Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 6 December 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)
Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Question of Korea: √1047 (continued)
  (a) Withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations
  (b) Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula

- Organization of work

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74-71306/A
QUESTION OF KOREA

(a) WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE FLAG OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(b) URGENT NEED TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE CONSENSUS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE KOREAN QUESTION AND TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

(A/9703/Add.1-5, A/9741/Add.1-5 and Corr.1; A/C.1/1048, 1049/Add.1; A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, L.677, L.705)

Mr. von WECHMAR (Federal Republic of Germany): The debate on the question of Korea in this Committee is nearing its end. We have already heard a great number of speeches reflecting the whole range of arguments, so that I cannot hope to introduce new aspects into the debate. I shall therefore be brief and confine myself to indicating the considerations which guide my delegation in sponsoring the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1.

Last year the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session in a consensus expressed the hope "that the South and the North of Korea will be urged to continue their dialogue ... so as to expedite the independent peaceful reunification of the country". At the same time it dissolved the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. And for the first time in over 20 years the General Assembly did not inscribe the question of Korea on the agenda of its next session.

My delegation would have appreciated it if it had not been felt necessary by others to reopen the debate on this matter, because we fail to see that there has been any new development which would call for the resumption of the debate. Furthermore, when last year's consensus was adopted by all delegations we were aware that the Security Council, through the United Nations Command, had been and continues to be involved in the maintenance of peace and security in the peninsula. The existence, 21 years after the end of the war, of a United Nations Command in Korea may at a first glance seem to be an anomaly. But at a second glance it becomes clear that this anomaly only reflects the basically anomalous situation in Korea where after 21 years there is still no peace. All we have is an armistice
agreement of which the United Nations Command, representing one side, is a
signatory. It also represents one side in the Military Armistice Commission.
Obviously we cannot, therefore, abolish the United Nations Command without
replacing it by an alternative arrangement, for otherwise we would
abolish the armistice structure itself.

After reading operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution in
document A/C.1/L.677 and after listening to the statements of the delegation
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, we have the impression
that the need for some alternative arrangement is recognized in principle
also by the sponsors of that draft resolution. This gives us some hope
that through negotiations between the parties directly concerned agreement
on an alternative arrangement might be found. The Security Council could
then examine whether the conditions created by this agreement permit the

In the meantime all the General Assembly can usefully do is to
encourage the two sides in Korea to co-operate in solving this question as
well as to negotiate on the wider question of the reunification of their
country. This is exactly the purpose of the draft resolution in document
A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. Unlike the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677,
the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 is based on the
realization that peace and reunification in Korea cannot be achieved by
seeking to impose the views of one side on the other, but only by
negotiation and mutually acceptable compromise. We trust, therefore, that
the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 will receive the support
of this Committee.

Mr. MANKOU (Congo) (interpretation from French): It is regrettable
that the question of Korea should have been relegated to the bottom of the agenda
of our Committee. While that was certainly due to chance, my delegation
expresses the hope and the wish that at the next session this item will
occupy a better place on the agenda, thus allowing for a better debate on
this subject. The fate of almost 50 million human beings deserves x.x. careful
attention.
My delegation would not wish to tire the Committee with a historical survey, but it is fitting that we should recall that it was in 1949 that the American forces evacuated South Korea. On 25 June 1950, the Security Council noted that an attack by the North against the South had constituted a breach of the peace. On 7 July 1950, the Security Council called on all Member States that had raised and provided troops to place them under a unified command under the authority of the United States of America.

After a merciless war which lasted three years, an armistice agreement was signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations forces and the representatives of North Korea, which put an end to the war. 

Thereafter we learned of the full significance of the 38th parallel, which sanctioned the division of Korea.

In 1954, a mutual defence treaty was signed between the governments of South Korea and the United States of America.

My delegation affirms here unequivocally that on 7 July 1950, our Organization, by the vote in the Security Council on Korea, committed an error, a monumental error no doubt, but nevertheless an error. Our Organization is human, and it is human to err -- and there was the cold war which heated passions and aroused appetites. My delegation is forcing itself not to comment on that monumental error. In brief, we are now in the maelstrom resulting from that error.

My delegation has listened with sustained attention to all the delegations which have already spoken on the question of Korea, in particular the delegations of North Korea, South Korea, the United States of America, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.
It seems quite evident that they are all filled with the same desire for the peaceful reunification of Korea, and yet this apparent evidence is the crux of the matter in Korea. North and South Korea, when they signed the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972, expressed their will to live in peace by continuing the dialogue among Koreans. And our Organization, at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, decided, on 28 November 1973, to dissolve the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

Some days ago, on 29 November 1974, to be specific, the Permanent Representative of Tunisia asked the Secretariat of our Organization, through you, Mr. Chairman, to give the Committee

"the most up-to-date information available on the United Nations Command, the nationality of the troops, the name of the Supreme Commander, if there is one -- that is to say, all technical information which could assist us to understand the situation better in the light of the most current information." (A/C.1/PV.2031, p. 56)

On 4 December 1974, the Permanent Representative of Cuba reiterated this request and communicated to the Committee certain items of information from South Korean and American sources regarding United Nations forces in South Korea.

"One concerns the possibility, as they see it, of integrating into a single command the so-called United Nations Command in Korea with the Eighth Army of the United States of America; ...".

The Permanent Representative of Cuba continued by saying:

"we should like to know if the United Nations authorities have any information about this plan and if the possible integration mentioned would imply that the United States Eighth Army would be incorporated in its totality into the United Nations Command in South Korea, and if anybody in our Organization has been informed of such a proposal."

The Permanent Representative of Cuba quoted a statement by Mr. Clements, the Under-Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, according to which

"... the Second Division of the United States Army was in the Demilitarized Zone in Korea."

And then the representative of Cuba asked whether
"...this Division of the United States Army is there performing any
function on behalf of the United Nations and whether any body of our
Organization is cognizant of the movements and activities of this United
States Division in the Demilitarized Zone." (2034th meeting, p. 67)
The importance of these questions in regard to a situation, which I would
euphemistically describe as distressing, has not escaped our Committee. The
Secretariat of our Organization, which has accustomed us to more serious work and
more effective co-operation, has not been able to supply us with the information,
and for a good reason: only the Pentagon can meet our request for information
since it is the United States armed forces which are in South Korea. There is
nothing illegal about that. The mutual defence treaty, signed in 1954 between
the United States and South Korea, authorizes the presence there of United States
forces. What is illegal, however, is the use made of the United Nations emblem
by these armed forces. It is a blot on our Organization.

My delegation has not forgotten 7 July 1950 and the United States has not
learnt its lesson, as was stated here by one eminent representative. The mistake
we would be making if we tolerated this illegality would have unparalleled
consequences. Since we really wish to achieve the peaceful reunification of
Korea, on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people, my
delegation invites members of the Committee to consider the draft resolution in
document A/C.1/L.676. Despite the seriousness of our Committee and the
importance of the matter we are considering, my delegation, on reading this draft
resolution, cannot keep seeing a sort of caricature superimposed on it.

