VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 36th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

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CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. GRUNDMANN (German Democratic Republic): The delegation of the German Democratic Republic wishes to introduce the revised text of the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", contained in document A/C.1/40/L.13/Rev.1. The sponsors of that draft resolution, in addition to the German Democratic Republic, are: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam.

After consultations with a number of countries, we have added a new paragraph to the preamble of the draft resolution. This new preambular paragraph, numbered 14, takes note of the Final Document adopted at the Eighth Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Luanda in September 1985, which states inter alia that there is an urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations on the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Permit me now to introduce, also on behalf of Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Viet Nam, the draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons", contained in document A/C.1/40/L.15.

As the discussion on agenda item 63 and the relevant discussion at the recent session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament have made clear, the prohibition of chemical weapons is being given the highest attention. In order to expedite the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, based on the results reached so far in the negotiations, it is imperative to intensify the efforts to that end.
In the present draft resolution, the co-sponsors have taken into consideration the following statement made at the summit meeting of the Warsaw Treaty member States held in Sofia from 22 to 23 October this year:

"In present-day conditions, the objective of a total ban and elimination of chemical weapons, including their particularly dangerous binary version, acquires even greater importance and urgency". (A/C.1/40/7, p. 8)

It is gratifying to note that the non-aligned countries also, in the Political Declaration adopted in Luanda in September this year, demanded that "efforts should be made to conclude without further delay a treaty banning the use, development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons. They urged all States to undertake negotiations in good faith and to abstain from any action that could impede the early conclusion of a chemical-weapon convention".

That is the objective of the draft resolution before the Committee in document A/C.1/40/L.15. The draft takes into consideration that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament is, in accordance with its mandate, directed to the full and complete process of negotiations for developing and working out the convention, and that in 1985 preliminary drafting of provisions of the convention was undertaken.

The co-sponsors have in each of the previous years submitted a draft resolution on the prohibition of chemical weapons. With regard to the draft now before the Committee I should like to underline the following aspects.

The first preambular paragraph recalls paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, on disarmament, which describes the prohibition of chemical weapons as one of the most urgent tasks. Consequently, the need for the earliest conclusion of a convention has been reaffirmed in the third preambular paragraph of the draft.
As a new element, the fourth preambular paragraph stresses the continuing importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed 60 years ago in Geneva.

The fifth preambular paragraph also is new. It underlines the determination, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the earliest conclusion and implementation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

Taking into account the growing awareness that the qualitative improvement and further development of chemical weapons will complicate ongoing negotiations, the seventh preambular paragraph draws attention to recent decisions on the production and intended deployment of qualitatively new chemical weapons.

The eighth preambular paragraph underlines the necessity for all States - today more than ever before - to display a constructive attitude towards such negotiations and the political will to reach an early agreement on the chemical-weapons convention.
The tenth preambular paragraph takes note of proposals on the creation of chemical-weapon-free zones aimed at facilitating the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and at contributing to the achievement of stable regional and international security.

The basic concern of this draft resolution is expressed in operative paragraph 3. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament is urged to intensify the negotiations in the relevant Ad Hoc Committee with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to proceed immediately to drafting such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

Paragraph 4 reaffirms the call to all States to conduct serious negotiations in good faith and to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of any new types of chemical weapons as well as from stationing chemical weapons on the territory of other States.

The new operative paragraph 5 calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Geneva Protocol of June 1925.

My delegation wishes to inform the Committee that it supports the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/40/L.24 and has become a sponsor, in accordance with its action last year. We consider draft resolution L.15 to be complementary to draft resolution L.24.

Before concluding I wish on behalf of the sponsors of resolution L.15 to announce two slight changes in the text.

In the sixth preambular paragraph, after the words "in particular", the words "highly appreciating" should be added, so that the whole paragraph reads:
"Taking into consideration the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its session in 1985 regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, highly appreciating the work of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons."

In the third operative paragraph, after the words "for this purpose", the words "to proceed immediately to drafting" should be replaced by the words "to intensify the drafting process of", so that the paragraph reads:

"Urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date and, for this purpose, to intensify the process of drafting such a convention for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-first session."

My delegation expresses the hope that the draft resolution I have just introduced will continue to find broad support in the interests of an early agreement on the chemical weapons convention.

Mr. EMERY (United States of America): I value this opportunity to address the First Committee, in particular at this time, because of its timeliness — less than a week before the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, during which they will discuss many of the significant issues in international security and arms control that are worked on with diligence and commitment by representatives in this Committee.

Naturally everyone here is concerned about the prevention of war. This Committee has before it several draft resolutions dealing with the prevention of nuclear war and one which addresses the more pertinent question of preventing any type of war. The basic position of the United States on this issue is well known. It is that wars are caused not by arms themselves but instead by those who possess them. The critical factor, therefore, is the behaviour of States, particularly
their observance of the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding the use of force in international relations.

At the same time the United States fully recognizes that effective and verifiable arms control agreements capable of enhancing international stability can make a significant contribution to the cause of peace. Clearly important in this regard are the bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms. My Government believes it is important to keep this Committee informed, within the agreed limits of confidentiality between the negotiating partners, of the status and prospects of those negotiations. The focus of my remarks today will be on the United States approach to the nuclear and space arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, and especially on the motivations, reasons and expectations underlying the President's recent decision to table new United States proposals in Geneva.

Many of us here today have become specialists in particular areas of international concern. Our world requires that we fulfill such a mission; our jobs require that we assume such roles. In my current position I have spent much time focusing on arms control issues. However, no one knows better than representatives here at the United Nations, who work daily on many complex and often frustrating global issues, that arms control efforts, however genuine, honourably motivated and deeply felt, will be fruitless if they are considered in a void.

I want to preface my remarks, accordingly, with a brief statement of our fundamental goals for a better world that I know many representatives here share. They are goals which we have pursued in the United Nations and which we will pursue with the Soviet Union in Geneva. The United States seeks a peaceful world in which countries stop trying to expand their influence through armed intervention, subversion or the threat of force. In this regard President Reagan introduced an initiative here in the United Nations in October for negotiated settlements,
withdrawal of outside forces and international efforts to build economies and to meet human needs.

Arms control must be part of a broader policy and framework - the broader policy to stop aggression and to promote increased adherence to the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The rivalry between East and West is not the result of personalities, of simple misunderstandings, of arms build-up or of economic competition. That rivalry stems from fundamental moral and political differences that are reflected in differences over a wide range of international, regional, human-rights, defence and other problems. Weapons are the symptom of this struggle, not its cause. Weapons to not themselves bring war. Aggressive acts and aggressive policies do.

The United States of course recognizes the need radically to reduce existing nuclear arsenals in a stable manner. We need to do the utmost, without delay, to eliminate the grave threat that nuclear arms pose. It is because of this threat that President Reagan has repeatedly stated during the course of the United States/Soviet bilateral nuclear negotiations in 1982 and 1983, and in the current talks in Geneva, that there is no more important goal than eliminating the threat of nuclear conflict, in part through genuine arms reductions; that he is prepared to go the extra mile with the Soviet Union to reach an agreement; and that he has given American negotiators unprecedented flexibility to try to narrow the differences between the two sides.

In this light, after meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in September, President Reagan welcomed the fact that the Soviet Union had made a counter-proposal to the proposals for substantial reductions in arms which the United States had offered in Geneva.
Let me turn to the Soviet counter-proposal. Let there be no mistake, it is one-sided. There are parts which are simply unacceptable. For example, the Soviet insistence on counting United States medium-range missiles and aircraft as strategic systems while leaving about 2,000 of their own comparable aircraft and missiles - including all SS-20s - plus nearly 300 Backfire bombers unconstrained.

The Soviet Union is well aware that its position to include in its definition of "strategic" the so-called forward-based systems has been rejected by every United States Administration since the early 1970s because of the adverse impact it would have on our ability to contribute to the defence of our allies. The Soviet demand for compensation for British and French systems in a bilateral negotiation is equally unacceptable.

There are other unfavourable aspects to the Soviet position. Given the sizeable and unconstrained Soviet defences against the United States retaliatory bomber force, the United States cannot accept any direct limit on the number of gravity bombs or short-range attack missiles carried by heavy bombers. Similarly, Soviet insistence on a ban on strategic defence research that is permitted under the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, which would prevent our ability to determine whether we can establish a strategic relationship in the future based upon non-threatening defensive systems which kill no one, is of course not acceptable to the United States.

