1. Question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara (continued)
2. Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (continued)

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QUESTION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE SAHARA (A/4183; A/C.1/258, Add.1, L.239/Rev.1) (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: Before taking up our agenda for today, the representative of Guatemala would like to explain his vote on the item "Question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara". I assume that the Committee will have no objections if I call upon him now. The representative of Guatemala has the floor.

Mr. KESTLER (Guatemala) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation would like very briefly to explain the votes we cast yesterday afternoon on the different draft resolutions presented to the Committee when we discussed the previous item concerning the question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara.

From the very beginning, my delegation was aware of the fact that in the subject we were discussing there were, besides questions of principle, fundamental political aspects which went beyond the framework within which we were discussing the item. That was why we tried to take an objective, just and impartial stand, although, when all is said and done, our stand had also to be determined by the friendship we felt toward both sides in the issue.

That was also the reason why we found ourselves unable to support either of the two extreme draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/258, Add.1, and A/C.1/239/Rev.1. We could not support the former because it contained statements of fact and principle which we believe did not seem to be in keeping with the statement and guarantees given by France, and because it was couched in terms which might be felt to be untimely, or not quite happily chosen, in view of the conditions in which these tests are to be carried out. Another reason is because it was the first statement that the United Nations was being called upon to make, notwithstanding the fact that other Powers have carried out tests which may have been even more dangerous than the test planned by France.
Furthermore, we were unable to support the second draft resolution, document A/C.1/L.259/Add.1, submitted by the delegations of Italy, the United Kingdom and Peru, because although it did recall the resolution of the General Assembly, resolution 1252 of the thirteenth session, it did not give a positive expression to the action which the United Nations Political Committee and the Assembly was supposed to take in view of the grave concern expressed by the African peoples. But on the other hand, it resolved a question that had not been submitted to the United Nations for debate, and that is that the French Government would take part in the negotiations to be held for the achievement of an agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control.

Confronted as we were with this dilemma, which I am sure must have also faced a number of other delegations, my delegation was happy to welcome the amendments of Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico and Panama, document A/C.1/L.240/Rev.1. We were pleased, as I say, to welcome these new amendments because they were more in keeping both with the debate and the views expressed by the parties concerned. To our way of thinking, this document gave due consideration to the grave concern which exists in the minds of the African peoples because of the dangers and risks which might be caused by this test. It also gives a more exact interpretation of resolution 1252 of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, bearing date 4 November 1958. Finally, as a new fact, it linked the action of the Committee to the negotiations to be held in Geneva on a general discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests under effective international control.

Proof of the appropriate position adopted can be found in the fact that the sub-amendments submitted by Ghana and Indonesia, document A/C.1/L.241. paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, with slight changes, took up this new element which I referred to which had not appeared in the original 22-Power draft resolution, but had been submitted by the five Latin American nations in their amendments.

It was for these reasons that my delegation intended to support the amendments submitted by the Latin American Powers. When the vote was taken, consistent with the stand that we had decided to take my delegation voted in
(Mr. Kestler, Guatemala)

favour of the three paragraphs in the Ghana-Indonesia sub-amendments, which contain the new element to which I referred previously, and as a question of basic principle stressed the action and position of France as against the negotiations which are being renewed in Geneva.
However, we could not support the paragraphs of the sub-amendment that contained the same views as those expressed in the 22-Power draft resolution. It was therefore logical that when the amendments of the two Powers were included in the 22-Power draft, our vote had to be in the negative, because we wanted the position to prevail that we had set for ourselves despite the fact that our opposition to the other paragraphs of the text alluded to was not substantive but only based on shadings and on the way in which the facts and principles were set forth. That is why our negative vote on the 22-Power draft (A/C.1/L.238/Rev.1) must not be taken to mean that we are unaware of the concern of the African nations. On the contrary, if one compares the texts, it will be seen that our support of the 5-Power amendment was an effort to include in any final text the expression of the serious concern felt by the African people, along with an appeal to France which was more in keeping with France's position as a sovereign State.

