Verbatim record of the one thousand and forty-second meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 2 November 1959 at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. MATSCH (Austria)

General and complete disarmament [70] (continued)

Note: The Official Record of this meeting, i.e. the summary record, will appear in mimeographed form under the symbol A/C.1/SR.1042. Delegations may submit corrections to the summary record for incorporation in the final version which will appear in a printed volume.
AGENDA ITEM 70
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT (A/4218; A/4219; A/C.1/818, 820, 821)(continued)

Mr. Krishna Menon (India): Although it is many weeks, Mr. Chairman, since you have occupied the chair of this Committee, along with the other officers, it does not diminish our desire or pleasure in congratulating you on your unanimous election. We therefore would like to convey these feelings to you and to the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur, who were also unanimously elected.

My delegation would also like to express its feelings of sorrow and sympathy, which have already been expressed in this Committee, in respect of the sad demise of His Majesty the King of Laos, a country that is so close to us both geographically and otherwise.

We come today to the latest stages of the debate on disarmament. For various reasons, including the one that my delegation may not have many opportunities of intervening on this subject in the course of this session, if nothing else on account of the developments that have taken place, I ask the Committee's indulgence to be able to deal with this problem in the context in which we see it, its past history and what we believe may be its progress in the future.

I can do no better to place this subject in its context than to read out to the Committee the most recent statement of our Prime Minister, after this item was placed on the agenda:

"There are few problems that call for more calm judgement than the issue of war. Yet, the approach to, and consideration of, this problem is more often than otherwise in the context of emotion, passion or prejudice, or at best in terms of pious virtue and sentiment. This is true whether it be of its causes and, as some argue, its justification, or, as humanity ardently desires, the abolition of war."

It goes on to say:

"It is unrealistic, and indeed perilous, to rest in the belief that this world of ours will be rid of the scourge of war and that war will be abandoned as a method of settling disputes and problems, merely because there is a general desire for peace. Too often this desire is coupled with placing the onus of existing tensions and threats to peace and of their
calamitous prospects on others -- individual national leaders, nations or groups of them. The plea for peace has thus become inseparable from political acrimony, and almost the language of war is used to promote peace! All this is part evidence that possibly the desire for peace, through well-nigh universal, is not yet an informed and instructed desire, nor is it free from some of the very factors that threaten civilization with a holocaust.

"We have to use our informed thinking to understand and assess these causes, and their relation to war and war institutions, their place in national and international politics, economy and thought, and seek to adapt and orient them in terms of our evaluation in relation to war or its avoidance."

It is in the background of this way of thinking that my delegation seeks to present its views to the Committee.

For two years prior to this session there was no discussion of disarmament in the organs of the United Nations proper, since the Disarmament Commission was not able to meet except to perform its formal functions or to pass on whatever there was. The item for the Disarmament Commission is not before us. I shall refer to that in a moment. But although there had been no discussion in these buildings or in what is called the narrow context of the United Nations, there perhaps has not been any period at which more intensive discussions have taken place than in the last two years between the people who are in the best position to deliver the goods. This is not to say that disarmament or the establishment of peace is the responsibility of a few Powers, however great or small, or however important in one way or another. But it is to point out that the method of direct discussion represents, on the one hand, the realization that one way or another, irrespective of the channel through which communications take place, results must be achieved.
As a result of this, there have been talks in Geneva, as we all know, on various items and aspects of this problem, and some partial agreements or progress to agreements have been reached. This progress, the pace of it, quick or slow, as we look at it, and what has not been reached, are all reflective of the present state of the problem and its difficulties.

I would like to say however -- and from the point of view of our delegation it is very important -- that the present debate, that is to say, the debate on the item that we have now, procedurally does not emerge from the Geneva talks. That is to say, we are not discussing either the progress or the report of the Geneva discussions. They proceed procedurally and therefore on merit from the item put before the Assembly by one of the delegations, the delegation of the Soviet Union, after the Assembly met and after it was thrown together with another item, and therefore it has political meaning. That is to say, we are discussing an item which has arisen from the context of factors that emerged after we met here. In other words, we in the discussion of this matter may not water it down back to our old controversies and also forget the newer elements and approaches imported into it.

But at the same time, I think it would be wrong to suggest that this main problem of a warless world, as my delegation termed it in the discussion in the general debate, is a new thing to the world or indeed in the context of modern debates. One can go back to antiquity and refer to theological phrases:

"They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift sword against nation. Neither shall they learn war anymore."

That is in the modern world, the last 2000 years. But if we go further back there are references in the same way. But for the purpose of our present controversy, apart from the history of the previous age in Europe, even in recent times, that is since the Disarmament Commission was set up, there have been definite proposals placed before us through the various organs, principally by the United States of America and the Soviet Union.
Now, if I will not tax the patience of the Committee, I should like to read two or three of these small extracts -- and perhaps go a little backward. It is usual in these halls to speak rather cynically about what has been called the "Geneva spirit". That is because we approach things with a spirit-like approach in a desire to count the material advantages that come out of them, or we are unable to assess the effects of that spirit upon action.

On 28 July 1955, President Eisenhower, speaking on war at Geneva said:

"I came to Geneva because I believe mankind longs for freedom from war and rumours of war. I came here because of my lasting faith in the decent instincts and good sense of the people who populate this world of ours. I return home tonight with these convictions unshaken and with the prayer that the hope of mankind will one day be realized."

He went on to say about the same time:

"I want to give you a few reasons for hope in this project. First, the people of all the world desire peace; not a peace of the mere stilling of the guns, but a peace in which they can live happily, tranquilly and in confidence; in which they can raise their children in a world of which they will be proud. That common desire for peace is a terrific force in this world, and one to which I believe all the political leaders in the world are beginning to respond."

If I may say so, with great respect, we do not pay adequate attention to that last sentiment in this extract which I read out to you.

Now, we come to a more recent statement of the President of the United States, that is, only a few days ago on 17 September 1959, he said:

"The basic principle is that we have the conviction, first of all, that mutual disarmament, universal disarmament, is really the one great hope of the world living in peace in future years."

The following day we heard the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union say to us:

"The peoples are thirsting for peace; they want to live without fear for their future, for their destinies, without fear of losing their loved ones in the conflagration of a new war." (A/PV.799, page 17)

"For centuries the peoples dreamed of getting rid of the destructive means of warfare." (Ibid.)
"We say sincerely to all countries: To counter-balance the slogan 'Let us arm!', which is still current in some quarters, we put forward the slogan 'Let us completely disarm!' Let us rather compete in who builds more homes, schools, ... for his people, produces more grain, meat, milk, clothing and other consumer goods; let us not compete in who has more hydrogen bombs or more missiles." (A/PV.799, page 38)

At the end of their historic interview, which is not merely a matter for the United States and the Soviet Union, but for the world as a whole in view of the subject, they stated:

"The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the President of the United States agreed that the question of disarmament" -- which we are discussing -- "is the most important one facing the world today. Both Governments will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem."

I will not read these any more because the Members of the United Nations are familiar with most of them.

There have been statements of this kind right through history, and our effort in the establishment of peace is still in the midst of a mental conflict and confusion. Taking the modern world, and if I may briefly survey, going back to the time of the Roman Empire, they established what Mahatma Ghandi called "the peace of the grave". That is, they conquered the empire of the Greeks, then they went on to conquer others, and conquered Britain and Gaul, even though the Teutons and Asiatics united against them. And they said, "There is peace". That kind of peace is the peace that comes out of a doctrine of balance of power. That is the kind of peace established by negotiation from strength, as it is called -- a very badly coined phrase. Also, that is the kind of peace where we regard powerful instruments of destruction as deterrents and agents of peace. Here again, if I may go back to Mahatma Ghandi's ideas, you can never get peace out of war. We are to equate means to our ends; and out of wrong means we never get good ends. So from that time onwards, there have been attempts.

Coming near to the statements of President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev, and the others, about a world that is rid of all arms, and we live in a condition, I hope, where disputes and problems between nations shall be resolved not by the
instrument of war. There have been many attempts at peace-making. In modern
times -- I will not give the chronology of it -- right down, shall we say, if
you take the very recent times and of 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia -- after
the Baruch Plan, there have been about twenty attempts. And each time the
establishment of peace has been based upon the balance of power. Introduced into
it is one of those doctrines that appeals to the national spirit of people, and
also the desire to survive, the doctrine that is called "self-defence" which has
appeared in our time by, in our opinion, a misrepresentation of the Charter and
Article 51. Self-defence will exist only in conditions where nations, fully
armed, are living in a state of peace by some sort of uncomfortable agreement.
Self-defence in the conditions of a disarmed world would become unnecessary
because the defence of any part of the world will become the competence and the
obligation of the entire world.

I intended to go through these various attempts, which have failed, because
reference has been made about the sentimental character of this approach -- and
the Briand-Kellogg Pact, for example, was quoted as one of those attempts that
became abortive. Well, first of all, just because we have tried and failed,
is not a reason not to try again until peace is established. But what is more,
conditions have changed so much, not merely in degree but in kind, going to the
basic quality of it. The current of history, beginning with the Peace of
Westphalia to the various treaties and conventions resulting in the Hague
Conventions and the establishment of the League of Nations, all that was based
upon the previous ideas. But now we have this situation: Right through modern
history, in between two wars, the statesmen of the world get together and say
"Let us have peace". And they spend the inter-war years preparing for the next
war -- quite unconsciously, perhaps -- in case peace does not come. So much is
their faith in removing mountains that they open their windows in the morning to
see if the mountain is still in front of it. Therefore, while it was possible
in past years that in the intervening periods of the wars we could discuss peace
in order to establish it, and do it again after the next war, we have different
circumstances now in that we will not have the facility to discuss peace if there
is another war in modern times. That is to say, there will be no ruins to
repair in the same way.
This, of course, has changed the entire situation, even discussing peace. My country is convinced that there is no half-way house between peace or war. That is why we want to devote some of the time that we take at this meeting to point out that there is a fundamental difference of approach in these matters, and while it is necessary to talk about control and disarmament, the size of guns and the reduction of troops -- we shall have something to say about all these things -- it is equally necessary to understand that the objective we have in view is not the balanced limitation of armaments. The balanced limitation of armaments is only a method of being able to throw away all arms. There is no possibility of achieving any of the things we have spoken about unless we have a world in which there are no national forces for so-called national security. This is not again either a new thought or something that we managed -- my delegation or my part of the world.

