other of the resolutions. Furthermore, it is possible that delegates will be unanimous in having a resolution of our Organization pass which will make a serious appeal for an agreement on a cessation of tests and a discontinuance of nuclear weapons.

This being the case, I feel that the best procedure to be followed, in order to safeguard an equal right in respect of both resolutions and avoiding any question of prestige, is to follow the general and normal rules of procedure, that is to say, to vote first of all on the three-Power draft resolution, it then being understood that we will immediately go on to vote on the twenty-two-Power draft resolution. In this way we will have a complete picture, both as to the degree of unanimity which I presume exists in the Committee, and also as to the degree to which a certain difference of opinion may exist.

Having heard a number of speakers, I still have the firm hope that many delegates who have certain preferences -- which I am quite willing to respect -- for the twenty-two-Power draft resolution, by a positive vote may also vote for the three-Power draft resolution. This will create a strong majority, strengthening the appeal we wish to make to the nuclear Powers.

May I add that by means of the vote which will follow the vote on the twenty-two-Power draft resolution, we shall make it possible for all those who desire to associate themselves also with the appeal to States other than the nuclear Powers.

So that there can be no possible misunderstanding with regard to the views of my delegation, I wish to declare that the Swedish delegation is ready to act in this way, voting in favour of the additional appeal contained in the twenty-two-Power draft resolution when it is put to the vote.
Mr. SASTROAMIDJOJO (Indonesia): There can be no ambiguity about the position of the Indonesian delegation, the position of my Government and people, on this question of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Outside and inside the United Nations we have called most urgently for a cessation of these weapons tests. At meetings, such as the Bandung Conference of 1955, in messages and appeals, including statements of President Sukarno, in resolutions of our Parliament and of youth groups and other bodies, we have urged the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy for the benefit and greater well-being of mankind. During the past years in this august forum, the Indonesian delegation has consistently supported, as well as co-sponsored, resolutions aimed at saving humanity from radioactive contamination and the threat of a nuclear holocaust. Also at this session of the General Assembly we have spoken and voted in favour of general and complete disarmament, the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, and the prevention of the wider dissemination of these weapons of mass destruction.

Our reasons for once again raising our voice in regard to the present item are two-fold. They are general and specific in nature. First of all, we feel that no amount of warnings or pleas can ever fully express or convey the burden of anxiety and dread which now weighs down upon the peoples of the world. The minds of men are troubled, even fear-ridden, by the chaos that they may reap from the continued testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. To do justice to these real fears, we must reiterate our pleas, and reiterate them again until the conscience of the world has impressed upon all States concerned the need to end the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Only then, when tests have ceased forever, will our pleas cease too.
Secondly, we believe that the General Assembly should be seized of this question on a continuous basis, and particularly at a time when it is the subject of negotiations at Geneva. The States concerned at Geneva should know that the United Nations, which has the ultimate responsibility in the field of disarmament, is following their proceedings with keen interest, with concern, and with high expectations of concrete results. This is, I think, the minimum we should do in support of the States concerned which have been conducting the negotiations on a test ban with perseverance and the determination to remove this menace to our survival.

These two aspects of the present item are appropriately set out in the draft resolution of the twenty-four Powers, which Indonesia has the honour to co-sponsor.

Under this draft resolution, the General Assembly would express the desire "to safeguard mankind from the increasing hazards resulting from tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons," and, further, would bear in mind "the profound concern evinced by the peoples of all countries regarding the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons."

At the same time, it welcomes the efforts being made by the States concerned at Geneva to reach an agreement on discontinuing these tests, welcomes the progress so far achieved, and notes with appreciation that the voluntary suspension of tests by the States concerned has enabled progress in the Geneva discussions.

