Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

(continued)

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): I shall speak on agenda item 63.

Over the years the solemn protestations of many delegations that they urgently desire the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons, as well as their destruction, have taken on an almost ritual character. No matter what their negotiators propose, irrespective of their positions in the Conference on Disarmament, they like to be seen as ardent supporters of an early conclusion of the convention. That holds true even for those delegations that promote manifestly unacceptable alternative or supplementary negotiations - for instance, in a regional context - as an alleged panacea for accelerating the work of the Geneva negotiators.

However, such verbal affirmations of faith do not help us much towards a chemical weapons ban; they generate atmosphere but not action. It is therefore more important to take stock of past achievements - thanks to its most recent Chairman, Ambassador Turbanski, the Conference on Disarmament has completed a relatively successful year - and focus on the work still to be done. The emphasis of our comments in the General Assembly should not be on self-satisfaction with a half-completed product, but on planning ahead realistically for the other half of the task that still needs to be accomplished, lest the final result eludes us.

My present statement will therefore be devoted to the tasks immediately at hand as subject-matter for next year's negotiations. There are two major areas on which we should concentrate: verification of non-production and on-challenge verification.
The groundwork has been laid for both of them, but more important work has been accomplished in other areas. A draft text for practically all articles of the future convention exists, and most of them are available in wholly or partly bracketed versions. The extent of the remaining work on those paragraphs should not be underestimated. We may therefore wish to adopt a two-pronged approach: to focus mainly on the two major problem areas which I have named and to create the necessary political momentum specifically for them. At the same time, legal and technical experts should forge ahead in transforming the intermediate results on other issues into treaty or near-treaty language as soon as possible. In the area of the destruction of chemical weapons a particularly large amount of preparatory work has been done - in good measure owing to the excellent work of the Chairman of Working Group B, Mrs. Bonnier of Sweden. This is a prime example of a subject on which a cleaning-up and streamlining operation appears indicated.

All substantive issues have been fundamentally resolved. Future work will have to concentrate on reducing the enormous amount of material that has now accumulated to a reasonable size so that it can be translated into proper treaty language.

The two priority areas, the two major focal areas, of outstanding problems require a different approach: they require a political impetus. As to the verification of non-production, no substantial progress was achieved during the 1985 session. Negotiations on this problem were rather burdened with an unwarranted discussion of political questions not falling within the terms of reference of a functional committee and thus absorbing valuable negotiating time. I refer of course to the recurrent criticism by the Soviet Union and other negotiators from the Warsaw Treaty countries of recent United States Government decisions aimed at clearing the way for the future production of chemical weapons - the first since 1968 - in the event that the Geneva negotiations on a chemical weapons ban do not achieve the desired result.
One may assess these United States endeavours from various angles, and I do not wish to probe the United States rationale at this juncture. But one thing is certain: that these United States plans are fashioned in direct response to the Soviet Union's unwillingness to join in the 17-year-old United States moratorium on chemical-weapons production. It is a fact that the Soviet-led military alliance disposes at present of a historically unprecedented capability of producing chemical weapons, and, for all we know, of huge chemical-weapon arsenals that could at any moment be increased at short notice. The obsessive criticism of the United States plans, so detrimental to smooth progress in the negotiating group on non-production, must thus be seen as a singular exercise in hypocrisy.

The real task on hand in that group is the following. In order to prevent circumvention of the future chemical-weapon convention, each contracting party should agree to subject the industrial manufacture of key precursors, which are suitable for the production of chemical weapons, to systematic international verification through on-site inspections on a random basis. Viewed realistically, it is clear that total monitoring of the chemical industry is neither desirable nor feasible. The so-called monitoring of non-production is in the nature of a confidence-building measure, however, suitable for supporting the objective of a future chemical-weapon convention. In this respect, a certain amount of monitoring is inevitable. The type and scope of such monitoring of the chemical industry must then be the result of having weighed the objective of a future chemical-weapon convention against the interest of the chemical industry in developing its economic and technological activities unhindered. These arguments are all familiar.

The Soviet Union has traditionally been sceptical with regard to the discussion on verification of non-production. It has nevertheless presented ideas of its own according to which the production of supertoxic lethal substances should
take place in a single small-scale facility under international supervision. In the view of my delegation and of many others, this proposal is not realistic because it is impossible to concentrate the entire production of supertoxic lethal substances - which are needed in any modern industrial society - in a single State-owned facility without hindering the economic and technological activities of the contracting parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities.

My delegation therefore considers the Soviet proposal unsuitable and not capable of contributing to the finding of common solutions to the difficult problem of monitoring industries. Let me express the hope that our Soviet colleagues will soon depart from such a proposal, which will simply not do the trick, not even in societies with State-owned industries - including the Soviet Union itself - let alone in free market societies.

The greatest difficulties in the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, however, are caused by the problem of how to proceed if a contracting party is suspected of having contravened obligations incurred under the convention. On the one hand there is no appropriate precedent under the existing arms control instruments. On the other hand, if a system to clarify suspect cases is expected to work well, contracting parties will be forced to make sacrifices with regard to their sovereignty.

