VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 45th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

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(continued)
The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.

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CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: This morning the Committee will proceed to take action upon draft resolutions in cluster 10.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico)(interpretation from Spanish): With regard to the first draft resolution in cluster 10, A/C.1/40/L.35, members will note that a revised text has just been distributed. I wish now to address draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, and, on behalf of my delegation and the other sponsors, to explain the minor revisions contained therein. The first change concerns operative paragraph 1 which originally read as follows:

"Reiterates once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States".

Some delegations observed that it might perhaps be less than fully accurate to say that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, since, as we all know, the Soviet Union has declared a moratorium on such testing as from 6 August 1985. I used the word "perhaps" because, while testing has surely been reduced thanks to that moratorium by the Soviet Union, testing by the United States has not continued at its previous pace; the situation there may even be the reverse.

I say that on the basis of an article that appeared in today's Washington Post, which quotes Professor Lynn Sykes of Columbia University, who showed that (spoke in English)

"The United States, which in the 1970s detonated about 12 underground tests a year at its Nevada test site, increased that number to roughly 16 a year under the Reagan Administration". (The Washington Post, 21 November 1985, p. A30)
To leave no room for doubt about what the sponsors wished to say in paragraph 1, we have revised it to read as follows:

"Reiterates once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon tests have not yet stopped, in spite of the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States",

which is clearly accurate.

The second revision concerns paragraph 3, which originally read as follows:

"Reaffirms also its conviction that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and an indispensable element for the success of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, since it is only through the fulfilment of the obligations under the Treaty that its three depositary Powers may expect all other Parties to comply likewise with their respective obligations".

Some delegations have expressed concern that this paragraph might in fact tend to weaken the obligations undertaken by States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the light of that, and to dispel any possible concern in this respect, we have revised paragraph 3 to read as follows:

"Reaffirms also its conviction that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and that the commencement of negotiations on such a treaty is an indispensable element of the obligations of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons under article VI of that Treaty".

It is my hope that thus revised the draft resolution will be adopted, if not unanimously - which is what the sponsors would like - then at least by an overwhelming majority.
I wish also to announce that the original nine sponsors of the draft resolution have now been joined by the delegations of Austria, Finland and Ireland in its revised version, A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on delegations wishing to explain their positions or votes before action is taken on the draft resolutions in cluster 10.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to explain its position on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, L.49 and L.73, all relating to the question of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to a general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, and has worked consistently towards that end. Accordingly, we gauge draft resolutions by the extent to which they aim at achieving that goal.

The Soviet delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, sponsored by Mexico and several other countries, since it is intended to bring about an early start to negotiations on that subject in the Conference on Disarmament. It names as the goal of those negotiations a treaty to achieve the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions.

In that connection, we must observe that, in our view, the goal of negotiations should be the preparation of a draft treaty that would effectively ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere and would contain provisions, acceptable to all, preventing the circumvention of this ban by means of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. That formulation, contained in draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42, submitted by the delegation of Hungary, is better balanced and takes into account the views of a broad range of States.
The Soviet delegation takes a favourable view of the idea of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, as set out in paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1. Unfortunately, the text of the draft resolution does not state the objective fact that on 6 August 1985 the Soviet Union unilaterally declared a moratorium on such explosions, in response to resolution 39/52 of 1984. We are grateful to the representative of Mexico, who in his statement today took a very favourable view of the initiative taken by the Soviet Union in declaring that moratorium.

As to verification of such a moratorium, the current technological state of the art makes it possible easily to determine whether or not nuclear explosions are being detonated. Of course, if agreement is reached on a prohibition of nuclear weapons everywhere and for all time, it will be possible to look for other mutually acceptable means of verification.
We have reservations also concerning another draft resolution introduced by Mexico, draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49, which seeks to convert the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water into a comprehensive ban on test explosions. We take an extremely positive view of the 1963 Moscow Treaty and are in favour of strengthening it and of increasing the number of its signatories until all nuclear States have become Parties to it. It is well known that two nuclear Powers, France and China, are not Parties to the Moscow Treaty. We would favour a tripartite prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, but with the additional participation of the other two nuclear States. Nevertheless, we shall vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49.

