VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE THOUSAND AND FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 19 November 1959, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEIZAQUEZ (Vice-Chairman) (Uruguay)

Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e. the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.1058. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEM 69

SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS (A/4186; A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1,
L.237/Rev.1/Add.1) (continued)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like the Committee
to note that the name of Cambodia has been added to the list of co-sponsors of
the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1. The Secretariat
will issue the necessary addendum.

I should like to remind members of the Committee that the list of speakers
will be closed today at noon.

Mr. BRUCAN (Romania): The question of nuclear and thermonuclear tests
has gained ever-increasing importance. One can safely assume that this question
far transcends its intrinsic significance. Indeed, it has a manifold impact on
both disarmament and international relations, which fully justifies the growing
concern of the United Nations in this respect.

Suffice it to note that, whereas last year, during the thirteenth session of
the General Assembly, the issue before us was whether the United Nations should or
should not take a stand of its own on the cessation of nuclear tests, today this
responsibility of the United Nations is no longer disputed, and now the issue
before us is rather how to make the United Nations stand concerning the cessation
of tests more effective and consistent with the cause of disarmament.

This in itself is one more step forward for the United Nations, in its
dealings with disarmament. However, one should not discount the differences which
still persist in the approach to the question of nuclear tests. The sooner these
differences are settled, the better.

I shall refer, firstly, to the question of radioactive fall-out resulting
from nuclear explosions.

It seems to me that, on this score, we should take the words of scientists
rather than those of politicians, generals or diplomats. In this connexion,
we have now the opinion of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects
of Atomic Radiation, which was set up precisely for the purpose of obtaining an
objective and reliable appraisal on the effects of atomic radiation.
This Committee has reached the conclusion that:
"... radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels" (A/3838, para. 54)
and it goes on to say:
"This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations." (Ibid.)
This is a warning too serious to be discounted.
Thus the question to be posed these days is not whether nuclear tests create hazards but rather why we are confronted with attempts to challenge the test judgement of this Committee with regard to these hazards.

We live in a world where we have to rely on solid and sane scientific judgements. We just cannot find a way out of the highly complex problems of this world, particularly in the field of disarmament, unless we depend on such scientific conclusions reached by a widely representative group of highly qualified men of science. Otherwise, we shall find ourselves in the midst of chaos.

It is high time to realize that scientific data as well as scientific conclusions regarding questions of world health and safety cannot and should not be adjusted or conditioned to decisions of expedient politics.

There is no excuse for anybody who tries to minimize the hazards resulting from test explosions, and particularly not for those whom the United Nations expects to do their best in reaching an agreement on the cessation of these terrible explosions.

It is true that radioactive fall-out was not the only reason that led to the decision to suspend nuclear tests. Yet it played an important role in the making of that decision.

In good logic, those who are strongly committed to a certain course of action have no reason whatever to argue that this course of action is not fully warranted.

I am particularly concerned with the effect our debates may have on public opinion. In our view, the public should be clearly warned of the harms and dangers of fall-out resulting from nuclear tests since the rousing of public opinion, the appeal to the conscience of man, is still one of the most effective means of ensuring the actual cessation of tests.

In short, I feel that the finding and the conclusions of the United Nations Scientific Committee should be actively defended against any attempt to underestimate or alter their meaning.

At this point, I would like to say a few words on the report of the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts, in which Romanian scientists participated along with scientists from seven countries.
We feel that the Geneva Conference of Experts provided a solid technical basis for a speedy political decision on the cessation of tests. This feeling is well founded on the fact that the report of experts on the methods of nuclear test detection and on the set up of a control system envisages various scientific and technical problems which might arise, including high altitude explosions as well as underground tests.
Although one has to reckon with the possibility that some specific data obtained after the Conference may require this or that change in the equipment design or in the methods of detection and identification, one can be no means accept the idea that such new data should serve as a basis for an over-all alteration of the recommendations and estimates unanimously agreed upon by the experts. It is a serious mistake and if I may say so, a sign of naïveté to proceed from the assumption that conclusions reached by such a group of eminent scientists may prove the lack of perspective which too often characterizes the pronouncements of politicians.

In fact, foreseeing precisely new findings and data in connexion with underground tests, the last provision of the technical part of the report of the Experts states:

"Improved apparatus and techniques should be actively developed and expeditiously incorporated into the control system for the purpose of continuously improving the effectiveness for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions." (A/3897/Corr. 1, page 19)

Hence, there was and there is no reason whatsoever for delaying the working out of a control system based on the report of the Experts, because of new seismic data generally envisaged by the Experts.

After all, technology has always been the means of simplifying things, rather than of complicating them. The simplication of things is the specific social function of technology. Therefore it is quite puzzling to see that during the Geneva negotiations technology is turned into an ever complicating element of the control machinery.

It is common knowledge that the technology of test detection has marked great advances in recent years. To cite only one example in only one country, the so-called Project Tepee developed in the United States is a radio-monitoring system said to be capable of detecting instantaneously more than 95 per cent of all atmospheric nuclear tests and rocket launchings anywhere in the world. We can assume that co-operation with Soviet and British technology will make up the remaining 5 per cent, thus insuring a simple and foolproof detection system.

As to underground tests, the Berkner Report, made public in the United States last June, declares that an expanded programme of research in
seismology would "probably result in further improvements which could achieve the same capability in the Geneva net of 120 stations as was originally estimated".

