VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 33rd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

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CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

ORGANIZATION OF WORK
The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the programme of work and time-table, this morning the Committee will proceed to its third phase of work, namely, consideration of and action on draft resolutions under disarmament agenda items 48 to 69 and 145.

As I announced at our meeting on Friday, this morning's meeting as well as those scheduled for tomorrow and the day after have been set aside for introductions and comments on draft resolutions.
Mr. SHINDE (India): On behalf of Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Romania, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia, I should like to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/40/L.26, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons". For the past several years the General Assembly has been adopting resolutions calling for prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Significantly, two nuclear-weapon States have been supporting this move. The Conference on Disarmament, particularly since 1982, has been expressly requested by the General Assembly to undertake negotiations to elaborate a draft convention to this end. However, no action has so far been taken in the Conference on Disarmament, not even by way of initiating a modest process towards that goal. Moreover, no cogent reason has been given as to why a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons should not be negotiated. We are therefore once again submitting this draft resolution to underline the utmost importance of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons for the prevention of nuclear war, a measure which has been duly recognized by an overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations.

We are acutely aware of the long and arduous task which separates the essential first step of banning the use of nuclear weapons from the ultimate aim of the abolition of those weapons. This awareness only further confirms our firm conviction that we must take the basic step without further delay. The international community at large is determined to eliminate the nuclear menace once and for all. Even those of its members who, because of their own precarious notion of security, are opposed to prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, do not hide their own sense of horror about the occurrence of nuclear war. All nuclear-weapon States support the proposition that a nuclear war must not be fought. Our approach
in this draft resolution is a simple and direct one which seeks to translate this universal concern into concrete action by explicitly removing the legal lacunae vis-à-vis the use of nuclear weapons. As the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Olaf Palme, said in his statement to the General Assembly:

"Any use of nuclear weapons would be deeply reprehensible. One can speak of an international norm which is gradually gaining acceptance. The time has come to consider whether mankind should not begin to study in earnest how this utter moral reprobation can be translated into binding international agreements. We should consider the possibility of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, by international law, as part of a process leading to general and complete disarmament." (A/40/PV.43, p. 66)

The decision by all nuclear-weapon States to forswear the use of nuclear weapons will inevitably trigger a qualitative change in attitudes all over the world towards the very maintenance of stockpiles of nuclear weapons as weapons of war. Such weapons would no longer symbolize prestige and status but rather a crime against humanity. Moreover, such a decision on their prohibition will actually amount to an unequivocal confirmation of the futility of those horrible weapons which has all along been implicitly conceded in the faltering faith of some of the nuclear-weapon States in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The preambular part of draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.26 duly reflects the gist of the ideas to which I have just referred. It is our earnest hope that the First Committee will this year provide an even more overwhelming endorsement of the principles of objectives of this draft resolution.

The related question of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race is at the heart of our second proposal, which is contained in document A/C.1/40/L.25, entitled "Freeze on Nuclear Weapons". For the fourth time since the second special session
of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we have decided to place before the General Assembly this draft resolution on a nuclear freeze. We do so because of our firm conviction that a nuclear-weapon freeze is a direct, logical and practical way to halt the nuclear-arms race and to proceed to nuclear disarmament. As in the past, the immediate goal we have in mind is to focus our effort on the two most crucial and easily identifiable elements central to the nuclear-arms race. Those are the production of nuclear weapons and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Our proposal for a freeze thus seeks, inter alia, a simultaneous, total stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. We are, of course, aware of the other crucial element of a comprehensive freeze, namely, an immediate halt to nuclear-weapons tests. However, we are all aware that though the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing has already been at the top of the agenda of all multilateral forums on disarmament for more than a quarter of a century, and that a number of resolutions have been adopted by the General Assembly specifically on that subject, agreement on this crucial issue continues to be prevented on various pretexts. Our principal purpose in submitting this draft resolution is to propose a practical and readily enforceable measure. The stoppage in the production of nuclear weapons can be verified by the same means which would be used to verify compliance with proposals for limitation or reduction of nuclear warheads. Moreover, with the cut-off in production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, all nuclear facilities - nuclear-weapon laboratories, reprocessing plants, enrichment facilities and so on - will become peaceful and will be subject to non-discriminatory international safeguards on a universal basis. Verification of a nuclear freeze would thus pose no insuperable problem.

We strongly feel that a freeze on nuclear weapons should be agreed to by all nuclear-weapon Powers and not merely by those with the largest nuclear arsenals.
If indeed we are to stop the nuclear-arms race and negate all pretext for further refinement or modernization of nuclear weapons of all kinds, it is necessary to call for a halt to the production of nuclear weapons everywhere. The endless propaganda and debate as to who leads the nuclear-arms race are hardly relevant in a situation in which the net result of the nuclear-arms race is a frightening nuclear stockpile of 50,000 nuclear warheads adequate to destroy this planet several times over. Let there be no basis for its further augmentation, regardless of in which country and by whom. A decision on a freeze will automatically create conditions for immediate reduction of nuclear stockpiles, thus paving the way for general and complete disarmament.

