Twenty-ninth Session
FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 21 November 1974, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)

later: Mr. SIDDIQ (Vice-Chairman) (Afghanistan)

Rapporteur: Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries [\textit{21}] (continued)

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;

(b) Report of the Secretary-General

- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General [\textit{27}] (continued)

- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [\textit{28}] (continued)

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The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

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- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /29/ (continued)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /30/ (continued)

- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)

- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)

- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)

- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /101/ (continued)

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- Organization of work
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The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Iran to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.700.

Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran) (interpretation from French): I have the honour, Sir, to introduce on behalf of the delegations of Egypt and Iran the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.700. Members of the Committee will recall that a few weeks ago the Ambassador of Egypt and the head of my delegation introduced the agenda item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". With your permission, Mr. Chairman, before explaining certain points of the draft resolution I should like to remind the Committee of the reasons why we thought it necessary at this twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly to bring up again a proposal on this subject which was made a few years ago by my own Sovereign.

Introducing the item in the First Committee the head of my delegation said, inter alia:

"In view of the political and economic situation prevailing in the Middle East, which is well known to everybody, the introduction of nuclear arms into that area could mean much more than simply a burdensome arms race, which in itself would be catastrophic." (220th meeting, p. 61)

I have no need to go into details on this, because we are all well aware that we are on the threshold of a new era when countries are going to have to give up, to an increasing extent, the use of traditional sources of energy in favour of nuclear energy. This development has created a situation which could not be foreseen at the time when the non-proliferation Treaty came into force. It was necessary, therefore, to take initiatives in order to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our part of the world; but, at the same time, all the countries of our region had to be assured that they would benefit from the peaceful application of nuclear technology. That is why, in agreement with the delegation of Egypt, before this twenty-ninth session we changed the wording of the item we had put on the agenda and instead of speaking of a "denuclearized zone" we preferred the wording which is now in the text of the draft resolution -- "establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone".

I should add that what we are hoping for, in the final analysis, is the banning of the production, acquisition, stockpiling and transportation of nuclear weapons under an effective control system. However, we are aware that such a purpose cannot be achieved immediately. That objective can only be achieved by
stages and after serious study of the problems arising. It is with that in mind that the delegation of Egypt and my own delegation are today presenting the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.700. The draft resolution, I hasten to add, is the fruit of consultations with a number of delegations of countries inside and outside the area, because here again we are aware that we cannot initiate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone without taking into account the views of States in other regions.

Having said that, I shall now turn to an introduction of the draft resolution.

I believe the preamble does not require a great deal of explanation, because it is quite clear. However, with regard to the fourth preambular paragraph, which recalls the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States, I should like to stress that that resolution was in support of the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and we think it important to refer to that resolution since the members of the Council of the League of Arab States are directly interested in the problem. We also thought it would be useful to refer to precedents, particularly with respect to Africa and Latin America, where efforts aimed at the establishment of such zones have been very successful.

Regarding the operative part of the draft resolution, I think that after the consultations we have been holding for some weeks we have reached a text which is reasonable.
Operative paragraph 1 does not attempt to put the cart before the horse; quite the contrary, it merely approves the idea of the establishment of a zone, because we -- both our delegations, as well as those delegations that we have consulted -- were aware that we could not decide to establish the zone before solving the problems that that would entail. All we would do, therefore was ask the Assembly to approve the idea.

We have worded operative paragraph 2 in that way because we believe that such a zone can only be established in our part of the world if a climate of confidence exists. In order to create that climate, we believe it necessary for the parties concerned to declare their willingness not to introduce or manufacture nuclear weapons in the area.

With reference to operative paragraph 3, I should like to remind the Committee that my country is a party to the non-proliferation Treaty. I would also remind the Committee that Egypt has signed that Treaty. In this connexion, the Ambassador of Egypt, in introducing this item in the general debate, made his country's position quite clear. We thought that in our part of the world the parties concerned could usefully consider the possibility of acceding to that Treaty.

With regard to the Treaty, I am well aware that there are divergent views in the Assembly. But I would draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that, in our draft resolution, Egypt and Iran are not asking all the members of the Assembly to accede to the Treaty. Our request is confined to our own region. Consequently, I hope that this paragraph will not give rise to any difficulties for certain delegations which have reservations on the matter but whose countries are outside that area.

On operative paragraph 4 I should like to point out that, as I said at the beginning of my statement, we cannot establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in one part of the world if other countries in other regions -- and in particular nuclear-weapon States -- do not co-operate in the attainment of our objective. We have worded this paragraph in a general way precisely in order to be able to muster what I hope will be unanimous support.
Operative paragraph 5 is linked with the other operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. As I have said, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone requires evidence of confidence on the part of those concerned, and we should like to know if the parties concerned in the area are genuinely interested -- that they are not just playing with words -- in the creation of such a zone. And if in this paragraph we have asked that the Secretary-General should report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, if we have specifically mentioned the Security Council, it is to show how serious we are about this question. In other words, in making this proposal we are serious and we hope that one day, as soon as possible, that nuclear-weapon-free zone will come into being, because -- and I have no need to say this in this Committee where there are so many ambassadors -- the Security Council is an extremely important body and we believe that it should be kept abreast of the situation with regard to this proposal.

The last paragraph does not require any particular comment. It is there because, as I said at the very beginning, we are not dreamers. We know very well that the establishment of such a zone will require a certain amount of time, studies will have to be undertaken, we have to ascertain whether or not the parties concerned want such a zone created and so on. Therefore, we know that it will take some time, we are not more optimistic than the optimists and we think that the question will have to be brought back to the General Assembly next year.

I can readily understand that, in view of certain positions, some countries outside the region may have some reservations on certain paragraphs, in particular operative paragraph 3. But I should like once again to draw the attention of those countries which are outside the region to the fact that, in our text, we are speaking exclusively about the interested parties in the region and that we are not trying to force the hand of countries in other parts of the world which have particular attitudes.

Those were the remarks that I wanted to make for the Committee's consideration on the subject of this draft resolution, remarks that I have made both on behalf of the delegation of Egypt and on behalf of my own delegation. We hope that the draft will meet with unanimous approval and thus encourage all the parties concerned to work patiently towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
Mr. OSMAN (Egypt): After this lucid, eloquent and comprehensive introduction of the draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East just made by His Excellency Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran, my statement will be short. Very little remains to be said now about this draft which is sponsored by Iran and Egypt.

The draft resolution which we have submitted to the Committee in document A/C.1/L.700 has as its ultimate goal the elimination of nuclear weapons from the region of the Middle East under an adequate system of international control. The motivation of both Iran and Egypt in sponsoring this draft and recommending it for the favourable consideration of the Committee is a purely constructive one. The sense of insecurity which accompanies the spread of nuclear weapons and the regional tension which results from such fear spurred the process of concluding the non-proliferation Treaty. According to the preamble of that Treaty,

"... the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war" (resolution 2373 (XXII, p. 5). The contracting parties to the Treaty adopted the principle that the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear technology should be available to all parties to the Treaty and declared their intention to achieve, at the earliest possible date, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures for nuclear disarmament.

The non-proliferation Treaty also contains definite obligations on both nuclear and non-nuclear States. I am sure the members of the Committee are already aware of those obligations.

The non-proliferation Treaty not only is a measure of crucial importance, but is also a necessary prerequisite for any future progress in nuclear disarmament as well as in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The idea of nuclear-free zones has been discussed in the General Assembly and elsewhere on many occasions ever since the middle of the last decade. In this respect, Africa and Latin America have been the subject of resolutions of the General Assembly in previous sessions. The denuclearization of Latin America is embodied in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This year we have two new areas included on the agenda: the area of South Asia and the region of the Middle East.
Egypt joined Iran, on 15 July 1974, in requesting the inclusion of the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". In their peaceful venture, Iran and Egypt are fully aware of the complexities and intricacies involved in the subject. But we start from the premise that nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, not for the purpose of destroying or threatening or blackmailing. The cause of peace and security in the area would certainly be enhanced by peaceful access to nuclear energy, particularly for assisting developing countries in their efforts to improve their living standards. Total absence of nuclear weapons in the region, regardless of which States own or control such weapons, is the core of the project. Any instruments of mass destruction will consequently be, and forever remain, banned from the territory, to protect the region from both the threat of nuclear destruction and the waste of resources in a senseless arms race.

If these basic elements are kept in mind, it will be easy to understand why this draft resolution should be commended to the attention of the Committee.

By way of conclusion, the draft resolution which we have before the Committee today, among other things, calls for the support of the international community by commending the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and requires from the States concerned in the area that they proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution also calls upon the parties concerned in the area to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, a prerequisite for establishing any effective, concrete, nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The adoption of this draft resolution may be an important step forward in our search for nuclear disarmament and an important milestone in the long struggle to achieve our cherished goal of general and complete disarmament by preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. My delegation hopes that this draft resolution will be adopted by unanimity.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Finland to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.701.
Mr. HYVÄRINEN (Finland): In my statement in the First Committee on 29 October, I proposed that this Assembly should consider the possibility of initiating a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. This proposal has received a broad and positive response from among the membership of this Assembly. I based that proposal on certain general considerations. In introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.701, I would now like to reiterate a few of them.

