VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE THOUSAND AND FIFTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 16 November 1959, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. MATSCH (Austria)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons [67]
(continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e. the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.1056. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.

59-61689
PREVENTION OF THE WIDER DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (A/4125; A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2) (continued)

Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation, in approaching the consideration of the item entitled "Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons", submitted to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly by the delegation of Ireland, bears in mind especially the fact that the most urgent task at present is the carrying out of general and complete disarmament.

The implementation of the proposals of the Government of the USSR for general and complete disarmament, which recently received the unequivocal support and approval of all Member States of the United Nations through the resolution adopted unanimously by our Committee on 2 November 1959, would in itself solve the basic question of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear armaments and weapons as envisaged by the Irish proposal.

Before I present my delegation's comments on the Irish draft resolution, I wish to draw attention to several serious circumstances which have a direct bearing on the problem of the wider dissemination of nuclear armaments and weapons.

The danger of a nuclear war, which today looms over mankind, emerges first of all from the fact that some member States of NATO have not ceased to regard the weapons of mass destruction as a basis of their post war policy and military strategy. Therefore, they continue to produce ever more numerous series of nuclear and rocket weapons; they equip their armed forces at home and at overseas bases with these weapons and impose them upon their allies in military alignments. For these reasons, and not because they would need such weapons for their defence, a ban on such weapons has been persistently rejected and the elimination of these weapons from the armaments of all States has been constantly opposed by these Powers. The situation that now prevails is even more alarming because nuclear armaments and weapons are being spread to new States as a result of the intensified pressure on member States of NATO brought to bear by the NATO Command, which forces them to introduce nuclear and rocket weapons for use in their armies.
The peace of Europe and of the entire world is also seriously endangered by the development of nuclear and rocket armaments in the German Federal Republic. The West German Bundeswehr is carrying out a reorganization so as to be ready to wage a nuclear war, and its nuclear armament is to be completed by 1961. The Government of the German Federal Republic is doing all it can to build for itself its own technical basis for the production of nuclear and rocket weapons and for that purpose it has collaborated with some of the member States of NATO.

The existence of war bases and the location of forces equipped with nuclear and rocket weapons on foreign territory constitute a grave danger for international peace and a permanent potential hotbed of war conflict, even though the development of military technology in the last few years has considerably weakened the original importance of these bases as military and strategic points.

The danger of a nuclear war is increased enormously by the ever growing number of States striving to start their own production of nuclear weapons. The efforts of the Government of the German Federal Republic have already been mentioned. As is very well known, France is making every effort at present to carry out the testing of its own atomic weapons in the Sahara. Reports appearing in the United States Press estimate that at present, in addition to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, at least another twelve countries possess perfect technical, economic and scientific resources and power to enable them to commence their own production of nuclear weapons in about five years.

This situation makes it completely comprehensible that the pressure of nations for liquidating the danger of a nuclear war which emanates from the continuing nuclear armaments is growing stronger and stronger day by day.

The way towards a radical elimination of the danger emanating from the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons is outlined in the proposals of the Government of the Soviet Union for general and complete disarmament, which in the field of nuclear weapons envisage

"complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, discontinuance of the production of all types of these weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States and destruction of stockpiles of these weapons."
The Soviet proposals also contain provisions on the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory and all rocket-launching installations.

The proposals of the Government of Ireland, on the other hand, contained in the draft resolution of Ireland (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.3), do not -- as was also stressed by some of the speakers this morning -- envisage effective steps to be taken for the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The adoption of these Irish proposals would give rise to fallacious illusions, and the danger of annular war would not in fact be eliminated.

The draft resolution of Ireland bears in mind only measures that serve the purpose of preventing a further increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, be it through the acquiring of nuclear weapons from other States, through the development of their own production or, finally, through the establishment of their production of nuclear weapons with the assistance of other States.

The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Ireland does not contain a single reference to the basic demand to effect the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States. For example, the draft resolution of Ireland entirely disregards the question of the existence of military bases equipped with rocket and nuclear weapons and the stationing of armed forces on foreign territories, which increase enormously the danger of a nuclear war. It does not benefit the cause of the peace and security of nations if these bases are equipped with ever newer and at the same time more destructive types of rocket and nuclear weapons.

Similarly, the draft resolution of Ireland has no regard for the issue concerning the establishment of rocket-and-atom-free zones in the world, which, in the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, would constitute a greatly significant means for preventing the further spreading of rocket and nuclear weapons on the globe and for attaining the relaxation of international tension. Here I have in mind the well known proposals for the establishment of atom-free zones in Central Europe, in the Balkans and the area of the Adriatic Sea, in the area of the Baltic Sea, in the Far East and in other parts of the world, as well as commitments of Powers to respect these zones in the event of conflict.
With regard to the establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe, as brought forward in the well-known proposal of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, the Government of Czechoslovakia has announced more than once in the past that it was fully agreeable to accepting the relevant commitments if these would be shared also by the Government of the Federal German Republic.