On the other hand, as the President has said, the Soviet counter-proposal has positive seeds that need to be nurtured. In particular, the Soviet acceptance of the concept of deep reductions in strategic offensive forces was a positive step, one which we have been trying to encourage since 1977. We therefore decided to build upon this in making a further effort to lay out a common basis for negotiation, drawing both on the basic principles of past United States proposals -
which remain on the table — and on the positive elements of the Soviet counter-proposal.

We shaped the new package so as to achieve deep reductions while retaining our principled focus on the need to reduce the most destabilizing weapons systems — weapons systems which have the greatest speed, are the most powerful, but yet are becoming increasingly vulnerable, and cannot be recalled once they are launched. Ballistic missiles, and especially intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), have all these characteristics that can provide a capability to strike first in a crisis. Eliminating these weapons will greatly increase stability and dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war. We must go beyond the old approach —

The CHAIRMAN: I am sorry to interrupt, but a point of order has been raised. I call on the representative of the USSR.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to ask a question. Today it has been announced that we will be considering draft resolutions on agenda items 48 to 69 and 145 relating to disarmament and we will take decisions on them. As I understand it, the general debate and discussion of specific agenda items have been completed, and now we are presenting draft resolutions and considering them.

I should like to know what draft resolution is being presented right now by the delegation of the United States and on what agenda item?

The CHAIRMAN: In response to the query of the USSR representative, he is indeed right that we are at this stage working in the framework of consideration of and action upon draft resolutions in which the main focus would be comments on and introduction of draft resolutions. I have been given to understand that this will also be done by the delegation of the United States. I therefore ask the representative of the United States to proceed while taking into account that he will indeed focus in his statement on the main framework of our discussion today.
Mr. EMERY (United States of America): I thank the Chairman, and I wish to assure the gentleman that the remarks of the representative of the United States of America are indeed focused on the problem of prevention of war in the nuclear age, the prevention of nuclear war, and in fact the prevention of all war.

We shaped the new package so as to achieve deep reductions while retaining our principled focus on the need to reduce the most destabilizing weapons systems – weapons systems which have the greatest speed, are the most powerful, but yet are becoming increasingly vulnerable, and cannot be recalled once they are launched. Ballistic missiles, and especially intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), have all these characteristics that can provide a capability to strike first in a crisis. Eliminating these weapons will greatly increase stability and dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war. We must go beyond the old approach, not only reducing obsolescent systems but instead giving priority to reductions of those systems which increase the risk of war.

The new United States proposals are comprehensive, including new elements in all three of the negotiating areas: strategic arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and defence and space.

As the Geneva meeting approaches, public discussion of it naturally becomes more and more intense.

That is to be expected, and generally it produces one of the great achievements of open societies – that is, public understanding. I should like to describe the general outline of the new United States proposals.

In the strategic-arms reductions negotiations, our new proposal builds upon the principle of 50 per cent reductions contained in the recent Soviet counter-proposal. We have introduced the following elements: reductions of 50 per cent in ballistic missile warheads to an equal limit of 4,500; reductions to an equal limit of 3,000 on the number of warheads carried by United States and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles – a compromise between the 2,500 limit
the United States previously proposed and the 3,600 limit in the proposal of the Soviet Union - and a 50 per cent reduction in the maximum overall strategic ballistic missile throw-weight possessed by either side.

Contingent on Soviet acceptance of these provisions, the United States would accept an equal limit of 1,500 on the number of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried by United States and Soviet heavy bombers - a 50 per cent reduction from planned United States levels - and a dramatic reduction in the permissible number of air-launched cruise missiles previously proposed by the United States.

This would result in a total of ballistic missile warheads plus air-launched cruise missiles equal to 6,000, as in the Soviet counter-proposal.

The United States would also: accept reductions to an equal limit on the number of United States and Soviet strategic ballistic missiles, ICBMs and SLBMs, of between 1,250 and 1,450 on both sides - this is approximately a 40 to 50 per cent reduction from current Soviet SALT-accountable levels - and accept an equal limit of 350 bombers on each side, a similar percentage reduction from the United States SALT-accountable levels.

In the area of qualitative constraints, we propose two modernization bans. First, we would ban the modernization of heavy strategic ballistic missiles and place a cap on their numbers at current totals. This means constraining the Soviet SS-18 ICBM force. These particular missiles, as I am sure members of the Committee realize, can alone effectively destroy the entire United States land-based missile force. Secondly, given the increasing difficulty in verifying the numbers and status of mobile ICBMs and in determining with certainty that any type of mobile ICBM carries only one warhead, we propose a ban on all such systems. Reductions taken during the sides' modernization of their forces would be according to a build-down formula that emphasizes stabilizing systems over destabilizing systems.
In the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations, the previous United States proposals remain on the table, and we shall continue to seek the total global elimination of the entire class of land-based long-range intermediate nuclear force missiles. There is no reason on earth why either the Soviet Union or the United States should need these weapons. Let us have the political will to eliminate them entirely. Would the world not be substantially safer then? However, until we are able to achieve this goal, as a potential interim step the United States has made new intermediate-range nuclear force proposals. Specifically they are as follows.

The United States would be willing to limit the United States long-range intermediate nuclear force deployment level in Europe existing at the end of 1985, that is, 140 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, in return for agreement by the Soviet Union to reduce SS-20 launchers in range of Europe to that same number. This offer builds upon the Soviet idea of a halt to intermediate-range nuclear force deployments in Europe.

The United States would retain freedom to mix Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile launchers within this overall level; but the exact mix, which could result in an equal warhead level on these and SS-20 missiles in Europe, would be a subject open for discussion. The United States would retain the right for United States missiles remaining after reductions to be relocated within Europe if decided by the United States and its allies.

The Soviet Union would be required to reduce the number of SS-20 launchers in Asia, outside the range of Europe, in proportion to reduction of SS-20 launchers within the range of Europe.

Finally, the end result would limit both sides to an equal global long-range intermediate nuclear force missile warhead number.
(Mr. Emery, United States)

Shorter-range missiles would also be appropriately constrained. The United States would retain its right to match Soviet shorter-range intermediate nuclear force missiles in Europe on a global basis - for example, by deploying shorter-range versions of the Pershing II missile.

The United States has presented new ideas in the defence and space negotiating group as well. We are proposing to the Soviet Union that both sides explore further a possible co-operative transition to greater reliance on defensive systems. The United States is also proposing that the sides join together in an "open laboratories" initiative with respect to strategic defence research. Under such an initiative, the sides would provide regular and reciprocal briefings on each other's strategic defence research programmes and would also provide opportunities to visit associated research facilities and laboratories. We view this initiative as an example of the type of co-operative joint effort aimed at ensuring a stable transition to greater reliance on defences in the future. At the same time, we have made clear to the Soviet Union that the United States is committed to pursuing its strategic defence research programme, that its programme is permitted by the Treaty on anti-ballistic missiles and that the United States will conduct it in full compliance with that Treaty and all other international obligations.

The United States is continuing to stress to the Soviet Union the critical nature of the related issues of verification and compliance with existing agreements and their relationship to progress in reaching any future agreements. It is clear that violations of existing agreements undermine confidence in the arms control process.

These are the main elements of our new proposals. What is the United States hoping to accomplish in fashioning these new proposals? For three years we have proposed cuts of about one-half in the strategic ballistic missiles of the United
States and of the Soviet Union and cuts of about one-third in the numbers of warheads on such missiles. For four years we have proposed the elimination of the entire class of land-based longer-range intermediate nuclear force missiles, including the United States Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile systems and the Soviet SS-20s and SS-4s. We welcome the fact that the Soviet Union finally has responded to these proposals.

In response to the Soviet counter-offer, we have now tried to come up with a proposal that embraces the new Soviet commitment to deep reductions and that structures those reductions and the resulting forces to accommodate in a fair and stabilizing way the force structures of the two sides. Our proposed reductions are responsive to Soviet suggestions, including: the 50 per cent reduction in the most important strategic systems, the 6,000 limit on the most critical strategic weapons, the sublimit on one leg of our triad - the intercontinental ballistic missiles - and certain bans on modernization. The new United States proposals are another demonstration of our serious commitment to achieving real and lasting arms reductions and of our willingness to go the extra mile to find areas of common ground and avenues of progress, to assist with the prevention of war.