A nuclear-weapons freeze is the very minimum that the nuclear-weapon States ought to accept if they are indeed concerned about resolving man's nuclear predicament. We trust, therefore, that our draft resolution will this year receive the support of an even greater majority of delegations represented in the First Committee and, later, in the General Assembly.
Mr. RISNER (United States of America): I take the floor today to introduce a draft resolution under agenda item 68, A/C.1/40/L.66, submitted on 7 November 1985. It addresses an issue of immense concern to all those who believe in the resolution of conflicts through peaceful means and in the integrity of international law, treaties and agreements. The draft resolution is entitled, "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements." The purpose is not only to encourage adherence to international law but also to call proper attention to the critical role in world-wide security of international law and, in particular, arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

We all recognize that international law, treaties and agreements do not absolutely guarantee security for States, but we must all look towards international law as an alternative to escalating armaments and the resort to violence.

Compliance is the corner-stone for any kind of agreement - be it economic, technological, environmental or whatever. Compliance, however, takes on an even greater significance in respect to agreements affecting the security of States. That is particularly true in arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

There is a simple reason why this is so: in the modern age, when the world is a more intimate and interrelated community, the security of all States is affected by the record of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The security of parties to an agreement is diminished by any instance of non-compliance. For non-parties there is also a negative effect.

The draft resolution, therefore, calls upon States to implement and to comply with their agreements, to consider the consequences of failure to comply, to support efforts to resolve questions that may arise concerning compliance and, finally, to request the Secretary-General to provide Member States with appropriate assistance.
(Mr. Risner, United States)

We in the first Committee devote our best efforts towards our common goal of a more stable and peaceful world. While we might disagree at times on the means for pursuing that goal, we all, no doubt, look forward eagerly to the achievement of new accords that add to international security and stability. But it is not the pointed words and signatures and treaty ceremonies that provide global security. It is the faithful compliance that must follow the treaty ceremony that signifies real progress in arms control and disarmament. The adoption of this draft resolution will strengthen the recognition that the signing of a treaty is the beginning, and not the end, of effective arms control.

Mr. ALZAMORA (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation is pleased to introduce in this Committee, on behalf of Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Togo, Uruguay and Yugoslavia, the draft resolution entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale", contained in document A/C.1/40/L.2/Rev.2, distributed on 5 November 1985 under agenda item 60.

By this proposal, the sponsoring countries have no intention of replacing the final objective of general and complete disarmament with supposedly selective options, whether selective in geographical scope or contents. On the contrary, our aim is to give new momentum, through the regional approach, which is nothing new, to the negotiations designed to bring about that final objective while at the same time dealing with important priorities related to development and to the strengthening of the security of the countries involved, and to the reduction of the general pace of the arms race at the regional level.

The concept of a region used in the draft resolution is based on a flexible criterion, in terms of geographical and security considerations, there is no need
for a hard and fast definition of the scope of application of the conventional disarmament measures which may be adopted. Furthermore, the possibilities opened up by a regional approach to conventional disarmament do not conflict with and are not intended to interfere with any steps which may be taken at the bilateral or international level in this sphere.

Lastly, the sponsors of the draft resolution are aware of the extremely varied situations existing in the different regions. Thus, our proposal does not seek to establish broad concepts and approaches applicable to all regions, but rather to encourage, in those regions where the States concerned deem that the existing conditions so allow, methods of conventional disarmament that meet the interests of those States.

The draft resolution I am introducing today contains seven preambular paragraphs and eight operative paragraphs.

The first preambular paragraph reflects the noble aim in the first paragraph of the preamble of the United Nations Charter, the need to preserve mankind from the scourge of war.

The second preambular paragraph is based on different resolutions of the General Assembly and the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, which was devoted to disarmament. Those documents refer to the political will of States to effect a reduction in arms expenditures in order to increase the resources available for the vast undertaking of bringing about the economic and social development of our peoples.

The third preambular paragraph reproduces paragraph 2 of the Final Document, which emphasizes the harmful effects on development of the continued arms race, with its nuclear and conventional arms build-up.

The fourth preambular paragraph faithfully reflects paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Final Document, which respectively lay down the priorities in disarmament
negotiations and state that nothing precludes negotiations on all the priority items concurrently. The reason for this particular preambular paragraph is, on the one hand, to make it clear that the adoption of effective nuclear disarmament measures is unquestionably a priority and, on the other hand, to make it clear that nevertheless nuclear disarmament in itself is not a pre-condition for progress in other areas of disarmament since if that were so, we should find ourselves in the absurd situation of having to leave it to the nuclear Powers, and in particular the great Powers, to take all the initiatives, as well as to decide on specific means of defining the pace and scope of the whole disarmament process.