We have already noted that draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, introduced by New Zealand, urges the beginning of negotiations on a test ban. We welcome this as a step in the right direction, although we feel that in the proposed programme of work for the proposed ad hoc committee excessive stress is placed on the question of verification.

In paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, as in previous similar draft resolutions, it is proposed that verification elements, including an international seismic network and an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity, be established apart from the development, and prior to the conclusion, of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests. For reasons it has stated repeatedly in the past, the Soviet delegation cannot agree with this approach to the question. We therefore request that a separate vote be taken on paragraph 5 of this draft resolution. We shall vote against that paragraph. If paragraph 5 is adopted, we shall have to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole.
We also have objections to paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, whose recommended programme of work for an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament is improper, particularly since it is not in keeping with the position of the socialist countries, as set forth in the documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. DUARTE (Brazil): I should like to explain my delegation's vote on the draft resolutions in cluster 10. I wish first to address three draft resolutions which follow up resolutions adopted last year: draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, a successor to resolution 39/52; L.73, which follows upon resolution 39/53; and L.42, which is a follow-up of resolution 39/60.

It will be remembered that last year my delegation voted in favour of resolutions 39/53 and 39/60. In the case of the former, we voted in favour of it because we believed that it contained positive elements which could encourage progress in the consideration of the subject in the Conference on Disarmament. Although its successor this year, draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, maintains some of that positive thrust - the recommendation that a negotiating ad hoc committee be established is especially praiseworthy - unfortunately certain other concepts have been retained and provisions added which are not in line with the views my Government holds regarding the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. In particular, the outline of a rigid programme of work for the proposed ad hoc committee would, in our opinion, prejudice the scope and outcome of the negotiations. Moreover, some of the emphasis of the proposed programme would in our opinion depart from the guidelines on this matter set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. For those reasons, my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73.
Also as regards draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42, which is a successor to
resolution 39/60, my delegation regrets that the earlier text, which it supported,
has been modified this year and highlights some views which are not directly
pertinent to the actual negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. We therefore feel
unable to support the initiative embodied in draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42,
notwithstanding the very constructive elements it retains.

As for draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, we feel that, as occurred with
its predecessor, some linkages and assumptions in the text preclude a positive vote
by my delegation. Besides prejudging the scope of a future comprehensive test-ban
treaty, the draft resolution also implies a judgement of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with which we do not agree; my Government’s
opinions and reservations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty are well known.
Furthermore, the draft resolution does not make the necessary distinction between
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and nuclear-weapon explosions. My
delegation will, thus, abstain in the vote on that draft resolution, as it has done
in the case of analogous texts.

With regard to the remaining draft resolution in cluster 10, draft resolution
A/C.1/40/L.49, it is our hope that its adoption will constitute a positive
development inasmuch as the text addresses concerns that my delegation has voiced
previously on compliance with commitments assumed under the partial test-ban
Treaty. In those circumstances, my delegation will support draft resolution
A/C.1/40/L.49.

In connection with the subject-matter of these draft resolutions, let me add
that Brazil firmly believes that the cessation of all nuclear-arms tests in all
environments and for all time remains one of the most important and urgent tasks to
be accomplished in our efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, which is itself a matter of the highest priority. The nuclear-weapon Powers bear special responsibility for the achievement of that task, for it is they that go on testing and improving nuclear weapons. It is thus incumbent primarily upon them to take prompt and concrete action to fulfil the commitments to that effect they have undertaken in binding international treaties, but which have yet to be met. They must do so in conjunction with and to the satisfaction of the international community at large, whose vital interests are at stake.

Lastly, multilateral negotiation of an effective nuclear-weapon-test ban must necessarily, in our view, aim at a non-discriminatory universal agreement concentrating on and eliminating the tests actually being carried out at present — nuclear-weapon tests — rather than emphasizing proposals that would tend to confuse the issue by focusing on the alleged need to curb tests that are not being carried out.

Mr. Cromartie (United Kingdom): I should like to explain why my delegation will vote against draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35, L.42 and L.73.

