Twenty-ninth Session

FIRST COMMITTEE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 18 November 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:
Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)

Rapporteur:
Mr. COSTA LOBO (Portugal)

- Tribute to the memory of His Excellency Mr. Erskine Childers, President of Ireland and His Excellency Mr. Al-Sayed Omar Sakkaf, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia

- Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries /24/ (continued)

  (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;

  (b) Report of the Secretary-General

- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use:
  report of the Secretary-General /27/ (continued)

- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /28/ (continued)

/.../

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches in the other languages. The final text will be distributed as soon as possible.

Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only. They should be sent in quadruplicate within three working days to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, Department of Conference Services, room LX-2332, and incorporated in a copy of the record.


The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

74-71210/A
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /29/ (continued)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /30/ (continued)

- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /31/ (continued)

- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /34/ (continued)

- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /35/ (continued)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2266 (XXII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /100/ (continued)

- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /101/ (continued)

- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health /103/ (continued)

- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia /107/ (continued)

- Organization of work
TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF HIS EXCELLENCY MR. ERSKINE CHILDERS, PRESIDENT OF IRELAND AND HIS EXCELLENCY MR. AL-SAYED OMAR SAKKAFA, MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SAUDI ARABIA

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): Before we begin our regular work of the day, it is my sad duty officially to announce to this Committee the death of His Excellency Mr. Erskine Childers, President of the Republic of Ireland. The death of the late President occurred yesterday, Sunday, 17 November. This statesman, who reached the highest office in Ireland after an outstanding political career, succeeded President Eamon de Valera, on 25 July 1963. I understand the grief of the nation of Ireland, and at this sad hour we wish to transmit to that delegation, on behalf of the First Committee, our feelings of solidarity and grief. We request the representative of Ireland to be so good as to transmit these sentiments to the Government of his country and to the family of the deceased.

Last Friday, when we met in the various Committees and in the plenary of the General Assembly, we had ceremonies to pay tribute to another illustrious deceased, Mr. Omar Sakkaf, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia. Sadly, that sorrowful news was not communicated to me and therefore the First Committee could not join in the tribute which was paid in other Committees of the United Nations to his memory.

I therefore request the First Committee, as a posthumous tribute to these eminent personalities who have died within the last few days, to rise and observe a minute of silence.

The representatives, standing, observed a minute's silence.
Mr. CORCORAN (Ireland): Mr. Chairman, I should simply like to express on behalf of the Irish delegation our deepest thanks for the kind words of sympathy and condolence which you spoke on the death of our President, Erskine Childers.

Ireland mourns today the passing of a great Irishman. He devoted his entire life to the cause of Ireland and the welfare of its people. If I could try to sum up in one phrase all he lived and worked for, it was the reconciliation of all our people in peace and harmony so that they could live and work together for the good of the nation as a whole.

I shall convey your words of sympathy and condolence to Ireland for I know they will be deeply appreciated by the late President's family, by the Irish Government, and by all the people of Ireland in this time of national mourning.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Ireland and, on behalf of the First Committee, I reiterate our collective feelings of mourning on the occasion of the death of the President of that great and friendly country.
Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): On behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Morocco, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Yugoslavia and Poland, I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons contained in document A/C.1/L.692.

The draft resolution has been the subject of extensive consultations as a result of which a number of proposals and suggestions offered either by individual delegations or by groups of delegations have been taken into account and are reflected in the text.

I do not propose to take much of the Committee’s time in introducing this draft resolution. For one thing, it is largely self-explanatory; for another, the General Assembly and this Committee have been seized of the problem of chemical weapons for a long time— a fact reflected in the first preambular paragraph, where reference is made to the resolutions pertaining to chemical and bacteriological weapons adopted at previous General Assembly sessions.

The second preambular paragraph, which states that the process of détente in the world is conducive to the implementation of further disarmament measures, is a reflection of the views presented—both in the general debate in the plenary Assembly and in the disarmament debate in this Committee.

The third preambular paragraph stresses the contribution that early agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction, would make to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This is a general opinion reinforced by the fact that chemical weapons are weapons of mass destruction the elimination of which from the arsenals of all States is one of the most pressing tasks.