This is a difficult challenge, because the two sides have very different approaches. The United States stresses balance between three types of systems - on land, sea and air - and technological sophistication. United States doctrine emphasizes deterrence and a retaliatory strategy. The Soviet force structure places heavy emphasis on much larger land-based forces with more hard-target kill capability; Soviet doctrine emphasizes classical war-fighting, which includes pre-emption, or striking first if they believe war is imminent.

As President Reagan has stressed repeatedly, there can be no winners in a nuclear war. All of us would lose. We hope that the leaders of the Soviet Union truly recognize this fact of mutual vulnerability and that their public statements
to that effect are genuine and sincere. Above all, we hope that they, too, seek to reduce the risk of nuclear war through substantial reductions of arsenals to much lower and equal levels, and to force structures that are more stabilizing and therefore will decrease the risk of war. Our agreed goal is the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons everywhere. The United States seeks through its new proposals to narrow the great differences in the sides' approaches to making progress towards that goal.

The United States does not seek in its new proposals either unilateral advantage or military superiority. The world knows the criteria we use to judge such an agreement. We seek equality, stability, real and militarily significant reductions, verifiability and a complete commitment to compliance on all sides. We will agree to nothing less.

These issues are difficult, and they are certainly critical. They must be addressed with caution and patience. Yet we seek the earliest possible progress for radical reductions in offensive nuclear arms - arms which can kill people and destroy civilization as we know it. In the long term, the United States seeks, as well, to determine, jointly with the Soviet Union, whether our mutual security can be guaranteed without reliance on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation but rather on a non-nuclear, non-threatening defensive balance. This is what we are investigating now in our research under the President's strategic defence initiative.

President Reagan finds the ethical considerations of a defence-reliant deterrent to be compelling. That is why the United States seeks in this negotiation to engage the Soviet Union in a frank and factual discussion, without polemics, of strategic stability, the offense-defense relationship and how the sides might co-operate in proving the feasibility of effective defensive systems which could make war much less likely.
If, through our research on the strategic defence initiative we can determine that such defences are feasible and could provide a safer basis for deterring war in a world with drastically reduced offensive weapons, then a move to ever greater reliance on defensive systems would be morally justified and would certainly make the world far safer.

In this endeavour we are seeking the co-operation of the Soviet Union. We will stay the course on our goals and principles and negotiate flexibly when appropriate, as we are serious about arms control. We want to make it work. Significantly reducing the nuclear arsenals that exist today has been one of President Reagan's prime arms control objectives since he took office.

In the forthcoming meeting between the two Heads of Government and at the next round of bilateral negotiations we will seek to promote a true negotiating spirit. What we are seeking is a long-term lasting improvement in our relationship with the Soviet Union.

As sure as there are many parts to the problem, there are many places to start; but there are many threats to peace and there are many ways to build peace. President Reagan is prepared to place our relationship with the Soviet Union on a more constructive basis. The hope and vision of my Government and of the American people were stated by President Reagan before the General Assembly here in New York last month:

"... let us go to Geneva with both sides committed to dialogue. Let both sides go committed to a world with fewer nuclear weapons and some day, with none. Let both sides go committed to walk together on a safer path into the twenty-first century and to lay the foundation for enduring peace."

(A/40/PV.48, p. 13)
The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker I should like to remind delegations that during this phase of our work, which is devoted to the consideration of and action on draft resolutions, we are specifically engaged in the introduction of and comments on draft resolutions. Accordingly, I should appreciate it if delegations would indeed focus their statements on the subject-matter under consideration.

Mr. FREIER (Israel): I shall speak on agenda item 64 and the draft resolution submitted under that item (A/C.1/40/L.63). My remarks are addressed to those delegations which do not inevitably take a position against Israel irrespective of the merits of its case.

In its resolution 39/147 of 17 December 1984 the General Assembly requested the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to prepare a report on Israeli nuclear armament and instructed UNIDIR to consult with the League of Arab Nations and the Organization of African Unity. That request and instruction are as singular as is the situation of Israel and it is on the following three singularities that I wish to dwell.

The request for this report is singular. There are, as the Committee knows, more than 35 States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and not subject to full-scope safeguards, among them many of proven scientific and technological capability. They are somehow immune from United Nations enquiries into their nuclear potential - they even presume to sit in judgement on Israel. India, as is known, exploded a nuclear device and has not adhered to the NPT, nor has Pakistan. Libya openly shopped around for bombs and adhered to the NPT only when it failed to secure its ends by the frontal approach and elected meanwhile to take the more arduous route of qualifying for nuclear technical assistance. I doubt there are delegations which believe that Libya’s change of stance amounted to a change of
intent. Yet these States and others are or have been respectable members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for ever ready to submit Israel to scrutiny and reproof from which they are exempt by virtue of their proven virginity.

The second singularity is thrown into relief by the injunction of the General Assembly that the League of Arab States be consulted. The League of Arab States is on multiple record about its main purpose, of which I shall quote only its Secretary-General, who declared as early as May 1948:

"This will be a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades."

The practice of the Arab League has been true to its mission. The day the State of Israel was declared, 15 May 1948 — the day so resolved by a United Nations resolution — the Arab States proceeded to invade the country and it was up to Israel alone to fight for its survival; and survive it did. Thereupon the League of Arab States decided to liquidate Israel by a policy of multi-pronged attrition and thus achieve the object which they had been denied by a single concerted assault. Many of the delegations present are at least aware of the boycott, centrally organized by the League, which attempts to deny the Arab market to firms trading with Israel and to hold them hostage in a matter in which they have no stake.

This, then, is the organization with which consultation was made mandatory upon UNIDIR in conducting its inquiry and drafting its report. That mandate amounted to an injunction to marshal arguments in support of foregone conclusions.

I invite Member States to pause for a moment and contemplate these two singularities, the particular enquiry into Israel's nuclear potential and the consultancy imposed on the enquirers, and to ask themselves whether any of them would agree that such perversion of propriety be perpetrated upon their country,
on any matter. They know the answer. Their answer is ours, and my delegation will rest its case on what I have said and not take issue with a report thus conceived.

However, there are delegations which might genuinely wish to understand Israel's security problems and stance, and this leads me to the third singularity, for which I can find no parallel in scope and design.

From the operative part of the draft resolution it appears that these problems and this stance are not sufficiently well understood. Israel has during the initial 30 years of its statehood faced an array of the 20 countries or so of the Arab League, amounting to 150 million people, stretching from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf and vowed to its liquidation. Save for Egypt, Israel continues to face such an array and such determination to this day. Members of the Committee are witnesses to the spate of invective to which my country has been and is being subjected inside and outside the United Nations and may have become used to it over the years. They probably know - and I quote the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - that Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq head the list of importers of arms in the third world; and they may regret the wastage. To Israel, that invective and those tools, however, spell real threats. As will be realized from my quotation of the Secretary-General of the Arab League, which goes back to 1948, their designs are unconditional and independent of any event or argument subsequent to the establishment of the State of Israel. They are primordial and pertain not only to our independence but also from time to time to our physical survival.

Against the enduring claim rightfully to wage wars against Israel and to delegitimize its standing between wars, it may be asked how Israel proposes that the Middle East be kept free from nuclear arms. It does so on the basis of the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, commonly referred to as the Palme Commission, which says expressly:
"The Commission believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region or sub-region concerned constitutes an important step towards non-proliferation, common security and disarmament."

Those are the words of the Commission, and such was the practice in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the recent agreement in the South Pacific. Such, indeed, was Israel's declared position even before the Palme Commission was convened.
The Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of Israel reiterated this position, once again, when he addressed the General Assembly on 2 October 1985. He then said:

"... we believe that the most effective and credible barrier to proliferation in so sensitive an area as the Middle East is a freely and directly negotiated convention establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, based on a system of obligations binding on all States concerned. Israel stands ready to begin such negotiations without delay or preconditions." (A/40/PV.18, p. 86)

Members will recognize the identity of views between Israel's policy and the recommendations of the Palme Commission, to which the United Nations General Assembly had given its agreement.

