Fourteenth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE THOUSAND AND FIFTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 16 November 1959, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. MATSCH (Austria)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons [67]
(continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e. the summary record,
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volume.

59-61628
PREVENTION OF THE WIDER DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (A/4125;
A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2)

Mr. PATHAK (India): The item which we are discussing is one in which
the Government of India has been closely interested in the wider context of
disarmament. This Committee has already had a wide-ranging discussion on the
item "General and Complete Disarmament". Some of the dangers to which the world
is exposed by the development of nuclear weapons have been discussed in connexion
with the previous item on the proposed French atomic tests in the Sahara, and
the Committee will shortly have before it an item proposed by my delegation.
In this intervention I shall briefly state my Government's views on the somewhat
limited subject before us.

As we are all aware, the Irish delegation raised the issue of the
dissemination of nuclear weapons at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly,
but after receiving a most sympathetic and favourable response, they decided
not to press their resolution because, to use Mr. Aiken's words:

"the primary purpose of our initiative has been attained by the
placing on record of the declaration of principle recognizing the danger
of disseminating nuclear weapons." (A/PV.779, para. 175).

Only one paragraph of the Irish draft resolution was put to the vote on that
occasion. That paragraph would have the General Assembly recognize the existence
of the danger of an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons,
thus aggravating international tensions and the difficulty of maintaining world
peace and rendering more difficult the attainment of a general disarmament
agreement. The paragraph was adopted by 37 votes to none, with 4 abstentions;
we voted for it because we agreed with the principles underlying it.

As I have said, the Government of India has for long been interested in the
issue now before us. We are therefore in sympathy with the aims and objectives
which have inspired the delegation of Ireland to bring up this matter once again,
even though we feel that their proposals do not go far enough in the light of
the developments since our last session, and though we have reservations on some of the details of their draft resolution.

In 1956, the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, placed my Government's views before the Disarmament Commission. Among the issues to which he referred in his statement before the Commission is the one we are discussing now. He said:

"Another aspect of this nuclear field is something that causes us all concern. I hope that it will be possible for the nuclear Powers to assure the world that there will be no trade in these weapons, that there will be no supply of them to other countries, from where they can go to still other countries, so that they will be distributed generally. That is, the transfer of atomic or nuclear or other weapons to a large number of countries would speed the danger of war; and when one country outside this group has the weapons, other people will try to get hold of them." (DC/PV.58, paragraph 84)

The Permanent Representative of India, in his note verbale of 25 July 1956, addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, set out the proposals of the Government of India for the consideration of the Commission and its Sub-Committee. This note suggested some initial steps to be taken towards nuclear disarmament. One of these steps was that:

"There should be no export or conveying of nuclear weapons to other countries by those countries at present manufacturing such weapons." (DC/98, page 3)

At the eleventh session of the General Assembly, the proposals made by the Government of India along with several other proposals came up for consideration, and it was decided by resolution 1011 (XI) that the various proposals which had been put forward up to that time should be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee for prompt attention.

We regret that the Commission did not consider our proposals in detail. However, in 1957 the Soviet Union proposed in the Disarmament Sub-Committee that:
"States possessing atomic or hydrogen weapons shall assume an obligation not to allow atomic military formations or atomic or hydrogen weapons of any type to be stationed outside their national frontiers."

(DC/SC.1/49, paragraph 6)

In the course of discussion, the Western Powers presented jointly a working paper which contained proposals for partial measures of disarmament.
Section IV of this paper laid down that "Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except where, under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with section III." Section III provided that "Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defence." (Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for January to December 1957, page 75.)

In explaining these proposals to the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Stassen, the representative of the United States, said on 5 July 1957, that

"The combined provisions of the first-step agreement which the United States is willing to have, include agreement on not transferring from its control to the control of any other State, nuclear weapons at present in its control, when the agreement becomes effective". (DC/SC.1/PV.130, Page 8)

Mr. Stassen went on to say,

"There were statements that the United States had transferred weapons to other States. This is not correct. The United States has not transferred nuclear weapons to any other State. In fact, the laws of the United States prohibit such transfer."

While my delegation does not wish to go into the details of the various agreements which the United States have signed with other States for co-operation in the use of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes, we are, in connexion with the specific item that we are discussing now, aware of one of the conditions which appear in such agreements, namely that "there will be no transfer by either party of atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons or special nuclear materials".

In this connexion I should also like to refer to the reply given by the United States State Department on 14 November 1958, to a question put by the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament. The question was, "Is the United States policy directed at curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries?"

The answer given was as follows:

"For many reasons, the United States would like to see the spread of nuclear weapons production capability curtailed. As additional countries achieve nuclear weapons capability it would become more difficult to achieve safeguarded disarmament agreements covering all types of weapons and forces."
It is also important for the future peace of the world that nuclear weapons do not fall under the control of irresponsible dictators who, through misunderstanding, impetuous action or evil intent, might lead a reluctant country into World War III."

The above will show that the nuclear Powers are aware of the dangers we are discussing. Prime Minister Nehru once said:

"It is perfectly clear that if some kind of settlement is not made, some agreement not arrived at, other countries will make atomic or hydrogen bombs. There is no doubt about this. There are several countries which possibly have the know-how but have not got the resources. They will get them also."