In its fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, the draft resolution refers to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of that important instrument and reaffirming the need for strict observance by all States of those principles and objectives.
We believe that this reminder is particularly timely in view of the fiftieth anniversary of that Protocol, which occurs next year.

The sixth preambular paragraph reflects the general view expressed, *inter alia*, in the resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly, as to the close link between the elimination of bacteriological (biological) weapons and the elimination of all chemical weapons. The same idea is referred to in the seventh preambular paragraph, which recalls the undertaking, contained in article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, to continue negotiations in good faith to reach early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

The next two preambular paragraphs, the eighth and ninth, refer to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its work with respect to chemical weapons. The latter of those paragraphs takes note that draft conventions on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as other working documents, proposals and suggestions, have been submitted to CCD for its consideration. In the course of our consultations, some delegations thought it advisable to refer to specific drafts and proposals. The majority, however, favoured a more general wording. We have complied with the latter view, for we believe that, without the expression of any explicit or implicit preference as to any specific proposal or proposals, the paragraph is non-discriminatory and better balanced.

The last preambular paragraph is of particular importance, in my view, since the statement of the desire to contribute to the successful conclusion of negotiations on effective measures for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, and for their destruction, is indicative of the great importance which this Committee and the General Assembly attach to meaningful progress in that all important field.
The operative part of the draft resolution is based, in essence, on the language taken from previous General Assembly resolutions on chemical weapons.

Thus, operative paragraph 1 reaffirms the objective of reaching agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States; whereas paragraph 2, closely linked to it, urges all States to make every effort to facilitate agreement in that regard.

A number of delegations in fact suggested that this paragraph include a specific appeal to States to refrain from any action likely to render more difficult or to delay the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of all chemical weapons. Other delegations argued, however, that the present wording does in fact contain an implicit appeal to States to refrain from any such action. Indeed, this is precisely how we read this paragraph.

In requesting CCD to continue negotiations, as a matter of high priority, on the question of chemical weapons, operative paragraph 3 follows the language of the resolution adopted last year. To emphasize more strongly the sense of urgency of the prohibition of all chemical weapons, it was suggested in the course of consultations that the wording of this paragraph include a term such as "with urgency", "with special priority" or "as a matter of highest priority". We believe, however, that the present language of the paragraph adequately conveys the idea both of priority and of urgency of progress that should be made by the Disarmament Committee in that regard.
While we also believe that the Disarmament Committee has before it enough specific proposals to elaborate concrete draft agreements, the reference to "existing proposals" is not to be interpreted to mean that in its efforts the Committee should or must confine itself to the proposals which have already been submitted. In fact it is entirely conceivable, and even to be expected, as was stressed by many delegations in the course of the debate in this Committee, that during its 1975 session important new proposals will be submitted to the Committee, adding new momentum to its negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We hope that the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the thirtieth session of the General Assembly next year will contain concrete draft agreements in that respect.

Operative paragraph 4 invites all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. On the one hand, this formula serves to emphasize the relationship between bacteriological and chemical weapons and, on the other, it represents an acknowledgement of the postulates of many delegations, expressed in the course of the recent general disarmament debate in this Committee.

Operative paragraph 5 extends an invitation to all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This language follows closely that adopted in General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) of 1969. As the representative of Mongolia, Mr. Dugersuren, recalled in his statement of 5 November, the appeal contained in that resolution found the most gratifying response, for, as he observed, 15 States acceded to the Protocol in the course of 1970.

Let us hope that the appeal contained in this draft resolution will have an equally gratifying response. That would be the most fitting commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol. As is to be noted, the same paragraph addresses itself to all States, including States which are already parties to the Protocol, by calling anew for the strict observance of the principles and objectives of the Protocol.
Operative paragraphs 6 and 7 are of procedural character and customary.

To sum up, the draft resolution reaffirms the principle of the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of all States, without prejudging, however, in what way that goal can best be achieved.