The interest in nuclear-weapon-free zones as such dates back nearly two decades. Proposals and ideas to that effect have been put forward in most regions of the world. So far they have resulted in only two concrete agreements on such zones: the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty covering the Antarctic. Furthermore, the first steps towards creating such a zone in Africa have been taken by the Declaration adopted by the twentieth General Assembly. The slowness of this process, we believe, is at least partly due to the fact that we are dealing here with difficult and complex questions which furthermore affect vital national interests of States in their respective regions.

On the other hand, it is obviously not due to any lack of interest in the idea as such. This interest has, on the contrary, grown over the years and is gaining increasing attention among States in different regions of the world. It has become one of the possible instruments in the efforts of States to enhance their regional security and to contribute to a lessening of the danger of a nuclear proliferation in the world in general.

I wish to reaffirm the conviction of my Government that the non-proliferation Treaty should continue to play the central role in the efforts to limit, through non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the danger of nuclear war. At the same time, it is evident that the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones -- embodied as it is in the said Treaty -- has to an increasing degree come to be seen as a valuable complementary instrument for seeking the same ends within a different structural and conceptual framework.
It is natural, therefore, that the time has come to undertake, without delay, the kind of broad and comprehensive study of this question in all its aspects that we are now proposing to this Assembly. It is not our intention to link such a study, in time or in substance, with any concrete consideration regarding the establishment of any such zone under consideration at present or contemplated earlier. Rather we have envisaged a broad and thorough inventory and analysis of this entire question, unrelated to any one particular region. Our hope would be that such a study would clarify the concept as such and provide such assistance and guidance as might be needed and asked for by any group of countries in the future.

It is indeed with these considerations in mind that we have delayed the presentation of our draft resolution until now. To underline the independent and separate character of the initiative as compared with any concrete proposals on nuclear-weapon-free zones, we have preferred to wait until the draft resolutions relating to these have been presented.

Following my statement of 29 October, we have held discussions with a large number of interested delegations. As a basis for these discussions, we informally circulated a preliminary draft resolution, which is now before the Committee in a slightly revised form.

We believe that we have arrived at a formulation of our text which takes into account different views that have been put forward during the extensive discussions we have held. Therefore we are confident that our proposal -- uncontroversial and broadly needed as it would seem to us to be -- will be unanimously accepted by this Committee.

The prevailing impression that we have gained from our talks has been that the idea of this study has been recognized as important and timely in all quarters. Nobody has objected to this. Some suggestions have been made with regard to the character and composition of the group of experts to undertake the study, the context in which it should be set up, its mandate, its relation to other disarmament and arms control undertakings at present in progress and so on.
In taking into account the different views expressed on these points we have inter alia come to the conclusion that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in view of its experience and competence in matters relating to nuclear disarmament in general and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in particular, would be the most suitable body under the auspices of which the study should be undertaken. It is not our intention that the study should be undertaken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as such but by a special group of governmental experts set up by it for that particular purpose and comprising the necessary expertise from among its members as well as other interested parties, non-members of the Committee.

The draft resolution also seeks the assistance of the Secretary-General in order to ensure that the group of experts receives all the personnel and the material assistance it may require. Without prejudging the form or substance of the study to be undertaken, we have also added a provision to the draft resolution which makes it possible for the group of experts to ask for and receive such assistance from interested Governments and international organizations as may be required. As far as the international organizations are concerned, we have thought of such bodies as the International Atomic Energy Agency, OPEC and the Organization of African Unity. Finally, as this is a question of global concern, we believe that the United Nations General Assembly should be seized of it and that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should transmit the study by the expert group to the Assembly in a special report in time for the next session of the General Assembly.

Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): In connexion with the forthcoming discussion in the First Committee of the draft resolution on the question of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health contained in document A/C.1/L.675, dated 24 September 1974, the Soviet delegation would like to make the following statement.
At the 1998th meeting of the First Committee the delegation of the Soviet Union gave a detailed explanation of the substance of the Soviet proposal on this question. Therefore, there is no need to repeat now the motives and reasons for which the Soviet Government put forward this proposal as an important and urgent question for consideration at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. We consider that the implementation of the idea of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health could be an important step towards curbing the arms race and towards disarmament. The adoption by the General Assembly of this proposal and the subsequent production of an international convention on this question would, without any doubt, promote the task of limiting the arms race and strengthening peace and would promote the averting of a menacing potential danger for the whole of mankind.

The response to this proposal which emerged in the statements in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in the First Committee demonstrates that this proposal, because it is so topical and important, has aroused genuinely great interest and widespread approval on the part of the delegations of many countries. We note with satisfaction that these delegations have supported the initiative of the Soviet Union and given a high assessment of its importance. We express our gratitude to these delegations for their positive attitude towards this initiative of the Soviet Union and also towards the highly humanitarian motives for which this proposal was put forward. Strong evidence of the favourable attitude towards this proposal was the fact also that 25 States became sponsors of the draft resolution that was put forward for the consideration of the Committee. In this regard permit me once again to express my gratitude to the delegations of Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritius, Mongolia, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic and Ukrainian SSR for their valuable contribution and sponsorship.
In the course of the discussion of this question in the First Committee and in talks with the other sponsors of the draft resolution and with representatives of many other countries, considerable interest was displayed in various aspects of this proposal. A number of delegations expressed the wish to introduce some clarifications into the initial text of the draft resolution which would make for a clearer definition of the purport of this proposal, and this in the final analysis would make it possible to increase the number of States supporting it.
The sponsors of this draft resolution considered the proposals of a number of delegations and found it possible to introduce certain clarifications into the text. These are now contained in the revised draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.675/Rev.1, dated 20 November 1974. A number of delegations expressed the wish to clarify the draft resolution in the sense that the implementation of the proposal to prohibit action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health should not be an obstacle to the application of the results of scientific and technological progress in this area for exclusively peaceful purposes.

In this regard, we should simply like to stress that the very fact that we raised this question in the General Assembly meant and still means that we did not place any limitations on the activities of States in the use of new possibilities created by the development of scientific and technological progress for influencing the environment and climate for peaceful purposes, the benefits of which could be widely used both by individual countries and regions and by mankind as a whole. It is precisely for this reason that both in the draft resolution and in the draft convention on this question provision is made for such a prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for purposes incompatible with the interests of international security, human well-being and health.

In order to accommodate the wishes of other delegations and to clarify this provision further, the sponsors have agreed to introduce a clarification into the third paragraph of the preamble and also into operative paragraphs 1 and 5 of the draft resolution by speaking of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate both for military purposes and for other hostile purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health. In these three paragraphs we have inserted the word "hostile" between the words "other" and "purposes". We consider that such a clarification will make it possible to interpret more clearly these provisions of the draft resolution, and subsequently the draft resolution itself when it is submitted to the General Assembly.
A clarification has also been made in the fourth paragraph of the preamble, proposed by the delegation of the Philippines. The profound interest of States and peoples is expressed not only in the adoption of measures to preserve and improve the natural environment, but also in measures for the modification or the moderation of the climate solely for peaceful purposes for the benefit of present and future generations. We have in mind particularly conditions, for example, that produce various elemental disasters in various parts of the world. The adoption of measures designed to curb those types of disasters would be of genuine benefit for the peoples of the States concerned.

There has also been a drafting change in the beginning of operative paragraph 2. The words "Takes into account" have been replaced by the words "Takes note". The point is that the General Assembly takes note of the draft international convention submitted by the Soviet Union as well as other points of view and suggestions put forward during the discussion of this question in the First Committee and in the Assembly.

The changes submitted by the sponsors, which in general clarify the text and consequently bring about an improvement of the individual proposals in the draft resolution, should make it possible, in our view, for a larger number of States Members of the United Nations to support the text and to vote in favour of the revised draft resolution submitted by the 23 sponsors, which I have already mentioned, in document A/C.1/L.675/Rev.1.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that this draft resolution will receive genuinely wide support both in the First Committee and in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly. We are convinced that the consideration of this question and the adoption of a draft resolution on it would be an important positive step by the United Nations and the entire international community towards the preparation of an international convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes and to spare mankind from a threat as dangerous as that of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the use of which, as we know, is permanently prohibited by a decision of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.
The delegation of the Soviet Union would like to express in advance its great regret should there in fact be delegations unable to vote in favour of the draft resolution of the 23 sponsors. We act in the belief that the adoption of this draft resolution by the Assembly would be in keeping with the interests of all countries and peoples without exception.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I have no further names on the list of speakers.

I should like to announce that the delegations of Kenya and Portugal have become sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691.
The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694 relates to agenda item 35 on general and complete disarmament, and is sponsored by Botswana and other countries. It was introduced to the First Committee by the representative of Nigeria and it refers to the denuclearization of Africa.