I do not think it is out of order to say that for the final vote, and when considering document A/C.1/L.239, the effect of our vote would have been exactly the same had we decided to abstain on all texts.

Our position with regard to the draft of Italy, the United Kingdom and Peru (A/C.1/L.235/Add.1) was also negative, in conformity with our previous position. However, we had to take a more categorical stand because we wished to support the third position, represented in the 5-Power amendment. This position was couched in more timely terms and was therefore able to be better received by all delegations.

I must also point out that the future position of my delegation on the votes that may be taken in the General Assembly will be determined by the presence or absence of a resolution similar to the one submitted by the five Latin American countries.

In order to be consistent, we also voted against the draft submitted by the three Powers (A/C.1/L.239/Add.1), since it did not include mention of the grave concern on the part of the African nations and it did not include it as part of this entire question. From the results of the votes, I gather that this was also the feeling of many Latin American countries that supported the 5-Power draft when it was put to the vote in document A/C.1/L.240/Rev.1.
In this case, we have confirmed the fact that two extreme negations must give rise to an affirmation. Our negative vote with regard to the two draft resolutions which represented the extreme points of view can only be taken as another proof of our efforts to contribute to the triumph of a conciliatory position, in which certain Latin American countries took the initiative.

My delegation was also led to this position by the friendship we feel to both parties -- to France, a country to which we look with admiration for all that she has done for culture, individual freedom and civilization; and to the African countries, with which we are linked by common desires and aspirations.

AGENDA ITEM 67

PREVENTION OF THE WIDER DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (A/4125; A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2)

The CHAIRMAN: We are now beginning consideration of the third item on our agenda, entitled "Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons". So far, the Committee has before it two documents relevant to this item, namely document A/4125 and the draft resolution submitted by Ireland, contained in document A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2.

Mr. AIKEN (Ireland): As my delegation did not intervene in the general debate on disarmament, I should like to say that we warmly welcome the tone and manner of the discussions which led up to the happy achievement of a unanimous resolution. The Irish delegation, as the Committee knows, is among those which have been active in urging a reconsideration of all attitudes which would impede our search for constructive agreements to reduce tension and promote co-operation. The unanimous resolution on disarmament represents, we trust, a significant step in that direction. We hope and pray that the deliberations of the Ten Nation Committee will lead to smooth and steady progress towards the growth of international law and the reduction of national forces and armaments.
I should like to endorse here the view of those representatives who, in our opinion, realistically, have stressed that the road to disarmament is likely to be long and hard and full of pitfalls. We are convinced that the reduction of national armaments and forces can only proceed step by step with the development of the rule of law and of an international force to maintain the law, and we view the resolution on general and complete disarmament, as many delegations view it, in the main as a reassertion -- a timely and we hope a fruitful reassertion -- of our determination to implement the principles of the Charter.

The draft resolution now put forward by my delegation does not conflict in any way with the objective of general disarmament. On the contrary, what it is intended to achieve is the prevention of the further deterioration in the armaments situation which appears to be impending unless specific efforts are made without delay to check it -- a deterioration which, if it occurs, may not only render general disarmament unattainable but may well bring about world war.
(Mr. Aiken, Ireland)

Delegates may remember that last year this Committee passed by 37 votes to none the first clause of this draft resolution now before us, the clause recognizing the danger of an increase in the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons.

Last year's draft resolution contained an operative clause calling for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with the problem. As this machinery did not commend itself to some delegations which were in favour of restricting nuclear weapons I withdrew the resolution expressing the hope that the danger recognized by the First Committee would be studied and dealt with by the eighty one-Power disarmament commission then about to be set up.

In the event, the disarmament commission met only once and the only business it dealt with was the resolution welcoming the Geneva agreement to establish the ten-nation committee on disarmament. In the hope that the ten-nation committee will deal with the most urgent aspects of the arms race, the present draft requests it to study the drafting of agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more countries during the years in which disarmament and related political problems are being discussed. The committee would be invited to study the feasibility of arriving at agreements containing the necessary safeguards whereby the Powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from transferring them to any nation not possessing its own nuclear weapons and whereby the States not possessing their own nuclear weapons would refrain from manufacturing or accepting them.