Let us read the first, second, third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble,
as well as operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676. It reads:

"Desiring that progress be made towards the attainment of the goal of
peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of
the Korean people,

"Recalling its satisfaction with the issuance of the joint communiqué at
Seoul and Pyongyang on 4 July 1972 and the declared intention of both the
South and the North of Korea to continue the dialogue between them,
"Aware, however, that tension in Korea has not been totally eliminated and that the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security in the area,

"Recognizing that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations has a continuing responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal on the Korean peninsula,"

And now let us read operative paragraph 1:

"1. Reaffirms the wishes of its members, as expressed in the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1973, and urges both the South and the North of Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea;"

So far, my delegation could support this draft resolution because this part of it smilingly expresses the hope that we all feel that Korea will be reunited in peace.
Let us now look at operative paragraph 2. It reads:

"Expresses the hope that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the area, will in due course give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command in conjunction with the arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement, which fall within its responsibility."

That is no smile but a grimace, a threatening grimace. The Korean question is to be removed from our grasp and placed before the Security Council. We, the small nations, know what this means. We are threatened with a cascade of vetoes, vetoes which simply harden positions and create rancour without changing anyone's point of view. Operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, as I was saying a moment ago, constitutes a caricature of the original design: a wolfish grin, a sardonic smile, a threat.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 belongs to the policy of the carrot and the stick which the small nations have had to endure ever since power was first used without wisdom. Since peace and the freedom of peoples are concerned, the People's Republic of the Congo will not accept the carrot nor fear the stick. That is why my delegation cannot support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, an invention of the United States of America.

At this stage of the debate on the question of Korea when each delegation only wants to listen to what it thinks is the truth, it seems superfluous to tell the real truth. And yet only historical truth will remain after we have finished going from compromise to compromise in our Organization. In brief, despite the presence of United States armed forces in Korea, my delegation does not doubt the desire of the United States to see the Korean people reunited in peace. However, a Bantu proverb says that a judge who reconciles man and wife should not go so far as to share their bed. If the presence of United States forces in South Korea is of such concern to my delegation it is because we believe that that presence is not a factor that can encourage dialogue between Koreans for peaceful reunification in accordance with the Joint Communiqué of July 1972.
The argument according to which North Korea, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union would invade South Korea were it not for the presence in that country of United States armed forces does not stand up to objective analysis. You would need an imagination run wild to see the Chinese, Soviet and North Korean armies pouring into South Korea to burn, destroy and massacre. These are methods more likely to be adopted by those who have made use of napalm, defoliants, pellet bombs and other still more deadly and more terrifying weapons in Viet-Nam.

Some sponsors of the American draft resolution have not hesitated to propose the admission to our Organization of North Korea and of South Korea, comparing them with the two Germanies which, according to the sponsors, are no worse off. My delegation deplores this comparison and considers that those who make it have a weak memory. Have they remembered of the Second World War only the big profits they were able to make at that time because they lived in a zone that was spared by the general conflagration?

Prompted by the desire not to embarrass any delegation my delegation will briefly remind those who pretend to have lost their memories of the following: Adolf Hitler did exist. There was a Second World War which gave birth to the two Germanies. The Korean question has nothing in common with the foregoing and my delegation is warranted in being alarmed at certain words such as "peace" and "dialogue" used in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. It seems to my delegation that the words have a different meaning depending on whether they are used by the sponsors of that draft resolution or by my delegation. What peace are they speaking of? What dialogue are they referring to? The maintenance of American troops favours a dialogue, of course; but it is a dialogue of cannon. After the Council will come the bombs. There will be peace, of course, the peace of the graveyard. The Congo, my country, cannot be an accomplice of those who wish to make large graveyards of small nations.

The Congo is a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677. It would appear so far that this draft resolution has not been the subject of any amendments. Not because it is sacrosanct, as was ironically alleged here by a permanent member of the Security Council, but simply because it is a sound draft resolution, which, when adopted and implemented, will bring to the Korean people unity in peace after more than 29 years.
On 2 December 1974, at the 2032nd meeting of our Committee, the representative of the United States said:

"The subsequent presentation of the resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.677 confirmed our fears that its sponsors looked to an intemperate and contentious debate ...". (2032nd meeting, pp. 84-85)

He continued:

"On the other hand, in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 the Committee is being asked to reverse last year's consensus and, in the process, to recommend abandoning the arrangement which has preserved peace on the Korean peninsula for more than 20 years". (Ibid., p. 86)

Later in his statement the representative of the United States said:
"... one suggests that peace might be maintained and peaceful reunification might be expedited by the removal of United States troops from Korea. History does not support that view. That particular solution to the Korean issue has already been tried once. It failed badly." (Ibid.)

First of all, it would seem that there is a very slight misunderstanding. Once that misunderstanding has been dispelled, we shall be able to make a clearer assessment of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, of which Congo is a sponsor. In that draft resolution the Committee is not called upon to go back on its consensus of last year, as the United States representative has said. That can be seen if one looks at the second preambular paragraph, which reads:

"Considering that the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session, on 28 November 1973, decided to dissolve immediately the 'United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea', expressing the hope that the North and the South of Korea would continue their dialogue in the spirit of the joint statement of 4 July 1972 and widen their many-sided exchanges and co-operation so as to expedite the independent and peaceful reunification of the country."

If we look at the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1), operative paragraph 1 reads:

"Reaffirms the wishes of its members, as expressed in the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1973 and urges both the South and the North of Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea;"

With slight variations, what appears in the second preambular paragraph in document A/C.1/L.677 is the same as we find in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1. The consensus of 28 November 1973 is not called in question in the United States draft resolution; still less so is it called in question in the draft resolution of which my country is a sponsor (A/C.1/L.677).

The United States representative blames our draft resolution because it asks the Committee

"... to recommend abandoning the arrangement which has preserved peace on the Korean Peninsula for more than twenty years." (Ibid. p. 36)
The "arrangement" -- does that mean the presence of United States troops; and "peace on the Korean peninsula for more than twenty years" -- does that mean the bloodless war which the Korean people have known for so long? We all know that the prolonged presence of foreign armed troops, even friendly troops, is a challenge to a people and makes it difficult to govern. The people of a country under military occupation, even within the framework of a mutual defense treaty, ends up by feeling nothing in common with those who rule it. The history of the third world countries has proved that, as has the history of the developed countries. I shall quote an example, and I apologize to the delegation of that friendly country. France, a permanent member of the Security Council and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, asked for the removal of United States troops from its territory. Obviously the case was not identical with the one we are now considering, but the results speak for themselves.

