VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE THOUSAND AND FIFTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 18 November 1959, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. VEIAZQUEZ (Vice-Chairman) (Uruguay)

Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e. the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.1057. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEM 69

SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS (A/4186; A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, L.237/Rev.1)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to remind the members of the Committee that the draft resolutions appearing in documents A/C.1/L.236 and A/C.1/L.237, which had been circulated previously, have been revised by their respective sponsors. The revised versions of the draft resolutions are contained in documents A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1, which were distributed this morning.

Mr. JHA (India): Once again my delegation has submitted the item "Suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" for consideration by the General Assembly. We have done so in the firm conviction and faith which have, during the past five years, prompted us to bring up this question more than once before the General Assembly. The Government and people of India have steadfastly urged that nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction be outlawed, that nuclear energy be used only for peaceful purposes and that the fissile material contained in existing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons be converted to peaceful uses. We believe that suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear test explosions is an essential first step in disarmament and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the outlawry of war. Equally important is the need to meet the moral challenge posed by the unleashing of the tremendous forces of nature locked up in the nucleus of the atom and hitherto not unmercifully hidden from man.

As members of the Committee are aware, we have brought this issue before this world forum every year since 1954 in the hope that the Assembly would take cognizance of the anxieties and apprehensions of the peoples of the world regarding the dangers of continued testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and make appropriate recommendations regarding cessation of such tests. As far back as 2 April 1954, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, said in the Indian Parliament:
"I have stated publicly our view that these experiments, which may have served one and only one useful purpose, namely, expose the nature of the horror and the tragedy, even though only partly, should cease. I repeat that to be our considered position and it is our hope that this view and the great concern which is reflected in worldwide opinion will evoke adequate and timely responses. Pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of prohibition and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction, which the General Assembly has affirmed as its earnest desire, the Government would consider among the steps to be taken now and forthwith some sort of what may be called standstill agreement in respect, at least, of these actual explosions, even if arrangements about the discontinuance of production and stockpiling must wait more substantial agreements among those principally concerned."
This proposal for a "standstill agreement" by our Prime Minister was forwarded for the consideration of the Disarmament Commission. Subsequently, several proposals covering many fields of disarmament were made by our delegation to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. Among all these, the one to which we attached special importance was the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Unfortunately, all our efforts were of no avail, and the sterile discussions in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee inevitably led to the virtual dissolution of the Commission. Apart from the proposals that we had made from time to time for the consideration of this matter in the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, which were the only forums where the questions in the field of disarmament were discussed in any seriousness and to which all proposals made in the Assembly until 1957 were transmitted, my delegation did not lose any opportunity during the sessions of the General Assembly to make some headway towards the goal of cessation of these experimental nuclear explosions.

I need not recall in any detail the main draft resolutions moved by my delegation at successive sessions of the General Assembly, to further the objective of cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. It is well known that for some time there was acute controversy on the possibility of detection of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions, despite the consensus of opinion among reputed scientists that most of these were capable of being detected. At the twelfth session of the General Assembly, the delegation of India submitted a draft resolution on the question of stopping nuclear tests. In this resolution (document A/C.1/L.176) we suggested among other things the setting up of a scientific and technical commission, which should look into the question of detectability of explosions. Our draft resolution failed to secure approval because of the opposition of certain nuclear Powers to our proposal in that draft resolution for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests without delay. However, the suggestions regarding the technical talks and the detectability of tests found favour and were incorporated in General Assembly resolution 1148 (XII) adopted at the twelfth session.
I have said all this to convey the sense of urgency and purpose with which my delegation has pursued its efforts to secure the discontinuance of the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. We have not been deterred by setbacks and failures, as we believed that we were persevering in a world cause sustained and supported by world public opinion. And, if I may say so, neither we nor the General Assembly as a whole have any reason to be despondent at the lack of results so far. Indeed, discussions here have not only mirrored the concern and the anxiety of the people of the world in regard to nuclear explosions and the continued possession and manufacture of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of mass destructive power even difficult to contemplate; they have in turn educated and stimulated world public opinion and interest. Indeed, these discussions have had their inevitable impact on the Powers that have been conducting nuclear and thermonuclear test explosions.

It is not without significance that the last two years have witnessed a significant advance in this regard. Two conferences have been held on the subject of cessation of nuclear weapons tests: the first a scientific and technical conference; and the second a political conference, which is being held in Geneva and is still pursuing its labours, with a view to implementing the findings of the first. Between 1 July and 21 August 1958, twenty-three experts from the East and the West met in closed session in Geneva and came to the conclusion that it was technically feasible to establish a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the world-wide suspension of nuclear weapons tests. According to them, even low-yield explosions of five kilotons or under could be identified by collecting samples of radioactive fall-out by recording seismic, acoustic and hydro-acoustic waves, by radio signals and by "on site" inspection of suspected and unidentified explosions. The Conference recommended the establishment of an international control organ with 160 to 170 land-based control posts and 10 more on water. The political conference in Geneva has, as a result of patient and protracted and, if I may say so, sincere and skilful negotiations, reached a large measure of agreement, although some outstanding issues, namely, the staffing of the control posts, the question of "on site" inspections, and the method of taking decisions in the
control commission, still await solution. It is our sincere hope that these negotiations succeed in the evolution of an international agreement which could later be adhered to by all Members of the United Nations. At the same time, it seems to us that in the attainment of these milestones of progress, the United Nations is entitled to take some credit, and that the discussions over the years in the General Assembly have not gone in vain.

The question may be asked: what is the reason for the persistence shown by my delegation? Much can be said on this subject, and has been said, not only during debates in past years but in the discussions in the Committee on other items concerning disarmament; in particular there was a fairly full discussion of the dangers arising from nuclear explosions during the debate on the item submitted by Morocco regarding French nuclear tests in the Sahara. It seems to me necessary, however, in a discussion on the subject of nuclear explosions to summarize, as briefly as possible, what appear to us conclusive reasons for continued United Nations interest in this subject.

Firstly, nuclear test explosions are intimately connected with disarmament. Until recently some nuclear Powers held the view that there could be no cessation of nuclear tests unless and until there was a comprehensive agreement on disarmament. This view has fortunately been modified, and now it is generally held that the cessation of nuclear tests, though connected with disarmament, need not necessarily wait till after a comprehensive agreement in all fields of disarmament. This had, indeed, been the view of my delegation all along. Test explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, however, are motivated by a desire for increasing rearmament and for perfecting and augmenting the destructive power of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. In this sense, nuclear and thermonuclear explosions are an ugly and ominous symbol; and without the cessation of test explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons there can be no advance towards the universally desired goal of total and general disarmament, which, only the other day, has been endorsed by the General Assembly with a unanimity, and in an atmosphere of hope and goodwill, unparalleled in the history of the United Nations. If the nations of the world which possess nuclear weapons, and others which do not possess these weapons but are in a position to manufacture
them now or in the near future, can agree to the cessation or suspension of test explosions of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the first major breakthrough in disarmament will have been made. The establishment of the necessary machinery for inspection and control, and experience of its working, will show the way to the comprehensive controls which must form part of any general and complete disarmament.
Here, may I quote a statement made by Mr. Wadsworth, the United States representative at the Geneva talks, who is playing such a valuable role in these talks -- a quotation which expresses the same idea I have mentioned just now. Speaking on 3 September 1959 at a news conference, Mr. Wadsworth said:

"We should not lose sight of the fact that these conferences are the only hope of establishing a precedent which can be used in negotiations throughout the whole field of disarmament."