Thus, we are not disregarding the order of priorities, far less attempting to change them in a way that would divert world attention from the urgent task of eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth. However, there is a legitimate desire, shared by many developing countries, to avoid a catastrophic social explosion, that might be fuelled in part by the frenzied piling up of new and more sophisticated weapons, serving only to enlarge the scope of the arms industry, which works to produce, not food and life, but hunger and death.
(Mr. Alzamora, Peru)

As I said in this Committee a few days ago,
"We developing countries cannot and should not have to wait for the large countries to begin the disarmament process, not only because our problems and our security requirements are qualitatively different but ... for those countries the arms build-up is not an alternative to development as it is for us. These are two totally different aspects of the problem."

(A/C.1/40/PV.11, p. 9-10)

The fifth preambular paragraph recalls a concept contained at the end of paragraph 41 of the Final Document with regard to the value and importance of unilateral measures of arms limitation or reduction in the creation of a climate conducive to the success of the disarmament process.

The sixth preambular paragraph recalls resolution 37/100 F on regional disarmament, adopted by the General Assembly without a vote on 13 December 1982, which represents an important precedent in the regional approach to disarmament. In this connection, it is also appropriate to mention, as being closely linked with that resolution, the valuable contribution contained in the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament submitted by a group of governmental experts on 8 August 1980 and the study on conventional disarmament presented by a group of experts on 23 June 1984.

The last preambular paragraph recalls resolutions 38/73 J and 39/63 F, which also relate to regional disarmament and were also adopted by the General Assembly without a vote in 1983 and 1984 respectively.

Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution sets forth a series of elements defining conventional disarmament at the regional level, taken from resolution 37/100 F, from the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, and from the Final Declaration adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries in Luanda on 7 September of this year. The first element relates to the requirement that the
regional situation allows of conventional disarmament. This means that in view of the differences between one region and another, not all of them will provide the right conditions for undertaking such a process. Nevertheless, without going into a discussion of the optimal conditions, it is obvious that there must be a free initiative on the part of the States involved, which may at first perhaps merely confine themselves to dealing with a part of a region, if this is the maximum expression of political will needed in those cases.

A second element is that the measures to be considered and adopted should be designed to strengthen peace and security at a lower level of forces, which means that conventional disarmament within a given geographical area should not be undertaken at the expense of the peace and security of the countries directly concerned, all of which presupposes a gradual and well balanced process which should result in an improvement of the existing status quo.

The third element relates to appropriate measures of conventional disarmament leading to the limitation and reduction of the armed forces and the conventional weapons of the countries directly concerned. In this regard, there is no doubt that it is up to the sovereign will of those countries to determine, through negotiation and agreement, the scope of those measures, and consequently the pace of the process of conventional disarmament. Thus the General Assembly can do no more than make a statement on the question.

The fourth element is an appropriate machinery for verification that is satisfactory to all the countries involved. The aim here is to guarantee compliance with the obligations undertaken in terms of the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons. Obviously it is also for the States concerned to determine the nature and scope of that control machinery.

The last element relates to two basic principles, whose full validity is beyond doubt in any eventual process of conventional disarmament at the regional
level. I am referring here to the inherent right to self-defence embodied in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and to the principle of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples under the Charter. They require no further explanation; these principles have been reiterated by the General Assembly many times throughout 40 years.

The second paragraph responds to the need, in a situation in which the total military expenditures of the world have reached the enormous figure of a billion dollars, to call attention to the unilateral decisions adopted by some Governments, mainly those of developing countries, to limit their procurement of conventional weapons and to reduce their respective military budgets. Those decisions express the political will of those countries, which wish to opt for peace and development, undoubtedly represent an important incentive to agreement on broader geographical measures. It is hardly necessary to say that this paragraph does not represent any attempt to preach unilateral disarmament in conventional weapons as a choice for Member States, but merely recognizes that unilateral measures are intended to make possible conventional disarmament between the countries directly concerned.

The third paragraph is intended to welcome all proposals on this question recently put forward or discussed in various regional organizations. My delegation considers that it is unnecessary to list all those proposals, since some might be overlooked. But I wish to point out that the interest in halting the conventional arms race is shared by countries of different regions, and that more than one region is involved in works of this kind.

Paragraph 4 contains elements of resolution 37/100 F and the Final Document. It is included because we wish to point out that, irrespective of any regional efforts that may be made in conventional disarmament, the primary responsibility in this sphere lies with the nuclear Powers and other militarily powerful States, which are the main protagonists in this spiral of self-destruction, and have made
of the arms race, if not a way of life, at least a stark and tangible expression of questionable power politics that serve only the ends of war and the unthinkable holocaust. On the other hand the paragraph also refers to the priority of nuclear disarmament within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. By this we intend to convey that any progress on the other priorities mentioned in paragraph 45 of the Final Document must be regarded as part of a convergent effort related to the weighty question of nuclear disarmament in the light of the final objective of general and complete disarmament.