I shall now call on those delegations which wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. ROWE (Canada): As we have stated on numerous occasions in this Committee and elsewhere, Canada is strongly sympathetic in principle to the concept of denuclearized zones, where they are feasible and would promote stability and when specific proposals for their creation are put forward by the countries of the region concerned. It is for those reasons that we welcome the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa made in 1964 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, that we supported General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, and that we are able to support the draft resolution before us today.

We continue to believe that the 1964 Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa deserves the consideration and respect of all States. We also believe that the aims of the 1964 Declaration and of this draft resolution would be furthered if, following the example set by so many African States, other States of Africa were to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This, in the Canadian view, would provide a more formalized and verifiable basis for the 1964 Declaration.

Finally, in supporting this draft resolution, it is our understanding that it in no way seeks to constrain recognized rights of passage in international waters.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of the United Republic of Cameroon has informed us that it has joined the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694, which we shall vote on in a few minutes.
Mr. LIN (China) (interpretation from Chinese): Based on its consistent stand of supporting nuclear-free zones, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694 on the denuclearization of Africa sponsored by Nigeria and 24 other countries. However, we reserve our own views on the questions of general and complete disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons referred to in the preamble of the draft resolution.

Mr. NUR YUSUF (Somalia): Somalia being an African country, of course it is to be expected that we shall support the draft resolution under consideration. However, we shall do so on the understanding that in operative paragraph 1:

"Reaffirms again its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone."

"Africa" means the continent and its territorial waters.

Mr. CLARK (Nigeria): In my introduction of the draft resolution yesterday I tried -- probably not well enough -- to emphasize that the object of the draft resolution was procedural, that we were not seeking to make a new declaration or to proclaim a new doctrine, that we were not asking for any specific action besides the formality of agreeing to inscribe an item on the provisional agenda of the thirtieth session, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa". This simple request ought not to have posed any problem to any genuine friend of Africa.

May I also say that I fully appreciate the explanation just given by Canada, and I assure our other friends who have drawn our attention to the use of the word "transporting" in the third operative paragraph of the draft resolution, that we are not seeking to impose on them any obligation which they have not assumed hitherto under General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) of 1965.

Fortunately there are no foreign military bases or extra-territorial zones in Africa at the moment. The question of interfering with existing security arrangements therefore does not arise; nor does the paragraph seek to interfere with the right of passage on the high seas or in international waterways, and I fully accept the point made by Canada.
Since we have had no adverse comments on the draft resolution, I should like to ask you to put it to the Committee that it be adopted by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria. One delegation has requested a vote. We shall therefore have to proceed in that manner.

Mr. MISHRA (India): Our vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694 does not, in our opinion, compromise our position in regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons mentioned in the third preambular paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As no other delegation wishes to speak, I put to the vote the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694. The draft resolution was adopted by 108 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I shall now call on those members who wish to explain their votes after the vote.

Mr. ALLEN (United Kingdom): It should hardly need to be stated again that my Government sympathizes with the concept of measures to promote regional security through the establishment of effective nuclear-free zones complementary to the non-proliferation Treaty. And this resolution is a timely reminder to us all that nearly 10 years ago heads of Government in Africa already envisaged the possibility of giving effect through an international treaty to their own Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa.

I would venture to remind the Committee that my delegation voted in favour of resolution 2053 (XX) of 1965. We regard the present resolution as evidence of the strong support given by many African States to international efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We could have gone along with a consensus on this draft resolution if the Committee had adopted the resolution in such a manner. But since a vote had been asked for, we felt obliged to abstain on this occasion in order to retain our formal freedom of action in detail in relation to this project.

I think it is clear that many details will have to be worked out and not all of them may be easy. In this connexion, let me say at once that we have noted with interest and pleasure the assurances on the subject of which the representative of Nigeria has just given to the representative of Canada. But I repeat that our sympathies remain with the desire of the African States to achieve the effective denuclearization of Africa within a suitable treaty framework. We wish them well in these further efforts and we look forward to what they will have to tell us next year when this subject will once more be formally on the provisional agenda.

Mr. SCALABRE (France) (interpretation from French): The vote of abstention which my delegation has just cast on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694 is in no way directed against the principle of the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Africa. As in the case of other regions, France is prepared to respect the intentions of the African States to have a status of denuclearization.
We are prepared to affirm that we shall in no way infringe the rules which those States may decide to adopt. The abstention of my delegation is due solely to the wording of the fifth preambular paragraph:

"Recalling its resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 and 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, which called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, including the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-free zone."

We note that the zone as defined contains French territories.

The position which we adopt in regard to these territories is the same as the one which my delegation had the honour to state before this Committee some days ago in connexion with the draft resolution concerning the accession of France to Protocol I of the "Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America. Because of the general principles of our public law, the Government of France cannot accept, in matters of self-defence, any distinction between the different parts of its territory, which would be the case if the status of denuclearization were applied to our territories in Africa.

Mr. YANNAKAKIS (Greece): In explaining our positive vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694, I wish to underline that we fully understand the concern of the friendly and peace-loving African countries to keep their continent free of nuclear weapons. This is the reason why we supported the said resolution. Taking into consideration the statements the representative of Nigeria made in this Committee and the assurance he gave to the representative of Canada today, we understand that the implementation of the resolution will by no means cause an impediment to the free flow of commercial navigation towards Africa, as well as to recognized rights of passage.

Mr. MENEGATTI (Italy) (interpretation from French): The delegation of Italy voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694 because we consider that any such initiative is constructive and useful as long as certain essential conditions are met, which we have mentioned on several occasions and again here yesterday afternoon. We have taken note of the explanations graciously given by the head of the delegation of Nigeria, particularly as regards the procedural nature of the resolution we have just adopted. Lastly, the delegation of
Italy interprets the draft resolution in the sense that it in no way infringes the principles and rules of international law which are in force in regard to rights of navigation.

Mr. GICHERO (Kenya): Normally, Kenya does not speak in explanation of vote after the vote. However, my delegation would like to observe that it is amazing to us, and Kenya makes a special note of it, that there is a certain kind of strange relationship among the three countries which abstained on this vote, despite the explanation given by Ambassador Clark of Nigeria and the assurance given to the Canadian representative. I repeat, there is a strange relationship between the attitude taken regarding this matter and also the attitude taken in the Fourth Committee regarding the same kind of issue that we should relate. The Kenyan delegation would like to comment, as regards the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, and the threat to the African countries and the way it was taken by the same three countries, that we hope that when it comes to the establishment of the Middle East as a zone of peace, they are going to change their attitude.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representatives of Madagascar and Burundi have asked to speak. May I be allowed to point out that as they are sponsors of the draft resolution which we have just adopted they may not explain their vote.

Mr. SOUMARE (Mauritania) (interpretation from French): I simply wish to explain that in the course of the vote the representative of my delegation was absent from this Conference room, and I wish it to be recorded in the verbatim record that had he been present my delegation would have voted in favour of the draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): These remarks will be duly recorded.

Mr. NUR YUSUF (Somalia): With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to say something regarding the explanation just given by the French representative.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): If there is no objection on the part of the delegation of Somalia, we shall first conclude with the explanations of vote and then I shall call on representatives who wish to comment.

The representative of Madagascar, if I understand him correctly, wishes to speak along the same lines as the representative of Mauritania, I believe. But even so, being a co-sponsor his support is taken for granted.

Mr. MERENNE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): Article 7 of the non-proliferation Treaty was drafted in order to take into account the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It constitutes, in fact, an invitation to conclude similar agreements in other parts of the world, which would thus strengthen the impact of the non-proliferation Treaty rather than substitute for it. The position of my Government is clear. We are in favour of the establishment of demilitarized zones. This principle has justified our vote in favour today.
(Mr. Mering, Belgium)

However, our positive approach to the problem does not prevent us from noting that the effectiveness of these zones will depend on the attainment of conditions that are not perhaps all clearly defined in the draft resolution. Verification, for example, is a determining factor and we would have welcomed a reference to the non-proliferation Treaty or to the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694.

These are some of the remarks I wished to make to explain more clearly our position in favour of the establishment of nuclear-free zones and also to say that the effectiveness of such zones is subject to certain criteria which ought to be respected.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I see that the representative of Burundi wishes to speak. I shall call on him when we have ended the explanations of vote. According to the rules of procédure, a delegation that is a sponsor cannot explain its vote. When we have ended the explanations of vote, I shall call on representatives who wish to comment on the draft resolution.

Mr. MANTIN (United States of America): The United States welcomes the initiative by the Nigerian delegation and other African delegations to give further impetus to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Africa. As we have made clear on many occasions, most recently at this year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, we would regard the realization of a nuclear-free zone in Africa as a major step towards the achievement of our common non-proliferation objective. My delegation would also have gone along if this draft resolution could have been adopted by consensus. However, as we have certain reservations with respect to operative paragraph 3, when a vote was called for we felt compelled to abstain. My Government recognizes that it is entirely appropriate for States in a region to call on States outside the region, including nuclear-weapon States, to lend their full support to the realization of a nuclear-free zone arrangement, and eventually to undertake responsibilities in order to make the arrangements more effective and more attractive to the regional parties. The adherence of the United States to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is evidence of our willingness to assume such obligations in the interest of furthering the objectives of nuclear-free zones.
In the case of the initiative before us, however, we feel it is still too early to enumerate the specific responsibilities which should be assumed by outside Powers. These specific undertakings should be the subject of further consultations, both among regional States and between them and States outside the region. Therefore, while we can endorse in principle the idea that nuclear-weapon States should refrain from certain actions in the context of a nuclear-free zone, we cannot subscribe at this early stage of the development of the zone to the particular set of undertakings contained in operative paragraph 3. It would have been preferable, in our view, if the sponsors had used the formulation similar to the one adopted in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.692.