The process of negotiations reveals differing conceptual viewpoints which concern the voluntary or mandatory nature of international inspections. My delegation notes with regret that the dispute concerning whether the appropriate organ under the convention should have the right to carry out an on-site inspection independently of the consent of the requested party has not yet been settled.
A great majority of delegations in the Conference holds the view that there must be a stringent obligation for the requested party, an obligation fully incorporated in the Treaty itself, to tolerate the conducting of an international on-site on-challenge inspection. The diverging views among those who profess the mandatory character of on-challenge verification relate to the questions of how rigorous an international on-site inspection should be and in particular whether or not a party may have - under very exceptional circumstances - a right of refusal, for example, in case of an apparent abuse of the right to request an international on-site inspection. These differences of opinion are still important, but do not seem to be insurmountable.

In contrast, the Soviet Union feels that the inspection of suspect cases should be entirely voluntary. Its delegation, insisted, in the negotiations on this year's report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, that a footnote be introduced in appendix I to article IX, entitled "Consultation, Co-operation and Fact-Finding", which reads as follows:

"Other delegations consider that on-challenge on-site inspections should be carried out only with the consent of the party in regard to which the request is made." (A/40/27, p. 74, footnote)

Does that footnote reflect the true Soviet position? I would recall that the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Shevardnaze, complained, before the United Nations General Assembly on 24 October 1985, that "there are those that would like to make world public opinion believe that the Soviet Union is against verification" (A/40/PV.48, p. 63). I do not wish to deal in detail with the complaint and the apparent sense of injustice the Minister felt. However, my delegation cannot but draw the conclusion from the negotiating posture of the
Soviet Union in the Conference on Disarmament that, at least in the field of on-challenge verification, the Soviet delegation continues to cause substantial difficulties on the way to achieving progress.

On the other hand, we have noted with great interest the further statement relating to verification by Foreign Minister Shevardnaze, and I quote him again. He said on the same occasion:

"Where verification by national technical means may be inadequate to provide the necessary degree of confidence, we are ready to supplement it with additional, mutually agreed procedures." (Ibid.)

This being an obvious case of the insufficiency of conceivable national technical means, we find that the Minister's remark is encouraging, enabling the Conference on Disarmament to look forward to co-operating with a Soviet delegation that will be endowed with a greater degree of flexibility in dealing with the complicated but quintessential subject-matter of on-challenge verification.

The problem of on-challenge verification deserves particular attention because it has to function as a safety-net where the mechanisms of systematic verification fail to provide sufficient confidence in compliance with obligations under a chemical-weapon convention. My delegation holds the view that the following principles should apply with regard to an effective, adequate system of on-challenge verification. First, there must be a stringent contractual obligation to comply with a request for an on-challenge verification. Secondly, bilateral efforts to clarify matters that may be considered ambiguous should be encouraged. However, the bilateral procedure of conciliation should not be established as a pre-condition for the conducting of an internationally organized on-challenge verification. Thirdly, decisions relating to the conducting of on-challenge verification should not depend on consensus, but on a qualified majority decision.
Obviously, there are fundamental problems of national security to be overcome before agreement on a system of adequate international verification can be reached. But the Conference on Disarmament will have to break new ground. None of the existing instruments of arms control have hitherto contained a verification mechanism designed to ensure the respect of a convention for the banning of a whole category of weapons. Hence particularly businesslike, flexible, serious efforts for the solution of this complex problem are necessary.
Delegations must free themselves from the illusion that there will be an agreement free of charge. The goal of the future convention — namely, to free the world from the scourge of chemical weapons — requires payment of the price of concessions towards an adequate international verification system. Those that are unwilling to pay such a price or make insufficient offers must openly accept responsibility for the continued threat to mankind by chemical weapons.

Negotiations during the 1986 session, particularly on those two areas, on which they should focus, will require concessions by all sides on the basis of a sober collective assessment of the positions and interests of all participants. Unfortunately, it is not enough in complicated disarmament negotiations of this kind to do one's homework once only.

However rationally and expertly conceived, however desirable from a national point of view, a negotiating proposal may be, however much initial polite applause it may have attracted, its test comes in the serious, detailed give-and-take of the negotiations themselves. A specific proposal that has been before the negotiators for several years, whether it be two years or four years, and that has neither broadened its appeal nor been adapted in response to the evolution of the negotiating process becomes not an object of veneration but a liability.

The accumulation of such liabilities makes the solemn protestation of commitment to the cause of a chemical weapons ban ring hollow. Immobility and credible involvement in a dynamic negotiating process do not go together. Negotiators must proceed on the assumption that there will always be at least one formulation which will optimize their own security interests and the interests of all others at the same time. That is the challenge of creative negotiating.

