Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND THIRTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 9 December 1974, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)

Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Question of Korea (continued)
  (a) Withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations
  (b) Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula

- Organization of work

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The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.
AGENDA ITEM 104 (continued)

QUESTION OF KOREA

(a) WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE FLAG OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(b) URGENT NEED TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE CONSENSUS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE KOREAN QUESTION AND TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

(A/9703/Add.1-3, A/9741/Add.1-5 and Corr.1; A/C.1/1048, 1049/Add.1; A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, L.677, L.705 and Rev.1)

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As was agreed, this afternoon we will continue examining the Question of Korea hearing explanations of vote and then we shall proceed to the vote.

This room 3, which has the advantage of a mechanical voting system, is different from the layout of the seats in room 4, so the delegations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea were unable to take the same seats that they had in the usual meeting room of the First Committee. Therefore, it has been arranged that the delegations would be seated in the balcony.

With regard to the voting procedure, in which both delegations are unable to participate, I trust that the arrangements we have made will be satisfactory to them.

Before we fully turn to this question, and in view of the popular saying in Spanish: "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure", I should like to bring to the attention of the representatives that if points of order are raised, rule 113 of the rules of procedure will be strictly applied, in other words, the representative raising a point of order cannot debate the substance of the matter. Therefore, the rules of the game will be similar for all and, if there is a point of order, I should like to request it to be as brief as possible and directly addressed to the matter before us.

I call on the representative of Algeria on a point of clarification.
Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (interpretation from French): I am certainly not the only one to observe that the atmosphere of this room today is the one which prevails on a great day, both in terms of the number of persons present in this room as well as the atmosphere that we all feel in it. It is clear that the debate which will culminate in our vote today is an important one, and this will explain the tension and the attention which we all observe today in this room.

I must say, on behalf of the group that I represent, that this atmosphere, this affluence, the importance that all of us attribute to the result of the debate has induced us to do everything we can to see to it that the voting procedure which is about to begin shortly under your guidance, Mr. Chairman, should take place in the fullest possible clarity. At the beginning of this debate we already gave the example of a courteous attitude and we have offered serious pledges concerning the honest and loyal fashion in which we would wish this debate to come to its conclusion. It is in this same sense that today I would wish to say a few words before we embark upon the voting procedure, and these few words are exclusively designed to introduce the greatest possible clarity into this debate and avoid any confusion which might be harmful to the dignity of the work in the First Committee.

When the agenda of the First Committee refers to "Question of Korea", all delegations present here must bear in mind what the wording of that agenda item represents. I must recall how agenda item 104, entitled "Question of Korea" was finally inscribed in the agenda of our sessions. I shall recall first of all that on 16 August 1974 the first item was inscribed in the provisional agenda of the twenty-ninth session, and was entitled "Withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations."
On 3 September 1974 a second item was inscribed in the provisional agenda, and it was entitled: "Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula". It is clear, as far as we are concerned -- as it should logically be clear in the minds of those who have placed this second item on the agenda -- that these are two entirely different items whose only link resides in the fact that both of them relate to the question of Korea; because if the sponsors of the second item had thought for an instant that they would be speaking on the same item as the one already inscribed, there would have been no reason whatsoever for their calling for the inscription of a separate item.

I therefore maintain, on behalf of the group that I represent, and in the name also of the simplest logic -- that when we are speaking of the question of Korea, we are dealing with two separate items which were brought together under the same heading solely for the convenience of discussion but which, in any event, have been inscribed in our agenda as two separate sub-paragraphs: (a) representing former item 106, and (b) representing former item 110.

We would therefore wish the First Committee to continue to consider that it is faced with two different aspects of the same question, each being dealt with by an independent draft resolution.

We would wish as of now to oppose any attempts at confusion by those who would seek to profit from the fact that these two aspects have been merged under the same heading in order to induce the First Committee into error and to claim that this is one and the same question on which there are two different draft resolutions.

I think that the point I have just raised is clear and that no one here can claim that initially it related to or that it can now relate to the same question with respect to which different draft resolutions are now before you.
That being so, I hope I have contributed to clarifying the situation, and I hope also that the Committee itself and you, Mr. Chairman, in particular, will take this clarification into account in regard to the way in which the voting procedure is conducted.

The Chairman (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Algeria for the clarification he deemed it necessary to make. While the representative of Algeria has not specifically requested an opinion of the Chairman, if I correctly understood his last words he did say that he hoped that I would take his explanation into account in the conduct of the voting procedure as he would like to see it.

In this connexion, so that there will be no misunderstanding, I should like to say that I have no latitude of interpretation other than that which is specified in the rules of procedure. According to Rule 131:

"If two or more proposals relate to the same question," -- I stress: 'the same question' -- "the committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted."

While it is true, as the representative of Algeria has correctly stated, that item 104 of the agenda consists of two subitems: (a) Withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations; and (b) Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula, item 104 as a whole is entitled: "question of Korea."

The decision to put the two subitems under a single title, "Question of Korea", numbered agenda item 104, was taken by the General Committee of the Assembly, and then ratified by the General Assembly as a whole. Therefore, as I said, I have no latitude of interpretation here, and when rule 131 is applied to the voting procedure, account must necessarily be taken of the fact that there are two or more proposals relating to the same question. That question, undoubtedly, is that of Korea, and relates to a single number: that is, agenda item 104.
Therefore, when we proceed to the vote, we shall have to respect rule 131 and put the proposals to the vote in the order in which they have been numbered.

Lastly, I should like to say something which I do not think should pose any difficulties: that is, that the term "proposals" in rule 131 is the same which throughout the rules of procedure is used to refer to draft resolutions. Unfortunately, the rules of procedure do not indicate what other procedure might be followed with respect to questions having two or more sub-items. Therefore, rule 131 should, in my view, be implemented as I have indicated.

With the same aims and purposes as those of the representative of Algeria, I believed that I should express my thoughts as well, as clearly as possible, so as to avoid any misunderstanding with regard to the procedure to be followed.

Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (interpretation from French): It is not my intention to cast any doubt on what you have just said, Mr. Chairman, or to challenge the provisions of the rules of procedure that you have just quoted. I nevertheless maintain -- and I hope you will give some attention to what I am about to say -- that the question of Korea is inscribed in the agenda of this session under two different numbers: 104 (a) and 104 (b); all those who are accustomed to our numbering system know that such a system can be used for the purpose of introducing a distinction in a common item.

I therefore believe that rule 131 which you have quoted, Mr. Chairman, applies fully, provided that account is taken of the fact that we have here two items on our agenda relating to the question of Korea, namely 104 (a) and 104 (b).
If the General Committee of the General Assembly and, subsequently, the General Assembly itself had really wished to inscribe the question of Korea under a single item, it would not have deemed it necessary to retain, within this item, two distinct sub-paragraphs numbered (a) and (b).

Mr. RAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I think that if we expatiate on the question of the rules of procedure, we shall need the whole afternoon perhaps to exchange ideas not in accordance not only with rule 121, which you cited, Sir, but also taking into account former practice. With all due respect to the representative of Algeria, I want to draw his attention to the fact that (a) and (b) of agenda item 104 are interdependent and interconnected; otherwise, there would have been two items. He might say: "Oh, they are two phases of the same problem" -- as, for instance, one might say "two faces of the same coin". But it is still the same coin.

Now, in order not to delve into analogies and similes by saying that they are the sides of the same coin, if he will bear with me I should like to draw his attention to the fact that the object of the consensus that was adopted last year was, inter alia, to dispose of the question of the troops. You see how the one is built into the other -- which makes (b) more inclusive than (a). In other words, the question of the urgent need to implement fully the consensus is inclusive of the question of the United Nations Command.

Nobody can say otherwise, because, then, what is the use of last year's consensus? We were supposed to bring both parties together to resolve this long-standing problem and bring peace to the Korean peninsula. Therefore, he is only dealing with the part without taking into account the whole.

But I say to him that he is like that doctor whose concern is with the tumour -- and here let us assume again that we fall into similes and analogies. To him the tumour here consists of the troops in Korea. But he is not thinking of the welfare of the patient. He wants to remove the tumour regardless of what happens to the patient. We tell him: "If you want to remove that tumour, the patient might die; and we do not want the Korean people to suffer."
I shall again depart from similces. I advisedly had an amendment to focus our attention to the necessity of incorporating the dissolution of the United Nations Command into the draft resolution that has numerical precedence. I would have submitted the same amendment to the other draft resolution, if it were relevant in any way. But I incorporated the substance of the draft resolution the purpose of which is to dissolve or remove the Command. And here I had in mind exactly what the representative of Algeria and the sponsors of the draft resolution had in mind in order eventually to do away with the Command. We do not want any foreign troops in any part of the world, especially in a peninsula which has a homogeneous people and which was divided arbitrarily.

If the sponsors of the so-called Algerian draft resolution accept this explanation of mine, our problems are solved. But if they do not, there is another way of persuading them to accept. And this time I have to ask the sponsors of the first draft resolution -- the one in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 -- to accept my amendment rather than have a vote on it. Then this would give it a double priority; this would give their draft resolution a double priority because the purpose of my amendment is to see that the dissolution of the United Nations Command is eventually effected. This is why, when France submitted the initial amendment, I said: "I salute France for having done something constructive." In other words, France, which usually votes with the Western Group, acted independently on the merits of the case that you cannot under the flag of the United Nations retain troops forever when the United Nations has expanded and the situation has changed in Korea.

Therefore, taking into account the first reason that I gave to the effect that priority should be given to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, the additional reason would be to ask the sponsors of that draft resolution to accept my draft amendment, and then it would be the more inclusive of the two. Because if the representative of Algeria wants specifically to give priority to his draft resolution, numerically and in the order in which it was introduced, he has no case whatsoever.
But if we go by practice, any draft resolution that has numerical priority -- or, chronological priority, I should say, because we are not dealing here with numerals only -- it provides double assurance that it is more inclusive, and we are dealing with one item and not two items, regardless of the subparagraphs. Then I think that priority is also assured in the sense that I have been trying to present to you, Sir.

Under no circumstances could the Algerian draft resolution have priority after the explanation that I have just given. And if the representative of Algeria has something else to say, I am ready to rebut his argument, if I can, because I see the thing clearly before me. There is no confusion. But he is trying to see the troops only, not the whole question. His eyes focus on the troops. He is like that thoroughbred horse that has blinders. Somebody put blinders on the two sides. He sees only the troops; but there are other sides of the road. Take off the blinders, my good friend, and then you shall see the whole Korean question in its own perspective. Our purpose here is to bring both so-called Koreas -- the North and the South -- together, and not to concentrate on what you consider to be a tumour. And all you want to do is to scoop out the tumour; whether the patient dies or not, you do not care. You are a surgeon who wants to remove the tumour, who wants to remove the army.
But let me tell you, Mr. Chairman, neither you nor I, nor major Powers -- whom I do not want to mention -- can remove the army because it is not our army. If it were the Saudi Arabian army or the Algerian army, we would not have to come here; we would have removed them a long time ago. Therefore, let us be practical and reasonable.

My good brother from Algeria once took issue with me in the General Assembly by saying that I lacked a little logic, and I rebutted him by saying that human relationships need not always be governed by logic. But here, I am afraid, he is a little more than illogical in his request.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If I have correctly understood the statement made by the representative of Algeria, for the time being, in so far as I know, he has not brought up a question of priorities but, rather, he wished to explain the views of his delegation with regard to the topics referred to.

Before I call upon the two speakers I have on the list, and by way of clarification so that there will be no room for doubt, I should like to say that I do intend, when we move to the vote, to first put to the vote the amendment submitted by the delegation of Saudi Arabia in document A/C.1/L.705/Rev.1. Then I shall put to the vote the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, and, lastly, the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677.