As a matter of fact, after a wide inquiry on the new data on underground tests conducted by the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Disarmament, the Chairman, Senator Herbert Humphrey, stated:

"Actually the data appeared to indicate that in some respects it may be easier to detect nuclear tests than the Conference of Experts at Geneva had concluded. The new data appeared to show that surface waves from a nuclear explosion are weaker than from earthquakes of comparable size and that, therefore, analysis of surface waves may be used to distinguish between the two".

All these facts and conclusions help to restore technology to its right place as the means of simplifying matters. Let us hope that the two Western atomic Powers will display more confidence in technology during further negotiations.

In conclusion, there was and there is no reason whatsoever for challenging the basic recommendations contained in the report of the Conference of Experts. This report has stood every challenge. The Soviet delegation at Geneva has rightly defended the Report of Experts from the eight countries from the East and the West.

May I reiterate the point that scientific conclusions reached by widely representative groups of highly qualified men of science should be defended by all of us. If we are to solve problems of disarmament, we have to rely on solid and sane scientific judgements. This is a matter of principle for the United Nations as well as for the forthcoming negotiations of the Ten-Power Committee.

The Romanian delegation feels that the continuation by the three atomic Powers of the suspension of tests is inextricably linked to the desistance from such tests by other States. The first does not work without the latter and vice versa. Both are parts of one single problem: the cessation of tests. In other words, it is inconceivable at this juncture to have one position toward the atomic Powers and a different position toward the other States. All should be equally urged to refrain from tests.
Those who speak of a fourth atomic power, either entertain illusions themselves, or would like to make others do so. There is no such thing as the question of the fourth atomic power. There is, rather, the question of the nth atomic Power, which would describe the situation which would obtain once the number of nuclear Powers increased. This is why we feel that the resolution on nuclear tests, to be effective, should cover both parts of the problem.

Mr. FEKINI (Libya) (interpretation from French): The debate in the Political Committee on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests has acquired a particular significance in the course of the present session of the General Assembly. Various aspects of this question have been analysed in the Political Committee in connexion with the discussion of the item of general and complete disarmament and of the item of the French nuclear tests in the Sahara, as well as in connexion with the discussion on measures to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Therefore, my outline of the views of the Libyan delegation on the question of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests will be brief.

It is well established in the world today that nuclear and thermonuclear tests carried out in the post-war years by the atomic Powers have constituted one of the most alarming aspects of the armaments race, which in its turn is one of the principal causes of international tension and one of the greatest factors endangering peace and security throughout the world. All the people of the world have been acutely aware of this danger, and a vast movement has stirred world public opinion, impelling it to take every opportunity to clamour for the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the prohibition of atomic weapons.
The Government and people of Libya have shared this legitimate concern caused by the nuclear weapons tests race, and they have repeatedly expressed their pressing desire that the mad atomic armaments race should be halted and that nuclear and thermonuclear tests carried out in various parts of the world should be discontinued.

The dangers to which peace and security is exposed, owing to nuclear and thermonuclear tests, have been intensified by other dangers due to atomic explosions, that is, the contamination of man's environment through radioactivity and radioactive fall-out. All the peoples of the world have felt alarmed at the dangers incurred by present and future generations, dangers to health, dangers to well-being and dangers to individual safety. The terror caused by the harmful effects of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions and their medium and long-range dangers are well known throughout the world. These fears of world public opinion are eminently justified. They have been corroborated by the findings of scientists, experts and research workers in the atomic field, medical experts and the most expert geneticists. Their findings demonstrate and account for the dangers caused to man, the danger to the present generation and to future generations, dangers caused by radioactive radiation issuing from or due to nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

In this connexion, the conclusions of the United Nations Scientific Committee, contained in its last report on the effects of atomic radiation, are particularly impressive and indicate the scale of the harmful and dangerous effects of radiation and radioactive fall-out due to the repeated and frequent nuclear and thermonuclear tests which have been carried out.

The question of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests has figured on the agenda of the General Assembly for a number of sessions. Our debates on this issue are taking place in an international atmosphere of relaxed tensions, full of encouragement and promise for a radical solution of the disarmament problem. By their voluntary consent to suspend nuclear and thermonuclear tests, the nuclear Powers have surely created favourable circumstances for the constructive progress of the Geneva negotiations and, I sincerely believe, for the felicitous conclusion thereof. On the other hand,
however, our debate is taking place in a world endangered by the menace that other hitherto non-nuclear Powers may seek to become nuclear Powers. Therefore, there is a great danger that nuclear tests will be resumed and that the efforts for arriving at agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests may be seriously jeopardized. All the peoples of the world attach great importance to the successful conclusion of the Geneva talks which have been carried out by the three nuclear Powers that are interested in reaching an agreement on the halting of nuclear and thermonuclear tests under effective international control. The peoples of the world are all the more eager to see the Geneva negotiations succeed as such success, while important in itself, will, moreover, constitute a step, and an important one, towards general and complete disarmament, the dream of mankind and people of goodwill for generations.

The legitimate alarm caused by nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests throughout the world has been associated with the feeling that it is the duty of the United Nations to safeguard mankind against the danger of war and the threat to health posed by such tests. Consequently, the First Committee would, in our opinion, be well advised to recommend that the General Assembly, as a result of our consideration of this question, adopt the following resolutions:

1. The General Assembly should express its appreciation to the States concerned for their efforts. We should express the hope that agreements will be reached on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests under effective international control as quickly as possible.