He further said that if more countries got these weapons, the possibility of coming to some settlement would become more and more difficult and, to use his own words, "the terror that hangs over the world will become worse". In this connexion I might refer to the study by a group of American scientists which has already been quoted here, in which a dozen countries including India are listed as potential nuclear Powers. So far as my country is concerned, however, we have made it clear that our efforts in the field of atomic energy are devoted entirely to peaceful ends.

The Foreign Minister of Ireland in his opening statement on Friday indicated that the expressions "States possessing nuclear weapons" and "Powers producing nuclear weapons" in the draft resolution would include all the Powers producing or possessing nuclear weapons at the time when the suggested agreements are ready for signature, whatever the number may be at that date. We sincerely hope that this will not be construed as an invitation to any State other than the existing three nuclear Powers to speed up its own efforts to join this group before the agreement comes into force. Such an idea might tend to retard progress towards the reaching of an agreement.

In the draft resolution, A/C.1/L.235, which the delegation of Ireland has submitted there are two points on which my delegation would wish to comment. Both these points appear in the operative part of the resolution. It is implied that the expansion of the "nuclear club" could come about by the present nuclear Powers handing over control of nuclear weapons to those that do not possess them.
We should like to submit that apart from the handing over of control of nuclear weapons, we should also take into account the transfer of the processes, skills and capital required for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, because a non-nuclear Power could become a nuclear Power not only by getting the weapons themselves, but also by getting what might be called the technical know-how and the means for development and manufacture of such weapons. In the discussion on general and complete disarmament the leader of my delegation, Mr. Krishna Menon, suggested that there should be a ban on the export of capital, equipment and technicians from one country to another for the purpose of establishing armament industries in the latter. This aspect must clearly be borne in mind in any study of this subject.

The second point I should like to mention in connexion with the operative part of the draft resolution is that while we entirely endorse the injunction on the non-nuclear powers not to manufacture nuclear weapons, we would make it quite clear that my delegation would not like this to imply in any way that we would thereby accept and sanctify the continued manufacture or retention of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear Powers. Our position on the question of nuclear weapons has remained unchanged. We have always believed, and continue to believe, that there can be no effective disarmament in the world unless the nuclear Powers decide that the development, manufacture, testing and stockpiling of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons must come to an end. We have suggested repeatedly that there should be a complete prohibition of the use of fissionable materials for military purposes and that there should be a transfer of fissionable materials from military to civilian uses. We want to see the end of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, and it is for this reason that my delegation would like to stress this point once again, that no action of ours should either sanctify what has already been done in the way of production of nuclear weapons or imply the approval of continued production of nuclear weapons by the present three nuclear Powers.

What has been called "the nth country problem" needs no restating here. We are all aware that the problems of nuclear disarmament, of the cut-off of
production of nuclear weapons, of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, and of the establishment of the necessary control systems, will be enormously complicated if more and more countries acquire nuclear weapons. The dangers of nuclear war will be correspondingly aggravated. My delegation feels that more comprehensive measures than the draft resolution proposes are called for, but will favour any step that will take us in the direction of our common objective of a warless world.
Mr. BISHE (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): The subject under discussion at the moment, the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was submitted by the delegation of Ireland and was discussed at the last session. We are now discussing it again, but in an atmosphere of greater possibilities.

The First Committee has already unanimously expressed the hope that "measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time". If to this there is added the majority opinion which requested France to refrain from carrying out nuclear tests in the Sahara, then we realize that the item and the resolution proposed by Ireland fit perfectly well into the atmosphere of disarmament.

In our statement on general and complete disarmament, we made our position perfectly clear. We said at the time:

"The Cuban delegation, as an ultimate ideal, also wants general and complete disarmament, but, first and foremost, we want disarmament in the field of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. This is the urgent aspect, this is what we cannot postpone. Either we do it or like the lemmings we go to our own destruction. Our fate hangs on an incident in the cold war, on an accident in the transport of nuclear weapons. This is placing much too much faith in too tenuous and fragile a support. The solution that can satisfy us is not only that of prohibiting nuclear tests. What will be gained by that? We could limit the nuclear club to the membership of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. I say we could do this at least because as far as the scientists of other countries are concerned it is much easier to discover that has already been known than to discover something new. The solution to the problem is not only in ceasing tests and avoiding the dangers of radioactive fall-out for the populations of the world. The solution lies by means of an international system of control well co-ordinated, and in the destruction of nuclear and thermonuclear stockpiles, and in ending once and for all this nefarious and dangerous production. This is the urgent appeal and request
of the Cuban delegation, and I am convinced that this is what all the small nations of the world want, because all small nations want and should be heard in the question and in the debate on disarmament." (A/C.1/PV.1030, pages 61, and 62-65)

If this is our view, it is obvious that we must support the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Ireland. Any forward step would be in keeping with our greatest desires. Or, to put it another way, if we are willing to go the whole way, we are also willing to welcome one step at a time.

If we reject the carrying out of nuclear weapons tests it is because we do not want to see an increase in the number of countries possessing such weapons. If that is our position, we must obviously oppose any wider dissemination of nuclear weapons that exist at present or that may be produced in the future.

However, none of these partial measures -- I should like to stress this because it is extremely important to my delegation -- is in itself a solution. If we wish to avoid the incalculable and destructive effects of nuclear war, we must proceed toward the nuclear disarmament of the three nuclear Powers, the liquidation of existing stockpiles and the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Above all, as a first step, this must be carried out as part of general and complete disarmament, which, after all, is the main dream and aspiration of all peoples.