Not only is the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear explosions necessary for halting the race for nuclear and thermo-nuclear armament among the Powers that now possess them, but it is equally necessary to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons among other nations. The late Professor Einstein used to say that in the not too distant future anyone could manufacture a nuclear bomb in his backyard. Scientists agree today that at least ten or twelve nations, besides the present-day nuclear Powers, are capable of manufacturing either now or in the near future nuclear weapons; and if no agreement is reached on the cessation of such tests sooner or later there may be test explosions by other Powers as a step toward the manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. Once such weapons are spread around the world, not only will disarmament become much more difficult but the chances of a nuclear war with total destruction will become immeasurably greater. The measure of support for the resolution on this item brought up by Ireland the other day which was adopted without dissent is a clear indication of the views of the United Nations in this regard.

Secondly, there is the fear arising from nuclear and thermo-nuclear explosions. This fear, as everyone knows, is real. It is the fear of total destruction likely to be caused by a nuclear and thermo-nuclear war -- destruction not merely of human lives but of all the accumulated culture and achievements of humanity. It is also the fear of the unknown which is sometimes more potent, more insidious than fear of something which one can lay one's hands on. There is today, no one can doubt, a widespread fear of the effects of the radioactivity released in the nuclear test explosions and of the effects of the nuclear fall-out. We have heard in this Committee, in the discussions on a previous item, views calculated to allay these fears.
Detailed figures were given during discussions to show that the increase in radiation caused by nuclear explosions is infinitesimally small compared to the natural radiation to which man is subject. Statistically speaking these figures are not open to question, but can anyone of us argue from these figures that there is no danger to human health from the increased man-made radiation as a result of the 207 nuclear explosions that have already taken place? There is difference of opinion among scientists as to the exact extent of the danger and the effects themselves are not fully known, but there is not one responsible body of opinion which asserts that increased radiation from man-made explosions poses no danger to humanity. If ways and means could be found to prevent deaths and damages due to natural radiation, man would do it. In the case of natural radiation, we are faced with a situation where, for the time being at least, we are unable to do very much to ward off the danger. Man-made radiation is an entirely different category and there can be no doubt that neither the occurrence nor the consequences of such radiation can be accepted as being inevitable.

What are the known facts about atomic radiation? Let me recall some of them, although much has been said on this subject in earlier debates. Eighteen scientists, Nobel Prize Winners of many countries, on 15 July 1955 warned that the use of nuclear weapons might contaminate the world with radioactivity and wipe out entire nations. At the international conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy in 1955 much attention was devoted to the possible genetic effects of radiation on the human race and suggestions were put forward that international organizations should be set up to study the matter and establish standards of radio-biological protection. The consensus of opinion was that although the danger might not be immediate, quick action should be taken to safeguard the human race against adverse effects of radiation, particularly as regards the possibility of unfavourable genetic mutations.

On 15 February 1955, the United States Atomic Energy Commission in a report on the Bikini Hydrogen Bomb test of 1 March 1954, said that there was sufficient radioactivity in the down-wind belt for about 140 miles in length and of varying width up to twenty miles, that is to say, an area of nearly 3,000 square miles, to have seriously threatened the lives of all persons in the area who did not take protective measures.
Addressing the Royal Society for Health in England, Professor Gordon Fair of Harvard said:

"Present figures indicate that fall-out from weapons tests before 1957 accounted for the birth of between 2,500 and 13,000 genetically defective children and between 25,000 and 100,000 cases of Leukemia and bone-tumor considered altogether."

The report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the effects of atomic radiation, to which reference has often been made in this Committee also states that an estimated total of 2,500 to 100,000 genetic defects will occur over subsequent years from tests already held.

The United States official publication "The Summary Analysis of the Public Hearings" held from 5 May to 8 May 1959, by the Special Sub-Committee on Radiation of the Joint Committee of Atomic Energy, on fall-out from nuclear weapons tests, says:

"It was generally agreed that in considering acceptable exposure limits in the context of worldwide environmental contamination from fall-out, the best assumption that can be made at present concerning the relationship of biological effect to radiation dose is to assume that any dose, however small, produces some biological effect and that this effect is harmful."

Many more quotations of scientific views might be made but I do not wish to burden the Committee with such quotations. Suffice it to say that responsible bodies like the Federation of American Scientists, the British Medical Research Council, the United States Academy of Sciences, and others have voiced grave concern at the genetic and other effects of radiation and nuclear fall-out.

I have mentioned these facts to show that even though the extent of the danger or damage caused by radiation or nuclear fall-out may be a matter of controversy, the danger is still there and cannot be ignored, and irrespective of how many people might be affected, world opinion and indeed the General Assembly cannot for a moment approve the continuance of the nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. No nation has the right to cause genetic or other damage to the human species, irrespective of whether they are its own nationals or not.
I mentioned the moral challenge offered by the whole question of nuclear explosions. What is the nature of this challenge? The challenge is nothing less than that of survival of the human race. This cannot be put in more precise or moving words than those used by the scientists' appeal for renunciation of war, made by the late Professor Albert Einstein and eight other world-famous scientists. The appeal said, inter alia:

"In the tragic situation which confronts humanity we feel that the scientists should assemble in a conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction and to discuss a resolution ..."

"We are speaking not as members of this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as human beings, members of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt ..."

"It is feared that if many H-bombs are used there will be universal death -- sudden only for a minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.

"Many warnings have been uttered by eminent men of science and by authorities in military strategy. None of them will say that the worst results are certain. What they do say is that these results are possible, and no one can be sure that they will not be realized...

"Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?"
The scientists' appeal, to which I have referred, concludes:

"There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death."

These are moving words. They do not come from a layman; they come from Professor Einstein, one of the two or three greatest geniuses that history has produced, a man of remarkable capacity for thought and prescience who, indeed, in many ways is one of the architects of the whole science of nuclear energy.

This is the great challenge of our time, the supreme challenge of the spirit. Shall man have the wisdom to use the tremendous power placed in his hands by the discovery of atomic power to make this planet a world of happiness and plenty, or will he, in wanton folly, use nuclear power for committing mass suicide and the destruction of the human race?

This is the challenge that we are facing today. Nuclear and thermonuclear tests are but a facet of this great challenge, since these are a symbol of nuclear war.

We of the United Nations are placed in a position of privilege and responsibility. The way we attempt to answer this challenge will be inscribed in the pages of history. I hope for the sake of us all that we shall face the challenge in the right way.