Mr. CHRISTIANSEN (Norway): On 4 July 1972 a joint communiqué was signed between the Governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, establishing a set of principles which should pave the way for a new and better relationship between the two States, aiming at national reunification. Like many others, my Government warmly welcomed that communiqué. We hoped that the spirit of compromise and conciliation which had made the communiqué possible would prevail also in the ensuing talks between the two parties and thus provide for a process towards genuine peace and a good neighbourly relationship, leading over time to a peaceful reunification in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations. Our hopes and expectations were reconfirmed in the consensus which ended last year's debate in the General Assembly on the question of Korea.

However, it is with deep regret that we note that our hopes have been far from fulfilled. The talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea have for some time been virtually at a standstill, and have so far brought no tangible results. Over the past year tension has again been growing on the Korean peninsula. It is not for us to make any judgement as to who is to blame for the failure to make progress along the road
of conciliation and peace. However, we do have the right and the duty to express to the parties concerned our sincere disappointment at the fact that they have not been able to achieve any positive results.

In relation to the situation in Korea, the Norwegian Government has but one objective: to promote peace and reconciliation between the North and the South. We feel that that should also be the objective of this debate. We consider it of great importance to avoid a political confrontation on this issue in the United Nations. Such a development might only add to the problems already existing and make it even more difficult than before to achieve progress in the talks between the two sides. The problems of Korea can be solved only through peaceful talks and not through confrontation, whether it be political or military.
My delegation has studied carefully the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.677 and has listened with great interest to the statements delivered by the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and other countries.

The views of the two sides do differ considerably on various important questions, especially concerning the past and the future role of the United Nations in Korea. Still it should be possible to identify some areas of agreement that could provide the necessary basis for a consensus and which could in time pave the way for renewed efforts towards the development of mutual understanding and confidence between the parties.

My Government therefore urges the Governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to seek that common ground exists and agree to a consensus again this year aimed at a resumption of the political dialogue in a spirit of understanding and conciliation. To continue the debate on Korea here in this Committee and a vote on the two competing draft resolutions would exacerbate the relationship between the two parties and make resumption of the dialogue even more difficult.

Before concluding, I would like to say a few words about the position of my Government concerning the question of the role of the United Nations in Korea.

First of all, I should like to state that my Government fully recognizes the legal and political competence of the Security Council and the General Assembly and their decisions concerning Korea.

Secondly, my Government believes that the time has come to phase out the United Nations presence in Korea; however, this must be done in an orderly manner and in conjunction with a positive development in the area. My Government sees a close link between the United Nations Command -- which was established by the Security Council and, consequently, can only be dissolved through a decision of the Council -- the Armistice Agreement and the demarcation line. In the view of my Government, the United Nations Command can only be dissolved if peace and security are guaranteed through alternative arrangements or through sufficient progress in the talks between the two parties.
This debate, which is now coming to an end, has already shown us that there is in this Assembly a widely shared hope for a consensus acceptable to both Korean parties. We firmly support this view. Once again, therefore, we urge the Governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to compromise and seek a common ground that can provide a basis for a consensus.

Mr. BOATEN (Ghana): At its 2181st plenary meeting, held on 20 November 1973, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of this Committee, adopted a statement on the Korean question. That was a departure from previous sessions of the General Assembly when conclusions of the debate on this item had been expressed in the form of resolutions. The statement, which was adopted by consensus, reflected the general view that developments during 1972, as reported by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, justified some optimism regarding a peaceful solution of the Korean question. It was felt then that those developments should be encouraged. In that statement, the Assembly:

"... noted with satisfaction that a joint communiqué was issued by the North and the South of Korea on 4 July 1972" providing for agreed joint objectives for negotiations between the two sides. Those objectives were in line with the stated objectives of the United Nations, repeated in several General Assembly resolutions, namely:

"... to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area."

My delegation has always supported those objectives and continues to support them.

My delegation cannot help reflecting on some of the underlying factors which gave rise to the Korean question. In our view, the Korean question, like some other issues that have given rise to localized conflicts, is a vestige of the competition between two conflicting ideologies which
characterized international relations in the years after the Second World War. Although it has become customary in recent years to speak of détente, my delegation is not convinced that the world has rid itself of the tensions and conflicts to which this competition gives rise. It is against this background that my delegation intends to address itself to some of the elements underlying the issue now being debated in this Committee.

Without wishing to bore my colleagues with a detailed historical account of the issue before the Committee, I nevertheless consider it relevant to recall certain facts which I consider pertinent to any attempt at finding a solution to the Korean question. My delegation finds it necessary because it is convinced that, unless we decide to face the facts as they are, a solution to the issue will continue to elude us.


Resolution 82 (1950) determined that:

"... the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

"... constitutes a breach of the peace".

In its operative paragraph 3, it called on:

"... all Member States to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."

Resolution 83 (1950) recommended:

"... that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

Operative paragraph 3 of resolution 84 (1950) recommended:

"... that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America".
Operative paragraph 6 of the same resolution requested:
"...the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as
appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command."

Resolution 85 (1950) gave the unified command what could be described
as a carte blanche with regard to the operations and conduct of the force
furnished under the command. This is not meant to be a criticism; perhaps
the purpose for which the force was constituted made this necessary.

The last substantive report to the Security Council in accordance with
the Council's resolution 84 (1950), however, appears to have been given in
1953. Subsequent reports since then have been nothing more than notifications
of administrative changes in the command of the unified command. In any case,
the Security Council, in its resolution 90 (1951), resolved:
"...to remove the item 'Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of
Korea' from the list of matters of which the Council is seized."

One permanent member of the Council, as members of the Committee are
aware, was absent from the Security Council's meetings which passed those
resolutions, and therefore did not participate in the voting. I say this,
not with any implied challenge of the constitutionality of the decisions
contained in the Security Council resolutions referred to, because my
delagation does not believe that this is an issue. It is fully appreciated
by my delegation that the United Nations per se does not have troops of its
own. Such troops as the United Nations may deploy in execution of decisions
of the Security Council will necessarily be, at least under the present
circumstances, what Member States are willing to contribute. Further, my
delagation cannot support the position that because one permanent member did
not participate in the decisions which gave legal sanction to the constitution
of the force, those decisions are invalid or unconstitutional.

As I said earlier on, my delegation does not consider that the legality
of the Security Council resolutions on the question of Korea is at issue.
That is not a preoccupation of my delegation. What is important, and what
we believe should be central to the issue under discussion, is the nature of
the force and the function it was constituted to perform. This is relevant to
our efforts towards finding a solution to the issue to ascertain whether the
presence of the force in Korea, as it was and as it is presently constituted, advances the causes of peace and security in the area. It seems obvious enough to my delegation that, unlike other United Nations forces which have been constituted for peace-keeping operations in other areas of conflict, the United Nations force in Korea is a combat force. It was constituted under Chapter VII, Article 39 of the Charter, to repel aggression, at the instance of one of the parties to a conflict which felt itself to be a victim of aggression. In the view of my delegation, the phase of the conflict which made the constitution of the force necessary is past; we have entered a new phase, namely, the phase of helping to create conditions leading to serious negotiations towards a peaceful solution of the issue.