Moreover -- and this, I believe, deserves to be stressed in particular -- the operative paragraphs of the twenty-four Power draft resolution are totally in keeping with the spirit and letter of the draft resolution unanimously adopted by this Committee on the question of general and complete disarmament. In the former draft resolution, we express the hope that an agreement to discontinue nuclear and thermonuclear tests with effective international control will be reached at an early date, and appeal to all States to desist from such tests. This is, in our opinion, nothing more nor less than a reaffirmation of the conviction and hope expressed in the resolution on general and complete disarmament which every Member State of the United Nations has co-sponsored. Under this latter resolution, the General Assembly expressed the conviction:
"...that any progress towards the goal of complete and general disarmament under effective international control will contribute to the achievement of these high aims," and expressed the hope,

"...that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time." (A/C.1/L.234)

To make this point even more clear, I think it is worthwhile to recall the words of my colleague and friend of India, when he said in his excellent presentation yesterday:

"Test explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons...are motivated by a desire for increasing rearmament and for perfecting and augmenting the destructive power of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. In this sense, nuclear and thermonuclear explosions are an ugly and ominous symbol; and without the cessation of test explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons there can be no advance towards the universally desired goal of total and general disarmament, which, only the other day, has been endorsed by the General Assembly with a unanimity, and in an atmosphere of hope and goodwill, unparalleled in the history of the United Nations. If the nations of the world which possess nuclear weapons, and others which do not possess these weapons but are in a position to manufacture them now or in the near future, can agree to the cessation or suspension of test explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the first major breakthrough in disarmament will have been made. The establishment of the necessary machinery for inspection and control, and experience of its working, will show the way to the comprehensive controls which must form part of any general and complete disarmament." (A/C.1/FV.1057, pages 8 to 10)

We therefore ask that, reaffirming the hope and conviction expressed in the resolution on general and complete disarmament, this Committee give its unanimous support to the twenty-four Power draft resolution, or at least support it by an overwhelming majority.

As regards the draft resolution sponsored by Austria, Japan and Sweden, at first glance it was our impression that it conflicts with the twenty-four
Power draft resolution. But after careful reconsideration, we believe that, although rather limited in scope, the three-Power draft resolution is complementary to the draft resolution which we are co-sponsoring. We will therefore vote in favour of it.

We hope, indeed, that the overwhelming majority of this Committee will adopt both the twenty-four Power and the three-Power draft resolutions, thereby giving notice of its abiding and avid interest in this aspect of disarmament. In voting by overwhelming majority for both draft resolutions, this Committee, too, will emphasize their complementary character. We are convinced that this would serve the cause of harmony in our deliberations.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): The United States has already made its position clear on the question of testing nuclear weapons. As I said here yesterday, the United States is anxious to achieve agreement on a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests just as soon as the Soviet Union agrees to an effective international control system. I think it is appropriate, however, for me to say a few words about the two draft resolutions before the Committee.

The first draft resolution, submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden, is addressed to the States concerned in the Geneva discussions, of which, of course, the United States is one. It urges the States concerned in these discussions to continue their present voluntary discontinuance of the testing of nuclear weapons.

The United States, as one of the States concerned, will vote in favour of this paragraph and will vote in favour of this draft resolution.

The United States has voluntarily refrained from conducting nuclear weapons tests since 31 October last year. We have recently announced our intention to continue this suspension at least through this year.

The purpose of this voluntary action is to provide the best possible circumstances for the success of the Geneva negotiations. At this point, it is obviously impossible to know what the status of these negotiations will be at the end of this year. However, I can assure you that the United States will continue to do everything in its power to enhance the prospects of success at Geneva. The
United States voluntary moratorium may be continued depending upon circumstances which have yet to develop.

On the other hand -- and let me be perfectly frank about this -- the objective which we are striving to achieve is the ending of nuclear weapons test explosions under an agreement providing for effective international control. That is what we want. We do not think that an indefinite continuation of a voluntary uncontrolled suspension of tests will contribute to this objective. In such circumstances, our further efforts to reach agreement on a test suspension with proper safeguards would probably be fruitless.

Furthermore, as we have repeatedly explained in detail to this General Assembly, we consider that test suspension which is not subject to verification is incompatible with requirements of national security. Since nuclear tests can be conducted in such ways that, in the absence of controls, they are impossible to detect, it is clear that without controls there would be no assurance that tests had in fact been stopped. For example, nuclear tests conducted underground leave no tell-tale fall-out.
The United States continues to believe that a system of agreed controls is an utterly indispensable prerequisite to a permanent cessation of nuclear tests. In the negotiations at Geneva we seek an agreement incorporating adequate controls which will represent a step forward on the path to achieving true disarmament. The Geneva negotiations are thus a test of whether we can in fact move forward in the quest for mutual arms control agreements. Our objective is not just the ending of nuclear weapons tests. In voting for the resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden, A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, the United States again notes that it remains opposed to any permanent cessation of nuclear tests without agreement on a system of international safeguards. The other resolution before the Committee, A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1 and Add.1, submitted by India and a number of co-sponsors, is more far-reaching; it includes certain language with which we are not in accord. I should like to make plain, however, that the same considerations that I have just set forth regarding the position of the United States also apply to this resolution.

Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): On this year's agenda of the First Committee we have had several items that had a bearing on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. In their speeches on the previous items -- general and complete disarmament, the suspension of nuclear tests in the Sahara, and the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons -- delegations, including my own, have already had occasion to refer to the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. To say this is not, however, to minimize the importance of the item before us. We welcome, as we have done in the past, the initiative of the Government of India in bringing this item before the General Assembly.

The whole world is awaiting with interest, and even with a sense of relief, if I may say so, the successful outcome of the negotiations in Geneva among the three nuclear Powers on the suspension of nuclear tests. It is really gratifying that the conference in Geneva has already made considerable progress in this field. There has already been agreement on several articles of the treaty for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Substantial accord has been reached on the question of control and inspection of atmospheric and above-ground tests. Of course, there is still some major disagreement with regard to the composition
and personnel of the inspection teams and also with regard to the procedure of making decisions concerning inspection -- problems which we hope will be got over without too much difficulty and in due course. It is heartening that even with regard to underground tests the Soviet Government has agreed to the proposal for convening the conference of technical experts with a view to exploring the scientific possibility of detecting violations of an agreement on such tests through on-site inspections. Members of this Committee are well aware that there had been an impasse over the possibility of the detection of underground tests for quite a while, and a sense of relief is now experienced by all as a result of the Russian agreement to take part in a conference of technical experts and scientists on this matter.

Apart from the heartening progress made in the Geneva conference, there seems to be a growing realization among the nuclear Powers that something must be done to prevent nuclear wars if human life and civilization on our planet are to be spared. The speech delivered by the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Christian Herter, before the National Foreign Trade Council two days ago, on 16 November, brings out this point very clearly, and I quote from his speech as reported in The New York Times of 17 November:

"...I believe that on certain fundamentals we can find a common language because we have a common interest.

"That interest lies simply in the basic will to survive, shared by free men and Communists alike. I think the Soviet leadership is reaching a conclusion similar to our own -- that unless the course of events is changed and changed soon, both sides face unacceptable risks of general nuclear war, which would approximate mutual suicide."

He further went on to say:

"Thus, the one area in which a common language has the best chance to grow is that of ground rules for the great competition which dominates our time -- some 'rules of the game' -- to keep it within bounds set by the conditions of co-survival."

In the opinion of my delegation, the "rules of the game" that the Secretary of State of the United States visualizes must eventually include the cessation of
nuclear tests and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The sooner this rule is established the better for the future of humanity.

This growing sense of concern and responsibility of the two great Powers of the world, the United States and the Soviet Union, in this matter, will, in our opinion, substantially contribute to the objective of general agreement on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We can but praise the great Powers for these recent helpful and constructive trends in their thinking that are bound to change the international climate itself for the better.

Lord Bertrand Russell not very long ago tried to point out the special responsibility of these two great countries for peace in the present-day world by publishing an open letter to Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev in the British weekly The New Statesman. In that letter he appealed to these two men who, between themselves, have such a great share of responsibility for shaping the future destiny of mankind, urging that they should throw their full weight on the side of peace by banning the possibility of nuclear war for ever.

There could certainly be no better way than this for these two leaders and for these two great countries to leave on history an indelible stamp of their true genius and greatness. After all, for what are they great if they are not capable of the great actions demanded of them by the situation of their times?

If they succeed in achieving the above purpose, these two countries shall have performed a great feat in history for the advancement of peace such as no other country at the time of its hegemony in the world could claim to have performed. No laurels would be too great for these two countries if, in this century when they have come to acquire great responsibility and influence in world affairs they can give a new direction to the future course of history by converting a situation fraught with the dangers and risks of total annihilation and destruction to one of permanent peace and prosperity. In achieving this, man himself will have given proof of his ability to use the nuclear power which has been place at his disposal by the latest scientific discoveries, for the general benefit and good of the world.