On 24 April 1952, the United States of America -- which I suppose represents in a very typical way Western civilization -- presented a document in the Disarmament Sub-Committee. It is marked Document DC/G.1/PV.3 24 April 1952. Since the document is available, I will not read it all out. But it says here:

"The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war by relaxing the tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter, impossible as a means of settling disputes between nations." (DC/G.1/PV.3, paragraph 20)

My delegation submitted the same type of thing in so many resolutions and also made its appeal on behalf of the Government of India in our commemorative session at San Francisco. But it is one thing for a comparatively under-powered nation -- economically, politically and militarily -- to speak about this; it is another for the Heads of two Governments of the most powerful countries, to put forward that as a problem of political policy.
"To achieve this goal," said the United States, "all States must co-operate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world; (a) in which its armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no State will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war, and (b) in which no State will be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other States having knowledge of such preparations."

Again, it goes on to say:

"To reach and keep this goal, international agreements must be entered into by which all States would reduce their armed forces to levels and restrict their armaments, types and quantities necessary for (a) the maintenance of internal security, (b) fulfilment of obligations of States to maintain peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

"Such international agreements must ensure by a comprehensive and co-ordinated programmes.""

My delegation does not necessarily agree with all the details set out, but we have read them out in order to point out that from the beginning of time there has been this attempt to try to talk about the bringing down of arms. Even conservative statesmen such as a British Conservative Prime Minister said years ago:

"Is not the time come when the powerful countries of Europe should reduce their armaments...when they should be prepared to declare that there is no use in such overgrown establishment". -- This is very relevant for us to consider today -- "What is the advantage of one Power greatly increasing its army and navy? Does it not see that other Powers will follow out its example? No increase of relative strength will accrue to any one Power;" -- that is to say, an arms race is not likely to give anyone a preponderance. -- "The true interest of Europe is to come to some accord so as to enable every country to reduce those military armaments which belong to a state of war rather than of peace."

This was said as early as 1841, and we are still discussing the same problems.

To come nearer to our time, with regard to the First World War, which was the war previous to the last one, the British Foreign Secretary, who had the
responsibility of declaring war at that time, said a few years after the war:

"What was the underlying cause which had been working for years to bring about War? ... It was, in my opinion, the great growth of armaments before the War. Before the War, it was often said that great armaments were a protection against war. Now, if we were wiser after the event" -- this is 1922 after the 1914 War -- "we should never say that again... The moral of the last Great War, and the state of Europe before it, was that great armaments did not prevent war; they brought war about. That was one lesson. Another lesson was that if war came on a modern scale no victory would enable the conqueror to escape from the awful suffering which war caused. And the next war, if it ever came, would be far more terrible than the last."

All this looks elementary today in the context of atomic destruction. I think it was the representative of Greece who, in speaking to us, said:

"It is necessary for us, while discussing this matter and speaking about a world without war or even universal disarmament, to look at the thing in a realistic fashion and consider what are the reasons."

But before we do that I would like to refer to the fact that we are discussing this item in the context of a draft resolution sponsored by eighty-two countries. It is a good newspaper story. I am sure it warms the corners of our hearts to feel that for the first time the co-sponsoring of a draft resolution by all the countries of the world represented here is on this subject. But it has more than one effect and more than one reaction. When everybody co-sponsors it, it may become nobody's business. Apart from that, it is likely to be regarded that the whole of this debate is a kind of shadow boxing or going through the motions of debate.

So far as we are concerned, the universal support of this draft resolution is not without precedent, and a precedent which did not have the consequences we desired it should have. In 1957, we had a resolution in this Assembly, after an acrimonious debate which, even though it was not sponsored by the eighty-two countries, was carried unanimously. After 1957, the result not of the resolutions but of the general turn of events was that there had been no progress in the Disarmament Commission. Therefore, this resolution should not be merely dismissed by us with the thought that here is a universal agreement. In that case,
we need not discuss anything at all. I submit that it represents, on the one hand, the anxieties of Governments and States in regard to this problem. It represents also encouragement, support. If it were the beginning, I would say that it represents a good sendoff, a good push to the ten-Power efforts that are being made, to the discussions that are going on at Geneva, to the coming together of the two great countries with their friends on either side. All this is represented by this draft resolution.

Therefore, we do not approach this merely from the point of view that we are one of the eighty-two countries and, consequently, the result must be a foregone conclusion from the point of view of obtaining a vote. In fact, we have hardly ever made speeches here with a view to influencing votes. They are decided in other ways. But in this particular case, the decision of the Assembly is a foregone conclusion. This is the opportunity for us, for those who are outside these discussions in their narrow context and those who may not have had the opportunity to present their views in the course of the discussions in this Committee, to express our views. Repeatedly in the speeches of the Great Powers or the participants in the ten-Power meeting and indeed in all the other speeches, it has been said that whatever is said here may be communicated to the ten-Power meeting. Of course, this is an old story. This also indicates that world Governments, large and small, have become very concerned.

But if we could be satisfied with a resolution of this kind, we could go back to the history of the United Nations in regard to the disarmament business. As early as 24 January 1946, this Organization, at its first session, passed resolution 1 (I), the first resolution that was passed. It appointed an Atomic Energy Commission and said that it

"shall proceed with the utmost dispatch and inquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible."

These were the concrete things it had to do: exchange of scientific information, control of atomic energy, elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and other major weapons of mass destruction, effective safeguards against violations.
In resolution 41 (I) of the same session, the Assembly recommended to the Security Council:

"that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connexion with the control of atomic energy and the general regulation and reduction of armaments."

Resolutions have been passed in this way. Similarly, smaller delegations, less significant delegations like mine, have repeatedly submitted proposals. While one has no desire to refer to them from any point of view of selfish nationalism, it is as well for the Committee to be reminded that the Disarmament Commission was repeatedly asked by resolution 704 (VII), resolution 715 (VIII), resolution 836 (IX) and resolution 914 (X) to consider proposals made in this Committee in their Commission. So far as we are concerned, resolution 808 (IX) and resolution 914 (X) of two separate sessions were specifically referred by name to the Disarmament Commission. The only result it produced was a certain amount of encomium and praise from leaders of the disarmament movement like Jules Moch, who said that they were very good, but we heard no more about them. What is more, it took two years before the Disarmament Commission found out that there were now procedural difficulties in allowing the delegation of India to present its proposals.

This is not said by way of complaint but only to point out that these proposals, proposals of the character made in this Assembly, have taken several years in order to reach a point of more practical consideration. Since there is not time, I will not read them but merely state what they say. These resolutions referred to an armaments truce, a United Nations peace fund, the enlargement of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, the cessation of tests, budgetary reduction, the stopping of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and a ban on the use of fissionable materials for military purposes. So it is not as though the topics were not discussed. All this has been referred to. But we approach this from a different point of view as well and, as I said a while ago, I will come back to it.
My Government desires attention to be drawn to some of the problems that have been discussed in this debate, largely with a view to presenting our view as to their inapplicability or applicability. Reference has been made to the fact that only if we remove these causes to a considerable extent would it be possible to take effective steps. We are not attempting any psychological examination or academic discussion of this matter. But the main problem, as the representative of Greece pointed out, was the problem of national security.

So long as this problem of national security is considered as an exclusive concern or, very largely, of national concern, then we are bound to have the problems of keeping arms, increasing those arms, as said by Lord Grey, and afterwards making those arms themselves the cause of war. In our opinion also, this lack of security arises on the one hand because of the egoistic feelings of nations with regard to their cultural, racial or other superiorities, or the conception that some people are born to rule and others are not, and that great nations and small nations are to a certain extent eliminated by the composition of the United Nations itself, in status but not in function. It also arises from the fact that nationalism often outflows its national frontiers and, not satisfied with flying aloft the flag of that country in their own territory, they desire to plant it in others.

That is why people like ourselves are unashamed to repeat, time after time, that empire and colonies are the cause of wars, even in their attenuated state, because of the desire for expansion, the desire and search for other land; what is more, the necessity to raise the size of national arms, not merely to protect their borders but to protect territories that are far away from them, calls upon them to demand more and more armament. We shall refer to this matter later.

Thirdly, comes what is now very fashionable and more current, and that is the ideological conflicts. These ideological conflicts are not new to us. In more modern times there were the Crusades in the Holy Land against the Infidel. The Infidel is the fellow whom you do not like, and the Holy man is one's self.
Ideological conflicts, therefore, are not new. But in the view of my delegation, the ideological conflict is largely a propaganda instrument, largely a motive power perhaps to already other existing factors and very often used by those who want to retain certain ideas or interests in order to get mass support.

Ideological controversies will disappear only when we begin to respect the human mind and realize that there is no conquest of an idea, bad or good. If it is a bad idea, as we see it, it must be counter-balanced not by another bad idea but by a good one. Therefore, we are likely in this time, largely on account of the propaganda that has gone on from either side, to give a place to the ideological controversies which to the future historian will appear rather exaggerated.

Then, of course, there are the economic conflicts. The economic conflicts, in old times, regarded part of the world as the producers of raw materials, and others manufacturers, where it was thought that the invisible exports from a country in the way of services would in some form be used as an economic hold on the others, where in order to retain one part of the world as prosperous, another part must remain poor and, what is more, those positions being stabilized or buttressed by the building of heavy barriers in the way of trade, coming in the way of traffic between nation and nation, euphemistically called "tariff walls". All these things have been responsible for creating rivalry between peoples.

