VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 28TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Today my delegation wishes to address itself to agenda item 63, entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons".

This year has marked the sixth consecutive year of multilateral negotiations on a total ban on chemical weapons. As a result of those six years of multilateral negotiations and of earlier bilateral efforts, the framework and the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention have gradually taken shape. That achievement, however, may be judged as relative if one takes into account the gap between the lofty aspiration of mankind to prohibit chemical weapons and the present-day gloomy realities of chemical-weapon arsenals still existing and posing an enduring threat to international security.

The task facing the negotiators is a challenging one. A comparison of the present scope of chemical disarmament negotiations with earlier nuclear disarmament efforts may help one to grasp fully the multifaceted character of the endeavour. The elaboration of the chemical weapons convention can be compared - in its own context, of course - to the elaboration of the nuclear test-ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such a comparison shows that a chemical weapons convention, by its complexity, its abundance of technical problems, its complicated link with peaceful chemical production, may be even more difficult to work out than those instruments were.

I must immediately add, however, that, despite the fact that the present undertaking to ban chemical weapons involves numerous intrinsic problems, the main barrier in the way of an early agreement is not of a technical or methodological character. It is no exaggeration to state that all the basic ingredients exist today to achieve an effective ban on chemical weapons in the not too distant
future. But to that end a certain amount of political will and readiness to compromise are needed on the part of those States which still do not believe that disarmament as a whole and chemical disarmament in particular have a raison d'etre of their own and which regard chemical weapons as an element of their security policy resting solely on military power.

The 1985 session of the Conference on Disarmament, besides experiencing the traditional ups and downs of negotiations, brought about some positive developments in the field of chemical disarmament. I must mention first that there was great interest in the issue, as shown by the mere fact that during this last session some 50 working documents were introduced by the Conference members and that a considerable number of countries not members of the Conference, took an active part in the deliberations. As an end product of the nearly 130 different meetings, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and its subsidiary bodies, under the competent leadership of the Committee Chairman, Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski, and the four subsidiary body Chairpersons were able to reach a consensus on a report containing the draft elements of a future convention. The draft texts reflect a more precise and elaborate formulation of different provisions than those contained in preceding reports.

It may be a positive sign for the future that, in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee, the preliminary formulations of provisions of the future convention, assembled in appendix I to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, will be used as a basis for the further negotiation and drafting of the convention, while the reports of the Working Groups and of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations will be equally utilized in the further elaboration of the draft convention.

There was another promising development in the concluding phase of the 1985 session: the process of narrowing the gap between the positions of different groups of States on key items. Unfortunately, that development was blocked because
the compromise efforts of the Soviet delegation were not met half way, to say the least, by the other major chemical-weapon Power, making an eventual breakthrough only a distant prospect. Thus the Ad Hoc Committee was deprived of the possibility of improving significantly the definition of chemical weapons and agreeing on all elements which constitute toxic chemicals.

At the same time the Ad Hoc Committee and its subsidiary bodies made certain progress on the questions of permitted activities, declaration of chemical weapons, principles for the elimination of chemical weapons, national implementation measures, prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and prohibition of the use of herbicides as a method of warfare.

The results achieved, especially during the past two years, in the drafting of preliminary formulations of the future convention may serve as a foundation for speeding up the negotiations with the aim of achieving an early agreement, given that there is the political will to that end. Unfortunately, 1985 bore witness to the lack of that very political will. The resolutions of the two Houses of the United States Congress to appropriate funds for the production of binary chemical weapons caused many cracks in the edifice of chemical disarmament. Binary weapons, in our view, represent a unique threat to the existing chemical weapons control régime and to a future chemical weapons convention; thus the implementation of plans for their production and deployment would bring the crumbling edifice of chemical disarmament crashing down.

Binary weapons, by reason of their characteristics, threaten to remove nearly all the constraints which have so far prevented chemical weapons from being converted into a militarily useful means of coercion. They remove the technological constraints, because they do not require stringent safety measures in production, thus making the production facilities less expensive and less dangerous. Their components could be produced by the chemical industry in large quantities, at short notice and at low cost. They remove the military constraints,
because their storage and handling requirements permit their easy transportation between rear and forward areas, their deployment in forward areas and, as a whole, their flexible integration in the military posture. They remove the domestic political constraints, because readily available chemical industrial capacities drastically reduce the stockpiling needs and because stockpiling in, and transportation through, populated areas pose no significant risk.