The Czechoslovak Government, endeavouring within the limits of its possibilities to contribute to the easing of international tension and to the averting of the threat of war, has always upheld and will further support all measures conducive towards the promotion of peace in the world. That is why it also fully adheres to the proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on general and complete disarmament, which would accomplish the termination of the feverish armaments race and which would for ever deliver mankind from the threat of war. That is why it favours the implementation of partial disarmament measures and the universal prohibition of nuclear weapons in the first place.

In the opinion of the Czechoslovak Government, it would be useful, until such time as general and complete disarmament is effected, to take some effective steps to liquidate any further increase of the danger resulting from the wider expansion of nuclear equipment and weapons. In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, any such measures must lead in the first place to the following objectives: firstly, the atomic Powers should not station their units equipped with nuclear weapons on foreign territories, and in cases where this has already occurred, they should be withdrawn without delay to their own territories; secondly, the Powers possessing nuclear weapons should not supply these weapons to other States and should not make any arrangements which would be helpful to the introduction of their production in other States; and, thirdly, the States should unite their efforts towards the establishment of nuclear and rocket-free zones in various parts of the world. The Powers possessing nuclear weapons should guarantee the integrity of such zones.

Such measures, in the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, could really be conducive to the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The proposal presented by the delegation of Ireland, however, would not ensure the satisfactory implementation of this objective. In view of the fact that the Irish draft resolution does not propose fully effective measures for the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, this draft cannot receive the support of the Czechoslovak delegation.
Mr. de LEQUERICA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation has closely studied the draft resolution submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, and we have approached this draft resolution with great sympathy and high consideration. Who can fail to have sympathy with an endeavour, whether or not it proves effective, to prevent the possible destruction which might follow in the wake of these nuclear weapons and which might be bestowed upon all peoples? Perhaps we would be guilty of following illusions if we focussed our attention merely on arms and weapons, as if all evils flowed only from them. There have been many different kinds of weapons in past history, and many of the wars in which they were used are mentioned in the great literature of the world. Stones were first used and then primitive war implements. Later, bullets were used so that the ambitions of some might be followed along the course of war. Thus, rather than averting or avoiding the harms caused by weapons which are contemporary, our efforts might better be directed towards reducing the spirit of warfare, combat and aggression in all men and to seek for reasons to live in peace. But that is a difficult dream to realize.

That is why, faced with a proposal such as that submitted by the Irish delegation, it is necessary to consider whether such a draft resolution has any possibility of being effectively implemented. If it clearly does not have any such possibilities, or if it falls within the general framework of studies to reduce the danger of war, to which our Assembly and its Committees have been dedicated, then we should meditate upon the advisability of a repetition of these generous motives and purposes which have little probability of producing any practical results. The noblest and most high-flown concepts are wasted if attempts are made to turn them into reality and if absolutely nothing can be attained in the way of positive results. If organs such as ours follow this course, the United Nations, whose executive powers are limited, might well be led into an excessive proliferation of generous proposals, almost inevitably followed by resistance from the powerful to whom they are directed.

In other words, we cannot spend our lives predicking peace, disarmament, fraternity and brotherhood unless we have a positive vision of what the peoples involved can actually perform in this connexion and unless we know whether they are prepared fully to engage in peace and disarmament. We cannot simply engage in noble and eloquent rhetoric, the effectiveness of which will be lost if we see a pure sphere of speculation, impossible of achievement in all its elements.
That does not mean that we are reluctant to give our support to proposals such as that submitted by the Irish delegation. But we do wish to recommend a certain degree of caution in order to avoid any disappointment and any waste of our own power, weight and authority before the universal conscience. We should not be unduly prodigal in such endeavours unless we have some hope of being effective and unless we can follow them through.

It may be that even these powerful weapons which today, because of their cost are reserved to the great national entities which have the means for their production, will not require such great economic resources and thus will fall within the grasp of those who do not have the tremendous budgets of the powerful nations or of those who endeavour to follow in their footsteps.
I anticipated this point very briefly in a statement made in the general debate in 1957, at which point I said:

"At present these techniques are still in the hands of the great Powers, which can reach agreement among themselves. We can all work to find solutions and to avert destruction and hope has not been lost. Nevertheless we may well tremble at the prospect of the continued advance of science, which is likely to place the means of destruction within the grasp of the individual. Why not? Other secret and obscure formulae in the field of applied science finally become available to the individual.

"Tomorrow men may be able to manipulate practically unlimited means of destruction and to employ them with their own hands. Private pharmacies and laboratories may be able to produce substances with frightful effects. Individuals will also be able to use small atomic devices. I can imagine, in dark moments, that in fifty years' time some chemist in Andorra -- and I deliberately choose that peaceful and pastoral little country, nestling in the Pyrenees between France and Spain -- will be able with the mixtures and devices available to him, to launch from the roof of his house waves of destruction which will wipe out Paris, London, Lisbon, Madrid, Rabat and Rome. This is not nonsensical, nor does the demented act of my imaginary Andorran chemist lie outside the diabolical possibilities of scientific progress." (Official Records, United Nations General Assembly, twelfth session, A/PV.699, paras. 7 and 8)

Before so terrible and fearful a future as this, I fear that simple exhortations will not prove sufficient and, as has already been said previously, to continue to utter them would be just as useless. A distinguished North American prelate, Monseigneur Fulton Sheen, has just written against atomic war, saying that such a nuclear war is not justifiable because its violence would go far beyond human control and because it is not a legitimate defence against any injustice, but represents only pure and simple destruction of human life because a war which would cause 50 million casualties would cause greater harm than any injustice whatsoever, and that would be preferable if the damage caused by the war would not be proportionate to the injustice.
But Monseigneur Fulton Sheen asks himself if it was possible to send atomic weapons to contain or frighten another nation and in this way to avert war. To this he replied that it was not possible except in a very limited degree. He wrote:

"There is no doubt that a conventional weapon can, in the kitchen, keep chicken thieves away from the chicken coop."