I should like to conclude with an appeal to all participants in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to make the necessary efforts to make possible a breakthrough in the negotiations on a draft convention during the 1986 session.
Our work in 1985 has been particularly well led. I should like to avail myself of the opportunity to thank Ambassador Turbanski for his dedicated and competent contribution. My delegation is proud to have endowed his negotiating team with one member of my delegation, Mr. Elbe, as the Chairman of one of the Working Groups. I also welcome Ambassador Cromartie as the incoming Chairman of the Group. We should all wish him well in his important task.

Mr. IDULE-AMOKO (Uganda): Mr. Chairman, the fact that the General Assembly has entrusted you with such important responsibilities during this session is not only an honour conferred upon your great country, Indonesia, but also an acknowledgement of your distinguished diplomatic expertise and statesmanship. My delegation wishes to associate itself with the sentiments expressed by previous speakers in this respect and to affirm our co-operation with you and all the other officers of the Committee.

This year two regional events have taken place in Africa under the umbrella of the World Disarmament Campaign. Over 50 participants, representing non-governmental organizations, educational communities and research institutes and elected representatives from all over Africa, were invited to the regional Conference in Cairo. A Ministerial Regional Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa was convened in Lomé, Togo, by the Organization of African Unity in co-operation with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Serious deliberations characterized those Conferences, at which far-reaching and serious decisions were taken. Not only was the role of the World Disarmament Campaign appreciated within the African context, but the special concern for Africa's security was reappraised and its validity within a secure international climate underscored. The Conferences once again drew the attention of the world community to the dangers posed to international peace and security by the racist and
aggressive régime in Pretoria and expressed deep concern about the continued military, nuclear and economic collaboration between that heinous régime and some leading Western Powers, including Israel.

To us in Africa peace means many things at the same time. It is the eradication of apartheid and colonialism as well as an end to man-made and natural disasters. It is the total removal of all obstacles that divide mankind on the basis of colour or creed and obstruct social development and international co-operation. Naturally we must be concerned when apartheid is armed and abetted, when regional and local conflicts are inflamed by external interests, when instead of being invested in social and economic developments resources are poured into the production and procurement of instruments of death and destruction, when instead of expanding external assistance that would contribute to the social and economic betterment of the poor in developing countries undue emphasis is placed on so-called military assistance.

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has just ended. The continuing validity and vitality of the Treaty was reaffirmed. That reaffirmation in itself was hailed as a great success of the Conference and was therefore said to augur well for the future of the Treaty. Whether such an assessment is fair is really not the question at issue. The most crucial question is whether, during the 15 years of existence of the Treaty, all Member States have lived up strictly to its principles and the obligations they assumed under it. I regret to state that my delegation does not share the optimism I have referred to. There can hardly be any doubt, of course, that the self-denial of a large number of non-nuclear States in not acquiring nuclear weapons has contributed immensely, if only partially, to the success of the non-proliferation régime. But the efficacy of an international legal régime is not founded on its unbalanced and selective application but rather
on effective observance of its principles and their obligations by all its adherents, big or small.

The non-proliferation régime has been undermined in several respects. The nuclear-weapon States have not only refused to disarm but frantically continued to expand their nuclear arsenals. Nuclear testing continues unabated in the face of an overwhelming international consensus in favour of the immediate conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Some of the nuclear States have even gone to the extent of giving assistance in the nuclear field to racist régimes whose aggressive intentions and postures pose tremendous threats not only to regional but to international peace and security. It is ironic that an international outlaw such as the racist régime in Pretoria should attract military and nuclear co-operation from some powerful Members of this Organization, when that régime is not a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is not a peace-loving Member of the Organization.
By failing to comply with the terms and obligations they assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States members are placing the future of the Treaty in serious jeopardy, for no one can say with certainty at this stage what will happen when its renewal comes up for debate at an appropriate time. It is not at all our wish to see the Treaty thrown overboard. But, on the other hand, the status of the Treaty may be endangered if the nuclear-weapon States deliberately continue to obstruct its effective operation. In this connection, I wish to refer to what Andrei Gromyko, the then Soviet representative, had to say to the Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, when the question of nuclear energy was first taken up by the Commission:

"The proposal for a wide exchange of scientific information is timely because such a scientific discovery as the discovery of methods of using atomic energy cannot remain for an indefinite time the property of only one country or small group of countries."

In the same vein, in presenting the United States proposals on the establishment of an international atomic energy development authority, Mr. Bernard Baruch stated:

"Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. The terror created by weapons has never stopped man from employing them. For each new weapon a defence has been produced in time. But now we face the condition in which adequate defence does not exist."

We of this generation owe tremendous admiration and respect to those great statesmen for their foresight and imagination. Two consequences flow from their predictions.
First, in the long run, that is to say in the course of history, not a single country can be prevented from eventually acquiring and possessing nuclear technology and possibly ultimately nuclear weapons. Secondly, there can be no effective defence against nuclear weapons. It therefore follows that either the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime is honoured by all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, or the gate will be thrown open in a decade or so for the unfettered proliferation of nuclear weapons. But then what would that entail for mankind since, as Mr. Baruch said, there is no defence against nuclear weapons? It is precisely because of this fear we have that we have yet to be persuaded that a space-based ballistic missile defence system can guarantee the security of the world.