Those implications of the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons, besides weakening international security and increasing political tension and military confrontation, could doom present chemical disarmament efforts to failure - if not for political reasons, then because of the insurmountable problems of definition, delimitation and verification. What is more, chemical-war-fighting doctrines and postures, coupled with proliferation trends, would fatally undermine the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

As the start of the production of binary weapons is scheduled for the fall of 1987, pending a Presidential decision due to be taken then, the next two years will be decisive to the fate of chemical disarmament. The interaction between the degree of flexibility and mutual understanding displayed in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and the outcome of programmes calling for new generations of chemical weapons will soon decide whether the world community will witness a move in the direction of a commitment to the total prohibition and complete elimination of chemical weapons or to a new cycle of the chemical rearmament and counter-rearmament process.

In conclusion, I wish to touch upon the problem of regional or partial solutions. As is well known, the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic made a proposal to establish a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe. The other day we had the privilege of listening to some considerations on this subject, which, among other things, questioned the feasibility and raison d'être of such a proposal.
As this is not the place to dwell on the merits of the various arguments - other forums are more appropriate for that - I should like only to shed some light on that peculiar sort of approach to so-called partial or regional measures of disarmament. The peculiarity of that approach consists in its setting partial measures against global ones and intermediate steps against the final goal, and in putting them forward as mutually exclusive factors. I have the feeling that a healthier philosophy is closer to reality and could be of more use in the realization of disarmament endeavours.

For our part, we are fully aware of the fact that a partial or regional solution may seem to be not too significant compared to the final goal. Yet it could be of real importance in bringing the final goal nearer. We see the main importance of such a regional solution not only in its concrete disarmament aspects but, first and foremost, in its being a manifestation of the political will - of the existence of such will - for real disarmament. We regard it as a step towards improving the general climate, and specifically the atmosphere of the ongoing negotiations, thus permitting the early conclusion of a general agreement.

It is, therefore, our well considered view that any proposal made at any given time implying concrete disarmament action or a clear manifestation of the political will to go in that direction deserves the attention of the disarmament community and merits serious negotiations with a view to its implementation.

Mr. KHANDOGY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic)(interpretation from Russian): The greater the world's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, the greater the urgency of prohibiting such weapons, of destroying the stockpiles and banning the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.
That is true for all means of warfare, including chemical weapons, which, because of their characteristics, are no less destructive than nuclear weapons.

The position of the Ukrainian SSR on this question is clear. There is no place for chemical weapons on earth. Their production and deployment must be stopped and existing stockpiles must be destroyed in order to preclude the threat of their use and to banish them for ever.

The elimination of chemical weapons of mass destruction is among the most important tasks in limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament. That is why during the discussion of this item in the First Committee, the majority of delegations have expressed well-founded concern at the fact that the question of prohibiting these barbarous weapons has yet to be resolved. It has been a subject of debate in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament for many years, but a mutually agreed solution remains a distant goal.

Socialist countries have repeatedly taken steps to speed up the drafting of an international agreement on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. At the same time, they have put forward proposals for partial or regional chemical disarmament measures. These include the proposals of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty aimed at ridding Europe of chemical weapons and the recent initiative of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the establishment in Europe of a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering the territory of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR believes that the implementation of those proposals would make it possible substantially to reduce the risk of chemical war on the continent and consequently throughout the world. It would make it possible also to commence the reduction of chemical-weapon arsenals and would help strengthen European security and mutual trust. Moreover, the implementation of
such regional measures would help promote the conclusion of an appropriate international convention banning chemical weapons, which is the ultimate goal of the socialist States.

The need for an international ban on chemical weapons is now beyond doubt. In the past 10 years the number of States possessing chemical weapons has, according to some calculations, increased threefold, and these weapons continue to spread. An immediate international ban on chemical weapons is made essential by the relative cheapness and simplicity of the manufacture of toxic agents for use in warfare, their existence in the possession of States involved in conflicts, the huge stockpiles of toxic substances and the continuing qualitative improvement of those substances.