The British Government understands the wish of many Member States to see early negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. We continue to believe, however, that an essential preliminary to the beginning of negotiations is the reaching of some agreement on how to solve the outstanding and serious problems of verification. I note that the communiqué issued on 22 October 1985 by Commonwealth leaders meeting in Nassau, Bahamas,

"called upon nuclear-weapon States to facilitate and pursue vigorously through the Conference on Disarmament the early resolution of outstanding problems, including the problem of verification, over a comprehensive test-ban treaty".

(A/40/817, p. 11)
(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

We strongly endorse this approach to that problem, which continues to present a major and substantive obstacle to the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban. A comprehensive test ban or moratorium on nuclear tests which is not adequately verifiable would be worse than useless.

My delegation participated actively in the working group set up by the then Committee on Disarmament in 1982 and 1983. In recent years we have submitted three detailed technical papers in the Conference on Disarmament, but they have, regrettably, not yet been discussed because of the refusal of some delegations to renew the mandate of the working group as an ad hoc committee in the 1984 and 1985 sessions of the Conference.
At the 1984 session, in an effort to resume substantive work on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation joined with others in proposing a broader draft mandate for an ad hoc committee. At the 1985 session we also joined with others in putting forward a detailed work programme for such a committee, which would include the important issue of scope, which remains to be resolved, as well as that of verification.

This programme of work remains on the table at the Conference on Disarmament, and we hope that the interval before the Conference's next session will give delegations time to reconsider their approaches so that a practical discussion of the issues can begin again.

Finally, my delegation cannot support draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49 since it follows from what I have just said that we should not favour a meeting of States parties to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty for the purpose suggested.

Mr. Gonsalves (India): The approach of the Indian delegation towards a nuclear-weapons test ban corresponds accurately to the preamble to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, according to which the aim of any agreement on a comprehensive test ban has to be "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

Accordingly we will vote in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35 and L.42, whose manifest goals as clearly stated in the title of each of those drafts correspond to this approach.

We will, however, not be able to support draft resolution L.73 as it does not support our approach of principle in this matter and as we also have reservations about some of its operative paragraphs, though we would at the same time acknowledge with appreciation the modifications in that draft resolution relating to the urgency of concluding a comprehensive nuclear-weapons test ban.
Our vote on draft resolution L.73 is absolutely without prejudice to our position on the Conference on Disarmament regarding the organization of the programme of work by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on individual agenda items. We believe that ad hoc committees should be free to arrive at appropriate programmes of work to accomplish their respective mandates.

My delegation would also like to place on record its considered view that, pending the conclusion of a treaty, all nuclear-weapon States, and not merely the depositaries of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, should suspend the testing of nuclear weapons so as to facilitate the negotiation of a nuclear-weapon test ban.

Finally, my delegation would categorically reject the notion of any linkage between the objective of a nuclear-weapons test ban treaty and the so-called Non-Proliferation Treaty. We firmly believe that a nuclear-weapons test ban stands on its own merits as an important means to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and that it cannot and should not be linked with any other flawed and discriminatory international instruments.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation would like briefly to explain its position on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/40/L.73.

Venezuela is at one with the spirit that has inspired the sponsors of that draft resolution. My country firmly and constantly supports all efforts aimed at concluding as soon as possible a treaty completely banning all nuclear-weapons tests. In the past we have voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions promoting that objective, including resolution 39/53, which is the immediate precedent to draft resolution L.73.

On this occasion, none the less, Venezuela will abstain when L.73 is put to the vote because we believe it is not appropriate for the Assembly to establish in advance, in a detailed way, how the Disarmament Conference should proceed in its
negotiations on a nuclear-test ban. We are basically concerned about paragraph 4, which urges the Conference on Disarmament to conduct its work within a pre-established programme that is too restrictive and would result in imposing on the Conference, and especially on the Ad Hoc Committee, which will be dealing with this, a sort of straitjacket that would oblige it to focus its activities on issues relating to scope and verification within a pre-established programme.

While we know that the points recommended in this programme are important and must be given due attention, we do feel that it should be the Conference itself, and more specifically the ad hoc committee, that decides its own programme of work, which should appropriately cover the different aspects of the problem in a balanced way.