The question which this Committee should ask itself is whether a force which had in the past taken the side of one party to a conflict can be expected to perform effectively the role of a peacemaker. In the view of my delegation, the presence of the United Nations force in Korea as it is presently constituted hampers the cause of peace; it does not advance it. Furthermore, my delegation would like to draw attention to General Assembly resolution 711 (VII). This resolution noted:

"... with approval the Armistice Agreement concluded in Korea on 27 July 1953 ..."

In operative paragraph 3 of its resolution 712 (VII), the General Assembly expressed:

"... satisfaction that the first efforts pursuant to the call of the United Nations to repel armed aggression by collective military measures have been successful ...".

This supports our contention that the purpose for which the United Nations force was sent to Korea was completed with the signing of the Armistice Agreement. With that function completed, the force, in our view, should have been withdrawn. In fact, subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly since 1958 gave the indication that the General Assembly itself envisaged this. The fourth preambular paragraph of General Assembly resolution 1264 (XIII) states:

"Noting further that in this exchange the Governments concerned, observing that the greater part of the forces sent to Korea in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations have already been withdrawn,
welcomed the announcement that the Chinese communist troops were also to be withdrawn from North Korea...

It is because of those considerations that my delegation supports the view that the force presently serving under the United Nations flag in Korea should be withdrawn. We have taken this position because we believe that by so doing the United Nations would help to create the conditions which would facilitate a meaningful dialogue between the two parts of Korea. A beginning to this was made in 1972, and we have no doubt that it will continue if the United Nations gives encouragement in the right direction. A first step in this direction, it seems to us, would be the withdrawal of the troops now serving in the area under the United Nations flag.

It has been argued that fresh hostilities between North and South would break out if those troops were withdrawn. My delegation does not share those apprehensions. In our view, a number of circumstances have occurred since 1950 which point to the development of accommodation and compromise on the part of all parties to the conflict. I refer to the change in status of the countries concerned vis-à-vis the United Nations. The two Koreas now have observer status at the United Nations. The lawful rights of the People's Republic of China have now been restored and it now occupies its rightful seat on the Security Council, the body charged with the primary responsibility by the Charter for maintaining world peace and security.

In our view, if the United Nations should consider it necessary to maintain any force in the area, it should be a different kind of force, constituted differently. It should be a force which would maintain a neutral position and facilitate the creation of conditions for negotiations towards a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Korean issue. This continues to be the objective of the United Nations, and it is the view of my delegation that we should work towards it.

Absence of hostilities is not necessarily peace. If the presence of the troops serving under the United Nations flag in Korea is merely to serve as a deterrent, my delegation would consider it self-defeating. Tranquillity based on deterrence, in the view of my delegation, cannot be regarded as peace. If there is to be peace in Korea, it should be negotiated by the two parties concerned. Peace by its very nature cannot be imposed by any force, however strong.
Mr. CHALE (United Republic of Tanzania): The Korean question presents one of the most absurd contradictions of our Organization. For over 25 successive years, this Organization has been seized of the problem of Korea. Indeed, the Korean question remains today a test case for our Organization's Charter. Among the ideals embodied in the Charter are those of respect by its parties for the territorial integrity of other States and non-interference in their internal affairs. These are the very ideals that have been denied the Korean people for over two decades.

Ever since the Korean question arose, the United Nations, and some of its Members, have paid a lot of lip-service to that country. That lip service has been a costly game to the people of Korea. For, while claiming to promote the unity and peace of that divided country, the imperialist forces have brazenly pursued a policy that is clearly designed to undermine the interests of the Korean people and to maintain the division between the two parts of Korea.

The presence in South Korea of the military forces of the United States used to be rationalized by cold-war logic, in spite of the inadmissibility of such excuses under the Charter of the United Nations. That excuse, however, has been rendered obsolete by the fact that that very party to the cold war is now busy preaching and expounding the achievements of détente. But how does one interpret the spirit of détente in the context of United States policies in the Korean peninsula? Is this not a dichotomy? By taking refuge in the so-called defence agreement with the Republic of Korea, which has been and remains a United States puppet régime, the United States, shall we say, is only confirming its double standard in its treatment of the relevant provisions of the Charter. For the so-called defence agreement was not made with the Korean people. It is a sham defence agreement, fabricated between the United States and internal enemies of the unity and peace of the Korean people. There being no legitimate defence agreement with the Korean people, the presence of the United States forces in South Korea can only be an interference in the internal affairs of that country. The kind of gross interference perpetrated by the United States in Korea is not one that assumes the form of mere threat. It is manifested in both intent and practice. For it claims the lives of those very people the United States asserts it has gone to defend. Indeed, there is no other enemy but the Korean people. The so-called defence agreement is indeed a complete distortion of the notion of defence as used in the Charter.
The presence of the United States forces in Korea helps to perpetuate a very unpopular régime whose police-state tactics have for so long oppressed the freedom-loving and peace-loving people of Korea. What is even worse is the fact that the United States uses the flag of this Organization to help the oppressive régime of South Korea, in violation of the United Nations Charter. If the United Nations has ever been scandalously abused, it is in Korea. The so-called United Nations Force, as everybody knows, including the United States, is a United States force, manned by the United States, commanded by the United States, and responsible to the United States. The presence of the United Nations flag serves only to hide the private nature of the United States forces in Korea; and this in our view is a most shameful cover-up.

Last year this Organization took note of the hopeful developments in Korea, in particular the agreement reached between the two sides. Among other things the two sides in Korea can work out a solution to their problem on their own only if they are freed from external interference. They asked each of us, and continue to ask us, to facilitate this process. If our Organization, and especially the United States, is sincere in wanting to see Korea united in peace for the progress of the Korean people, then the two sides must be encouraged to continue with dialogue.

And to this end, first, the United States of America must withdraw its forces from South Korea and, secondly, the United Nations must dissociate itself from the abuse of its flag. These are straightforward appeals made by the Korean people themselves, who know best what is good for them. They should not be let down. No pretext will ever succeed in lifting the weight of the condemnation which the Korean people will cast on anyone who thwarts the earnest aspirations of the innocent Korean people. Nor will any nation of the United Nations get any comfort from the rest of the world community, which sees in the Korean question a threat to its own peace and security. The very Charter of the United Nations will convict us of hypocrisy and sentence us to eternal shame and ignominy.
"1. Calls for the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea and an end to foreign interference in all its forms in the domestic affairs of Korea;

"2. Further calls on the United Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-eighth session, to consider the question of Korea and to decide on the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag and on the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea with a view to facilitating the peaceful and independent reunification of Korea;

"3. Declares that Korean membership in the United Nations can only be achieved in the name of a single State, after the complete reunification of the country or after the establishment of a confederation of North and South."