As we can see from the resolutions of the General Assembly, for example, the need for the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and for their destruction is now acknowledged by virtually all Members of the United Nations. An excellent opportunity for reaching an appropriate agreement in the near future, including effective national and international controls, is provided by the document introduced by the Soviet Union in the summer of 1982 on basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

In an attempt to accommodate the positions of other countries, during the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament the socialist countries have repeatedly made proposals intended to facilitate the quest for mutually acceptable solutions. We recall in particular the proposal for inclusion in the text of a future convention of a provision banning the use of chemical weapons, a number of proposals for guaranteeing that such weapons would not be produced at peaceful industrial chemical facilities and facilitating verification of this, proposals
concerning the specific methods to be used to destroy chemical-weapons stockpiles, and so on.

Finally, the Soviet Union declared last year that, in connection with the elaboration of verification procedures to monitor the destruction of chemical weapons in various special facilities, it was prepared to agree to a solution in which the effectiveness of verification from beginning to end of the destruction process would be guaranteed either by the constant presence at the facility of representatives of an international monitoring body or by a combination of systematic international verification measures at the facility and at the weapons stockpile related to it.

Despite all this, as can be seen, inter alia, from the report of the Conference on Disarmament, there has been no decisive move forward in the negotiations. As soon as light appears at the end of the tunnel, certain delegations move to halt further progress and even to turn the negotiations backwards.

Moreover, because of the obstructionist position taken by the United States in the negotiations, which is intended to guarantee the further build-up and upgrading of chemical weapons, there is now a threat of a total deadlock in the negotiations. That was the purpose of the United States draft text of April 1984 of a so-called comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons. It has now become perfectly clear that this has led simply to a widening of the gap between the sides and on a number of important aspects has caused a considerable setback in the negotiations. This concerns in particular verification issues. In fact, the United States draft text cancels out the previously agreed principle of verification by request and advances the intentionally unrealistic notion of a standing invitation to inspection, providing for compulsory inspections at any place and at any time, even when these are unwarranted. Clearly, that approach
runs directly counter to the generally recognized principle of adequate measures of verification, as set out in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

Moreover, there are clear attempts to retain, even during the effective lifetime of the proposed convention, the industrial capacity for the production of chemical weapons, particularly the latest types of chemical weapons. That is why the United States has refused to accept the proposal that each State's production of extremely dangerous super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes should be concentrated in a single specialized low-capacity facility. Such a concentration of the production of specific chemicals would greatly facilitate control measures.
Lastly, according to the United States draft, the use of herbicides for military purposes and of irritants in hostilities would remain beyond the framework of the convention. With its experience of the actual use of herbicides in the war against the peoples of Indo-China, the United States would like, in general, to legitimize the use of such toxic chemicals, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

In spite of all the difficulties - and even at times the deadlocks - the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in 1985 were aimed at focusing on a whole series of basic aspects of the future convention. The outlines of certain possible agreements on some of these aspects began to take shape. The overwhelming majority of States viewed with all due seriousness the appeal of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly

"to refrain from any action that could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from the production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons". (resolution 39/65 B, para. 4)

Notwithstanding all this, the United States Congress decided to appropriate for the coming fiscal year $124.5 million for the production of a new generation of chemical weapons - binary weapons. This decision was taken at a time when precisely at the Conference on Disarmament drafting of the articles of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles was proceeding.

By slowing down the elaboration of the convention under the pretence of concern for strict verification, and simultaneously developing the production of binary weapons - which has added immensely to the difficulties of verification -
the United States has been creating barriers to the elaboration of an international agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons which are difficult to overcome. Moreover, the production of binary weapons is viewed as part of a broad programme for the creation of new weapons designed to secure military-strategic supremacy for the United States.

According to foreign reports, in the United States armed forces binary chemical weapons have already been developed on the basis of exceedingly toxic nerve agents. For example, they have now deployed artillery shells and "Big-Eye" aerial bombs using binary weapons and work is being done on testing binary mines, aerial spray devices, cluster bombs, non-guided missiles and warheads for operational and tactical missiles. In Pine Bluff, Arkansas, a facility has been set up for the production of binary artillery shells and their charges and aerial bombs of exceptionally high capacity - about 570,000 rounds annually. Overall, the quantity of chemical weapons as the result of the implementation of these plans is to increase from 3 million to 5 million units.