Mr. KAUFMANN (Netherlands): I should like to intervene very briefly to give the Committee the views of the sponsors on the amendment in document A/C.1/L.705/Rev.1, that is the revised amendment of Saudi Arabia, or, if I may say so, of Ambassador Baroody, to our draft resolution (A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1).

The sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 have studied Ambassador Baroody's amendment with the greatest care and the greatest sympathy. We are indeed extremely grateful to him for his efforts to reach a more generally acceptable text. The sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 have therefore decided that they will vote for the amendment.
If the amendment of Ambassador Paroody is subsequently adopted, which we hope it will be, it will then replace the original operative paragraph 2 of our draft resolution.

May I take this opportunity to express the appreciation of the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 for all the efforts which Ambassador Driss of Tunisia has undertaken to reach a generally acceptable solution at the end of our long debate. We very much regret that it has not been possible to find such a common position and that therefore today we shall have to go to the vote.

Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation would like to associate itself with the explanation given by the representative of Algeria at the beginning of the meeting concerning the situation before the Committee now. We understand that the Committee did indeed decide to examine together the two items requested separately by two distinct groups of countries. It complied with that agreement and put it into effect last Friday. Now the Committee must vote and of course, it cannot vote simultaneously on two draft resolutions. Therefore, it must reach a decision with regard to one and then turn to the second.

Besides the explanations provided by Ambassador Fahal, we would like to put forward other arguments which my delegation feels would require the Committee to vote first on the draft resolution dealing with subitem (a) and then, consequently, turn to subitem (b). We feel that this order -- alphabetical order which, far from being invented by us is a logical outcome of the situation -- is justifiable, the more so if we take into account the fact that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 is designed to define the view of the General Assembly, or in this case the First Committee, with regard to the question of Korea in its present phase, whereas draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 in essence suggests a definite procedure to be followed and would transfer the application of that procedure to a different body of the United Nations.

The most fundamental logic requires that before we decide whether we should suggest that the Security Council take any given action with regard to the
situation in Korea, the General Assembly should first pronounce itself and state its point of view in this regard. Not long ago the General Assembly was confronted by a similar situation with regard to South Africa and adopted the very procedure which I am referring to now. It first defined its own opinion and then requested the Security Council to decide what its views were.

We also have had other quite recent examples in this Committee itself when we debated concurrently different items which were interconnected, and then proceeded to vote on different draft resolutions without necessarily following the order implied by the symbol of each document. I am referring to some of the matters dealing with disarmament. Furthermore, rule 131 of the rules of procedure, which I have before me, speaks of the order in which proposals have been submitted. It does not specifically refer to the numerical order, to the formal numbering that appears at the top of the page of a draft resolution, but, rather, to the order in which the proposals have been submitted, that is, to something more fundamental as we see it.

In fact, the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, although bearing a somewhat higher number than the one in document A/C.1/L.676, was submitted in its present form on 7 October, in other words, somewhat more than two months ago. The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676, while bearing a lower number, in its present revised form was submitted to this Committee on 4 December, in other words barely five days ago, and the Committee can clearly recall the statement made by the representative of Liberia and his request that this new document be distributed, as was in fact done five days ago.
For these reasons my delegation believes that the simplest and most logical way of approaching this stage of our examination of the question of Korea -- that is, the vote -- is first to reach a decision on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, which refers to subitem (a) of the item under consideration and which also serves to define the view of the Assembly, before we turn to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, which is connected with subitem (b) of this item and moreover refers to the procedure which the Assembly would suggest once it had defined its criteria.

Moreover, we believe that rule 131 clearly stipulates that the Committee can reach a decision with regard to the order in which draft resolutions will be voted upon, and I should like to request formally that the Committee reach a decision in that respect and that priority be given to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.677.

Mr. KULAGA (Poland): The representative of Algeria has raised an important problem, it seems to me. I should like to talk about this problem in relation to the problem and not by starting a new general debate. I will not talk about the tumour and the patient: I think that removing the tumour, especially when it is malignant, is of course of extreme importance, but that is not the reason for my intervention.

The question raised by our colleague from Algeria concerns the fact that we have before us two separate items which have been debated, for purely practical reasons, under the same title. I will not enter into the argumentation already put forward by our colleague from Algeria concerning the submission of the item concerning the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag. This was done at a very much earlier stage. It was introduced as a separate point on the provisional agenda; it was considered as such by the General Committee. What I should like to mention especially here is the fact that the author of the proposal to have the two questions -- the first one and then the next one which was added later -- discussed together himself said:

(spoke in French)

"It was merely a question of facilitating the work of the Assembly and for purely practical reasons -- I emphasise 'purely practical reasons' -- it would be more logical to deal with the two items simultaneously."
I am raising that point because the implications of the question and the implications of what the representative of Algeria has said are very important indeed. Some of them were explained by the representative of Cuba. I should like to add to what has been said already that had it been meant as one item I am sure the authors of the second proposal -- subitem (b) -- would not have chosen to put on the agenda a new point; they could have done so under the point which was already on the provisional agenda for the session. Logically, therefore, and by the implied admission of the sponsors of the second item, we have two separate and distinct items on our agenda: we have item 104(a) and item 104(b), with all the consequences that has for the vote on the two proposals which are before the Committee.

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Sri Lanka): Whether or not we have one or two items is quite immaterial. In the application of rule 131 we must decide whether we have two or more proposals and we must determine which proposal has been submitted first. The proposal that has been submitted first is entitled to priority under the rule unless the Committee decides otherwise. What I wish to point out is that the date of a particular document does not necessarily determine its priority. You will observe that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 was, as pointed out by the representative of Cuba, submitted on 7 October 1974 and the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 was also submitted on that date. But the draft resolution which is said now to be entitled to priority under rule 131 on the ground that it was submitted first is not the draft resolution submitted on 7 October 1974: it is the draft resolution submitted on 4 December 1974. The fact that it is called a revision of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 submitted on 7 October 1974 does not entitle it to the same date as the previous resolution. It differs in a material respect from the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 submitted on 7 October 1974 as a glance at operative paragraph 2 clearly shows. As a matter of convenience the same symbol is retained but, having been given a different date, it loses its claim to priority.
Mr. AKE (Ivory Coast) (interpretation from French): I should like to put a preliminary question to you, Mr. Chairman. Would you tell us, with the support of the Secretariat, which of the two draft resolutions before us was introduced first? If I can have an answer to that question I can continue my comments.

Mr. KAUFMANN (Netherlands): I have listened with increasing amazement to the statements of the last few speakers, with the exception of the very pertinent question of the representative of the Ivory Coast. There is not the slightest doubt that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, which was introduced on 29 November, was submitted earlier. For those who are interested in the dates, they are mentioned at the bottom of the text of document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 was submitted on 16 September 1974 -- that is, almost two weeks later than the other draft resolution -- and was introduced a week ago by the representative of Algeria. So I think your own interpretation of rule 131 is totally clear, and indeed I understood the representative of Algeria to go along with your ruling, if only reluctantly. I am surprised therefore that one sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 and one non-sponsor found it necessary to come back to this question of which proposal should be submitted to a vote first.
Of course, there are ample precedents. If a draft resolution undergoes, in the course of the debate, a revision because its sponsors are willing to accept amendments, there is ample evidence that it retains its priority. It would indeed result in a totally disorderly procedure if, merely because a draft resolution has undergone some change because the sponsors have accepted amendments instead of having a vote on them, it would for that reason lose its priority. This would introduce chaos and disorder into our procedure.

I submit that all those who have spoken, including the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, would, on further reflection agree that this is the case.

Perhaps it is even more important that the sponsors of the draft in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 are convinced that their draft resolution, certainly after we accepted and incorporated the French amendment and after we have pronounced ourselves on the Saudi Arabian amendment, which we wish to go into the record, is the one having the most wide-ranging and realistic effect, the one which is most moderate and which is most helpful to the people of Korea.

So, even with those added reasons, we feel that there is no reason whatsoever not to maintain the priority to which, under the rules of procedure, we are entitled for the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, in accordance with your own ruling, Mr. Chairman; and I hope that the statements that have been made are not to be interpreted as any challenging of the ruling, which seems to me the right one and a wise one.

The CHAIRMAN (intervention from Spanish): I wish to thank the representative of the Netherlands.

There are some speakers who have requested to speak. I believe that the debate as to which draft resolution has priority could go on for hours, because each speaker would, and with good reason, defend his point of view. The way to resolve this question, in my opinion, is as follows. After I announce the order in which I propose to put the draft resolutions to the vote, there are only two choices open to us: one is to challenge the ruling of the Chairman, which any delegation has the right to do; the other is
to request, in accordance with rule 131, that priority be granted to one or the other draft resolution. It was through the use of rule 131 that the representative of Cuba made a formal proposal. Rule 131 states:

"If two or more proposals relate to the same question, the committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the proposals in the order in which they have been submitted."

The Chairman, as I said, does not have any latitude, and the order would be the numerical order. Therefore, the representative of Cuba, exercising the right he enjoys under rule 131, has formally requested that the Committee reach a decision by giving priority to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677. I believe that the best way to conclude this matter would be to put to the vote immediately the proposal made by the representative of Cuba, and I now do so.

The proposal was rejected by 50 votes to 48, with 33 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): In accordance with the decision just taken by the First Committee, the order for the voting will be as follows: first, the amendment to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, appearing in document A/C.1/L.705/Rev.1; then the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, followed by that in document A/C.1/L.677.

I shall now call on those delegations who are on my list for explanations of their votes on the amendment in document A/C.1/L.705/Rev.1 to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1.

Mr. MAINA (Kenya): My delegation would have liked to explain its vote before any voting started, even on the procedural question. However, I do not wish to pursue the matter further and shall now proceed to explain our vote.

The Kenyan delegation has listened very carefully to the debate on the question of Korea and has taken the trouble to acquaint itself with the relevant facts and the history of the whole question. We shall not, however, tire the Committee with those facts, but shall rather refer to a few salient ones.
After assessing the historical facts of the case and after listening to some of the most forceful legal arguments as well as bitter statements from all sides, my delegation has serious hesitations in making a statement. My delegation, in common with many others, wishes to participate in a debate only when it feels that it can contribute towards finding a solution to a problem. In this case, a serious doubt does exist in our minds.

We find that there are no less than six States directly concerned in the problem. For some of them it is a question of survival itself. For others, larger and more complicated questions of power and prestige are involved and yet for some, historical ties, as well as questions of neighbourhood, are involved. It does not appear possible, therefore, to make any suggestions that would help the situation without offending at least two or more States at once. That partly explains why the question of Korea has been on the agenda of the United Nations for so many years. It explains partly why many Members favour a consensus which states no more than a wish or a hope. Such a move in the Assembly would release us from a somewhat unbearable burden. Yet, it is incumbent upon us all to contribute whatever we can to the efforts of the Organization in dealing with a serious problem like the question of Korea.

On its release from the control of Japan, Korea was divided temporarily by the big Powers during the war to facilitate their military operations against Japan without dangerous military conflicts. That division has become almost permanent and the cry of the Koreans is for reunification.

The South cries for reunification on its terms and the North equally strongly cries for reunification on its own terms. What is at issue and what is scarcely ever discussed are the apparently mutually exclusive political economic systems that the two Koreas have developed under the suzerainty of the big Powers.

The United Nations became involved in the Korean question, as everybody knows, through the provisions of the Charter relating to the maintenance of peace and security. Whether we call it so or not, the bloody war was waged in the name of the reunification of Korea. The United Nations brought about an armistice, not peace and not reunification. Although the United Nations has a duty to offer assistance when requested, the unification of States is not one of its Charter functions.
The controversy which surrounds the United Nations over the question of Korea relates to the peculiar arrangements made at the time the United Nations accepted a role for peace keeping in Korea. It is that involvement in a problem in which the United Nations does not even appear to be fully in control of its own affairs, that is worrying many delegations, including my own. It is also that involvement that makes it possible for some delegations to propose measures that clearly interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign States.