Thus it is not the intention of the sponsors of the draft resolution that I have the honour to submit to this Committee to disregard the urgency of nuclear disarmament at this time, and even less to distract world attention from the frenzied race in which the super-Powers are engaged to modernize their vast nuclear arsenals. However, since nuclear disarmament is a priority, we should also draw attention to some regional processes that threaten a repetition on a small scale of the arms race, whose harmful effects on investment have been pointed out in so far as the security of a State is mainly a function of its surroundings, the worst that can happen is that behind the screen of certain apparently logical ideas States merely try to justify in their own case what they criticize at the world level in this Committee. At the worst, we should simply be justifying what has been criticized the world over.
Paragraph 5 attaches importance, in the context of regional disarmament, to the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations, in keeping with Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter. Thus, on the basis of paragraph 28 of the Final Document, which refers to the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in the success of disarmament negotiations, all States are requested to contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the adoption of regional agreements on conventional disarmament.

Paragraph 6 emanates from the conviction that the co-operation of countries that are suppliers of conventional weapons is the logical consequence of any process to limit armaments and to reduce military budgets. This means that the requirement of co-operation derives from the scope and nature of the agreements entered into by the States directly concerned, and is in no way subject to those agreements or independent of them. On the basis of that understanding of co-operation by the supplier countries, its importance lies in the need to ensure, for international solidarity, the full application of those agreements.

Paragraph 7 is procedural in nature; its only purpose is to allow States directly concerned to make use, if they consider it advisable, of the valuable experience that the Secretariat has gained during 10 years of work on the standardization of information on military expenditures, price indices and parities in purchasing power, in order to compare military expenditures. Hence, this is an optional, not a mandatory, provision. Of course, the report requested of the Secretary-General will be subject to the interest shown by the States directly concerned.

Finally, the purpose of paragraph 8, which is also procedural in nature, is to keep the item on conventional disarmament on a regional scale on the agenda of next year's session of the General Assembly. Its subsequent inclusion in the agenda will depend on any new developments there may be at that time.
Those are, in summary, the main ideas contained in the draft resolution that I am introducing today, on behalf of 17 Member States, for the Committee's consideration. Although this is not an initiative that is completely foreign to the concerns that have governed the First Committee's work since 1978, it does represent a concrete proposal that directly meets the interests of many developing countries, weighed down by the chauvinism of security, the myth of the correlation of forces and the traffic by the merchants of death.

We believe that the General Assembly should not be a forum for the achievement of disarmament through the airing of disagreements. That would be rendering meagre service indeed. It would bog us down in mutual recriminations and in struggles for individual causes. Meanwhile, the arms race continues at all levels, everywhere, and the arms industry continues to flourish. We must once again claim for the General Assembly its role of promoting disarmament; there must be renewed faith in the Charter and new momentum must be given to the efforts of States of good will that have given the highest priority to the question of the integral development of their peoples.

On behalf of the co-sponsors, I would request - since during the consultations we held no major objection was expressed - that the draft resolution on conventional disarmament on a regional scale be adopted by this Committee without a vote.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Sri Lanka, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, who will introduce the Committee's report and draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.50.

Mr. WIJEWARDENE (Sri Lanka), Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference: I have the honour, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, to introduce the report of the Committee contained in document A/40/28.
In 1985, pursuant to resolution 39/150, the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference held two sessions, during which it heard statements made by 12 Member States as well as States with observer status. The Committee has also maintained, through its Chairman, close contacts with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes.

The report consists of three chapters. Chapter I, "Introduction", includes, inter alia, references to the Committee's mandate and organization of work and the list of the elected officers. Chapter II, in addition to the procedural part, incorporates updated indications of the attitudes of the nuclear-weapon States presented to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 39/150. And, finally, chapter III contains the Committee's conclusions and recommendations. In that chapter, the Ad Hoc Committee states, inter alia:

"Having regard for the important requirements of a world disarmament conference to be convened at the earliest appropriate time, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, the General Assembly should take up the question at its fortieth regular session for further consideration, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of resolution 36/150, also adopted by consensus ...". (A/40/28, para. 14)

In addition, the Committee recommends that:

"The General Assembly may wish to renew the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and to request it to continue to maintain close contact with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee". (A/40/28, para. 15)

In concluding the introduction of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, I should like to convey to all the members of the
Committee, and in particular to the members of the Working Group, my gratitude for their invaluable co-operation in the preparation of the Committee's report. I would also like to ask the delegation of Spain to convey the Committee's highest appreciation to the Rapporteur, Mr. Laclaustra, who has already completed his mission in New York, for his dedication in fulfilling the responsibilities entrusted to him and his contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. I would also thank Mr. Tomaszewski of Poland, who presided over the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during my absence.