The co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.692 are confident that it will commend itself for unanimous adoption by the First Committee and, subsequently, by the General Assembly. Such unanimous endorsement would be an eloquent demonstration of the importance that the international community attaches to progress towards the prohibition of all chemical weapons.

In the spirit of co-operation with the Chair, the delegations sponsoring the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.692 are prepared to have this document acted upon at the Chairman's earliest convenience.

In conclusion, I should like to express the appreciation and thanks of the Polish delegation to the delegations co-sponsoring the draft as well as to those which, in a spirit of co-operation and good will, have contributed to its elaboration.

I am also glad to inform the Committee that Nigeria and the Netherlands have just asked to be added to list of co-sponsors of the draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Poland for introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.692. The Committee has taken due note of the fact that the Netherlands and Nigeria have been added to the list of co-sponsors. I should like also to announce that, in communications addressed to the Chairman, Belgium and Morocco have joined the co-sponsors.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to put forward a few considerations which will place in its perspective the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.692, co-sponsored by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico, which I have the honour to introduce today.
In a previous statement which I made in this Committee on 29 October, I had occasion to emphasize what was stated here a week earlier by Senator Symington to the effect that the nuclear arsenal of the United States was equivalent to 615,385 bombs of the type which in 1945 in Hiroshima caused the deaths of more than 100,000 persons. The Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Military Applications of the Joint Atomic Energy Commission of the Congress of this country declared on the same day: "Since the agreement on strategic arms limitation was signed in 1972 the two so-called super-Powers have been adding nuclear weapons to their war arsenals every day of the year."

Within the same order of ideas, it is also worth mentioning some interesting facts selected from among the abundant data published in one of the latest issues of The Defense Monitor, an organ of the Center for Defense Information, with headquarters in Washington. We read in that magazine:

"The strategic nuclear arms race continues at high velocity, while the glacier-like Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, inch forward. As of mid-1974, 7,940 United States strategic nuclear weapons are targeted on the Soviet Union, and 2,600 Soviet strategic nuclear weapons are targeted on the United States."
"Since July 1972, when the SALT I agreements were signed, the United States has deployed an average of one new strategic nuclear weapon every eight hours. Unless checked, the United States arsenal of such weapons of mass destruction will swell to 10,000 by 1977. The Soviet Union has deployed one new strategic nuclear weapon every 48 hours since 1972.

"Both the United States and the Soviet Union" -- I am continuing to quote from the magazine I have mentioned -- "have, roughly, 200 cities of over 100,000 people. Clearly, strategic nuclear weapons are deployed in far greater numbers than the cities they could annihilate in a nuclear war. Each of the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union has at least three times the explosive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Some are 16,000 times as powerful.

"During the Second World War the United States dropped just over two million tons of TNT on Germany and Japan -- two megatons. By mid-1974, the United States maintained a strategic nuclear weapon force capable of delivering 4,807 megatons -- the equivalent of over 2,400 World War IIIs. Today, a single United States Titan missile can deliver an explosion on a target five times as powerful as all of those World War II United States bombing raids. Moreover, a single United States Poseidon submarine can disperse nuclear death to more cities than all the German and Japanese cities bombed by all the Allies throughout World War II -- all within an hour. The land-based tactical nuclear weapons of the United States abroad can deliver the equivalent of 275 World War IIIs in response to an attack on our allies. ... A B-52 bomber is capable of carrying four 24-megaton bombs equivalent to 7,385 'Hiroshimas' in explosive power."

That is the end of the quotation I have taken from the publication I mentioned, The Defence Monitor, which is the organ for the Centre for Defense Information. Figures such as the preceding have rightly led the leaders of the Centre to speak of nuclear weapons going beyond what is
intelligible, nuclear weapons exceeding any rational use and of so prodigious a destructive power as to go beyond human imagination.