The United Nations accepts the existence of the two independent and sovereign States in Korea. That acceptance of the two sovereign States in Korea imposes certain obligations on my delegation which we can ignore only at the price of permanent inconsistence and illogicality. We take note in passing that South Korea has a bilateral defence agreement with the United States of America, while North Korea has similar defence arrangements with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China. They are entitled to those arrangements as independent States.

With regard to the United Nations Command in Korea, resolution 84 (1950) of the Security Council in part:

"Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America;

"Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

"Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

"Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command."
It is not necessary to comment at length on that resolution nor to assess what have been the achievements or failures under it. It is enough to state that the fact that no similar resolutions have been passed by the Security Council since 1950 is significant. This is an open-ended mandate to a military force of the United Nations over which the Organization has no control and on which reports may be provided by a Member of the United Nations only as the Member finds appropriate. In order that the need to extricate the Organization from this source of embarrassment may not be overstated, I would agree with the representative of the United States when he said:

"The United States Government and the Republic of Korea have both made it clear that they are willing to consider an alternative to these present arrangements, one which would help to preserve the present Armistice between the two sides, and the machinery which supports it. We fully agree that the time has come -- and is perhaps overdue -- for reconsideration of the role played by the United Nations under the arrangements established by the Security Council in 1950." (2032nd meeting, p. 88)

My delegation would simply underline the fact that in our view a review of the United Nations role in Korea is long overdue.

With regard to the unification of the two Koreas, we believe that this will not be brought about by any resolution or action of the United Nations -- not even by the withdrawal of all foreign troops. We know that if the two Koreas call with one voice for all foreigners to quit their land, all foreigners will go. We know that if all Koreans decide to unite tomorrow under one system of government no external force can stop that unity. Enough statements have been made in this Committee by both sides to show the possibilities for the future. It is most important, in our view, that the United Nations recognizes the dangers which the question of Korea holds for the world. For us this means that the United Nations should rectify its position so that if need arises in the future, the Organization can play its true role without handicaps. As no advice is solicited and as we respect both North and South Korea as sovereign and independent States we can only wish both success in their efforts to reunite Korea peacefully; we cannot take sides by supporting any draft resolution or move in the United Nations that has not been supported by both States. My delegation will, therefore, press the appropriate button when voting commences.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Barbados on a point of order.

Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados): I am speaking on a point of order with respect to the second provision of rule 131 of the rules of procedure. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that that provision reads as follows:

"The Committee may, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal."

We submit that both drafts -- A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 and whatever additional revisions may be made thereto and A/C.1/L.677 -- are proposals on the same item. We submit that if the draft in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 is put to the vote and adopted, there should not be a vote on the draft in document A/C.1/L.677. It is, then, our concrete proposal that this Committee should not vote on the draft in document A/C.1/L.677 if the draft in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 is adopted.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I have noted the formal proposal of the representative of Barbados. After the first draft has been voted upon, we shall give it our attention.

I call on the representative of Norway on a point of order.

Mr. TELLMAN (Norway): I should like to state for the record that due to a technical error our vote on the procedural question of priority was wrongly recorded. I should therefore like to ask that our vote be recorded as "No".

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I would suggest that representatives pay attention to their voting. It will be recalled that before terminating the voting procedure I asked two questions: first, whether all votes had been recorded and secondly, whether all votes had been appropriately and duly recorded. That was the time at which a delegation whose vote had not been properly recorded should have raised a point of order and requested that it be corrected.

Mr. ROBINSON (Guyana): My delegation has listened with keen attention to the debate that has taken place over the past few days on the item currently before this Committee, the question of Korea. My delegation has also studied most
carefully the two draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.677) that have been proposed on this issue.

The history of developments in Korea in recent decades is a complex one. The division of Korea occurred as a direct result of the cold war, and was fostered by considerations of so-called strategic interest. During the course of that history, some delegations, including those of both North and South Korea, have taken opposite positions on key and vital aspects -- as, for example, the question of membership relating to Korea in this Organization and in the specialized agencies.

It is the view of my delegation that the way forward must be informed by a critical appreciation of the forces that shaped the past actions of parties involved in the situation in Korea. It must be charted with the acknowledgement that contemporary international relations are not governed by the same operational principles that guided actions in the era of the cold war, acknowledgement that there are at large today currents and trends both firm and fragile which seek to relegate to history the attitudes and consequences dominant in that period and to replace them by a growing adherence to the principles of mutual respect, democratization of international relations and friendly co-operation.

Guyana's principal concern in its approach to this debate has been that the activities of the United Nations must be directed towards fostering an atmosphere that advances the efforts of the North and of the South towards reunification. The activities of the United Nations in the appropriate organs must lead to a contribution which seeks to facilitate the creation of conditions favourable to the peaceful and independent reunification of Korea with the clearly expressed desire of the peoples of both North and South Korea, and the result of those efforts must be that the Korean people can take steps agreed upon among themselves for reunification without external interference. For, while recognizing the justifiable concern of the United Nations in this matter, it is quite evident that the issues affecting the Korean people are ultimately for the Korean people themselves to settle. Consequently, Guyana, as a country which maintains diplomatic relations with both the North and the South, welcomes the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972 and the contacts that have been established between the two sides as well as the various initiatives each has taken to put forward proposals for peace.
It is with that background in mind that my delegation approaches the two draft resolutions before us. It would of course have been convenient if this Committee had been in a position to adopt a consensus along the lines of last year's, and, indeed, as we said earlier, in a fundamental sense we remain firmly convinced that the problem of Korea can be solved only through consensus, goodwill and compromise.

In that sense, the draft resolution in document A/C.1/PV.2039 contains elements informed by such considerations and not unworthy of support. But that draft fails fundamentally and realistically to address the need to give serious thought to disposing of an historical aberration whose perpetuation serves only to confuse this crucial issue. I am, of course, speaking of continuing the fiction that it is the United Nations that is maintaining troops in Korea.

History has provided sufficient evidence to support the view that the presence of foreign troops in areas of tension may serve to perpetuate that tension rather than diminish it. We hold to that view while recognizing the right of States to establish defence arrangements to their own satisfaction. But the time has surely passed when the United Nations can be used as a cover for any such arrangement. And that is what we take to be the concern of the operative paragraphs of the draft in document A/C.1/L.677.

Continuation of the use of the United Nations flag in Korea is no longer justifiable, and in that connexion we note the recent acknowledgement that the perpetuation of other arrangements from an earlier time -- that is, UNCURK and payment by the United Nations for the upkeep of the cemetery in South Korea -- are no longer necessary or warranted.
At the same time, we note that the wording of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 is not such as to bring into question the authority of any other United Nations organ. To us this is important and we are constrained to observe that even though an arrangement might be considered to have been ill-conceived from its inception, it would be unfortunate if the method of its dismantling were improper or not fully thought out.

It is on this basis and for these reasons that my delegation finds itself in a position to support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677. And it is because the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 fails to address itself fully to the issue of the continued use of the United Nations flag in Korea that we will be obliged to register an abstention on that draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Niger on a point of order.

Mr. SALLUM (Niger) (interpretation from French): My point of order is simply to say that at the time of the vote a short while ago my button did not function properly. Had it functioned, I would have voted for the procedural motion. I would wish his clarification to be noted in the verbatim record.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The comments just made by the representative of Niger will be recorded in the verbatim record of the meeting.

Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation would like to explain its negative vote with regard to document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. We shall do so briefly, because we will surprise no one when we say that we totally reject that document.

However, we should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to some basic inconsistencies to be found in that text and also some that relate to the way in which the First Committee has dealt with the question of Korea for more than two decades.
They are the principal reasons, among others, for our negative vote with regard to that document.

I should also like to draw the attention of representatives to the texts which year after year, except during this session, have been adopted by this body of the General Assembly with regard to Korea on the basis of proposals submitted by the United States delegation, in company, almost always, with many of the countries that are sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 today.

My delegation has brought a good number of volumes, like this one I am holding, which record the resolutions adopted at each session by the Assembly. I will not read all these volumes because it is unnecessary, since, year after year, in the part dealing with Korea, in each resolution adopted by this Committee under United States pressure a paragraph is included, that is exactly the same every year and that is in categorical opposition to operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution which has been submitted to the Committee in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1.

So I have taken a volume at random, one that contains the resolutions which were adopted at the twenty-fifth session in order to read operative paragraph 6 of resolution 2668 (XXV) which, I repeat, is exactly the same as the paragraph that appears in each and every resolution adopted by this Committee on the question of Korea, under North American influence.

Let us see what this operative paragraph 6 states; I shall read it in its entirety:

"6. Notes that the United Nations forces which were sent to Korea in accordance with United Nations resolutions have in greater part already been withdrawn, that the sole objective of the United Nations forces at present in Korea is to preserve the peace and security of the area, and that the Governments concerned are prepared to withdraw their remaining forces from Korea whenever such action is requested by the Republic of Korea or whenever the conditions for a lasting settlement formulated by the General Assembly have been fulfilled."

I repeat the last sentence:
"... or whenever the conditions for a lasting settlement formulated by the General Assembly have been fulfilled."
In no place in that paragraph, and in no place in any other paragraph of that resolution, nor in any of the others which year after year the United States has managed to have adopted in this Committee, is reference made to the Security Council, nor has it been said that the Security Council should examine the question of the withdrawal of the troops stationed in South Korea. On the contrary, year after year it is asserted that this is a matter for a decision of the General Assembly and note is taken too of the fact that several countries have withdrawn their forces without this action having been taken in response to a decision of the Security Council or of the General Assembly, but merely by a decision of those Member States.

So we must now ask why, in this year 1974, the United States and those accompanying it as sponsors of this document, prefer to attempt to transfer this matter to the Security Council.

My delegation is tempted to say that the only aim of such a procedure is to impose upon this Assembly the tyranny of the minority, in this case, the tyranny of the minority of one. In the Security Council, the United States can exercise its veto to prevent a solution being reached which, year after year, for two decades, it has itself asserted falls within the purview of the General Assembly.

For this reason, my delegation believes that, to be consistent with ourselves, and in particular for the sponsors who year after year have asserted the authority of the General Assembly in this connexion to be consistent with themselves, the only logical thing to do would be categorically to reject the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1.
(Mr. Alarcon, Cuba)

Obviously, the only motive explaining why there has been a change this year in the line which had been followed for two decades is the fear of the growing power within the Assembly of the countries which are genuinely concerned about promoting the cause of national independence, the equality of States, and true peace, and which oppose the presence of foreign troops in South Korea.

The formulation in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 can be interpreted in no other way than in connexion with the recent scandal in the General Assembly, which reflects the preoccupation of the imperialist States which, faced with the growing progressive tendencies within our Assembly, must resort to such manoeuvres as those clearly reflected in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1), in their continued violation of the rights of the Korean people, in their continued military occupation of Korean territory, and in preventing the Assembly from categorically expressing its view.

Besides that, however, this draft resolution continues to sow an element of fundamental confusion which has not yet been clarified despite the repeated demands of various delegations during the debate on Korea. It makes continued reference to a "United Nations Command" which the United Nations ignores, and about which the Organization, through the Secretariat, has been unable to furnish us with information, even on its composition and leadership. That confusing term is still used, and there is a continued refusal to give the Committee -- at least, we have received none so far -- the basic explanations which we should all demand if we truly wish to take a vote on this document in full knowledge of the facts.