Having said all this, to emphasize the great importance of the subject before us and the approach of my delegation in bringing it up before the United Nations, we would like to make it clear that my delegation has a sense of satisfaction at the earnest efforts being made in Geneva to reach a final and definitive agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests with effective international control. We wish to pay a tribute to the patience and the earnestness of purpose and perseverance of the three great Powers -- the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- which are participating in the Geneva discussions. It is our earnest hope that these discussions reach a satisfactory conclusion and that the remaining points
of difference are resolved very soon. The omens are good. Agreement for the
cessation of nuclear tests should be facilitated in the new atmosphere of
understanding among the great Powers. If agreement is reached, the world will
heave a sigh of relief and we shall enter a new era of hope and confidence for
the future of nations.

It may be asked why we have thought fit to bring this subject before the
United Nations again when the Geneva discussions are already in progress and
promise results. I can assure the Members of the Committee that we have done so
to help and not to hinder the negotiations in Geneva. Our task is to reinforce
and not to undermine the efforts that are being made. We sincerely feel that
the question of the suspension of nuclear tests is an issue of such great
importance that the United Nations must remain continuously seized of it. It
is our intention that the United Nations General Assembly, by its resolution
and through an appropriate expression of opinion, record appreciation for the
efforts being made by the nuclear Powers in Geneva to reach agreement on the
suspension of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons under a system of
effective international control, and we wish the Powers godspeed in their
efforts to reach agreement in this regard.

It is also our intention that we should appeal to the Powers to continue
their present voluntary suspension of tests, and that not only the three nuclear
Powers who are at present in a position to conduct such tests but all other
States should desist from undertaking such tests even if they should have the
capability to do so. Such an appeal might have looked somewhat impractical
a couple of years ago. But 1959 is not 1956 or even 1957; it is different.
The success already achieved in the negotiations and the proximity of eventual
complete agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests make such an appeal not
only entirely practical but timely, natural and desirable, as well as urgent and
imperative. We believe that the discussions in the General Assembly will
contribute to the realization of the great objective of prohibition of nuclear
and thermonuclear tests, and eventually to the outlawing of all nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons. It is in this spirit that we have co-sponsored, along
with others, the draft resolution before the Committee which is contained in
document A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1. This draft resolution embodies the ideals to which
I have just given expression on behalf of my delegation. I am very happy to state that the delegations of Japan and Cuba have consented to be added to the list of sponsors, and I request the Secretariat to make the necessary change to the list and issue a further revision of this draft resolution. I am informed that the delegation of Libya would also like to be associated with this draft resolution, and we are very happy to ask that its name also be inscribed in the list of sponsors.

I do not wish to speak much about the draft resolution specifically at this stage. I reserve my right to speak on it later after hearing the views of the other members of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I have taken note that the names of the delegations of Cuba, Japan and Libya are to be added to the list of co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1. The Secretariat will also take note of this and make the additions required.

Mr. HAYMERLE (Austria): The fact that the Austrian delegation is again to be found among the sponsors of a draft resolution on the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests aimed at an early solution of this problem corresponds with the well-known attitude of my Government on this subject. We have on several occasions expressed ourselves on this question. I therefore believe it to be unnecessary to repeat what has already been said.

When the Austrian delegation, together with the delegations of Japan and Sweden, introduced the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1) now before the Committee, it was guided by its avowed purpose to help realize the ardent hopes of all peoples for an early cessation of nuclear weapons tests. It is quite clear to us that the acceptance of this draft resolution would not itself bring a solution to this problem. And yet we believe that the thoughts and aims expressed in this draft resolution would substantially aid the parties to the Geneva negotiations now in progress. Last year, we passed another resolution on the same subject, which was mainly concerned with procedural questions. Since then, the international climate has undergone a gratifying change, a fact which has not, of course, been without bearing on the Geneva talks on the cessation of
nuclear weapons tests. We all know that during the past year important progress has been made in spite of many disappointing setbacks. We may therefore be well justified in our hopes that this vital question will be brought to a solution.

The draft resolution offered by us takes account of this development. Even if the progress of the Geneva talks has sometimes appeared painfully slow, we must not overlook the substantial gains that have nevertheless been made. We are fully appreciative of this development and have attempted to give it due credit in our draft. In the Austrian delegation's view, the reasons for the repeated delays in the Geneva talks have been two-fold: first, the complexity of the subject matter; and, secondly, the fact that new insight has been gained into some of the relevant phenomena, such as the discovery that subterranean nuclear explosions as well as those in great heights are discernible to outside observers.

It is understandable that developments of this order throw a new light on the matter and delay the negotiations. In the meantime, however, the Governments concerned have declared themselves on the subject in a manner that appears to confirm our hopes that a solution of the problem as well as of its above-mentioned aspects is now in sight.
In this context I would like to mention the Soviet declaration of 29 August of this year, according to which the USSR will not test its nuclear weapons as long as the Western Powers do not resume their own tests. Furthermore, there is the British declaration of 10 November, according to which the United Kingdom will not test its nuclear arms while the Geneva talks are in progress. Finally, there is the recent declaration of President Eisenhower, according to which the United States might be prepared to continue their suspension of nuclear tests beyond the current year.

In the view of the Austrian delegation, the resolution before the Committee contains all the points that are important for a successful conclusion of the Geneva talks. There is only one point which I would like to single out for special attention: it is that which mentions the prohibition of future atomic weapons tests. We have intentionally spoken in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft of a "prohibition" of such tests as on 6 December 1958 unanimity was achieved in Geneva that there ought to be such a prohibition. The relevant communique of the participants in the conference informed us that they had reached agreement on this point, as it was the declared aim of their negotiations to arrive at a multilateral convention on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Thus, in case such an agreement should be reached, it would appear assured that no country which would be a party to this agreement could further attempt any such tests.

We believe, therefore, that our draft fully corresponds to the facts of the present situation and we may therefore express the hope that it will find the unanimous support of all delegations. Such unanimous acceptance would be a meaningful contribution to the disarmament resolution recently passed by this Committee, and it would also do justice to the President of the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, who expressed the wish that this Assembly might go down in the annals of history as the General Assembly of Peace.

Mr. Sandler (Sweden) (interpretation from French): As a result of the allocation of agenda items, three separate items more or less relating to the question of nuclear tests have been placed on our agenda for consideration and report to the General Assembly.
These items are: first, item 67, the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, which is closely connected with the prevention of testing; secondly, item 68, the question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara, which, in spite of its specific character, involves wider aspects of the test problem; and thirdly, item 69, the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

As the debate has amply demonstrated, these three items are interrelated, and there might have been some reasons for discussing them together. Since, for specific reasons, it was decided otherwise, items 68 and 67 have been discussed as separate items and have already been disposed of. The Swedish delegation did not speak in the course of those discussions.