2. The Assembly should appeal to the States involved in the Geneva discussions to continue their present voluntary suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. The Assembly should also appeal to other States to renounce any intention to carry out such tests.

3. The Assembly should request the States concerned to report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly on the results of their negotiations.

It is in this frame of mind that the Libyan delegation, together with some other delegations, has presented to the First Committee for its consideration the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1, in the hope that this text will be favourably acted upon.
The representative of India, speaking yesterday, provided ample and, in our opinion, highly convincing evidence on this subject. I should like to take this opportunity to present to his Government and delegation the expression of our sincere appreciation for their position and persevering efforts to secure United Nations support for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

We have likewise taken note with appreciation of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, co-sponsored by Austria, Japan and Sweden. This draft resolution deals with the Geneva negotiations and addresses itself to the States concerned, with a view to bringing about the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests. It will be a pleasure for my delegation to support this draft resolution.

May I conclude by voicing Libya's fervent hope that the United Nations will contribute effectively to the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests, to the prohibition of such weapons of mass destruction and to the exclusive use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

I also hope that this debate will contribute to facilitating the way to a general agreement on the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests, which will be a harbinger of general agreement on general and complete disarmament and the eventual establishment of lasting peace throughout the world.

Mr. BROVKA (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): For two months now, the halls of the United Nations have been resounding with the voices of the representatives of many States in defence of mankind. The speech made in the General Assembly hall by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Nikita S. Khrushchev, sounded a mighty and powerful appeal throughout the world which pointed the way to free mankind from the danger of a new war, which pointed the way to a peaceful and joyous life free from fear and suspicion. It cut a luminous path through stormy waves of mistrust and suspicion.

The many speeches which we have had the privilege of hearing in these halls, whatever their form, asserted a single thought which increasingly united the whole world, the thought that the peoples are tired of the horrors of war, that they want to live in tranquility, that they want to labour in peace and experience the joys of life since life is given to man only once.
That is why such great emotion was occasioned by the decision adopted by all States Members of the United Nations on the necessity of general and complete disarmament for the benefit of all mankind. We may state with confidence that the world uttered a sigh of relief when they heard these wise words which appealed for peace throughout the world. All of us know that in this great world, notwithstanding differences of ideological convictions, notwithstanding different economic systems and the welter of mutual suspicion and mistrust, which has grown monstrously over the past decades, it is not so easy to reach immediately satisfactory solutions of such important questions as general and complete disarmament.

But those events which have occurred over the past few months -- and I have in mind particularly the historic meeting between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, and President Eisenhower, and the statements of a number of other political leaders throughout the world, and the decisions of the General Assembly -- make it clear that a favourable time has come about in order to solve once and for all the problem which stirs all peoples, that is, freeing mankind from the dangers which have been menacing them.

The peoples of the whole world are acquainted with history and legend about the scourges which have been visited upon mankind. We know of the flood, of the hunger and famine and of the destruction of Pompei, of numerous wars -- seven-year wars, thirty-year wars, and many years wars -- which decimated the peoples over the centuries. Many are present here who have lived through several wars, especially the appalling last war unleashed by German fascism.

But what may happen in the event of future conflicts, future conflagrations, makes it necessary for all of us to be reasonable, and reasonable in a timely manner, because any delay may lead to an irreparable catastrophe. Is it not encouraging, therefore, that the understanding of the three States possessing weapons may lead to an agreement on the complete cessation of nuclear tests. We know that this is only a beginning, that a great deal has to be done in addition to make sure that the sky shall be cloudless and fair over all continents of the world.

But this is a beginning, and a beginning which, given the necessary desire to make progress, can conduce to complete agreement. The Soviet Government has done everything in its power to contribute to the successful completion of the
negotiations. Late reports from Geneva speak of substantial forward movements. The representative of the Soviet Union announced on 3 November of this year the Soviet Government's readiness to consider, together with the United States of American and the United Kingdom, the question of the technical aspects of the detection of underground nuclear explosions, and he proposed that a meeting of experts should be convened soon in Geneva to solve the question of the sending of control inspection teams to detect underground nuclear explosions.

The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom responded by promising to consider this proposal in a most constructive spirit. It is possible and necessary to reach agreement as to the number of inspection teams to be sent to verify the matter of nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union has expressed its firm views on this matter. It would be good if the Western Powers would arrive at an agreement on this question as speedily as possible.

I believe that we sincerely desire that the Geneva conference should lead to success. Each of us has been trying to examine the successes of this conference and its shortcomings. May I be permitted as the representative of Byelorussia to express some views on this topic. We are glad that real ways to an agreement have been found at the Geneva conference. The preamble and the seventeen articles of the treaty have been adopted. We are glad that new moves have been noted at the recently resumed sittings. What are the remaining hurdles? It would be incorrect to assert that these hurdles are posed by any unwillingness of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to arrive at an agreement.

We are convinced that the vast majority of the American and British peoples want peace and that their Governments understand the necessity of freeing their peoples from the appalling danger. But it seems to us that the United States of America and the United Kingdom ought to approach the solution of this problem -- which is the most important for mankind -- with a bit more vigour, and that they should display greater confidence in the realistic Soviet proposals. The Soviet proposals are distinguished by their logical and convincing nature. It is to be hoped that the Western Powers will take account of the convincing arguments of the Soviet Government, that they will take account of the thoughts expressed in their support by many prominent world leaders and that, jointly and together with the Soviet Union, they will arrive at the only correct and necessary decision, that is, the simultaneous cessation of nuclear tests.
The hearts of millions of human beings are attuned today to the halls of the General Assembly, where the most urgent problems of mankind are being dealt with, and also to the halls of the Geneva conference, called upon by the peoples to take the first decisive step toward universal and complete disarmament by way of reaching agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. That is why we have feelings of bitterness and sadness when we hear certain statements which cannot be counted among those which express the aspirations of the peoples. So much so that it is difficult to figure out whose designs are thus expressed.