Thus this text is presented to the Committee without our knowing yet what the Second Division of the United States Army is doing in the demilitarized zone -- without our knowing yet what the final aim was of the United States plan to integrate into one single command the United States Eighth Army and the so-called "United Nations Command"; and, indeed, without our knowing yet the extent to which the United Nations flag is being illegally used by the United States armies stationed in South Korea.

In other words, the Committee is being invited to vote in such a way as not to solve the problem and to be unable to make its views prevail with regard to the presence of foreign troops in South Korea. What is worse, and more serious, the text would introduce a factor which would close the door to the possibility of any future action by the Assembly.
The sponsors have nevertheless had no hesitation in coming before us and contradicting the policy which they themselves had been following for 20 years. Nor have they had the slightest hesitation to acknowledge before us the essential weakness of their position and their fear that the Assembly might categorically decide upon the total withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea.

In the face of such a gigantic manoeuvre, we believe that the only reaction of this Committee can be the categorical rejection of this document, the only possible effect of which, if adopted, would be to maintain the presence of foreign troops in South Korea, perpetuate the illegal use of the United Nations flag by the United States, and prevent the Assembly from acting independently and reaching its own decision.

Mr. SALIFOU (Niger) (interpretation from French): With your permission, Sir, I should like to explain Niger's vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. It will be recalled that, last year, a consensus was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. It called upon the parties in particular to continue their dialogue, with a view to accelerating the political reunification of Korea. This year, we have before us two draft resolutions, the consensus not having been achieved: the draft in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, and the draft in document A/C.1/L.677.

May I say, in this connexion, that if it had to vote on the individual paragraphs of the draft resolution, my delegation would vote in favour of operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1) which I have just mentioned, because we cannot change our mind at the end of the year.

As for the draft in document A/C.1/L.677, the delegation of Niger will vote in favour of it.

Mr. NJINE (United Republic of Cameroon) (interpretation from French): May I remind the Committee that on 4 July 1972 the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Korea signed a Joint Communiqué in which they presented their views concerning the process of
reunification of Korea. It was then agreed that that reunification was to be independently achieved, by peaceful means and within the framework of the great movement of national unity. That opening of dialogue between the two parts of Korea was hailed enthusiastically, not only by the Korean nation but also by our Organization, which by consensus on 28 November 1973, noted with satisfaction that turn of events and decided to dissolve immediately the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.
My delegation deplores the fact that for a year now the continuation of the dialogue between North and South Korea has met with growing difficulties. This situation ought not, in our opinion, to give rise to excessive pessimism or be exploited for partisan purposes. It should rather help the international community to understand the true dimensions of the Korean question, through patient, realistic and disinterested efforts.

My delegation suggests solutions that are acceptable to the two parts of Korea for the ultimate resolution of the issues involved. In invoking the Korean question in the course of the general debate of this session, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Cameroon stated that

"... we consider that following the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea the time has come to withdraw all foreign troops still stationed on Korean territory. It is only in a situation free from outside interference that the people of Korea will be able freely and effectively to resolve the problem of the independent and peaceful reunification of their country." (A/PV.2257, p. 28-30)

My Government, while thus expressing its opinion on this question in full independence and objectivity, wishes to reiterate its respect for the views expressed by the Governments of North and South Korea, which are maintaining diplomatic relations with my country. We would also wish to express our confidence that the Korean nation will be able to find, in the legacy of its long history and rich culture, the necessary elements for overcoming its present division.

The position of my delegation should therefore not be interpreted as constituting any attempt to exert pressure on the position of either of the parties. My Government believes that no excessive position can be taken seriously, as Talleyrand said. That is why in the past weeks my Government attempted, in its contacts with the two Governments in Korea, both at Yaoundé, the capital of my country, and in New York, to explore the possibility that this Committee might arrive at a consensus this year as well. We regret that this friendly undertaking was not crowned with success. The adoption of one of the draft resolutions submitted to this Committee will not solve the Korean problem. On the contrary, we believe that it will help not only to polarize the various positions
in the United Nations, but also to create further division between the Koreans themselves and perhaps also bring about an irreversible acceptance of the international existence of the two parts of Korea that would completely destroy any hope of the reunification of that country.

It seems to me desirable that, on the one hand, our Committee should invite the Koreans to solve their problem in an atmosphere of trust and peace and, on the other, the great Powers should agree to include the Korean peninsula within the present process of détente.

This political approach does not appear to have been reflected in the draft resolutions now before the Committee. Consequently my delegation will abstain in the vote on all these draft resolutions.

Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Soviet Union wishes to draw the Committee's attention to the somewhat strange proposal by the representative of Barbados. From the very outset of today's discussion we proceeded from the idea that you put forward, Mr. Chairman, namely, that we should vote on both draft resolutions.

The question arose as to which should be voted on first, which should be given priority. An unjust decision was adopted; however, it was adopted and we are required to yield to it, since the majority voted for that unjust decision. But the delegation of Barbados goes further. It wishes to deprive us of an opportunity to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677. On what basis, may I ask?

After all, from the very outset it was quite obvious that priority should have been given to that very resolution. The question of Korea was not included in the provisional agenda prepared by the United Nations Secretariat. In September this year a group of delegations made a proposal concerning the withdrawal from South Korea of the troops present there under the flag of the United Nations. After that, the delegations of Western countries, with the co-operation of certain countries of the third world, suddenly woke up to what was happening and introduced another item referring to the consensus and to a dialogue. But these are different issues.
The fact that a decision has been taken that we should vote on consensus and dialogue is no reason whatever for excluding a vote on the other draft resolution, introduced by a large number of States. Mr. Chairman, we understood your introductory statement to mean that both draft resolutions would be put to the vote, and the only question was which would be voted upon first. The question of the priority in the voting has been disposed of; we are to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 first. But disposing of that question in no way excludes the sponsors of the second draft resolution from calling for a vote on their draft resolution, because that group of States, and those Members of the United Nations which support that proposal concerning the withdrawal from South Korea of the troops present there under the United Nations flag, consider that there can be no dialogue or unification while foreign troops are present in one part of Korea.

Everyone in the First Committee and the General Assembly, and in the United Nations as a whole, is fully familiar with the fact that in North Korea there is not one single foreign soldier, while in South Korea there are 38,000 foreign troops under the United Nations flag. First, their presence there is unlawful, since the decision concerned was adopted in the absence of two members of the Security Council. This has been frequently pointed out, and it remains a fact.
Secondly, the presence of foreign troops in one of the parts of Korea establishes abnormal conditions for the holding of a dialogue and for the conducting of talks leading to reunification. The balance of forces is unbalanced, is unequal.

Here, the representative of Saudi Arabia had spoken of a tumour, but it is precisely the tumour that is in South Korea, a cancerous, malignant tumour. The general mood in the United Nations is that foreign troops should not be present on other peoples' territories.

The Soviet Union has frequently made proposals concerning withdrawal of foreign troops from other nations' territories. We insist on South Korea not having any troops, especially under the flag of the United Nations. It is precisely this tumour that compels a large group of States which have introduced this question in the General Assembly's agenda and have introduced a draft resolution on the matter, to insist on the troops there, under the fictitious flag of the United Nations, being withdrawn, because the presence of foreign troops in one part of Korea is a genuine obstacle to the creation of normal conditions for the dialogue and for reunification.

Accordingly, it becomes necessary for both draft resolutions to be voted on. Whatever arguments might be adduced by the opponents of such an approach, the matter stands that there are two questions in the item on Korea, although they are headed by a single title, "Question of Korea".

Mr. Chairman, you have excellent practice in our work as Chairman of the First Committee of this Assembly when we discussed questions of disarmament. On a number of items, a number of draft resolutions were introduced and all of them were voted on. Consider concrete examples concerning the nuclear-free zone in South Asia. Two draft resolutions were introduced and one of them, the first one, received a majority. It would seem, therefore, that since a resolution was voted on, and adopted by a majority of the votes cast, there was no need for a second resolution. Nevertheless, both draft resolutions were voted on. And today, in this room, the plenary meeting of the General Assembly also voted for those resolutions; and both of them have now been adopted and both of them have now become documents of the General Assembly.
Therefore, what basis then is there for objecting to voting on the second
draft resolution on the Korean question? There is neither any logic nor any
argumentation in favour of such a proposal.

Since Friday of last week, there has been in United Nations circles much
talk concerning the tyranny of the majority. Well, I personally am a victim
of the tyranny of the majority. During the years of the cold war, I
represented the Soviet Union: I was alone in the Security Council. Ten
deginations always voted against my proposals. I protested, I complained,
objected, but the tyranny of the majority pressed upon me. And then there was
no question at all on the part of those who belonged to the mechanical majority;
they were quite silent about the tyranny. They have started talking about it
now. And the solution of the Korean matter is an example of the tyranny of
the majority and of mechanical voting. This also must be borne in mind here
in the course of the vote.

Solutions were forced on us in those days unconditionally, without
taking into account the opinions of the minority. But has the situation
changed to such an extent in the United Nations that there is any cause for
complaint against the majority? No, the complaints are addressed to the third
world because it is forcing the decision. But that does not correspond to
reality. Let us consider the draft resolution in document A/C.1/PV.2039/Rev.1.
How many representatives of the third world will you find there as sponsors?
Bolivia, third world; Haiti, yes, third world -- Gambia, Guatemala, Dominican
Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Lesotho, Liberia, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
After all, those are third world countries and all of them are sponsors
of the draft resolution. With whom? With the United States, with the
United Kingdom, with New Zealand, with Western countries. So what basis is
there for complaint?

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the
representative of the Ivory Coast on a point of order.
Mr. AKE (Ivory Coast) (interpretation from French): I should like to apologize to the representative of the Soviet Union but I would merely like to ask you a question, Mr. Chairman: is what the representative of the Soviet Union saying right now an explanation of vote with regard to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1? If it is not, I would ask that we vote.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I have not felt that the statement made by Ambassador Malik is an explanation of vote. I believe it is a point of order. This point of order is to oppose the other point of order which was brought up by the representative of Barbados, that we would not vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 if the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 is adopted. In other words, I consider the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union as being a point of order.

But I should like to remind him of what I said at the very beginning of this session; in other words, that in raising points of order we should avoid going into matters of substance. The point of order raised by the representative of the Soviet Union will be dealt with in due course, as is stipulated in rule 131 of the rules of procedure which states: "The committee may, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal". Therefore, the Committee is the body which must vote on whether the next proposal should be voted on. It is not the Chairman, nor the delegations which can reach that decision, but rather the Committee as a whole.

Consequently, after having voted, bearing in mind the proposal made by the representative of Barbados and the opposition raised by the representative of the Soviet Union, I shall put the appropriate question.

I call on the representative of the Ivory Coast on a point of order.

Mr. AKE (Ivory Coast) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank you for the explanations you have just given me. If the representative of the Soviet Union is not explaining his vote, but rather is
raising a point of order with regard to the point of order of Barbados, I would request that we vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 and then, after the vote, deal with the point of order of Barbados, at which time the representative of the Soviet Union could comment on that proposal.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I have the impression that the representative of the Soviet Union has already put forth his views and that he is coming to the conclusion of his point of order. After he has spoken, there are three further speakers on the list to explain their vote. I hope that that will not take up too much time and then, in a friendly spirit in any case, we could turn to the votes.