Before proceeding, may I be permitted briefly to recall that the Swedish delegation has, by its vote, expressed its sympathy for the purposes underlying the draft resolution tabled by Ireland. A still more dangerous situation than that of today would result if the fourth country problem were tomorrow transformed into an nth country problem. In a report, carrying precisely this title, by a group of scientists under the auspices of the American Academy of Art and Science there will be found an interesting study of the capabilities for other countries to become members of the nuclear club and thus make the membership much wider.

Further, I wish to state my conviction, which has reaffirmed by the technical exposé of the very able French representative, that France will take all possible precautions in order to minimize to a tolerable degree the possible dangers that may arise from the projected tests in the Sahara. In spite of this, and primarily motivated by reasons of a nature that fall within the purview of the general question we are now discussing, we regret that France so far has taken a negative attitude to the African-Asian appeal in this matter. Any modification in this position would be warmly welcomed.

Let me also use this opportunity to say a word relating to a misunderstanding of Press information from Sweden, contained in a statement made in a friendly way the other day, when I was not present in the Committee, by the representative of Indonesia. I can assure him that nothing has happened in Sweden which changes in any way the attitude the Swedish delegation, in conformity with instructions from its Government, has already taken by its voting during the last few days and is taking by its statement today in the matters the First Committee has been
debating for some weeks. I wish very amicably to thank my Indonesian colleague for giving me this opportunity to make a correction.

In conformity with the agreed procedure of this Committee, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, which my delegation had the privilege of sponsoring together with Austria and Japan, refers only to item 69 on our agenda. In drafting this resolution we have tried carefully to avoid dealing with points covered by the two other items. This draft resolution should be seen as a concluding expression of the common desire that has marked the general disarmament debate, that is, that nuclear tests should be stopped.

The text of our draft resolution is clear and simple. We do not attach primary importance to the wording of the resolution. Our main interest is to achieve the widest possible support from the members of this Committee for a serious appeal to the nuclear Powers to reach a speedy agreement. So far as the substance is concerned, this draft resolution is very similar to one tabled last year by the same three sponsors. Today, we are able to proceed a bit further because the Conference at Geneva, which we then welcomed, has now been making slow but gradual progress throughout the past twelve months.

Indeed, a good deal has happened since the discussions here last year. Instead of speaking in general terms of the danger inherent in future testings, I should like to deal particularly with some of these new elements.
First, I will merely recall the concluding remarks made by our Minister of Foreign Affairs in the general debate on 30 September. Speaking on behalf of the Swedish Government, he said:

"It is of the utmost importance that at least the three atomic Powers reach an agreement regarding a final ban on all kinds of nuclear weapons tests. The next step should be that those States which have so far not produced any nuclear weapons adhere to the agreement. My Government wishes also to express the hope that, pending a more final agreement, the actual presently-existing ban against nuclear weapons tests will be prolonged for as long as necessary, and that it will be observed as also establishing a rule for those States which have not yet produced nuclear weapons."

(A/PV.814, p. 73).

Of the outstanding elements that warrant mention at this stage is the fact that in the course of the Geneva deliberations, mutual and sincere efforts are made to reach definitive results. I shall revert, a little later on, to one of the crucial obstacles in the way of these efforts to achieve an agreement.

There are also new materials on which we can base our evaluations of the risks involved in future tests. In Sweden, we have, since 1950, made scientific measurements of the artificial radioactivity. Carefully and continuously, in our region, we are studying the changes of the size and character of this radioactivity. In the course of our research in this field during the last year, a new potentially dangerous by-product of tests has been discovered. Thus, we have noted that particles much bigger than the usual very small ones have appeared in the fall-out. The rate of radioactivity in these particles has been proved to be so high that it signifies a deadly dose for cells coming in direct contact with these so far unknown particles.

The measurements made in my country of the effects of the large-scale tests in October of last year have shown that, given other weather conditions, we might have been exposed to a troublesome if not alarming size of fall-out in northern Sweden. The concentration of long-lived fission products had its maximum about six months after these tests. The resulting radioactivity has thereafter rapidly decreased since the tests have been stopped. Our experience confirms
observations in other countries that the fall-out comes down to earth more speedily than had been supposed earlier. This means, on the other hand, that short-lived fission products ought to receive more consideration than has been the case before.

Of the greatest interest, further, is the Summary-Analysis of the Hearings of 5-8 May 1959 held by the Special Sub-Committee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the United States Congress and printed in August of this year.

Some of the major points emerging from these hearings are the following:

First, short-lived isotopes such as strontium-89, iodine-131, barium-140, zinc-95 and others were described by several witnesses as worthy of more consideration or even potentially equal in hazard to strontium-90 and cesium-137.

Second, similarly long-lived carbon-14 was described as a potential long-term hazard from nuclear weapons tests.

Third, assuming successive cycles of testing over the next two generations or less, following the same pattern as the past five years, the predicted average concentration in bone will be about 48 strontium units. This is close enough to the maximum permissible body burden of 67 strontium units to suggest that a hazard to the world's population could result during this period.

Fourth, the biological significance of low levels of radioactivity is still largely unknown. No solution was reached on whether or not a threshold level of radiation exposure exists below which effects such as cancer and leukemia do not result.

These quotations may suffice. Given the present uncertainty in important respects, I find myself still in the same position as was stated by me in January 1957 when the Swedish delegation appealed for a moratorium in the testing. At that time I asked and I now repeat the following question:

"At a time when we know more, in what way could we undo the harm possibly done today?"
Let me return now to the present state of the Geneva negotiations. As we all know, one crucial problem is the difficulty in detecting underground weapons tests. In this connexion, I have read with the greatest interest a speech by the Honourable Hubert Humphrey in the United States Senate on 18 August of this year.

On the basis of the recommended formula that all unidentified events, the size of a 5 kilotons explosion or larger and 20 per cent of all events below 5 kilotons, should be subject to inspection, Senator Humphrey has made a calculation of the practical implications of such a formula. According to Mr. Humphrey, this means that the number of inspections in the Soviet Union would be 366 per year or roughly one inspection in the Soviet Union per day. The number of inspections to be held in the United States would only be slightly less. The Senator went on to say:

"These numbers give the impression that the inspection problem is so huge that the negotiators might just as well pack up their bags and go home because it is almost absurd to suggest that such a large number of inspections should take place."

But the Senator does not want at all that the negotiators should pack up and go home. He believes, if I have understood him correctly, in a sampling system, or sampling method. It seems to me very important to take into account what he says later in his speech about a self-enforcing system:
"Furthermore, I am sure that if the mobile inspection teams ever revealed a test which was a violation of the agreement, the agreement would be entirely ended. So there is a kind of self-enforcing apparatus." Later on he said:

"Any use of the veto" -- that is, against inspection -- "would be a warning signal at the least and the end of the agreement at the most."

I think that these observations are well worth our attention.

In the last few days there have been encouraging signs from Geneva.

In the event that, in spite of our earnest hopes, difficulties should remain, it may be of interest to note what Senator Humphrey said in a speech on 30 October. He suggested a two years' moratorium by all Powers on explosions below the 5-kiloton range. This period should be used, he said, to refine techniques for low-yield explosions without on-site inspection.