The deployment of new chemical agents of mass destruction is planned primarily for the territories of Western European States. Thus binary weapons would become yet another source of mortal danger in the densely populated countries of Western Europe.

As is well known, the General Assembly has in the past few years expressed profound concern at the planned production and deployment of binary chemical weapons and drawn the attention of the international community to proposals for the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones. Recent events have shown that this question has lost none of its topical relevance. Indeed, it has acquired even greater acuteness.

The chemical-arms race has an exceedingly negative effect not just on prospects for the elaboration of an appropriate international agreement. It is
also having a poisonous effect on the entire international atmosphere and tends to aggravate military confrontation generally. In order for a ban on chemical weapons to become a reality, it is necessary to have political will, a constructive spirit and a desire by all States, in deeds and not in words, to promote the attainment of this goal.

The Ukrainian SSR delegation hopes that the comprehensive discussion in the First Committee of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons and the relevant General Assembly resolutions will provide the Conference on Disarmament with precise guidance as to the real reasons behind the impasse in the negotiations and ways of overcoming existing obstacles.

The new proposal of the Soviet Union on the elaboration of an international agreement for the non-proliferation of chemical weapons deserves serious support. Such an agreement would make a valuable contribution to the speedy attainment of our ultimate purpose – the complete elimination of chemical warfare agents – and facilitate the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament.

Our delegation believes that the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons has now reached the stage for international regulation. The parties to the negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament have a mandate for the elaboration of a text for an appropriate convention. Intensive negotiations have been proceeding in the Special Committee on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski. The overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations have a vital interest in the need to rid our planet of the chemical danger, and this, in the last analysis, will have a decisive effect on the speedy elimination of this barbarous means of mass destruction.
Mr. FERM (Sweden): Two years ago the General Assembly adopted resolution 38/188 H, which requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on concepts of security. I had the privilege to serve as Chairman of the Group, which this summer concluded its work and adopted its report by consensus. That report is now before the First Committee in document A/40/553, and I should like to share some thoughts on it with members of the Committee.

First, I wish to take this opportunity to thank all the members of the Group of Experts for their co-operation, which made it possible to complete our task successfully on time. I wish also to thank Dr. K. C. Lin, who served as Secretary of the Group, and all the other members of the Department of Disarmament Affairs who assisted us.

The purpose of the study was to encourage policy makers to look into the problem of security in its entirety, to see the growing interactions between issues and to understand that the security of individual nations can no longer be divorced from the security of the entire international community.

The Group of Experts understood security as a condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress. International security is the result and the sum of the security of each and every State of the international community. International security cannot be reached without full international co-operation. The Group recognized that support for this approach by the Soviet Union and the United States was of particular significance.
Chapter II of the report of the Group of Experts contains an overview and
discussion of eight concepts of security, namely: balance of power, deterrence,
equal security, collective security, neutrality, non-alignment, peaceful
coexistence and common security. That overview attempts to summarize those
concepts and presents different views on them to stimulate discussion on the
broadest possible basis as a contribution to efforts that seek to identify common
ground between nations.

The different security concepts have evolved as a result of changing
political, military, economic and other circumstances. All of them have as a
common objective the protection of national security. However, they may stress
different elements of how to reach that goal most efficiently. Some concepts may
emphasize national, unilateral action to maintain security; others, multilateral
co-operative approaches.

Traditionally and in practice, concepts of security have stressed unilateral
steps to reduce national vulnerabilities through military defence. On the other
hand, a number of concepts have evolved, such as the collective security concept
embodied in the United Nations Charter or the concept of common security which
places emphasis on political co-operation aimed at increased confidence between
States.

National and international security are becoming increasingly interrelated.
Global interdependence grows and actions not only by the major Powers but also by
other nations can have major regional or even international repercussions. In this
situation, the need for multilateral and co-operative approaches to security
becomes ever more urgent. This is underscored by the fact that all nations face
the threats posed by the nuclear arms race.
(Mr. Ferm, Sweden)

The report draws attention to a security problem which is often neglected, namely, the vulnerability of small States. No fewer than 34 of the States Members of the United Nations have a population of 1 million or less. It is important that the international community pay attention to their special security needs.