Our planet is already saturated with nuclear and conventional weapons in both their quantitative and qualitative aspects. It is therefore very chilling when we see rabid preparations are embarked upon to extend the arms race into outer space.

Outer space is the common heritage of mankind. No country or group of countries should have the right to convert it into arsenals of nuclear weapons or theatres of nuclear conflagration. The General Assembly has categorically recognized the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. By its resolution 1962 (XVIII) on the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the General Assembly solemnly declared that:

"The activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security, and promoting international co-operation and understanding."
It is, therefore, patently clear that those who dream of "star wars" and are bent on militarizing outer space are not in accord with the general spirit and letter of the aforementioned resolution and are also bound to contravene existing bilateral treaties on this important subject. We urge the Conference on Disarmament to step up efforts to conclude with the utmost urgency negotiations leading to a treaty on outer space. In the same spirit, we welcome all initiatives towards the convening of an international conference for the peaceful utilization of outer space with a view to setting up an agency under international auspices for that purpose. In our view, such a conference should be held without pre-conditions and should be attended by all Member States and other interested parties.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can go a long way towards fostering mutual trust, confidence and reduction of regional tension. We therefore welcome the recent establishment of such a zone in the South Pacific, based on the free will of all the States of the region. But those zones must be seen as a means rather than an end in the disarmament process. The concrete realization of such zones as nuclear free not only depends on the co-operation of the countries of a region but also invites the goodwill of all other members of the international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, whose nuclear armed carriers roam the earth's waters, air space and seas. It is important that they respect the will of the peoples of the South Pacific to keep their region free of nuclear weapons and desist from all nuclear tests in that region.

Nuclear weapons today pose the greatest danger to mankind and its civilization. We must proceed to nuclear disarmament or face annihilation. Thus, in this spirit, Uganda joins in the clarion call of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement and peace-loving peoples the world over for an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons, and the cessation of their development, production, testing and deployment,
pending general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The immediate conclusion of a comprehensive-test ban is a prerequisite of such a measure. Regrettably, there are those who say that although a comprehensive-test ban is their long-term objective, a cessation of nuclear testing would destabilize strategic stability and national security. The corollary of this assertion is that the continuous acquisition of nuclear weaponry enhances rather than diminishes the security of States. In order to feel secure, so the argument goes, the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons must be intensified.

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which finds its ideological rationale in this unsavory dogma, flies in the face of sanity. Stretched to its extreme, this doctrine borders on absurdity. The situation could be likened to that of a sufferer from obesity who, on visiting his dietician for advice on how to reduce his weight, is told by his respected doctor to eat more in order to become slim and fit. However ravenous this gentleman might be, common sense would prompt him to conclude that his doctor was no longer interested in his welfare, much less in his very survival.

We reject in toto any notion claiming that the security of a few must be predicated on the insecurity of many. Security is either for all or for none. The prevention of war, particularly nuclear war, must be the overriding pre-occupation of the United Nations, which was founded to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The more we squander on armaments the less secure the world becomes.

There is another matter of pressing concern. According to the latest statistics, global military spending is running at well over $US 800 billion per annum. This figure is in rough parity to the sum total of foreign indebtedness of the third world - a very serious problem that today threatens the foundations of the fragile economies and régimes in those countries.
Social and economic unrest, compounded by natural disasters, has aggravated the problems of the poor nations. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that if arms production and procurement could be suspended for only one year, the third world's foreign debts could simply be written off with the stroke of a pen.

What about being that creative and charitable, if only for once, just for the sake of humanity, which some Member States daily vow to make secure with nuclear weapons? There is sufficient evidence to establish a close link between disarmament and development. Halt military spending, and the world will construct more hospitals, schools, roads and social amenities. Divert money into food production, and the world will be rid of poverty and hunger.

It is in that light that we look forward to the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, in the preparation of which we are actively involved. We sincerely hope that the Conference will establish concrete ways and means of channelling resources from military expenditures into more productive human activities that can speedily contribute towards the amelioration of the social and economic conditions of the world's poor. But, as we have said before, such machinery should not serve as a smokescreen for the spiralling arms race and to obscure lack of progress in disarmament.

Before I conclude I wish once again to express our deep appreciation for the effective manner in which the United Nations fellowships on disarmament programme continues to be administered. The programme has contributed handsomely by increasing our understanding of the complex issues surrounding war and peace. We shall welcome any fresh measures aimed at consolidating and expanding it, so as to integrate it with some advisory services. This, we feel, can enhance the role of the United Nations in disarmament, about which a great deal has already been said.