To this effect, we have already pointed out that when we spoke last year we felt that it was not an edifying spectacle to have a prior declaration of impotence on disarmament made by our countries.

Very little or almost nothing can result in the general advance in the problem of peace and war, and even very little concrete effect will be had on armaments. If these results are not going to be attained, we might as well reflect on the matter further. We ought to say to the powerful: Undertake the negotiations which the nations which at present without the means of producing contemporary weapons have asked, and renounce forever such purposes, become countries to encourage all mankind, so that the countries on the sidelines can cheer or criticize, like spectators in a football game. This would be the role of those not having the means of destruction. I confess that this view of the picture is a disagreeable one. Here we have been discussing the proposal for atomic rearmament on the part of one illustrious nation. Many opinions have been expressed here, and there has been respect and consideration for those who, in a world open to competition between various States, wish to maintain their dignity and their might so that their rights may be respected whenever the question arises. If the eighty-two nations represented here all had atomic weapons, perhaps they would be more industrious in carrying out negotiations to reduce the level of armaments.

However, I wish to be optimistic and to think that juridical values and ideas would lose nothing, for I do not believe that these can be the patrimony of half a dozen Powers, but are rather a spiritual behest granted to all mankind. Much has been made of the desire of some nations not to communicate their atomic secrets to other nations. While the motives and causes for war and for preparing for war still exist, or while it is necessary in peace to prepare for war, nations will not communicate these secrets. Our simple and symbolic request would have very little
value or worth indeed before the exigencies and requirements which lead them
to the conciliation of nations, since these nations are governed by practical
considerations or imperative ideals which we do not believe the peoples of
the world can renounce. But they will reach the goal by another means, they will
get there by a more decent and enlightened proposal from the people than by the
previous renunciation of those who have nothing to renounce, as unnecessary
tribute to those who up to now had everything in this regard.

In view of the fact that the proposal of the Irish delegation is only
intended for the Committee of Ten, it is quite natural for our Committee to
take up this point of view and also quite natural that there would be no objection
against this draft resolution here, even though we vote in favour of this draft
resolution with some scepticism, as we have pointed out.

**Mr. TARABANOV** (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): The question
raised by the delegation of Ireland concerning measures to be taken for the
prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons has found a favourable
echo and has commanded support in world public opinion. The sincere and
ardent desire of the people is to live in peace and to avoid a catastrophe of
a new world war which threatens mankind because of the armaments race and because
of the development of new weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.

Under the increasing pressure of the peoples of the entire world, and thanks
to the persistent efforts of the countries committed to a policy of peace and
peaceful coexistence between States, a relaxation in international tensions has
lately occurred. This has come about because some progress has been registered,
although it is modest progress, in the negotiations on disarmament.

Tangible expression of the wishes of the peoples to have nuclear weapons
eliminated from sensitive areas, to have a world exempt from all nuclear
weapons, has been noted in our debates.

It is true that throughout the debates on general and complete disarmament,
on the basis of proposals made by the Soviet Union, results were achieved which
were unprecedented in the annals of our debates on disarmament -- that is, a
unanimous vote on a resolution co-sponsored by all the countries represented in
our Organization.
In the course of this debate, some representatives came out against partial disarmament measures, against regional disarmament measures, under the specious pretext that security, as they put it, was indivisible.

The Government of the Peoples' Republic of Bulgaria, which is committed to a policy of peace and friendship with all nations, has repeatedly declared that pending the achievement of a concrete agreement on general and complete disarmament which would make it possible for the peoples to live without fear for the morrow, would be prepared to support any effort taken on a regional scale designed to secure better understanding among the peoples in the solution of controversial questions between States, as well as the elimination of nuclear weapons from limited areas.

In the fulfilment of its policy of peace, the Bulgarian Government has consistently supported all proposals designed to arrive at agreement on disarmament. For example, it has taken a stand in favour of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; it has come out in favour of the cessation of nuclear tests; it has come out in favour of the reduction of conventional weapons.
With a view to contributing concretely and practically to the achievement of this end, the Bulgarian Government has spared no effort, within the limit of its capacities, to help create an atmosphere of reduction of tension and co-operation between the Balkan countries. On a number of occasions, it has urged efforts for the solution of certain problems. It has associated itself, along with other Balkan Governments, in proposals for the creation of a denuclearized zone in the Balkans which would eliminate nuclear weapons from that part of the world.