May I also take this opportunity to introduce, on behalf of Burundi, Peru, Poland and Sri Lanka, the draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Conference" contained in document A/C.1/40/L.50.

By and large, the draft resolution is essentially similar to the corresponding resolution adopted by consensus last year, and the minor changes incorporated in its text reflect the conclusions and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference contained in its report that I have just introduced.

In accordance with operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would once again renew the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The General Assembly would also request the Ad Hoc Committee to continue to maintain close contact with the representatives of States possessing nuclear weapons, in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes, as well as with all other States, and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

In conclusion, I should like, on behalf of the sponsors, to recommend that draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.50 be adopted by consensus.
Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): On behalf of my delegation and others, I should like today to introduce three draft resolutions.

The first of them, entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and contained in document A/C.1/40/L.34, reaffirms as a whole the basic idea of General Assembly resolution 39/57. Its sponsors - Afghanistan, Angola, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Mongolia, the USSR, Viet Nam and my own country, the People's Republic of Bulgaria - reiterate once again their profound conviction that the elimination of nuclear weapons would be the most effective guarantee against the threat of their use. Until this goal is achieved, however, the international community should elaborate effective measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. In the light of the recently concluded Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its fourth preambular paragraph the draft resolution indicates that such measures would constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution also reflects the results of the consideration of this item in the Conference on Disarmament and the need for a wider approach to the solution of this problem. The tenth preambular paragraph notes that an overwhelming majority of delegations, including those of the nuclear-weapon States, stressed the importance of that item and their readiness to engage in a substantive dialogue on the issue.

A substantial element is the provision of the fourteenth preambular paragraph that the non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories have every right to receive reliable international legal guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
The operative part of the draft resolution reaffirms once again the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution proposes that the Conference on Disarmament should continue to explore ways and means to overcome the difficulties encountered in carrying out negotiations on this question. Accordingly, it requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue active consideration on this subject, including through re-establishment in 1986 of the Ad Hoc Committee on the respective agenda item with a view to elaborating an international instrument of a legally binding character to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In conformity with the above-mentioned basic premises of the draft resolution, the sponsors propose in the last operative paragraph to include in the provisional agenda of the forty-first session of the General Assembly the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The sponsors of the second draft resolution, entitled "World Disarmament Campaign" and contained in document A/C.1/40/L.21 - namely, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam and Bulgaria - consider it a further reaffirmation of the commitment of the United Nations to the world community's efforts to curb the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and for disarmament. As a whole, the draft resolution reaffirms the principal provisions of the resolution on the relevant item last year - resolution 39/63 A - while at the same time the third preambular paragraph omits the provisions regarding which
many countries had reservations. Operative paragraph 4 reflects the understanding of the sponsors that the World Disarmament Campaign would be even more effective if in carrying out the Campaign due regard were given to the proclamation by the General Assembly of 1986 as the International Year of Peace, as well as to other important dates and anniversaries related to international peace and security. Past experience, including that of the Disarmament Week, demonstrates that the marking of important dates and anniversaries related to international peace and security contribute to intensifying the actions and activities of the world community in support of effective measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament.

The third draft resolution I have the honour to introduce, on behalf of the delegations of Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Poland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam and Bulgaria, is on "Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans" and is contained in document A/C.1/40/L.46. Emphasizing the urgent need to take at the international level prompt concerted measures to curb the naval arms race, to limit and reduce naval armaments both quantitatively and qualitatively while this is still possible, the sponsors point out in the eighth preambular paragraph that such measures should be worked out and implemented with due regard to the principle of not harming the legitimate security interests of any State. In the tenth preambular paragraph it reaffirms that seas and oceans should be used for peaceful purposes in accordance with the régime established by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Another new element - in the thirteenth and fourteenth preambular paragraphs - is that the General Assembly takes note of the United Nations study on naval armaments carried out with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental
experts and considers that the discussion at the 1985 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission constitutes a valuable initial step in the common search for ways and means which would ensure proper conditions for more detailed and thorough consideration of the issue of curbing the naval arms race with a view to holding later appropriate negotiations.

Without dwelling at length on the operative paragraphs, I should like to stress the new elements which provide for the possibility of holding negotiations concerning the curbing of the naval arms race in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the continued consideration of this question by the Disarmament Commission in an appropriate subsidiary body, taking due account of the views expressed on the subject matter in the replies of Member States to the Secretary-General, in verbatim records of the Disarmament Commission, in the working papers and the United Nations study on this question, as well as of future initiatives, with a view to submitting recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.