My delegation also has a problem with paragraph 5, which urges the Conference to take immediate steps for the establishment of an international seismic monitoring network. Here again we are aware that such a system might be an essential element within a system of verification to ensure that obligations under the Treaty are fulfilled. But at the same time we feel that such a mechanism should not be established in isolation, outside the context of negotiations on the nuclear test ban treaty. This matter should be resolved together with all the other elements that will necessarily form part of the negotiations on that treaty.

For those reasons Venezuela will abstain in the vote on draft resolution L.73.

Mr. MIGLIORINI (Italy): The Italian delegation wishes to explain its position on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73.

Italy has always been and is in favour of the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty and attaches great importance to making progress towards this goal. However, we are fully aware of the need for and the difficulty of effective verifications and of the existence of a linkage between nuclear testing and the structure of forces ensuring the strategic balance on which international security is based.
We therefore consider that progress towards a comprehensive test ban is a complex endeavour that will in our judgement be better accomplished through a gradual and realistic approach based on the consideration of this issue in its proper perspective and in all its aspects, including verification.

We regret that on this particular issue it has proven very difficult until now to achieve even a limited measure of consensus in the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament. While we appreciate the efforts of the promoters of draft resolution L.73, we do not see the position I have just outlined reflected in that draft, and we doubt that it will promote an effective convergence of views on this specific issue.

Furthermore we have reservations on the formulations of the draft resolution containing precise indications to the Conference on Disarmament on how to organise its work.

In conclusion, the delegation of Italy will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73.
Mr. McDowell (New Zealand): New Zealand wants to see all nuclear tests stopped. We want the Conference on Disarmament to proceed immediately to practical work on the issues that must be resolved if there is to be an adequately verifiable and comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests. It is our commitment to that approach, an approach which is embodied in our draft resolution in document A/C.1/40/L.73, that makes it difficult for us to give full support to the somewhat different approach set out in the other draft resolutions that also call for an end to nuclear testing - that is, those contained in documents L.35, L.42 and L.48.

At the same time we do recognize that many delegations reflect their support for the goal of ending all nuclear tests by voting in favour of all the draft resolutions on this subject. We respect that position; indeed we welcome it.

International concern about nuclear testing is long-standing, but it has been given renewed focus and impetus by the call issued by the Non-Proliferation Review Conference for the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time. We are pleased that the draft resolutions in documents L.35 and L.42 take account of that call and do address directly the need for a test ban treaty to cover all nuclear test explosions - that is, not only tests of nuclear weapons but also so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. We are also pleased that those drafts take account of the need for verification to be addressed in the negotiation of a test ban treaty.

We would therefore have liked to have been able to support those draft resolutions. It is a matter of regret that there remain in these drafts various elements that preclude us from voting in favour of them.

One particular concern with the draft in document A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1 is paragraph 7, which calls for a moratorium on nuclear tests by three of the nuclear-weapon States. We recognize that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have accepted special responsibilities through their membership
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Partial Test Ban Treaty. They are not, however, the only nuclear-weapon States in the world today. We cannot support a draft resolution that calls for an end to testing by those three States and omit a similar call to France and China, the other two nuclear-weapon States. We do not, quite frankly, understand entirely why the distinction is drawn.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/40/L.42 also marks a considerable improvement over equivalent drafts of earlier years. It is disappointing therefore that, while the question of a comprehensive test ban is more properly addressed in paragraph 1, the draft reverts in paragraph 5 to a call for consideration only of a treaty banning nuclear-weapons tests. There seems to us to be an element of inconsistency here, since paragraph 1 of this draft resolution itself recognizes that a test ban treaty could be circumvented through resort to "peaceful nuclear explosions". Paragraph 3 would have the Assembly welcome the six-month unilateral moratorium on all nuclear-test explosions announced by the Soviet Union on 6 August of this year.

As I said on 16 October in New Zealand's general statement on the disarmament issues, New Zealand acknowledges the various proposals that have been made this year for a moratorium, but we do not believe that a moratorium, especially an unverified one of the kind announced by the Soviet Union, can be a substitute for a properly verifiable and legally binding treaty.