The proposal made by the Irish delegation is additional proof of the fact that world public opinion is greatly interested, pending achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament, in measures for the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons since such dissemination would most likely increase difficulties on the path to the achievement of a general agreement on disarmament. It is to be noted, however, that the content of the Irish proposal, as it has been explained to us in the speech of the Foreign Secretary of Ireland, fails to cover the item under discussion.

The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2) proposed by Ireland and the explanations given orally make it clear that the proposal does not deal with cases where nuclear weapons are transferred by a producing country to the territory of an ally, so long as the key to these weapons, the control over these weapons, remains in the hands of the country which has produced them. This, according to the explanations given, would constitute a certain guarantee against the expansion of the danger of war. We were told that this would be a guarantee for the maintenance of peace. But the fact is that military bases on foreign territory would be allowed to possess nuclear weapons, since the key to these weapons would remain in the hands of the producing countries. More than that, one may infer from these explanations that the transfer of nuclear weapons to other countries may be continued provided control were retained by the Power that has produced those weapons.

Consequently, nuclear bases on foreign territory not only would not be eliminated, but, on the contrary, the door would be opened wide in the future for the construction of additional military bases with nuclear weapons on foreign territories.
It is our opinion that this Organization should never shoulder such responsibility albeit indirectly. It is the task of this Organization to work for effective disarmament, for the elimination of nuclear weapons, instead of encouraging or abetting the transfer and dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form. There ought to be a prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons by any additional countries, with control over their territory. But it would be strange for control to be instituted on the territory of countries that do not produce nuclear weapons without arriving at any agreement on certain aspects of the disarmament problem.

Would this not be tantamount to fulfilling the dream of some circles to organize control over foreign territories before and even without arriving at any agreement on disarmament, not even on some of the aspects of disarmament? What is more important, and perhaps more disturbing in this proposal, is that the control envisaged would apply to the production of new fissile materials, a proposal already advanced a number of years ago by the Western countries.

This proposal of the Western Powers was regarded as unacceptable because instead of resulting in real disarmament by prohibiting the production and use of nuclear weapons, it would seek to apply control to newly-produced fissile materials only, leaving the possibility wide open for the production of new nuclear weapons with existing fissile materials. This in fact would still make it possible to perfect and develop nuclear weapons further. By instituting control over fissile materials in countries that do not produce nuclear weapons, the Irish proposal would introduce, through the back door, the old proposals of the Western Powers which have been repudiated by practice and common sense as well.

By its vote on the proposal in connexion with the Soviet item on general and complete disarmament, the First Committee unanimously recognized that simple and comprehensible proposals not only are the best to lead us along the path to disarmament, but are at the same time the most effective ones for the restoration of confidence between States.

It appears from the explanations offered here by the Irish delegation that the proposal concerning control to be organized on this basis would also seek to stop the transfer of nuclear weapons from certain Powers to their allies.
According to the sponsors of this proposal, it would be difficult to effect illegal transfers without incurring the risk of being exposed before world public opinion. It should be noted that currently, in view of the developments in technology, it is not easy to transfer secretly an atomic installation from one country to another. That is not the real danger. The real danger is the overt transfer which is taking place in the sight of the world. The real danger is in the insistence of some Powers in seeking to convince their allies that they should accept the emplacement of nuclear weapons on their territories.

It is our impression that the Irish proposal may breed dangerous delusions among the peoples that real disarmament was being engaged in, whereas, in reality, this proposal hardly touches the surface. It does not tackle the base of the problem, the foundations of the problem. To create this impression would be tantamount to immobilizing world public opinion which, as others have previously emphasized, constitutes a particularly important factor in the campaign for genuine disarmament. It would mean pacifying the fears and the apprehensions of the peoples by getting them to believe that genuine progress is being achieved on the path to actual disarmament.

We would have wished that the doubts and misgivings to which this proposal is subject, since it proceeds from the praiseworthy idea of preventing dissemination of nuclear weapons, should have been dispelled so as to make it possible for the draft resolution to pave the way to genuine progress on the path to disarmament.

In so far as this is not the case, my delegation is unable to support this proposal and will be unable to vote for it.

Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): We welcome the initiative of the Government and delegation of Ireland in bringing up before this Assembly once again the question of prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear tests. The importance of this question can never be over-emphasized in the present-day world in which the issue of war or peace itself could depend on a mere accident in the transportation of nuclear weapons. It will be agreed by all that the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons will accordingly increase the risks of a nuclear war, apart from multiplying the chances of war by accident.
The vote of 37 to none last year in favour of the first preambular paragraph of the present draft resolution was a proof of the recognition by world public opinion of the danger of an increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons.