In conclusion, I should like to express the confidence of all sponsors, including Bulgaria, that the three draft resolutions thus introduced will be carefully studied and will find understanding and support among all delegations.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Today my delegation would like to speak on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.2/Rev.2, "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale", introduced this morning by the representative of Peru, and draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.14, "Study on conventional disarmament". Both draft resolutions make excellent contributions to our work. My delegation supports them. I should like to express that support by placing the two texts in the larger analytical perspective of the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament.
Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.14, presented by the delegation of Denmark, seeks to implement further the study on the conventional arms race and conventional weapons and forces, an important United Nations disarmament study which we owe to the initiative of Denmark and the commendable work of a group of experts. Fittingly, the draft resolution encourages a yet larger number of States to give their views on the study and thereby to broaden its echo in the international community, but it also recommends that more concrete work on conventional disarmament, making the widest use of the study, be undertaken in the various organs of the multilateral disarmament machinery. One of those organs would of course be the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the topic of conventional disarmament constitutes one of the 10 headings of the Conference's long-term agenda and where such work is in fact overdue. When adopted, this portion of the draft resolution will also enable delegations wishing to do so to make use of the study in the discussion on the general item on nuclear and conventional disarmament in the forthcoming 1986 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. My delegation is convinced that the study, together with the corresponding comments by States, will make a timely and much-needed contribution to the work of those disarmament organs.

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.2/Rev.2, introduced by Peru as its main author and with many other delegations co-sponsoring, has visibly taken its origin from the admirable initiative of President Alan Garcia, designed to spur a comprehensive regional disarmament process in Latin America. However, it goes beyond that historic origin and advocates the introduction of balanced measures of conventional disarmament on a regional scale in other areas of the world as well. My delegation would like to reiterate its praise for the Peruvian example and to stress its conviction that such regional initiatives, based on the need to ensure military
balance in a region and to enhance the security of all States concerned at the
lowest possible level of weapons, are a most welcome development. The specific
initiative in Latin America is already supported by a large number of other Latin
American States, and it is to be hoped that those Latin American countries that
have so far been silent on this issue or expressed reservations will now join in
approving it and promoting its implementation.

The two draft resolutions on which I have commented are not only welcome as to
their purpose and wording; they are also highly topical. Their appearance
coincides with an obviously stronger emphasis by the international community at
large on conventional disarmament measures. The Declaration and Programme of
Action adopted by the recent Ministerial Regional Conference on Security,
Disarmament and Development in Africa, held at Lomé under the auspices of the
Organization of African Unity, has focused attention, in a very similar spirit, on
the opportunities for regional co-operation and disarmament and a curtailing of
conventional armament processes in Africa. That document combines vision and
realism. African leaders have focused, in a most mature manner, on the real
security problems that beset their countries and have undertaken a pragmatic search
for remedies and for the construction of a co-operative political order in their
part of the world.

My delegation is particularly impressed with this African endeavour in view of
its similarity of purpose with steps which the countries of free Europe are seeking
to achieve at the Stockholm and Vienna negotiations, with a view to redressing a
grave conventional imbalance in Europe and to making the outbreak of a conventional
conflict ever less likely in that troubled region, the focal point of long-standing
East-West antagonism and a region where the accumulation of conventional weapons
hardware, just as the accumulation of nuclear weapons, has reached such
unprecedented heights.
But these regional conference events are only part of the picture which we have seen this year during our deliberations in the First Committee. Increased concern with the problems of conventional armament and the necessity for conventional disarmament have characterized a great number of statements, among which I would particularly like to cite those of the representatives of Singapore, Cameroon, China, Greece and Peru. Their comments have been clear and perspicacious and they gain particular significance when considered in conjunction with the many positive replies conveyed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the basis of General Assembly resolution 39/151 C, commenting upon the conventional weapons study.

All or several of those delegations or replies have made the following points: that in spite of the threats of the nuclear age nobody can remain indifferent to the enormous cost in resources and lives of armed conflicts - all conventional - which have taken place since the Second World War; that States must be increasingly aware of the advances in conventional arms technology which further increase the destructive power of such armaments; that more than four-fifths of world military expenditure is spent on conventional weaponry and that that expenditure is growing from year to year to exorbitant, if not to say absurd, proportions; that conventional potentials are nevertheless increasing in all regions of the world; and, finally, that there is an increasing awareness that nuclear war is highly unlikely to commence as such and that the most preoccupying scenarios of conflict are those where a conventional attack could lead to the ultimate use of nuclear weapons and also that in their regions of the world the perceived security threat originates from conventional weapons and that their regional security could be enhanced primarily by measures of conventional disarmament.
These are important insights and if they are now proferred by a largely increased number of delegations that would seem to make a compelling case for assigning a stronger role to the consideration of conventional disarmament issues in the United Nations disarmament forums.