The horrifying situation which those arsenals have created for the world and for all mankind is surely what prompted the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union to make before the General Assembly of the United Nations, two months ago, statements like those which appear in the first operative paragraph of the draft resolution A/C.1/L.688, and which I cannot resist reading. The first of the two senior officials to whom I have referred said:

"The world has dealt with nuclear weapons as if restraint were automatic. Their very awesomeness has chained those weapons for almost three decades; their sophistication and expense have helped to keep constant for a decade the number of States which possess them. Now, as was quite foreseeable, political inhibitions are in danger of crumbling. Nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible, whether through design or miscalculation; accident, theft or blackmail." (A/PV.2236, p. 26)

For his part, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union affirmed:

"Stable and lasting peace is incompatible with the arms race. They are antipodes. One cannot seriously think of eliminating the threat of war, while at the same time increasing military budgets and endlessly building up armaments .... (A/PV.2240, p. 63-65)

"The supreme interests not only of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States, but also of the peoples of the whole world, require that the Soviet Union and the United States, possessing the colossal might of nuclear weapons, should make every effort to achieve appropriate understandings and agreements." ( Ibid., p. 71)

The sponsor of the draft resolution I am introducing considers it appropriate to incorporate these two statements in the text of the draft resolution, so that they might be recorded in the official documents of the General Assembly of our Organization as a lasting testimony and an indestructible reminder of the urgent need for the two super-Powers to take measures without delay as are required in the light of what their authorized spokesmen have described with such unusual frankness. We are convinced that the General Assembly fully shares, as is stated in operative paragraph 3
"the deep concern reflected in those statements with regard to the gravity of the situation created by existing nuclear arsenals ..."
This is also why we are inclined to believe that there would be general acceptance of the idea of urging, as is done in operative paragraph 4 -- the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics "to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace of their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and stresses once again the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament;", and that there would also be support for inviting the two Governments -- as provided for in operative paragraph 5, the last paragraph of the draft resolution -- to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the results of their negotiations."

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary) (interpretation from French): Hungary is among the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.692 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons which the Committee is now examining. The representative of Poland, Ambassador Jaroczek, gave a detailed and precise explanation of the document before us, which therefore makes it unnecessary for me to go into all the aspects of this question.

At the meetings of our Committee particular attention has been given in statements to the problems of nuclear weapons, the quantitative and qualitative proliferation of those weapons. The great majority of people have recognized the danger of a growing nuclear arms race. We wholeheartedly share this view and this concern. We too are of the opinion that the most urgent task of our day is that of completely eliminating the threat of a nuclear war.

Nevertheless, we feel that the priority given to the question of nuclear disarmament should not divert our attention from the fact that in our time armaments are assuming unforeseeable dimensions and that in situations of war the application of other means of warfare -- new or conventional -- may have effects on our society and the human environment as disastrous as those of atomic weapons. Chemical weapons are among the most dangerous means of mass destruction.
The opinion expressed as to the stagnation of disarmament applies primarily to chemical weapons. There has been no real progress for years, although the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has devoted a considerable proportion of its activities to the consideration of questions related to chemical weapons. It is true that several important documents are before CCD, but negotiations on producing a convention banning the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on destroying existing stockpiles, have not led to any outstanding results.

As we see from the draft resolution, the General Assembly has already adopted several resolutions on this subject, without, however, being able to influence in a positive way the work of CCD. We may say, therefore, that the adoption of a new draft resolution is a useless pastime. We have heard such opinions expressed even at this session of our Committee. But we consider that there are at least two co-related factors which can have a favourable effect on the outcome of future negotiations.

The first is the change in the international political situation. Détente has already borne its fruits in the field of disarmament, among others. At the Summit meeting in Moscow last July, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to plan a joint initiative in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to concluding, as a first measure, an international convention to prohibit the most dangerous of the chemical weapons. Such a convention could in the near future lead to the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

We hope that the other countries which, for lack of a political decision, were against the idea of such a convention will take an affirmative decision.

The second factor should rather be considered as a technical one. In the last few years, discussions, negotiations and draft conventions and working documents have revealed the positions of various groups of countries. Common ground and the possibilities for compromise are familiar to most people. On this subject I should like to refer to the draft convention submitted in CCD on 28 March 1972 by the socialist members of that
Committee. The draft was received favourably by most delegations as a very useful contribution to the final drafting of the convention.