The proposal contained in document A/C.1/40/L.49 is a new one. It recommends that parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty consult to consider the possibility of converting that Treaty into a comprehensive test ban treaty. While we do recognize that the draft resolution is only a recommendation for consultations on that idea, we have considerable reservations about the idea itself. We do not think that a comprehensive test-ban treaty containing adequate verification provisions could be achieved through that type of quick-fix amendment procedure, attractive though the idea is at first sight.
For the reasons I have just stated, New Zealand will abstain on the draft resolutions contained in documents L.35, L.42 and L.49.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): The policy of the Australian Government is to pursue urgently a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time. Our approach to the draft resolutions contained in cluster 10 is guided by that policy, and as a consequence and consistent with that policy my Government would be prepared to support any draft resolution which clearly set a path towards the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. We would support any genuine initiatives aimed at achieving such a treaty.

When we have surveyed the draft resolutions that have that motivation, in particular those provided in documents A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1 and L.42, it has been our sorry conclusion that what is provided for in those drafts will not seek a clear, direct path towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Those draft resolutions are limited in scope, they do not provide for the development of adequate means of verification of compliance with such a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Under those circumstances my delegation will not be able to vote in favour of those two draft resolutions.

Having said that, like my colleague from New Zealand we recognize the important motivation and the important ideas that are contained in those two draft resolutions, and we ourselves have no difficulty with the concept that delegations may feel able to vote for each of the various approaches towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty that are advanced in the draft resolutions in this cluster.

Our position is illustrated perfectly in the terms of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/40/L.73, but we do note with regard to the other two draft resolutions - A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1 and L.42 - that they, perhaps in lesser detail,
but no less than the draft resolution in L.33, in fact put the Assembly in the position of "urging upon", or giving an instruction to, the Conference on Disarmament.

Under those circumstances my delegation finds it difficult to accept criticism of L.73 on the basis that it purports to give a direction to the Conference on Disarmament. This is something each of the draft resolutions seeks to do, and it is within the authority of this Assembly.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49, Australia is sympathetic to the sentiments expressed in that draft, which promote the idea of a conference to amend the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. But we do not see this as being either a substitute for or the best way to achieve a verifiable negotiated comprehensive test-ban treaty. The problem is not finding an appropriate treaty format for a comprehensive test ban but overcoming the outstanding verification problems facing a comprehensive test ban and the national security policy objections of the nuclear-weapon States and some others.

Australia is in fact particularly concerned that verification issues relating to a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be given the fullest attention by a negotiating body such as the Conference on Disarmament, and that is what is provided for in draft resolution L.73 - the fullest attention, rather than the scant attention that an amending conference on the Partial Test Ban Treaty would be likely to be able to give those vital issues of verification.

Under these circumstances Australia, as a State party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, will not support the initiative set forth in document A/C.1/40/L.49, but will instead abstain in the vote.
Mr. LARHOUIT (Morocco) (interpretation from French): My delegation would like to explain its position on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73. My delegation attaches great importance to the question of the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. However, we regret that the 1963 agreement on a partial ban was not followed up by a comprehensive treaty. We also regret the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able so far to create an ad hoc committee on this question, in spite of the various constructive proposals from the non-aligned group, the Group of 21. However, my delegation regrets that it will have to abstain in the vote on this draft resolution. It cannot agree with certain of its provisions, particularly operative paragraph 4, which defines the mandate to be given to the ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament. The practice has been that it is for the members of the Conference to define at its own session the mandate to be conferred to the Committee in question. We would have liked to see operative paragraph 4 put to a separate vote; but if there is no separate vote on this paragraph, then we shall have to abstain on the draft resolution as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no other delegations wishing to explain their votes before we take decisions. We shall therefore proceed to take action on the draft resolutions listed in cluster 10, beginning with draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1. It has 12 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 32nd meeting on 8 November 1985. The sponsors are: Austria, Ecuador, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia.

A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Grenada, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Spain, Turkey, Zambia

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1 was adopted by 111 votes to 2, with 25 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42. It has 13 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Hungary at the 36th meeting on 13 November 1985. The sponsors are: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam.