It is hard to believe that such things can be said without blushing for shame and that such things could be said to people who are thirsting for peace. However sad, this is a fact. Mr. Truman, on 8 November of this year, came out in The New York Times in an article in which he made a proposal clearly at variance with the sincere desire of the peoples of the world for peace, and that includes the American people, I am sure. He said:

"I do not think that it is appropriate to continue the prohibition of nuclear tests which we have ourselves assumed and we must immediately revoke it."

Now in our days, when the whole world has been facing the dawn of hope to be freed forever from the horror of destruction, it is difficult to believe one's ears on hearing words which are calling again for the development of these diabolic weapons which would necessarily doom mankind to horrible sufferings. We are glad that many political leaders in the United States disagree with Mr. Truman. The New York Times, in the same issue, noted that the views of Mr. Truman are at variance with the views of three leaders of the Democratic Party of the United States: Adlai Stevenson, Senator John Kennedy and Senator Humphrey.

We were glad to note the report of The Times of London of 10 November of this year that the prominent American physicist, Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling, speaking in Melbourne, Australia, on 9 November, at the Australian-New Zealand Congress for International Co-operation on Disarmament, condemned Mr. Truman's statement. Mr. Pauling stated that he was outraged at Mr. Truman's position which he said was an unimaginable act. It was at variance with the policy of the United States Government.

It would seem to me that whoever sincerely loves mankind, its present and its future, must do everything in its power for the attainment of our common aim.
No inventions, fabrications or pettifoggery will help. No propaganda tricks can be used in order to spawn hatred and mistrust amongst men. Unfortunately there are many people who try to do so. There is no need to cite their names, but one of the most mendacious canards of this kind who set the ears of everybody ringing must be mentioned. It happened not today. The information service of the United States in Rio de Janeiro used a falsification, a crass and pitiful one, when it stated that increased radioactivity in Brazil was caused by test explosions of hydrogen bombs carried out by the Russians, as indicated by the red colour of the atomic dust. Now, really, what discoverers! In other words, they tried to ascribe the blame because of the red colour of the dust. I am afraid that these profound discoveries could lead to the point where they will accuse the rooster for the redness of his comb.

One wonders why such inventions are necessary. What can they contribute to the growth of mutual trust and understanding amongst peoples? In these days, days of a general tendency to get rid forever of the horror and threat of destruction which has been hovering over mankind, we must not trouble the waters. We must clear things up. We must try to create understanding and explain to mankind the danger confronting it if it does not put an end to weapons of mass destruction in good time. The best minds of our period and the best scientists of the world have convinced us that there must be a cessation of nuclear weapons tests without delay. We have also heard from many speakers in our Committee of the horrible consequences of radiation to which living beings may be exposed. Prominent scientists who cherish human life -- I do not mean pseudo-scientists -- have been at one in asserting that if we want to live and let our children and grandchildren live, and lead happy lives, we must put an end to the contamination of the world.

I would just like to refer to the American newspaper, the Washington Post, which on 3 October of this year published a memorandum put out by five of the most prominent physical scientists of today, Linus Pauling, Nobel Prize winner, Hideti Yukawa, C. Sakata and C. Tamanaga from Japan, and Jean Pierre Vigier of France, who spoke of the harm caused to mankind by nuclear test explosions. The memorandum states that more than one million men will lose their lives and 1,250,000 abnormal children will be born as a result of radioactive fall-out from
atomic and hydrogen bombs blown up hitherto; and as a result of nuclear explosions, 140,000 abnormal children have already been born. That elementary calculation indicates that the radioactive fall-out from each super bomb results in the birth of 15,000 abnormal children. Atomic tests have already disseminated enough carbon 14 to give rise in the future to the birth of 1,250,000 abnormal children. Serious genetic and hereditary consequences will be felt for many generations, inasmuch as carbon 14 has a life span of 5,600 years.

There is no need to adduce here additional evidence from scientists of all countries who demand that nuclear tests be stopped. Each of us who cherishes life on earth is well aware of these things, because they could not have failed to alarm us over the past few years. Data can be cited as to the boon that is in store for mankind from the peaceful uses of atomic energy. I think it is sufficient to imagine the force of constructive power as compared to destructive power. In the appeal in the memorandum of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Parliaments of all countries, it is stated convincingly that if we arrive at general and complete disarmament, how many houses, schools, hospitals, plants, electric power stations and roads could be built with this saving? Taxes would be reduced, taxes which now devour an increasing portion of the income of workers and peasants. Inexhaustible possibilities will appear to translate into reality the grandiose projects of scientists and technologists. Scientists and specialists will achieve the objective of serving peace and the flowering of mankind, rather than the reverse. That is why we seek from the bottom of our hearts to put an end to armaments in general and bring about an unconditional prohibition and cessation of nuclear test explosions.