Despite these reservations, my Government wishes to voice its encouragement for further efforts by African States to advance the goal of a denuclearized Africa and to express the hope that these efforts will be successful at an early stage.

In conclusion, I should like to assure the representative of Nigeria that the United States is prepared to consult with African States on the issues contained in operative paragraph 3 and to give serious consideration to any concrete ideas put forward in this regard.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Since there are no more representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote I shall call on representatives who have asked to speak to comment on the draft resolution which was just adopted.

Mr. MIKANAGU (Burundi) (interpretation from French): The delegation of Burundi was not present in this Conference room for reasons beyond its control when the voting took place. My delegation would like it to be recorded that we would have voted in favour of the draft resolution had we been present at the time of the vote.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): As in the case of the delegation of Madagascar I wish to point out that the sponsors' vote in favour of their draft resolution for which, for reasons beyond their control, they were not present to vote for is automatically assumed to have been positive.
Mr. NUR YUSUF (Somalia): In explaining his vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694, the French representative repeatedly stated that there are French territories in Africa. My delegation wonders what territories he had in mind. Both French Somaliland and the Comoro Islands are not French territories. They are African territories, but they are French colonies. I am sure that members of this Committee are aware that the destiny of the above-mentioned countries, or territories, are being discussed in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.
Mr. CLARK (Nigeria): I should like with your permission, Mr. Chairman, to thank the friends of Africa who joined with us and enabled us to obtain 110 votes in favour of our draft resolution. I think that is a resounding victory for Africa.

The triple abstention of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America is too painfully reminiscent of the triple veto in the Security Council in the recent discussion on an African subject, the question of South Africa, for us to let it pass in silence. The abstentions in the vote just taken constitute a sinister display of the policy of duplicity and double-talk which some of those countries pursue towards Africa.

As my friends from Kenya and Somalia have just pointed out, on the one hand with sweet words they profess friendship and amity towards African States, while on the other hand they continue their sales of arms and nuclear reactors to South Africa, disregarding the pleas of the African countries and contrary to resolutions of the United Nations. They proclaim adherence to the principles of liberty, freedom and independence in Africa and elsewhere but they hold on to colonies until they are forced out. They say they are for international peace and disarmament, but they are nostalgic about their imperial past, or present, and cling to the right of transporting and deploying nuclear weapons in a manner that threatens international peace and endangers nuclear-free zones like Africa.

The Charter of the Organization of African Unity is a charter of hope, peace and independence. We are confident that the European colonies and the territories of Africa still under European domination will soon be free.

May I refer briefly to the points made regarding the word "transporting" in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution by quoting what I said yesterday:

"In any case, it is reasonable to expect that the question of transportation will be dealt with later, when the written text of a treaty is also available for negotiation; but the question of transit must be seen in the light of international law."

I went on to say:
"By action or inaction, like failure to appreciate the genuine fears of the African States concerning the transportation of nuclear weapons into and from their territories, the nuclear Powers may be endangering the life of the goose that lays the golden egg. Speaking for Nigeria, I would say that the lesson will not be lost on us, if the word 'transporting' in this paragraph -- that is operative paragraph 3 -- "is seized upon by any nuclear Power to refuse us their full support." (2025th meeting, page 33)

Mr. KONEJO (Congo) (interpretation from French): My delegation, too, understood the representative of France to speak of "French territories in Africa". We in the Congo believe there are no French territories in Africa: there are French colonies. When people talk of "French territories" that makes other people smile, but it certainly does not make us, in the former French colonies, smile. I remember, not so long ago -- about 30 or 35 years ago -- I was told that my ancestors were Gauls, tall and blond with blue eyes. I do not want them to be able to tell future African children of their "Gaulish ancestors" or of any other ancestors coming from other countries and still in control of Africa.

As for the comments of the three Powers that are permanent members of the Security Council -- France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America -- on general disarmament, their views remind me of leaders who promulgate rules and are the first to break them. When it is a question of disarmament my country is not worried at all. As I said in my statement, the nuclear danger is not a matter of concern to my country, because the day the sun is split into two, four, even a thousand fragments because the great Powers have so willed it, there will be no difference for the peasant, the worker or the intellectual of my country between that disaster provoked by the super-Powers and a natural disaster. The nuclear danger is a matter of concern to the super-Powers, and my delegation finds it difficult to understand how those super-Powers could abstain on a draft resolution concerning the denuclearization of Africa.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I now call upon the representative of France in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. SCALABRE (France) (interpretation from French): I should like to make it clear, in regard to what the representative of Kenya has said -- I am not really speaking in exercise of the right of reply but rather to make a clarification -- that the vote of my delegation was based on considerations of French public law which were already explained when we were dealing with a continent other than Africa. I would add that those considerations would be valid for any continent where an identical situation might arise, whatever the friendship we might feel for the countries concerned and the sympathy we might have for their undertaking. I should specify that the vote of my delegation was based on no other consideration.

In reply to the representative of Somalia, whom I thank on this occasion for having recalled the friendship which links our countries, I would venture to point out that, apart from the Territories he has mentioned, the French Department of Reunion is concerned under the fifth preambular paragraph, which I quoted.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Since there are no further speakers on my list on this question, I shall consider that the Committee has concluded its consideration of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.694.

We shall now turn to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.699 on agenda item 31, "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace". The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Mauritius and described by him as the least controversial among the texts submitted to this Committee. As the Committee will recall, in submitting this draft resolution, he referred to document A/8908 of 13 December 1972, as follows:
Mr. KEVIN (Australia): I should like to explain my delegation's voting position on the draft resolution which has just been adopted by consensus.

Australia has been a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean since its inception and we have at all times sought to play a constructive role in its deliberations. The Committee has, particularly in the year just ended, proved its ability to work in a spirit of co-operation towards its common objective under the wise chairmanship of Ambassador Amerasinghe.

The Committee succeeded this year, for the first time, in reaching agreement on the text of a draft resolution which all its members, in spite of certain very real problems, ultimately found it possible to sponsor; and that draft resolution was adopted here last week by a very large majority. This is a very real mark of progress and a proof that all members of the Committee have been working hard to carry out the mandate of the General Assembly.

With regard to the draft resolution which was just adopted by consensus, that initiative was launched a little unexpectedly. The possibilities for enlarging the membership of the Committee were by no means open-ended and they were essentially limited to Indian Ocean regional States not already represented on the Committee.

My Government had some difficulty in understanding why it had not been possible to complete the consultations and to handle matters in such a way that the names of all the proposed new members could have been clarified before voting on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.699 in this Committee. Australia would have preferred that course of action.

However, as we did not wish to impede the progress of this Committee, particularly in view of the present heavy pressure of work on us, we acquiesced in the consensus procedure on the draft resolution as worded at present. We did that in the firm conviction that our eminent and outstanding Chairman will, in the course of his consultations, take full account in selecting a third member to join Bangladesh and Somalia of the desirability of maintaining an appropriate representation, before the resolution is adopted in the plenary Assembly.

Finally, I would like to add that, as far as my country is concerned, this year's enlargement in the membership of the Ad Hoc Committee should in no way preclude possibilities for further expansion next year.
Mr. Pereira Monteiro (Portugal): The delegation of Portugal has no objection to the enlargement of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean as proposed in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.699. We think, however, that this resolution should in no way preclude or impair the future participation in the Ad Hoc Committee of States that have not yet attained full independence and, consequently, are not yet Members of the United Nations. This viewpoint, moreover, is reflected in the third and fourth preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution just adopted.

Mr. Moghtaderi (Iran): I should like to explain the position of my delegation with respect to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.699, which has just been adopted by consensus.

My delegation welcomes the proposal to enlarge the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. As a member of the Ad Hoc Committee, and also as representative of a littoral State of the Indian Ocean which has taken a keen interest in promoting the peace and security of that waterway, my delegation understands and fully supports the desire of other littoral States of the Indian Ocean to have a voice in an affair that can affect their interests in such a direct manner. We were particularly glad to learn that Bangladesh, which has an extended shoreline along the Indian Ocean, and Somalia, the candidature of which we also welcome, desire to fill two of the seats that will become available as a result of the adoption of the present draft resolution. In fact, the prior consultations regarding the enlargement of the Committee made the full composition of the Committee known, my delegation would willingly have joined in sponsoring the draft resolution.

Mr. Martin (United States of America): I wish merely to say that if this item had been voted on, the United States would have abstained.