In arguing for such a strengthened and more balanced emphasis on conventional disarmament one has to tackle formidable adversaries. A number of States have attempted, not unsuccessfully, for a certain number of years to deflect the attention of the United Nations system to a practically exclusive consideration of nuclear issues, advancing the ominous and singular nature of the nuclear threat, often described in exaggerated terms, as a reason for the alleged insignificance of conventional issues and of balanced, verifiable conventional disarmament measures on a regional scale. It is interesting to note that the proponents of that view are largely to be found among the members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, a military alliance that enjoys large conventional superiorities in crucial regions of the world and by certain countries of the third world with a considerable conventional preponderance in their region but, at the same time, no seeming willingness to renounce for themselves the nuclear option.

At a time when the desire of many States to focus more strongly on conventional disarmament is gaining ground, the time may have come to ask those countries the following legitimate questions. To what extent are they interested in stable security relationships in their region and how would they wish to counter the uncomfortable - if certainly unjustified - suspicion that they would like to maintain a *reservatio mentalis* in favour of using the conventional military option in their region? Those countries should also provide an answer to the question whether their exclusive emphasis on global nuclear disarmament measures is not largely responsible for the lack of achievement, not to say the paralysis, of the multilateral disarmament process.
The truth is, of course, that neither emphasis exclusively on nuclear disarmament nor denial of the nuclear problem and preoccupation exclusively with conventional disarmament would be appropriate; both have to be looked at in their interrelationship and in how they impinge jointly on the security situation both globally and in individual regions. Nuclear and conventional disarmament are both needed and must both have priority, as the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has wisely recognized. The question then is one of balance and respective weight.

I should therefore like to make use of my statement in support of the two aforementioned draft resolutions on conventional matters to contribute a few thoughts on how this balance can be achieved and what the precise relationship of nuclear and conventional disarmament is. I propose to dwell briefly on the specificity of nuclear weapons and that of conventional weapons respectively, both in terms of the dynamics of current weapons technology. I should then like to look at the link between both types of weapons in terms of possible conflict scenarios and to the contribution that both types of weapons and their mix make to security and stability and possibly the prevention of war. As a result I hope to demonstrate that as long as nuclear weapons exist and are not substituted for in their stabilizing function, conventional and nuclear armaments are locked into a dynamic interrelationship so that neither an exclusive preoccupation with nuclear disarmament nor with conventional disarmament alone can make this world, globally and regionally, a safer place.

Nuclear weapons in their singular and terrifying nature have been described in this Committee countless times. Indeed, the threat emanating from their existence is self-evident. Nuclear-weapon technology provides the means to produce sudden destruction of an unimaginable scale over vast areas with largely indiscriminate effects and relatively limited possibilities of excluding collateral damage.
Thus nuclear weapons cannot be used as an instrument of physical force to achieve political aims. They are not a means for promoting the conquest, control and exploitation of enemy territory. They cannot serve, through their use in the Clausewitzian sense, the continuation of power politics by military means.

Under the conditions of a largely bipolar military power structure in the world, the initiation of offensive use of nuclear weapons entails, in addition, the risk of suicide and incalculable self-destruction.

The intended role of nuclear weapons is thus reduced to politics. Their very possession is designed not only to prevent their use, to restrain others, by the risk of incalculable damage but also to invalidate and offset grave imbalances in the conventional capabilities of the military systems that benefit politically from the possession of nuclear weapons. Where nuclear weapons exist they form part of a complex security equation that is designed and perfected with the aim of preventing conflict between the military systems in question, and they can do this effectively provided certain conditions of balance and stability are met. To be sure, this nutshell description of nuclear realities contains no value judgement and does not address the question as to where alternatives lie and how nuclear disarmament, specifically the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons, can – as they should – optimize security and stability, nor does it address the issues of residual regional and global risk.

However, on the basis of this brief reminder of the specificity and traditional function of nuclear weapons, one can more clearly recognize the changes that may result from the dynamics of nuclear-weapon technology. The emergence of ever-smaller nuclear charges; of weapons of high accuracy and minimal collateral damage generation; of weapons where the mix of the blast, thermal effect and radiation is variable; of weapons that combine precision and deep-penetration capability; and, finally, the emergence of dual capability systems will obviously
influence some of these basic traditional assumptions and blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons in the sense that a certain overlapping effect between the two will result.

Conventional weapons, for their part, despite the immense growth of their sophistication and destructiveness since the Second World War, have retained their basic characteristics as being relatively calculable and easily dosable weapons that can actually be used for police actions or defence, for the acquisition of control over a territory and, indeed, for the settlement of political conflict by armed intervention. In contrast with nuclear technology, there is no significant technological threshold to cross, although not all conventional weapons can be used without the presence of some sophistication, and there is no limit to the proliferation of conventional arms that might curtail their acquisition and use, as in the nuclear field.

These characteristics have been seen at work in the many conventional conflicts, specifically in the third world, that have been so frequently deplored in these chambers.