This desire of Soviet men and women was will expressed at the third session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by Mr. Khrushchev, when he said:

"In our proposals it is stated in black and white that in the event that the Western Powers are not prepared to go in for general and complete disarmament, we may find it possible, indeed essential, to arrive at agreement, if only on partial steps to be taken in the field of disarmament. The Soviet Union considers that among these measures may be counted the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and, first of all, the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons."
I think that this sets forth convincingly the position to which Soviet men and women are committed. All side-steppings, reservations and quibbles which prevent the direct solution of this question are unworthy of our epoch. That is why references to the point that certain explosions cannot be detected are unconvincing. A study of scientific and technological progress makes it entirely possible to establish effective international control. There are no valid reasons for further delaying the solution of the most urgent and essential questions -- the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the cessation of tests. We must remove all obstacles from the path toward peace. Let the path to peace be strewn with magnificent flowers. Let each of us give the flower of his soul to the cause of peace. What a magnificent garden will thus be created on this planet. This is the duty of each and every one of us. The Byelorussian delegation is convinced that the General Assembly can, and must, adopt a decision which will contribute to the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. In this we profoundly believe.

Mr. LOUFFTI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): A number of times during the previous sessions of this Committee I have been able to define the position of my delegation regarding the question of the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests which we are discussing today. A number of years ago we supported the recommendation of the Bandung Conference, at which the countries of Asia and Africa committed themselves, until complete prohibition of nuclear tests had been carried out, to appeal to all the Powers to come to an agreement on a cessation of tests of nuclear weapons.

Then, too, at the Accra Conference held in April 1958, my Government joined the independent states of Africa in the declaration whereby they solemnly and vehemently condemned all atomic tests in any part of the world, and especially in the Sahara.

It is, I think, superfluous to explain here the reasons for which my delegation took this position. The threats which weigh over us owing to radiation from nuclear tests suffice in themselves to explain our point of view.
These dangers have been illustrated by a number of speakers who have spoken before me in the course of this debate as well as in the debate on nuclear tests in the Sahara.

In an excellent statement yesterday, the representative of Sweden mentioned studies that have been made in his country on the changes in the intensity and character of radioactivity. He stressed that the degree of radioactivity of certain particles was found to be so high that it would be fatal to the cells coming into direct contact with these heretofore unknown particles. He also mentioned the discussion that took place in the Special Sub-Committee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress, which was published in August of this year. He concluded that in view of the present uncertainty regarding a number of important aspects of the problem, the Swedish delegation found itself in the same position as that of January 1957 when the Swedish delegation requested a cessation of tests.

I shall not go into the details of the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, but shall limit myself to citing a short paragraph from that document:

"Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment to world-wide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations; these hazards, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed persons. The Committee concludes that all steps designed to minimize irradiation of human populations will act to the benefit of human health." (A/3036, paragraph 24)

The obvious conclusion from all this is that the dangers of radiation are not as yet entirely defined, but they do exist. Even if certain scientists minimize the danger of nuclear explosions, we know that the majority of scientists recognize and have stressed these dangers.

In these circumstances, it is clearly in the interests of humanity to find some way of stopping these tests and of preventing present and future generations from undergoing the dangers of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. For these reasons, my Government has always contended that we must end all nuclear and thermonuclear tests.
Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that if nuclear tests continue, a number of States will produce atomic weapons, thus greatly complicating the situation and making it even more difficult to stop tests and to stop the manufacture of atomic weapons.

What I have said thus far also applies to the atomic tests that are to be carried out in the Sahara. I shall not belabour this question. Our position on this question was clearly defined at a previous meeting.

We have followed with great interest the negotiations that have taken place in Geneva since October 1958 between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is with great satisfaction that we note that considerable progress has been achieved in this field. In his very frank statement on 14 October 1959, the representative of the United States, Mr. Lodge, told us of the progress that has been achieved and also stressed the points on which no agreement has been reached. Yesterday, in a remarkable statement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, also informed us of the course of the negotiations in Geneva.

We may conclude that, if agreement has not been reached on all points -- and we know that these are very delicate and complex negotiations -- at least progress has been achieved. Indications are that agreement might also be reached on the identification and control of underground nuclear explosions.

What is even more encouraging is that the States participating in the discussions at Geneva have maintained a voluntary suspension of tests. I do not think I need stress the importance of this suspension. I think it is recognized by everyone.

My delegation has joined with twenty-two other delegations in presenting a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1) which reflects our views on this question. This draft takes into account the progress that has been achieved so far in arriving at agreement on the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and expresses the hope that further agreement will be reached in the near future. We also appeal to the States concerned in the Geneva discussions, and to those who are not taking part in the discussions, to maintain and continue their present voluntary suspension of tests. We trust that this draft resolution will be adopted in the Committee.
The delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden have also submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1) which has the same end in view but deals with the work being carried out in Geneva by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Our draft resolution is wider in scope because it is also addressed to States not participating in the discussions at Geneva and it requests them also to desist from conducting such tests.

My delegation feels that there is no contradiction between the two draft resolutions; we feel that they merely complement one another. I believe that the Committee might safely adopt both draft resolutions.

If agreement is reached in this field, it will be considerable progress towards general disarmament. As a matter of fact, if agreement is reached on the cessation and control of tests and on the principles governing such control, we might then find a solution with respect to control over disarmament, a subject which has caused so much difficulty in the past.