However, -- and we may congratulate ourselves in so thinking -- there is one course which nobody now speaks of in respectable society, and that is what is called "war muscle"; that war is necessary in order to make people what they are. I remember seeing a show some years ago in New York where the father tells a son that he must be a cannibal. And he said, "I will not eat a man". Then the father says: "What has happened to you? You cannot eat a man! Have you gone soft?" So the wars must have appeared to Mussolini. He is no longer prevalent and that is one great advantage we have gained.
We say, therefore, that security must not merely be a national affair. It should not merely be a question of, in the name of self-defence, getting together in order to form great war groups and accumulating arms to cause further wars. The idea of expansionism must go, and where large areas of the world are today in the possession of groups of people, which on the one hand creates controversies and, on the other -- purely from this point of view -- makes necessary the retention of arms either to suppress unwilling populations or in order to prevent the territory from being taken by somebody else, that will also have to go.

Therefore, the emerging action, in order to be possible, must accept this view of a warless world.

It is not possible to give commands to national States' sovereignty unless you can back it with the power of sanction, and if the power of sanction is present in someone, that power must effectively be greater than those against whom the sanction is exercised. If there are groups working together, other groups come in. Therefore, in the submission of my delegation, so long as it is thought that peace can be established by methods of war, there will be no peace, there will be these arguments about disarmament. If they are successful, they will lead towards the goal.

The new item which is called "general and complete disarmament", which as I have said, has respectable support from all quarters, in our view means a world without war, which lives under a world law where it is possible not only to bring down the size of armies, but to abandon them altogether. This calls for a degree -- not an absolute one -- of economic equality as between peoples in the world, looking upon disarmament as a significant step towards peace and, what is more, not using the resources of a nation in order to arm countries which do not require arms for their own defence but only require them for purposes of alliances and what not.

This attempt has a rather sordid history in the past. Nowadays we talk about
arms that will fire only in one direction. When we say to our friends, "These war alliances are threatening to us", they turn around and say, "They are not intended against you". Our answer is that the guns that fire only in one direction have not been made. But then, in older times, it was even worse. If one looks at the Patent Office Library in the United Kingdom, one will find that there was a gentlemen who patented a weapon in 1870. He said: "I have a new type of gun which is a gun that fires automatically and prevents invaders from boarding ships". The Turks at that time were a powerful people and he claimed great advantage for this war-like invention. He said that it was:

"A new type of gun or machine, called 'defence' that discharges so often, and so many bullets, and can be so quickly loaded as to render it next to impossible to carry any ship boarding."

Its peculiar virtue lay in the fact that it was constructed with two sets of magazines, one for round bullets for fighting Christians, and the other for square bullets, with sharp edges to be used against the Turks.

This was the old days. I read this not because of morbid interest, but because we have moved on. We are not after all so bad as humanity; we have moved on to the idea that there must be some equality in offensive weapons and, therefore, we have banned some of these things, and introduced new ones, of course.

Then there is also the idea that if weapons are made, they must be sufficiently respectable for innocent people to carry. Therefore, it is interesting to recall that one of the armaments which were wielded by soldiers in this olden time was an old mace made of iron or steel, capable, in skilled hands, of breaking the strongest body armour. A point about this mace was that it might properly used in war by Priests and Bishops instead of a sword, so that it might conform to the canonical rule against their shedding of blood. Apparently, if you knock your head, you do not shed blood.

I well remember my history master explaining this difference and pointing out with ironic gusto that Bishops and maces could take effective part in hand-to-hand warfare by breaking a limb or battering out a brain. So that humanity has gone through all this foolishness of trying to camouflage something.
The alternative to the mace today -- and I hope that nobody will take
offence at it -- is a clean bomb; that is, instead of a dirty bomb, you have a
clean bomb; instead of a sword, you have a mace. All of this leads to the
following. It is not, as a great man said, a matter of physics, but a matter of
ethics. How well arms may be abandoned, so long as war is not banished from the
world as an instrument of policy, depends to a certain extent on individual minds.
To the mind of my delegation the main purpose of this debate must be, as we shall
point out later, to create a change of climate where we are no longer aiming to
be killed by nine-inch guns and not by nineteen-inch guns, but already to avoid
the whole purpose of killing.
Therefore, in the modern version there are various humane weapons where radiation does not come out and, what is more, there is the idea that these instruments are not intended for the purpose of war. I beg to submit, I presume to do so, that if children have toys they will play with them. Unfortunately, the vast capacity of man in the field of technology, particularly between the days of 4 October 1957 and today, has advanced beyond all known limits and has not been matched by his growth in culture or imagination or even by the idea that if he hurts somebody he will hurt himself. It always reminds me of what the great British General, Lord Montgomery, once said. He said that the safest place in the next war would be that nearest to the enemy because the radiation would go away from him and not towards him.

Therefore, this problem as it is presented to us and as we must present it before the world, has a different orientation, that we are not looking to a number of people who will be like a protection squad in order to use physical force, and unless this is done we are not likely to get anywhere.

Apart from anything else, the reason, of course, is this. With modern weapons, and I do not only mean atomic weapons, to a certain extent the danger is greater when it is agreed that we rely only upon molecular weapons, because we may go back to the wars of those times. In modern times, even without any deliberate attempt at waging war, the mistaken judgement of somebody, the machiavellian policy of someone, or the conveying of wrong news, purposely or otherwise, can lead to difficulties.

I will not refer to any more recent instances because it might arouse feelings, but it is possible today, for example, that an aeroplane which is carrying atomic bombs for practice purposes may pick up phenomena in the sky on the radar screen which might be mistaken for an aircraft of some other country, yet it might be a large bird or a meteor, and the pilot would drop his bombs somewhere. Again, there may be such a situation as that which precipitated the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, when King Frederick William of Prussia, aided by Bismarck, was endeavouring to ensure that Prince Albert would go to Spain in order that France might be beaten out of the business. What he did was to edit a press telegram so that it appeared as something
different from what it was. He thus created a war mentality and precipitated
the war, even though Napoleon Bonaparte might have waged war without that. Therefore, we have to create this climate of peace if we are to get anywhere.

We have before us the Soviet proposal which contains this main objective, which is what moves us the most, in spite of what is called "the lack of realism", to which we will refer in a moment. It has tacked on to it certain proposals which some may think rather vitiate it, but, on the other hand, the Russians claim that they are being realistic. And there are certain specific proposals, all of which we have heard about in this room so many times, but since time is going on, my Government desires its views to be expressed on these matters, not in order to have a premature discussion, but because we will have no other opportunity of presenting these views in this way.

I will first take the United Kingdom proposals. Now, as is known, the United Kingdom is very close to us and usually there are consultations, not on matters of defence, but generally speaking. At least, we know their mind and they know ours, which is a great advantage. What is more, the British people, as they would all admit, have a very pragmatic view of things, what Lord Dickenson called "a sense of fact". Therefore, I am personally rather disappointed that my good friend, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, has put forward these proposals on which we have to make remarks and observations which he might not accept.

The programme is divided into three stages, and we would say that these three stages would only take us to the beginning of disarmament. That is the first point. The second point is that the first stage and the second stage really does not carry us far at all, because we are told that we must find methods of cut-off, and then there is some talk about outer space, something about nuclear weapons, which is already being discussed, and something about surprise attack. My delegation does not say that all this is not necessary; all we do say is that the first stage, as a milestone, even as conventional type of disarmament discussions, does not take us very far, but it does represent an attitude and an approach which desires to see a beginning made. We therefore hope that this first stage will be taken as something that is already taking place or has taken place.
Next we come to the position where it is sought to implement this. Here we have certain observations to make, particularly in regard to proposal D, and I hope the United Kingdom delegation will try to appreciate our point of view in this. In the first stage, under proposal D, we would pursue the idea of handing over specific quantities of designated types of armaments to the custody of an international organization. I find it difficult to describe my consternation at this proposal that Mr. Hammarskjöld must have a large armoury where all these weapons that other people have discarded, not because they are useful, can be placed. Field Marshal Hammarskjöld will be in charge of this large quantity of arms to convert him into a new Napoleon. This is not a laughing matter; it is a very serious matter. This is going the wrong way. The orientation is wrong. It is the way of trying to establish peace and abandon war by a collection of arms.

What are these arms of specific quantities and designated types? They would include the hydrogen weapon, the atom weapon, flame throwers, napalm bombs and what not. Presumably they would include all the poison gases in the world and all the bacteriological weapons and, I fear, also the instruments of psychological warfare. While this is not the time to analyse proposal D in detail, my delegation wishes the Ten-Power Committee to take this particularly into account. This is not a question of difference or of variation in detail. It is an entirely different and in our view an erroneous method of approach to collect these large arms and place them at the disposal of an international organization. That will become clear when we speak about the international police force.

With regard to the question of outer space, while we hope that a study of that will be pursued, it does not come in the way of progress in what is called the first stage.

I turn now to the French proposal. As usual, Mr. Moch presents novel ideas with great sincerity, and everybody would support anything that would stop the use of weapons. But we are not looking at the matter purely from the point of view of disarming an individual. What we are told is this: if the vehicles, the carriers, which deliver all these terrific weapons were made difficult to obtain by their non-manufacture, if we tackled the problem of
the carriers, then we would get somewhere. My delegation was at first impressed by this idea when we heard about it, but then we thought about the matter and we found that while the highest speed vehicle that today carries atomic weapons would be out of the way, we would still have passenger aircraft travelling at 1,500 miles an hour, and, to start with, that would be adequate. After a couple of days, others would be produced. The history of Germany in the inter-war years and its capacity to put Messerschmidts and what not and, ultimately, their V-bomb into the sky is an indication that a cutting out of these vehicles would not be sufficient. What we want is not to abolish the carrier, but the carried, It is the atom bomb that is carried which must come off. We would not make any objection to the abolition of vehicles intended for this purpose, but we say that this should not be regarded as being effective enough to prevent the delivery of bombs, because there would be vehicles fast enough for this purpose.
Another aspect is that among the vehicles must be included the bases because the base is probably the most potent carrier. It is from there that these inter-continental or other weapons would go out; and now we are told that these bases may well be under water and, therefore, unless these proposals are viewed from that point of view, we shall be in difficulties.