Negotiations in good faith between the States of the region are the confidence-building precursor to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is inconceivable that mutually binding arrangements inherent in such a zone can rest on the assumption that conventional wars continue to be the order of the day. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not, as is known from experience, inhibit the practice of conventional wars. A nuclear-weapon-free zone does. This is the essential difference, and the one which matters to us.

The Palme Commission further tells us:

"Peace ... must be sought through a tireless process of negotiation, rapprochement, and normalization, with the goal of removing mutual suspicion and fear". (A/CN.10/38, annex, p. 12)

Israel has been and is ready to act on this principle, and both Israel's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have restated before the General Assembly their commitment to negotiation and peace. My delegation, therefore, puts it to Member States that they prevail on the Arab States to take up this challenge, rather than continue to support Arab intransigence which, patently and expressly, seeks no peace.
Every nation is sovereign to decide on what - under prevailing circumstances - will best further the cause of non-proliferation, whether the NPT or regional arrangements in the form of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This right cannot be usurped by the United Nations with respect to any country, Israel included.

My delegation, therefore, suggests that the Committee refuse to endorse any demand upon Israel which they would reject in the legitimate exercise of their own sovereignty, and any request for sanctions against Israel, such as in operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.63, for similarly exercising its sovereign rights.

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.63 compels us once again to make reference to a non-existent nuclear co-operation with South Africa. I invite the Committee - and in particular our friends in Africa - to rest assured that this is a mere myth in which there is no truth. These are the facts, no matter how convenient the perpetuation of this myth is, especially to those Arab countries which fuel the economy of South Africa.

In short, my delegation recommends that draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.63 be rejected in its entirety.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Argentina takes this opportunity to introduce two draft resolutions which in substance are nothing new, since they reproduce practically in their entirety texts which are already known on issues of pathetic import for the human race.

Prevention of nuclear war, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament are major items on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations which have not been able to overcome the obstacles in their path. Paralysis in the treatment of those items therefore justifies our insistence in repeating them, bearing in mind how serious those issues are. Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.65 deals with the prevention of nuclear war. On a previous occasion we
made a statement contained in the records of the twenty-second meeting of this Committee, in which we referred to General Assembly resolution 39/148 P, dated 17 December 1984, in which the General Assembly:

"Expresses its conviction that in view of the urgency of this matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it is necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war;"

and

"Again requests the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war ...".

In that statement we also stressed that resolution 39/148 P, according to our interpretation, contains an objective which is basically methodological because it points to a method of work. In other words, the Conference on Disarmament is asked "to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee ..." to consider appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.65 which we are introducing today pursues the same objective.

We also wish to point out that this draft resolution reflects the position of the non-aligned countries adopted at the eighth Ministerial meeting held in Luanda in September of this year.

The second draft resolution I should like to introduce is A/C.1/40/L.64. It deals with the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. On this item, the delegation of Argentina made a statement contained in the records of the thirtieth meeting of this Committee.
This second draft resolution is intended to promote consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race in the Conference on Disarmament. We all know the conditioning factor at the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament with regard to nuclear items.

The Ministers of the non-aligned countries who also met recently in Luanda stated that nuclear disarmament must take into account equally the security interests of the nuclear-weapon States and of non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as ensuring that the survival of mankind is not endangered.

The non-aligned countries bear a special responsibility, because it is up to them to work towards understanding and towards bringing closer together the positions of the military alliances. The draft resolutions which I have just introduced are an expression of that inescapable role which the non-aligned countries have made their own.
Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The distorted descriptions of the position of the Soviet Union contained in the statement by the United States representative would seem to call for some reply. I shall refrain from making that reply, however, since I am mindful of your appeal, Mr. Chairman, to Committee members, as well as out of respect for the delegations in the Committee, which, with the exception of the United States delegation, have been adhering to the working guidelines of the Committee that we all approved.

I wish to introduce today draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.44, entitled "Nuclear-weapon freeze". The draft resolution is sponsored by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A nuclear-weapon freeze would be, relatively speaking, one of the easiest and most effective ways of establishing confidence and, at the same time, lessening international tension and the threat of nuclear war. It is for that reason that this question is being considered by the United Nations General Assembly as a priority matter calling for immediate solution. The idea of such a freeze, as has become clear in recent years, is of interest to the overwhelming majority of States, in spite of differences of approach. As has been demonstrated by the debate in the General Assembly at this session, the timeliness of the question has not diminished but increased. The appeal to the nuclear Powers to halt the development of their nuclear arsenals has also been included in several highly important documents of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and in the 1984 and 1985 Declarations of the Heads of State or Government of countries of five different continents, Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania.
The Soviet Union takes that appeal by the international community into account in its foreign policy. We have put forward specific proposals in this regard. The idea of a nuclear-weapon freeze has been reflected in the redrafting of the programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which deals with the question in the context of steps leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, however, our proposal is rejected by the States to which it has been addressed; I refer to those States that year in, year out, stubbornly reject relevant recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly.

The draft resolution we are submitting today is not merely a repetition of the draft resolution we submitted last year on this subject, and I wish particularly to draw Members' attention to this. Taking into account the wishes of a number of States, we have included several additional elements, in particular with regard to verification measures. We hope that these additions have not escaped the notice of those who express concern in that regard.

I believe it is also important to mention that in our new draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon freeze there is a closer link with subsequent steps that would lead to a reduction in nuclear weapons up to their complete elimination.

Specifically, we are proposing that the General Assembly appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to freeze their nuclear arsenals, from a specific date, on a global scale and under appropriate verification, as a first step to their reduction with a view to their complete elimination. That appeal should promote the embodiment of the idea of a nuclear-weapon freeze in the specific language of concrete agreements. The Soviet Union, for its part, has always been and remains ready to reach such agreements, on a reciprocal basis, of course.
Mr. CESAR (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): On behalf of the sponsors - Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam and Czechoslovakia, I have pleasure in introducing draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.48, entitled "International co-operation for disarmament", under agenda item 65.

It is unnecessary for me to dwell upon the complexity of the current international political situation. It has been analysed in detail in statements during the general debate, including the statement by the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The overwhelming majority of States spoke in favour of taking decisive steps to prohibit offensive weapons in outer space, to ban nuclear-weapon tests and to freeze and subsequently reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Steps should also be taken to achieve progress in other areas under discussion in all disarmament forums as well as on a bilateral basis. An important practical step could thereby be taken towards implementing the decisions in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The importance of that session has been confirmed again at this session of the General Assembly. In that connection there is also an increasing emphasis on the United Nations Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, adopted at the initiative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1979. That is because the main objective of the Declaration is to promote the implementation of the decisions of the General Assembly at its special sessions. That fundamental purpose was also reaffirmed in resolutions adopted at the thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth sessions of the General Assembly, of all of which Czechoslovakia was a sponsor. Moreover, those resolutions
supplemented and elaborated upon the basic provisions of the Declaration on
International Co-operation for Disarmament in such a way that today that document
reflects the evolution of this extremely important issue of our time.

This is also the thrust of the draft resolution being submitted this year,
which emphasizes the relevance of earlier resolutions and of the Declaration
itself, as well as laying special emphasis on new elements in the present situation
concerning disarmament matters.
The main purpose of the foreign policy of all States should be to eliminate the threat of nuclear war, reduce military confrontation and develop international relations in a spirit of peaceful co-operation and détente. Ideological differences should not be transferred to the plane of international relations, thereby undermining their stability. That is especially true at present, when, more than ever before, there is a need for the active interplay of all States and Powers that advocate normalization of the international situation. Political dialogue by States with differing social structures, statements by realistically thinking circles, activities by anti-war movements and all peace-loving forces, indicate that the restoration of détente and its application to all areas of international relations and a shift towards reliable security and co-operation are fully achievable.

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.48 emphasizes the special responsibility of the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals. It expresses the conviction that those States must begin the process of ending the arms race and preventing its spread to outer space. If that is done, a good basis will be established for the solution of all international questions. This appeal is exceptionally timely today, on the eve of the summit meeting in Geneva between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States. In the light of that fact, and also on the basis of the statements of the majority of delegations in the First Committee, the draft resolution draws attention to the very destabilizing effects that any militarization of outer space would have. At the same time, the draft resolution contains an appeal for the peaceful use of outer space, for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

The draft resolution commends and fully accepts the decisions contained in the New Delhi Declaration by six States, dated 28 January this year. In addition to referring to the foregoing questions, that Declaration draws attention to the need to end nuclear-weapon tests as a first step towards nuclear disarmament.
Concrete results in the area of disarmament can be achieved only through constructive negotiations on the basis of the principles of the equality and undiminished security of all parties.