But, above all, we hope that decisive results will be achieved without any great delay during the continued negotiations in Geneva.

In the draft resolution proposed by Austria, Japan and Sweden, prohibition and appropriate control are interdependent. I have no intention of starting any dispute about adjectives when I suggest that, for us, the term "appropriate" is preferable in order to avoid unnecessary perfectionism. The view of my delegation is this: any control system ought to be regarded as effective in the degree that it is, for all practical purposes, appropriate in each specific case.

In conclusion, may I say that easy as it may be to obstruct an agreement, if only a clearly ineffective control system is accepted, it is just as easy to achieve the same negative result in asking for an unreasonably high degree of control. Even in this latter case, there would be neither ban nor control. And we need them both.

Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan): My delegation has appealed at every opportunity for the conclusion of an early agreement on the suspension, under effective international control, of nuclear and thermonuclear tests as having priority over disarmament measures. At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly my delegation co-sponsored a draft resolution which was adopted by the Assembly on 4 November 1958 (1252 (XIII)).
It is noteworthy and commendable that since the start of the negotiations on 31 October last year, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have made efforts to reach an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests with an effective international control system.

My delegation welcomed wholeheartedly the statements on 17 September of this year by the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Herter, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Lloyd. Mr. Herter stated:

"...The three Powers have agreed on a number of details which would have to be a part of a full accord, and technical agreement has been recently reached on the means of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions at high altitudes and in outer space..." (A/PV.797, p. 28)

And later Mr. Herter said:

"...Our hope is that if we allow a reasonable extension of time for the negotiations to proceed, significant progress can be made." (A/PV.797, p. 31)

Mr. Lloyd stated:

"...In spite of the remaining difficulties...I still have high hopes of an agreement which will pave the way for wider agreements." (A/PV.798, p. 17)

The three Powers have already overcome many difficulties in the course of devising a reliable and workable international control system.

My delegation, furthermore, welcomes the recent news that the Soviet Union has announced its readiness to participate in a new evaluation of the problem of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests, which was one of the central issues in the course of the negotiations, as Mr. Herter pointed out on 17 September.

As I stated on 23 October in the First Committee, the early conclusion of the negotiations on the suspension of nuclear tests is the most important one. Once we succeed on this particular issue, there will be a new horizon opened up for the solution of other major disarmament measures. The success of this key issue will contribute, on the other hand, to the creation of the political climate indispensable to further progress towards disarmament. It is earnestly desired, therefore, that the three Powers should reach an agreement on the issues which
remain unsettled and should conclude as soon as possible an agreement for the suspension of nuclear tests.

My delegation wishes to express its satisfaction in the fact that since November last year no testing of nuclear weapons has taken place in the world. This gives us a certain sense of relief from the fear of radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons which were increasing year by year up to November of last year. We hope that the three Powers will continue their present voluntary discontinuance of testing of nuclear weapons. It is our earnest desire, however, that the suspension of tests under effective control will be legally and constitutionally formalized by an international agreement.

From the points of view which I have mentioned, my delegation co-sponsored two draft resolutions, worded more or less in the same way and with the same objective: one with twenty Powers and the other with Austria and Sweden. I sincerely hope that these draft resolutions will be approved by this Committee.

Mr. Kuznetsov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): A few days ago the First Committee, having discussed the programme of general and complete disarmament submitted by the Head of the Soviet Government, Nikita S. Khrushchev, unanimously adopted a draft resolution calling upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The implementation of this programme will rule out forever from the life of human society wars and the incalculable disasters resulting from them.
It is quite understandable that negotiations on the programme of general and complete disarmament will take a certain amount of time. One would like to believe that Governments will approach this great task with full responsibility, that they will listen to the voice of the people and will not permit the solution of this vital problem to be delayed. Does this mean, however, that the consideration of urgent partial questions related to disarmament should be postponed? Of course not. On the contrary, we should constantly do everything to facilitate in every way the solution of those partial disarmament measures which brook no delay and for the successful implementation of which exist all possibilities. Acting in such a manner we shall promote the creation of more favourable conditions both for reaching an agreement between States regarding general and complete disarmament and for its practical implementation.

Among the important questions which have long become pressing, we should mention, first of all, the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. As is well known, this question directly affects vital interests of all peoples on the globe. Nuclear tests are a manifestation of the arms race in the field of creating new, ever more dreadful means of the annihilation of human beings. The cessation of tests would mean the end of the development and checking of atomic and hydrogen weapons. At the same time, it would immediately result in a significant improvement and invigoration of the international atmosphere. It would create still more favourable conditions for carrying out radical measures on disarmament, and in particular it would be an important step toward a total ban on nuclear weapons.

There is another very important aspect of this question. The carrying out of tests means that already now, in this time of peace, the life and health of millions upon millions of people in all parts of the globe are endangered by radioactive fall-out resulting from nuclear explosions. If nuclear weapons tests are not stopped, then, as we have been warned by prominent atomic scientists, biologists, doctors and geneticists, the consequences will gravely affect present and future generations.

The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which includes well-known scientists from fifteen countries, among them the
Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France, has arrived at a unanimous conclusion as to the necessity of stopping the contamination of the environment as a result of the explosions of nuclear weapons. The Committee's report submitted to the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly says in this connexion:

"Radioactive contamination of the environment resulting from explosions of nuclear weapons constitutes a growing increment of world-wide radiation levels. This involves new and largely unknown hazards to present and future populations; these hazards, by their very nature, are beyond the control of the exposed persons. The Committee concludes that all steps designed to minimize irradiation of human populations will act to the benefit of human health." (A/3838, page 41)

The Scientific Committee particularly emphasized the need in "the cessation of contamination of the environment by explosions of nuclear weapons..."

The popular movement for immediate cessation of tests has become truly universal; it has penetrated into all corners of the globe. The world public raises its powerful voice against nuclear weapons tests. This force cannot be ignored. The Soviet Government consistently comes out in favour of concluding without delay an international agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. I will recall that the Soviet Union was the first nuclear Power to put forward in 1955 a proposal on banning atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Since that time it has striven persistently for the cessation of all experiments with these weapons in any environment.