It may be asked, what are the nuclear Powers to which the resolution alludes? The answer is that we have in mind all the Powers producing nuclear weapons at the time when the suggested agreements are ready for signature, whatever the number may be at that date. The longer the agreements are delayed the greater is the danger of an increase in the number of nuclear Powers. With each addition to the nuclear circle the greater the number on the periphery who will feel themselves compelled, whatever the cost, to become as well armed as their neighbours.

There is, I think, no conceivable addition to the list of countries possessing nuclear weapons which will not cause a significant change in the pattern of regional and world politics. The change may indeed be great enough to destroy the balance of destructive weapons and forces, the precarious balance which has given the world the uneasy peace of the last few years.
In the view of my delegation, there are today two distinct sets of dangers facing us and they require different sets of measures aimed at averting them. The first set of dangers arises from the situation with which mankind has been trying to live since the end of the last war. That is the situation where two great power blocks confront each other, divided by deep mutual mistrust and ideological antagonism, and strenuously competing in a world-wide diplomatic and propaganda effort, backed ultimately by the military capacity, possessed by each set of Powers, to annihilate civilization. That situation, fraught with danger as it is, is nonetheless one with which we have managed to live for a number of years. Techniques have been evolved to deal with it -- very uncertain techniques it is true in comparison with the dangers involved, but perhaps slowly increasing in effectiveness. But for the second set, the new dangers, not only do no techniques exist, but we can hardly assess the scope and magnitude of the dangers themselves. These new dangers are, of course, those which are likely to flow from the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The present deadlock between the two great power systems makes it all the harder to prevent the spread of these weapons and it is unfortunately too early to say that that fundamental deadlock has been broken.

According to a recent and authoritative survey made on behalf of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, more than a score of countries now appear, in varying degrees, to be capable of entering the nuclear race.

The scientists concerned estimate that twelve countries are "technically able to embark on a successful nuclear weapon programme in the near future". Eight more are considered "to be capable economically and fairly competent technically". Six more are named as being "probably economically capable". The scientists put the danger in immediate and concrete terms when they say "the production of a few Hiroshima-style atom bombs is well within the reach of ten or more countries". It is almost superfluous to comment that what is within the reach of ten States now is likely to be within the reach of an indefinite number of additional States in the future.

As delegates are aware, plutonium, which is the fissionable core of some nuclear weapons, has for some years been obtained as a by-product of one type of nuclear electric power station. Nuclear reactors of this type are in course
of erection in countries not producing nuclear weapons. More are projected. Countries which may build this type of electric power plant mainly to keep their industrial potential and technical experience abreast of the times, will find themselves with the basic material for nuclear weapons on their hands. It will become increasingly hard for the Governments of these countries to resist domestic pressure to take the further step of producing nuclear weapons. They will be pressed to do so on the grounds of economy and security if not for considerations of prestige.

Nor is the possibility of wider dissemination even confined to States. Revolutionary organizations and groups can come into possession of such weapons by various means, and they are ever more likely to do so according as these weapons become more numerous, more easily transportable and part of standard military equipment. The danger of such access becomes greater as the nuclear circle expands, bringing with it new tensions and new political complications.

No one can calculate in advance the interplay of forces if country after country, revolutionary group after revolutionary group became possessed, secretly or openly, of nuclear weapons. All these, the new factors to which I have referred, point to one conclusion: national, regional and world politics would be radically changed and the new risks would be far greater than those which now confront humanity. It is against this scale of danger that we must, I suggest, measure the risks which may be inherent in any scheme to stop the spread of nuclear weapons now.
The dangers involved in wider dissemination include, in addition to those I have mentioned, several others to which the publication of the American Academy refers as "accidental atomic war, demagogic atomic war, and nuclear blackmail". The same publication -- Daedalus, Vol. 88, No. 3 -- concisely describes the prospect before us in the words: "The more numerous the states equipped with nuclear weapons the greater the possibility, mathematically and inexorably, of insane decisions and the further away the prospect of international agreement".