The Chairman (interpretation from Spanish): As no other delegation wishes to explain its position, I now call upon the representative of Mauritius to comment on the resolution that has just been adopted.
Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): I am not speaking in explanation of vote after the vote, but rather on a point of clarification and to comment on certain remarks made earlier. I am certainly not exercising the right of reply.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank you and warmly congratulate you on obtaining a consensus on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.699, which I had the honour of introducing yesterday.

I also thank all my colleagues on the First Committee for their full co-operation. I fully appreciate and respect the positions of those States which abstained in 1972 when the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean was set up.

Finally, I wish to give my personal assurances to my good friend and colleague of Australia that it was never the intention of the representative of Mauritius to handle the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace in a high-handed manner. Mauritius is not an evil force at the United Nations. As I explained yesterday, I am leading a one-man delegation and it has been physically impossible for me to carry out extensive consultations. Indeed, I even apologized to this Committee for not having been able to do so. My young, talented, handsome colleague of Australia should not read into the resolution what is not there. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that your just approach to the procedure will have put his mind at ease.

Once again, I thank the Committee for having adopted the resolution by consensus. We can perhaps now look forward to the day when all draft resolutions before this Committee will be adopted by consensus, preferably without debate. It will certainly make so much less work for the one-man delegation of the Star and Key of the Indian Ocean.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before concluding this item, I should like once again to appeal to any delegation that is interested in becoming a member of the Ad Hoc Committee -- since there remains one vacancy -- requesting them to inform the Chairman of this so that a selection may be made and the corresponding names then be transmitted to the President of the General Assembly.
We have thus concluded our consideration of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.699. We shall now go on to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691, on agenda item 27, entitled "Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use". This draft resolution is sponsored by Austria and certain other countries and was introduced to the Committee by the representative of Sweden.

In this connexion, I also wish to bring to the attention of the Committee the financial and administrative implications of the draft resolution now under consideration, appearing in document A/C.1/L.696.

I shall now call on those delegations desiring to speak in explanation of their votes before the vote.

Mr. ROWE (Canada): As is well known, my delegation welcomes the international consideration at present being given to the question of weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. Canadian delegations have sought to participate fully and constructively in the Ad Hoc Committee of the Diplomatic Conference and at the recently concluded Lucerne Conference of Government Experts. My Government intends to continue such participation. It is the Canadian view that the work completed by the Lucerne Conference was most valuable. Much light was shed on the questions at issue: the use of certain conventional weapons, their medical effects, and the legal criteria which might be relevant to the possible prohibition or restriction of their use. These are better understood in the international community; it is now for Governments to consider the data and the views presented at Lucerne and to determine the next steps that should be taken. My delegation, for its part, shared the consensus of the Lucerne Conference, as reflected in its report, that these questions should again be taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Diplomatic Conference, but that it is unlikely that Governments will have had time by next February to digest fully the material now available. And thus we share the doubt expressed by the representative of Sweden that the Ad Hoc Committee would be ready to adopt any treaty rules on the subject at its 1975 session.
Therefore we consider that a second conference of experts will be required later in 1975. It is important that such a conference have a detailed mandate and be provided with full documentation. The Canadian delegation to the Diplomatic Conference will work in the Ad Hoc Committee towards those ends.

In taking this position and in voting for this draft resolution, the Canadian delegation would like, as a final point, to stress its view that the primary work of the Diplomatic Conference nevertheless remains the consideration of the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention of 1949. We fully trust that, while the work of the Ad Hoc Committee will be important and valuable, the Diplomatic Conference will continue to be able, in the words of resolution 3076 (XXVIII) of last year, to include this work in its agenda "without prejudice to its examination of the draft protocols submitted to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross".

Mr. KEVIN (Australia): As I have the floor so fortuitously soon after the kind words of the representative of Mauritius, I should like to take this opportunity of thanking him.

I should like to explain the Australian delegation's vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691. Australia has been actively interested and involved in the international efforts that are under way to reach agreement on the prohibition of the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. Australian experts participated in the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional weapons at the Geneva Conference and also at the International Committee of the Red Cross Conference of weaponry experts in Lucerne in September this year. We were very pleased at the progress made in Lucerne in particular in establishing an area of common ground where military concerns and humanitarian concerns could meet.

The Chairman's summary of conclusions at the Lucerne experts' meeting, contained in the report of that meeting which was circulated last week in this Committee, is a valuable recapitulation of the points on which there seems to have been broad agreement. In the view of the Australian Government, it is essential that further progress should be built on the basis of that agreement if humanitarian objectives which many of us here share are to be achieved.
My delegation carefully studied the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691 in that light. We should have liked to see the draft resolution phrased in such a way that it could be sure of receiving wide support from all relevant countries, including the major weapon-producing countries. If it had proved possible in the wording of the draft resolution to reflect more adequately the important consensus established at the Lucerne Conference, that objective might have been achieved. The draft resolution as it now stands, and in particular operative paragraph 3, does not, in the Australian view, entirely reflect three points which were agreed at Lucerne: firstly, that, since newly presented facts need to be digested, it is doubtful whether the Ad Hoc Committee would at the next session of the Conference on humanitarian law be ready to adopt new treaty rules on weaponry; secondly, that another weaponry experts' conference should be convened and should focus on such weapons as have been or may become the subject of proposed bans or restrictions on use; and, thirdly, that this second conference should study the possibility, content and form of such proposed bans or restrictions.

For these reasons, my delegation regrets that it was unable to sponsor the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691. We shall, however, be voting in favour of the draft resolution, the objectives of which we wholeheartedly support.

Finally, we should like to thank the representative of Sweden for his valuable and informative statement made in introducing the draft resolution yesterday, which has clarified most, if not all, of the points which were of concern to us. We hope that, in the light of that statement, the draft resolution will receive the highest possible vote.

Mr. TAYLOR (United Kingdom): I should like to explain how the United Kingdom will vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691. I have two preliminary observations.
First, the United Kingdom has no military interest whatsoever in napalm as a weapon. Secondly, the United Kingdom is most willing to continue the search for possible restrictions and prohibitions on weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. Indeed, the leader of my delegation on 5 November expressed in this Committee our readiness to move towards an international commitment to obtain and share a greater knowledge about weapons which would, he hoped, lead to further positive action. Therefore it is a matter for regret to my delegation that we are unable to vote for the draft resolution before us. I should like to explain our reasons for this stand.

It is the belief of the United Kingdom delegation that the subject of weapon prohibitions should be approached extremely seriously by States and should be subjected to careful and dispassionate research. The draft resolution before us does not, of course, merely concern napalm but, under the category of incendiaries, may also include such weapons as tracer ammunition and certain types of armour-piercing anti-tank rounds. In addition, as the Swedish representative has pointed out, it also covers a wide range of other weapons, such as high-velocity projectiles, blast and fragmentation weapons and time-delay weapons. Many of these weapons I have mentioned are already in the military inventories of States -- I would say, in the military inventories of the majority of States. We for our part strongly believe that careful study by experts is needed before Governments may contemplate the far-reaching step of prohibiting any of these weapons.

This is why many Governments, including my own, supported the holding of a conference on weaponry in Lucerne which would bring together experts from a wide range of disciplines: legal, diplomatic, military and medical. I do not think our assessment of the value of that Conference differs widely from that of the co-sponsors of this draft resolution, though we would perhaps place a rather different emphasis on what happened there. It is certainly true, as the representative of Sweden pointed out yesterday, that the work at Lucerne -- which was, we agree, both longer and more intensive than earlier similar periods of study -- exposed extensive disagreements between experts; but the Swedish representative came close to ascribing this state of affairs either
to domination of that Conference by military experts or to a determination by certain "technologically advanced States" -- as he expressed it -- to rebut the evidence that had been advanced in earlier reports. We for our part do not agree with either of these points of analysis.
There is another and possibly simpler explanation of what happened at Lucerne which I commend to this Committee. It is simply that the earlier reports were in certain important respects wrong, and the significant parts of the evidence advanced both previously at Lucerne and at that Conference itself were based on inadequate research. But we certainly agree with the sponsors that, in balance, the Conference served a useful and a positive purpose. And we agree, it seems, that the conference also revealed the need for more basic research and work before prohibitions can be usefully arrived at.

We do not think that this is the correct forum, nor indeed the correct time, in that Governments have not had a sufficient opportunity fully to digest the ICRC report for a discussion of the details of the report itself. The representative of Sweden yesterday did, however, highlight certain excerpts from the report and we feel obliged, therefore, briefly to follow him in this respect. He referred in his statement to a passage in paragraph 30 of the report. The idea expressed there came from a United Kingdom expert, but may have become somewhat over-compressed. The intention was to argue that even accurate and discriminating weapons such as, for example, machine-guns or certain modern types of aerial bombs might and can be used in an indiscriminate manner by attempting, for example, to cover with blanket fire or pattern bombing a relatively large area. That was one thought behind the passage referred to.

The other thought was that such area uses of weapons might in certain circumstances be legitimate as a method of impeding attacking forces without harming civilians, for example, in areas where no civilians were present, as in certain types of terrain.