I should like to request the representative of the Soviet Union to continue with his point of order but taking into account the comments I have just made.
Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I consider that statements on points of order are out of place. That is why I am dealing with the draft resolution which is about to be voted on, and I wish to state that the Soviet Union will formally object to that draft resolution and vote against it. Is that readily understandable to those who wish to speak on points of order? I am dealing with this present draft resolution on which we are about to vote and I say that we shall vote against it, and we insist that the delegation of Barbados should not insist on its proposal that the second draft resolution not be voted on, because that would be unjust and unfair. Those who insist on the second draft resolution not being voted on will be contributing to the persistence of a cancerous tumour in South Korea and to the placing of South and North Korea on an unequal footing in the conduct of their dialogue. Now, in fact, dialogue is referred to in both drafts. I would draw the attention of representatives to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. Here we find dialogue mentioned in the first paragraph in the operative part of the draft resolution. In the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 dialogue is referred to in the fourth preambular paragraph, which reads:

"Recognizing that the continued presence of the foreign troops in South Korea and the continuation of the interference of the outside forces in the internal affairs of Korea constitute a serious obstacle in the way of promoting a dialogue" -- I repeat "dialogue" -- "between the North and the South for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country and turning the armistice in Korea into a durable peace."

Thus, between the two groups there is no disagreement concerning dialogue. Both they and we are for dialogue, both they and we are in favour of the continuation of the talks between the South and the North. But we consider that the withdrawal of the foreign troops which are stationed there under the United Nations flag will contribute to the dialogue, while they adhere to the opposite view. In other words, they are in favour of that cancerous tumour's remaining there, but that cancerous tumour will contaminate the whole organism and the dialogue will perish; it will not withstand the presence of that tumour and that contamination.
So by all means let us finish as we started, and we started by talking about voting on both draft resolutions. They have received priority. Well, let us congratulate them. Let them be happy, they have two votes more than we have. But let them not prevent our voting on our draft resolution. Then we shall have a fair approach to the voting on such an important issue as the Korean question concerning dialogue and reunification and the elimination of all obstacles in the way of a settlement of this question.

Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): I assure you that my explanation of vote is unimpeachable.

Kuwait is a small country which stands for the peaceful settlement of political issues. It advocates non-interference by foreign Powers in the domestic affairs of States. Korea has been a classic victim of foreign interference. Our policy in Kuwait has always been against such interference, which has brought nothing but division and tension to the Korean peninsula. We are against meddling in the domestic affairs of Korea from any source. We are also against the dispatching of foreign troops to Korea, whether overtly or surreptitiously, since we believe that such encroachment on the domestic rights of the Korean people triggers off animosity rather than contributing to harmony. Therefore my delegation will vote staunchly and with ferocious determination against the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1.

That the United Nations flag has been abused is a fact that even the obtuse are forced to admit. My country is not willing to support the continued presence of foreign troops stationed in Korea which masquerade as United Nations forces. Their presence is not acceptable under the Charter nor in keeping with the essential spirit of the United Nations as an organization designed to preserve and promote peaceful coexistence among nations. The flag of the United Nations has been usurped to serve interests which, in our view, are alien to the United Nations, contrary to the principles of the Charter and detrimental to the image of this Organization. That usurpation took place when the Western Powers enjoyed ascendancy within the United Nations. It is not merely legitimate to ask for the removal of the United Nations flag now, it is also pertinent to question the legality of the presence of foreign troops in the guise of friendly United Nations forces. We maintain the view that
the presence of foreign forces sheltering under the United Nations flag is not only illegal but contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter. My delegation is not concerned about the identity of those troops. Its opposition is directed against the use of the United Nations flag as a cover designed to provide a questionable legality for the foreign forces in Korea. We say forcefully that the United Nations flag, which has been so long abused by those foreign troops, should be furled and carried out of Korea.

Kuwait believes that the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea is a prerequisite for creating the proper atmosphere for fruitful dialogue between the North and the South in order to achieve the goals of peaceful reunification and national unity. The presence of foreign troops has retarded the process of national reunification and perpetuated the artificial division of the country. The Korean people cannot exercise its legitimate right to self-determination so long as foreign troops are stationed in its territory. It cannot give its whole-hearted attention to the task of economic and social development while it is constantly harassed by outside interference in its domestic affairs. The process of national reunification reconstruction and development must take place peacefully without foreign pressure, coercion or constraint.

The people of Korea has suffered for long from the ravages of war and from living in a tense atmosphere fraught with the seeds of turmoil and conflict. They should now be afforded the opportunity of embarking upon the great task of reconstruction and national development.

While voting against the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, we give our blessing to the future endeavours of the Korean people and would like to assure them that our sole concern is their prosperity, progress and well-being.
Mr. HUANG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): In the view of the Chinese delegation, in substance, the amendment proposed by the Saudi Arabian representative to the draft resolution of the United States and others has not gone beyond the framework of the draft submitted by the United States and others. They have one point in common, that is, neither of them make any mention of the question of the withdrawal of all the foreign troops under the flag of the United Nations. They keep far away from this question as they do from plagues. They insist on referring the question of the dissolution of the United Nations Command for consideration by the Security Council.

As we have pointed out, the earlier "resolutions" of the Security Council on the Korean question were adopted under the manipulation of the United States in the abnormal circumstances in which the People's Republic of China, a permanent member of the Council, was deprived of its lawful rights in the United Nations: these "resolutions" were in complete violation of the United Nations Charter principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of any State, and therefore they are utterly illegal and null and void. The proposal now to refer the question again to the Security Council is in fact an attempt to resurrect those illegal resolutions. Even the ridiculously scanty information about the so-called United Nations Command and the United Nations forces as provided by the Secretariat is sufficient to show that the Security Council has, in fact, had nothing to do with the so-called United Nations forces over a long period. The Secretariat is unable to answer any of the questions posed by the representatives, and it will have to seek the answer from the Pentagon of the United States Government. The so-called "United Nations Command" is in fact a command of the United States aggressor troops in Korea, and it is responsible only to the United States Government. Even the United States Government dare not come out to deny this. Now, as the people of the world are demanding ever more strongly the withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea, the United States, compelled by the circumstances, has again invoked the Security Council as the last hurdle, in an attempt to retain the United States troops in South Korea for continued interference in Korea's internal affairs and for obstruction of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea with the help of the veto power in the Security Council. This is of course absolutely impermissible.
In their draft resolution, the United States and others mention the United Nations Command. I might well describe their plight by telling a fable. Several blind people are discussing what an elephant is like. Some say it is like a water pipe, others say it is like a pillar, still others say it is like a wall. As to what is the United Nations Command, can you explain it clearly? Can the Secretariat do so? Since the Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, came to office, he has never received a single report from the so-called United Nations Command, not even a word. Things are very clear: the United States and other co-sponsors want this Committee to vote with closed eyes as the blind people talking about the elephant. Is there a United Nations Command in South Korea, and what differences are there between this Command and the United States Command? How many troops are there under this Command? How many troops are carrying out duties in the demilitarized zone of several hundred kilometres? Can they answer these questions? The spokesman of the United States Mission has alleged that there are only a hundred or a hundred-odd people under the United Nations Command. Then what troops are the United States Second Division which are performing their duty along the Military Demarcation Line? Are they United States troops or United Nations troops? Paragraph 13 of the Korean Armistice Agreement signed by the United States on behalf of the United Nations Command as one of the belligerent parties stipulates explicitly "cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel". If the United States troops in South Korea are not United Nations troops, then where have the United States troops come from? You have asserted that they were sent in pursuance of the bilateral agreement between the United States and South Korea. If this is the case, how would you treat the provisions of paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement?

What we are hearing now is sheer quibbling, and shameless quibbling. Its purpose is to perpetuate the stay of the United States troops in South Korea, continue the obstruction of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea and the division of Korea. There are too many farces in the United Nations. What we are facing now is one of such farces, like the one we witnessed the other day on the Cambodian question. I will not talk at length on this question. Such are the facts. Anyone with eyes, with conscience and common sense will see them clearly.
The Chinese delegation and other co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 will vote against the Saudi Arabian amendment and the draft resolution submitted by the United States and others.

Just now the representative from Barbados has tried to prevent this Committee from voting on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 submitted by Algeria and 39 other countries. In our view, this is totally unjustified and is in violation of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I am sorry to interrupt the representative of China with regard to the point of order raised by the representative of Barbados, but as I said a few moments ago in reference to another point of order, when we come to that time I shall give an opportunity to delegations who wish to speak in reference to that item to do so. For the time being we shall merely restrict ourselves to explanations of vote. I call on the representative of China.

Mr. HUANG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): This is a component of the procedural manoeuvres played by the United States and others. The Chinese delegation is firmly opposed to it.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I now call on the representative of Canada to refer to the amendment in document A/C.1/L.705.

Mr. BKUDO (Canada): Since, as your ruling has indicated, we have already spoken on the draft resolutions before us and since, as you noted, we are a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, I do not propose to speak about it, but rather to say a word about the amendment proposed by Ambassador Baroody. But first, let me say that my delegation is a little concerned over the tension, if not the acrimony, that has entered into our discussion. We are attempting to reach a sound decision on the Korean question in our Committee and it is in that sense that I wish to speak and that I hope our discussion can continue this afternoon. In draft resolution A/C.1/L.676 we had proposed a moderate text which attempted to provide a framework for the continued dialogue between North and South Korea. Clearly that draft resolution was not perfect and indeed it was for that reason that we readily accepted the amendment proposed by France in document A/C.1/L.704. In doing so, I think the sponsors showed an easy flexibility in our approach to the Korean question. As a further measure of this attitude, I should like to emphasize that my delegation, as has already been indicated by the Ambassador of the Netherlands and as one of the sponsors, fully supports the amendment proposed by Ambassador Baroody this afternoon contained in document A/C.1/L.705/Rev.1. We hope that the acceptance of this amendment, which is an improvement to our draft resolution, will in fact lead the Committee in the direction of a sound decision on the Korean question.

Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): As always, the Permanent Representative of Mauritius, whatever his personal views may be, will vote in strict accordance with the specific instructions he has received from his Government.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As there are no further speakers to explain their vote before the vote, we shall now proceed to the vote. I should like to announce that the voting has begun and, therefore, rule 123 of the rules of procedure now applies by virtue of which after the Chairman has announced the beginning of voting, no representative
shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connexion with the actual conduct of the voting.

We shall first vote on the draft amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.705/Rev.1, amending operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. In that connexion, a roll-call vote has been requested. I should like to request delegations to express their votes only when they have been called upon to do so. I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia on a point of order.

Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): This is very serious and not a laughing matter. The roll call has not begun and yet some of our colleagues, either inadvertently or intentionally, have begun to press their buttons to give an indication to others how they should vote. I do not think that this is either constitutional or in good taste. I believe that when there is a roll call the button should be pressed only when one's name is called, otherwise it is not a roll call.
A vote was taken by roll call.

_Egypt, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first._

_In favour:_ El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic.

_Against:_ Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Niger, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Albania, Algeria, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen.

_Abstaining:_ Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, Zaire, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Cyprus, Ecuador.

The draft amendment was adopted by 57 votes to 43, with 35 abstentions.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, as a whole, as amended. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Romania, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Saudi Arabia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar.

Against: Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Albania, Algeria, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland.

Abstaining: Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, Zaire, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru.

The draft resolution as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 61 votes to 42, with 32 abstentions.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call upon the
representative of Somalia on a point of order.

Mr. HUSSEIN (Somalia): I would assume that all here are trying their
best to find a satisfactory and durable solution for the chronic and pathetic
question of the Korean peninsula, but, although we all agree upon the end, we are
unfortunately not in agreement as to the means of achieving the desired goal.
That is why the Committee has before it different draft resolutions which are
in contrast in form and substance.

With due respect to the proposals contained in other draft resolutions, my
delegation has subscribed to the draft in document A/C.1/L.677 in the strong
belief that it provides the most suitable answer to the pressing problem of the
Korean question.

That draft refers to the urgent need to remove the tumour, to use the words
of Ambassador Baroody, in the hope that its immediate removal might save the
patient's life. It might be possible that the tumour is benign, and therefore
it might be advisable to remove it immediately.