I greatly fear that we are now on the edge of a slippery slope: that before long, if we do not check this disastrous progress, the momentum acquired will be such that it will be beyond any human power to halt the increasingly rapid descent towards destruction. It would be a piece of tragic irony indeed if this descent towards destruction through the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons were to begin at the very moment when humanity's hopes are high because of the unanimity in this Organization on the need for controlled disarmament. If agreement on limitations cannot now be attained, that very fact, combined with what is known of the atomic capabilities of certain States, will impel other States to reconsider their atomic policies and seek individual safety through nuclear arms. The pattern, like that of panic, is one of numerous, isolated, desperate actions, each aimed at individual safety and all together bringing on a collective disaster.

The debates on our resolution last year showed that many delegations are anxiously aware of the dangers involved in the further spread of nuclear weapons. What may perhaps be contested, however, is the necessity for specific measures to meet these dangers.

It is sometimes asserted, for example, that an agreement on the cessation of tests will serve the same purpose. My delegation finds it hard to accept this. It is true that universal agreement on test cessation, which is most earnestly to be desired, would be a long step in the right direction. Such an agreement would, of course, require participation of all nations, including non-members of this Organization, and the setting up of a world-wide system of inspection machinery. Granted that an agreement at Geneva were followed by a world agreement not to test, it would still do little to check the actual dissemination, as distinct from the testing, of the weapons. They could still be manufactured.
and be transferred from one country to another without in any way infringing
international law or breaking any agreement. For these reasons, we do not believe
that test suspension would in itself be an adequate check on the wider
dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The second objection, which was indeed advanced against the proposals when
we made them last year, is that inspection and control may not be possible. Here
the problem falls into two parts: secret production of nuclear weapons by non-
nuclear States, and secret transfer of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers.
It is, we understand, relatively simple and cheap to install an effective system
of accounting to ensure that the entire production of a given reactor goes to
peaceful uses, from the date of installation of the accounting system. The point
about the date is important and underlines the need for urgent action before
further reactors are installed in non-nuclear States. Agreement on inspection
and control against manufacture of nuclear weapons in new countries would in itself
be an advance, but that advance is unlikely to be achieved unless there can also
be an agreement against transfer of the weapons.

Our suggestion is that, if the nuclear Powers agree not to transfer nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear States, the non-nuclear States should agree not to produce
or acquire these weapons and agree also to accept inspection of their reactors
and their territories to ensure that they are keeping their undertakings. At the
present time there is, of course, no inspection at all against secret transfer.
Even if the inspection system suggested is said to be incapable of being made
100 per cent effective, it would be an improvement on the present situation, in
which there is a complete absence of inspection and control over the production
and transfer of nuclear weapons. It would also give useful experience in the
techniques of inspection and control to be applied when the nuclear Powers agree
to cut off production.

We wish to emphasize that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, there will
always be the danger of secret transfer. We wish to emphasize also that any
agreement for complete nuclear disarmament, such as our unanimous disarmament
resolution envisages, must carry with it a far greater risk: that of secret
retention. A few nuclear weapons secretly retained, if some Powers had destroyed
all their nuclear weapons, would carry infinitely more serious consequences than
the secret giving of a nuclear weapon when all the major Powers were still fully equipped with nuclear weapons ready for instant use.

Our contention is that any risk of a breach of the non-dissemination agreements is in existing conditions a minor and acceptable risk. Our contention is that such agreements are urgently necessary if we are to prevent the risk of nuclear war and the difficulties of disarmament from becoming ever greater through the spread of nuclear weapons while we carefully and gradually feel our way towards the goal of universal national disarmament and the international rule of law and law enforcement.