I believe that the situation is crystal clear. What remains is for this Organization, and this Committee in particular, to decide that the question be settled. We are here to see that peace and security prevail in the world. Let us take the necessary action. The action is in the hands of the United Nations, which means us. Let us take that action.

Mr. EL-SHIBI: Mr. Chairman, this is the first time I have taken the floor in this Committee during the present session. Therefore I would beg your indulgence to be allowed at this late stage to extend to you, on behalf of the Iraqi delegation, our warmest appreciation for the able and efficient manner in which the work of this Committee has been conducted under your leadership. Your well-known diplomatic skill and your vast knowledge of the work of this Organization have once more been amply proved during the past few weeks while you have been Chairman of this Committee.
Mr. El-Shibib, Iraq

Iraq is one of the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.677, calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations. Our sponsorship of that draft resolution is predicated upon the following reasons.

First, we believe that the occupation of South Korea by foreign troops is contrary to the United Nations Charter and the recognized principles of international law on non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

Secondly, the presence of foreign troops in South Korea is contrary to the Korean Armistice Agreement, which stipulates the necessity of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.

Thirdly, we believe it is contrary to the letter and the spirit of the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity stated in the North-South Joint Statement.

Fourthly, we believe that the presence of those foreign troops under the flag of the United Nations in order to serve foreign designs and interests makes a mockery of the United Nations and its purposes as stated in the Charter.

Therefore, we firmly believe that the positive action embodied in the consensus on the Korean question adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session should be followed by a decision this year to disband the United Nations Command in Korea and allow for a speedy withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea.

The history of Korea, as is well known to all, informs us that Korea is one nation and that the Korean people will never tire in their struggle to achieve the independence and unity of the country and to put an end to the division imposed upon the one nation over the past 29 years.

In this regard, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under the leadership of President Kim Il Sung, has persistently and tirelessly advanced various reasonable proposals to achieve the aim of the Korean people in unity and independence. We note in particular the five-point proposal President Kim Il Sung advanced in June 1973.
On the other hand, the régime in South Korea, bolstered by the presence of foreign troops, has imposed upon the Korean people a series of so-called "emergency measures" which deprive the Korean people in the South of the most basic liberties and human rights.
At the same time, all efforts to achieve the peaceful unification of Korea have been stalled and frustrated in order to perpetuate the division of the country and thus prevent the whole people of Korea from realizing its national aspirations in unity and independence.

In his address before this Committee, the head of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea advanced a series of proposals with which my Government finds itself in full agreement. These proposals and the draft resolution which my country is sponsoring point out the way to achieve a reasonable solution to the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korean soil in a peaceful manner. We believe that the real aim in opposing these proposals is the continuation of United States occupation of South Korea and the perpetuation of the division of the country against the wishes of the people.

The people of Korea has always supported the just struggle of the Arab people. My country in response expresses its full solidarity with the Korean people in its fight against the occupation of its country by United States troops, under whatever flag it may be, and for the reunification of its country.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Iraq for the very kind words he was so good as to address to me.

Mr. GROOT (Denmark): Last year this Committee considered under the item "The question of Korea" two draft resolutions which in many respects were far apart. Yet the Committee succeeded in agreeing on a consensus text which was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly. This consensus expressed the hope of the General Assembly that the South and the North of Korea would continue their dialogue in order to expedite the independent, peaceful reunification of the country. The Danish Government was gratified that in this way a bitter confrontation on the question was avoided.

This year we also have before us two draft resolutions concerning the question of Korea. Some of the complicating factors in last year's debate, such as the question of UNCURK and the question of Korean membership of the United Nations, have not reappeared in this year's draft resolutions. In other respects also the texts of the present draft resolutions seem closer to each other. One might therefore assume that some compromise solution based on a consensus text or on a third draft resolution could be worked out during the present session,
and we appeal to the parties concerned to make an effort to this effect.

We have carefully examined the two draft resolutions that we are now debating. We find that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676 represents a natural sequel to the consensus statement that was adopted last year. We support the appeal to the Republic of Korea and to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to continue their dialogue. We fully agree that the question of international security falls within the responsibility of the Security Council. Furthermore, we find that the French proposal put forward in document A/C.1/L.704 has improved the text. Many nations have expressed the opinion that the role of the United Nations Command should be studied in order to decide on a call for its dissolution. We agree to this. It is important, however, that alternative security arrangements be found in order to preserve peace, because the Armistice Agreement remains the basis of the maintenance of peace in the area until an alternative arrangement acceptable to all parties concerned is agreed upon. We find that the final decision on the dissolution of the United Nations Command must be taken by the Security Council in accordance with the rules laid down in the United Nations Charter.

With regard to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, we have noted that the preamble only refers in general terms to the consensus text reached last year. We regret that the text in its operative part does not expressly call for a continuation of the dialogue. The draft resolution also raises the question of foreign troops in South Korea.

In accordance with the principle of universality we recognize South Korea as well as North Korea as two independent and sovereign States and we consequently maintain diplomatic relations with both. This recognition implies that we respect their right of self-defence as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Any State has the right to conclude security arrangements with other States and, consequently, also to have foreign troops stationed on its territory. We cannot endorse a General Assembly resolution infringing on this fundamental right.
If both draft resolutions, which in our opinion are somewhat contradictory, come to a vote, the Danish Government will, for the reasons mentioned, feel obliged to support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 while it will not be possible for us to support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677. This position reflects the belief of the Danish Government in the rights of independent and sovereign States and in the international security system as it is established by the United Nations Charter.

The Danish vote -- and I emphasize this -- should not be construed as a one-sided attitude, in favour of South Korea and against North Korea. As I have mentioned earlier, we maintain diplomatic relations with both and we shall continue to work for and strengthen our good relations with these two countries.

I realize that we are in the eleventh hour as far as our dealings with respect to the Korea question are concerned. I should like, however, to point out that the possibility of avoiding a final confrontation of votes exists until the General Assembly has concluded its consideration of the question.

If an agreement should prove possible between the two sides in this question we would suggest that the following components be taken into consideration: an appeal to the two Koreas to continue their dialogue to expedite a peaceful reunification of Korea, and an appeal to the parties directly concerned to take appropriate steps towards a solution of the question concerning the dissolution of the United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain peace and security in Korea.

We hope that the representatives of the two sponsoring groups will reconsider the advisability of a confrontation of votes in this Committee. It is the wish of the Danish Government that this year also a common stand can be found on the question of Korea.

Mr. SICILIANI (Haiti) (interpretation from French): The tension which prevails in the region of Korea has for nearly a quarter of a century been a source of grave concern for peace-loving peoples. My delegation believes that it is urgent to find a peaceful solution in Korea, a solution based on the generally expressed views over these many years.