It is in that conviction that I wish to propose that the draft resolution
in document A/C.1/L.677 be put to the vote immediately in accordance with
rule 131 of the rules of procedure and on the basis of the understanding the
Committee reached during its discussion of the procedural matter brought up at
this very meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As the representative
of Somalia may recall, a proposal has already been made in this connexion, that
no vote be taken. Subsequently, in a series of statements, the representatives
of the Soviet Union and China opposed that proposal.

The representative of Somalia has now requested that a vote be taken on the
draft, and at the appropriate time I shall consult the Committee in that
connexion. I shall now call upon delegations wishing to explain their vote after
the vote.
Mr. RYDEBECK (Sweden): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. We did so because that resolution contains those important elements which in our view can be decided by the General Assembly at this stage.

One such element concerns the desirability of a continuation and increase in inter-Korean contacts. That point was also covered in the consensus text adopted by last year's session of the General Assembly.

Another element is the consideration of the dissolution of the United Nations Command. In that context, we believe that all parties concerned should consider, without undue delay, the factors which are essential to make a decision to that effect possible. Here I am thinking specifically of the fact that the United Nations Command is a signatory to the Armistice Agreement and that its dissolution would require appropriate alternative security arrangements aimed at maintaining all vital elements of the Korean armistice. As soon as those arrangements can be effected, a decision to dissolve the United Nations Command can be taken by the Security Council. That would allow the withdrawal from the south of Korea of all foreign troops under the flag of the United Nations.

Finally, may I add that our hope for a consensus again this year will remain alive until this session or the General Assembly concludes its consideration of this item.
Mr. BOATEN (Ghana): In my delegation's statement on this issue on Friday, 6 December, I outlined our position regarding the force operating in Korea under the United Nations flag. In my statement I said that the status of the force was not in issue. I said that the preoccupation of my delegation was the nature of that force, and whether, as it is presently constituted, it helps our efforts towards finding a solution to the Korean question. In that regard, my delegation was in no doubt that the Force as it was, and is presently, constituted does not advance the cause of peace.

It is because of these considerations that my delegation supports the dissolution of the United Nations Command in Korea. We maintain this position because we do not believe that a force which had taken the side of one party in a conflict against the other could be a useful element in seeking a permanent settlement of the issue.

My delegation would have voted for the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 because, while not satisfying my delegation in all its elements, it makes a positive recommendation for the dissolution of the United Nations Command. My delegation will be willing to give consideration to any appropriate arrangements which might be found necessary to maintain the Armistice Agreement already achieved while efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the issue proceed.

My delegation found itself unable to support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 because while it recognizes the problem that the United Nations Command creates for efforts directed at finding a permanent solution to the issue, it shies at making a positive recommendation for the termination of the Command. In consequence, my delegation had no choice but to abstain both on the amendment in document A/C.1/L.705/Rev.1, and on the draft resolution as a whole.

In conclusion, my delegation would like to make it clear that our position is without prejudice to the right of sovereign States to enter into defence agreements they consider necessary in their security interests.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Zambia on a point of order.
Mr. BANDA (Zambia): I should like to declare that I would have wanted to ask to speak on a point of order just as the delegation of Ghana was explaining its vote. However, out of deference to my colleague and brother from Africa I thought that I would wait before you, Mr. Chairman, announced who next was going to explain its vote.

In the opinion of my delegation we feel that the two draft resolutions, that is, the resolution that has already been voted upon and the voting that should take place as a result of the point of order by the delegation of Barbados should be sorted out now. We feel that the discussion has already taken place regarding the two draft resolutions, that is, the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.677, and that the explanations of vote can take place after we have sorted out this procedure, namely, that the proposal by the delegation of Barbados should now be put to the vote. Thereafter, we will be given the opportunity to discuss it.

I must be honest with you, Mr. Chairman, and tell you that our delegation feels that the debate is taking a rather long time and that our draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 is being put at a disadvantage because at that point most delegations will probably be feeling tired or will have left. Mr. Chairman, we beg you to see our point of view and put the proposal of the delegation of Barbados to the vote.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I believe that, indeed, many representatives are tired. However, I should like to draw the attention of the representative of Zambia to the fact that we have only two speakers for brief explanations of vote: the representatives of Venezuela and France.

So, if there are no objections, on his part, I believe that we could conclude this procedure and immediately following that I shall ask the Committee to decide on the proposal made by the representative of Barbados.
Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Venezuela originally intended to abstain in the vote on the two draft resolutions which were before this Committee with regard to the question of Korea. Neither one of those texts was satisfactory and, in our opinion, rather than leading to a solution of the problem they served only to polarize the positions of the parties.

The only thing that Venezuela desires in connexion with this problem is a negotiated solution, without any alien or foreign interference, a solution which will make it possible to bring about the eventual reconciliation of the two sectors of that divided population and ultimately, if possible, the reunification of the Korean people through a free and sovereign expression of their right to self-determination. None of these two texts, as I said, was satisfactory to my delegation, rather we felt that both contributed to widen the gap in the points of view of the parties.

For this reason, we received with sympathy the proposal made by the representative of Tunisia which he read in this Committee and which in fact tended to promote a more balanced approach to the problem of Korea. Since that proposal was not a formal one, we found that the incorporation of the amendments proposed by France and Saudi Arabia have indeed considerably improved the texts in document A/C.1/L.576/Rev.1. In its amended version, that draft resolution which we have adopted, combines, if not all, at least some of the fundamental elements which, in the view of my delegation, are needed to make progress towards an equitable solution of the question of Korea.
Those elements are, among others: first, the reaffirmation of the General Assembly consensus of 28 November 1973; second, the need to respect and maintain the Armistice Agreement; third, the need for the Security Council to consider the question of dissolution of the United Nations Command as a means of facilitating the withdrawal of the troops stationed in Korea under the flag of this Organization; and, fourth, the need for the parties to the conflict to initiate negotiations as soon as possible, with a view to the achievement of reconciliation and eventual reunification, so that lasting peace may be established in the region.

Once these elements had been incorporated, even though only partially to a limited extent, in the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.676), my delegation found it acceptable or, in any event, less incompatible with the position of neutrality and impartiality which we have always tried to maintain with regard to this thorny and delicate problem.

For some time Venezuela has maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea; and this year, barely two months ago, we established diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Hence the only interest and objective which my delegation can promote in a matter involving these two countries with which we have friendly relations is to promote initiatives likely to facilitate a solution satisfactory to the Korean people as a whole, overriding any foreign interference or any artificial division, geographical or other, that has been imposed on Korea.

Mr. de GUTIERREZ (France) (interpretation from French): The consensus adopted last year on the question of Korea was not only the result of very difficult negotiations, but also the expression of a great hope for a real expansion of the dialogue between the two parts of Korea, a dialogue which had been opened by the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972.
That hope has been dashed, and we are obliged to note that since last year very little progress has been made towards true rapprochement between the North and South of that divided country. But is that any reason for pessimism, and for us to regard the present stalemate as permanent? I do not believe so. On the contrary, disappointing as the current situation may be, and as elusive as tangible results may appear, the reconciliation process begun by the historic Communiqué of July 1972 is irreversible.

The division of a homogeneous people with a very marked character of its own flies in the face of reason and the laws of history. It was the conviction that this abnormal state of events could not go on forever which prompted my delegation to hope that, this year again, a new consensus might emerge that would reflect the common will of the two parts of Korea, as countries espousing their own respective interests, not to revert to a situation of confrontation.

Such, unfortunately, was not the case and, taking a step backwards, we have had to decide on one of the texts that were before us. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 as revised precisely because that text, based on last year's consensus, seemed to us to be inspired by a spirit of dialogue rather than of confrontation. To make it more acceptable to the other side, and to try to narrow the gap between the respective positions, my delegation took the initiative of proposing the inclusion of a specific reference to the dissolution of the United Nations Command, on which the intentions of the sponsors of the two texts seemed to agree, and -- here we agree with the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 -- which obviously represents an anachronism.

By agreeing to incorporate that amendment in their text, the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 have, in our opinion, given proof of a desire for conciliation, and we wish to pay tribute to them for that, just as we pay tribute to Ambassador Baroody's motives in proposing what he was good enough to call "an expansion" of the French amendment. Grateful as my delegation is to him, we considered that his text provided too rigid an indication of what the deliberations of the Security Council should deal with and this prompted certain reservations on our part which led us to abstain. Those reservations, however, applied only to certain
nuances, and therefore my delegation had no difficulty in voting in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 as amended by Saudi Arabia.

In conclusion, may I express the hope that the adoption of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.676) will not be regarded as the victory of one camp over the other, but rather as a basis of negotiation with a view to achieving rapprochement between the two parts of Korea -- a rapprochement which, I repeat, seems foreordained by the logic of the situation, and which the French delegation hopes for most sincerely.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We have thus concluded the explanations of vote and, thereby, consideration of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 as amended, which the Committee has just adopted.

During the course of our work, earlier in the day, the representative of Barbados made a formal motion that no vote be taken on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677.

The representative of the Soviet Union, in his statement, opposed the motion of the representative of Barbados.

Subsequently, similar statements were made by the representatives of China and Somalia, and finally the representative of Zambia requested that the Barbados motion be put to the vote immediately.

May I recall here that, in accordance with rule 131 of the rules of procedure, the Committee may, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal. I shall accordingly put to the vote the proposal made by the representative of Barbados.
Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, does the representative of Barbados withdraw his proposal? I merely wish to clarify this point.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): My understanding is that he has not withdrawn his proposal.

I call on the representative of the Philippines, on a point of order.

Mr. YANGO (Philippines): Mr. Chairman, as I understood your last statement, you were about to put the proposal of Barbados to the vote.

I asked to speak because, in spite of the fact that the hour is late, I thought that there should be an opportunity given to some delegations to express their views on the proposal of Barbados. You stated, Mr. Chairman, that some delegations in the course of their statements had already opposed the proposal of Barbados.

Now, I believe that you also stated a while ago that, at the appropriate time, you would call on some delegations wishing to participate in the debate on the proposal of Barbados.

This is my question, Mr. Chairman. Do you intend to give these delegations an opportunity to speak on the proposal of Barbados or to put that proposal to the vote at once?

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): What I said was that these procedural questions were under discussion and that, under rule 131, after the voting, I would put the proposal of Barbados before the Committee for consideration. If the Committee so wishes, it can of course have a debate on that proposal. But, no matter how long or short the debate may be, the only possible resolution of the matter is that either the proposal is withdrawn or it is put to the vote. Perhaps we might save time by putting the proposal of the representative of Barbados to the vote.
Mr. YANGO (Philippines): Mr. Chairman, I should very much like to co-operate with you. I have already alluded to the lateness of the hour. However, perhaps you could give the other side an opportunity to express its views by calling on one or two speakers. It is up to you, Mr. Chairman, but I would ask you to give the other side an opportunity to express its views on the proposal of Barbados. That is my request.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Unfortunately, in this particular rule of procedure, as opposed to some others, there is no mention of how many speakers can speak in favour and how many against this proposal. So perhaps we can decide to listen to two or three more speakers. But, as I have already stated, in the final analysis this question will have to be decided by means of a vote.

Therefore, I shall ask those representatives who have indicated a wish to speak on this question to be as brief as possible so that we may conclude our work. Accordingly, I shall now call on those representatives who have asked to speak on this question, in the order in which I became aware that they wanted the floor.

Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): The question is not whether we should or should not vote on the proposal of Barbados -- and my good friend and opponent, the representative of Senegal, told me very faithfully what that proposal was, namely, whether or not we should vote on the so-called Algerian draft resolution.

Sir, if we do vote on it, then we shall set a precedent which you, as a one-time Chairman of this Committee, will regret for the remainder of your life because you will have opened the door. Now, do not tell me otherwise just because you represent a big Power, Mr. Soviet Union. I could do that too.