I do not wish to dwell on the so-called somatic and genetic effects of exposure to ionizing radiation. We are all aware of the possibility of contamination of the air, water and soil by radioactive fall-out resulting from nuclear and
thermonuclear tests. It has been shown that these radioactive fall-outs can cause leukemia and bone cancer and may in some cases also affect the well-being of unborn generations. We know further that excessive increases in the existing amount of radioactivity may prove to be dangerous in other ways as well. I do not wish to elaborate this theme, because this aspect of the subject has been treated fully here and elsewhere by men more competent than myself.

While I have the floor, let me briefly address myself to the two resolutions that are before us and which in our opinion, are not mutually exclusive of each other. They are largely complementary and supplementary to each other and truly reflect the climate of public opinion in the world concerning the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.
The twenty-three-Power draft resolution, however, has one precise advantage over the three-Power draft resolution, inasmuch as the former seeks to prevent other States that are not yet in possession of nuclear weapons from complicating the Geneva negotiations by conducting their tests meanwhile. We hope that no Member State will have any difficulty in supporting both resolutions, which, in essence, ask for determined efforts on the part of the principal parties concerned to reach an agreement on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and meanwhile to continue their present voluntary suspension of tests. These resolutions could have just one effect, and that is to encourage the progress of the Geneva Conference and relieve trembling humanity, at least for the present, of its fears and anxieties about exposure to radioactive fall-out resulting from nuclear tests. We commend both resolutions to the Committee for its unanimous acceptance.

Mr. PLIMSOULL (Australia): I can be very brief on this item because the Australian position generally was stated when I spoke in connexion with item 68.

The Australian delegation supports the draft resolution which has been put forward by Austria, Japan and Sweden. I do not think I need elaborate that because the resolution seems to meet with fairly general approval in the Committee. The resolution, however, leaves a further question, and that is: what is the position of other countries while the three present nuclear Powers are refraining from tests? On that, the Australian attitude has been publicly stated over a period of several years. Under item 68, I quoted some statements on this subject by the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Menzies, and by the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Casey. They both set out -- over a period of several years, as I say, and in public statements -- our hope that the number of nations manufacturing nuclear weapons will not increase. This is not solely, or even principally, because of fears of the danger of radiation. We know that individual tests can be held without the spread of dangerous fall-out, provided that proper precautions are taken. The Australian delegation therefore cannot accept the first two paragraphs of the draft resolution put forward by twenty-three countries as an accurate way of stating the facts, and any vote of ours in favour of that resolution should not be taken to mean that we accept the statements in those two paragraphs of the preamble.
Our concern about the emergence of another nuclear Power, whatever its identity, is prompted rather by other considerations, and these were illustrated in the remarks I quoted earlier from the statements by Mr. Menzies and Mr. Casey. In brief, our concern arises from our belief that, the greater the number of nuclear Powers, the greater the danger of a war -- and, also, the greater the number of nuclear Powers, the more difficult it is going to be to achieve and maintain disarmament.

Paragraph 3 of the operative part of the resolution sponsored by the twenty-three nations covers the situation of other countries while the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union are refraining from tests. It says, in other words, what I said in this Committee under item 68 in explaining our vote:

"... we cannot think it right that a fourth country should be free to conduct a test while the nuclear Powers are under constraint."

(A/C.1/PV.1053, page 73-75)

Paragraph 3 envisages a state of affairs in which the present nuclear Powers and all other countries alike refrain from tests, and, as is said in both resolutions before us, it is to be hoped that during that period, while every country is refraining from tests, the Geneva talks will quickly reach an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, "including an appropriate international control system." I should like to stress that we regard this reference to effective international control as an important element in the two resolutions before us.

In the light of what I have said, and for the reasons I have set out, the Australian delegation will vote for both resolutions before the Committee.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria)(interpretation from Russian): The discussion in the First Committee on this item at the thirteenth session made it clear that this is universally regarded as one of the acute problems of our time, one which awaits rapid solution. The debates which recently took place here in connexion with France's intention to explode a nuclear bomb in the Sahara again confirmed that this is the position of most countries. Moreover, it has become clear that the great majority of delegations in the United Nations and the peoples of the world have formed an opinion on this question to the effect that test explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons are inadmissible and unacceptable in any form,
shape or manner, wherever they may take place and regardless of any attempts to
disguise their implications. They constitute a serious and appalling threat to
the future of mankind. Consequently, it is essential to reach an agreement as
swiftly as possible on the definitive and unconditional discontinuance of such
tests.