It is our sincere belief that the role of the United Nations can be effective only if seen within a dynamic context. Institutions are created by men and for
men, and not vice-versa. They can be useful if they serve the purposes and objectives for which men have created them. It is in this context that a debate has been raging over the years about the alleged sanctity of the veto in the Security Council, our guardian of international peace and security. If we can discuss our supreme organ of international peace, what, then, should prevent us from discussing other organs within the United Nations system? The system must be responsive and rise to the challenges of the unforeseen demands of the international community, as and when necessary. The review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be carried out with sobriety and without generating mutual suspicion.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): As I indicated in my previous statement, the Polish delegation wishes to dwell today on one of the problems which attract the growing attention of the international community and are a subject of the constant concern of the General Assembly. I have in mind the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Chemical weapons belong to the most terrible category of weapons; they are weapons of mass destruction. Their specific features — in particular, the possibility of easy dissemination to great distances and manifold ways of penetrating the human body — would be most harmful to civilian populations, especially in densely populated areas, such as Europe.

In June this year 60 years had passed since the signing of the Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The anniversary was observed at the Conference on Disarmament and in other international forums, such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

The Protocol outlawed the use of chemical weapons but did not prohibit its development, production and stockpiling. Though a major achievement so far towards preventing chemical war, the Protocol was only a partial solution. It had,
however, a significant bearing on the development of the relevant part of international law. In the mean time, one of the categories of weapons dealt with in the Geneva Protocol became the subject of a total prohibition under the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

The prohibition of the other category - chemical weapons - has been the subject of ongoing negotiations for over 15 years. Those negotiations have been particularly intensive during the past three years.

Poland has always attached great significance to the work on a complete prohibition of chemical weapons. We have been consistently active, advancing many constructive initiatives in this field. It is worth recalling, in the historical context I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, that it was Poland that first proposed that the future Geneva Protocol should apply equally to the material used for bacteriological warfare. In 1968, at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, Poland was one of the initiators of resolution 2454 A (XXIII), requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a study on the consequences of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. Poland, individually or together with other socialist States, has introduced many concrete proposals and initiatives with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, both within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere. The representatives of Poland have already twice had the honour to chair the work of the Conference on Disarmament's subsidiary body on chemical weapons.

As we all remember, at its thirty-ninth session the General Assembly adopted three resolutions dealing with the prohibition of chemical weapons. All of them urge the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the negotiations with a view to the final elaboration of the Convention at the earliest possible date, one of them calling for submission of a draft convention to this fortieth session. To Poland's
disappointment, and to my personal disappointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we still do not have such a draft. I will try to point out some of the reasons for this unfortunate state of affairs.

The future convention on chemical weapons would prohibit the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and retention of those weapons and reiterate the prohibition of their use. Stockpiles of chemical weapons would be eliminated, under strict international control. Relevant production facilities would also be eliminated.

In other words, the envisaged scope of the convention would guarantee that chemical weapons were eliminated totally and for ever. It should also be remembered that for the time being there is no other disarmament agreement, existing or under negotiation, which would provide for the elimination of a whole category of existing weapons of mass destruction. In that sense, the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons will be an unprecedented step. The negotiating process is thus very complicated and difficult. One should not make it even harder by actions totally incompatible with both the ultimate goal and the spirit of the negotiations.

It is most regrettable, in this context, that plans for production of a new generation of chemical weapons are being advanced, thus adding additional difficulties to the already sufficiently complex negotiations on the Convention in the Conference on Disarmament.
(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Regardless of all the arguments used by the proponents and supporters of binary chemical weapons, there is no doubt that they constitute a totally new generation of chemical weapons. History has proved convincingly that a new generation of weapons has never been conducive to disarmament efforts but, on the contrary, has always been an incentive to a new round in the qualitative arms race.

Both the production and the stockpiling of binary and multi-component weapons are much safer and easier than in the case of traditional unitary chemical weapons. Therefore, these weapons could be produced by civilian industry. Such features could easily provide incentives to non-chemical-weapon States to produce or acquire such weapons, thus leading to the unchecked proliferation of chemical weapons and to the growing possibility of their use, even in minor local conflicts.

That is why the decision of the United States Administration to initiate the production of binary weapons can not but be regarded as nothing but detrimental to the negotiating process at the Conference on Disarmament and to overall disarmament efforts. The threat of the introduction of these binary or multi-component chemical weapons into military arsenals should be avoided at all costs.

As has been pointed out by many speakers in this debate, this year again the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons made further progress in elaborating the future convention. This was possible because the members of the Ad Hoc Committee contributed actively to the search for mutually acceptable solutions.

I am grateful for the kind references which have been made in the First Committee to my humble role as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. In this connection, I should like to stress the importance of the efforts exerted by the Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Committee's Working Groups - Mrs. Bonnier of Sweden, Mr. Poptchev of Bulgaria and Mr. Elbe of the Federal Republic of Germany - and by the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on non-use, Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia.
The present state of the negotiations is fully reflected in the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly. The report contains the draft text of preliminary formulations of provisions of the future convention. It reflects areas of agreement as well as the remaining divergencies and in some cases gives alternative formulations or additional explanations or interpretations.

The future convention, according to its preliminary structure, will be composed of 16 articles, a great number of which still need further, in some cases very substantial, work. In other cases, it is merely more precise drafting that is needed. But, more important, there is still a lack of common understanding on some crucial issues. I do not wish to go into details, but I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to some issues which I consider to be of major importance to further negotiations.