In the event of failure to reach a timely agreement on the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, the additions to the list of the Powers possessing nuclear weapons may not only bring about a change in the existing pattern of international and regional politics, but may also upset the precarious balance of destructive weapons and forces which has at least made possible the uneasy peace of the post-war years. This peace has been a very uneasy one and I think that it is always rewarding to emphasize this particular character of the kind of peace we have had. It has at best implied an absence of a shooting war, although sometimes not even that. We live in a world in which two great military power blocs armed with the latest weapons of death and destruction, capable of totally destroying human civilization itself, face each other across a deep gulf of fear and mistrust as well as ideological antagonisms heightened by world-wide diplomacy and propaganda efforts. We have got used to this kind of situation, however dangerous it may be, and have even evolved techniques, however imperfect and uncertain, to cope with it. But for the new kind of risks and dangers entailed in the wider use and distribution of nuclear weapons, not only have we not been able to evolve an adequate technique to date, but we are, truly speaking, not even fully aware of the magnitude and extent of the dangers themselves. The present relations between the two power blocs are, unfortunately, such as to make them easily ignore the risks and dangers flowing from the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

With the passage of time, there is every likelihood of there being further additions to the list of nuclear Powers. Many countries, including China, Japan, Sweden and India, are said to have the potentiality for manufacturing atomic weapons. The failure to reach a timely agreement on this matter may eventually lead every country to undertake the manufacture of these nuclear weapons in the interests of their own security and defence. The temptation to enter the exclusive nuclear club, for any Member State under those circumstances, cannot be ignored, as was evidenced by the competition noted among the present nuclear Powers themselves.
before all of them possessed these weapons. We all know that the United States was the first to possess the nuclear weapon, to be joined successively by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

Many others might become nuclear Powers in due course, but the fact is that the possession of these weapons by a greater number of countries increases the difficulty of maintaining world peace and, at the same time, increases the chances and risks of nuclear war.

One cannot visualize the situation resulting from the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons more vividly than in the words of Mr. Aiken, the Foreign Minister of Ireland. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to quote from his opening statement on the subject in this Committee:

"I greatly fear that we are now on the edge of a slippery slope: that before long, if we do not check this disastrous progress, the momentum acquired will be such that it will be beyond any human power to halt the increasingly rapid descent towards destruction. It would be a piece of tragic irony indeed if this descent towards destruction through the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons were to begin at the very moment when humanity's hopes are high because of the unanimity in this Organization on the need for controlled disarmament." (A/C.1/PV.1054, p. 16)

Before I conclude I should like briefly to express my delegation's opinion on the question of the difficulty of installing a system of inspection to detect the violation of an agreement on such a matter as this. In our view, the difficulties entailed by the installation of an inspection system in this case will not be as great as in the matter of installing the system of inspection envisaged by an agreement on total nuclear disarmament. No inspection system, of course, can be fool-proof and certain risks have to be taken, even in accepting these agreements on inspection themselves. But our contention is that the risks involved in the acceptance of an inspection system for supervising agreements on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons will be considerably less than those entailed by the acceptance of an inspection system needed for other nuclear disarmament measures.

I have tried to outline as briefly as possible the attitude of my delegation to the subject before us. The Irish draft resolution fits in very well with our approach and, therefore, we shall support it.
Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): In his very clear statement introducing the draft resolution on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, the Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, recalled that last year thirty-seven delegations voted in favour of the first clause in the draft resolution which was then submitted by the delegation of Ireland, and that paragraph was similar to the pertinent paragraph in the draft resolution now before us. It recognized the danger in the increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. The delegation of Venezuela was among those thirty-seven delegations, and this year we shall stand on the position which we took at that time and which was summarized in a statement which I made before this Committee on 31 October 1958. I said:

"We shall vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Ireland in A/C.1/L.206 because we feel that it complements the measures to be taken to reduce the danger of atomic warfare since it recommends a study of one of the important aspects of the problem, which is the ever-increasing dissemination and distribution of nuclear weapons." (A/C.1/PV.970, p. 31)

For these same reasons my delegation will now vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Ireland in A/C.1/L.235/Rev.3.

Mr. LOUFFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly my delegation voted in favour of the second paragraph of the draft resolution then submitted by the delegation of Ireland. We took that position because we considered that there was real danger in the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The paragraph was adopted at that time by a large majority -- in fact, no delegation voted against it.
The Irish delegation today presents a revised draft resolution, A/C.1/L.235, Rev. 3, which, in our opinion, is procedural in character since it asks the ten-nation disarmament committee to study this question and report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. This is clear from the text of the resolution and also from the explanations given by the Foreign Secretary of Ireland, who in his speech of 13 November specified that what he suggests at the moment is that a study should be made; then he expressed the hope, of course, that this study would be followed by agreement on the question.

My delegation is not unaware of the fact that this question has delicate implications in that the manner of tackling and studying it is not a simple one. It may in fact raise burning issues. I do not for a moment wish to enter into this consideration. However, my delegation will vote for the draft resolution, and it hopes that the result of the fruitful study of this question by the ten-Power Committee will come to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, as the draft resolution submitted by Ireland provides. My delegation can only congratulate Ireland for the useful initiative which it has sponsored.

Mr. WEI (China): My delegation appreciates the motives that prompted the Irish Government in proposing the present item on our agenda. We are grateful to the Foreign Minister of Ireland for his able and lucid presentation of the nature of the problem and the objective of the Irish proposal. We agree that the most urgent problem is how to realize nuclear disarmament in a programme of general disarmament with effective international control. We further agree that without international agreement on nuclear disarmament there will be the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more countries of the world.