Speaking without exaggeration, it may be said that the peoples now regard
nuclear test explosions as a direct atomic danger that already exists in
peacetime, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, as an appalling potential
danger of mass extermination and the most dangerous expression of the armaments
race, which may drag the countries down the inclined plane into the abyss of
a nuclear holocaust.

Attempts to dispel this justified alarm and assertions that the danger is
not really as great as it has been said to be, attempts which have taken place in
this very Committee when we discussed the proposed French nuclear tests in the
Sahara, are all attempts that are doomed to failure. We should like to emphasize
that the dangers involved in nuclear weapons tests cannot be refuted or denied
with any degree of validity. As far as the danger of radioactive fall-out is
concerned, its danger to the health of this generation and succeeding generations,
categorical findings have been made on this subject by the most authoritative
scientists. Yesterday, the representatives of India, Sweden, the Soviet Union and
other countries told us of the opinions of doctors, physicists, geneticists and
biologists -- opinions which no one can question and which surely are authoritative.
For our part, we shall refrain from adducing any additional information of this
kind or citing any additional names or figures, since this has already been done
sufficiently and there is no need to try to force open an already open door.

There is another danger in nuclear tests, and that is that they constitute
a particularly flagrant form of the armaments race policy, one which has the
danger of war implicit in it. This is well known to all members of this
Committee.
For this reason, without losing sight of the danger of atomic radiation and radioactive fall-out, we should like to concentrate our attention on the other aspects of nuclear tests. The continuance or resumption of test explosions in the series of tests carried out by the countries which already possess nuclear weapons not only increases the danger of nuclear fall-out and intensifies the arms race. At the present time, when we have just adopted a resolution which opens up the most promising prospects for progress in the field of disarmament and the elimination of war as an instrument of international policy, the resumption of testing of nuclear weapons would complicate the international situation and lead to difficulties in the forthcoming disarmament talks. It is our opinion that it is essential to emphasize this aspect of the problem.

At the present time the question of nuclear tests is more and more inextricably linked with the disarmament problem as a whole. It becomes, rather so to say, the central core of the whole complex of disarmament problems. For this reason my delegation feels that this question has been rightly placed before us again, because the United Nations must in no circumstances lose sight of this problem.

The problem is particularly important not only because it arises in the negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in Geneva but also because as long as it remains unsolved other countries entertain the notion of carrying out their own tests -- hence additional dangers. There are voices heard in various countries insistently demanding the resumption of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons.

In the course of the debate on the question of test explosions in the Sahara, the nature of the first problem became clear. As far as the second one is concerned, it is quite clear that it would spell the resumption of explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The meaning and justification of these test explosions, as is well known, is to be found in the alleged need to develop existing types of weapons as well as new types of such appalling weapons which would be endowed with even greater destructive potentialities.
What this can lead to is an open secret. In addition to intensifying the arms race between the atomic Powers, it would also increase the number of participants in this race, the number of countries determined to have their atomic bombs at all costs. Consequently the efforts made so far and the progress already achieved in the United Nations along the path to disarmament would suffer utter failure.

There is scarcely any need for me to describe the situation that would obtain in the event that the testing of nuclear weapons were resumed. There is scarcely any need for me to explain that such a situation would in no way promote the disarmament negotiations. I emphasize this only to demonstrate how imperative it is for the United Nations to make every effort to avoid this possibility, to exert every ounce of its authority to encourage the Geneva negotiations. These negotiations have been in progress for a year. We are fully aware of the value of the results obtained and the efforts made to register further progress, but we cannot fail to note that the record of the negotiations in Geneva has itself given rise to some concern.

It is true that agreements have been reached in Geneva on a number of important issues but it is also true that, so long as agreement is not arrived at on the outstanding questions, the danger of new difficulties remains. In yesterday's statement by the representative of the Soviet Union we heard a profound analysis of the problems still outstanding and the reasons why no agreement had been reached on them. It is well known that, after many months of negotiations, one of the parties asked for the reconsideration of certain questions on which the experts had made categoric findings. Under the pretext of examining new scientific data, the talks are being protracted. Of course, science progresses at a rapid pace, and therefore such cases can be repeated. This cannot be divorced from the problem at it stands before the United Nations and before world public opinion, and this is a question of the greatest moment.