First of all, we still lack precise definitions of some very important elements of chemical weapons. Needless to say, precise definitions and criteria are in most cases indispensable at a given stage of the work. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to talk in a businesslike manner about the elimination of stocks or production facilities, permitted activities or verification problems, without a clear understanding of, and agreement on, all relevant definitions and criteria. I repeat "all relevant definitions and criteria", because attempts are still being made by some delegations in the Conference on Disarmament to camouflage certain problems of great importance, such as that of binary weapons, by the use of vague definitions and guidelines. That is by no means a pathway to progress.

The elimination of stocks of chemical weapons and of the relevant production facilities is a problem which has to be looked at from many angles - technical, military, economic, political and psychological - all of them interrelated. Although a general framework for elimination has been designed, a lot remains to be
done with respect to general and detailed planning and the carrying out of the whole operation. That process, encompassing the elimination of tens of thousands of tons of highly toxic chemicals, would, when accomplished, be a major, genuine disarmament achievement. To reach that goal we have to know first what to eliminate, then how to do it, and finally how to verify it. That is the only logical approach, and it is being supported by the socialist States and by a majority of the other States participating in the Conference on Disarmament.

Another of the important issues to be covered by the convention is the complex area of permitted activities with regard to toxic chemicals and their precursors. Provisions regarding permitted activities should prevent any possibility of using commercial industry for chemical weapons production purposes. At the same time, however, the chemical industry should not be restricted in such a way as to interfere with its normal peaceful activity. The same applies to control measures with regard to the chemical industry. These should guarantee that no activities prohibited by the convention are carried out, but should not be unnecessarily intrusive.

It is clear from what I have said that, notwithstanding the progress achieved, much remains to be done. The complexity of the task still ahead of us should make everybody realize that the final elaboration of the draft convention will not, unfortunately, be a matter of a few months only. Moreover, to be realistic, the period between final elaboration of the draft convention and its entering into force and becoming fully operational will also have to be counted in years.

Therefore, we do not understand why some delegations question the validity of partial solutions and interim measures such as the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones and steps aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons, which we feel could be achieved in a shorter time.
For our part, we fully support the idea of establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, as proposed by the socialist States in 1983. Likewise, we support the recent proposal by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia that such a zone be established in central Europe. We believe that this would contribute to building mutual confidence and strengthening regional and global security. We also believe that steps to ensure the non-proliferation of chemical weapons should be supported, not opposed. Incidentally, even some of the quite outspoken opponents of such steps – when they are suggested by the socialist States, of course – have told us in this Committee, although using different terminology, that they are in fact undertaking precisely such measures. We cannot but be genuinely puzzled by that strange logic.

I believe that all of us here agree that our main objective in dealing with the question of chemical weapons remains the prohibition and total elimination of those weapons. The General Assembly should therefore again call upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts with a view to the final elaboration at the earliest possible date of a draft convention banning chemical weapons and should appeal to all States to refrain from any action detrimental to the negotiating process.

I should like to express my hope that all concerned will display the necessary political will to conduct negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of results already achieved, in good faith and a genuine spirit of co-operation and compromise, thus permitting the speedy solution of outstanding problems. I wish also to assure this Committee and the incoming Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie, that Poland will continue to do its utmost in this regard.
Mr. EKEBUS (Sweden): On behalf of the sponsors - Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, the Sudan and my own country - I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.16 on the reduction of military budgets.

The item "Reduction of military budgets" has been on the agenda of the First Committee for several years. Some progress has been made. One example is the adoption by the General Assembly in 1980 of a carefully elaborated system for international reporting of military expenditures.

It is true that not very many States have so far complied with the recommendations of the Assembly to participate in the reporting. However, the system is still at an early stage of implementation and this year we note a welcome development in the reports received from countries that had hitherto not participated in the reporting. We hope that the number of participating States will grow even more in the years to come.

It is of course highly desirable to achieve active and growing participation on the part of States of all geographic regions and with different economic and budgeting systems. Apart from the important confidence-building impact of such a development, it would also serve the purpose of enabling a further refinement of the reporting system.

However, the main objective of this whole reporting exercise is not to provide better statistics on military expenditures but to promote international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain such expenditures. If and when Member States, and in particular the most heavily armed States, decide to try seriously to negotiate such agreements, they would need to know what the military expenditures are and how they can be defined and reported in the framework of an agreement. The existing reporting instrument as adopted by the General Assembly would in this context provide a very useful basis for the negotiations. It is therefore important
to preserve such a reporting system and to improve it further by a continuous and possibly growing participation.

Future negotiations will no doubt have to deal also with the problems of comparing and verifying military expenditures. Any agreement lasting more than one year will have to take into account that national rates of inflation may be very different, and each negotiating party will of course require sufficient assurance that the other parties do comply with the provisions of the agreement. The purchasing power of national currencies also varies considerably between different countries.