Being guided by the desire to make a practical beginning in stopping nuclear weapons tests, and thereby to take the first step toward delivering mankind from the threat of a destructive nuclear war, the Government of the Soviet Union adopted on 31 March 1958, and subsequently on 29 August 1959, the decision not to resume nuclear tests in the Soviet Union. Only in the event of the Western Powers resuming their tests will the Soviet Union consider itself freed from this obligation. If other States joined us in our initiative and assumed a similar obligation, the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests would be solved once and for all.
In connexion with the question under consideration, it is necessary to
dwell upon the work of the Geneva Conference of the three Powers, the Soviet
Union, the United States and Great Britain, the objective of which is to work out
and sign an agreement on the complete cessation of all kinds of nuclear weapons
tests under effective international control. In the course of these talks, the
three Powers reached agreement on the drafts of the preamble and seventeen
articles of the future treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. These
articles incorporate the provision to the effect that each of the parties to the
treaty undertakes to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear weapons
test explosions in any place under its jurisdiction or control, and to refrain
from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of
nuclear weapons test explosions anywhere. It is provided that the treaty will
remain in force indefinitely if, of course, its provisions are observed and
fulfilled by all parties. Agreement has been reached on questions relating to
the procedure of adopting amendments to the treaty, its ratification,
et cetera.
There have also been settled a number of questions concerning the setting up and functioning of an international system of control over the cessation of test. The USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom have agreed on the texts of the articles dealing with the establishment of the control organization to supervise the cessation of tests, the components of that organization and so forth. Agreement has been reached to the effect that parties to the treaty will undertake to allow the stationing on the territories under their jurisdiction of the control bodies recommended in the report of the 1958 Conference of Experts and to render them the necessary assistance.

I should also like to draw your attention to the fact that last summer the experts gave further consideration, taking into account the experimental data received, to the question of detecting nuclear explosions at high altitudes, which was resolved in 1958 on the basis of theoretical calculations alone. It appears from the report adopted by the experts on 10 July last that the detection of such tests is quite feasible. According to their recommendations, a control system should be set up of five to six earth satellites placed in orbit at an altitude of the order of 30,000 kilometres. The satellites are to be equipped with appropriate instrumentation to detect explosions.

The Conference has recommended as an alternative solution -- if this is considered necessary on technical or economic grounds -- that a system of earth satellites with orbits at lower altitudes should be set up. In order to receive data from the satellites, it is recommended that a number of ground control posts be equipped with the appropriate apparatus.

The work of the experts in the field of high altitudes has once again confirmed the validity of the conclusions contained in the 1958 report of the scientists which served as a basis for devising a system of control over the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

In spite of the fact that the negotiations in Geneva have been protracted -- they have already been going on for over a year -- definite progress has been achieved in the course of these negotiations. It should be hoped that in the near future these talks, which have recently been resumed after an interval, will successfully end in the signature of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapons test. All prerequisites for this are at hand. The Conference has resumed
its work under more favourable conditions owing to the visit of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikita S. Khrushchev, to the United States and to the adoption of the resolution on general and complete disarmament by the General Assembly.

What are the issues which the Geneva Conference is yet to solve? One of them is the question of staffing the control posts which are to supervise the fulfilment by States of their obligations with regard to the cessation of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union upholds the principle that the personnel of the control posts should be recruited both from the citizens of the host country and from foreigners. There is hardly any need to prove that such an approach is the most expedient and practicable in all respects. The representatives of the western Powers had long adhered to the opinion that all operational and technical personnel at the posts should be recruited only from foreigners. Some time ago they agreed to the principle proposed by the Soviet Union. Now the question is what should be the proportion of the representatives of foreign countries and the representatives of the host country in the composition of the control post personnel.

We are of the opinion that since the participants in the Geneva negotiations agreed to this principle, it will not be difficult to reach agreement on the composition of the control posts, provided this is desired by all sides. The Soviet Union is sincerely striving for this.

Neither will it be difficult, in our opinion, to come to an agreement on the procedure of adopting decisions on financial and administrative-managerial questions if, naturally, neither side seeks to obtain any privileges for itself or tries to impose its will upon others.

There actually remains at present one unsettled question on the path to reaching an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, namely the question of the number of inspection teams to be sent to the territories of States parties to the agreement to investigate events suspected of being underground nuclear explosions. I should like to dwell on this point, since it was touched upon by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries in the course of this session of the General Assembly.
As is known, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union approved the report of the experts who had worked out in Geneva in 1958 detailed recommendations regarding control over nuclear explosions. As is known, the Conference of Experts, having considered the control system for detecting violations of a possible agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, came to the conclusion that "the methods of detecting nuclear explosions available at the present time ... make it possible to detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low yield explosions (1-5 kt)". The Conference of Experts reached the conclusion that "it is technically feasible to set up ... a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of an agreement on the worldwide cessation of nuclear weapons tests".

The 1958 Conference of Experts paid great attention to detecting and identifying underground explosions. In this connexion, the report says that "the majority of earthquakes can be distinguished from explosions with a high degree of reliability ... not less than 90 per cent of all earthquakes taking place in continents can be identified. The remaining 10 per cent or less of cases will require the analysis of additional seismograms where this is possible... for those cases which remain unidentified inspection of the region will be necessary."

The Conference of Experts recommended the inclusion of the method of recording seismic waves in the number of basic methods for detecting nuclear explosions by means of a network of control posts.

The experts arrived at a firm conclusion that with the application of the above methods, "whatever the precautionary measures adopted by a violator, he could not be guaranteed against exposure, particularly if account is taken of the carrying out of inspection at the site of the suspected explosion".

The above recommendations of the experts were proved by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and, by common consent, they were taken as a basis for the control system which must constitute an integral part of the agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. It seemed that there remained no obstacles to reaching agreement and signing an appropriate document. This is how matters stood.
However, in January 1959 the United States declared its intention to review the recommendations regarding the control over underground explosions which had been made by the experts in 1958 and approved by the Governments. In this connexion reference was made to new seismic data that had been obtained. Such an explanation cannot but give rise to perplexity. It is a well-known fact that in our time, with the swift development of science and technology, there will constantly appear new scientific data and technical possibilities for perfecting control apparatus. And if each new scientific or technical development in this field is used to delay the agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, there will be no end to revisions and negotiations.

In this connexion one cannot ignore the fact that it has been agreed in Geneva that the control system will periodically be subject to consideration with a view to making appropriate changes on the basis of the achievements in science and technology. The adopted text which is to be included in the agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests stipulates that upon the expiration of two years following the coming into force of this treaty, the Commission will consider the functioning of the control system established under the treaty, in order to appraise its effectiveness in controlling the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the parties to the treaty; to determine, in the light of experience and scientific progress, whether it is desirable to effect any definite improvements in the control system or to supplement it with new elements; to examine such measures for improving or maintaining the effectiveness of the control system as may be suggested by any party to the treaty in the light of the experience acquired in the course of the implementation of the treaty.

It is also envisaged in the agreed draft that the Commission can subsequently undertake for the same purpose annual reviews of the functioning of the system at the request of the Conference or any of the original parties to the treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

Of course, this also refers to the question of control over underground explosions. If we really want to see the cessation of any nuclear weapons explosions and the conclusion of an appropriate agreement, we must approve a control system making use of present-day achievements in science and technology. It stands to reason that with the emergence of new achievements in the fields
of science and technology, corresponding changes should and will be introduced into the system of control as well. Everyone present here realizes full well that the most advanced techniques of today will tomorrow no longer be advanced; but this does not at all mean that the conclusion of agreements should be postponed pending the emergence of yet more advanced techniques. We hope that our partners in Geneva will not take this road.