The fundamental idea of the draft resolution is reflected in its very title. There is therefore no need to go into any further detail about its contents. I express the hope that, once again, the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations will support the idea of developing and strengthening international co-operation for disarmament.

Mr. SHAKER (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): Today I wish to introduce two draft resolutions. The first, document A/C.1/40/L.67, relates to the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The second, document A/C.1/40/L.5, concerns the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

As members will note, draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.67 is simple, but it deals with an important and successful conference. I am introducing this draft resolution on behalf of a large number of countries that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under its single operative paragraph, the General Assembly would note with satisfaction that, on 21 September 1985, the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted a Final Document by consensus. That Final Document contains two important annexes. The first (A/C.1/40/9, pp. 2-18) is the Final Declaration of the Conference, which was also adopted by consensus. The second (A/C.1/40/9, pp. 19 and 20) is the declaration by the group of non-aligned and neutral States.

I do not have to mention the results attained by the Third Review Conference. In their statements to the Committee, many members have already referred to the great success achieved by the Conference, and I also spoke of that in my statement during the general debate in the Committee.
I would merely express the hope that this draft resolution will be supported by all the members of the Committee, particularly since the resolutions of the Third Review Conference were adopted by consensus.

I turn now to the other draft resolution I have the honour to introduce today: draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.5, concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. Everyone here is familiar with the initiative taken by Egypt in this connection. I would merely state now that Egypt prepared this draft resolution having regard to the report (A/40/442 and Add.1) submitted by the Secretary-General in response to the relevant resolution adopted last year by the General Assembly. It will be recalled that that resolution requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of all concerned parties regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.
The draft resolution has some new elements this year, namely paragraphs 6 to 9. Paragraph 6 thanks the Secretary-General for his report, which includes the opinions of the parties concerned regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East; paragraph 7 takes note of that report. Paragraph 8 requests those parties which have not yet communicated their views to the Secretary-General to do so. We hope that next year we may receive responses from States that have not yet replied.

Paragraph 9 welcomes any further comments from those parties which have already communicated their views to the Secretary-General. Some countries that responded this year might wish next year to add something new to their responses.

Paragraph 10 requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its next session.

That is all I want to say at this stage concerning that draft resolution. I hope it will have the support of the Committee and be adopted by consensus, as was last year's resolution.

Mr. ENGO (Cameroon): At the fifteenth meeting of the First Committee, on 28 October 1985, my delegation had the honour to outline the views of the Government of the Republic of Cameroon on the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, which appears as item 68 (g) on the current agenda of the Committee. At that time we stressed the view that the item deals with the core of the role, indeed the very raison d'etre, of the United Nations under the Charter, namely the maintenance of international peace and security. We also expressed our hope that at its 1986 substantive session the Disarmament Commission would successfully conclude its consideration of the subject and submit a final report to the General Assembly at its forty-first session, also in 1986.
(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

I am speaking to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.72, entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". The sponsors of the draft resolution are Australia, Bahamas, Belgium, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Ruanda, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Togo, Zaire and Zambia.

Our draft resolution is essentially procedural. It does not seek to take sides on any of the specific problems in the disarmament field. Its aim, rather, is to review the role of the United Nations in this entire field with a view to rendering it more effective. We believe that disarmament is of global relevance and of interest to all countries and all peoples. The United Nations, an organization committed to universality of its membership, and charged with the solemn responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, therefore appears as the most appropriate forum for the building of a universally applicable process of peace, including disarmament. This Organization must therefore strive towards reconciling the various and sometimes different positions of States on the various specific disarmament problems with a view to arriving at consensus agreements.

A more effective United Nations role in this field is particularly important for small countries like mine, which have neither the means nor the inclination to join the arms race nor adequate means for credible protection from weapons of mass destruction possessed by the militarily significant States, in particular the nuclear-weapon Powers.

Over the past four decades, especially with the traumatic dawn of the nuclear age, Governments and peoples the world over have increasingly recognized that disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, is an essential component of efforts
(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

not only to realize international peace and security but, above all, to remove the ghastly threat posed to the very survival of the human race by nuclear weapons. No issue is more compelling and more universal than the quest for nuclear disarmament, and no forum provides a more ideal framework for global negotiations in the interest of our collective security, than the universal forum of the United Nations. What is required is to enhance concretely the effectiveness and credibility of this universal forum to enable it to discharge fully its central role and primary responsibility in this field.

From the statements of representatives in this Committee it would seem clear that, despite many efforts over many years, progress in the disarmament field has regrettably been extremely limited and the role of the United Nations has appeared to be increasingly marginal in this domain. A comprehensive review of the role of the United Nations in this field would provide an opportunity for the international community to identify new ways and means of making that role more effective with a view to promoting substantial progress in disarmament.

Forty years since the establishment of the United Nations with a view to saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war, some stock-taking would appear necessary in order for us to re-examine collectively what the international community is doing in this critically important field. We recognize that a number of important and commendable structural and institutional improvements have been made within the context of enhancing the United Nations role in the field of disarmament. Many of those improvements came about as a result of the first review undertaken by the General Assembly in this field about a decade ago.

But, as we emphasized in our last statement to this Committee, last month, the Government of Cameroon, on whose initiative the General Assembly last year decided to undertake the review of the role of the United Nations in the field
of disarmament, does not measure the effectiveness of the United Nations role in 
this field by the large number of meetings held or resolutions adopted, or by the 
many expensive and largely peripheral activities of the disarmament secretariat. 
We anxiously need concrete, practical political agreements among States as well as 
institutional arrangements in which Member States can have confidence. In our view 
the United Nations has adequate facilities and resources at its disposal to play a 
more effective role in the field of disarmament. The central issue is to make 
better use of those resources.

It is our conviction that the immediate focus in our collective endeavour at 
this stage must be on the fullest and most constructive use of the resources and 
structures of the United Nations system in the field of disarmament. If the 
regrettable impasse and deadlock in disarmament efforts, including in the 
Disarmament Commission itself, have demonstrated anything at all, perhaps the 
greatest is that notwithstanding the importance that may be attached to the 
institutional arrangements and reforms established, they should neither be confused 
with nor made to replace concrete, substantive results.
Our primary concern is not so much the quantity but the quality of work done. It is not a question of things rightly done but rather of doing the right thing. We have no doubt that the United Nations has efficiently carried out its various activities in the field of disarmament so far, but the question to be posed is: Has the United Nations been effective in this field?

Some of the reasons why the Organization's role has not always been fully effective in this field lie well beyond the institutional context of the United Nations. There has all too often been a regrettable absence of the appropriate political will. And in several instances, for whatever reasons, determined efforts have been made to bypass the world body completely, even on universally relevant disarmament initiatives.

A review of the United Nations role in the field of disarmament is neither a panacea for the lack of progress in this field, nor is it meant to replace substantive deliberations and negotiations. Rather it is meant to assist and enhance those efforts by identifying ways and means by which the Organization's role in this field can be more effectively discharged. The review should provide an opportunity for infusing meaning and substance to the notion that the United Nations has a central role and a primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. Otherwise the concept will remain a powerless vehicle - which can serve only to erode further the already fragile credibility of the Organization in the eyes of the public.

As has frequently been stressed in statements of representatives in the Committee, we believe that disarmament is a question of security and that it is therefore of interest to all countries. Progress in this domain requires co-operation and participation by all. The process of democratization and equal participation has already begun and must actively be encouraged. A more effective United Nations role in this field would help to ensure that opportunities are
provided for accommodating the concerns and interests of all Member States in all relevant disarmament discussions and negotiations. It would also ensure that the role and contribution of the Secretariat was in accordance with the requirements of Member States for substantive support. Therefore the world forum of the United Nations with its objective of universality should be utilized more fully and more constructively in this field.

As I stated earlier, draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.72 is essentially procedural. It follows on the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission as reflected in paragraph 30 of the Commission's report to the current session of the General Assembly (A/40/42). Most of the provisions of this draft resolution are based on consensus texts of General Assembly decisions and resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 39/151 G on the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, which was adopted by consensus at the Assembly's thirty-ninth session last year.