The Swedish delegation also referred to a passage in paragraph 82 of the report. The argument at the Conference -- and this was not advanced by the United Kingdom team -- was that in banning incendiary weapons like napalm, the international community might, perhaps inadvertently, unless the definitions were exceedingly carefully drawn up, also prohibit the use by, for example, a guerrilla or by a villager of a home-made petrol, or in American terminology, gasoline bomb against an invading tank. As can be readily imagined, such a prohibition could have serious and far-reaching consequences. Whatever the attitude taken by the experts at Lucerne,
it seems to us that this was a legitimate point to raise and one that could indeed justify further careful consideration.

Finally, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the work done at Lucerne by the Working Group on Incendiaries, which is recorded in annex 5 of the ICRC report. A close study of the text of the report, especially paragraph 1.3 of annex 5, will reveal that one group of experts, having first taken the initiative in pressing for prohibitions against incendiary weapons, then ascertained that the Working Group was proposing to include as a subject for study certain smoke-piercing projectiles which make use of the medium of heat and which apparently form an important part of the military inventory of those experts' own country. The weapons that I have just referred to are, of course, capable of inflicting quite as terrible injuries as any type of weapon which the Conference considered. But this group of experts in question then went on to seek to exclude further consideration of this particular type of weapon from within the general category of incendiaries.

I mention this episode because it illustrates the difficulties which could face Governments if prohibitions were approached without sufficiently careful preliminary research and agreement upon definitions.

It was, therefore, and it remains, the view of the United Kingdom that the Conference revealed that the whole subject merited further study at a gathering of experts found on similar lines to that convened at Lucerne. Indeed, this appeared to be the general view at Lucerne too, since this was reflected in the consensus of the Conference which is recorded in paragraph 262 of the ICRC report in the pink cover, to which my Australian colleague recently referred. I shall quote from point 3 of that consensus:

"Since the newly presented facts need to be digested and further study and research are needed, it was doubted that the Ad Hoc Committee" -- that, of course, refers to the Ad Hoc Committee of the Geneva Conference -- "would, at its next session, be ready to adopt new treaty rules concerning the prohibition or restriction on the use of any conventional weapons." (page 80)
Point 7 of those conclusions states:

"It is hoped that the United Nations General Assembly will take the foregoing work into account when drafting any relevant resolutions."

Not a single one of the 49 national teams present at Lucerne dissented from those passages of the consensus which I have just read out. Although we were pleased, for our part, to hear one of the sponsors of the draft resolution before us repeat this understanding in his statement, we find it a matter for regret that the draft resolution now before us contains nowhere in its operative paragraphs a reflection of this aspect of the consensus of Lucerne. The omission is further compounded by the actual language of operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution before us, which invites the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva "to continue ... its search for agreement on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons". There is, therefore, nothing in the draft resolution before us which could convey to the Geneva Conference the belief unanimously supported at Lucerne that further study and research is needed before the Diplomatic Conference could proceed to adopt rules.

In conclusion then, let me express the hope that the divergence of views about the draft resolution which will lead to our abstention is merely a temporary divergence and that when Governments have had time both to read and fully to assimilate the report of the ICRC from Lucerne, we shall all be able to continue our work together in a positive and useful way.

Mr. MISTRAL (France) (interpretation from French): My delegation would like to explain its reasons for abstaining in the voting on the draft resolutions in document A/C.1/L.691 concerning napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use.

I should like first to point out that the title of agenda item 27 is inadequate, if not inaccurate, because the draft resolution deals not only with napalm and other incendiary weapons, but also and particularly with high velocity projectiles, blast and fragmentation weapons and time-delay weapons.
The French Government has taken part in the Conference of Government Experts, held this year in Lucerne under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross. We do think that such meetings make it possible to achieve better understanding of the problems which arise from the use of certain types of weapons, and to gather certain data which will be valuable for Governments when they come to examine the problem of regulating the use of those weapons. My Government would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the high quality and seriousness of the work done by the governmental experts which led to the drafting of the report on the use of certain conventional weapons. But if there is a conclusion we can draw from the Conference of Government Experts, it is that it has appeared that the problems examined were even more complex than one might have imagined, and there are really very few chances of seeing the Ad Hoc Committee of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian Law achieving results acceptable to all.

It is regrettable, in the view of my delegation, that such an attempt should be made. It is clear that the regulation of the use of certain conventional weapons raises two kinds of problem: first, those relating to the consequences for combatants and possibly for civilians of the use of such weapons, and to their effects which in certain cases may be considered as particularly cruel, as causing unnecessary suffering or as having indiscriminate effects. That is the humanitarian aspect of the matter. The second kind of problem relates to the need for States to have arms systems which can ensure their defence and help them to respond to aggression. That is the political aspect of the matter.

In the view of the French delegation, those two kinds of problem are inextricably linked. They are, if one may say so, consubstantial, and there is no point in thinking that we can come up with the solution to this problem by attacking it obliquely, however ingenious that attack may be. Now, the international Diplomatic Conference relates above all to humanitarian law. The Government representatives are essentially specialists in that area. In the nature of things, they are less concerned about the political aspects of regulating the use of weapons than are specialists in that particular field. If we really want to face the facts as they are, with the realism required by such a serious subject, I am sure everyone would agree that in the final analysis it is the political aspects, considerations of national defence, which will determine the attitude that States will take in the end.
It is therefore in an essentially political body that such a question should be considered from an over-all standpoint. It could be usefully debated in the world disarmament conference. But until such a body meets, such discussions should be reserved for the only international institution which is designed to deal with the political aspects of disarmament, namely, our own Organization, its General Assembly and particularly the First Committee. In referring to another body the problem of regulating matters which should be its own concern, our Organization will be failing to face up to its own responsibility and will be failing in its duty.

I should like to point out that, while we deplore the position which may be taken by our Assembly, we do, up to a certain point, understand it. The futility of efforts made in allied fields, for example, the inability of States to regulate the prohibition of the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of chemical weapons is not encouraging. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which for years now is supposed to be presenting us with a text on this problem, has not yielded any concrete results. I do not think I am going too far if I say that the activities of that body have disappointed even its most stalwart champions. But the conclusion that should be drawn from this failure is that that organ needs to be modified and reorganized according to improved rules to make it possible for it to conclude successfully the work entrusted to it. We should not try to give to others responsibilities which seem too heavy for ourselves.

I have no illusions about the result of the vote which is to take place, and if my delegation must play the invidious role of Cassandra, it is in order to induce our Committee to recognize -- as indeed events have confirmed -- the need to revert to saner practices and to waste no more time in hoping that others, instead of ourselves, will solve problems which we have not been able or wanted to resolve.*

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would also like to explain its vote on the draft resolution which we are now considering, in document A/61/691.

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*Mr. Siddiq (Afghanistan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.
The Soviet Union has always supported and continues to support the efforts of the United Nations to prohibit particularly cruel means of waging war. Our position of principle in the Soviet Union on this matter is determined by our participation in international agreements concerning armed conflicts, including the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Bacteriological and Biological Weapons, the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Victims of War, and so on.

As to the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons, the position of the Soviet Union has been reflected in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, entitled "Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use" (A/9725). In preparation of the report, as we know, a Soviet expert took part.

The problem of napalm and other incendiary weapons has technical aspects and also military aspects. Those aspects are directly linked with the solution of this problem and those aspects, of course, should be considered very carefully before we can be in a position to take a decision and conclude an appropriate agreement on the banning of napalm and other incendiary weapons. The question of what measures can be taken with regard to napalm and other incendiary weapons requires, I repeat, very careful consideration in order to determine all the aspects relating to the limitation and prohibition of such weapons. The question of prohibiting the use of any conventional weapons which are liable to cause unnecessary suffering, and the question of prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of such weapons should be resolved together with the whole problem of limiting armaments and disarmament, which is being considered in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

The immediately preceding speaker, the representative of France, made some criticisms about the Committee on Disarmament.
Of course, we do not intend here to defend that Committee and flatly state that it is able to cope with the problems facing it. But nevertheless, I would like to remind you that within the Disarmament Committee some extremely substantial agreements have been concluded which, at the present time, have entered into international practice and have become outstanding documents of international law. There is the non-proliferation Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, and then there is the Convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons and toxins which similarly has been signed by more than 30 States of the world and which we hope will soon come into force.

It would be wrong, therefore, to assess the situation and the state of affairs in such a way as to suggest when handing over to the Disarmament Committee the consideration of any question which has very important technical, military and other aspects, that that Committee is not in a position to make any progress in the consideration of these matters in any favourable direction.

The consideration, however, of this question at the Conference on Humanitarian Law, or, as it is called here, the Diplomatic Conference, as proposed in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691 would, in our view, be inadvisable since this question, we feel, does not fall within the competence of that Conference. The consideration of this matter at the Conference, in our view, would not make for any progress in solving the problem of prohibiting the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons. The Soviet delegation believes that the most appropriate organ for considering this important matter -- and we would like to repeat this -- is the Disarmament Committee, which has accumulated sufficient experience in considering matters connected with the limitation of armaments and disarmament.

Since the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691 does not provide for consideration of this problem in the Disarmament Committee, the Soviet delegation considers that it will not promote progress in the consideration of this question or in the consideration of all the
aspects involved. Therefore, we will abstain in the voting on this draft resolution."