Then there are the Soviet proposals, which are well known to this Assembly. But here we want to say that my country stands fully for the necessity of organization, of inspection, control and all those things that appear, unfortunately, essential in an imperfect society like ours. But at the same time, this controversy as to which should come first has always appeared to us as unreal -- the chicken or the egg. We think that any disarmament proposal carries within it the whole machinery of control. One could agree with the idea that a control machinery should be established and left there in the hope that disarmament will come afterwards. In our view, therefore, whenever any disarmament, however small or large, takes place, it should not even wait for the control machinery; the progress towards it should not be lax or slowed down because the other is not ready. It was for that reason that, several years ago, we suggested that the Secretariat might draft, even if it were not accepted, the blue print of a disarmament treaty so that discussions would be on specific problems instead of saying which should come first and which should not.

To a certain extent we have discovered, by Mr. Lodge's phrase, built-in systems, and when he explains that you will probably understand. If it properly goes along with the disarmament proposals -- that is to say, if we are abandoning guns of such and such size and this is the way we shall inspect it -- then I do not think that any reasonable person can object to it.

Mr. Lodge has asked us three categorical questions. They are not quite in place here, but, since my time is getting on, I shall take them out of turn. One is with regard to the international police force.

To a certain extent, my delegation has expressed its views in a statement before the General Assembly. The Government of India is totally opposed to the formation of an international police force by allocating units of a national force for that purpose for these various reasons.
First of all, a police force that functions in the context not of a warless world, but of a world with national arms, would have to have at its disposal all that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd would give to Mr. Hammarskjold. That is to say, this police force would at least have to be as big or powerful as all the national armies put together. Therefore, we would have to create a super-leviathan for the international police force, which would be a menace to mankind, apart from its heavy cost; and it would also try to improve its weapons, so that the competition, instead of being between the Americans and the Russians, would be between the international community of the United Nations and the Americans and Russians put together. That is a very fine spectacle. Therefore, the idea of an international police force composed of a lot of soldiers and equipment and everything else, and this great project of peace converted into an armory with all that goes with it, is not an idea to which my Government can lend its support. I submit that an international police force is what it says. It is not only international; it must be police and its force must be used for that purpose.

A police force by definition is a force that is used against people who are under certain common law and, what is more, are not people whom one faces with the same arms, unless they are brigands. Even then, a burglar or housebreaker -- or whatever you have these days -- probably has much smaller weapons than a policeman. So, an international police force, on the one hand, can function only in the context of countries which have subscribed to international law -- that leads on to Mr. Lodge's next question -- of some kind where there are no national armies. For these national armies, small as they may be, if put together become very big and, what is more, these small national armies will be tempted, as they are now, to intervene in the internal affairs of other people, either in order to make them good people or in order to assist them against bad people. Whichever it is, if you have all the problems of war in as small a context, nothing can be saved.

The proposal is made that each country must set aside units of its own national army to create an international police force. That would be at least the best way to make it international. Then, as we have here, the geographical representation, canvassing, arm-twisting and what not to be able
to see whether a Patagonian or a Laplander would be the Commander-in-Chief, would follow, and international rivalries would come in. So, with the rivalries in the international police force, they would agree like the international civil servants of the international community.

Therefore, we are against national units being kept in reserve for these purposes by these law-abiding nations; and, of course, whether law-abiding or not, it would be decided by the majority of people here, who may or may not be law-abiding in all circumstances, as we have seen in recent times.

Secondly, it is not a practical proposition. I have some acquaintance with this matter. How do you keep units of a national army earmarked for a certain purpose? And if the Secretary-General cannot find a special job for them, what do we do with them? We would have a lot of soldiers or equipment earmarked for this purpose -- obviously paid for by the United Nations -- and what would they do in times when there was no trouble anywhere? Which always tempts Secretariat officials to find some trouble somewhere in the world in order to make use of an international police force. Therefore, this idea of earmarking units in a particular country is entirely impractical. We found it impractical in having to send out units to Gaza or anywhere else. The only way to find the units is to take them out of the regular army as it stands and replace them by other forces, or by territorials, or go without them. Therefore, the conception that you can have an international force of this kind -- a super-force armed with all the terrific weapons of international war, on the one hand, or having units in a particular country, not international but still national in character -- and I would like to see the superman who would command these forces -- that is, in our opinion, out of the question.

Secondly, they would be of such a size as not to relieve the world. The Secretary-General finds it difficult to persuade the Assembly to provide the $60 million, the large fortune that is required to run this Organization. We still have trouble in dealing with the outgoing in regard to commitments which we have undertaken; so, in a warless world, if the preparation for war is going to cost so much, then the disarmament and the peace are not worth much. And that is why you cannot obtain peace by methods of war.
Then Mr. Lodge asks: what sort of international law would prevail? International law has been described -- some people say inaccurately -- as international morality. This international law would not be enforceable in the municipal courts of any country. The international laws that would govern the police force would have to be above the national laws of various countries. At the present moment, if Indian troops go to Gaza, as far as they are concerned they are governed by Indian military law, which may be totally opposed to the law in Israel or to the law in Egypt. Supposing, for example, in our military law there were punishments which offend the conscience of these countries in which they are living, then a serious situation is created. Therefore, in my opinion, the international law that pertains to the international police force would have to be a law equally accepted by every country, and not as in Korea during the last few days and not as in Gaza. What is more, in these international police forces, being composed of units drawn from different countries, under the command of a particular national, usually the national of a country that has a smaller army and has probably not used it for a long time, the administration would be found very difficult. But that is not really Mr. Lodge's question. His question is: who is going to enforce this law, and will they conform to certain difficult standards? This, I think, is a problem in which the Disarmament Commission, the United Nations and everybody, as we shall find out later, should do some work in research and find out how these forces would be governed.

In our humble submission it would be much simpler when the element of sanction becomes as low as in the case of a policeman. If, even in a municipality, all the citizens are armed and are permitted to take the law into their own hands, then, in the enforcement of the law, the case of even a burglar would become a civil war. That is because the offender is not armed, on the one hand, and the people around are willing to support the authority of the police force, even though sometimes one may give succor to a hunted criminal. But it is because of that that enforcement becomes possible.

My country does not believe in security forces for the purposes of internal order. What does it mean? These security forces are for the purpose of maintaining internal order. If it is suggested that armies are necessary in order
to obtain the assent of citizens to a government, then that kind of government should not have international sanction. Security forces of national army character become necessary only in the context where they are going to be used against people across the border. If security forces are only for the purpose of dealing with civil tumult, with drunks or other offenders, then it is not necessary to have security forces. Therefore, security forces to the extent of international armies, in our opinion, have no meaning. But that is tied up to another problem, and I can understand most of these countries raising the question of security forces because national armies today are not over-sized and, in a great many countries, are not intended and necessary for the defence of their frontiers only, but in order to keep the whole of 4 or 5 million square miles of land in other parts of the world because they are, by some strange logic and by some interpretation of law, made part of the territory of the mother country, so-called. So then, if security forces are intended only to keep order in the homeland of a country against their own people, then, if in any community it becomes necessary to use the army to rule -- that is, if there is no consent -- then they are not security forces; we are discussing and giving support not only to a police state, but a state that is unarmed helotry.
Therefore, security forces in that way are not something that we can support. To talk about an international police force being organized in the way often suggested in these rooms is to put the cart before the horse. The police force comes only after there is a law. Police are intended to enforce the law and not to make the law. Police are not governed by anything which they think is necessary at any particular time, and they are not under the command of commanders. Therefore, for an international police force to emerge, we must first of all establish the international community.

This is not an argument for delay, but rather the reverse. Since we think that international wars -- wars between nations -- can be avoided by the use of forces which are neutral, or which are objective, or which have no interest in the matter, then since we all want to establish such a force, I think national armies must go. As the minister of defence, I would be the happiest person in the world if I had the work of demobilization.

My Prime Minister has a reputation of being extremely realistic, and this is what he said about the Soviet proposals:

"It seems to me as a proposal a brave proposal, which deserves every consideration. Whether humanity, that is, various countries concerned, is brave enough to put an end suddenly to armies, navies and air forces, I do not know. But the time will come, will have to come, when something of this kind will have to be adopted, because in this era of atomic and hydrogen weapons and ballistic missiles, war has become an anachronism."

My delegation says these things because, if humanity is to survive, it would have to have at least intervening periods of abandoning arms. In other words, to put it in rather an exaggerated way, disarmament to a certain extent is inevitable today. Because for one thing, people cannot afford to pay for it, big countries are afraid of small countries -- they have rivalry in that way -- and what is more, even if more weapons can be built they are not necessary, because each of these atomic Powers presumably has enough weapons to destroy the world ten times over, so why should they destroy it an eleventh time? Therefore, the whole problem of disarmament from that point of view, to my humble mind, has an element of inevitability.
But having disarmed, we will go back again, and this is where we want to mention another factor which we have in mind. Let us suppose there was a disarmed world, by which we mean a world where there is a limitation of armaments. That is the same kind of idea which one of the countries concerned put forward some time ago, that both the Soviet Union and the United States have a limited number of atomic bombs in order to protect the peace of the world. Let us also suppose there should be a limitation of armies to this size, that size, and the other size. Now, we say that if there are molecular weapons in the world, enough to start a small war, that war carries the momentum to become a big war. A small war is started, and each side wants to improve its weapons, and those weapons will keep on improving. We may throw away, we may dismantle and destroy -- I am told we cannot destroy -- but we may dismantle and prohibit the present deadly weapons, but the people who make them would still be there, because no one is suggesting that all these great geniuses and technicians of science should be destroyed. Even if they were, others would come in their place. So that if you start a small war with small weapons, mankind having known the great advantages of civilization and having the capacity to make these deadly weapons, in a short time, from the molecular weapons we will proceed to other weapons. This has been the experience of wars in the past.