In the draft resolution's operative part, the most important element is the request to the Disarmament Commission to continue, as a matter of priority, its consideration of the item on the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament with a view to submitting its report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-first session, including conclusions, findings and recommendations, as appropriate.

As we pointed out in our statement on this item at the 15th meeting of the Committee on 28 October, we have taken note of all the valuable comments and views put forward by Member States on the subject in question during the 1985 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission. We take particular note of the agreement reached at that session of the Commission on "Topics for appropriate recommendations", which would serve as the programme of work for this item at the Commission's next consideration of the subject next year. We hope that, especially
with the agreement reached on that programme of work, the Disarmament Commission will proceed to a substantive and comprehensive review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and produce consensus recommendations for the consideration of the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

The seemingly increasing marginalization of the role of the United Nations in this internationally and universally critical domain is a source of major concern. An urgent reappraisal of the situation would appear to be in order. Concrete practical measures to reform are urgently required to prevent the Organization from lapsing into permanent paralysis, indeed, irrelevance, in this crucial field.

In less than a week the leaders of the two super-Powers will begin their long-awaited summit meeting in Geneva. Recent disarmament-related meetings everywhere, including the discussions in this Committee, have had that forthcoming Geneva summit in mind. Understandably, when the leaders of the two nations possessing the largest arsenals of the deadliest weapons meet to discuss disarmament and security-related issues, everyone listens. But when they choose to meet for that purpose outside the framework of the United Nations and thousands of kilometres away from the political Headquarters of the Organization even as it observes its fortieth anniversary, we must be forced to ponder about the standing, indeed the credibility, of the world body in the eyes of its founding fathers.

The results of the work of the Disarmament Commission on the question of the review of the United Nations role will, in our view, surely have a bearing one way or another on the judgement of Member States and of the international public as a whole regarding the role and credibility not only of the Commission but also of the United Nations as a whole.

Let us rise collectively to the occasion to ensure that in the future the United Nations truly exercises its central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. On behalf of the other sponsors, I commend to all members of
the Committee draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.72 and I express the hope that it will be supported by consensus.

Mr. Cromartie (United Kingdom): On behalf of the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey and my own delegation, the United Kingdom, I have the honour to introduce to the Committee draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.56, entitled "Objective information on military matters".

The present draft develops further the ideas in previous resolutions which were overwhelmingly adopted, without any votes cast against them.

The basic concept underlying the draft resolution is the promotion of an atmosphere of confidence. When States have a clearer idea of the military capabilities of others which they may perceive as potential adversaries, mutual confidence is increased. There will be less likelihood of ignorance and fear breeding over-reaction and an unnecessarily high level of armaments. This approach was expressed, inter alia, in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.
I want to make it clear that we are talking not about giving away matters of vital national security but simply providing statistics and other data on, for example, numbers and types of weapon systems which most States represented in this room already furnish on a routine basis to their parliaments and to international works of reference, such as Jane's.

The present draft resolution draws attention to the role that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities can play in reducing tension; it asks States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other major military Powers, to consider additional measures to promote openness and transparency on their military capabilities and also to communicate their views on the subject to the Secretary-General.

In conclusion, let me express the hope that the approach embodied in this draft resolution will command wide support.

Mr. EKBUS (Sweden): I have asked to speak to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.36, on the study on the naval arms race, and I do so on behalf of Australia, Austria, China, Finland, France, Gabon, Indonesia, Iceland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and my own country, Sweden.

The study on the naval arms race (A/40/535) was carried out by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a Group of Governmental Experts under your eminent chairmanship, Sir.

On 1 November, in your capacity as Chairman of the Group of Experts and as representative of Indonesia, you shared with us your thoughts on the report on this study and, inter alia, expressed the hope that the report would be seen as "a serious effort to bring together many disparate aspects of the naval scene and to present a reasoned and non-polemical account of the present naval situation".
I share the hope thus expressed by you as Chairman of the Group as well as your belief that the report contains

"enough information to give a useful picture not only of naval forces and naval arms systems but also of the resources of the sea and the vital importance they represent to the human race". (A/C.1/40/PV.22, pp. 3-5)

The Group of Experts so ably chaired by you, Sir, has managed to provide us with not only a very substantive investigation of a complex set of issues but a study based on a consensus of experts from four different continents.

In the operative part of the draft resolution I am introducing today the Assembly expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and the Group of Governmental Experts and commends the study and its conclusions to the attention of all Member States. As is common with United Nations studies, the Secretary-General is asked to reproduce it and to give it the widest possible distribution.

Furthermore, in operative paragraph 7 the Disarmament Commission is requested to consider, at its forthcoming session in 1986, the issues contained in document A/40/535 in their entirety and to do so with a view to facilitating the identification of whatever measures might be considered possible in the field of naval arms reductions and disarmament, pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, as well as confidence-building in this field.

The Disarmament Commission is asked to take into account in so doing all other relevant proposals also. In order to provide the Disarmament Commission with as broad as possible a basis for its consideration, operative paragraph 5 invites all Member States to communicate their views concerning the study to the Secretary-General so that he will be able to submit a compilation of these views to the Disarmament Commission in time for its consideration of the issues involved.
The views of those Member States that did not have the opportunity to be represented in the Group of Governmental Experts would, I believe, be particularly welcome.

Finally, the draft resolution proposes the inclusion of an item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament" in the provisional agenda of the forty-first session of the General Assembly, at which time the Disarmament Commission is also requested to report on its deliberations and recommendations.

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.36 is put forward with the aim of widening awareness of the issues contained in the study and of providing for serious consideration within the framework of the Disarmament Commission of all aspects involved. The draft resolution itself is mainly of a procedural character. I therefore wish to express the hope of my delegation, as well as that of the other sponsors, that this draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. Gurinovich (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR has the honour to present for the consideration of the First Committee at the fortieth session of the General Assembly draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.33, entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons".

This problem becomes more acute each year. The use of the achievements of scientific and technological progress for military ends is extremely dangerous, because it stimulates the arms race. As everyone knows - and it has been pointed out by many delegations, including the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR during the general debate on disarmament matters - abuse of the achievements of science and technology for purposes of the arms race may lead mankind to the point where not only may unimaginable weapons of mass destruction be created but a qualitatively
new dimension may be added to the arms race itself. This new dimension will make the next upward spiral of the arms race not only difficult to control but altogether impossible to verify and therefore impossible to contain, because of the special technical characteristics of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

In order to take practical and effective measures to prevent the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and in furtherance of steps proposed earlier the delegations of 24 States belonging to different regions of the world and with different social and economic systems - namely, Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam and the Byelorussian SSR - propose, on the basis of what is stated in the draft resolution and the provisions of the Final Document unanimously adopted, by the tenth special session of the General Assembly, that the General Assembly reaffirm the need to prohibit the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.
For these purposes they request the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to keep constantly under control the questions of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons. From our point of view such control could be most effectively carried out through the assistance of a periodically convened group of experts. Those provisions are in operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution.

The establishment of effective machinery for the purpose of giving timely warning to the international community of the real threat posed by the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction would be in keeping with the highest interests of mankind. The draft calls upon all States to contribute, immediately following the identification of any new type of weapon of mass destruction, to the commencement of negotiations on its prohibition with the simultaneous introduction of a moratorium on its practical development. That is provided for in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution. This is the essence of the preventive approach to the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Such an obligation could be assumed by States, including those represented in the Conference on Disarmament, in a joint declaration or in the form of unilateral statements.

Naturally, all States should refrain from any action which could adversely affect efforts to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. That provision is in operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution. This purpose, as we see it, would be served if States were to adopt timely unilateral or agreed measures whereby they would renounce the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and use scientific and
technological achievements exclusively for the aim of the economic and social progress of all peoples, including those of the developing countries.

In drafting the provisions of this draft resolution, it is no exaggeration to say that the sponsors made a significant step towards finding a common denominator that would enable us to solve the problem of preventing the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction in military arsenals and to do so through the joint efforts of all States. The sponsors are deeply grateful to the delegations of non-aligned and developing countries which year after year have actively supported a draft resolution on prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Many of them have co-sponsored resolutions on the question.