We shall not speak of missiles because they are merely means of very rapid transport for which distances no longer exist. The danger lies in the nuclear warhead which can be transported by the missile. If the nuclear warhead did not exist and if, in its place, the missile carried a satellite, then the missile would become a valuable instrument for the exploration of outer space and for future scientific conquests which would be even more incredible than those already achieved.

We do not wish to underestimate the importance of the subject before us. We believe that there are sufficient reasons to warrant its being set up as a separate item. But at the same time we believe that, in order to give it all its potential scope, and in order truly to apply the measures proposed by the delegation of Ireland, these measures must go hand in hand with other disarmament measures in the nuclear field. If there is no nuclear disarmament of the three nuclear
Powers, then, day by day, the number of these Powers will grow. We see it in the case of France, and France will soon be followed by other Powers, because already the stage of atomic secrecy has been left behind. As the techniques of production are perfected, less prohibitive resources than those used at present will be employed for the manufacture of those weapons.

We therefore repeat that the greatest responsibility lies at the door of the three Powers that form the nuclear club. Either they agree to complete nuclear disarmament or the nuclear arms race will lead us to a world conflict with these weapons. The example of nuclear weapons is more persuasive than the beautiful words we speak here. The greater the number of Powers which have accumulated atomic or hydrogen bombs, the greater will be the danger of a nuclear war. If this is so, then we are right when we say that the stopping of nuclear and thermonuclear tests is not enough. Nor do measures and commitments to avoid the dissemination of nuclear weapons suffice if there are Powers that still keep these weapons and Powers that exercise a nuclear monopoly.

It is obvious, especially in a world full of tensions and prejudices and resentment, that the Power that speaks a nuclear diplomatic language will not be left behind. That Power is listened to not because it is right but because it has the might to make itself heard. The equality of nations is just another legend, a myth. Even in the United Nations, equality is to be found simply in choosing the country to cast the first ballot in a roll call vote or in placing delegations around the table in alphabetical order. We do not say this with resignation, because we have always remained optimistic in the struggle to transform what is into what should be. In this case the equality of all nations, great and small, is what should be our ideal, and we shall devote our greatest energies to it.
To avoid the dissemination of nuclear weapons, we should have to review the entire policy of facts and alliances between nations. Even admitting procedures of inspection such as are suggested by the representative of Ireland, it would be very difficult to prevent the nuclear Powers secretly giving one another these weapons or giving their allies these weapons, or even accumulating nuclear stockpiles under their own control in strategically located places in their own territories. The Cuban delegation finds it impossible to admit that, if we do not do away with nuclear weapons altogether, we shall be able to carry out the generous purposes of Ireland and avoid a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Apart from international agreements, and the giving of their word of honour, if it were not for the formidable power of world public opinion, the great Powers would always be acting as they have so far acted, in accordance with their own interests and their own convenience.

What attracts our attention is the discriminatory policy that is followed in the system of existing alliances. Nuclear weapons are accumulated for any possible trouble that may occur, but they are stockpiled in foreign countries without the secrets of their manufacture being revealed. Therefore, two classes of allies are established: those that possess the nuclear secrets, or class A, and those that do not possess those secrets, or class B. All this is negative and creates obvious incentives for the development of the nuclear armaments race. I believe that the three nuclear Powers should bear this carefully in mind when the committee of ten considers and adopts decisions on the matter.

I do not think I need to reiterate the arguments presented by Mr. Aiken in introducing his draft resolution on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. But we should like to underline his observations on the fact that for a number of years plutonium has been used as one of the basic fissionable materials and as a sub-product of one type of nuclear power station, and with regard to the increasing number of nuclear reactors of this type that are being set up in countries that as yet do not produce nuclear weapons but thus possess the necessary materials for the manufacture of such weapons if the need should arise.

The Cuban delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution presented by Ireland. We agree that the decisions that we arrive at should be passed on to the committee of ten through the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations and the Secretary-General and that a study of the different plans on disarmament should be
carried out there, and also that the Committee of ten should consider whether it is possible to arrive at an international agreement, with measures for control and inspection, according to which the Powers producing nuclear weapons will refrain from handing over control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them, and the Powers not possessing such weapons will refrain from manufacturing them.

As I said earlier, this is not the total and complete solution, but it is a step forward towards the nuclear disarmament that we should like to see achieved as the first phase of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. Sastroamidjojo (Indonesia): When the question of disarmament was discussed in the First Committee during the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, I expressed two thoughts which, I feel, are pertinent to the present item of the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

First, I stressed that the widening of the nuclear armaments race was an urgent and immediate problem, which posed a grave peril to peace and security in the world. The Indonesian delegation, at that time, voted in support of the second paragraph of the draft resolution of Ireland, which is now incorporated as the first preambular paragraph of document A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2 We believed that the former draft resolution was both timely and constructive, and therefore deeply regretted its subsequent withdrawal.

As much as was our regret on that occasion, we are today happy to note that this matter has been reintroduced as an item on our agenda. The Indonesian delegation certainly appreciates the initiative of the delegation of Ireland, its perseverance and its submitting of a draft resolution on this subject. We are grateful that the United Nations has thus been given another opportunity to correct last year's omission and to promote a thorough study of this question, which can only grow more dangerous with the passage of time.