Even if countries who have armies were disarmed, as they were after the First World War, this situation could arise in the normal course of industry. Let us take the example of Germany after the First World War. Happily, there was a Nuremberg trial, to which I shall refer in another context. Let us take case number ten. In December 1947 the head of the Krupp organization and his eleven co-defendants were indicted by the Allies, who won the war, with the crimes of planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of aggressive war. A company is waging an aggressive war! They were also indicted with plunder and spoilage, crimes involving prisoner of war and slave labour, and common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against the peace, but that is not material. Captured documents proved that after 1918 Krupps duped the Allied commissioners into believing that their products were such peaceful objects as padlocks, milk cans, cash registers, carts, motor cars, and locomotives. In a memorandum of Gustav Krupp it was said that after the assumption of power by Hitler he had the satisfaction of reporting to him that Krupps stood ready shortly to begin the re-arming of the Germans.
Krupp made it clear that because of his conviction that Germans must again fight to rise, his companies had from 1918 onward maintained at their own cost -- they are a patriotic people -- developments in production of war material, and that they had to maintain these activities for the future. It was boasted that the demolitions consequent on the presence of the Inter-Allied Control after the armistice were not real but only apparent. The most important guns that were used in 1939 to 1941 were already developed in 1933, having been tested secretly, and the ordnance organization had stood ready for mass production on Hitler's orders.

Then Krupps, not satisfied with this, wanted to export his enterprise into the neighbouring and the peaceful country of Sweden; but the Swedish Government came to the rescue, and as soon as they discovered it, in less than two years they passed laws prohibiting the employment of foreign money in armament concerns. This is one of the things we will have to consider with regard to preventive measures. The Krupps also, by ingeneous financial accountancy, were prominent among those who enabled Germany to conceal expenditure of 12 billion marks, extending over a period of several years. Therefore, if any attempt is to be made to cut down the size of these arms and say "You shall not do that", and so on, unless the treaties are observed, in this case it is better to abandon arms totally. That is to say, if you are relying on the ethical quality in man, there is no reason why the ethical quality should stop short of a capacity of killing. Therefore, you either take it as a whole or we play at this business.

The Soviet Government had examined the situation and had come to the firm conviction that the way out of the deadlock should be shown along the road of general and complete disarmament. Even at the risk of being called not sufficiently non-aligned, my Government would say that was a correct statement. But it is also supported by the Government of the United Kingdom, when Mr. Ormsby-Gore tells us:

"But I assure you that this single adjective 'comprehensive' has the same meaning for us as the two adjectives 'general and complete' ..."

(A/C.1/PV.1029, page 6)

There is for my Government nothing novel in the concept which lies behind the formal title of the item. This thing we cannot agree with, because if we try to water this down after there is no new entry in the new field, then we shall be discussing the same old thing we have been discussing before.
The United States Government told us that the road to complete disarmament is long and that the United States will be happy to travel to the end of it. That is what we would like to see. Mr. Jules Moch, the doyen of this moment, said that the plan is a straight and narrow path leading to total and controlled disarmament, which the people certainly dream about, but which cannot be total unless at the same time an international force is created among the States to play the same role that law enforcement agencies play among citizens. We subscribe to this. We certainly agree on the general considerations underlying the Soviet plan and with the advantages that all peoples will receive from total disarmament. Whatever may be the immediate necessities for finding formulas for the various problems put forward with regard to partial measures, the objective of our discussions should be this world without war which alone can sustain a world without war. A world which relies on war, however limited, will become a world laden with war, knowing the experience of mankind. Therefore, we must not say with Milton:

"The remedy; perhaps more valid arms,

Weapons more violent, when next we meet

May serve to better us, and worse our foes,

Or equal what between us made the odds."

This doctrine we must discard, and adopt the other one.
We are told -- and my delegation likes to face this as far as it can --
that this idea is a dream, that it is utopian. If it is utopian, no thought is
necessary; in Utopia there would be no war, and therefore it would be unrealistic.
Now, I ask you, is it more realistic to spend a hundred billion -- so we are told;
in some other book it will say more than that -- on the manufacture of weapons
which we are told will never be used? -- a doctrine with which I do not agree,
since they are being used, if only for practice purposes, throwing them away,
which is war use because these instruments of war, almost the moment they leave
the drawing-board become obsolete, and they go on to something else, Therefore,
this hundred billion of war expenditure is being used for war purposes, except for
the fact that it does serve to promote technical developments, and so on. So, is it
more realistic to spend a hundred billion a year, to keep the whole world keyed up
to conditions of war, to seek safety only in the machines of destruction, and to
say that you cannot trust your neighbour, even when your neighbour is untrustworthy?
Or is it more realistic to take away the weapons of war? We are asked, How can this
be accomplished at this time? I would like to submit, in all modesty, that if
demobilization is possible in a short time, why should not disarmament be possible?
The United States of America -- and I do not vouch for these figures as they have
been published; the Americans do not let me into their secrets -- the United States
of America had a peak strength of 12,300,000 men under arms during World War II.
That was presumably at the end of the European War in 1945, when the United States
army numbered 8,300,000. In 1946 the army had been reduced to 1,900,000, and
four years later, in 1950, it had been reduced to 591,487. So it was possible,
without any particular attempt at disarmament in this sense, in the normal course
of administration to demobilize 8,300,000 people to 591,487 in less than five
years; and what is more, practically all weapons of war used at that time were
dismantled or thrown into the scrap-heap or put into Cellophane to be sold to
people who are less sophisticated in the arts of war, and so they were withdrawn
from commission. Therefore it was possible for the United States of America -- not
the most perfect people in the world in regard to organization; and I do not say that
we are -- but the United States reduced their strength from 12,300,000 to 591,487
in five years. In two years, from 1944 to 1946, they reduced their forces from
12,300,000 to less than two million. They reduced by ten and a half millions in
two years, and in another two or three years the 1,900,000 became 591,487.
It may be said that demobilizing men is a very different proposition from demobilizing establishments. Even with all the organization that has gone on, if there are no men these weapons will not be used, and what is more, the people who produce them will go into other things.

Referring again to documents which are public and available, the Soviet Union had a peak strength during World War II of 12,500,000. I hope the representative of the Soviet Union will not join issue with me on these figures, and that if he does he will supply me with other figures. But at the end of World War II they had a peak strength of 12,500,000. In 1946 this had come down to 6,000,000, and in 1950 to 2,800,000.

France, it is reported, had armed forces of 5,000,000 at the end of World War II. In 1946 this had come down to 855,000, and in 1950, 659,000.

The United Kingdom -- usually but quite wrongly considered very slow in everything -- had an army of 5,120,000 during World War II. Whether that figure includes the army of the Commonwealth, I do not know. This figure was reduced to 800,000 in 1948, and to 725,000 in 1950.

These figures are telling in more than one way. When they really wanted to demobilize, vast millions were demobilized in two years. But between 1946 and 1950 the figures became smaller, not because more could not have been demobilized but because it was not the policy to do so.

So I submit that it is not so fantastic to think that it is possible to dismantle the weapons of war. I do not say it should be done in four calendar years or five years or six years. That really does not matter. Time is not measured since Einstein's day by the calendar, but by events. It is occurrence that makes time, and as occurrence goes forward time will be bridged.

I also wish to repeat that once the process of demobilization and dismantling and discarding starts, it acquires its own momentum. It overcomes resistances, political, psychological and mechanical; it will have produced devices whereby these things can be quickly done; the psychology of dismantling and demobilization of resources in this way would become the accepted law of the world. I believe the slave-owners of two or three hundred years ago must have said, "When these slaves are liberated what are the 'poor devils' going to do? They will be out of work. They do not want to leave their jobs and homes, and what is more, it
will take a long time to send them away." But the decision was made, and if today anyone were to suggest keeping slaves, he would not be regarded as a person fit for decent society. So that these problems which we think impossible to solve or unrealistic, are more realistic.

I should like to ask, since the weapons of yesterday have already become obsolete, is it more realistic to make bigger, more efficient, "more beautiful" bombs than those that fell during the war years? Is that more realistic? Is it more realistic to contemplate the possibility of every country in the world making these deadly weapons? This seems to be the case, if you read the investigations conducted by a group of American scientists under the chairmanship of the American Mr. Davison, where a number of countries, including my own, are listed as having the capacity to make atomic weapons within two or three years -- as though we would make them. But how do we know? I say we will not make them, but I may not be there in two or three years.

Therefore the possibility of demobilization is more realistic than the capacity for massing arms. We take time over this because it is the hope of our delegation that, if not the United Nations Organization, then world public opinion will set in motion this idea, that we contemplate not merely less arms and less expenditure, but a method by which we outlaw war as an instrument of policy, a method through which differences between neighbours would be settled by invoking the councils of nations, by the impact of opinion, so that, since both sides would be without arms, the actual precipitation of a large-scale conflict would be largely and remotely delayed. It is quite true that there are smaller problems, unresolved problems, in the world, but they would fall into their place.

And here we must all take courage from the fact that, while there have been failures during the last two years in the sense that we actually have no solution for the most troublesome problem of surprise attack, the main cause of war, apart from what I said before, is the reverse of the security idea, and is the fear that people have. That is why Yugoslavia, in company with my delegation, sponsored a resolution last year asking for the study of this question at Geneva. Actual studies are going on, and though no results have been reached we have received very welcome news from the leader of the United States delegation offering to resume these talks. When the element of surprise attack is removed, there will be some advantage.
Similarly, we have made no progress in regard to co-operation in outer space, but developments have gone ahead in outer space. There has been no progress likewise in the matter of a suspension in the increase of arms, as was asked for in the resolution submitted by my delegation some time ago for an arms truce. Likewise, as we must be reminded by the rumours — I don't know the facts — of further nuclear explosions, in the Sahara Desert, there has been no progress in stopping what is called the "nth power" problem, or the "fourth power" problem.