However, we are not yet convinced as to the practicability and feasibility of any attempt to limit possession of nuclear weapons to a given number of countries. We wish to reserve our decision on the substance of the question, but we have no objection to a procedural study. We do have serious doubts about the wisdom of the General Assembly asking the ten-nation committee to consider the feasibility of the Irish proposal. We all know that the ten-nation committee is not an organ of the United Nations and that it is not a representative body. Therefore, in spite of the praiseworthy spirit of the Irish proposal, we shall abstain from voting
Mr. SCHWEITZER (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation would like very briefly to explain the affirmative vote which we propose to cast when we vote on the Irish draft resolution, a resolution which has been debated in this Committee for some time.

Consistent with the position taken last year by Chile, when we supported a resolution which requested a suspension of nuclear tests during the negotiations undertaken by the nuclear Powers, and consistent with our position this year, when we supported the unanimous move toward complete and general disarmament subject to international control and inspection, we shall stand by the fervent hope of our country to live in a free world, a world free from the concern and anxiety following upon the arms race, which is becoming ever more a matter of anxiety in view of the existence of nuclear weapons.

We are conscious of the fact that this vote will not dispose of a problem which is a very complex one; nor will we bring to an end the grave difficulties and problems encountered by men in all latitudes. But this vote will serve to put before the world the spirit which actuates us, and we cannot fail to speak forth, nor do we wish to do so. We consider that the Irish proposal is a reasonable one. It is based on unimpeachable reasons and motives and includes very cautious and wise proposals. That is why it deserves the support which we will give it in the vote.

Mr. EŞİN (Turkey): While explaining briefly the votes we are going to cast on this resolution, I would not like to miss the opportunity of paying tribute to the Secretary for External Affairs of Ireland whose analysis of the question impressed us deeply.

We will vote in favour of the draft resolution, which we consider to be a procedural one, suggesting only to the disarmament committee of ten Members to consider appropriate means to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and to examine the possibility of arriving at an international agreement to that effect, with proper safeguards for inspection and control. A more substantial resolution would have involved problems we have not touched on here.

On the other hand, we have taken into consideration the fact that the draft envisages a study of this question within the proper framework of the disarmament
issues. It is our view that this question cannot be completely dissociated from
the other aspects of the disarmament problem and from progress in this field.

It is with this consideration in mind that we will vote in favour of the draft
resolution presented by Ireland.

Mr. NOCH (France) (interpretation from French): Not having taken part
in the general debate, I should like to explain in a very few words why I shall
abstain from taking part in this vote. I shall do so not because France feels
aimed at by this text -- this is not so -- but for four reasons of a general
character which I shall sum up briefly.

The first reason is this: the question dealt with is far from being a novel
one. It constitutes a particular instance of the more general problem of the
manufacture and transfer of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons, which,
it is proper to recall, was studied at great length in the course of our
negotiations, especially in 1957 in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission
then sitting in London.

The second reason: we are not in favour of the crystallization of a nuclear
monopoly, whatever the number of the Powers benefitted thereby, if these remain
free to carry on the armaments race. We have demonstrated that it was vain and
idle to use discriminatory measures to halt or inhibit the scientific evolution of
a country. The only fruitful way would be to apply to all without distinction
measures which would be capable of international control.

The third reason: the transfer and possession of fissionable materials and
nuclear weapons alike is difficult, may even impossible, to control. It is
therefore not desirable -- in fact it is dangerous -- to make a generalized
disarmament effort which would be focussed on measures of this order. This would
in fact constitute a set of merely moral undertakings which would not be
satisfactory for any country when its security was at stake.

The fourth, and last, reason: our Committee will therefore surely understand
that the true disarmament problems must at last be dealt with by it. These
problems would be relatively simple to solve if the Powers concerned agreed to
study them fully. What is essentially involved is control over the manufacture
of fissionable materials for warlike purposes and the discontinuance of that production; then the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons. What is involved is the progressive reconversion under control of military stockpiles for peaceful uses. What is involved is control -- which is still possible to set up -- of the manufacture of nuclear delivery vehicles and the discontinuance of their manufacture. These are the genuine, the only, problems. The others are only so many alibis, and our Assembly should at least become aware of that.
At all events, the French delegation is not opposed to having the Ten-Power Committee study, *inter alia*, the measures proposed by the delegation of Ireland. It is because these do not constitute disarmament measures that we shall not vote in favour of this text. But since we regard them as a consequence of genuine disarmament measures, we shall not vote against this proposal. Hence, our abstention.

*Mr. Kuznetsov* (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to express its views briefly on the draft resolution sponsored by Ireland on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Unswervingly guided by the interests of peace, the Soviet Government has taken a consistent stand for the complete and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons, with their elimination from the armaments of States and the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons.

The Soviet Government has repeatedly made proposals and unswervingly continues to seek ways and means for the solution of this problem. The head of the Soviet Government, Nikita S. Khrushchev, submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration proposals on general and complete disarmament with the establishment of effective international control. The carrying out of these proposals would at last put an end to the armaments race and would eliminate fully and for all time the danger of a new war.