In conclusion, my delegation trusts that the Powers negotiating in Geneva will keep the United Nations informed of the progress of their negotiations.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I should like to begin my remarks by saying a few words about the statement made before this Committee yesterday by the representative of the Soviet Union. The Committee will recall that he discussed at some length the details of the negotiations which have been taking place at Geneva during the past year and longer. He rather naturally gave an account of those discussions which was favourable to the position of the Soviet Union. I do not find that particularly surprising. I think it is quite understandable and I take no objection to it. But I would not like the Committee to think that I considered his account of the negotiations to be wholly accurate and unbiased. I do not wish to take up the many points which were contained in the statement made by Mr. Kuznetsov, but I think perhaps I could give the Committee one illustration of what I mean.

The representative of the Soviet Union said that one of the outstanding problems in the Geneva negotiations was the question of staffing the control posts, and this is what he had to say about the matter:
"The Soviet Union upholds the principle that the personnel of the control posts should be recruited both from the citizens of the host country and from foreigners. There is hardly any need to prove that such an approach is the most expedient and practicable in all respects." He went on:

"The representatives of the western Powers had long adhered to the opinion that all operational and technical personnel at the posts should be recruited only from foreigners. Some time ago they agreed to the principle proposed by the Soviet Union." (A/C.1/PV.1057, page 42)

That was his account of the negotiations on the staffing of control posts, and perhaps I might detain the Committee for a few minutes to give the United Kingdom version of those negotiations.

When we started the negotiations last year, the position was the following. In each control post there were to be approximately 30 technicians. The Soviet Union's first proposal was that of those 30 technicians, 1 or 2 should be foreigners. This was for a control post on Soviet territory. That is to say, 28 or 29 technicians in a control post on Soviet territory would be Soviet citizens. The United Kingdom and the United States took the view that this would not provide adequate assurance for the other parties to the treaty, and our original proposal was that, for a control post in the Soviet Union one half of the technicians should be personnel from the other two nuclear Powers and the other half should be other foreign personnel representing all the other countries in the world that have an interest in seeing that any obligation to stop tests was carried out.
Later, it is true, the Soviet Union increased the number of foreigners they would allow in a control post in the Soviet Union. But the Western position was this that we could not exclude that element in the world community who had an interest in this agreement, quite apart from the three nuclear Powers, and therefore, our staffing proposals -- which we still stand by -- are that one third of the personnel in the control post should be nationals of the Soviet Union, one third should come from the Western nuclear Powers, and one third should represent the whole of the rest of the world community. I leave it to the Committee to judge whether they think that that is a fair offer on the staffing of control posts and whether it is accurate to say that the Soviet Union upholds the principle that the personnel of the control posts should be recruited both from citizens of the host country and from foreign countries. That might be a little bit misleading if one did not know that the original Soviet position was that one or two foreigners should be in each control post containing thirty technical personnel.

However, I entirely agree with the representative of the Soviet Union when he went on to say:

"We are of the opinion that... it will not be difficult to reach agreement on the composition of the control posts, provided this is desired by all sides." (A/C.1/PV.1057, p. 42)

I have only given this one example because I do not wish to detain the Committee with an elaborate analysis of the Soviet representative's statement. I think if I did that we might well become involved here in the very negotiations which are going on in Geneva, and I would not like to repeat with our colleague, Mr. Kuznetsov, the rather lengthy exchanges I have already had with his colleague, Mr. Tsarapkin in Geneva. I am sure the First Committee would not wish to celebrate next year the first anniversary of our discussions on this particular item. It has been our view that these negotiations at Geneva are best carried out on a confidential basis, and indeed, the three Powers negotiating there have agreed on that basis because we have felt that public debate on these kinds of matters, these detailed matters, does not necessarily produce the best results. I personally believe that the best progress will be made in those negotiations if we continue on the basis of confidential discussions.
In my previous speeches to this Committee I have, I think, already made abundantly clear the attitude of my delegation to the nuclear test conference which I have just been discussing. However, it may be convenient if I summarize that attitude in a few words.

We believe that it is extremely important that the nuclear test conference in Geneva should reach a successful conclusion not only because it would bring about the cessation of nuclear weapons testing by the participating Powers, but also because success in that conference seems to us the most hopeful starting point for an attack on the whole problem of real disarmament. We believe that there is a genuine prospect of success in the negotiations at Geneva. It has been a long and slow task to reach the points of agreement which we have so far attained. There are still difficult points to be resolved. But we shall bring to their solution the same patience as we have exercised hitherto -- and let no one mistake patience for delaying tactics. The creation of a satisfactory international control organization would set such an important precedent, if it could be obtained, that we must ensure that the work upon its details is done thoroughly. Therefore, we must not lose heart when for a while progress does seem rather slow. The important thing is not to make wild judgements or jump to hasty conclusions on scanty evidence but to give every support to the negotiators. The best way to our mind to achieve this purpose is to leave the negotiators in peace and not to strike attitudes in public which would lead to a hardening of positions on either side.

I must remind the Committee at this point of the position taken by my Government regarding the voluntary suspension of tests. We have said that as long as useful discussions continue in Geneva, it is not our intention to resume nuclear weapons tests. We have taken this position deliberately in order to help the successful conclusion of negotiations.

The question of French nuclear testing has by the general wish of the Committee been discussed under a separate item. So has the question of the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries. As I understand it, it is the wish of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, that is to say, the draft resolution sponsored by Austria, Japan, and Sweden, to obtain the widest
possible measure of support for an appeal to the three parties actually negotiating an agreement at Geneva to intensify their efforts and to give them the encouragement of the whole United Nations Assembly in their task. I believe that the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden is the most likely to achieve that objective.