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): My delegation regrets having to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution before us. We had hoped that it would be possible for the First Committee to achieve consensus on a resolution reflecting general understanding of the appropriate approach to be taken in the next stage of international consideration of questions concerning the use of napalm, incendiaries and certain other conventional weapons. We are concerned in particular that the forthcoming session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law not be diverted from what we regard as the Conference's primary task -- namely, that of furthering consideration of the draft protocols which would afford greater protection to both combatants and non-combatants in time of war. Thus, we find that the language in operative paragraph 3 of the present draft resolution is troublesome in its invitation to the Conference "to continue ... its search for agreement on possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons ...".

We think this sets an over-ambitious goal for the Conference, a goal that is unrealistic especially in light of the recognized need for further expert examination of various aspects of the use of these weapons, and that could deflect attention from the primary work of the Conference. The United States participated actively in the first session of the Conference of Government Experts under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross. We concur with the conclusion reached at that Conference and agree that a second session is necessary to explore further the many complex questions concerning specific conventional weapons, including incendiaries, that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. These questions cut across a wide range of fields of expertise, military, medical, legal and technological; and my Government

* The Chairman resumed the Chair.
believes that considered and authoritative expert views would be prerequisites for further serious examination of possible rules concerning the weapons in question in any form.

The United States expects to participate actively in the contemplated second session of the ICRC expert Conference. We do not, of course, think that the Diplomatic Conference need be precluded from making any consideration of the weapons in question at its next session. Thus, we could have accepted a formulation in operative paragraph 3 inviting the Conference to continue its examination of possible rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. This would have allowed participants in the Conference to put forward any views they might have on the question.

Let us conclude by reiterating our strong view that the Diplomatic Conference should primarily pursue the humanitarian goals embodied in the two J protocols under consideration.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Since there are no other speakers, we shall proceed to vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.691 on agenda item 27, sponsored by Austria and other States.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Guyana, Hungary, Israel, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 100 votes to none, with 14 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I shall now call upon those delegations which wish to explain their vote after the vote.

Mr. JANOSZEK (Poland): The Government of Poland is in favour of the prohibition of the use and of the eventual elimination of napalm and other incendiary weapons from the arsenals of all States. I should like to recall that the Polish delegation was a sponsor of the resolution on napalm adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session. I refer to resolution 2932 A (XXVII). We also favour the adoption of measures which, as the first step, would restrict the use of such weapons. It is our view, however, as we stressed last year and again in my statement of 4 November this year, that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum in which to work out agreements in that regard most effectively.
We recognize that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts may deal with the humanitarian aspects of the problem. It is our considered view, however, that we have to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons.
My delegation has studied with great care the text of the draft resolution submitted in document A/C.1/L.591. I have also listened with interest to the statement of the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Eckerberg, which he made in introducing the draft resolution yesterday. We have noted that the sponsors of the draft allow for the possibility of the disarmament aspects of the matter being taken up, to quote Mr. Eckerberg, "in the proper disarmament forum" (2024th meeting, p. 17). It is regrettable, however, that the draft resolution did not provide specifically for entrusting this matter to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, not even in its disarmament aspects. It is for this reason, therefore, that while we sympathize with the motives behind the draft resolution and while we are in agreement with its objectives, the Polish delegation felt constrained to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

Mr. MERENNE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): By voting in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.591, the delegation of Belgium shows its understanding that the draft resolution is giving serious consideration to the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. My delegation wishes to quote from the report on the work of the Conference. It says:

"The report of the Lucerne Conference will be presented to the participants at the second session of the Diplomatic Conference and will be an important point on the agenda of the Ad Hoc Committee". (Report of the Work of the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, p. 80)

The delegation of Belgium notes, furthermore, that a reference to the protocols of the International Committee of the Red Cross does not appear in operative paragraph 3 of the text which has just been adopted. At any rate, it is the opinion of the delegation of Belgium that the examination of the problem of certain weapons and consideration of their use must be carried out without prejudice to the consideration of the protocols submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Mr. Menegatti (Italy): The Italian delegation has just voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.691 as an expression of its sympathy and support for the ultimate objectives which inspired the efforts of the sponsors. We now wish to put on record that we still believe that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Humanitarian Law is not the proper forum in which to elaborate agreements or rules prohibiting the use of napalm and other conventional weapons.

Finally, we interpret the draft resolution in the sense that the examination of the problem of napalm by the Diplomatic Conference must not in any way be prejudicial to its main task, which is the consideration of the draft protocols submitted to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Mr. Andreae (Federal Republic of Germany): We have voted for the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691 because we fully support its humanitarian objective. We are in favour of providing for increased protection of the civilian population in armed conflicts and also of sparing combatants unnecessary suffering. For this reason the Federal Republic of Germany participated in the first session of the Conference of Government Experts at Lucerne. We feel that this Conference was very useful but would like to point out that in our opinion the results achieved do not yet enable the Diplomatic Conference to work out rules for prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons.

In addition, I should like to support the view expressed by the representatives of Canada and the United States a moment ago that it should remain the main task of the Diplomatic Conference to consider and to finalize the two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The Chairman (interpretation from Spanish): Since there are no further speakers who wish to explain their vote after the vote, I consider that we have concluded consideration of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.691.

I now call on the Secretary of State for Pakistan who wishes to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.702.
Mr. SHAHT (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I am indeed beholden to you and the members of the Committee for your indulgence in agreeing to accord me the courtesy of listening to my statement introducing a draft resolution entitled "Strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

In my statement to this Committee on 15 November I mentioned that this year Pakistan would concentrate on two issues in the field of nuclear disarmament: first, the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear States and, secondly, the proposal concerning the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

Yesterday the Committee adopted the draft resolutions of Pakistan and India on the latter issue. I wish once again to express my delegation's profound gratitude to those Member States which lent their support to our draft resolution on this question. In this context, may I thank you, Mr. Chairman, most sincerely for the kind words you said about me yesterday. I regret that I had to leave the Committee soon after my explanation of Pakistan's vote on the Indian draft resolution and was absent when you spoke. If the sponsors of the two draft resolutions eschewed confrontation and opted for peaceful coexistence yesterday, that was in no small measure due to your impartiality, integrity and authority as Chairman, to which all of us must bow.
The question of security assurances is not new to this Committee or to the United Nations. Security Council resolution 255 (1968) was the outcome of discussions that took place in this Committee and elsewhere on the measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the nuclear threat. However, the non-nuclear-weapon States were not entirely satisfied with the assurances provided by the three nuclear-weapon Powers to States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty under that resolution. In the Security Council in 1968 the delegations of Algeria, Brazil, India and Pakistan, among others, expressed similar if not identical reservations on the text and abstained in the vote on the resolution.

The danger of the nuclear threat has continued to preoccupy the non-nuclear-weapon States, except perhaps those which are covered by a nuclear umbrella under the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances. My delegation considers that measures to ensure effectively the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States which are not assured of a deterrent against the nuclear threat would be an important contribution to the improvement of the general climate for nuclear disarmament and in restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This question was considered at the Fifth Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held in Kuala Lumpur last June. That Conference adopted a resolution which recommended that the existing security assurances provided to non-nuclear-weapon States should be reviewed with a view to making them more effective. The resolution further called upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation has undertaken consultations with the nuclear-weapon States on the basis of the recommendations of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference. We are, of course, aware of the varying preoccupations of each of those Powers and have endeavoured to take them into account. We realize full well that any proposal on this matter, if it is to be fruitful, must be acceptable to them. The draft resolution in the document which has just been distributed (A/C.1/L.702) under the heading which I have quoted already, which I now have the honour to present to this Committee, has been formulated with all those considerations in mind. My delegation is greatly encouraged by the generally positive response which it has elicited in the course of consultations with the nuclear-weapon Powers and other delegations.
I turn now to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.702.

The first two preambular paragraphs reiterate views that are universally acknowledged.

The third preambular paragraph would note that non-nuclear-weapon States have called for assurances from the nuclear Powers that they will not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against them. The reflection of this fact would not, we believe, prejudice in any way the position of any nuclear-weapon Power on the scope of such assurances or on the manner in which they should be extended. We are confident, therefore, that this provision will pose no difficulty to any delegation.

The fourth preambular paragraph reflects the views on the question of security expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union at the 1624th meeting of this Committee, when he stated:

"The Soviet Union, which attaches great importance to matters of security, shares the legitimate desire of States to protect their peoples from danger and, above all, from nuclear attack or the threat of nuclear attack. The importance of this problem must not be minimized."

The fifth preambular paragraph contains the substance of the views stated by the representative of the United States at the 1611th meeting of this Committee on this question. He said:

"The effort to strengthen world security must be pursued unceasingly in existing bodies in the United Nations where all Members bear a responsibility. Let us therefore resolve to do so, bearing in mind the views expressed and suggestions made at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. We will play our part in that effort."

The sixth and final preambular paragraph is a paraphrase of the statement made by the Minister of State for External Affairs of the United Kingdom at the 641st meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year on the question of security assurances.