I shall mention this dispassionately, objectively: Why did I spend four or five days working on the Saudi Arabian amendment? It was to make sure that in accordance with that draft resolution -- which has already been adopted -- steps would be taken to dissolve the United Nations Command. I gave credit to our colleague from France because he started the idea and I elaborated on it.
Now, by a vote of 61 to 42, we have decided in that. It means that the General Assembly definitely decided that steps should be taken to dissolve the United Nations Command. This has become the property of the house, of this Assembly. What does the so-called Algerian... draft resolution ask us to do in operative paragraph 1? It says:

"1. Considers that it is necessary to withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;".

If it did not say "under the flag of the United Nations", then this paragraph would stand on its own feet. Mind you, we have taken a decision, by virtue of the amendment which I submitted and which was adopted and is now the property of the house. I shall read out operative paragraph 2 of that resolution:

"2. Expresses the hope that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the area, will in due course give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command... which falls within its responsibility."

Are we going to duplicate -- ask for the same thing? This is very clear. This is the raison d'être of my amendment. Otherwise, why should I have an amendment? I said: "Discourage this fiction. This flag is no longer representative of the United Nations." It was in this spirit that I submitted the amendment. Now, where is my Algerian friend? He is staring me in the eye. What he and others say is:

"1. Considers that it is necessary to withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea...".

What is the difference between "to withdraw" and "the dissolution"? It does not say "the prompt withdrawal"; it says "to withdraw". It could be now; it could be a year from now. We are more interested in having the United Nations Command dissolved and, ipso facto, the troops withdrawn.

So what are you doing? Barbados or no Barbados, it is not a question of Barbados now asking for something here. It is a question of duplication. You cannot take a decision on that paragraph, which is really the nucleus of the whole resolution, without taking "under the flag of the United Nations" out of the phraseology.
Neither in my erstwhile amendment, which is now the property of the house, nor in operative paragraph 1 of the Algerian draft resolution do we give a timetable for the withdrawal of the troops. In the first resolution we call it "dissolution of the United Nations Command"; and, if you dissolve the Command, how can there be troops without a command? Can you tell me, Sir? When you dissolve the Command, you are doing away with the United Nations troops. Therefore, how can we vote twice on the same thing? This is unconstitutional, with all due regard to my learned and experienced colleague from the Soviet Union. He should know better; he should know that this is unconstitutional in so far as United Nations practice is concerned. Of course, you do not agree, because you are looking at it politically. I am looking at it objectively. You were involved in the Korean war; Saudi Arabia was not involved in the Korean war. We can speak from the vantage point of objectivity; whereas you or China or the United States are all parties to the conflict.
Of course, who am I to tell you that you have delegated other Powers to talk on your behalf, instead of all of you talking on the question. They are parties -- what are you saying, my good friend from Sri Lanka -- they are parties to the conflict; otherwise they would not have agreed to occupy the peninsula and draw an imaginary line. You are parties to the conflict. Therefore, it suits you to rationalize your policy here in the light of your interest, strategic or otherwise; I do not know what it is.

But I am speaking from the vantage point of someone who refused even to recommend to my Government to get involved in the Korean war in 1950. And we were vindicated. Why should we? Now, I for one would like to see the United Nations Command dissolved tomorrow. What will the South Koreans do now with the American troops? I do not know. Probably, they will sign an agreement. Perhaps they have an agreement, maybe secret or otherwise. They do not tell me what they do. But you cannot take another vote on something that has already been voted on, unless there is a new element in it. The new element is lacking; there is no time-table, and it is a duplication.

My colleague from Barbados, with whom I do not see eye to eye many times, did not even have a right to submit such a request, because such a request is unreceivable. And the vote on the Algerian draft resolution should be considered out of the question. You cannot do that. That is why I said, Mr. Chairman -- and not lightly, Sir -- that you will regret it, that you will have set a precedent whereby questions which have already been voted on will pop up again and people will say, "Ah, we did that on the Algerian draft resolution".

So be careful. If I were you, Mr. Chairman -- thank God I am not a Chairman, never was and never will be -- I would give a ruling. Let anybody dare to challenge your ruling. But you do not want to get into trouble with your ruling. You do not want it said at the end of the Assembly that our Chairman took sides. But I plead with my colleague from the Soviet Union to listen, and I hope that he has listened to what I said. How can he refute what I said? I am prepared to listen to him as to why he wants duplication.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): With all the respect with which I always follow the statements of the representative of Saudi Arabia and with which I have always heard his arguments, I would also like to point out, since he has addressed himself directly to me, telling me what I may or may not do, that I too, having thought that a situation of this kind might arise, have done what in English is called "my homework". And since he has asked me to make a decision, contrary to his belief I am not afraid of shouldering the responsibility of a Chairman, even though it may be at the end of the Assembly.

In that connexion, I should like to point out to the representative of Saudi Arabia and in fact to the entire Committee -- because I believe it might save us a lengthy discussion -- the following. Rule 130, which refers to voting on amendments, says in one of its sentences:

"Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter amendment shall not be put to the vote."

By this sentence, the rules of procedure clearly state that when an amendment has been voted upon and adopted, it implies the rejection of another, and therefore it is up to the Chairman to decide or not to decide to put the other amendment to the vote. However, on the other hand, rule 131 leaves no room for doubt when it states: "The Committee may, after each vote on a proposal, decide whether to vote on the next proposal." It is not a responsibility or a prerogative of the Chairman to decide whether it should be put to a vote. It is the Committee that must shoulder the responsibility for such a decision, although, as the representative of Saudi Arabia pointed out, it may be regretted later.

It is for that reason that I believe -- and this is the ruling of the Chairman -- that it is up to the Committee to decide whether or not we take a vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677. I also believe that we would avoid a dialogue, which might be extremely interesting but in the final analysis, as I stated earlier, would in any case lead to a vote. We could avoid that if we were to take a vote on the motion of the representative of Barbados immediately.
The representatives of Zambia, Sri Lanka, Senegal and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic have asked to speak on points of order. After the statement I have just made, I wonder whether it will be necessary to hear those statements. If not, perhaps I might request the co-operation of those delegations and thus we might proceed with a vote on the motion of Barbados.

Since I hear no objections on the part of the delegations whose names I read out, I wish to thank them for their kind gesture.

Mr. AMEPASINGHE (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, you thanked me rather prematurely, but I am grateful to you for having given me the opportunity of speaking.

What I wish to say is that an arrangement that had been adopted for reasons of convenience is now being unfairly exploited to deny to the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 the right to have their draft resolution put to the vote. I do not agree at all with the interpretation of the rules given by my good friend, Ambassador Barcoody, and I have learned one lesson in this debate: never to look at Mr. Barcoody when he is speaking.

Your ruling, Mr. Chairman, is absolutely right. I only want to appeal to the representative of Barbados not to adopt a tactic which is definitely and clearly unfair. Coming from a country of jurists and cricketers, I think it is just not cricket.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The Committee will now proceed with the vote on the motion of the representative of Barbados. Might I ask the representatives to listen carefully to the manner in which I shall put the motion to the vote so that there may be no misunderstanding. First of all, I must say that a roll-call vote has been requested on this issue. Secondly, I should like to state that those delegations which are in favour of the motion of the representative of Barbados, that is to say, who are in favour of not taking a vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, will please reply in the affirmative. Those who are against the proposal of Barbados will vote "no", and the others will abstain.
A vote was taken by roll call.

Iraq, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

**In favour:** Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (Federal Republic of), Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland.

**Against:** Iraq, Jamaica, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Albania, Algeria, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary,

**Abstaining:** Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran.

The motion was rejected by 57 votes to 48, with 30 abstentions.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): We shall now vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iraq, Jamaica, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, Zaire.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The result of the vote is 48 in favour, 48 against and 3 abstentions, therefore the draft resolution has not been adopted.

In accordance with rule 133, which reads:

"If a vote is equally divided on matters other than elections, the proposal shall be regarded as rejected",

the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 is regarded as rejected.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As no delegation wishes to speak in explanation of its vote after the voting, I should like to remind the Committee that at an earlier stage we decided that after the voting on the draft resolutions we would hear statements by the representatives of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in that order. I therefore call now on the representative of the Republic of Korea to make his statement.

Mr. PARK TONG-JIN (Republic of Korea): The First Committee has just completed the voting procedure. In so doing, the Committee has adopted the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, as amended by the proposal submitted by the representative of Saudi Arabia. The resolution adopted gives clear endorsement, in effect, to the policy of peace pursued by my country, and confirms the merits of the course of action originally proposed by 26 Member States representing Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe. My delegation gave warm support to it from the beginning of our debate. It is our sincere hope that all Member States will abide by this decision, marked by reason and a sense of realism, and help us to carry out its terms.

In the name of the delegation of the Republic of Korea, I should like formally to express our heart-felt gratitude to those friendly Member States that have stood by us and finally brought about the successful adoption of the draft resolution, as amended, which my delegation strongly supported.

I should also like to thank each and every representative who intervened in the debate to support the just cause of my country.

In the course of our debate we have noticed that some representatives who spoke in favour of the opposing draft resolution held quite a distorted image of my country and some serious misunderstanding of the current situation on the Korean peninsula. But with ignorance and prejudice, no one can reach a fair judgement. Some wise man has said that ignorance is less remote from the truth than is prejudice. I hope to remove their ignorance and misunderstanding of my country and my people. In that spirit, I venture to invite all those speakers who made statements in support of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, to visit my country, at their
convenience, as official guests of my Government. We in the South live in an open and free society. We do not want to pretend that we are perfect, but we have made rapid progress in all fields of our nation-building, defending our independence and our traditions. Since it is not our practice to restrict the freedom of movement of any of our guests by means of guided tours, visitors are free to observe anything, anywhere, and to talk with anyone on the street. My Government will be indeed happy to arrange such tours or trips for those who, without proper knowledge, oppose our concepts and our actions. Indeed, we firmly believe in international co-operation and better mutual understanding among nations.

To you, Mr. Chairman, I wish to express appreciation, on behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Korea and on my own behalf, for the skilful chairmanship you have demonstrated during our debate. It has been marked by impartiality, efficiency and dignity. I am certain that the able chairmanship with which you have guided our debates in this committee room has contributed greatly to the successful conclusion of the debate on agenda item 104. We are grateful to you, Mr. Chairman.

Finally, may I add that my delegation wishes also to express through you, Mr. Chairman, its thanks to the Secretariat staff of this First Committee for their co-operation and assistance in our debate.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to thank Ambassador Park Tong Jin of the Republic of Korea for the kind remarks addressed to myself.

I should now like to call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. LI JONG MOK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (spoke in Korean; interpretation into English furnished by the delegation): The First Committee of the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly has just passed an unwarranted decision which runs counter to the desire of the entire Korean people and the peace-loving peoples of the world for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. That decision is, in fact, aimed at continuously keeping the United States troops in South Korea under the sign of the United Nations forces.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea resolutely opposes and rejects this unwarranted decision. The United States has employed every conceivable trick to prevent the United Nations General Assembly at its current session from adopting a just decision on the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations. Owing to the obstructive machinations of the United States and its followers, the First Committee of the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly has failed to solve the question that is the subject of the item jointly submitted by 40 countries for the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations.

In this Committee the representatives of many countries strongly demanded the withdrawal of United States troops which, occupying South Korea, impose on the Korean people the sufferings of national division, and asked that the Korean question be left to the Korean people themselves. That notwithstanding, the United States has persistently plotted to have its unwarranted draft resolution, which pursues the aim of permanent occupation of South Korea by United Nations troops, adopted in disregard of the will of many countries. This has only revealed more clearly its aggressive nature.