And yet here also rapid change must be noted. The destructiveness of conventional weapons grows at a rate that increasingly makes the infliction of non-absorbable existential damage possible. Emerging technologies are in the process of generating deep penetration and "smart" weapons that change the traditional battlefield fundamentally. The same launch vehicles may propel nuclear, conventional or chemical charges over large distances, and the age of non-nuclear strategic weapons, ominously free from the constraints of non-proliferation, may be with us soon. Thus, from the conventional side also the hitherto strict dividing-line between conventional and nuclear disarmament becomes increasingly fuzzy, making a more synthetic view of both a compelling necessity. In
the extreme hypothesis of a major nuclear exchange, of course, the singular frightening effect of the nuclear weapon with its threat to the physical and political survival of a large portion of our globe would stand unrivaled. But conventional armaments today can already wipe out entire nations and spread non-absorbable damage on a large scale. This means that the hypothetical overlap between the lethal effects of the two categories of weapons is now growing, and growing rapidly.

These phenomena of weapon technology are, however, only one element in the necessary redefinition of the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament.

Their crucial interlinkage is of a strategic nature.

The first, and perhaps most important, part of their interdependence is the link by conflict scenario: for all practical purposes a nuclear war will not result from a nuclear exchange as such, but from the deterioration of a conventional conflict. Strategic planners may wish to hedge against all contingencies that are technically conceivable, but politically, a nuclear disarming strike at the outset of hostilities growing out of a severe crisis remains, in view of its suicidal nature, the least likely of all possible scenarios. This, although now widely acknowledged, cannot be repeated often enough. The elaborate precautions that the nuclear Powers have taken to prevent or defuse accidental nuclear occurrences also make it virtually impossible that a general nuclear conflagration would result from a malfunctioning or misinterpretation. This means that, however small that eventuality, a nuclear conflict could only be the result of a grave conventional war, be it that an attack by the superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact occurs in Europe, based on the mistaken calculation on the Soviet side that its increased capabilities for
non-nuclear attack and for the suppression of NATO's escalatory threat would permit a decisive onslaught at bearable military cost, or be it that a regional conflict in particularly sensitive areas would involve the nuclear Powers and that their crisis management and normal prudent restraint would utterly fail them. Both scenarios, while fortunately not an imminent threat, point to the crucial significance of regional military balances and settlement of conflicts, and thus of conventional disarmament measures.
A second element of the interdependence of the nuclear and the conventional factor is that, increasingly, not only nuclear weapons but conventional armaments as well, because of their growing destructive capability and the potential mutual threat to the economic and political survival of the respective adversary that may emanate from balanced arsenals, exercise a deterrent effect, restraining from the initiation of conflict and thereby preventing war. That phenomenon also points to the necessity of promoting military regional balances and co-operative relationships through appropriate concrete measures.

This war-preventing effect of conventional forces is often the result of a complex construction of regional balances in which the conventional capabilities of the region and conventional and nuclear factors elsewhere form a complicated whole that disarmament planning must take into account. Regional imbalances influence attempts at global balances, just as global imbalances may upset efforts to establish and maintain regional balances. Nuclear and conventional factors are closely intertwined, and it would be futile to separate them artificially.

Draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.2/Rev.1, submitted by Peru, with its insistence on balance and security for all States, shows an intimate awareness of the complex prerequisites for the successful steps towards regional disarmament it seeks to foster. In giving its full support to this draft resolution, as it does to draft resolution L.14 as well, my delegation hopes that these texts and their interpretation will help the multilateral disarmament forums to move away from the sometimes obsessive preoccupation with nuclear matters in order to reach the requisite balanced approach in which nuclear and conventional disarmament can both be pursued with equal vigour and effectiveness and in their organic relationship.
ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: As I indicated in my statement on Friday, the officers of
the Committee are at present engaged in efforts to group all of the draft
resolutions in clusters, using the most logical and practical criteria as well as
taking into account the pattern that has evolved during the past two years as a
result of initiatives taken by my immediate predecessors. It is my intention to
circulate the clusters to the Committee on Wednesday, 13 November, in an informal
paper.

At this time I should like to announce the first cluster of draft resolutions
on which the Committee will proceed to take action on Thursday, 14 November 1985.
I hope that this early announcement will give delegations sufficient time to
prepare themselves as well as to seek the necessary instructions from their
respective Governments. The first cluster includes those draft resolutions which,
in the Committee's officers' view, the Committee would perhaps be in a position to
act on in a rather expeditious manner.

The first cluster of draft resolutions, on which the Committee will act on
Thursday includes the following: A/C.1/40/L.5, L.12, L.14, L.16, L.19, L.27, L.28,
L.29, L.32, L.41, L.50, L.55, L.59, L.69 and L.72. I should also like to inform
the Committee that, in view of the urgency of the subject matter involved, the
Committee will also take action on draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.60, "Bilateral
nuclear-arms negotiation" on Thursday, along with the first cluster of draft
resolutions I have just enumerated. That could be done even earlier, if the
Committee should be in a position to do so.

If I hear no objections, may I take it that the Committee agrees with the
procedure I have just outlined?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.