With regard to chemical warfare, we are told by a research student in America that the ancient Hindus were probably the originators of chemical warfare. I do not take any responsibility for that. The beginnings of chemical warfare are lost in antiquity. References to particular nations are not intended to point the finger of blame; we are in the company of friends. Incendiary chemicals — I suppose the poor Hindus threw only a little bit of a candle, or something — incendiary chemicals have been known to be used since at least 1200 B.C. in Greece as also in India and by the Romans. Greek fire was invented in 600 B.C., with the property of spontaneously bursting into flame. (All this sounds very modern.) Smoke also has been used since early times to screen movements, so when in the First World War they created smoke-screens they were not being very modern, apparently.
Tear gases for harassment purposes were used by the French in August 1914, followed by the Germans and British later. The first American use of gas was phosgene against the Germans in June 1918.

This is not what should worry us.

In the total, both sides employed about 17,000 chemical troops and caused 1.3 million casualties, but only 91,000 were deaths. About one fourth of the ratio was wounded and dead, as compared with other weapons. Something like 9 million shells filled with mustard gas were fired, producing 400,000 casualties, nearly five times as effective as shrapnel and high explosives.

So these days we are rather inclined to think that chemical warfare is no longer a danger.

I would request the United States delegation not to regard the next quotation as chosen with a view to making an attack of any kind. This is the purely military point of view. It was reported in the New York Times, under dateline 8 August:

"Leading military officials are trying to overcome public horror of chemical, biological and radiological warfare.

"Pentagon strategists fear that unless a formidable programme of public education in this field is carried out the country may suffer as significantly as if it were behind in nuclear-armed missiles.

"What the public must know, according to the highest Defense Department authorities, is that many forms of chemical and allied warfare are more 'humane' than existing weapons."

This is one of the ideas which we must get, not only in America but in every country: this idea of humane killing. It is rather a contradiction in terms.

In the New York Times of 30 August it was reported from Pugwash:

"Twenty-six scientists from eight countries who have been discussing the danger of biological and chemical warfare to humanity, animal and plant life, concluded a one-week-long session here today. They warned the world that only international control of such agents and weapons could ease heightened distrust among nations and eliminate 'the amnesia of secrecy.'"
"It was emphasized that while control of nuclear weapons is proving difficult, control of biological and chemical weapons is more awkward. The cost of the latter is infinitely less than that of the hydrogen bomb and so places much less expensive instruments of mass annihilation in the hands of small nations."

So I should like to point out that limited agreements on non-use of this weapon or that weapon are not going to get anywhere. What is more, chemical warfare was not employed during the last war, my advisers tell me now, largely because it was ineffective in a system of round-the-clock bombing. But the great countries in possession of arms are still storing these chemical gases. I beg to submit that an agreement of an international character, though it has now lasted nearly thirty-four years, is not the most effective way of doing it.

In 1925 there was a Geneva protocol, to which some nations had subscribed and others have not, but I remember — I was a scholar in those days — that on 13 August 1914 the Germans published in Berlin that the British were using poison gas, and on 14 August, the next day, the British published that the Germans were using poison gas. So somebody knew about it. I do not know who started it first. So these gases will be used. The same applies to bacteriological warfare.

Taking all these rather diabolical weapons of various kinds, which are inexpensive and maybe secretly concealed, there is no answer in the modern world except matching the power that is exhibited by man in the so-called conquest of nature in this rather complex world, other than to refer to the ethical problem in the context of social organization; as my Prime Minister rightly warned, not in terms of sentiment, not in terms of pious intentions.

I have said: "where no progress was made". But it would be very wrong for us not to refer to where progress has been made. One area is in regard to a subject prohibited in the United Nations: Antarctica. My delegation had the temerity to bring it up two or three years ago and upset the whole of the Latin American continent. But I am glad to hear by rumour — for nobody has told us — that in Washington on 15 October the twelve nations active in Antarctica pledged their determination to keep that continent free of war:
"Mr. Kuznetsov said the convening of the Conference 'indicates that its participants agree that a regime for Antarctica should be established on an international basis with due consideration to mutual interests and rights.'"

While we have no desire to go into the details of this conference, even if the elements of it are true, we have made the first step towards finding a place in the world -- I believe it is about 6 million square miles of ice -- which at any rate would not be a theatre of war or a base for operations.

The success of the Geneva talks is another area. We come now to the crux of this problem: the establishment of the ten-Power Committee. My delegation does not support this by saying that we cannot do anything else. We think it is a development of great importance, and we raised this problem about seven years ago in the United Nations and repeatedly stated that direct negotiations between the Americans and Russians were the only beginning that would bring about effective talks in this direction. So we regard this Ten-Power Committee mainly as direct talks between those who can deliver the goods.

This ten-Power Committee is nothing new. It is merely an expression of the diplomatic capacities and diplomatic facilities existing in people and it is in no way opposed to the purposes of this Organization. But we think that if we agree, as we have, and wish this ten-Power Committee well, then we must leave it to make its own procedures and arrange its own composition, not upsetting the balances, because, if it is to reach a successful conclusion, no impediments should be put in its way.

It is for us to devise ways and means by which the United Nations as a whole may be able to express its concern and make its contribution in other ways, but we regard the ten-Power Committee as self-sufficient, as coming into existence as a result of the Geneva agreements, as having potency for good. At the same time, in our humble submission, the usual diplomatic channels should not be confined to communications between these ten great Powers. They have their own representatives and chancelleries, and the world -- not in this building, not in our committees, but in terms of Governments -- should have some knowledge of what is going on -- I shall not say "should be informed", for that is the wrong word -- depending upon the discretion, the desire and the willingness of these people to have communication with them. That must be left to them. In that way the problem would not be isolated.
I shall not quote the Eisenhower-Khrushchev communiqué, which everybody has read. I am sorry that so much time has gone by that I must omit many of the things I wished to say and come down to the actual proposals we should like to submit for consideration.

I have already spoken a great deal about the climate that should lead to the solution of this problem. We should like to see the people appreciate the difference between cutting down the size of armaments and coming to agreements with regard to their size and so on, and we should like public opinion in the world -- not so much Governments and chancelleries, but public opinion in the world -- to realize that there is no alternative for survival in this world except a world free from war, where war is no longer an instrument of national policy. Since I have spoken so much about this, I shall leave it for the moment.

The second suggestion I should like to make is that this ten-Power Committee, we hope -- we are not proposing this, but we hope -- will function generally under the umbrella of what is usually called the summit. That is to say, if it gets into a deadlock, the world will not hear merely about a deadlock, but the great ones will step in and try to resolve it so that it is not isolated from what is now called the new atmosphere arising from the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting, the visit of Mr. Macmillan to the Soviet Union, and the impending visit of the Soviet Prime Minister to France and so on. If in this more or less specialized technical committee there arise difficulties, either because the meetings are too long or the speeches are too long, or because of getting involved in previous history -- and we must not forget that out of the ten Powers on the ten-Power Committee at least six or seven will be the same that have been dealing with this for ten years and know each other too well, sometimes knowing what is good and sometimes knowing what is bad -- and if there is a conflict of this kind, we hope that the ten-Power Committee will resort at once to asking the bigger Powers to step in to resolve the particular problem.

Then I want to make a suggestion, which at the present moment I will make on my personal responsibility because it involves many matters of principle on which I have not been able to consult my Government. Often it is asked: how do we enforce agreements? How are agreements in regard to violations implemented?
The Nuremberg trials do put forward ideas which are worth considering. Suppose there was in the world a code in regard to scientists, shall we say, or in regard to soldiers or in regard to statesmen -- whatever it may be -- the violation of which would be regarded as a violation of a peace treaty. Suppose, for example, technicians and scientists together made an atom bomb in secret. That would be a violation of an agreement. There is no way now to enforce that agreement, except by going to war or making the country adopt some other method. It is worthwhile considering, and we put it forward only as a suggestion, whether the Nuremberg method in this matter, of making the individual violator subject to penalty under the national laws of his own country, again by treaty, would not be the right thing to do.
That is to say, if a scientist is hired for the purpose of violating the law in regard to the banning of weapons, that scientist -- apart from the country -- becomes individually liable for an act of the kind I read out a while ago. Therefore, if individual responsibility can be fixed by way of agreement in an international treaty, then it becomes obligatory on the part of the municipal power to execute the law of that country or to hand the individual over to an international tribunal, as the case may be.

Whatever may be the controversy about the Nuremberg method, it brought to the forefront for the first time the idea of fixing individual responsibility for crimes against humanity. A crime against humanity cannot be perpetrated by a nation in the abstract. It is morally responsible, it is politically responsible, but the actual hands and the brains must be those of individuals. If, as in the case of Nuremberg, punishment hangs over people who violate the laws of men, as set forth in a treaty and sanctioned by this Organization, that may well serve as a deterrent.

Fourthly, we would suggest that the deep secrecy which is spread about, which really leads to the leaking of information to a considerable degree and to espionage, and, what is more, the spreading of erroneous scientific knowledge in order to mislead one's opponent, is not only against the laws of civilization but also contributes to all those fears of disguised experiments and what not.

I have already said that the ten-Power committee, in our opinion, while it should be entirely the master of its own procedure, will have diplomatic connexions with various Governments, and the use that it may make of any party on its own responsibility, to resolve matters would be a very healthy way of dealing with some of these problems.

Then we would suggest that there should be a ban placed by the industrially advanced countries on the export of capital equipment and technicians to other countries, which are not manufacturing arms, for the purpose of establishing arms industries. We read in the newspapers the other day that these things were beginning again. I read out the extract about what happened in the mid-war years. If, therefore, arms industries are to be established in countries which are not members of the United Nations or are not properly represented here by the government whose writ runs in the place -- if in those areas, if that situation should unhappily continue, arms establishments were to arise -- then there would be a leakage which would make any agreement useless. Therefore, it should be a
point of honour, a point of international understanding and agreement, that the promotion of this particular kind of enterprise and traffic is not in the interests of humanity.