The other thought that I expressed at the past Assembly session, and which I should like to reiterate today, is that it is also the responsibility of countries which do not possess nuclear and thermonuclear weapons to end the armaments race and to relieve the fears that now oppress mankind. I said then:
"... our interest and our responsibility" -- that is, the interest and responsibility of States that do not possess nuclear weapons -- "are as great as those of the nuclear Powers. We too, individually and as Member States of the United Nations, have obligations to our peoples. The difference lies rather in the means at our disposal to discharge the common responsibility. The nuclear Powers have the bombs. We have the force of moral persuasion..."

I know that there may be some question about this equation, some doubts about the relative strength of moral persuasion as against that of the nuclear bomb. But I think that everyone must agree that in respect to this particular problem of the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, a special responsibility falls upon the countries which do not produce such weapons. After all, in the first place, it is incumbent upon these countries to recognize that present danger by spurning gifts of nuclear weapons. It is, thus, within their capacity not only to exercise the force of moral persuasion but also to adopt concrete measures to prevent an enlargement of the nuclear armaments race.

True, it is for the nuclear Powers to decide whether or not to hand over the control of atomic weapons to any nation that does not possess them. But ultimately it remains wholly within the domain of the non-nuclear nations to refuse to accept such weapons. If such a moral act of self-denial were adopted by all non-nuclear Powers, then obviously the danger inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons would be automatically removed.

I do not say this, of course, with any expectation that my words will induce the adoption of a universal declaration of self-denial, although this would be a wonderful thing. What I do wish to emphasize, however, is that, in contrast to other aspects of disarmament, in this field the non-nuclear nations have a special responsibility to discharge in deeds as well as words.

Therefore we consider it as a good omen that this item was brought before the United Nations by Ireland, a non-nuclear Power. We hope too that, in the ten-nation Disarmament Committee, the countries which do not possess nuclear weapons will take a particular interest in pressing forward with a thorough study of this problem, as called for in the draft resolution before us.

During the past weeks, we have heard a lot about the greatness of nations. Now, in preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, nations can display greatness and by their humanitarian actions they can earn the appellation of greatness.
The Indonesian delegation, as is well known to members of this Committee, has consistently stood for a complete prohibition of the manufacture, testing and use of nuclear weapons. We are as adamantly opposed to the spread of these weapons, for it would create an extremely hazardous situation due to the presence therein of the element of irresponsibility and the possibility of an uncontrollable chain reaction.

In fact, both the urgency and immediacy of this problem and its grave danger are generally recognized. The Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, has already referred to the survey made on behalf of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, which reveals that many countries are now technically capable of entering the nuclear race and others have the economic or technical capacity to do so in the near future.

In apparent confirmation of this survey, we read in The New York Times of Friday, 13 November -- truly an unlucky day, if I may say so -- that a unanimous report by a committee of eighteen leading representatives of Sweden's governing Social Democratic Party gave the green light to the Swedish Government to begin research on atomic weapons. The despatch in The New York Times further stated that a decision to make these weapons was put off until 1965, at which date Sweden expects to have a nuclear reactor programme far enough in operation to make its own plutonium, if it wishes.

I cannot refrain from expressing the hope of the Indonesian delegation that the Government of Sweden will never wish to manufacture nuclear weapons. We consider Sweden not only as a friend of Indonesia, which in the United Nations has always shared our abomination of these weapons, but also as the country of the Nobel Peace Prize, presented this year to Mr. Philip Noel-Baker -- a man who has dedicated his life to bringing about disarmament in the world.

As I have already noted, there exists general agreement as to the danger of this problem. We expect, indeed, that the first preambular paragraph of the Irish draft resolution, which was adopted last year without a dissenting vote, will receive this year the unanimous support of this Committee.

In conclusion, there is one other observation that I would like to make in the most friendly way. Last Friday, one representative mentioned two aspects of this problem of the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons
which, in his opinion, required careful study. They were: first, "the requirement that the aim must not be sought to be achieved at the cost of any weakening in the relative strength of our defences, and secondly to the necessity for applying a reliable system of international control to any measures that may be contemplated".

We can certainly agree with the latter need; that is, the institution of adequate measures of international control, but, on the other hand, it seems to us that the first-mentioned requirement is not in keeping with the attitude that the United Nations should take in regard to this problem. To worry about or even to think in terms of a weakening in the relative strength of one's defences already presupposes a wide dissemination of nuclear weapons, which is exactly what we must seek to prevent from happening. As the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland pointed out in his statement of 13 November, there exists a "balance of destructive weapons and forces, the precarious balance which has given the world the uneasy peace of the last few years". (A/C.1/PV.1054, p. 11) And until we have reached the stage of general and complete disarmament, the maintenance of this precarious balance through the prevention of the transfer of nuclear weapons to any nation not possessing them, and of their manufacture or acceptance by these nations, obviously cannot at all disturb the relative strength of our defences.

Consequently, we feel that this matter does not have any place in the contemplated study of this problem. In this particular field of disarmament, we are seeking to apply preventive measures, rather than to reduce the present arms arsenals of any nation. The aim is solely one of achieving a greater measure of security for the entire world, not for any one nation, by outlawing the spread of nuclear weapons under a system of international control. It is to the attainment of this goal, and this goal alone, that we should concentrate all our attention and energy.