It is well known that the United States has announced its suspension of nuclear tests for a year beginning on 31 October 1958, and this time-limit was subsequently prolonged till the end of the current year. The legitimate question arises: what next? Together with other delegations, we should like to make sure
that, even after the end of the year, the test explosions will not be resumed. Both the success of the Geneva negotiations and the further relaxation of international tension are jeopardized by the prospect of a resumption of nuclear tests after the expiration of the deadline, whether it be at the end of the year or any other time. What we want is the certainty that there will be no more test explosions. Unfortunately, in his statement today the representative of the United States failed to give any assurance on that point. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has issued a categorical assurance that the Soviet Union will not resume the testing of nuclear weapons as long as the Western countries do not explode their nuclear weapons. The world is waiting with bated breath a Western declaration, all the more so as the Western countries have heard a number of voices raised in favour of the resumption of nuclear weapons tests.

We feel that the evolution of the position of a number of countries on the disarmament question and the universal desire of all Member States of the United Nations to arrive at agreement in this field, as expressed in the unanimous resolution on general and complete disarmament, have created a most favourable situation, which leads us to hope that this appeal to the three nuclear Powers not to resume testing will be heeded.

The United Nations must certainly not miss this opportunity to have its weighty say on so important an issue. This would give renewed impetus to the Geneva negotiations and expedite the achievement of an agreement, for which the whole world is waiting, on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, which would in turn open the door wide for further progress in discussions on general disarmament.

Without losing sight of this objective, and expressing clearly the position of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on the testing of nuclear weapons and on disarmament, the Bulgarian delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolutions which have been presented to this Committee for its consideration.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): At this stage of the debate I should like to consult the Committee as to what we ought to do next. It is obvious from what has been said here that there is wide agreement in the Committee that both draft resolutions before us should be voted upon. Furthermore, it appears that both draft resolutions will receive support from the Committee. This being the case, representatives may wish to continue after 6 p.m. so that we might conclude the debate today and go on with the vote. We still have four speakers on the list before the taking of the vote, but it may well be that some representatives will wish to explain their votes. Such explanations of votes might have to be made at the Committee's meeting tomorrow afternoon. Taking all this into account, the Chair feels that we might be able to conclude our meeting at about 6.30 p.m. Naturally, I am in the hands of the Committee as to this question, and I should like to know whether the Committee wishes to continue the meeting until we finish this debate.
Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Chairman, it is your privilege and discretion to set the pace of our work, and it is not my intention to suggest that we go on if it is the view of the majority of the members not to do so. But as you have very rightly pointed out, we have a great deal of work to go through, and we have had enough discussion on this subject. There is a considerable measure of agreement. I would suggest that we continue until about 6:30 p.m. or a little later, to finish our item and to finish with the voting.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I understand that the representative of India has submitted a motion that we continue our debate until we end our discussion. If there are no objections I shall take it that the Committee agrees with that motion.

Mr. MOCH (France) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, I see no major need in continuing if it is to become a protracted meeting. Precisely because Morocco was opposed to France in a recent motion, I am very eager to go with the French delegation to the reception in honour of the anniversary of the King of Morocco. It is traditional here to wind up between 6 and 6:30, and I do not see why we should depart from this tradition since tomorrow we are not directly concerned in the debates in the plenary meeting, and thus we could easily wind up tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, it seems that the proposal of the representative of India is an eminently reasonable one. I should like to support the proposal that the Committee should continue its work today. We have only four speakers on the list and we could quite easily vote on this resolution today. I think that all the representatives will have ample time to show up at the reception of the Moroccan delegation. The Soviet delegation would also like to go to the Moroccan reception, and we are fully confident that we will have ample time to get there.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I suggest that we vote on the continuation of the meeting until we end the debate on the question. If there are no objections we shall proceed to the vote.

The proposal was adopted by 56 votes to 2 with 14 abstentions.