Before concluding my statement, I should like to turn very briefly to operative paragraph 5. The representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, Ambassador Dugersuren, in his statement on 5 November, so eloquently explained the importance of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, that all that is left for me to do is to express the hope that the appeal in the draft resolution to all States which have not yet acceded to the Protocol to do so will quickly strengthen that document in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of its signing.

As one of the co-sponsors, my delegation commends this draft resolution to the Committee in the hope that it will be adopted unanimously.
Mr.  (Japan): I should like to present a few comments on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690.

In August 1945, my country was twice subjected to the scourge of nuclear weapons. Almost 30 years have passed since then, and Japan, as a peace-loving State and a Member of the United Nations, maintains friendly relations with most of the countries of the world and has left behind the unhappy memories of the war.

However, there is one thing which the people of my country cannot forget, and that is the trauma produced by nuclear weapons. This trauma has been retained by the new generation born after the war, and we intend that succeeding generations retain it. Naturally, this inborn hatred of nuclear weapons is not confined solely to Japan and the Japanese people; I am profoundly gratified that I have been able to confirm this after having participated in the disarmament discussions in this Committee. During the general debate here in which some 90 countries took the floor, there was practically no speaker who did not emphasize the urgency of nuclear disarmament. In saying this I realize that for years the United Nations has been constantly stressing the importance of the nuclear weapons issue, and has not just started to do so this year. I realize also that, as was pointed out by many representatives, in spite of these efforts we have still not come close to the day when the earth is rid of nuclear weapons. And this leads me to emphasize once more the cardinal importance of nuclear disarmament, and in particular the efforts that need to be exerted by the nuclear-weapon States.

How then are we to accomplish the complete end of nuclear weapons? As has frequently been pointed out, the spread of nuclear weapons can take place both horizontally and vertically. Obviously it is necessary to close both the horizontal and vertical paths in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, gradually reduce their number, and finally eliminate them. There are two steps that will be necessary to achieve this: the first is a comprehensive test ban, and the second is the prevention of an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States.

The comprehensive test ban is a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament, and there is no need to reiterate that the utmost efforts must be exerted by the United Nations to take this indispensable step. On this question our Committee has already adopted the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.683 by a great
majority. There is no need to recall that my delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution.

It goes without saying that a qualitative and quantitative increase in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons would result in a nightmarish threat to the survival of the human race. But an equally important and urgent task is that of preventing an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States.

Such an increase would automatically augment the number of independent centres of decision-making which could take unilateral decisions to use nuclear weapons. This, obviously, would proportionately enhance the probability of such decisions. It is clear, therefore, how important is the prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to protect mankind from the threat of their use.

For this reason I cannot take the view that the prevention of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is less important, less essential to deal with, than is the cessation of the nuclear arms race. I mean to say that we should not be complacent over the fact that the number of nuclear-weapon States does not increase at the moment. It cannot be argued that horizontal proliferation may be overlooked because of the continuation of vertical proliferation. I am fully convinced that lack of progress in the complete cessation of vertical proliferation should not be used as an argument against taking effective measures for the prevention of horizontal proliferation. Clearly, an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States would render negotiations for the cessation of vertical proliferation more difficult.

Now the question is: how can we effectively prevent horizontal proliferation? In dealing with this question we are inevitably confronted with implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. Of course, it may be theoretically possible to make a distinction between nuclear explosions that are clearly intended for peaceful purposes and those for military purposes. However, I should like to remind the Committee that nuclear explosions, even for peaceful purposes, are still explosions of nuclear explosive devices.
It is well known to all of us, for example, that dynamite is usually used for peaceful purposes, such as building dams and railroads. Why then do we need to control our use of dynamite? It goes without saying that its use has to be strictly controlled because it is a dangerous explosive. To take another example, we use hunting rifles for peaceful purposes, but they could also be used as weapons in a murder. Therefore the use of guns must be placed under strict control for public safety. Exactly the same thing could also be said regarding peaceful nuclear explosions. The effectiveness of these explosions for the purpose of earth moving and large-scale excavations for civil engineering and mining, if it were put to use, derives from the huge release of physical energy. If such a device, designed and developed for peaceful nuclear explosions, were to be used against a population centre -- it is repugnant to me even to mention such a possibility, though this is an integral part of my chain of thought -- then there could be no doubt that a nuclear holocaust, or even a far greater one than those already experienced in 1945, would be produced.
How then should the world come to grips with peaceful nuclear explosions? We must first address ourselves, as part of an all-out effort aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to the question of how we can give the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions the consideration it merits, with a view to reaching, as soon as possible, the best and most widely acceptable solution. This is precisely the objective of the draft resolution before the Committee in document A/C.1/L.690.