There is no doubt that all States must persistently spare no effort in seeking ways and means for eliminating the danger of a destructive nuclear war and they must support all measures designed to facilitate the reaching of an agreement on this important and complex question as quickly as possible.

The draft resolution proposed by Ireland acknowledges the existence of a danger in the increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government takes account of the fact that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons and the emplacement of such weapons on foreign territories increase the danger of the outbreak of an atomic war, intensify suspicion in relations between States and render more difficult the achievement
of agreement on disarmament. That is why steps actually leading to inhibiting the broader dissemination of nuclear weapons are worthy of encouragement. However, the operative part of the draft resolution in paragraph 1 and the explanations offered by the representative of Ireland give no grounds for considering that the measures proposed constitute an actual step toward diminishing the threat of nuclear war. The draft speaks of the desirability of studying the feasibility of an international agreement whereby the Powers producing nuclear weapons would merely refrain from handing over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them and whereby the Powers not possessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturing them.

At the same time, however, the draft does not even propose consideration of the question that States should be prohibited from holding nuclear weapons outside the bounds of their own territories. The draft does not even put forward the problem of the prohibition and liquidation of these destructive weapons.

In present conditions, this approach to the question is, in our opinion, utterly inadequate and is only calculated to breed delusions among people, and this in turn is dangerous for the cause of peace. The draft, in fact, does not breathe a word about the need to dismantle foreign atomic and rocket bases, which constitute a great danger for the cause of peace. The draft does not even pose the question of the establishment of non-nuclear zones.

There is scarcely any need to demonstrate that without the solution of these issues, one cannot speak seriously of the lessening of the danger of nuclear war. If these problems are not solved, it is impossible to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The proposals of Ireland take no account of the substantial modifications which have recently occurred in international life. We have in mind, on the one hand, the fact that as a result of the efforts that have been made, there had been a noticeable improvement in the international situation, which has created favourable conditions for taking effective and concrete measures for disarmament. We were unanimous in the First Committee in approving the resolution on general and complete disarmament, which is a most important event in the life of the United Nations. On the other hand, the proposals of Ireland take inadequate
account of the circumstances that certain States are continuing to take dangerous steps for the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is common knowledge that the Western Powers which possess nuclear weapons station their armed forces on the territories of other States, where they have military bases and where they are setting up new ones. These troops stationed in foreign territories have recently been equipped with various types of nuclear weapons at an intensified pace. The press has reported that certain countries have quite recently during the current session consented to making their territories available for the construction of rocket launching installations for missiles with atomic and hydrogen warheads, in addition to equipping their own troops stationed on foreign territories with nuclear weapons. The western nuclear Powers have commenced to hand over these weapons to the troops of their allies in the North Atlantic bloc. The ruling bodies of NATO have confirmed and are implementing a plan for equipping NATO armed forces in Europe with so-called tactical nuclear weapons. Under this plan special units are being set up in the countries members of that bloc armed with rockets and short-range guided missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads as well as atomic artillery weapons and other similar military equipment and devices.
There is no doubt that the construction of rocket and nuclear bases on foreign territories, the setting up of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the emplacement of atomic military units on foreign territories are intensifying seriously the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and surely are utterly incapable of contributing to the elimination of mistrust and tension in relations between States. In order to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons in fact it would be necessary first of all to take care of the situation created as a result of the measures listed above which have been carried out by certain Powers. If this is not done, the nuclear armaments race is bound to continue with all the dangerous consequences involved.

The draft resolution proposed by Ireland, far from providing measures against the dissemination of nuclear weapons, which is thus being carried out, in reality tacitly approves this development. The carrying out of the Irish proposal would not prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons, but would only create the semblance of such measures being taken. In other words, the decision which we are being urged to adopt is only calculated to give the appearance that something is being done to prohibit nuclear weapons and to limit their dissemination even while in reality no practical measures would be taken towards prohibiting nuclear weapons or diminishing the threat of an appalling, destructive nuclear war.

For the reasons set out above, the Soviet delegation is unable to support the draft resolution sponsored by the delegation of Ireland.

Mr. AIKEN (Ireland): First of all, I should like to thank the members of the Committee for the constructive way in which this proposal was discussed. I need hardly emphasize that we do not regard our proposal as a cure-all for all the difficulties which confront humanity at the present time. This proposal deals with a very limited problem, but we think that it is a key problem in the present world situation and that if we cannot prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons the situation is bound to become worse and the danger of a nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons by the smaller Powers and revolutionary groups is bound to grow.
I was interested in some of the criticisms of this draft resolution which were made by the representative of the Soviet Union, the representative of Bulgaria and the representative of Czechoslovakia, and I should like to point this out to them. There were other proposals made in relation to disarmament that did not deal with the whole disarmament problem. Among them was the proposal put forward by the Foreign Minister of Poland a couple of years ago dealing with an atom-free zone in Central Europe for a beginning. I should like to remind the representatives that those proposals did not treat with the problem of foreign bases or nuclear weapons held by the major Powers in bases beyond their territories. The example I gave dealt simply with the one problem of trying to restrict nuclear weapons within a certain zone. As for myself, I am altogether in favour of the zone approach, the limited approach, to disarmament and to the same approach to the extension of the rule of law. Disarmament, however, is going to take a very long time. It is forty years since international organizations started to talk about disarmament.