Therefore, for the reasons that I have given, we find this draft the most appropriate, and we will support it.
Mr. HAYMERLE (Austria): I apologize for intervening again, but I would like at this juncture of the debate to make just one brief remark on the two draft resolutions before us. I have listened with attention to the statements which were made yesterday and today. It seems to me that there were certain doubts in the minds of some speakers with regard to the compatibility of the two drafts, and I would like to allay these doubts by explaining that, in our opinion, the difference between the two draft resolutions lies mainly in their scope: whereas the twenty-three-Power draft resolution is intended to cover a comparatively wide range of aspects of the problem, ours purposely concentrates on the Geneva conference and the States involved in it. In our view, however, this does not mean that one of the resolutions is incompatible with the other. We believe that a vote on our draft should not preclude a vote on the twenty-three-Power project.

Mr. VIDIC (Yugoslavia): The fact that we have been listening, on the whole, only to comparatively short statements by Government representatives with regard to this item of our agenda does not in the least reflect the measure of importance that we attached to this problem. Actually, we have unavoidably dealt one way or another with the issue of the suspension of nuclear weapons tests in the course of the previous debates relating to the questions of disarmament, the intention of the French Government to engage in nuclear weapons tests in the Sahara, and the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The very fact that we have unavoidably had to deal with this issue in our Committee in connexion with all the preceding items illustrates, in the best possible manner, to what an extent the suspension of nuclear weapons tests constitutes a problem which cannot be by-passed and which requires a complete solution.

I am gratified that we are discussing the question of the suspension of nuclear weapons tests also as a separate item of our agenda. This provides us here with the opportunity of discussing together the state of negotiations that are now taking place in Geneva and of concentrating our attention on those questions which are, in this connexion, of the greatest interest to us.
I wish to point out the following. In addition to the very course and progress of the negotiations, which will be, we expect, brought to a successful conclusion at an early date, the existence of the de facto moratorium on the carrying-out of nuclear weapons tests is one of the extremely important characteristic features of the present situation. This very fact has already eased considerably the dangerous and painful situation which had prevailed until the moratorium as a result of the intensification of nuclear weapons tests. The moratorium in itself is an expression of the awareness of the nuclear Powers of the absolute necessity of suspending these tests, as well as of their favourable response to the wide-spread dissatisfaction which had prevailed in the world with regard to the tests they had been carrying out so persistently. The example which was set in this respect by the Soviet Government and which was followed by the other two nuclear Powers deserves to be emphasized. It is absolutely necessary that this moratorium continue. Many representatives have made statements to this effect and we may freely assume that this is the dominant feeling in our Committee. I do not deem it necessary to set forth once again all the arguments in favour of this exigency.

In this connexion, however, there are several points which need to be stressed:

First, the intention of the French Government to engage in nuclear weapons tests in the Sahara would upset the present moratorium and would be fraught with dire consequences that we should not at all underestimate. We have already explained in our speech on this particular item the reasons why we think so. Consequently, we hold the view that the United Nations has the right and the duty to appeal to France as well as to any other Power to refrain from nuclear weapons tests.

Secondly, certain influential political personalities have recently again begun to advocate a resumption of these tests. It is difficult to imagine a more short-sighted attitude -- and precisely on the eve of the reopening of negotiations on disarmament and on the threshold of the conclusion of an agreement by the three nuclear Powers on the permanent cessation of tests. The significance and implications of such a resumption would not be less serious if the tests were to take place underground.
Thirdly, in spite of all the positive features of the moratorium the very existence of a definite feeling of uncertainty with regard to the duration of this situation makes it imperative for the nuclear Powers to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement on a lasting, controlled cessation of nuclear weapons tests, which should subsequently be transformed, as a matter of urgency, into a general, international agreement through the adherence to it of all the States in the world.

These considerations prompt us to express our appreciation of the initiative of the Indian Government to examine again the situation arising from the problem that we are discussing.

Last year we exerted, together with the delegation of India and many other delegations, most active efforts in favour of the opening of the negotiations which are now in course. The thirteenth session of the General Assembly played an extremely important role with regard to the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. I am convinced that our present study of this question will also have a powerful impact conducive to the final solution of this extremely significant problem of our time.

For this reason, this year also we find ourselves in the group of sponsors who insist upon an early and successful completion of the negotiations conducted by the three nuclear Powers in Geneva. In spite of the successes achieved so far, we must, unfortunately, state that the danger of a resumption of nuclear weapons tests or of the undertaking of such tests by any side has not yet been eliminated. Such a resumption or undertaking of tests could jeopardize all that we have achieved by persistent and positive efforts in this respect during the past year. In the present situation when, according to the general appraisal, an agreement is both indispensable and possible, such an agreement might easily amount to a decisive turning-point leading to the creation of conditions for putting a final stop to the present ruthless race in arms of mass destruction, and for channelling developments in the opposite direction, that is to say, towards the liquidation of the arms race, the reaching of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and the creation of firm foundations of peace among nations.

In connexion with the agreement that we have in mind, we attach great importance to the question of underground tests. We do so because of the emergence of a tendency to try to reach an agreement on the cessation of tests above ground --
speaking in general terms -- while postponing for later study and solution the question of underground tests, owing to the alleged impossibility of controlling such tests. The data which are adduced in this respect are not convincing, for several reasons. I will refer to only one of them, which is, in our submission, the most important one.
We do not share the view that the only reason for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests should be the elimination of the danger of radioactive fall-out, although we attach full importance to this aspect too. Actually, the continuation of underground tests would leave the door open to the perfecting of nuclear weapons, that is, it would leave the door open to the continuation of the race in nuclear arms. Therefore, the abstracting of underground tests from the expected agreements -- in other words, the legalization of such tests -- would not only permit the existing nuclear Powers to proceed with the nuclear arms race but would enable a greater number of States to join this race, with all the ensuing consequences for peace. In this way, the carrying out of underground explosions could also completely destroy the positive impact that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests would unavoidably have on the very solution of the question of disarmament, on the international atmosphere and on international relations in general.