As one of those who took part in the preparation of the draft resolution, I have tried to explain at some length the prime considerations and motivations that lie behind it. The intention of my delegation, and of the delegations which are sponsors, is a simple one: to do the best we can to reduce, and eventually to eradicate, the threat posed to mankind by nuclear weapons. I wish to reiterate that this proposal is not intended to divert attention from the danger of the nuclear arms race, and I have explained why it would not do so. I should point out that this draft resolution is no substitute for the draft resolution on a comprehensive test ban, but is complementary to it.

Let me add that nothing in the draft resolution denies or detracts from the equal rights of all States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Japanese delegation would be the first to oppose any resolution that was in substance, or even by implication, prejudicial to the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and its availability to all States. It is obvious to all that the draft resolution would not interfere with the enjoyment of the benefits of these peaceful uses. The world of today is seeking resources and energy with a determination that grows greater day by day, and the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is increasing accordingly. Given those circumstances, which are the concern of all, it becomes clear that the central issue on which we must focus our attention is supremely important: we must learn how to proceed effectively with the much desired promotion of peaceful nuclear energy, without at the same time encountering the dilemma that this would increase nuclear armaments. In the view of my delegation, the draft resolution provides a basis for studying the ways and means of avoiding such a formidable dilemma.

I wish to conclude my statement by expressing my conviction that the General Assembly, which has laboured for so many years to advance nuclear disarmament, will adopt this proposal by the greatest possible majority.
Mrs. THORSSEN (Sweden): In my statement in the First Committee on 25 October I devoted a significantly large part of my time to discussing peaceful nuclear explosions, the question of their feasibility and desirability, the impossibility of distinguishing between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and those for military purposes except by the politically declared intent, and the risk that they involve of endangering the non-proliferation Treaty and the proliferation of nuclear-explosion technology. In speaking today on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690, which is co-sponsored by the Swedish delegation, I want to reiterate those points of view, while being fully aware of the concern of developing countries to make the fullest possible use of any modern technology intended to assist in their pursuit of development towards a self-sustained economy in peace and security. Sweden's record of support for the legitimate aspirations of developing countries in this respect cannot be questioned or challenged. It should be perfectly clear that our concern, voiced here, over the many implications of peaceful nuclear explosions is based on a thorough consideration of this problem as well as on widespread public and political support in my country -- a country which, possessing high nuclear technology capability, has repeatedly and recently reaffirmed its intention to remain non-nuclear -- for an international regulation of such explosions.

The draft resolution before the Committee is therefore seen by us as one of many expressions of the international community's urgent desire for effective and comprehensive measures to halt the arms race and to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The most prominent task in multilateral disarmament efforts, which is assigned the highest priority in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, is and remains the completion of a comprehensive test ban.

I want to point out that the draft resolution before us contains three preambular paragraphs dealing with the urgent need for measures to reverse the momentum of the nuclear arms race through an effective comprehensive test ban, among other things. On the other hand, States advocating the feasibility and harmlessness of peaceful nuclear explosions would do well to understand the motives of those who feel it urgent to achieve, at long last, the international regulation of such explosions as is foreseen in article V
of the non-proliferation Treaty, a treaty which has been ratified by about two thirds of the United Nations membership. It is hoped that the procedures envisaged in the draft resolution will create a sound basis for a thorough consideration by the General Assembly at its next session of the problems connected with peaceful nuclear explosions and their international regulation. I need hardly point to the fact that a very short time is available for the detailed studies of various aspects of this issue to be undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and, it is to be hoped, the non-proliferation Treaty review conference. If the draft resolution is adopted, the message from this session of the General Assembly to the various international bodies concerned should therefore be seen as an appeal to go ahead.