I may say quite candidly that our approach to the problem of disarmament and the associated problem of the spread of nuclear weapons is based on the assumption that the nuclear Powers must act in their own enlightened self-interest: that, until their security is fully assured to their own satisfaction by an international force, they will not voluntarily part with any of the powers which the monopoly of these weapons gives them. What we ask is that they should hold the keys of the stores and assume the responsibility before their own people and before humanity for seeing that nuclear weapons are not spread throughout the world until a cut-off of all production can be achieved and existing stocks devoted to peaceful uses.
By not giving these nuclear weapons to their allies the nuclear Powers might possibly face some political inconvenience and tactical complexities. But there is no military or political advantage to be gained that outweighs the danger involved in spreading these weapons to more countries and thus giving their Governments or their revolutionary groups the power to start a nuclear war, or to engage in nuclear blackmail -- conceivably against a former ally. There is little doubt, we believe, that the safest and most effective use the nuclear Powers can make of their nuclear weapons is to stock-pile them under their own lock and key until they can gradually deliver them to a United Nations force upholding a world system of law and security in which they have learned to trust by seeing it operate successfully in limited areas.

Apart from the argument of enlightened self-interest, there is another strong argument for relying on the good sense of the nuclear Powers to keep the agreement not to give nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear State. Let us suppose that a nuclear Power gives nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear ally and confers on it an advantage in some local dispute in which the great Powers concerned did not wish to be directly involved. For this advantage to be obtained, the ally would have to show that it possessed the weapons. But if such an international agreement as we have in mind were in force it would be known that the ally in question, the new nuclear Power, had not produced these weapons itself; that would be determined by the inspection system. It would be clear therefore that it had got these weapons from an existing nuclear Power. The existing state of international relations and alliances would point unmistakably to the great Power in question and that Power would then stand before the world as being in flagrant breach of a solemn international agreement designed to make peace secure. For any Power which attaches importance to world public opinion -- and no great Power is strong enough to ignore it -- that would be a propaganda defeat of the first magnitude. The Committee will note that, failing an international agreement, no such stigma attaches to the transfer of nuclear weapons. Any great Power can hand them over at any time, if forced by the pressure of its allies relying perhaps on the fatal argument that others have them or are likely to have them soon.
For the reasons I have stated, my delegation believes that any risk involved in making non-dissemination agreements ought to be in present circumstances an acceptable risk if we set it against the alternatives: the colossal and unknown risks of that dark region into which we are in danger of drifting -- a nightmare region in which man's powers of destruction are constantly increasing and his control over these powers as constantly diminishing.

For these reasons, my delegation believes that it will be rewarding for the ten-nation committee to explore the possibilities of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons through such agreements as I have outlined and subject to such safeguards as the committee and its advisers are in a position to devise. In this draft resolution we are not, of course, calling for any definite conclusion before the matter has been studied. What we are calling for is a specific study which we hope will lead to firm agreements. It is our hope that all members of the Committee who recognize the existence of the danger -- and that is certainly the great majority of those present here -- will take the view that the next logical step, after the recognition of the danger, is the study of the best means of averting that danger. If that is so, by passing this draft resolution we will entrust to the responsible statesmen of the ten-nation committee and their expert advisers the task of studying what agreements can be reached to avert what is at present perhaps the most insidious danger now threatening humanity.

The last clause of the draft resolution requests the ten-nation committee to report the result of its work to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations. I appeal to the members of this Committee to pass this draft resolution with a vote which will emphasize the dangers we see in the further spread of nuclear weapons and emphasize the urgency of dealing with the problem with all possible speed.

The CHAIRMAN: The representative of Ireland has referred to the discussion of this subject which took place in this Committee at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. He has also introduced and explained the draft resolution now before us. Without wishing to curtail the debate in any way, the Chair assumes that members of the Committee intervening in the debate may wish to focus their attention to some extent on the draft resolution. The Chair
(The Chairman)

will consider this entirely in order and, indeed, hopes that, since the draft resolution has been in the hands of the delegations for some time now, those who wish to do so will be able to intervene in the debate as soon as possible. I need not remind the Committee about the rapid approach of our deadline of 5 December.

Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, I can assure you that my brief intervention will be along the lines which you have just indicated.

When, during the thirteenth session of the Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, first made his suggestions for measures aimed at the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, my delegation was not able to express an opinion on their tenor, because the Netherlands Government had lacked sufficient time to study them. We therefore welcomed the Minister's well considered withdrawal of his draft resolution after a vote on its second paragraph had been taken.

It is with equal appreciation that we now hail the re-introduction of this item on our agenda: not -- let me add at once -- because my Government has by this time completed its studies of this matter and has reached final conclusions concerning means that might be employed in order to prevent the danger so rightly brought to our attention, but because during the time that has elapsed since the last Assembly session, my Government's thinking on the implications of an unchanged continuance of the present situation, as well as on the most effective approach to a solution of the problems posed by a possible change, has had the opportunity of taking clearer shape.
As to these implications, it is my delegation's view that, as science and technology progress and become more widely spread, the likelihood of an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons under their own exclusive political control, will become greater. This may happen either through purchase, or through technical assistance or as a result of the possibility that countries, for which the manufacture of nuclear weapons is at present a strain on or beyond their power, will acquire the financial means, the scientific skill and the technical equipment necessary for such manufacture. Such a development, that is to say, an unlimited increase in the number of countries possessing their own nuclear weapons, might lead to added difficulties in the way of reaching satisfactory agreements on international disarmament and to a serious complication of the problem of efficient control of such disarmament. Without wishing either to dramatize or to exaggerate these prospects the Netherlands Government nevertheless feels that they are sufficiently serious to be considered as an incentive to study the desirability of preventive action of some sort.

It could perhaps be argued that the necessary measures are already being taken, now that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear test explosions is being negotiated and various plans for general and complete disarmament will come up for discussion presently. It seems to my delegation, however, that these measures will not, in themselves, provide an effective remedy to the development I have mentioned. Although the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests would probably create a tendency among the non-possessors of nuclear weapons to forego any aspirations they might have to produce them, it would not offer any certainty that no efforts at production or acquisition would in fact be made. Complete disarmament would, of course, exclude this possibility, but even if we accept the most optimistic estimate, this happy state could not be reached before several years have passed, and in the meantime the temptation for outsiders to join the "atomic club" would continue to exist. My delegation therefore concurs in the view that the most serious attention should be given to this problem.

With regard to the manner in which it would be most desirable to carry out the search for a solution, my Government believes that, even today, the time is not yet ripe for the discussion or adoption in the General Assembly of any decision on the substance of the problem.
The problem has many aspects which require careful study. If I might mention only two of these, I would point to the requirement that the aim must not be sought to be achieved at the cost of any weakening in the relative strength of our defences, and secondly to the necessity for applying a reliable system of international control to any measures that might be contemplated. This latter requirement will need most careful planning, particularly in respect of the prevention of export and import of nuclear weapons, which is less easily controlled than their manufacture.

My delegation was happy to see that in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.2) introduced by the delegation of Ireland, no immediate and final measures are recommended. Instead it limits itself to suggesting to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee that it should consider appropriate means for averting the danger and examine the feasibility of arriving at an international agreement. It thus ensures that the problem will be studied within the framework of the negotiations on general disarmament and at the same time that no precipitate steps are taken.

My delegation will give its full support to this draft resolution.

Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon): We believe that there is hardly any scope for widespread discussion of a draft resolution of this kind. We want to give only very briefly the three reasons which immediately move us to support the draft resolution which the representative of Ireland has so ably placed before us.

In the first place we support the draft resolution exactly because of what is stated in the first paragraph of the resolution. We believe in that statement. We believe that there is always a danger to world peace if, in some form or another, nuclear weapons are allowed to continue. We acknowledge that in the interests of defence most countries would want not only to preserve the nuclear weapons that they have, but to go on improving the destructive potential of these weapons. Therefore, anything that is directed towards the reduction of nuclear weapons in the world will have our approval. Therefore, as we believe that there is a danger if those countries that are able to manufacture nuclear weapons are permitted to distribute or disseminate these weapons amongst their friends, there would be an increase in the danger to the world
and in creating a greater difficulty in maintaining world peace. That is the first reason why we are impelled to support this resolution which we feel has a very good purpose behind it.