In order to be able to compare the military expenditures of different States, there is thus a need to construct military price indices and military purchasing-power parities. In resolution 37/95 B the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to conduct a study on these problems.

Pursuant to that resolution the Secretary-General appointed a Group of Experts to carry out the study. It has submitted two progress reports, and this summer it completed its work by adopting a final report (A/40/421) unanimously. In a statement to the First Committee on 1 November 1985, Mr. Hans Christian Cars who served as Chairman of the Group of Experts, presented the contents of the report.

In the operative part of the draft resolution the Assembly takes note of the study, expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and to the Group of Experts and draws the attention of all Member States to the study and its conclusions and recommendations. The Secretary-General is requested to reproduce the study as a United Nations publication.

Paragraph 5 invites all Member States to present before 15 April 1986 their views on the study and to suggest further measures with a view to facilitating future international agreements to reduce military expenditures, while paragraph 6 requests the Secretary-General to submit a report containing the views received to the next session of the General Assembly.
In paragraph 7 the Assembly takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the replies received in 1985 from Member States in the framework of the reporting system. These replies are contained in document A/40/313 and Add.1 and 2.

Paragraph 8 stresses the need to increase the number of reporting States with a view to the broadest possible participation from different geographical regions and representing different budgeting systems.

In paragraph 9 it is recommended that all Member States should report annually, by 30 April, to the Secretary-General by using the reporting instrument.

Finally, in paragraph 10 it is decided to include the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" in the provisional agenda of the forty-first session of the General Assembly.

Mr. MANDA-LOUNDHET (Congo) (interpretation from French): For 40 years now the world has managed to avoid a conflagration. Nevertheless, the international community should not lose sight of the fact that peace is now more than ever precarious and that it is our duty to preserve it.

While considerable efforts have been made to this end and our Organization, unlike its defunct predecessor, the League of Nations, has survived various vicissitudes and continues untiringly to redouble initiatives for peace and progress for mankind, the conduct of certain of its Members, including the greatest Powers, is often quite enigmatic.

Indeed, the United Nations is striving to find all possible openings likely to lead to lasting peace and security; but the major military Powers, in order to preserve their hegemonic and commercial interests have chosen the opposite course and do not hesitate to undermine the judicious decisions and resolutions of the Organization.
For some weeks now we have been talking about disarmament in the Committee and we shall shortly be ending the debate on this question and related problems. Can we assert that all the statements made here have been free from ulterior motives? No, we cannot make that claim, since all we need do is compare the rhetorical good intentions with the actual facts of the situation currently prevailing in the world to avoid being misguided.
However, the international community should not allow itself to be misled. The machinery necessary for accentuating war escalation is maintained in various places by those States which have a vast weapons potential and where certain parties are competing with each other to be ahead in the game. Nuclear tests for military purposes, despite the need for a healthy human and natural environment and the effective application of the security system envisaged in the Charter, are following each other at a disquieting pace. While we are striving to find ways and means of awakening humanity from the torpor of nuclear war, hundreds of thousands of scientists are working to discover ever more devastating and deadly weapons. What stubbornness! What diabolical perseverance! And that is obvious proof that the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, has taken a disturbing turn. Nevertheless, everyone knows that, as stressed in the conclusions of the Secretary-General's report on prevention of nuclear war, in document CD/603:

"... a nuclear confrontation could have such consequences as to threaten the very existence of life and the very conditions of survival on our planet."

If the international community should focus particular attention on the manufacture of nuclear weapons, it should not neglect another danger - by no means the least of all possible dangers - which is also threatening our life and the survival of future generations. I am talking about conventional, chemical or bacteriological weapons which, in the case of war, would not only cause damage but would also surely lead to an escalation of nuclear war.

Unfortunately, we cannot fail to see that the major nuclear Powers are those which also possess the greatest potential of conventional weapons and, not satisfied with their performance on earth and at sea, have extended the risks of war into outer space itself - outer space which is the common heritage of mankind.
Spy satellites are criss-crossing space, others are arrogantly stationed above the territories of certain weak States and are engaging with impunity in scrupulous monitoring of their activities.

Referring to that state of affairs in the Conference on Disarmament on 10 July 1984, the Secretary-General pointed out:

"We find ourselves in a special situation which is at once a threat and a challenge. The threat arises from the extension of the arms race into the new dimension of outer space and from the emergence of new weapon systems which are difficult to verify. This trend will destabilize still further an already precarious situation, which has its origin in the atmosphere of mutual suspicion prevailing between the two leading nuclear Powers.

"The challenge is to acquire the necessary capacity to dispel this mutual suspicion and to establish in its place the essential basis for mutual trust which will enable us to halt the arms race and progressively negotiate reductions in arms levels. That, of course, is easier said than done, because to promote mutual understanding between different systems is a difficult and delicate task. Nevertheless, in the present dangerous circumstances it is urgently necessary to undertake that task." (CD/PV.271, p. 7)

In such an international context where we are so concerned with peace and the survival of humanity, these can be brought about only by general and complete disarmament, and that means in fact active international co-operation based on trust. But how can we think of genuine co-operation in the world where, as one representative put it, "tigers are looking for each other without demilitarization"? We must find some solution to this paradox of behaviour.
The Congolese delegation feels that the United Nations has an essential role to play and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. We think that the forums of our Organization without any doubt constitute the appropriate framework for the search for solutions to the problem of disarmament.