Last year the General Assembly adopted a consensus on the question of Korea. My delegation hopes that all future action will draw its inspiration from that, that is why we are among the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1, which is now before the Committee.
The purpose of my statement in the debate on this agenda item is to associate the voice of Haiti with that of other countries which speak reason and peace. Indeed, in many General Assembly resolutions it has been stated that "the only purpose of the United Nations forces now in Korea is to safeguard peace and security in the region".

A draft resolution would have us believe that the presence of United Nations forces prevents a fruitful dialogue between the parties directly concerned. The United Nations was created to maintain and strengthen peace and security in the world. Its beneficial action has been praised by one and all and it is a well-known fact to everyone that the United Nations brought peace to Korea and continued to work to maintain and strengthen it. The presence of United Nations forces has not been an obstacle to the opening of the dialogue between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Why should its withdrawal constitute a prior condition for the resumption of the dialogue which has been interrupted? Furthermore, since 1954, most United Nations forces have been withdrawn from the region. The remaining forces contribute to the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement. Because we must not lose sight of the fact that this Armistice Agreement was signed, on the one hand, by the United Nations Command and, on the other, by the North Korean Army and the Chinese volunteers. Since the 20 years of the existence of this Agreement, United Nations forces have never violated it.

The United Nations has a positive role to play in this question. Its presence in Korea constitutes the guarantee that no military confrontation will occur in the peninsula. We are told of the presence of foreign troops in the southern part of Korea. But these troops stationed in the Republic of Korea are there by virtue of a bilateral agreement which was duly signed in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. There is no article in the United Nations Charter which authorizes the Organization to interfere in the internal affairs of States with a view to preventing them from signing agreements freely entered into. On the contrary, the role of the United Nations is to create the atmosphere necessary for signing treaties and finding compromise.
We, the peoples of the United Nations, are in favour of compromise, of the tireless quest for peace which will enable us to solve the burning problems of food, energy, housing and disarmament. The world needs peace. The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676/Rev.1 is a compromise text which emphasizes, once again, the will of the peoples of the United Nations to coexist peacefully, to see the peoples of Korea continue their dialogue so as to find a satisfactory solution for all. Were it necessary to prove this affirmation, my delegation would wish to borrow from His Excellency Ambassador Obame, the representative of Gabon, a non-aligned country which maintains relations with the two Koreas, who, in his statement of 29 November, in joining the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.676, said:

"Thus our role, the role of all objective people, is to seek a satisfactory settlement of the conflict, without in the least jeopardizing what has already been achieved ..." (A/C.1/FV.2051, pp. 28-30)

It is the peace now prevailing in the region which has been achieved. My delegation believes it is very important to find arrangements to preserve the Armistice Agreement which is the legal basis for the peace prevailing on the peninsula.

To conclude, my delegation appeals to the Committee not to depart from the Charter which confers a special responsibility on the Security Council in regard to certain questions. We believe that a new consensus, this year again, on the question of Korea would prove the maturity of the peoples of the United Nations, meeting in the General Assembly.

Mr. NDABANIWE (Burundi) (interpretation from French): Our Committee is meeting once again to consider a question of vital importance for the future of the Korean people, for peace and security in the Far East in general and on the Korean peninsula in particular.

The consensus which the General Assembly adopted on 28 November 1973, undoubtedly represents an important contribution by our Organization to the solution of the Korean problem. Today, we must move forward and do whatever we can to expedite the process of normalizing the situation on the Korean peninsula, in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Korean people.
The entire Korean people wants peace and unity with national independence. It rejects the artificial division which was imposed on it by force for reasons alien and contrary to its interests, as part of a policy of domination and supremacy. It wishes to abolish the barriers which have been set up to separate the children of the Korean family. It wants to be master of its own affairs, to live in freedom and dignity, as it has done for more than 4,000 years, free from foreign pressures and interference. This is perfectly clear in the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972, and is also clear in the statements made by the leaders and spokesmen of both parts in Korea.

It is the duty of the United Nations to assist the Korean people to attain its objectives as early as possible and by peaceful means, by creating the conditions for an atmosphere of peace, mutual trust and national reconciliation, and by eliminating all sources of tension and misunderstanding on both sides of the 38th Parallel, by removing all obstacles which prevent the Korean people from exercising its right to self-determination.

In this connexion, my delegation considers that the foreign occupation troops stationed in South Korea under the United Nations flag must be withdrawn and the so-called "United Nations Command" in Korea dissolved. We all know that the mission entrusted to the so-called "United Nations Forces" in South Korea is precisely the maintenance of the status quo and of the deadlock in Korea. In supporting the policy of provocation and aggression of the Seoul authorities in regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United Nations Forces, which ignore our Organization and serve exclusively the interests of a great Power in that region of the world, has only maintained an atmosphere of tension and has strengthened the elements that are hostile to the reunification of Korea. This being so, no just solution can be found to the Korean question as long as foreign troops are maintained on part of Korean territory.

Some speakers have told us that the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in South Korea would encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to invade the South and would thus provoke a breach of the peace in the region. This argument can deceive no one. In fact, the representative of South Korea, in his statement, insisted on the fact that he represents two-thirds of the Korean nation.
On the other hand, we know that the Seoul authorities can at any time mobilize an army of more than 3 million men, provided with the most modern and most impressive military equipment. In these circumstances and inasmuch as the Seoul authorities are in firm control of their population and army, an invasion by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would be tantamount to suicide.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always proposed to the other party the achievement of the reunification of Korea by peaceful and democratic means with, as a first step, cessation of the arms race, reduction of military potential, reduction of military effectiveness, and the signing of a peace treaty to replace the Armistice Agreement of 1953. Who would recognize in these proposals the language of a warlike, annexionist and expansionist country?

To these concrete and generous proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea South Korea replied by saying that the reunification of Korea would take place after victory over communism. Thus it is clear who has aggressive intentions with regard to whom.

The so-called United Nations Force in Korea constitutes both an anachronism and a blot on our Organization. It is an anachronism because, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement on Korea of 1953, all foreign troops were to have been withdrawn after the cease-fire. It is a blot on the Organization, which has agreed to sanction a policy of aggression by lending its name, its insignia, its blue helmets and flags to foreign occupation troops in Korea. The United Nations attitude in this Korean affair has seriously jeopardized the prestige and authority of the Organization throughout the world.

It is time to do justice to the Korean nation. It is time to correct the mistakes our Organization has committed in interfering in the internal affairs of Korea and preventing the Korean people from fully and freely exercising their inalienable right to self-determination. Let us allow the Korean people to settle their own affairs, free from external pressures and restraints.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677, of which my country is a sponsor, alone responds to this concern. We are convinced that those who sincerely wish that peace, justice and freedom be restored on the entire Korean peninsula will support this draft resolution.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Cuba on a point of order.

Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): I have asked to speak on a point of order at this time in order to clear up a point which had been raised at a previous stage, also on a point of order, and to take advantage of the fact that the representative of Tunisia is now present.

As the Committee will recall, at his request the Secretariat gave us an explanation a few days ago indicating that it was not able to supply some details which Mr. Driss was interested in knowing.

I should now like, with the permission of the representative of the Secretary-General and in order to contribute to the effort made by the Secretariat, to inform the Committee that yesterday we learned that the spokesman for the United States Mission to the United Nations, Mr. Courtney Sheldon, announced at a press conference that the name of the United Nations Commander in South Korea is General Richard Stilwell, who is also the Commander of the Eighth United States Army in Korea and, as the United States spokesman said, "he wears two hats".

At that conference, too, the United States spokesman said that General Stilwell has a staff of 100 United States officers, a limited number of other foreign troops, and almost all the South Korean forces.

It seemed to me that the Committee, and in particular the representative of Tunisia, should receive this explanation, which was communicated to reporters yesterday. I thought they should be informed of this too, and therefore I wished to transmit this unofficial information, which was not formally submitted to this Committee, but which was made known to our delegation.
Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I would not have been averse to speak again on what seems to be an intractable problem as it now stands, fossilized, so to speak, by two different draft resolutions. But then I would feel guilty if I did not pursue the question in light of what has been happening, not only since 1953, but more so since many of us have discovered that there was some tacit agreement between the major Powers that perhaps the time is not ripe for settling this Korean question once and for all.

Needless to say, those major Powers have mostly economic -- but, more importantly, strategic -- interests in the region. I would put the strategic interests first. And we know that politics always revolves around economics, but I will not go into this matter now.

Have we spent the time allotted in this session in vain? Last year, it may be recalled that I said that the consensus was a sort of common denominator, an agreement that suited in part primarily all the major Powers concerned, and -- I do not say this slightingly -- their followers, their clients, or those who were of the same persuasion. In fairness to many Member States represented here, they need not be followers or clients but their persuasion was that they would support one resolution or the other. And then came the consensus; and as I mentioned time and again, especially in the Sixth Committee, many of us who had criticized the veto in the past in the Security Council came to the conclusion that there was something far worse than the veto, and that was consensus.

Hence, I insisted that a draft resolution that I had submitted last year be mentioned in the report of the Rapporteur. We have gone around in circles and we are faced with the same situation.

And when I referred to my brother, the representative of Tunisia, he also had doubts and qualms about the consensus and that is why, last year, he did a lot of spadework in order to bring some understanding to the two parties, and he is still doing it this year; and I subscribed to all that he said, and I listened attentively to him.
But it seems, as I said, that the situation is frozen, because we still have two draft resolutions. Am I reopening the debate, Sir? It is almost finished. This afternoon there will be some speakers and then the draft resolutions will be put to the vote mechanically; and were I or my colleague from Tunisia to submit new texts, we should, I am sure, be asked to suspend them or to have them put on record so that they might perhaps pave the way in the process of negotiations and so that the negotiations might benefit from certain points therein.

This is not satisfactory, I submit. We cannot go on like this. It is 21 years since the Armistice Agreement was signed. Those North Koreans used to be called the guilty party. Now they are no longer guilty; they are sitting with us. Praise be to God, who changes and never changes.

Here the leaders of many countries are like the ladies: they change dresses according to the fashion from one day to another. And here peace in Korea is begging by the wayside.

I feel a moral responsibility, having spent 29 years of my life here. Were they in vain? Many of you elders here, and the young who are the pillars of the future -- shall we go round in revolving doors without even getting into the hall? That is what is happening today. Somebody is pushing the revolving doors and we cannot even get into the hall. By "hall" here I mean some place in which we can meet instead of being partitioned by the segments of the revolving door.

So, what is the difference if now the North Koreans are sitting over there. And look how, instead of seating them as we have seated the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, who salute each other in German -- I have heard them say aufwiedersehen -- the two Korean delegations have been seated apart. That is symbolic, unless they have chosen to be apart. They should be together and they should start talking together. No, we separate them, because they cannot be seated there; that is for the overflow of the delegations. Perhaps it was an inadvertent arrangement, but it is symbolic of what is going on. What shall we do?
That is why I said we salute France, for having dissipated the fiction that it is still a United Nations affair in Korea; and we should really salute the French again and again for having courage. They belong to the Western world, and you know, Sir, how we work in blocks -- the Western world, the Latin American world, the Arab world, the African world -- by solidarity. It is no longer funny. "Will you lend your name?" "What is it?", they ask one another, "What is the draft resolution about?" "Oh, don't ask me."
They put their names and they do not ask. That is why France broke the ice with that amendment, by saying "The dissolution of the United Nations Command". It does not exist; it is a fiction. It is an American army and there may be, I do not know, some mercenaries around them or with them. Somebody must pay for that army. Many people are broke that sent troops; they were broke that sent troops in 1950. But who paid the bill? Our American friends. Thank God they cannot afford to do it continuously. The dollar is in such bad shape, and so are other currencies. There is the problem.
There are other major powers which think that sooner or later the Americans will do what they did in Viet-Nam and somebody will come and save their face and say we should have peace in Korea, and they will withdraw the troops.
The activism will continue between the North and the South, not because the Northern Korean people and the Southern Korean people would like that but because there are special strategic and other interests that will see to it that they are divided and separated and will disregard the sovereignty of the whole people and make it subject to their petty national interests, the petty national interests of the major Powers and other Powers that have a finger in the Korean pie.

I considered very seriously submitting another draft resolution; but then I said "What is the use?" We tried last year, my good friend from Tunisia and I, and he was among those who came and pleaded with me to suspend it and give the consensus a chance. Here we are, still in the same position. But this year I thought of another way, hoping it might have some effect on our North Korean friends and on our South Korean friends. I do not want to say "the Republic of Korea" and "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" because I am thinking in terms of people. Governments come and go, they are ephemeral;
the people remain. Where will we be in 40, 50, or 60 years? Unless there are people in their teens here, we will be gone under the sod. But our people will continue to live, unless by miscalculation some madman should bring mankind to an end through diabolical weapons, including nuclear weapons. It is the people we should consider.

What I should have liked to submit as a draft resolution, starting with "The General Assembly", followed by the usual preambular and operative paragraphs, I am submitting as what I hope will constitute a working paper, or one of the working papers, for the two parties concerned, the North Korean Government and the South Korean Government, because there is no alternative to their getting together, unless there are some Powers which do not want them to get together, for reasons of their own. There is no substitute for the dialogue between a people that is homogeneous, ethnologically and linguistically, but unfortunately divided ideologically.
I have borrowed some of the phraseology I used in the draft resolution that appears in the report. But it is not simply a synthesis; there is a new element in this paper. And, unless somebody objects -- and I hope that nobody objects, because I would then open a debate, procedural and otherwise -- this paper will appear verbatim in the Rapporteur's report, as was done last year, so that it will always be handy for the two parties concerned as they may want to see whether they can use some of the principles embodied in it or, rather, the objectives that we hope will be attained, as spelled out in the document.