Only a small group of Western States have in the past refrained from approving such a resolution. The proposed wording of our draft does take into account the position of the Western countries, which have spoken in favour of drafting, with the help of experts, separate agreements on identified new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The Western countries have disagreed only with our idea of including in the draft resolution a comprehensive agreement of a preventive nature. Those States also considered that the banning of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction should come before those types and systems had emerged.

That position has been directly taken into account in the proposed draft resolution. Accordingly, the sponsors expect the Western countries to meet them half-way and we hope they will vote for the draft resolution. By doing so they would confirm their readiness to prevent a qualitatively new upward spiral in the arms race.

During the preparation of the draft resolution the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic held extensive and, it seems, highly useful consultations with a broad range of delegations, including the Western ones.
Moreover, we emphasize the advisability of establishing an effective warning mechanism built into the framework of the priorities of the Conference on Disarmament in the form of a periodically convened group of experts. Without what I would call that type of impartial machinery to control developments in this area, the provisions of a general nature would amount to no more than vague good intentions. We think the establishment of such a machinery should impress those who are most in favour of control.

The sponsors hope that the general concern over the dangerous consequences of the establishment of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction which emerged during the discussions in the First Committee and during the preliminary consultations on the draft resolution and its content will in the final analysis lead to the establishment of effective procedures to prevent the inclusion of such types of weapons of mass destruction in the military arsenals of States.

In conclusion the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, on behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.33, and in accordance with its operative paragraph 5, calls upon all States to undertake efforts to ensure that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes. The sponsors think that the draft resolution in its present wording could have the support of all delegations, which would make it easier to limit the arms race and strengthen international security in the cause of peace, development and co-operation.

Mr. MAHBOUB (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Israeli nuclear armament" (A/C.1/40/L.63) under item 64 of the agenda, on behalf of the following delegations: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and my own delegation, the delegation of Iraq.

It is noteworthy that the item on Israeli nuclear armament was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, during which the Assembly adopted its resolution 34/89 of 11 December 1979 in which, inter alia, it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. At the thirty-sixth session the General Assembly took note, in its resolution 36/98, of the report of the Secretary-General (A/36/431).
In this resolution it:

"Expresses its deep alarm at the fact that the report has established that Israel has the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and possesses the means of delivery of such weapons;"

It also:

"Calls upon all States and other parties and institutions to terminate forthwith all nuclear collaboration with Israel;"

It:

"Requests the Security Council to prohibit all forms of co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field;"

It also:

"Requests the Security Council to institute effective enforcement action against Israel ..."

and it:

"Demands that Israel should renounce without delay any possession of nuclear weapons and place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards".

However, the Zionist entity paid no heed to that resolution and has persisted in its disregard and defiance of similar resolutions adopted since then by the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international forums. That entity, which aims at expansion, has persisted in its arrogance and in its defiance of the will of the international community, thus threatening not only the region of the Middle East but also the whole world with highly devastating consequences.

There are growing indications of the increase of the capability of the Zionist entity to manufacture nuclear weapons, in co-operation with the racist régime in South Africa. It is also undertaking secret and illegal activities which consist
of smuggling nuclear devices and material from countries which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In addition to the information contained in the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), document A/40/520 of 9 August 1985, concerning Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, there are other sources of information which confirm those facts beyond any doubt. They also indicate the dimensions of this question, and I shall give the following examples.

A report by the Institute for Strategic Studies in Georgetown, Washington, in November 1984 proved that Israel possesses some 50 to 100 nuclear bombs. The Minister of Science and Development in Israel has said that Israel had decided 20 years ago to devise plans for the production of a nuclear bomb in order to avoid depending on other States in this connection and that it had become capable of producing such a bomb. This was published in the Boston Globe in December 1985. The Office of Technological Evaluation in Washington has said that until the year 2000 Israel will be the only State in the Middle East which possesses nuclear weapons. The American Aerospace newspaper in March 1985 also mentioned that Israel has placed a number of Jericho II mobile intermediate range nuclear missiles in the Negev desert and in the Golan Heights, and it also added that Israel possesses nuclear bombs as well.

There are many other sources. In May 1985 the American periodical Newsweek mentioned a report about the involvement of Israel in smuggling 800 Kryton devices which are used in nuclear explosions and stated that Israel has illegally acquired, without notifying the IAEA, 41 tons of depleted uranium, which can be used to produce the equivalent of 4 1/2 pounds of plutonium. This is a serious violation of the provisions of the NPT and of the international safeguards of the IAEA.

When the representative of the Zionist entity spoke this morning about the grave threats against that entity since its usurpation of Palestine — and I do not
want to talk about that subject - in that statement, and by reference to those threats he wanted to emphasize and justify Israel's position as regards nuclear weapons.

The list in this connection is very long and self-evident as regards its danger. What aggravates the situation is that the aggressive Zionist entity has followed and is still following a military ideology built on what is called the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

The UNIDIR report confirms that entity's activities and its co-operation with the racist régime in South Africa in both the military and nuclear fields. Those activities have been and will continue to be a source of increasing anxiety and danger to the two volatile regions - Africa and the Middle East - and also to the world in general. It is a source of deep tension in those two regions, threatening to plunge them into a destructive nuclear catastrophe.

Therefore, support for this draft resolution is not support for one party against another, but is rather support for international peace and security, which is the basis of the United Nations Charter and of all civilized concepts. Support for the draft resolution under consideration will also contribute to dispelling many fears which have been mentioned in this Committee with regard to the eruption of a nuclear catastrophe which can only be avoided through the renunciation by Israel of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, placing all the nuclear facilities of Israel under international safeguards, and through the compliance by Israel with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and of the IAEA in connection with Israel's nuclear activities.

What I have mentioned is a prerequisite for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt has today submitted a draft resolution concerning the establishment of such a zone.
(Mr. Mahboub, Iraq)

While my delegation has consistently supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and throughout the world, we believe that Israel's possession of nuclear-weapon stockpiles prevents the realization of that goal in the Middle East. Israel's armed attack on Iraq's peaceful nuclear facilities was tantamount to an attack with nuclear weapons, and it too requires that the international community take effective measures to avoid the repetition of such an attack or the threat to use force in this area.

The draft resolution my delegation has the honour to introduce on behalf of 23 countries is before the Committee in document A/C.1/40/L.63. Because of the lateness of the hour I see no need to read or review its provisions. The draft resolution is aimed primarily at taking a positive step towards peace and security in a volatile region of the world. That is the main purpose underlying the draft resolution. In order to avoid nuclear catastrophe, effective international efforts free from narrow self-interest are required. We hope that the draft resolution will enjoy the Committee's support as a practical expression of its interest in avoiding the horrible spectre of nuclear weapons, which threaten the peace and security of the world.

Mr. MRKIC (Yugoslavia): The arms race continues unabated, in spite of the clear commitments of the entire international community as expressed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Developments took a turn contrary to the one jointly adopted in the Programme of Action of the first special session on disarmament. That was largely due to a lack of political will on the part of those who bear the greatest responsibility for halting the arms race and launching genuine disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. That assessment has been most strongly embodied in the course of the general debate in our Committee.
The bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers on nuclear and space weapons have been welcomed throughout the world. It is expected that those negotiations will produce concrete results, that is, significant reductions of nuclear arsenals and an agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the meantime, however, the world has not become more secure. The nuclear-arms race has become more intensive, and a further deployment of nuclear weapons has taken place.

It is for that reason that the sponsors, Algeria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Burma, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia, have submitted draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.58, in the hope that it will encourage efforts aimed at halting the arms race and at launching disarmament.

The sponsors are firm in their belief that the recommendations and decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament should be implemented. The sponsors would like to express their desire that the draft resolution receive general support.

**Mr. MEISZTER** (Hungary): On behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam and Hungary, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42, entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 39/60 on an immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".

At the outset my delegation must state that, to our profound regret, resolution 39/60 has not been implemented. As is well known, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to carry out negotiations with a view to reaching
agreement on such a treaty. More than that, for a number of successive years the Conference on Disarmament has been unable even to provide the institutional framework for carrying out negotiations on that issue. At the same time, the issue has lost nothing of its timeliness. Discussions at last year's session of the General Assembly unequivocally revealed that prevention of nuclear war and halting of the nuclear-arms race enjoyed absolute priority in the security policies of the overwhelming majority of Governments represented in the United Nations. The discussions also made clear that the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests was regarded as a first step - I would even say a "first must" - on the road to that goal. This year's discussion, both in the General Assembly and in the First Committee, vigorously reinforced all the postulates contained in resolution 39/60. That reiteration was made on a level never before seen, emanating as it did from more than 50 Heads of State or Government of all continents and representing all existing socio-political systems and all geographical areas.