From what I have said, I need hardly add that the Indonesian delegation will be most happy to vote for the draft resolution tabled by the delegation of Ireland, which, we hope, will produce the desired results of speedily removing this danger to international peace and security.
Mr. KAMIL (Federation of Malaya): The question of the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was discussed by the First Committee in the course of its debate on questions of disarmaments at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. Although the deliberations on this particular aspect of the disarmament problem did not at that time reach any formal conclusion by way of the adoption of a resolution, it did, nevertheless, serve one useful purpose. It served the purpose, if I may say so, of putting on record the recognition by the General Assembly of the dangers inherent in the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. This recognition was expressed by the First Committee's approval by 57 votes to none of that paragraph of the draft resolution introduced by the delegation of Ireland recognizing the dangers of the possible increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. It may be recalled that the delegation of the Federation of Malaya was among the thirty-seven which endorsed the view expressed in that paragraph.

The representatives will note that the paragraph in question appears again today as the first clause in the preamble of the Irish draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2 which is now before this Committee.

Several speakers who have preceded me in this debate have expressed the view that as a result of scientific and technological progress in many countries there would appear to be a greater likelihood than ever before of an increase in the number of countries which will acquire the necessary means of entering the nuclear club. They might be able to do so either by themselves manufacturing nuclear weapons or through the purchase or transfer of these weapons. Such a development, were it to occur, might well aggravate the difficulties of attaining an international agreement on general disarmament and add further complications to the already complex problem of working out an internationally acceptable agreement on an effective system of control and inspection which, in the view of my delegation, is essential for any disarmament measure. My delegation, therefore, welcomes the suggestion that this problem should be given serious attention.
The problem of disarmament -- and the question of the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons is certainly one aspect of the disarmament problem -- has many facets that require careful and thorough study. Any measure for disarmament, for instance, must be consistent with the maintenance of international security and the security of every nation, and in this regard must include an effective system of inspection and control.
This same principle must necessarily apply to any measures that may be contemplated for the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. To reach an agreement in respect of this problem is undoubtedly a difficult task. There must be detailed and thorough examination and planning, particularly in respect of the problem of control and inspection which, as some delegations have rightly pointed out, might prove to be more difficult in the case of export or import of nuclear weapons than in the case of their manufacture.

My delegation feels that this question is well within the scope and the capacity of the ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, to which this Committee, already a few weeks ago, unanimously recommended the transmission of all proposals for complete and general disarmament for examination. My delegation agrees, therefore, with the suggestion in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2) that the ten-nation Disarmament Committee should consider appropriate means whereby the danger of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons may be averted, and, with this end in view, examine the feasibility of arriving at an international agreement subject to inspection and control.

It could be argued that in view of the discussion that will soon take place in the ten-Nation Committee on the proposals for complete and general disarmament, the consideration of measures aimed at the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, as proposed in the draft resolution, might be superfluous and unnecessary. My delegation is, however, of the opinion that owing to the long time that is likely to be taken in reaching an acceptable agreement on general disarmament under effective international control and inspection, it may be necessary, in the meantime, to consider whatever measures possible to prevent the addition of further difficulties and complications which the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons may well give rise to. My delegation therefore concurs with the view that this problem should be brought to the attention of the ten-nation Disarmament Committee for its consideration.

The delegation of the Federation of Malaya will therefore support the draft resolution introduced by the delegation of Ireland.
Mr. Palamas (Greece): The Greek delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2) submitted by Ireland, with a view to preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. In stating our position, I deem it necessary to explain the reasons for which we will cast a positive vote on the Irish proposal. These reasons determine the exact meaning of our approval and the limits of our acquiescence to the proposed course of action.

The fact that the present initiative was undertaken by Ireland was not a minor factor in our decision to view it in a positive way. If Ireland is generally considered as a politically "non-committed" country, we do recognize it as a nation and, within these walls, as a delegation resolutely committed to stand for what is right, for what is just and good, in a disinterested way.

In the present instance, the Foreign Minister of Ireland, in his very able statement made the other day before this Committee, expounded the risks lying in the prospect of a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. We do share his anxieties and also his opinion that this is a point of major importance deserving careful study and detailed analysis.

It is in this sense that we consider this draft resolution as a procedural one, and our positive vote goes mainly to its procedural character. By adopting it, we would ask the ten-nation Disarmament Committee to examine the possibility of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and to report to the Disarmament Commission. In our view, the ten-nation Committee is requested to examine the problem in its broader context and implications.

It is true that in the first operative paragraph of the draft resolution, it is said that the Committee of ten will:

"...examine the feasibility of arriving at an international agreement, subject to inspection and control, whereby the Powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from handing over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them and whereby the Powers not possessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturing;"

I must promptly say that we understand this particular request as practically defining the problem and indicating a way in which it could be dealt with. Still, the main task of the ten-countries Committee would be to consider all appropriate
means whereby the danger of the dissemination of nuclear weapons could be averted. Had it not been for this broader interpretation, my delegation could hardly subscribe, in advance, to the projected international agreement. We cannot conceive of such an agreement independently of an appropriate setting of disarmament measures.