Would you kindly see to it, Sir, that the following text is included in the Rapporteur's report:

"Noting that the artificial separation of the Korean people at the 38th parallel was the outcome of political arrangements agreed upon by the major Powers to serve extraneous strategic and ideological interests, notwithstanding the fact that ethnologically, culturally and linguistically the people of the whole Korean peninsula constitute a single national entity,

"Expressing the hope that, in the spirit of universality, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea will resume constructive negotiations with a view to reunification, by merger, confederation or any other political instrumentality they deem fit, so that they may ultimately consider membership in the United Nations as a single national State and thereby further the means for promoting the maintenance of peace and security in the area,

"Recognizing that if all Powers, and especially the major Powers, refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Korea and undertake to respect the sovereignty of the Korean people as a whole, regardless of the two ideological systems to which the two parties respectively adhere, a satisfactory solution to the problem of Korea might then be easily found,
"1. Expresses the hope that, as soon as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea resume negotiations, both parties will take into account that genuine neutrality might ultimately be the solution to the Korean problem;

"2. In order to achieve this objective, appeals to the parties concerned to give new and serious consideration to the following:
"(a) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea undertake not to join coalitions or military alliances directed against each other or any other Power that pursued policies which resulted in dividing the Korean peninsula into two zones separated at the 38th Parallel. (b) The States that were militarily and otherwise involved in the Korean peninsula and all States Members of the United Nations, and especially those in the region, undertake not to interfere, overtly or covertly, in the domestic affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea."

The undertaking has to be made by two sides: on the one hand, North and South Korea or their Governments and, on the other hand by all Member States of the United Nations to assure genuine neutrality, but particularly by those that were militarily and otherwise involved, and equally by the Member States of the United Nations in the region of South East Asia, or East Asia, or by whatever name you want to call that geographical part of the world.

Here is the key to a solution: the genuine neutrality of Korea. I want to amplify what I mean by the words "overtly and covertly". "Overtly" means visible intervention, things that you can see, like troops, like agents -- but not agents from outside because that is "covert" -- in other words, clients of major Powers in each part of Korea. They are visible, too, we know. We have seen them in other parts of the world. In my region we saw many of those clients in the Middle East at one time or another during the last 50 years.

I hold no brief for the United States, for China or for Russia. As I mentioned, in this affair of Korea the United States were "suckers" and they learned their hard lesson in Viet-Nam until allegedly they established peace there. I do not think there is peace there. Every now and then I am so grieved when I read in the papers that people are being killed, regardless of what side they belong to; they are people who are being killed. The Governments seem to be quite safe, whether they are in Hanoi or Saigon.

Now the United States is tired of maintaining troops there, and no doubt they want to disengage themselves as they have disengaged themselves from Viet-Nam; but at the same time they want to make sure that this area will not be used as a springboard against their interests in the Far East.
However, the technique of the other side is to use overt and covert means, overtly by sending arms, and covertly by seeing to it that the people are disciplined and indoctrinated. So why does not the United States do the same thing, and then there will be no troops, and our Chinese and Soviet friends will be happy, because they know very well that indoctrination is more effective than a military presence. Once the military presence is over, there will be propaganda and, God help us, there will be pandemonium and then maybe there will be military clashes. That is obvious. That is why the Americans are clinging to the troops; I do not think they like maintaining the troops but they have no other alternative. If they took out the troops, what will they do? In no time the Chinese and the Russians would spread their agents through. Do not think that the Americans do not have agents, but they are not as strong in that part of the world as in other regions, perhaps nearer to their own.

These are the facts, so do not fool yourselves here and say, "Let us deal with this; we are for this or that draft resolution". Let us be frank with ourselves and not repeat the mistakes, not only the mistakes of the First World War, but also the more serious mistakes that were committed after the Second World War. I am a contemporary of both world wars and I saw what happened in the aftermath of the First World War. We are compounding the mistakes made in the period after the Second World War.

This is my humble contribution during this Assembly, and I appeal to the two Korean Governments to have mercy on their people, to forget their petty national interests, to embrace like brothers and pave the way for peace, not only for their people, but for the world at large.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia who has presented a text, as he stated, in the hope that it will serve as a basis of negotiation for the parties directly involved. He also asked that this text should appear in the Rapporteur's report. If there is no objection on the part of the Committee, this text will appear in the Rapporteur's report.

It was so decided.
Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like to inform the Committee that, since we presented a preliminary draft resolution for the purpose of consultations, we have been contacted by many delegations, and we have the feeling, from those contacts, that we are moving towards a consensus. I should like to appeal to you, Sir, to assist me in this matter; I certainly do not want to derive any advantage from it myself.

Furthermore, I should like to point out that in those consultations a proposal was made to replace the fifth preambular paragraph, which reads:

"Recognizing that the dissolution of the United Nations Command ..."
and so on as operative paragraph 1, which would read as follows:

"Recognizes that the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations can facilitate the implementation of the consensus adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session in November 1973."
and re-number the other paragraphs accordingly.

I wanted to inform the Committee of this possibility, so that consultations can go on with a proper understanding of all relevant facts.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Tunisia. I can assure him that the Committee as a whole very much appreciates his efforts and the efforts of other delegations to reach a friendly solution in this matter. For my part, I am prepared to do whatever is necessary, in accordance with the wishes of the two parties involved, in order to achieve a solution.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before adjourning the meeting, and so that all delegations may know exactly what is to be our order of business, I wish to make a proposal to the Committee after giving out the relevant information.

This afternoon we shall conclude the general debate. Consequently, the voting procedure will take place on Monday afternoon, since on Monday morning, in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, there will be voting on all the items relating to disarmament that have been adopted by the First Committee.

Furthermore, as appears in the Journal, for our meeting on Monday afternoon, which is to be held at 3 o'clock, we shall have to use Conference Room 3, so that we can use the mechanical voting system. Monday's meeting will begin with explanations of vote before the voting. Then we shall proceed to the voting, after which we shall hear explanations of vote after the voting.

Once we have concluded all of this, we shall hear statements by the delegations of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea only, in that order. Thus both delegations will have had opportunity fully to set forth their views and also, each of them, to speak three times.
In addition, in my personal view this break until Monday afternoon could make it possible for those delegations that are trying efforts to reach common ground, to succeed in the time allowed.

If there is no objection on the part of the Committee, I shall take it that this proposal I have made on the procedure for our work meets with the Committee's approval.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.