In 1919, immediately after the First World War, disarmament discussions took place. Since then, with the exception of the few war years, there have been disarmament commissions, there have been committees and there have been sub-committees all dealing as hard as they could with this question of disarmament. We know that, while hopes were high when every new proposal came forward, eventually nothing very fruitful was done. I think we may take it that the Powers that are going to engage in the ten-nation committee will in fact do their best to bring forward disarmament proposals that will meet the danger as quickly as possible.

This, however, is going to take a great number of years. In the meantime, there is the danger that the situation they started out to deal with in 1959 will become more dangerous with each year that passes. This suggestion, we think, has the value that it will stop the danger from becoming much greater, if our proposal is adopted. It will prevent more countries from getting the nuclear weapons.

We urge this Committee to show by its vote that it agrees that there is a great danger in the further spread of nuclear weapons and that the ten-nation disarmament committee should do all in its power to deal quickly with this matter in the way suggested by this draft resolution or by some other means.
We are not attempting to tie down the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee to studying the proposals contained in our draft resolution. In order to emphasize that, revision 3 of the draft resolution contains an amendment to emphasize that we wanted these suggestions to be included with any other suggestions that might be put forward when the Ten-Nation Committee is at work.

The representative of Afghanistan made a suggestion for the improvement of the wording of the first paragraph of the preamble. I would like to ask him to understand that my difficulty in accepting his proposal is that this paragraph was passed last year in the wording that is in this resolution, and I think it is better to keep it in its present wording, even though it is not completely satisfactory.

I do not want to hold up the Committee in coming to a vote. Again, I want to thank the representatives who took part in the debate, and to thank them particularly for the tone in which they debated this project. I hope that this debate will stimulate a discussion of this problem in all our countries, and stimulate the Ten-Power Committee to deal with it quickly.

Mr. LODGE (United States): The United-States believes that the Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, has drawn attention to an important aspect of the general subject of disarmament which deserves serious study.

The Irish draft resolution provides that consideration of the problems which might result from an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons should take place within the wider context of the disarmament question as a whole. It suggests that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee include a study of this problem in connexion with its over-all responsibilities for general disarmament negotiations.

The United States believes that to refer this subject to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee is useful since it will ensure careful scrutiny of this question in relationship to the broader question of disarmament. I stress this point because we do not regard this as suggesting, as the Soviet representative implied, that this subject can be considered and solved apart from the over all problem of disarmament.

For these reasons the United States will vote in favour of the Irish draft resolution.
The CHAIRMAN: This completes the list of speakers in the general debate. Before proceeding to the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.235/Rev.3 -- a roll call vote has been requested -- the Chairman would ask any member who wishes to explain his vote to do this now because there will not be any explanation of vote after the voting.

Everybody seems satisfied, therefore, we can start with the voting.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Sweden, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

**In favour:** Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia.

**Against:** None

**Abstaining:** Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain.

Draft resolution A/C.1/L.235/Rev.3 was adopted by 66 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.
The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting the Chair would like to consult the Committee on item 4. The representative of India, Mr. Menon, has covered in his statement of 6 November also the item suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests proposed by India. Many representatives have referred to this question of nuclear test cessation in their statements on disarmament and the Sahara test questions. Therefore, it can be assumed that the general debate on item 4 will be a short one, and combined with the debate on the draft resolutions.

Two draft resolutions have been submitted: the three-Power resolution document A/C.1/L.236, and the Indian draft resolution document A/C.1/L.237. Efforts are being made by the delegations concerned to combine these two draft resolutions into one. If their efforts succeed it would help to shorten the debate on the draft resolution. I understand that if the effort succeeds, a merged draft resolution will not be ready for introduction at a meeting tomorrow morning, but on Wednesday. Therefore, if any members are ready to make statements on the item as such, we will have a meeting tomorrow morning.
Therefore, may I now ask the Committee, are there any members ready to speak tomorrow morning in the general debate on the item, Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests?

Mr. PATHAK (India): Mr. Chairman, as you have very rightly pointed out, we have had a discussion on several items which come under the umbrella of disarmament; and you have also, if I may say so, quite rightly pointed out that much of what might be said during the general debate on our item has been stated before. Therefore it is possible, in fact it is quite right, that the debate should not be very long. But at the same time, it is the view of our delegation that, considering the great importance of the subject, Suspension of Nuclear Tests, there need not be any constriction as regards the general debate on this item. We hope ourselves to be as brief as possible, but at the same time, on some of those subjects the maximum airing of views in this Committee and in the General Assembly is of the greatest importance. I will be quite prepared to speak on the subject tomorrow morning, if that meets with your convenience and the wishes of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there any other member prepared to intervene tomorrow morning? As there is only one member ready to speak tomorrow morning, we shall have to cancel tomorrow morning's meeting also. The next meeting, therefore, of the Committee will take place on Wednesday, 18 November, in the forenoon.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.