Let us suppose that the nuclear Powers agree to refrain from handing over the control of the nuclear weapons they produce to the countries not possessing such weapons and that these countries too accept to refrain from manufacturing them. We know -- and the Foreign Minister of Ireland made it abundantly clear -- that the implementation of such an agreement under effective international control is extremely difficult. But let us for a moment imagine that even this obstacle is cleared. In this case the results would be manifold.

The nuclear Powers will continue to produce, to perfect and to stockpile nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The monopoly which they now have in this respect, which is a monopoly de facto, will be transformed into a monopoly de jure, and the so-called "nuclear club", instead of being abolished, will become an exclusive one. There is every reason to believe that independent countries will not find it easy to be reconciled with such a situation. Facts are facts and cannot be challenged other than by facts. But principles and agreements must necessarily stand on equality of rights and terms.

The last point, but not the least, is that as long as collective security remains the main foundation of peace, the production and the distribution of all armaments, including nuclear weapons, should be governed by the interests of common defence. Measures interfering in the functioning of collective security, without appropriate and co-ordinated changes in the structure of general peace, have little chance of being accepted.

I am sure that it is neither the intention of the Foreign Minister of Ireland nor of this Committee to envisage the creation of such a state of affairs. On the other hand, we have every reason to believe that the nuclear Powers too would not be inclined to assume such a heavy responsibility in the face of the world. Does this mean that the efforts to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons are doomed to failure? We certainly do not think so because the whole picture changes
if viewed in the framework of broader measures on disarmament covering, among other points and in correlation to such points, the dissemination of nuclear weapons. If, for example, an agreement on the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests is reached, if the suspension of the production of nuclear weapons is envisaged, it then becomes more practicable to request the nuclear Powers to refrain from handing over the control of nuclear weapons to nations not possessing such weapons and at the same time to expect that these nations would also refrain from manufacturing them.
These last measures, considered as part of a comprehensive scheme of disarmament and as steps of a provisional and transitional character, can be viewed favourably, while they appear to be unrealistic whenever they seem to deal separately with the dangers generated by the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the procedural character of the draft resolution makes it more acceptable to all. The Ten-Power Committee is requested to report to the Disarmament Commission which, in turn, will have the opportunity to study and to reconsider all the points of substance contained in that report. The Disarmament Commission will then make further recommendations to the Assembly and to the Security Council.

It is in this sense that the affirmative vote of my delegation means our sharing in the concern regarding the dangers inherent in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and in agreement on procedure without any premature endorsement on matters of substance.

In conclusion, may I be permitted to say that, in our submission, partial nuclear disarmament could be achieved only in terms of general nuclear disarmament. General nuclear disarmament does not seem feasible except in terms of general and complete disarmament as regards nuclear and conventional armaments as well. Furthermore, regional disarmament, either in nuclear or in conventional weapons, depends on general and comprehensive disarmament. Within these broad patterns we may proceed by steps, or even by more radical measures; but we venture to say that, in any case, the basic pattern will not change.

Mr. SHANAHAN (New Zealand): When the Prime Minister of my country addressed this Committee some days ago he made it clear that New Zealand viewed with considerable sympathy the initiative taken by the Irish delegation in bringing before the General Assembly the question of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. On Friday last, 13 November, we listened with care to the impressive analysis of this problem given by the Minister of External Affairs of Ireland.

We are very conscious of the dangers which might arise if no effective steps are taken to limit the nature and extent of the disarmament problem. Unless such
action is taken at the international level, more Governments may feel impelled, for security reasons, to have nuclear weapons under their own political control. The complications that could thus be added to the already complex nature of the disarmament question are self-evident.

If the negotiations in Geneva lead to the universal acceptance of an agreement not to test nuclear weapons, an important stage will have been reached in the limiting of the proportions of the problem, but it will not have its result in the final resolution of this problem. In the existing conditions of international suspicion and distrust, Governments may still feel that their security demands that they acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.

It is for these reasons that my delegation welcomes the suggestion contained in the Irish draft resolution that the Ten-Power Committee should examine the whole question of restricting the spread of nuclear weapons. We feel that this problem can best be studied within the framework of general disarmament negotiations, whereas the representative of the Netherlands has pointed out that careful attention can be given to such essential considerations as effective means of control and the maintenance of relative security. My delegation would also expect that full account would be taken of the need to ensure that measures of verification were universal in their application. No region of the world can be immune from inspection and control.

It would appear that, at the present time, the industrial capacity needed to produce nuclear weapons is still so large that it would be exceedingly difficult for a Government to conceal its intentions to manufacture such weapons, though not, of course, the precise stage of development which had been reached.

It would appear also that the inspection system which would be required to ensure compliance with an agreement not to produce nuclear weapons should be less difficult to achieve than that needed to control the transfer of nuclear weapons.

My delegation is, therefore, attracted to the idea that there should be a standstill agreement embodying an undertaking, subject to effective control, whereby countries not at present possessing nuclear weapons would refrain from producing them. In such conditions there is hope that sovereign States will be willing, in the wider interests of peace, to forego the right to develop nuclear weapons. This would, we earnestly believe, be a renunciation which would meet with universal and positive response.
My delegation hopes also that serious consideration will be given to the suggestion that countries possessing nuclear weapons should refrain from handing over control of such weapons to other countries. We recognize, however, that there are serious practical difficulties involved in this proposal. It must be asked, for example, whether the nuclear Powers would be prepared to enter into such an undertaking without the assurance that measures could be devised to protect them from the consequences of non-compliance on the part of others. I believe it is generally accepted that there are at present no sure means of detecting existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, but this is no necessary reason why this problem should not be considered and examined as part of the broader problem of comprehensive disarmament.