Secondly, this draft resolution does not pretend to state definitely a way of meeting this difficulty. In other words, there is nothing here which commits the Assembly to a stated course of action. Apparently, the representative of Ireland also recognized that we are at a stage when further study of this problem is required. It would appear to be a simple problem, but there are difficulties in the application of a request that there should be no dissemination; and those implications will have to be fully considered either by this Committee or by some other group; we ourselves agree that we must have at least a medium for such examination in the Ten-Power Disarmament Commission; this is a part of disarmament -- this draft resolution refers to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is legitimate for us to ask that that Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee be good enough to consider this matter in all its details and in all its implications and report to this Assembly so that the Assembly may then be in a better position to come to some decision which may have the desired effect.
The third reason why we support this draft resolution is in the interests of our own security. If the dissemination of these weapons is permitted or unhindered -- and when I use the words "unhindered" or "permitted" I do not mean an absolute embargo which somebody will impose on these countries; we do not urge that their rights be interfered with to that extent -- what we do intend and, I believe, even the mover of the draft resolution is to ask for the co-operation of the present nuclear Powers and, with their agreement, hope not to allow these nuclear weapons to be distributed to other countries, however closely allied they may be to the possessors of nuclear weapons or however friendly they may be.

It is true, we believe, that nuclear weapons possessed either by the present nuclear Powers or by those to whom they are given by these Powers will be used only for defensive purposes. Unless there is some accident or some very unreasonable action taken by some country, no country today will want deliberately to provoke a war to use these nuclear weapons. Therefore, we have no fear of that. We believe that they will be used for defensive purposes.

But even for defensive purposes, if we allow or permit dissemination of these weapons freely, then immediately the question arises: What about the right of people who do not have powerful allies or friends having nuclear weapons to get nuclear weapons for themselves in their own defence? Any one of the present nuclear Powers -- the United States, the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union -- may be able to give their nuclear weapons to another friendly country. But there may be a country which is also concerned with its own defence which has no such powerful friends or at least to whom these nuclear Powers will not give nuclear weapons. Then there will immediately arise the desire of these countries to produce these nuclear weapons themselves and a competitive system will grow up because of this dissemination. Today in a sense nobody wants to be engaged in competition, at least ninety per cent of the other countries of the world, as we heard yesterday and the day before when we were discussing France's desire to become a nuclear Power. We have shown why that should be avoided. Anyway, that has been fully discussed.

If there is no dissemination of nuclear weapons today, I do believe that, although there are three or four countries in Europe who are now in a position to proceed one step further to explode an atomic bomb, they will not desire to do that because there is not that amount of competition today. But if the present nuclear
Powers distribute their nuclear weapons only to their particular allies and friends, then others who cannot get the weapons in that way will be compelled in their own defence to use all their ingenuity to try to work out nuclear weapons of their own. We will thus start a dangerous cycle of competitiveness in the production of nuclear weapons, and that will be solely because of the reason that the distribution of nuclear weapons is going to be unlimited.

Those are the three points which actuated my delegation to support this draft resolution. So far as we are concerned, we can heartily commend the acceptance of a draft resolution of this kind to the Committee. It does not commit the Committee to any course of action except to ask the Ten-Power Committee to study the draft resolution. I hope that it will receive wide-spread support from this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any other member wish to speak? Since some members have indicated their desire to speak, I invite them to inscribe their names with the Secretary as soon as possible.

Unless there is objection, I intend to close the list of speakers at 6 p.m. today. The closing of the list would, of course, not preclude explanations of vote after the voting had taken place. Are there any objections? There seems to be none.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Is any member prepared to speak this afternoon? In that case, the Committee will reconvene on Monday at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.