Those statements, made by representatives of the nuclear-weapon Powers in disarmament debates, reveal that they are not unappreciative of the anxieties
felt by non-nuclear-weapon States. The most recent instance of such recognition on their part is paragraph 3 of the United States-Japanese communiqué of yesterday, which notes "... the importance of protecting non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear threats". It is important, we consider, that this understanding attitude be reflected in the draft resolution since it can establish a basis on which further measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States could be devised.

The operative part of the draft resolution contains only two paragraphs. The first would declare the General Assembly's firm support for the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States. We do not believe that there can be any objection to the reiteration of this view, which in fact flows directly from the principles of the Charter, in particular Article 51 concerning the right of States to individual and collective defence.

Operative paragraph 2 would recommend to Member States consideration of the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear States "in all appropriate forums". This too would not in any way prejudice the manner or means by which the security of non-nuclear States is to be assured. There are several alternative methods that could be explored.

At the moment a formula acceptable to all the nuclear Powers has not yet evolved. My delegation feels, as I have said before, that the suggestion for the assurance that the nuclear Powers will not threaten the non-nuclear States with nuclear weapons merits their earnest consideration. But these are matters that require the most careful consideration, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States.

It is imperative, however, that the Assembly recommend that the examination of additional methods to strengthen the security of non-nuclear States be initiated without delay — for the danger of nuclear proliferation looms large and more and more non-nuclear States are likely to be faced with the agonizing choice of deciding whether or not to rely on the international community to ensure their security against the nuclear threat.

The draft resolution which I have just presented to the Committee draws attention to an issue that, even if it finds no direct mention in our statements here, has exercised all Member States, especially the non-nuclear countries,
ever since the delegation of Ireland alerted the world to the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons and to the urgency of containing it. Despite the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty, this danger has increased, is increasing, and calls for further collective counter-measures if it is not to become uncontrollable.

According to competent sources, at least 26 countries could acquire atomic weapons during the next decade. Professor Bernard Felt, Professor of Physics at MIT and who was Secretary-General of the Pugwash Conference, recently stated that continued development and testing of nuclear weapons had produced odds of about 3 to 1 that a nuclear device will be used in a conflict before 1984, and suggested that the chances of a nuclear war occurring in the remaining 26 years of this century as even worse.

And, speaking in the General Assembly last September, Secretary of State Kissinger reminded us that political inhibitions were in danger of crumbling and "Nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible, whether through design or miscalculation, accident, theft or blackmail." \(A/PV.2238, p. 26\)

Such warnings should not go unheeded. Even at this eleventh hour there could be hope if only Member States would summon their collective will to act.

We do not of course belittle the steps already taken by the two super-Powers to prevent a nuclear holocaust, to control the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and the first tentative steps they took in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. But we submit that we would be only deluding ourselves if we thought that a universal collective security system against the nuclear peril had come into existence as a result of those measures.
Even 30 years after the Charter of the world Organization first saw the light of day, it is a matter of infinite regret that its bright promise of security for all States is farther away from realization than ever. No doubt the two main power-blocs have been able to assume their own security through equipping themselves with what they call the nuclear deterrent and through military alliances. But what of the countries of the third world, and particularly those of the Middle East, southern Africa and South and South-East Asia, not to speak of countries elsewhere, such as those in Latin America? Is it not surely time that the security concerns of those non-nuclear States were more seriously taken into account? Is it sufficient to devise a world equilibrium based on the accommodation of the interests of two or more Powers, howsoever large? How long will that equilibrium last if it ignores the principles of justice and, in particular, the principle of universality? Mr. Kissinger has said that as a historian he has to live "with a sense of the inevitability of tragedy", but as a statesman he must act on the assumption that problems can and must be solved. And that was his approach.

It is in the spirit of that approach that the Pakistan delegation decided to put forward its modest draft resolution on strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Since the text takes fully into account the views of all the five nuclear-weapon Powers, we hope that it will be unanimously endorsed by this Committee, despite the relatively short time available to conclude consideration of the various proposals that are before it on disarmament matters.
ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I should now like to make the following announcement to the Committee.

As of today, 21 September 1974, I have received a letter signed by the Permanent Representative of Algeria, Ambassador Thaki. The letter reads as follows:

"On behalf of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.677 on the question of Korea, I wish to request you to postpone the debate on the question of Korea until the end of the debate on the item entitled 'Restoration of the legitimate rights of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia' in plenary Assembly.

"Please receive the assurances of my highest esteem, etc."

On the basis of this formal request from the representative of Algeria, I should like to express some considerations for the information of the Committee.

Prior to the organization of the work of our Committee as approved at our 1987th meeting on 25 September 1974 I had consultations and talks with many delegations so as to try to determine the order of work in the manner most satisfactory to all delegations. In the first place, I took into account that, with regard to the question of disarmament many delegations have come from abroad to attend meetings on these specific questions which, if you like, are highly technical, and that these delegations have to be advised sufficiently in advance so as to organize their travel.

I also took into account that as regards the question of Korea there are two parties directly interested, namely, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. As a result of all these consultations and with regard to the question of Korea, it was obvious that one of the parties concerned wished to have this matter dealt with as early as possible while the other party wished it to be dealt with as late as possible.
Bearing in mind those needs that I have referred to as regards
delegations speaking on disarmament items and seeking a mean
equidistant line, I proposed to the Committee that the item on Korea
be dealt with immediately after we have concluded consideration of the
disarmament items.

At the meeting on 25 September, as members of the Committee will recall, it was unanimously agreed that we would deal first with the items on the peaceful uses of outer space and thereafter with the disarmament items, followed by the question of Korea, concluding with the last item, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security". In all the consultations I had the most positive constructive co-operation from the two Korean delegations, and when the Committee had adopted its work plan I received assent from the two parties for the date we had set. On the basis of those assurances, both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea made arrangements so that their delegations could be present in New York on 25 November, when we would start consideration of the item, and in accordance with the invitation to participate in the debate which the First Committee addressed to the delegations. I thought it appropriate to recall all this background, because, given the formal request for postponement of the debate, I wished the Committee to have before it as many facts as possible before it made its decision.

Obviously your Chairman cannot himself decide on the request made by the representative of Algeria and he is therefore compelled to put it to the Committee.

Mr. BENSMAIL (Algeria) (interpretation from French): I should like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, to put this question to the First Committee tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of Algeria has asked that the First Committee should decide this question tomorrow morning and for my part I consider the request a logical one, since most of the representatives here now are specialists on disarmament and
not necessarily experts on Korea. So if there is no objection on the part of the Committee I shall accede to the request just made by the representative of Algeria and put this question to the Committee as the first item of business tomorrow. Since I hear no objection, I shall put the question to the Committee when we meet tomorrow.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to inform the representatives that in the English text of the proposal for the prohibition of actions to influence the climate, some rather insignificant but nevertheless annoying inaccuracies have crept in. The Soviet delegation would therefore request, Mr. Chairman, that the English text of our proposal be reprinted and recirculated. This request arises from the fact that we have been holding talks with the co-sponsors on the basis of the English text, and we cannot of course depart from the text we have agreed upon with all the co-sponsors.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I am informed that the necessary corrigendum will be ready tomorrow morning in the wording of the English text to which the representative of the Soviet Union has just referred.

The Committee will begin its work tomorrow morning with consideration of the proposal I referred to earlier. We shall consider the proposal made by the representative of Algeria. We shall then vote on documents A/C.1/L.675/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.695/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.700, A/C.1/L.701 and A/C.1/L.702, the one which has just been introduced.

Mr. THOMPSON FLORES (Brazil) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to request a clarification, Mr. Chairman. You have just told us that tomorrow we shall vote on document A/C.1/L.695/Rev.1. I should like to know whether there will be other draft resolutions on item 24. Could you give me that information?

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Regrettably, I am not able to inform the representative of Brazil on that point. Generally speaking, I have
been told that a draft resolution is being prepared on that same item and that consultations have been taking place for that purpose. However, to the best of my knowledge, it has not yet been given to the Secretariat and I therefore cannot predict whether it will be submitted.

**Mr. THOMPSON FLORES** (Brazil) (interpretation from Spanish): In that case, I should like to reserve my position, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.695/Rev.1 until tomorrow, in order to see whether there are any other drafts, because my delegation would like, if possible, to have a vote on the two draft resolutions if there is going to be another one.

**Mr. MARTIN** (United States): I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if there would be any inconvenience to the Chair or to other members of the Committee if you changed the order of the vote. It would be very helpful to me if document A/C.1/L.675/Rev.1 could be put to the vote at the end of the day rather than as the first thing in the morning. If there is no objection, I would appreciate that consideration.

**The CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from Spanish): Personally, of course, I have no objection, and as you will have noted, I do try to accede to the requests of the delegations. I am sure that in that case we can vote on the other draft resolutions in the order I have read out. At any rate, I should like to say that document A/C.1/L.675/Rev.1 was distributed some time ago and that we shall definitely vote on that draft resolution tomorrow.

**The meeting rose at 6:40 p.m.**