For all these reasons, we feel that the most serious efforts should be exerted in Geneva in order to reach an agreement with regard to this question too.

These are some of the most important points that I wish to stress in connexion with the question of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

It follows from all the aforesaid that my delegation is convinced that the resolution that we are sponsoring together with twenty-two other countries is in harmony with the requirements of the present situation, with the responsibilities of the United Nations and, I hope, with the views held by the majority of delegations with regard to this problem.

Mr. SHANAHAN (New Zealand): Both in the general debate and in the course of previous discussions in this Committee, my delegation has set forth its views on the testing of nuclear weapons in unequivocal terms. We have expressed our earnest hope that the last nuclear weapons test has taken place. The further data concerning the character of radioactivity presented in recent inquiries in the United States, and the evidence of new and previously not fully understood elements in fall-out, mentioned by the representative of Sweden in his most interesting statement yesterday, all emphasize the gravity and the urgency of the problem.
We consider that, if there is to be any real assurance that the cessation of tests is to be permanent, there must be an international agreement embodying full and effective provisions for control and supervision to which all States will subscribe.

The representatives of the three Powers which are at present engaged in negotiations at Geneva have reported to this Committee that substantial progress has already been made toward the conclusion of such an agreement, and each has expressed confidence that the remaining obstacles will be overcome. With many others, we welcome this most promising development. The importance of an agreement, if it is universal in its application, lies not only in the fact that it would allay the widespread apprehensions to which steadily increasing levels of man-made radiation have given rise in recent years. In our view -- and this is of fundamental importance -- an agreement on this vital though limited issue could also be the starting point for progress toward real measures of disarmament in both the nuclear and conventional fields.

I do not think it can be disputed that the progress already made at Geneva is due in considerable degree to the decision of the Powers concerned to suspend their own nuclear tests. Nor can it be doubted that a resumption of tests by any of these three Powers, or the initiation of tests by others, would greatly affect the present encouraging prospects of agreement.

These are the basic considerations which will determine the stand taken by my delegation in the voting on the resolutions before us. We join wholeheartedly in expressing appreciation of the efforts of the three nuclear Powers to reach an agreement on the permanent cessation of tests. We feel, moreover, that it is wholly appropriate that this Assembly should underline the importance of reaching an agreement at the earliest possible moment and should appeal to the three Powers to maintain the present suspension of tests which they have voluntarily undertaken. We believe, however, that the Assembly should not limit its appeal to the three nuclear Powers but should rather address itself to the international community as a whole. The acceptance by all States of such an appeal would, in our view, do much to ensure that the existing complexities of the disarmament problem are not further compounded. The responsibility for
achieving a final solution of this problem does not lie exclusively with the three nuclear Powers. It rests also upon all other States which now possess or may develop a capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The twenty-three-Power draft resolution takes these important considerations fully into account. My delegation will therefore support it. Although we do not regard the three-Power draft resolution as adequate in its scope, it does contain provisions which are complementary to those embodied in the twenty-three-Power draft resolution, and we shall accordingly support it also.

Mr. Alpha DIALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I shall not take long to express my delegation's point of view on the resolutions before us. The delegation of the Republic of Guinea has repeatedly stated and reaffirmed its position on the question before us. This position has not varied. It is to be found in the resolutions and recommendations of Bandung, Accra and Monrovia.

We are convinced that the alarm caused by nuclear and thermonuclear tests is universal and that all the peoples want to be freed from the haunting atomic fear. Since the beginning of this session, statements have been made here and in other places which confirm this point. What remains to be done is to embody this unanimous will in resolutions that would do honour to this Assembly and would point the way for the nations of the world.

It is in this frame of mind that my delegation has co-sponsored the resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1, which is now before this Committee. There is no doubt, in our opinion, that this resolution expresses the unanimous will of all men. It clearly and unreservedly expresses what has been consistently recommended here and elsewhere: suspension of all nuclear tests, without any qualification. Any attitude at variance with this position would also be at variance with our mission of the defence of peace.
It has been stated clearly here that it is not a question of a fourth nuclear Power but of further nuclear Powers that might wish to arrive on the scene. If, for reasons of opportunism or political blindness, the forest were not to be seen for the trees, it would be most unfortunate.

The draft resolution of which my delegation is one of the co-sponsors is a pertinent and appropriate one and is in harmony with our aspirations.

With regard to the other draft resolution, presented by Austria, Japan and Sweden (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1), it is the opinion of my delegation that this is a consequence of the draft resolution which we have presented. It may be said to be restrictive in effect, but, if the group that has sponsored this draft feels for any reason that it should be maintained, we shall vote in favour of it because it is not at variance with ours; on the contrary, it complements it.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As the Committee no doubt knows, the list of speakers was closed at noon today. There are still nineteen speakers on the list, and there may be some explanations of votes later. Therefore I would ask members of the Committee to do all in their power to allow us to begin the afternoon meeting at three o'clock sharp.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.