The Group of Experts, in their conclusions, share the following understandings:

First, all States have a legitimate right to security. The security needs of one State must not be defined in such a way as to undermine the legitimate security needs of others. The security of small States is as important as the security of large States.

Secondly, the right to use military force in self-defence is recognized and reaffirmed in the Charter of the United Nations. However, the use of military force to gain security at the expense of other States is unacceptable.

Thirdly, security should be understood in comprehensive terms. Security policies can no longer be concerned with peace, defined merely as the absence of war, but must deal effectively with the broader and more complex questions of the interrelationship between military and non-military elements of security. It is essential to address underlying political, social and economic problems.

Fourthly, nuclear weapons have transformed the conditions of security. Ultimately, the fates of all States are affected by the continuing increase in the nuclear arsenals or by failure to negotiate arms limitations. As a consequence, security is the concern of all States.

Fifthly, in the nuclear age the interest in survival must transcend differences in ideology, political institutions and socio-economic systems. The world's diversities should not constitute an obstacle to international co-operation for peace and security.

Sixthly, disarmament and arms limitation are an important approach to security. The arms race runs counter to efforts to maintain international peace
and security and impedes the realization of the purposes of the United Nations. Arms limitation and disarmament have thus become the most urgent task facing the international community.

I believe that this is the first time that a United Nations document contains a discussion of the different basic ideas, the concepts, that form the basis for national security policies. Let me express the hope that the report of the Group of Experts will be seen as a contribution to the discussion in the United Nations of these issues which are vital for us all and as a contribution to a better understanding of different security concerns. Let me also express the hope that the report will be seen as a humble contribution to the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations and to the efforts to strengthen the ability of our Organization to prevent and solve international conflicts.

Mr. KUNDA (Zambia): Since this is the first statement that I am making in this Committee, I shall respect your injunction, Mr. Chairman, not to offer you and the other officers of the Committee my delegation's congratulations on your unanimous election to your respective offices.

On this historic fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, it is worth recalling that the very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly - resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946 - deals, inter alia, with the question of disarmament. Essentially, that resolution unanimously established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to draw up plans for the control of atomic energy and the elimination of atomic weapons and all other major weapons of mass destruction. That action symbolized the abhorrence that the international community manifested towards nuclear weapons and the entire gamut of the nuclear age at its very inception. No one could imagine then that the nuclear age would endure to the extent that it has.

As we scan the record of disarmament efforts since then, we do so with a sense
of missed opportunity to eliminate nuclear weaponry at an early stage. The vision that animated the first session of the General Assembly with regard to disarmament is as remote today in terms of its realization as it was 40 years ago. Meanwhile, nuclear weaponry has made quantum leaps in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and in accuracy and overkill potential. Nuclear weapons have thus completely changed the whole concept of warfare as it had been known.

The only thing that we can say for ourselves is that the abhorrence of nuclear weapons, so eloquently registered in General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 1946, among other things, is expressed even more vociferously 40 years later. Just by listening to the various policy statements by representatives in this Committee and, indeed, in the plenary Assembly by various Heads of State or Government who came to grace the fortieth anniversary, one is struck by the resounding abhorrence of nuclear weapons coupled with anxiety and uncertainty about the future of the human race, which is so terminally threatened by the relentless arms race. we can also say for ourselves that numerous efforts have been exerted by the United Nations and other forums with a view to arresting the nuclear arms race through nuclear disarmament.

The problem of nuclear disarmament has been compounded by a host of circumstances, none more serious than the attitude of nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two super-Powers which cannot let go of their massive nuclear arsenals. The two super-Powers are engaged in a race for superiority by accumulating and refining nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. To be sure, they have come to believe that the deployment of those weapons on a massive scale is essential to the security of their countries. In other words, they identify nuclear destructive power with their respective national security. As a consequence, they have become trapped in the cult of destruction. In the process, the arms race thus engendered has assumed a momentum of its own.
The human race is engaged in a race against the arms race - a race it can ill afford to lose, for losing means the extinction of the human species. The human race can only win this race through general and complete disarmament. Disarmament is, indeed, an international responsibility, but the greater responsibility for it rests upon the nuclear Powers, particularly the two super-Powers, which possess the largest share of lethal nuclear devices and other weapons of mass destruction. They are the undisputed trustees of international peace and security. They must discharge their responsibilities by taking a bold lead towards general and complete disarmament.