It is our view that the ideas embodied in the draft resolution presented by the Irish delegation deserve wide-spread support. The draft resolution underlines the urgency of devising measures to limit the dimensions of the problem of nuclear armament before its solution has passed entirely beyond our reach. It does not underestimate the complexities of the problem, but it does propose an approach from which, we trust, practical measures of action will emerge. My delegation will, therefore, support the draft resolution.

Mr. FEKINI (Libya) (interpretation from French): I should like to explain very briefly the view of the Libyan delegation on the question of prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The atomic danger, which sprang from the discovery and use of atomic weapons at the end of World War II, has become intensified, indeed dramatic in form, owing to the breaking of the United States monopoly by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The grave anxiety which has beset the peoples of the world owing to the nuclear and thermonuclear weapons race between these three Powers has been increased by the legitimate fear that these weapons of mass destruction might be transferred to non-nuclear Powers. These fears are all the more justified since the post-war world has found itself divided into antagonistic blocs through alliances which comprise large numbers of Powers on both sides.

It is a well established fact that the number of nuclear Powers in the world is likely to increase. Considerations and pretexts of all kinds -- defence, prestige, demonstrations of scientific and technical capacities, etc. -- are liable to push a number of States into manufacturing their own atomic weapons. Discussion
on the second item on our agenda gave this view of things the opportunity of expressing itself in forthright terms.

The balance of power established in the world in the framework of the tripartite atomic monopoly is likely to be broken in a manner which would turn nuclear weapons into weapons that were as conventional as others, and it is not to be ruled out that the day will come when atomic weapons traffic will be as normal as weapons contraband in general.
Clearly there is considerable danger, which is becoming intensified, that the dissemination of nuclear weapons throughout the world will even further complicate the precarious situation of world peace. The danger of mass destruction, which could be envisaged previously only within the framework of a universal conflagration, may even arise in the case of a localized regional clash. The situation in the world, the interplay of alliances and interests, which are complex enough in the present state of affairs, will surely be more so in a world where the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons would cause the hazards and risks of a catastrophe which would endanger the very existence of mankind to proliferate. There is no doubt that the dissemination of mass destruction weapons is increasingly becoming one of the most alarming realities of the present world, where possession of nuclear weapons may spread more and more, either from the efforts of States to manufacture them through their own resources, or trying to get them from their allies or by any other imaginable means.

Such a situation presents grave danger to the peace of the world and the maintenance and security of individual peoples and nations alike. It is therefore a matter of urgency that the United Nations should take all necessary measures in order to forestall a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons in the present state of affairs, which seems to be promising for the radical solution of the disarmament problem.

The Libyan delegation considers it is particularly imperative to begin an effort to prevent the wider dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. This would be an important stage on the path to definitive prohibition of nuclear weapons and the destruction of stockpiles. That is why it seems to us very important for the General Assembly to recommend to the United Nations Disarmament Commission to devote to the problem of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons time and examination so as to halt this alarming tendency and in order to attain its objective and work out the most radical possible solution as swiftly as possible. The United Nations Disarmament Commission might likewise recommend to the ten-nation disarmament committee the study of proper ways of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons pending a solution of the general and complete disarmament problem which this Committee has endorsed with an enthusiastic and unanimous vote.
In conclusion, being aware of the grave dangers posed to the world by the increasing dissemination of nuclear weapons, as well as of the necessity of doing everything within the framework of the United Nations in order to elaborate measures capable of preventing that threat from coming to pass, the Libyan delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Ireland, introduced in clear, eloquent and sincere terms by the Hon. Frank Aiken, the eminent Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland.

Mr. Vidic (Yugoslavia): We have all had the opportunity to set forth during the present session of the Assembly the views of our Governments concerning the outstanding and more far-reaching problems of disarmament. There is a general consensus of opinion that we should approach the solution of these problems resolutely. Important steps have been taken in this respect so far, and they are filling us with hopes of ultimate success.

It would not be appropriate here to indulge in an enumeration of the respective positions. However, in connexion with the question which we are considering today, I wish to state that it is absolutely necessary to try to reach a solution likely to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. All of us are aware, to a greater or lesser extent, of the appalling threats to world peace arising from the existence of atomic and hydrogen weapons as well as from their wider dissemination. However, it is not sufficient to content ourselves with this conclusion. It would be wrong to reduce the whole problem to that of quantity. Moreover, we cannot separate the questions relating to the various aspects of disarmament from the necessity of ensuring a parallel consideration of international relations on the basis of active and peaceful coexistence among States and peoples with different social and political systems. We are firmly convinced that no other road is likely to lead us to the attainment of the desired aims; that is to say, to the establishment of firm foundations for peace, disarmament, as well as all-round and fruitful co-operation among nations.
It is in this context that we have set forth at the present session Yugoslavia's views on the problem of disarmament. May I now turn to the more limited aspects of the problem with which we are now dealing. I have already stated that it would not be reasonable to reduce the problem to that of quantity. We must seek to evolve an acceptable method for restricting the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, but we must be fully aware of the fact that this cannot constitute an aim in itself and that we should apply ourselves, in the first place, to the task of solving the basic problem of the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear Powers. In this sense it is not possible to separate the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons from the general context of nuclear disarmament; that is to say, to separate the question in an artificial manner or to set it against the more far-reaching aspects of nuclear disarmament. I know that the delegation of Ireland is aware of this, as is shown by the statement made in this Committee by the Foreign Minister of Ireland, Mr. Aiken.