A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Grenada, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Spain, Turkey

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42 was adopted by 107 votes to 3, with 26 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49. It has seven sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 32nd meeting on 8 November 1985. The sponsors are: Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia.

A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Grenada, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Zambia

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49 was adopted by 108 votes to 3, with 26 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73. It has 20 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of New Zealand at the 34th meeting on 12 November 1985. The sponsors are: Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sweden, Thailand and Vanuatu.

A recorded vote has been requested on the draft resolution as a whole, and separate recorded votes have been requested on operative paragraphs 4 and 5.

We shall begin with operative paragraph 4.
A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Zaire, Zambia

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe

Operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73 was adopted by 70 votes to 3, with 60 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to take a separate recorded vote on operative paragraph 5.
A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam

Abstaining: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burma, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Iraq, Israel, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Romania, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe

Operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73 was adopted by 80 votes to 12, with 40 abstentions.*

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, as a whole.

*Subsequently the delegation of Uruguay advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.
A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Portugal, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, as a whole, was adopted by 103 votes to 3, with 32 abstentions.*

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those delegations wishing to explain their votes on the draft resolutions in cluster 10 after the voting.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): The United States wishes to explain its votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35, L.49 and L.73, all of which address the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

*Subsequently the delegation of Democratic Yemen advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.
It is well known that a comprehensive test ban continues to be a long-term objective of the United States arms control policy. Such a ban should be achieved in the context of broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities and expanded confidence-building measures.
Additionally, of course, the United States recognises the necessity for maintaining an effective deterrent. My Government has taken an important step towards that goal by pursuing with a sense of great urgency deep, equitable and verifiable arms reductions during the course of the negotiations in Geneva with the Government of the Soviet Union. We are confident that progress in that forum will open the way towards a comprehensive test-ban.

I must also call attention to an additional reason why the United States could not support draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35 and L.49. Those draft resolutions contain paragraphs that imply that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) reached consensus on a call for immediate negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban. A reading of that document clearly establishes that there was no such consensus. The United States is of course fully committed to the implementation of the NPT. The recent Review Conference demonstrated once more the importance of that Treaty.

In addition, the United States voted in favour of operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73. My Government has consistently supported, and has actively contributed to, the development and improvement of the seismic monitoring network. That effort centred in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament should go forward.

The United States looks forward to being able to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban, but such negotiation must rest upon a sound foundation, not upon emotion, however well intentioned, and not on the basis of inaccurate scientific information. We intend to continue to devote large sums of money to the scientific research and development of seismic and other technologies that will serve as a basis for a sound régime of verification for nuclear testing. We hope that other nations will co-operate in the proper use of this technology for verification.
We particularly regretted, in this respect, the declining by the Soviet Union of our invitation to be present, with whatever equipment it deemed necessary, at a recent nuclear test. We invite all other nations to join us in building such a foundation for a comprehensive test-ban.

Mr. Campora (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The Argentine delegation has abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49 because it prefers the mechanism proposed in draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35 and L.42, on which the Argentine delegation voted affirmatively, which pursue the same objective through the Conference on Disarmament, in our opinion the most appropriate multilateral framework for the preparation of a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon Powers are represented in the Conference on Disarmament, a condition that is not met in the mechanism envisaged in draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49.

As for draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73 on agenda item 51, my delegation abstained in that vote. We hope that next year it will be possible to prepare a single draft resolution, together with A/C.1/40/L.35. We also hope that that may be done far enough in advance to enable it to be given the careful consideration the subject deserves.

We must note that the operative paragraphs 4 and 5, with their detailed sub-paragraphs, could have benefited from more time for our consideration, since we remain unconvinced that the General Assembly should be making such detailed statements on rather technical aspects. We must also express our approval of the negotiating mandate being given the Conference on Disarmament in draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73 on the first item on its agenda, "Nuclear-weapons-test ban".
Mr. JESSEL (France) (interpretation from French): I should like briefly to explain the negative votes just cast by the French delegation on the three draft resolutions, A/C.1/40/L.42, L.49 and L.73.