Mr. URQUITA (El Salvador) (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of El Salvador previously spoke in favour of the idea and the objective that nuclear and thermonuclear weapons be completely abolished as one step towards general disarmament and true and lasting peace which will ensure not only the survival but also the welfare of humanity. Consistent with this view we have supported the efforts of the Political Committee to obtain a reconsideration on the part of France of its decision to carry out nuclear tests in the Sahara, and also, we supported the proposal of Ireland to prevent wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

In so far as the item before us is concerned, specifically, suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, my delegation cannot but be satisfied and pleased at both the Austrian, Japanese and Swedish draft resolution, A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, and that of Afghanistan and twenty-two other Powers in document A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1. We feel this way because in both we are trying to urge upon the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to continue their efforts to come to an agreement on this final cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests by means of an adequate system of international control which would be effective; and all three countries are urged to continue their negotiations in Geneva, and also maintain their present voluntary discontinuance of the testing of nuclear weapons as well as an appeal to other States to desist from such tests.

These two draft resolution seem to us to be complementary. They are not certainly incompatible. They both seek, we know, the same noble objective, but the contents of one are far from contradicting the contents of the other. As we see it, the General Assembly will have replied and met the anxiety of humanity if, by a great majority perhaps, I pray a unanimous vote, we adopt both resolutions.

My delegation is ready to vote in favour of both these resolutions, and wishes to congratulate the co-sponsors most warmly for their initiative.
Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): After having heard the statements made by the speakers who preceded me, my delegation feels more convinced than ever about the opinion it stated in this Committee yesterday.

My delegation stated that both draft resolutions, having the same objective and couched more or less in the same language, should meet with the approval of this Committee. It is true that the twenty-four-Power draft resolution has greater scope than the three-Power draft resolution, which has doubtless its merits, even though limited in scope. It is the considered opinion of my delegation that these two drafts are not only compatible but also complementary.

Therefore, my delegation wishes to appeal again strongly to the Committee at this juncture that both draft resolutions will obtain the widest possible support.
Mr. SULAIMAN (Iraq): Yesterday in my statement on the draft resolutions before the Committee I said that as the draft resolution presented by Austria, Japan and Sweden on the subject of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests did not cover Powers capable of producing and testing nuclear weapons besides the present three nuclear Powers, my delegation regretted that it was not able to support it. This statement was made on the assumption that only one of the two draft resolutions before us -- namely, the draft resolution presented by Austria, Japan and Sweden and the draft resolution presented by India and twenty-two other Powers -- would be adopted. It is my understanding now that both resolutions will be put to the vote.

Considering the fact that there are no contradictions between the two draft resolutions and that, as a matter of fact, they have the same objectives although the three-Power draft resolution is more limited in scope, my delegation will vote in favour of both resolutions when they are put to the vote.

Mr. JHA (India): I do not wish, Mr. Chairman, to detain you and the Committee for more than a few minutes. I would only like to say that we are entirely in accord with the idea of both draft resolutions being put to the vote. It has been said that they are mutually compatible and mutually complementary. We agree with these appellations. We would ourselves vote for both the draft resolutions.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the delegations -- there were several of them -- who complimented my Government on its persistence in bringing this matter before the General Assembly for the last few years. I can assure them that their words are a great source of satisfaction to us and that they will be greatly valued and cherished by my Government.

Mr. PAFIZWAK (Afghanistan): In the statement that my delegation made, we thought that we would not be able to vote for the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden. But in the light of the statements made this morning by the representative of Austria that this draft resolution was complementary to the other one and in the light of the new development that both draft resolutions are going to be put to the vote, my delegation, as an explanation of the vote that it will cast, would like to say that our vote will be a vote of abstention on this draft resolution.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We shall now vote on the two draft resolutions which are before the Committee in documents A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1. We shall vote first on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1.

U THANT (Burma): I request a vote by roll-call.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Thailand, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, France.

The draft resolution was adopted by 76 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We will now vote on the
draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1/Add.2.
A vote was taken by roll call.
Nepal, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Sweden, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria,
Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia,
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco.

Against: France.

Abstaining: Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey,
Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Belgium,
Brazil, China, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Italy,

Draft resolution A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1/Add.2 was adopted by 60 votes to 1, with
17 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If the Committee does not
object, explanations of votes will be heard at tomorrow afternoon's meeting.
There being no objection, the Committee will reconvene tomorrow at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.