I should like to add a few words on the possibility of achieving in the future universal, or next to universal, acceptance of the international regulation of peaceful nuclear explosions. In his statement to the Committee on 11 November the representative of India referred to this matter when he said:

"Only in the context of a complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests could consideration be given to the possibility of concluding an agreement on the regulation of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to be signed by all States. The accompanying system of international safeguards which will have to be devised should be based on objective, functional and non-discriminatory criteria. It should be universal in application." (2016th meeting, p. 23-25)
In our view this statement reflects a realistic assessment of the prospects for universal adherence to an international agreement in this field which should be taken seriously. Consequently, it is all the more urgent for the international community to exert renewed strong pressure on the nuclear-weapon Powers, and particularly the two super-Powers, to respect its yearning for a world free from nuclear tests and to enable us to take the decisive steps towards a comprehensive test ban.

But meanwhile -- and this is important -- we have to start, jointly, as soon as possible, and through competent international bodies, the studies and deliberations that will enable us to examine the amount of common ground that may exist between us regarding the complex and difficult matters relating to peaceful nuclear explosions in order to reach an international regulation. I therefore hope that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.690 will receive generous support in the Committee.

I should like to add to what I have just said, because it is my intention to expand somewhat the theme dealt with in the draft resolution to which I have referred. Obviously, the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions forms part of the much wider problems of the spread of nuclear power and related technology which are facing the international community today.

In my general statement a few weeks ago, I expressed the intention of the Swedish delegation to revert to these matters at a later stage during the deliberations of this Committee. I think that the consideration of the draft resolution under reference provides an appropriate opportunity for making some comments in this regard.

It is clear to us that the nuclear proliferation problems have grown enormously more complex with the rapid expansion of civil nuclear power programmes -- an expansion which, according to a United Nations study just published, amounted to 33 per cent in just one year, from 1971 to 1972. The problem is particularly linked to the awesome increase in plutonium production, which, conservatively speaking, could reach an annual level of more than 80 tons, or, in other words, many thousands of Hiroshima-size bombs, by 1985. I use this example as a way of measuring the size of the problem. At
the same time it is clear that the plutonium grade ordinarily produced in civil reactors is not the same as the so-called weapon plutonium; netherless, it can be used for nuclear devices. Through this development, enormous nuclear explosive capabilities are created in many countries -- quite apart from the accompanying and serious environmental risks raised to levels which make their management very difficult, to say the least. We would be tragically lacking in responsibility towards the peoples of the world, both present and future generations, if we did not make every effort through international co-operation to take a very thorough and serious look at the management problems as well as the dangers to security and the environment linked with nuclear explosive technology and the expected increase in the stocks of plutonium.

It is also clear that what has been done so far to regulate internationally nuclear explosive technology has not been enough. First, the central international instrument in this context, the non-proliferation Treaty, has only partly fulfilled its aim. While one can say that it has served its prime purpose in a satisfactory way as regards the countries party to it, the lack of progress as regards the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States under article VI is a deplorable failure. The fact that the Treaty has not yet gained universal adherence is, of course, its most serious drawback.

Secondly, certain general weaknesses in the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system must also be mentioned in this connexion. As is well known, all IAEA safeguard systems are based on the principle of verification. They are designed to detect, but not physically to prevent, diversion of fissile material from peaceful to non-peaceful uses. Furthermore, international rules for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and of nuclear materials during storage and transport are lacking.

I shall sum up the situation as we see it today and for tomorrow. Beyond any doubt, no nation has solved the security problems relating to transport, stocks and reprocessing of the rapidly increasing amount of plutonium soon to be produced. Beyond any doubt, no multilateral agreement in force today has been worked out with a view to covering comprehensively the problems of today, even less those of tomorrow. Beyond any doubt, there is increasing concern that fissionable material used in the nuclear fuel cycle may be used for non-intended