The French delegation voted against draft resolution L.42 because the text contains an appeal to all nuclear Powers to join in a test moratorium. The French delegation cannot accept such a moratorium for the same reasons that prevent it from precluding an agreement on the prohibition of such tests. Furthermore, in light of the number of tests carried out by the two main nuclear Powers and the technological advances for those States that stem from such tests, the principal effect of a test moratorium would be to enshrine the qualitative and quantitative advances now accruing to those Powers.

We also voted against draft resolution L.49. We are not a party to the 1963 Treaty, nor are we a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, but we believe, as my delegation has stated on many occasions, that a test-ban can only be realized in the framework of a nuclear-disarmament process the prerequisite for which remains reduction of the arsenals of the two Powers that have the largest such arsenals.

Further, the French delegation voted against draft resolution L.73. In addition to the aforementioned substantive reasons, we did so to express our legal reservations, in particular with regard to operative 4 of the text, on which we also cast a negative vote, because in that paragraph the General Assembly would be setting a particularly detailed programme of work for an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament, whereas the Conference on Disarmament alone is competent to decide on such a programme of work.

Mr. MOLDE (Denmark): I should like briefly to explain my delegation's votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, L.42 and L.49, all concerning the cessation of nuclear-test explosions.
My delegation abstained in the voting on those three draft resolutions. My delegation wholeheartedly supports the objectives of the three draft resolutions. We also support the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty banning all - and I would emphasize "all" - nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time. The Danish Government has long considered this to be an urgent matter of extreme importance. However, it is the view of my delegation that a fourth draft resolution on the subject, A/C.1/40/L.73, of which my delegation is a sponsor, offers the most constructive and realistic procedures for attaining a speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.
Mr. HALACHEV (Bulgaria): I should like to explain the votes of the Bulgarian delegation on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, L.49 and L.73. Our votes on those draft resolutions are based on the consistent position of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in favour of the speedy conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. That position has been stated on many occasions in this Committee as well as in the Conference on Disarmament.

In keeping with that position my delegation sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42, "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 39/60 on the Immediate Cessation and Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests". We also voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.49, "Cessation of All Test Explosions of Nuclear Weapons". We fully share the main thrust of those two draft resolutions.

The draft resolution entitled "Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty," A/C.1/40/L.73, does not reflect our basic requirements. Although we share some of the conclusions contained in it, we cannot subscribe to a number of its provisions. The draft resolution provides for the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban," but proposes a programme of work for that ad hoc committee that could set back negotiations for a number of years. It is inappropriate for the General Assembly to decide on the programme of work of a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament.

In addition, that programme of work is completely unbalanced. The over-emphasis on the issue of verification does not take into account the progress so far achieved in that field and could result in dragging out negotiations for years to come, a considerable delay in concluding the treaty and continuation of nuclear-weapon tests. Those are the reasons for our abstention in the vote on operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution.
The provisions of operative 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73 envisage the establishment of mechanisms which, in the absence of a real treaty effectively prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, are in our view superfluous. This, as a matter of fact, is in the interests of those States that have no desire to cease nuclear-weapon tests, with a view to continue the development of new nuclear arms. That is why those States refuse to accept the moratorium on all nuclear tests and to negotiate in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Consequently, we voted against operative paragraph 5.

Finally, for all the foregoing reasons, the Bulgarian delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73 as a whole.

Mr. ROCHE (Canada): Canada very carefully studied the three draft resolutions on nuclear testing, A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, L.42 and L.73, before deciding on its vote. It is well known that the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty stopping all nuclear tests in all environments for all time continues to be a fundamental and abiding Canadian arms-control and disarmament objective. We believe that a comprehensive test-ban is a concrete, realistic measure that would constitute a major step in curbing the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. That is why Canada continues to work to overcome the significant political and technical obstacles which must be resolved before a comprehensive test-ban treaty can ever be achieved.