That is putting our finger on this Committee's importance and the delicate nature of the responsibilities that our Chairman bear. But we have not the slightest doubt that you will be successful in this difficult task. I should like to take this opportunity to convey to you my warm congratulations on your unanimous election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Congratulations go also to the two Vice-Chairmen, Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia and Mr. Bagbeni Adeida Nzengeya, and Mr. Yannis Souliotis, our Rapporteur.

In keeping with its policy of peace and freedom, the People's Republic of the Congo supports all efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament, in particular the early halting of the arms race. My delegation therefore notes with satisfaction the announcement of the resumption on 20 November, at the highest level, of the Geneva negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America which have been suspended since last year. We venture to hope that they will make it possible to take a step forward towards disarmament.

However, as was stated by Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar one year ago:

"If the essential means of avoiding a nuclear war are in the possession of the major nuclear Powers, nevertheless other countries have the duty of making their contribution by exercising restraint in situations which may rise to the dangerous nuclear threshold. The survival of the human race should not be allowed to be at the mercy of negotiations between the major Powers."

(Mr. Manda-Loundhet, Congo)
Regional measures and agreements freely entered into to ensure the prevention of nuclear war are liable to help progress towards disarmament and strengthen international peace and security. The Tlatelolco Treaty which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America, and declarations on the denuclearization of Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and other parts of the world are all examples of encouraging efforts to build up trust amongst States. Such efforts will always be supported fully by my country.

Unfortunately, in spite of those good intentions, there are aberrations which continue to be of concern to us. That is the case with South Africa's nuclear capacity which constitutes a constant danger to African States. Indeed, it is to be feared that the racist Pretoria régime may very well use such a capacity in the service of its odious policy of apartheid. The delegation of the People's Republic of the Congo here and now calls on all States collaborating with South Africa to halt immediately all their military and nuclear co-operation with that country. The Security Council should take the urgent measures necessary to enforce the arms embargo declared against Pretoria.
The People's Republic of the Congo wholeheartedly supports the idea that there is a link between disarmament and development, and we wish to reaffirm that the Disarmament-Development-Security triad is one and indivisible.

The hundreds of thousands of dollars — in fact more than a billion, according to reports in our possession — spent each year on arms could be devoted to development. My country hopes that resolution 39/160, adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1984, will soon come into force. Together with 53 other members, we took part in the work of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held from 29 July to 9 August 1985 at United Nations Headquarters. The Congolese delegation is gratified at the fact that certain proposals, such as that of France, already making provision for the holding of an International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

At the time when we are celebrating with such ceremony the 40 years of the existence of our Organization and on the threshold of 1986, which has been proclaimed the International Year of Peace, the Members of the United Nations, and first and foremost the super-Powers, are under a duty to do their best to work for our well-being and the survival of future generations.

Mr. KAHN (German Democratic Republic): My delegation wishes to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/40/L.6. This draft is a contribution to agenda item 65, entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session". The subject matter of the draft is the obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations.

It has become manifest during the course of the general debate that the state of affairs as regards disarmament negotiations still does not live up to the urgent requirements of the present time.
The German Democratic Republic has already outlined in detail in document A/40/842 its position on the bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations.

In its statement of 29 October my delegation singled out, in particular, those priority issues that should be the subject of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. We would not, therefore, deem it appropriate to repeat them here.

With the present draft resolution, the German Democratic Republic has also taken into account the following statement made at the summit meeting of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Sofia from 22 to 23 October this year:

"The States participating in the Meeting deem it necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the acting multilateral forums: the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the Stockholm Conference and the Vienna talks, to start a fruitful discussion of those questions related to arms limitation and to disarmament which are currently not covered by negotiations... The socialist States represented at the Meeting call for an increased contribution by such a representative forum as the United Nations to efforts for halting the arms race and achieving disarmament."

It is gratifying to note that the non-aligned States, in the Political Declaration adopted in Luanda in September this year, have also made similar statements and demanded that the bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations ought to be facilitated and mutually complemented instead of being impeded or even frustrated.

In each of the past few years the German Democratic Republic has sponsored a draft resolution on the disarmament negotiations. Permit me to address specifically two aspects of the present draft which merit particular attention. First, the twelfth preambular paragraph welcomes the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. Secondly, operative paragraph 4 expressly refers to the elaboration of drafts of treaties on a nuclear-weapon-
test ban and the prohibition of chemical weapons as the objective of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, and also calls upon the Conference to proceed to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of nuclear war as well as the prevention of an arms race in outer space without further delay.

As in the past, my delegation is also looking forward this year to trustful and constructive co-operation with the delegation of Yugoslavia with a view to sponsoring a joint draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.