In his statement a few minutes ago, the South Korean representative claimed vociferously that the adoption of the draft resolution initiated by the United States was their success, but his conduct is no more than another revelation of the
traitorous acts of the present South Korean authorities which are trying to
perpetuate the division of the country by clinging to outside forces. A stern
punishment will certainly be meted out to the South Korean authorities by the
people for their treason and betrayal.

The whole course of the discussion on the question of Korea has clearly
demonstrated that the ranks of the countries which support the just struggle
of the Korean people for the withdrawal of United States troops from South Korea
and for the attainment of the independent and peaceful reunification of the country
have been expanded and strengthened beyond comparison and that the United States
will soon meet its fate when it will have no alternative but to withdraw its
troops from South Korea in the face of these ever-growing forces.

As is seen from the result of the vote on the draft resolution calling for the
withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the
United Nations, the discussion of the question of Korea in this Committee has proved
to be a political victory for us. Those countries which have supported and
sympathized with us are all newly-emerging forces which represent the future and,
accordingly, those forces are unlimited in strength and no force can check their
dynamic forward movement. Though some of the countries have so far failed to
understand today our just cause in the realization of the independent and peaceful
reunification of the country after the withdrawal of United States troops from
South Korea, they will certainly come to understand as days go by that we are on
the side of justice. The future is ours and history will prove that our struggle
is entirely righteous. So long as the United States troops continue their
occupation of South Korea, we will fight to the end for the withdrawal of those
forces. The Korean people will certainly compel the United States troops occupying
South Korea to withdraw from there and will achieve, without fail, the reunification
and independence of the country, with the support and encouragement of the peoples
of the world which love peace and justice, even though great difficulties still lie
on the way to the reunification of the country.

Before concluding my statement, I wish to express, on behalf of the delegation
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, my profound thanks to the
representatives of all the countries which have expressed support and sympathy for
the struggle of our people for the independent and peaceful reunification of the
fatherland.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. BARCODY (Saudi Arabia): It was reported to me that none other than my colleague from China seems to have criticized my stand on this question by stating -- I am paraphrasing now what one of my colleagues sitting behind me took down -- something to the effect that there was one thing in common between the Saudi Arabian amendment and the American-inspired draft resolution: they both failed to mention anything about foreign troops stationed illegally in South Korea as if they were afraid to touch upon the subject.

Unless I am mistaken -- and I stand to be corrected -- it was my good colleague Ambassador Huang who made such observations.
I want to make the position of Saudi Arabia clear on this subject, and the only way I can reply to the representative of China is to ask him if, when he has the time, he would refer to my various statements on the Korean question. I need hardly repeat what I said a few minutes ago: that we refuse to be drawn into the conflict on the Korean peninsula. Every year I have repeated that the major Powers -- and I made it clear that China was not involved because China at that time, the period immediately after, or even before, the end of the Second World War, was preoccupied by its own affairs, but the other major Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union -- made arrangements to move troops to the thirty-eighth parallel. Time and again I have said they had no business to embroil us in that situation. Perhaps they have global strategic responsibility in the sense that each one must act in a certain way to preserve spheres of influence. That is their business, not ours. But we have asked them time and again to use their good offices to put an end to the anomalous situation in which a single peninsula is divided into two zones, on ideological grounds, in spite of the fact that the people of the North and the South are ethnologically and culturally the same people.

I should like now specifically to tell my colleague from China that in my statement of this year, leaving aside those of other years, I said that the presence of the United Nations in South Korea was becoming a fiction and it was American troops who were occupying Korea, by an understanding between the Republic of Korea and the United States. I have repeatedly said that it was not fair that the flag of the United Nations should be hoisted over the so-called "United Nations Command". That is why in our amendment we explicitly elaborated upon what our colleague from France had said about including the dissolution of the United Nations Command in Korea. I need hardly repeat what I said about that Command a few moments ago. Suffice it to say that in the so-called Algerian resolution, which was not adopted, the first operative paragraph says that the General Assembly

"Considers that it is necessary to withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;" (A/C.1/L.677)

That is precisely what we meant -- not what we implied -- by the Saudi Arabian amendment, which has been adopted by the Committee; therefore we cannot be blamed
for refusing to vote on the same thing twice. We believe that this situation cannot go on indefinitely and we hope that China, the Soviet Union and the United States, instead of asking some of us to be either with them or against them, will come to an agreement, use their good offices and bring the North Koreans and the South Koreans together and ultimately, as I mentioned in my working paper, perhaps find a solution through the neutralization of Korea — and eventually of Viet-Nam, and eventually of Cambodia — and not keep us seized of questions that they consider it is their prerogative to deal with in a certain manner in keeping with their old approach of "balance of power" and "spheres of influence".

When I spoke, I spoke in that spirit. My colleagues from the Soviet Union and China know very well that when I believe the United States is wrong on certain issues I tell them so, not in whispers but openly in the United Nations. When we believe the Soviet Union is right, we say so. For example, when the Soviet Union wanted Russian to be considered a diplomatic language we did not stick our necks out because we received any benefits from the Soviet Union. In fact, we have no representation between us. We supported the Soviet Union because it was asking for a right which it had acquired through having become a great Power whose language ought to be considered a diplomatic language. On the question of the revision of the Charter, we thought more time should be spent before we plunged into constituting an ad hoc committee to study the revision of the Charter. We did not do that because the Soviet Union happened not to be very eager about the revision of the Charter. We did not vote against the revision of the Charter because China seemed to be in favour of the revision of the Charter. We voted on the merits of the case, on what we thought were the merits of the case.

Let this be understood by the representatives of the major Powers: Saudi Arabia is not negotiable. Its policy, so far as I am concerned — and I am given enough latitude to express its policy — is predicated on what is best not necessarily for Saudi Arabia but for the United Nations as a whole.

One last warning. If we go on in this manner, voting out of solidarity, then we might just as well consider the United Nations as only a shadow of what
it was meant to be. We could then conduct our voting by mail, and have a sort of ballot box outside each Committee. We could go into a room as groups, and we might have Whips, as the British have in their Parliament, to see to it that everyone toes the line, and we would then go and cast our votes.

Why should we come here and argue, if everyone is solidified, fossilized, frozen in the attitude of his group?

Saudi Arabia is a country of the so-called third world, but that does not commit it to being a sheep that must blindly follow the members of the third world group if they can amass a majority within the group. That applies also to the European group. Some of them, no doubt, have different views from their colleagues in the European group. That is why we are beginning to salute the Scandinavian countries sometimes for not toeing the line along with other countries of the European group. I know that there is a great deal of discipline in the socialist group. They all vote together automatically. Sometimes Yugoslavia wavers to see whether it will abstain or something, but they all vote alike. What for? If we all vote alike, why debate the question?
In conclusion, I must say this. We base our votes on what we think will lead to solutions. We do not vote by solidarity, unless we are 100 per cent sure that a group is right -- and no one is absolutely right. I refute any imputation and am ready to defend Saudi Arabia and the United Nations against any implications that we are clients or followers of any one big Power. We stand on our own feet. Our head is high. Our record is clear. And if anyone dare challenge me and say we act otherwise, I shall take up the gauntlet and open the books wide. Then we shall see where the truth lies.

Mr. HUANG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The explanation made by the Saudi Arabian representative just now did not change the basic characteristics of the Saudi Arabian amendment and the draft of the United States and other countries, that is, neither of them makes any mention of the question of the withdrawal of the United States troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations. Both are aimed at enabling the United States to use its veto in the Security Council to delay a settlement of the Korean question, continue its interference in the internal affairs of Korea, obstruct the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea, and continue to divide Korea. In his explanation, the Saudi Arabian representative could not deny this. Hence it is not convincing at all to us.

China adheres to principles. We will never barter away principles. It was precisely for the purpose of upholding principles that China became a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677.

China firmly maintains that the United Nations Command must be dissolved and that the United States troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations must be withdrawn. No matter what procedural manoeuvres they may resort to, they can never prevent the inevitable result of the historical advance.
Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): What the representative of China has said calls for a reply. I can assure him that I read word for word not only his statement on this question but also his statement on the Cambodian question. I took his statement home with me and studied it, and I know in what spirit it was made.

I am sure he and his country mean well, but their approach to solving the problem need not, in view of the divergent views, be sacrosanct. That is what I should like to tell him.

But as for my manipulating anything in order to make one party win or another lose -- that I reject vehemently. He may remember my draft resolution of last year, the one incorporated in the report of the Rapporteur on the condition that I suspended it and accepted the consensus. It had no objective other than seeing both parties come together.

Now if some countries -- and I am not naming names -- are better than others at covert intervention, the ills remain; the ailment is still there. I am not going into details. But I should like to refresh the memory of the representative of China by re-reading what still obtains:

"Noting that the artificial separation of the Korean people at the 38th parallel was the outcome of political arrangements agreed upon by the major Powers to serve extraneous, strategic and ideological interests, regardless of the common will or widespread consent of the Korean people to such arrangements,

"Regretting that the separation of the Korean people at the 38th parallel was tantamount to arbitrary partition of the Korean peninsula into North and South zones, notwithstanding the fact that ethnologically, culturally and linguistically the people of both zones constitute a single national entity,

"1. Calls upon all Powers, and especially the major Powers, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Korea and to undertake to respect the sovereignty of the Korean people as a whole;
"2. Expresses the hope that, in the spirit of universality, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will resume constructive negotiations with a view to reunification by merger, confederation or any other political instrumentality they deem fit, so that they may ultimately consider membership in the United Nations as a single national State and thereby further the means of promoting the maintenance of peace and security in the area". (A/9341, para. 15)

Last year, the major Powers asked me to forego putting that draft resolution to the vote in favour of the consensus. I warned them that the consensus would get them nowhere. It was an agreement between most of those involved to get the smallest area of agreement and to have a sort of common denominator. I was vindicated; I was justified. But what has happened this year? Look at the result: a house divided upon itself. Forty-eight votes in favour, 48 votes against.

Once and for all I declare that we are against any troops, including United Nations troops, occupying any territory or country unless it is by the will of the parties concerned.
We have a famous Arabic proverb: "If you cannot immediately get what you want, settle for the most you can get." If tomorrow we were again to vote unanimously against the stationing in Korea of United States troops under the United Nations flag, would the United States withdraw? Suppose it were a Chinese group: would it withdraw? Suppose it were a Soviet group: would it withdraw? They find a way to tell us that they are there in order to stop the fighting. We do not want to be involved in their squabbles, in their sphere-of-influence policies, in their power politics.

All we say is that we beg them, we plead with them, to come together and reach an understanding. And that is why I thought this year of a working paper that might eventually neutralize Korea and save the efforts and the substance of the major Powers and the United Nations, by neutralizing that country, as Austria was, so that no one could then interfere in Korea's affairs.

As I have mentioned time and again to the Koreans, North and South, there should not be a capitalistic State; there should not be a communistic State; they should not go for communism or capitalism but for Koreanism. That was why I have intervened for the last 10 years, with the welfare of the Korean people at heart -- not the petty national interests of any State, big or small.

**ORGANIZATION OF WORK**

**The CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from Spanish): Before adjourning this meeting, I should like to announce that it is expected that tomorrow the First Committee will begin consideration of agenda item 36, Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. We have a maximum of eight meetings to devote to this item, and the President of the General Assembly, anxious for the Assembly's work to be completed punctually, has urged the First Committee to conclude its work on this item by Friday at the latest, and, if possible, sooner.
I would therefore urge those delegations interested in participating in the discussion on this item to inscribe their names as soon as possible. I would also urge those delegations that have been working in recent days on the preparation of draft resolutions to submit them as soon as possible, because their early introduction will unquestionably facilitate the debate and the eventual adoption of a resolution.

The meeting rose at 7.55 p.m.