Canada studied the three nuclear-test draft resolutions with a view to assessing what they can accomplish in the Conference on Disarmament in terms of realistic and practical measures which would ultimately lead to a comprehensive test-ban. We note that draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42, sponsored by the group of socialist countries, was appreciably rewritten this year. It speaks vaguely but tantalizingly of negotiating adequate measures of verification. Canada is a major
proponent of the need for adequate verification of any negotiated arms-control agreement. Draft resolution L.42 also alludes to the problem of the circumvention of a comprehensive test-ban by means of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which, of course, has been one of our concerns because they constitute a possible loophole.

However, L.42 also welcomes a testing moratorium. From our viewpoint, such an unverifiable declaratory measure is not helpful in achieving the comprehensive test-ban and detracts from the draft resolution. We note that draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, sponsored by the group of neutral and non-aligned countries, has perceptibly improved by calling for the establishment of two working groups in the Conference on Disarmament which would deal with the structure and scope of the treaty and with compliance and verification. It now also recognises the necessity of prohibiting all nuclear-test explosions, not just nuclear-weapons tests. However, draft resolution L.35/Rev.1 also calls for a moratorium without any acceptable verification measures and seems to ignore the necessity of all five nuclear-weapon States participating in the work towards a comprehensive test-ban.

The third draft resolution, A/C.1/40/L.73, which Canada supported, has most to commend it. Specifically, it outlines a realistic and detailed programme of work encompassing scope, verification and compliance. Moreover, it highlights the critical role that the establishment of an international seismic monitoring network would play in monitoring and verifying compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Canada generally shares the broad objective of that draft resolution. It is not, however, entirely satisfied that the proposed way of achieving that objective is realistic. Nevertheless, it is our strong hope that the many positive elements in it will help to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to proceed with its substantive work on this question.
Mr. KUNDA (Zambia): My delegation would like to explain its vote on
draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, L.49 and L.73 on the important and urgent
question of the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.

To begin with, I should like to reiterate Zambia's fullest support for all
efforts aimed at the realization of the cessation of test explosions of nuclear
weapons. We fervently believe that such a course of action would go a long way in
arresting the hitherto unbridled nuclear-arms race. We believe, too, that a
cessation would provide an unparalleled confidence-building measure that would
significantly raise the level of trust among States. In addition, a cessation
would constitute a major contribution to general and complete disarmament, a goal
which Zambia resolutely strives for.
(Mr. Kunda, Zambia)

In essence, therefore, Zambia supports the underlying thrust of the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons in draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, L.49 and L.73. However, as is well known, Zambia is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the three draft resolutions make repeated reference. In the circumstances, my delegation has had no other choice than to abstain in the voting on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, L.49 and L.73.

Mr. Gyi (Burma): The delegation of Burma wishes to explain its votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1, L.42, L.49 and L.73.

In the past, we have given our earnest support to all efforts towards the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions, and to achieve that objective the delegation of Burma has joined all endeavours being made in the Conference on Disarmament to conduct multilateral negotiations to achieve a test-ban treaty. We regret, however, that despite such efforts the Conference on Disarmament has not, after seven years of existence, been able to establish an ad hoc committee with a mandate susceptible to negotiations.

This year, we believe that there is a general convergence of approaches in the draft resolutions before us, in that all the draft resolutions are susceptible to the commencement of negotiations. We therefore support the main thrust of the draft resolutions and have cast affirmative votes on all of them. That is not to say, however, that we would necessarily agree with all that is said in them.

We would also like to stress that in the past we have supported all draft resolutions calling for the suspension of all nuclear-weapon tests pending achievement of a test-ban treaty, and our affirmative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42 is consistent with our previous efforts.
My delegation would also like to explain its position on operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.35/Rev.1. We do not consider it relevant to associate ourselves with those parts of that operative paragraph in which reference is made to the relationship between negotiations on a test-man treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, since Burma is not a party to the latter. For the same reasons, my delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.67 relating to the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, when it stated that it was not relevant to express its views on the Final Declaration of that Review Conference, in which Burma did not participate. My delegation holds such views wherever references are made to that Final Declaration in draft resolutions on which I have just explained my delegation's vote.

Mr. Fischer (Uruguay): With regard to operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.73, my delegation does not agree to setting a fixed time table for the prospective negotiations. We feel that it would have been more appropriate had the text expressed the need for all the items to be included in the agenda without setting a predetermined list.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.