All this could have authorized us to submit the same resolution this year without the slightest change. However, the sponsors of the present draft resolution thought differently and felt it necessary to take into account some critical observations concerning the wording of some elements of the draft. Delegations will consequently find some new wording in the preambular section. We also, quite naturally, found it necessary to update our draft in the light of the new measures taken in the time-span between the two sessions of the General Assembly, as well as in consequence of some outstanding proposals that reached us during the fortieth session. I have in mind the measures on the unilateral cessation of all nuclear explosions taken by one of the major nuclear-weapon States and the proposals for a suspension of all nuclear tests for a period of 12 months, with the possibility of its extension, contained in the joint 24 October 1985
message addressed to the leaders of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the Heads of State or Government of six countries. Although we are fully aware that the moratorium is not an end in itself - on the contrary, it would be more correct to say that it is only a beginning - the sponsoring delegations regard it as a highly useful measure capable of improving the political atmosphere, demonstrating the good faith of the parties and giving the necessary unrestricted time to conduct negotiations. It is for that reason that we incorporated those proposals in both the preambular and operative parts of our draft resolution.

The acuteness of this problem so eloquently pointed out at this fortieth session of the General Assembly, as well as our profound conviction that the experience accumulated over the years in the multilateral negotiating body could and should serve as both an incentive and as a framework for conducting negotiations and for reaching eventual agreement on the subject, have prompted the sponsor delegations to submit draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.42, which is now before the Committee. The wording of the draft resolution is straightforward and the preambular and operative paragraphs are self explanatory. I see no need to waste the precious time of the First Committee by reading them out. We trust that after studying the draft resolution the Committee will find it completely in line with the feeling and wishes of the overwhelming majority of delegations here. I should, consequently, like to express the hope of the sponsors that the draft resolution will be given favourable consideration by our Committee and will command the widest possible support.
Mr. MORRISON (Canada): Today I have the honour to introduce two draft resolutions. The first one is contained in document A/C.1/40/L.24 and is entitled "Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons". It is sponsored by the following 22 Member States: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, German Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rwanda, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay and Viet Nam. This resolution has enjoyed the full support of all members of this Committee in the past, and it is the hope of the sponsors that this full support will continue.

The submission of this traditional or consensus draft resolution is not merely a drafting exercise, which requires minimal change from one year to the next so as to retain the consensus it enjoys. As we all realize, consensus in this day and age in any forum is no mean achievement. In this case, it is a reflection of the deep concern shared by all Member States of the dangers accompanying the continued existence of chemical weapons. As a result, it also reflects the degree of urgency which we believe should dictate the pace of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament as it attempts to bring to fruition its negotiations on what are admittedly technically complex matters. We are convinced, however, that these technical questions are well within the reach of the negotiators to resolve. Of course, we also recognize that these negotiations - and indeed arms control negotiations generally - do not simply lend themselves to purely technical solutions. That is why this consensus draft resolution is so important. It reaffirms our joint dedication to do whatever is necessary to achieve the worthy goal of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

Delegations will note that this year's text differs only slightly from that adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. It increases the
emphasis on our common position that "all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations". Furthermore, it highlights our regret and concern that such a convention has not yet been elaborated, while also noting the progress in the negotiations as recorded in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament.

Last year, Ambassador Natorf of Poland in his introduction of this traditional resolution drew attention to its reaffirmation of the "urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the two international instruments now in force pertaining to the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and to the elimination of the latter". I, too, wish to highlight the necessity for the strict observance of these two instruments, each with its own place in the realm of international law. Few would doubt, and indeed none could ignore, the grave implications for us all of violations of these treaties.

In this context, it is of particular interest that in the course of the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament there has emerged an agreement that a future convention should be comprehensive in scope and that it should include a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. This is simply a reflection of the well-known fact that the Protocol makes no provision for the verification of allegations of the use of chemical weapons, and in no way does this detract from the moral authority and legal status of the Protocol. The future convention, it is generally agreed, will include provision for verification.

The sponsors hope that this draft resolution will continue to enjoy the unanimous support of the First Committee and that it will be adopted by consensus. Such a consensus would, in our view, renew our dedication to future progress and send a clear message of hope to our colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament.

The second draft resolution I should like to introduce for consideration is contained in document A/C.1/40/L.37 and is entitled "Prohibition of the Production
of Fissionable Materials for Weapons Purposes". It is sponsored by Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sweden and Uruguay.

This draft resolution continues to be important for a number of reasons. It is a reminder that the ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes remains a key element in any progress towards nuclear disarmament. At the same time, we believe that the draft resolution is realistic for it recognizes that, as a prerequisite to its implementation, there must first be progress towards a comprehensive test ban. This draft resolution also points to an effective way of prohibiting nuclear weapons proliferation, both horizontal and vertical.

A ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes represents one step in the eminently logical sequence we must follow towards the goal of effective arms control and disarmament.

The sponsors look forward to draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.37 receiving this year the same degree of support that its predecessors received in past years.

The CHAIRMAN: We have just heard the last speaker on the list of speakers for this morning's meeting. We have also exhausted the list of speakers in connection with the introduction of draft resolutions and comments on them, which is the phase in which we find ourselves. Hence, unless the Committee is of a different view, we can dispense with the afternoon's meeting.

Tomorrow morning, the Committee will commence taking action on draft resolutions on all disarmament items. In this connection, as I announced earlier, an informal paper setting out the Chairman's suggested programme of work, which lists the draft resolutions on disarmament in 13 different clusters, is now being distributed.
In my earlier statement on the subject, I referred to the kind of criteria that have been employed by the Bureau in devising the clusters. We have attempted to group the clusters on as logical and practical a basis as possible and have endeavoured, at the same time, to group them according to related subject matter, to the extent feasible. I should like to stress at this stage that no other significance should be attached to the Bureau's efforts in this respect than its desire to facilitate and expedite the work of the Committee with a view to utilizing the time allocated for this phase of the Committee's work in the most effective and efficient manner possible.

With respect to any timetable for action on the draft resolutions, it will be my intention, as far as possible, to move from one cluster to another in sequence at the conclusion of action on each cluster. Accordingly, I shall not be in a position to give any precise indication of the days on which any particular clusters will be taken up. Nevertheless, to the degree possible, I shall try to give advance notification concerning the drafts to be acted upon at any future meeting.

It goes without saying, of course, that in applying the procedures that I have just described, the necessary degree of flexibility will be maintained.

As for action on each individual cluster, delegations will, first of all, have the opportunity to make any statements - other than explanations of vote - which they regard necessary with respect to the draft resolutions in that cluster. Subsequently, delegations wishing to explain their positions or votes on any or all draft resolutions in a particular cluster before a decision is taken, will be able to do so.
Then, after the Committee has taken a decision on the draft resolutions contained in a given cluster, delegations wishing to explain their positions or votes after the decision is taken, would do so.

I would, therefore, urge delegations again, to the extent possible, to make a consolidated statement on the draft resolutions contained in an individual cluster, with respect to the statements and explanations of vote concerned.

May I take it that the suggested programme of work and the procedures that I have outlined are acceptable to the Committee?

Mr. LAKHOUIT (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I have a simple question. My delegation understands that the delegations will have an opportunity to make statements with regard to the consideration of a cluster of draft resolutions. Does that mean that even the countries which are sponsors of draft resolutions will be able to make statements concerning the draft resolutions being considered?

The CHAIRMAN: In response to the query by the representative of Morocco, in that first stage, before we start action on each cluster, delegations are free to make comments other than explanations of vote; in other words, comments of a general nature that can take any form; but sponsors, of course, are included in that category. Sponsors are precluded only from giving explanations of vote. But in the general comments, if a sponsor wants to impart some information or make a comment of any other nature, which is not an explanation of vote, he or she is allowed to do so.

If there are no other questions, do I take it that the procedures and the suggested programme of work is acceptable to the Committee?

It is so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.