Permit me, further, to dwell upon the question of the number of on-site inspections by teams to investigate events suspected of being nuclear explosions. Since January 1959 the representatives of the United States have been saying that the solution of this question requires the establishment of a ratio between the number of on-site inspections and the number of unidentified seismic events. However, it is not clear as yet what underlies this approach, since for the elaboration of such an approach it is suggested that the new seismic data and conclusions presented by the group of American experts headed by Dr. Berkner be studied. In its report to the President, the above group expressed itself in favour of carrying out, in addition to the study of the data obtained, a research programme, before a system of control over the explosions conducted under the ground may be set up. Furthermore, the group itself admits that the implementation of any suggested research programme will require at least three years and must include the carrying-out of underground explosions.

It follows from what I have said that insistence on carrying out the above-mentioned work prior to the signing of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests means that the attainment of an agreement on the cessation of tests will be postponed indefinitely. It may turn out that even the new data received in three years will be insufficient, in the opinion of those who now oppose the ban on nuclear explosions under the ground. Consequently, if one is to take this road, agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests may be postponed for any period of time.

Meanwhile, there is a simple and reliable method of solving the question of inspections.

As is known, the Soviet Government presented on 23 April of this year a proposal based on the considerations outlined by Prime Minister MacMillan during his stay in Moscow. The substance of this proposal is that the question of
inspection should be solved by establishing a fixed number, previously agreed upon among the Powers, of inspections to be carried out each year if the reports of the control posts show the presence of events which could be suspected as being underground nuclear explosions. This proposal offers a practical solution to the problem and constitutes a good basis for agreement. According to scientists, the principle of selective inspection is widely used in different fields and has fully justified itself.

Undoubtedly, it would be possible to agree upon a number of inspections that would fully guarantee the possibility of detecting a violation of the agreement. The achievement of such an understanding would restrain the countries which might be tempted to violate the treaty and to conduct nuclear explosions in secret. The carrying-out of a fixed number of on-the-spot inspections will have a sobering effect on those Governments which might be inclined to conduct secret underground tests of nuclear weapons.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Nikita S. Khrushchev, stated on 15 May of this year that on its part the Soviet Government, on this basis, "is ready to assume an obligation guaranteeing a timely and unhindered admittance of inspection teams to the region on the territory of the Soviet Union where the event suspected as a nuclear explosion has been observed and where the side concerned has manifested its desire to send such teams".

With due account of the experience of the functioning of the control system, the question of the number of inspections could be periodically reviewed, as is envisaged in the draft agreement.

If in fixing the inspection quota we take another road and try to establish a sort of proportion between the number of inspections and the number of unidentified events, this can lead us only into impenetrable jungles and divert attention from the substance of the problem.

The Soviet Union has never been opposed to considering and taking into account new scientific and technical data which tend to increase the efficiency of the control system. In particular, it did not oppose, as certain speakers tried to assert here, the consideration of new seismic data obtained in the United States.
I recall in this connexion that in February 1959, with reference to the United States proposal that the data and conclusions on underground explosions obtained by American scientists should be examined, the USSR made the following statement:

"The Soviet Government will instruct its scientists to study these conclusions thoroughly as soon as they are received. However, this should not influence in any way the work of the Geneva Conference in working out a system of control based, as was previously agreed upon, on the report of the conference of experts approved by the Governments of the USSR, the United States of America and Britain."

Throughout the whole course of the negotiations, the Soviet delegation has been exploring avenues for bringing the positions of the sides closer together, and it continues to do so.

Guided by the desire to remove the remaining differences on the question of control of underground explosions, including on-site inspections, and taking into account the desires of its partners in the Geneva negotiations, the Soviet Union proposed the convocation of a technical working group to consider the data relating to these questions and to prepare appropriate recommendations. The Soviet side proposed that the working group, proceeding from the discussions and conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts, examine within a short period of time new scientific data relating to the detection and identification of seismic events as well as the possible improvement of technical methods and instrumentation. The technical group must, on the basis of the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of Experts and taking into account the examination of the new data, work out the instructions determining the complex of readings of the instruments that would serve as a basis for despatching agreed on-site inspections.

We hope that the participants in the Geneva Conference will in the near future agree on the objectives, programme and time limits of the work of the technical group.

Permit me to express the hope that our partners will also, on their part, display a willingness to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the questions which require agreement.
All peoples are following with close attention the negotiations taking place in Geneva. Also quite understandable is the interest shown in this vital question by the United Nations. The Organization can and must say its weighty word in favour of the speedy conclusion of an international agreement on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests for all time. The duty of the General Assembly is to raise its voice in favour of having all participants in the Geneva conference mobilize their efforts and complete their negotiations within the shortest possible time by signing of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

The General Assembly must also call upon all States not to resume nuclear weapons tests while the agreement on the cessation of test explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs for all time is being negotiated. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has stated that it will not resume nuclear explosions provided that the Western Powers likewise refrain from doing so.

In conclusion, permit me to assure the Committee that the USSR, as a country participating in the negotiations between the three Powers in Geneva, and being guided by the interests of all mankind and sincerely striving for the success of the Conference, will make every effort to see that an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests -- in the air, underground, underwater and on the ground -- is concluded as soon as possible. It would be an important step toward saving the peoples from the threat of a destructive nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of the United States, who has asked for the floor to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. LIEGE (United States of America): I should like to make a few brief remarks under my right of reply.

The representative of the Soviet Union said that the insistence of the United States on the further study of the scientific data relating to the detection of underground tests "means that the attainment of an agreement on the cessation of tests will be postponed indefinitely". (Supra, page 47)
I really think that calls for a few words of reply from me, and I should like to say that the United States is definitely not dragging its feet. We are anxious to complete agreement on a treaty regarding the cessation of nuclear weapons tests just as soon as the Soviet Union agrees on an effective international control system.

We welcome the recent agreement of the Soviet Union, after it refused for several months to examine the scientific data, to discuss the technical data relating to underground tests. At this very moment, our representatives in Geneva are working out the basis for discussions on this subject. We expect these discussions to succeed. The moment the work is completed, there need be no delay in moving on to the translation of the findings into the provisions of the treaty.

The Soviet representative has continued to maintain today that the number of inspections should be fixed without reference to the scientific facts. This is hard to understand, I must admit. One can only speculate as to the motive for rejecting the idea that inspection should be related to the number of unidentified events.

Mr. Sulaiman (Iraq): I should like in a few words to state the position of my delegation with regard to the draft resolutions before us.

In the last few weeks, this Committee has adopted three resolutions related to one another and to the subject of the present draft resolutions. In the last operative paragraph of the resolution on general and complete disarmament, sponsored by all the Members of this Organization, the hope was expressed that "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time." In the opinion of my delegation, one of these measures is the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. The decision of the three atomic Powers to suspend such tests was welcomed by all of us as a practical step toward a final agreement on the total cessation of tests.