Finally, I should like to submit that the world today spends billions and billions of dollars, of roubles and of pounds in research on weapons of war. I think that the Secretariat should submit papers and we should consider whether the time has not come, and whether it is not urgent, to do some research in the other direction -- not to make policy, but to give facts -- instead of war research, an inquiry into peace research problems. This may well be a part of the work of the Disarmament Commission. It should include the great scientists of the world, who, in their public pronouncements and in the efforts they make when they are not strictly employed by Governments for this purpose, are very emphatic about all the matters we have been speaking about. The great scientists of the world, perhaps the main statesmen of the world, should participate in this vast organization, so that the money that may be available for this purpose may be spent on other things than inventing methods of war. Suppose, for example, that we were told, as we were told two or three years ago, that it is possible to explode an atom bomb in one's pocket and that therefore any suspension is of no value. Then the scientists who would be international servants, with no particular allegiance to national policies, would be able to come forward either to contradict that or, if that were the case, to find some other method.

The same applies to the resolving of certain disputes. No one is suggesting the establishment of a new machinery of conciliation. Some vast research of this kind is called for by an Organization whose main purpose is to rid the world of the scourge of war and to be a centre for the resolving of disputes.

If this Assembly makes no other decision than to turn our hand to this more constructive purpose, it will have accomplished a great deal.

My purpose in making these submissions is in no way either to anticipate what the ten-Power committee will do or to advise it. We trust its competence in these matters, we wish it well. Even though the representatives on that committee will represent their countries, by the very fact of our endorsement of their establishment, by the functions they have taken in hand and the great hopes they have aroused, and, what is more, through the faith that this Organization places in them, they have really become the custodians of the pursuit of truth and the establishment of peace.
While, therefore, the ten-Power committee is not a sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission and owes it no organizational responsibility -- the only organizational connexion we will have with the committee is that it will be serviced by the Secretariat in many ways -- I hope it will take into account the fact that, while there are great national loyalties, there are even greater loyalties to the idea of peace and to the purpose of this resolution. The resolution should be the charter of that committee. It is a resolution not only endorsed, but sponsored, by the eighty-two Members of this Organization. It is a resolution which has evoked great hope in the minds of men in every part of the world.

Finally, my delegation would like to suggest that the Disarmament Commission of eighty-two nations, which did not meet last year except to pass on information, will meet around the middle of the coming calendar year, in order to be informed and educated and equally in order to give encouragement to the ten-Power committee. That, in our submission, would be a very good way to keep the United Nations well informed and intimately concerned with this matter, apart from the referral to chancelleries. We would like to hope that the great Powers themselves, those who are involved in this and who must be the deciding factors in this matter, will give consideration and lend their support to this suggestion, so that the Commission would meet again in six months or so. It would not be a matter of sending out a notice overnight to the permanent representatives to meet in New York -- distinguished people though they may be. The meeting would take place at governmental level, after the difficulties had been considered by Governments in the chancelleries. Thus, when we gather here, we will not be putting forth our own ideas -- bright as we always think our own ideas are -- but there would have been a real delegate conference, and the disarmament business would have become much more broad-based and with roots striking deeper into the people. It would also be a method whereby this controversy would be carried from council halls and chambers into the market place and would become part of the national politics of every country.
It is our hope that the suggestion we have made will not be thought of as intended to displace other ideas or to constitute a reflection on the ten-Power committee. But to have a target in this way, and a comparatively near one, where proposals would be considered in this vast world assembly by delegates accredited for that purpose, with their technical advisers, would be a great step forward.

We believe that the proposals we have submitted are not unrealistic. We firmly believe that it is possible to disarm this world. We firmly believe that it is possible for man to throw away his arms. For thousands of years, men have talked about turning their weapons into ploughshares. But the time has now come when, if they do not turn them into instruments of peace, they will no longer be here to turn them into anything.

We must therefore recognize that, as the poet said:

"The moving Finger writes, and having writ
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line
Nor all thy Tears wash out a word of it."

That should be our outlook in this matter.
Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The First Committee is about to complete the discussion of the question of general and complete disarmament. In this connexion the Soviet delegation considers it appropriate to dwell briefly on certain results of the discussion which has continued for nearly a month.

Having unanimously resolved to consider this question as the first item of its agenda, the First Committee has thereby acknowledged the paramount importance and urgency for the destinies of the world of the question of general and complete disarmament, submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita S. Khruushchev, in his historic address at the plenary meeting on 18 September. The fact that the representatives of sixty-three countries took part in the discussion of the Soviet proposals is indicative of the profound interest which the Soviet proposals evoked on the part of the countries Members of the United Nations.

In the course of the discussion it became perfectly clear that the idea of the necessity of general and complete disarmament had met with wide support. It was confirmed in the debate that all the necessary prerequisites were ripe for the implementation of complete disarmament.

It was justly emphasized that the question of disarmament has now acquired special importance and urgency. Indeed, never before in the entire history of mankind has the need to maintain peace been so acute and pressing as in our days. The age of the atom, space rockets and electronics has opened up vast prospects for the development of science and technology. At the same time humanity has found itself faced with the terrible threat of an atomic-rocket war. And the rate of development of these lethal weapons, which can at any moment be put into action not only as a result of evil design but also simply due to a mistake or technical failure, increases with the passing of time.

All this makes it incumbent upon us to take the most urgent measures in order to stop the backsliding of mankind into the abyss and to ensure a peaceful and tranquil life to the people. The Soviet proposals point out precisely this way -- the speediest and the most effective and reliable way of solving this problem.
We propose that there should be effected within the shortest time limit, approximately within four years, general and complete disarmament of States under effective international control. This means that all armed forces should be disbanded, all armaments eliminated, military production stopped and nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and rocket weapons should be banned and destroyed once and for all. The war ministries and general staffs of countries should be abolished, foreign military bases on alien territories should be dismantled and nobody should undergo military training and military expenditure in all forms should be discontinued.

The States would only retain small contingents of police or militia of agreed size to be used for the maintenance of internal order and security of the citizens and equipped only with small arms.

Without armaments nobody could wage war. A world without armaments would become a world without wars since the very possibility of unleashing wars would have been eliminated. The settlement of all questions by peaceful means, by means of negotiations based on equality, would become an inviolable law of international life.

We are glad to note that in the course of the discussion the overwhelming majority of delegations gave positive appraisal of the concrete programme of general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union. This is also confirmed by the fact that the draft of the Joint Soviet American resolution on this question was warmly supported by the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and other countries. It is gratifying to note that all the representatives of countries Members of the United Nations adhered to that joint draft as co-sponsors.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction the businesslike co-operation that has taken place between the delegation of the Soviet Union and that of the United States in working out the joint draft resolution.

We expect that the Soviet proposals will be taken as a basis for the work of the Committee of ten Powers which shortly is to begin working out an appropriate international agreement on disarmament.
However, along with the widest support of the Soviet proposals, we sometimes hear the voices of sceptics who, while paying lip service to the idea of complete disarmament, are trying at the same time to sap this idea and to past doubts on the possibility of putting the Soviet proposals into effect. These sceptics do not mind recognizing the idea of disarmament as being a great and noble one, etc., but at the same time they make reservations to the effect that putting this idea into effect is only a matter for the distant future. This kind of scepticism was voiced also in the statements made by certain representatives here in the First Committee. As we understand it, those who sincerely strive to solve the disarmament problem must help those who have not yet clearly understood the Soviet proposals submitted to the United Nations and, on the other hand, not to permit the advocates of the armaments race to prevent the working out and putting into effect of concrete measures on general and complete disarmament.

I shall recall certain considerations regarding the possibility and necessity of carrying out general and complete disarmament in our time.

As is known, the Soviet Union presented extremely far-reaching proposals on disarmament already in the period between the First World War and Second World War. At that time some people rejected our proposals, asserting that they were of benefit only to the Soviet Union because it was a weak country at that time. Indeed, the Soviet Union was the only Socialist State at that time and assuredly it was immeasurably weaker than it is today. However, at that time also, in putting forward broad proposals on disarmament and the destruction of weapons, the Soviet Union was guided by humane ideals, seeking to ensure peace on earth. And if the Western Powers had supported the proposal of the Soviet Union at that time, the world would not have been compelled to go through the tragedy of the Second World War.
Now the Soviet Union has put forward a proposal on general and complete disarmament on a new basis, taking into account the new situation and the new balance of powers obtaining in the world. The Soviet Union, as is universally acknowledged, now is a mighty world Power. And now it is no longer alone. There exists a great camp of Socialist States. In these circumstances, nobody can assert that our proposals upon general and complete disarmament have been dictated by weakness.

Therefore, when we submit disarmament proposals today, it is perfectly manifest that they are dictated by humane objectives and are designed to exclude war from the practice of international relations, war which can bring tremendous disasters in the age of thermonuclear weapons. We do not want to use for military ends the advantages which we have and which will increase with the further development of the Socialist countries.

And if some decades ago there could not be found sufficient forces and means to implement the idea of general and complete disarmament, now that this idea has become the banner and slogan of the broadest masses of entire peoples and nations, all the necessary prerequisites for its being put into effect are at hand. The destructive weapons created by human hands can and must be destroyed by those very hands. Such is the firm conviction of the Soviet Government shared by the entire Soviet people. This found expression in the appeal of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 31 October addressed to the parliaments of all countries of the world to do everything possible to relieve the peoples of the terrible scourge, the arms race, to achieve disarmament and to open up before all mankind the road of an eternal peace.

As is pointed out in that appeal, the prospects of solving the disarmament problem are all the more favourable now since recently changes for the better have been effected in international developments. Increasingly broad sections of the population, members of Parliament, public figures and statesmen are becoming aware of the senselessness and danger of a continued arms race. The desire to put an end to the "cold war" is growing everywhere, and so is the desire to solve disputed international problems without the use of force, on the basis of negotiations and agreements.
The proposal for urgently putting into effect general and complete disarmament is not a propaganda manoeuvre, as some leaders have tried to depict it. It is based on a sober-minded and objective assessment of the present-day international situation and of the balance of forces in the world. Life persistently demands that States with different social systems know how to live peaceably and solve all matters between themselves by means of negotiations.