When called upon to determine our attitude toward the proposal of the delegation of Ireland, we wish to make our position clear. This is the reason for which we are laying particular stress on the context within the framework of which the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons can be only a transitory measure leading to nuclear disarmament. It is in this light that it appears to be worthwhile to endeavour to study and solve this question.

Bearing in mind the existence of the two big military alliances of the existing Power blocs, and the possibility of a certain distribution, and thereby, also dissemination, of nuclear weapons in conformity with their military strategic plans, we are convinced that such a form of dissemination of nuclear weapons should also be avoided in the interests of peace and with a view to facilitating the solution of the problems of disarmament, international tension, et cetera.
For this reason, we have always been opposed to the setting up of nuclear and missile bases, or for that matter any bases, on the territory of other States, and have also given our support to the establishment of atom-free zones in areas where the main forces of the existing blocs are confronting each other, particularly in Central Europe.

Actually, it would be normal to expect that all States should support the concentration of our efforts on the opening of disarmament negotiations by opposing the continuation of the armaments race. One of the methods to be applied in this connexion would be the prevention of the wider production and dissemination of nuclear weapons, in the hope that it will be possible to evolve in the near future a method for effective disarmament, in the first place of the existing nuclear Powers where the greatest possibility for the dissemination of nuclear weapons actually lies, at least for the time being. That such a view has prevailed in our Organization, and that it is of tremendous importance for future efforts in the field of disarmament, has been borne out by our debate on the intention of France to engage in nuclear weapons tests in the Sahara. Nuclear tests can be prevented on a lasting basis only through the general and permanent cessation of nuclear weapons tests, discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons, destruction of existing stockpiles, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and a suspension of the armaments race. Precisely these measures constitute an essential part of the plans and proposals on complete and general disarmament which have been forwarded, according to our joint and unanimously adopted resolution, for study and solution to the Committee of Ten and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

If the proposal of the Irish delegation on the necessity of undertaking a study of the possibility of preventing a wider dissemination of nuclear weapons is viewed in this context, then my delegation considers the initiative a useful one and, in the light of the above considerations, will vote in favour of the proposal.

Mr. FAZHWAK (Afghanistan): I should like briefly to explain the position of my delegation on the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Ireland. The question of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was discussed.
at the last session, and the discussion which has taken place at this session on the question of disarmament, together with the statements on the previous item dealing with nuclear tests in the Sahara and the constructive statements already made on the present item give us some hope that this draft resolution will be adopted unanimously. The Afghan delegation will support it.

My delegation would like to make only one observation on the first paragraph of the preamble, not as a formal proposal but as a suggestion submitted for the consideration of the Irish delegation. The first paragraph reads:

"Recognizing that the danger now exists that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons may occur, aggravating international tension and the difficulty of maintaining world peace and thus rendering more difficult the attainment of general disarmament agreement."

My delegation believes that the paragraph would be better if the words "and thus" were changed and replaced by the word "by", so that the last part of the paragraph would read "... the difficulty of maintaining world peace by rendering more difficult the attainment of general disarmament agreement."

This is a mere suggestion submitted to the author of the draft resolution for his consideration and our purpose in making it is that we want the question of the elimination of international tension and the maintenance of peace to be the final goal of the disarmament negotiations.

Mr. VELAZQUEZ (Uruguay) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the Minister of External Affairs of Ireland and will thus take advantage of the opportunity of paying tribute to the indefatigable efforts of that heroic nation on behalf of peace. We have weighed with great attention the realistic arguments put before us by the representative of Ireland and we are convinced that the dangers he has outlined might well become real dangers if the time comes when nuclear weapons are as widely disseminated as the representative fears. We feel that this entire matter requires very careful study and that at the moment there are certain objections of principle which cannot be avoided until this Assembly, or international agreements arrived at elsewhere, can finally settle the question of general and complete disarmament.
However, since this draft resolution does not recommend substantive measures and merely suggests that further study be made of the various possibilities which may lead to the objectives sought, and that ultimately the results of these studies will be submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, my delegation, even though aware of the difficulties ahead of us, will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

_The CHAIRMAN:_ I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to a third revised version of the Irish draft resolution, which comprises changes to the first operative paragraph.

As the Committee is aware, the list of speakers in the general debate on this item was closed on Friday last at 6 p.m. There are eight more speakers on my list and there may be some explanations of vote. It is my hope that at this afternoon's meeting we shall be able to complete this item. Then we should be in a position to take up the next item, suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, at the beginning of the meeting tomorrow morning. In any case, it is my intention to turn to the new item tomorrow morning as soon as this item is completed. Accordingly I request members to prepare to intervene in the new debate. Because the plenary meeting tomorrow afternoon will take up several items of importance to representatives in the First Committee there will be no meeting of this Committee tomorrow afternoon, the meeting scheduled in the Journal for that time being therefore cancelled.

_The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m._