Many of the preambular paragraphs of the Afro-Asian and the Irish resolutions brought before this Committee, and adopted by it, were nearly identical with those contained in the draft resolution submitted by the twenty-three Powers.
Throughout the discussions on all the subjects relating to disarmament, the deep concern over the dangers and hazards of nuclear tests, and the call for all States possessing nuclear weapons or capable of producing them to refrain from further tests, was repeatedly emphasized. The first paragraph of the Irish resolution, adopted by this Committee by a great majority, particularly stressed that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons might aggravate the international tension and thus endanger peace, rendering more difficult the attainment of a general disarmament agreement.

In the opinion of my delegation, the operative paragraphs of the twenty-three-Power draft resolution fully reflect, and are in harmony with, the desires of the peoples of the world as expressed during our deliberations.

In my statement during the discussion on general and complete disarmament, I stated that we unreservedly support any measure that would lead to the maintenance of peace and the elimination of the means and possibilities of war. Hence my delegation has co-sponsored both the draft resolution on general and complete disarmament and the draft resolution on the question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara. We also supported the draft resolution on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, submitted by Ireland.

In the light of the foregoing remarks, my delegation has co-sponsored the draft resolution presented by the Indian delegation.

In the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden, no mention is made of other Powers capable of producing and testing nuclear weapons. Consequently we regret not being able to vote for that draft resolution.

Mr. QUAISSON-SACKEY (Ghana): In my statement during the debate on the question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara I set out very clearly and in detail the views of my delegation on the general question of the suspension of nuclear tests. I shall therefore address myself very briefly to the two draft resolutions on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, in response to the Chairman's appeal.
The testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is today a source of great anxiety and doubt in the minds of millions of people the whole world over. Furthermore, it is an aspect of disarmament which seems to provide a starting point from which relatively quick results may be achieved. Stop nuclear and thermonuclear tests and you have a firm basis on which to proceed to carry out disarmament. It is the view of my delegation that, if agreement to suspend and finally to discontinue the testing of nuclear weapons is achieved, the whole atmosphere with regard to the question of complete disarmament will be so improved that negotiations towards the achievement of a disarmament agreement will be made much easier.

The substance of the draft resolution before us now has at one time or other been supported, in principle, by this Committee since the whole question of nuclear weapons became an issue of this Assembly. If there is any question which has been fully debated here in all its aspects, it is the testing of nuclear weapons. All of us recognize that there are increasing hazards resulting from nuclear tests, and we know the concern of many peoples regarding such tests. If I may say so, this concern was expressed in no uncertain terms by the majority of this Committee when we were discussing the question of nuclear tests in the Sahara.

Against this background, my delegation views with very great hope the discussions that are going on at Geneva between the nuclear Powers to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, and my delegation would like to express to the participants in these negotiations its very best wishes for the success of their endeavours. We also hope that, while these discussions are proceeding, the States concerned will continue their present voluntary suspension of nuclear tests. But the whole effort at Geneva would be hampered and, in fact, sabotaged, if, while these discussions are continuing and while nuclear tests have been suspended in the meantime by the three Powers concerned, tests are conducted by other countries not at present participating in the negotiations. That is why it is so important that while these discussions are proceeding, and while there is hope that an agreement will be reached, the General Assembly should appeal to all States everywhere to refrain from nuclear tests and thus help those actually participating in these discussions to arrive at some mutually acceptable agreement, beneficial to mankind.
Ghana is co-sponsoring this draft resolution (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1) because of the great hope we entertain that something good will come out of the Geneva talks, and we sincerely hope that representatives on this Committee will see their way clear to support this draft resolution in the spirit in which the draft resolution on disarmament was unanimously adopted at the beginning of our work. This draft resolution (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1) is an urgent appeal, and my delegation hopes that it is an appeal which will not fall on deaf ears. Let there be peace on earth in our time and goodwill among men.

Mr. Pahiwak (Afghanistan): On behalf of the Afghan delegation, I wish to state briefly the position of my delegation on the question before the Committee. The representative of India has presented a joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1), and my country has co-sponsored this draft resolution. We do not wish to repeat what has already been said in the discussion of almost all the disarmament items on this question which is now before the Committee. We do not want to repeat what we ourselves have said as to the importance, the essentiality and the urgency of the steps which should particularly be taken in the field of the cessation of nuclear tests.

At this stage we should like first of all to pay a warm tribute to the delegation of India for the initiative that it has taken in this field, an initiative which from the start has been taken with our approval and which has led us to co-sponsor the joint draft resolution in its first form and also in the revised form which is now before the Committee.

To explain further the reason for our co-sponsoring this draft resolution, we should like to say first that we wish to give once again expression to our own profound concern, and that of all other peoples of the world, over the testing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons; secondly, we wish to give expression to our appreciation to the nuclear Powers and also to pay a warm tribute to them for their positive answer to the desire of the people of the world by voluntarily suspending such tests; and, thirdly, we should like to express once again the sense of urgency with which the question of the cessation of tests under effective and international control should be dealt with.
In co-sponsoring the draft resolution, we have joined without hesitation in the appeal to the States concerned in the Geneva discussions to continue their present voluntary suspension of tests and to other States to desist from such tests. We should have expected all Members of the United Nations to join in this appeal, in the same language common to all of them, being derived from the common desire of the people of the world, and to give a strong expression to the universal desire of mankind.
We have also considered the other draft resolution which has been submitted by the delegations of Austria, Japan and Sweden (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1). We have listened carefully to the representative of Sweden this morning, and we understand their intention to secure wider support by wording slightly differently the desire which would lead to a resolution of the General Assembly. But we are not convinced that it will be a satisfactory step if one calls upon those countries who have voluntarily suspended nuclear tests to continue the suspension and not to ask other States to desist from such tests.

As to the argument that this idea has been covered by other resolutions, we would like to say that it is in fact to a great extent an outcome of the order of the discussion of the different items which has given rise to this argument. Otherwise, the idea in the general appeal to all countries has its most proper place in this draft resolution which is dealing with the general appeal to all countries; and specifically with the general problem of suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, with a view to their complete cessation.

Before concluding, we should like to express our appreciation to the delegation of Japan for its understanding of the joint draft resolution in A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1 and thus deciding to co-sponsor this draft resolution. We do not only hope that this draft resolution will be met with the unanimous approval of the members of the Committee, but also that it will serve its real purpose by being met with the approval of the States to accept the appeal made to them by reaching an agreement on complete cessation of tests, and also by the approval of all other countries by desisting from carrying out such tests.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Since there are no other speakers on the list for this item, we have to consider the question whether this Committee can meet this afternoon. I hope that other members are prepared to speak in the debate this afternoon because of the urgency of completing this item, and the other items on the agenda, as soon as possible. Are there any speakers for this afternoon?

Since there are no speakers for this afternoon, I shall regretfully be obliged to cancel this afternoon's meeting.
To assist in the planning of our work, however, the Chair considers it essential to set up a list of speakers. Therefore, if there is no objection from the Committee, I believe we should close the list of speakers tomorrow at 12 o'clock on this item. Assuming that there will be speakers, I shall reconvene the Committee for tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.