The Soviet State and other Socialist countries proceed from the Leninist premise of the inevitability and objective necessity of the coexistence of States with different social systems. By the nature of their social systems, the Socialist States are the most resolute and persistent champions of peace. Their entire domestic and foreign policy is permeated with the ideas of humaneness, care for man, for the happiness of the people. They want to coexist peacefully on a reasonable basis.

State agencies and public organizations of all countries should work on creating conditions for co-operation between nations, when each country chooses for itself what it considers necessary without anything being imposed on it. Only in these conditions will coexistence be truly peaceful and good neighbourly. Coexistence on a reasonable basis implies the recognition of the existence of various social systems, the recognition of the rights of every nation to settle its affairs independently, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

These principles are finding an ever greater recognition on the part of States.

As a result of the efforts of peace-loving States and of an ever growing influence of peaceable forces throughout the world, tension in relations between States has been considerably reduced, prospects for the consolidation of universal peace and for the development of society without wars on the basis of peaceful coexistence have become more promising.

The visit of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikita S. Khrushchev, to the United States and his meetings with President Eisenhower played an important role in easing international tension. The Heads of both States recognized, as the Soviet-American communiqué stated, that the question of total disarmament is the most important question facing the world today.
The necessity of a speedy solution of this problem has been once again confirmed in the Soviet Union at the session of the Supreme Soviet, which has just adjourned. The session payed special attention to the problem of general and complete disarmament and adopted, on the report of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita S. Khrushchev, concerning the international situation and the USSR foreign policy, a special appeal to the parliaments of all countries on the question of disarmament. This appeal will be circulated to the members of the General Assembly.

At the session of the Supreme Soviet the problem of general and complete disarmament was further elucidated. This refers, in particular, to the question of control. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, in his statement at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 31 October, dealt with this question. He said that there were statesmen in the western countries who on the sly sapped the faith of the people in the realistic nature of the Soviet proposals on disarmament and distorted our proposals regarding control. Having stressed that both in his statement before the United Nations General Assembly and in the Soviet Government declaration the USSR position on that score had been clearly stated, Nikita S. Khrushchev: said:

"A careful study of our proposals will show that the Soviet Government proposes the establishment of strict international control over all disarmament measures. For every stage of disarmament we propose an appropriate stage of control. We also propose that controllers should be present on the territory of States from the very start of the disarmament process until its full completion, and also after disarmament has been carried out, so that no State could secretly prepare for war. We want the volume of control to correspond to the nature of disarmament measures.

"We also are agreeable to the establishment of appropriate agencies, apparently under the aegis of the United Nations, to ensure effective control so that all States that will have adopted sacred obligations and commitments on disarmament should strictly observe them."
Many delegations that spoke here referred to the existence of common elements and common ground which the Soviet Union and her western partners have achieved in the approach to the solution of the disarmament problem, including questions of control and inspection. Our task is to work out, on the basis of unanimous approval by all members of the General Assembly of the idea of general and complete disarmament, a concrete system of disarmament measures under effective international control.
In the course of the discussions a number of concrete questions were touched upon and certain conditions have been expressed concerning the contents of the Soviet proposals. We are willing to examine any remarks and proposals aimed at solving the disarmament problem. Some delegations, in particular, touched upon the question of what internal security forces would be required by the States if existing armaments were to be eliminated. It can be said on this point that the question of the size of the police or militia or other forms of forces designed to maintain internal order in the States, like many other practical questions, should be carefully studied and agreed upon.

We should not, however, permit the raising of far-fetched questions aimed at diverting attention from the gist of the disarmament problem. Meanwhile, some all but push to the foreground the question of what international armed forces should be set up to replace the national forces which are to be abolished as a result of complete disarmament.

One cannot, however, fail to arrive at the conclusion that this question is indeed a far-fetched one. If all countries are disarmed and possess neither armaments nor armies, surely none will be able to start a war. The question arises, why should we then have supernational armed forces?

On 31 October, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR stated:

"We believe that if complete and general disarmament is effected, it will be possible to find forces of moral influence, to take various measures and sanctions on decisions by the United Nations with regard to one country or another which might risk starting a conflict".

There can be no doubt that the common sense of people will take the upper hand, that sensible decisions will be adopted enabling nations to live in friendship, to trust each other and not to interfere in the affairs of other States.

My delegation has listened with great interest to the views expressed a moment ago by the representative of India on the question of the establishment of an international police force. His arguments, surely, are worthy of attention.
In proposing the carrying out of a programme of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government does not stand on the position of "all or nothing" as a position which some have attempted to ascribe to it. We have repeatedly declared that if it should prove impossible at the present stage, owing to the position of the Western Powers, to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union is prepared to come to terms on a number of partial steps in the field of disarmament. At the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, listed among such steps a ban on nuclear weapons and above all, the cessation of tests of nuclear weapons, the setting up of a zone of control and inspection with a reduction of foreign troops on the territories of the appropriate countries in Europe, the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe, the dismantling of foreign military bases on alien territories, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States Members of NATO and the States-Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and so on.

But it must be clear to everybody that the most reliable guarantee against war lies in general and complete disarmament of States, that is, in a radical solution of the disarmament problem which would provide for the destruction of all material means of waging war. This radical pact alone would make it possible to rule out altogether the possibility of unleashing another war with all its consequences, and this alone would ensure the well-being and security of the peoples for all time.

It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament have evoked such a wide response and have gained such great support not only within the United Nations but throughout the world. It may be said without exaggeration that these proposals have stirred up all sections of the population in all countries of the world.

By adopting the resolution containing the approval of general and complete disarmament and an appeal to the States to do their utmost for reaching a constructive solution of this problem, we are making an important step towards saving mankind from war, even though this is merely a beginning. The working out of concrete agreements on general and complete disarmament will certainly require good will, the desire to do it, and big efforts on the part of all and,
first and foremost, on the part of the largest States of the world. But understanding on the main thing -- on agreement in principle with the idea of general and complete disarmament -- permits us to hope that all obstacles will be overcome in the way of prompt elaboration and implementation of practical measures to solve this, the most pressing question of our time. The Soviet Union for its part will spare no effort for the achievement of this noble goal.

The Soviet delegation, Mr. Chairman, is grateful to you and to all the Members of the First Committee for the careful attention with which they have examined the item on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I recognize the representative of the United States of America who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. LODGE (United States of America): Mr. Kuznetsov made one statement in the course of his remarks, which, I think, calls for a few remarks by me in order to keep the record straight. He said:

"We expect that the Soviet proposals will be taken as a basis for the work of the Committee of ten-Powers which shortly is to begin working out an appropriate international agreement on disarmament". (Supra p 52)

On that remark, let me make these three comments: first, the resolution before you refers to the declaration of the United Kingdom of 17 September 1959, the declaration of the Soviet Union of 18 September 1959, and the other proposals or suggestions made. That language is clear enough, I believe, to make completely plain that the new ten-Nation Disarmament Group has been asked to give thorough consideration to all pertinent proposals, not just one proposal, but to all proposals.

Secondly, the United States for its part has under way a new and thorough review of disarmament in the light of present day technology. This review will prepare us to participate constructively in the new disarmament group. We may wish to put forward proposals of our own.
Thirdly, our discussions here have shown the wisdom and the usefulness of a joint approach to the problem of disarmament. Helpful ideas and suggestions have been put forward in this room by many members. This spirit of mutual co-operation and mutual accommodation is what brought about the resolution which is before us, co-sponsored by all of the eighty-two members of this Organization. If we can maintain that joint approach to the work which is ahead, then we are entitled to hope for progress in real disarmament.

I sincerely hope that the remarks of the Soviet representative do not mean that the Soviet Union will insist that its point of view must form the basis of discussions in the ten-Nation group. Significant negotiations will take place only if we approach them with an open mind and in the conviction that there is no monopoly on wisdom in the complex process of solving the problems of disarmament.
On page 5 of his prepared text, Mr. Kuznetsov said:
"By the nature of their social system the Socialist States are the
most resolute and persistent champions of peace."
I imagine that when he uses the words "Socialist States" Mr. Kuznetsov does not
include the United States, although we will cheerfully match what our Government
does in the general field of social welfare against that of other countries. But
whether or not Mr. Kuznetsov includes us among countries devoted to social
welfare, I stoutly and cheerfully deny that his country is any more resolutely
or any more persistently a champion of peace than we are. We are utterly devoted
to peace and we have proved our devotion to peace and to the ideals of the United
Nations Charter without selfish gain to ourselves by giving of our treasure and
by giving of our blood.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no more speakers on my list. The Committee
has now heard all those who were on it. In all, sixty-four delegations have
participated in the general debate, which, from the 1037th meeting on, has also
dealt with the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.234.

As the Committee is aware, the draft resolution before us has been
co-sponsored by all members. Moreover, it has been clear from the debate that
the proposal has the enthusiastic support of the Committee. In these
circumstances, it would seem unnecessary actually to put the draft resolution to
the vote. Therefore, if I hear no objection from any member, I shall declare the
draft resolution adopted unanimously. Since I hear no objection, I now declare
the draft resolution adopted unanimously.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning this meeting, I wish to remind the
Committee that the General Assembly will meet in plenary session tomorrow morning
at 10.30 to deal with the agenda shown in today's Journal. For this reason, the
next meeting of this Committee will take place at 3 p.m. tomorrow when we will
take up item 68 entitled "Question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara." We
already have two speakers for that meeting, and I urge other delegations who wish
to intervene to inscribe their names on the list with the Secretary as soon as
possible so that the Chair can arrange for the smooth development of our
deliberations. The plenary meeting will take place in this room.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.