In this regard, the Programme of Action enunciated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), adopted in 1978, is as valid today as it was seven years ago. That Programme must be implemented if the world and humanity are to be spared a nuclear holocaust. This will require, *inter alia*, making rapid progress in all disarmament forums, especially the Conference on Disarmament as the only multilateral negotiating body on matters of disarmament.

The need for arms control cannot be over-emphasized. Its classical objectives are to reduce the risk of war, to reduce damage should war occur and to reduce the burden of defence. Given these objectives, arms control negotiations take on a special sense of urgency and significance. With arms control being uncontrolled between the two super-Powers, the relations between them have been characterized by tension. That has also given each side the maximum reason for mistrusting the other. However, it is common knowledge that when the two super-Powers negotiate, the dark cloud that otherwise overshadows the entire international scene during the tense period somewhat dissipates. Right now, we are enjoying a relatively sane international atmosphere because the two super-Powers are negotiating in Geneva and their meeting at the summit is in the offing for 19 and 20 November 1985 in Geneva.
In light of the foregoing, Zambia supports the triad negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva, which resumed this year after a year-long hiatus. We also look forward with fervour to the much-publicized summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and the General Secretary of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, this month. It is our sincere hope that the talks and the summit meeting will not fall victim to the fate of past negotiations, which were characterized by parallel monologues in which each side was more interested in posturing and in justifying its own position to world public opinion about the righteousness of its stand than in negotiating seriously with each other. Given these circumstances, we are keeping our fingers crossed – but not holding our breath – about the outcome of both the triad negotiations and the summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union.

My delegation has repeatedly upheld the view that nuclear disarmament deserves the highest priority. At the same time, however, the case for according equal priority to conventional disarmament as well commends itself for a number of reasons. To begin with, since 1945 the world has indeed been spared the horror of a nuclear conflagration but it has hardly been spared the horror of about 150 regional conflicts, which have over the past 40 years exacted a toll of more than 20 million lives lost and an unimaginable destruction of property. These wars were not fought between nuclear-weapon States. They were fought in the third world. The third world has become a fertile arena in which military competition between East and West takes the form of active backing by the super-Powers, which support opposite sides in any conflict in various regional outposts.

It must be borne in mind, too, that the lion's share – about 80 per cent of the world's military expenditure of almost $1 trillion annually – is consumed, not by the nuclear arms race, but by conventional forces. Since these forces are
mainly used to prosecute regional wars in the third world, conventional weapons spell enormous agony and insecurity for these countries. As a consequence, third-world countries are compelled to divert their limited and finite resources to meet the burdens of military expenditure for the purpose of maintaining internal stability and the defence of their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

One other consideration that makes it imperative to arrest the conventional arms race is the fact that the growing sophistication and capability of conventional weapons may raise or lower the nuclear threshold. Whichever is the case, these forces pose a grave threat to the vital distinction between nuclear and conventional forces. Without a clear dividing line between nuclear and conventional forces, one is left with the nightmare of a conventional war sliding surreptitiously into a nuclear conflagration. Given the number and frequency of conventional conflicts in today's world, it is not far-fetched to believe that sooner or later a conventional war will inadvertently give rise to a nuclear conflagration.

The case of the Bay of Pigs, when the world was on the verge of a nuclear holocaust that could have begun through conventional conflict, is still fresh in many of our minds. Elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East, the chance for an American-Soviet conventional clash that could easily translate into a nuclear catastrophe is all too high.

Allied to the nuclear and conventional arms race is the question of chemical weapons. Since these weapons possess the characteristics of both conventional and nuclear weapons, their use, too, has the potential, indeed the danger, of degenerating into a nuclear engagement. And because chemical-weapon are relatively cheap and easily accessible, they could become the poor man's equivalent of nuclear weapons. Their continued use is all the more reprehensible since these weapons are
already prohibited under the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We urge the Conference on
Disarmament to speed up its work on a chemical-weapon convention to arrest without
any further delay a horrendous chemical arms race.

In regard to outer space, Zambia can only reaffirm that general and complete
disarmament requires that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes and that it shall not become an arena for the arms race. We therefore
wish to appeal to those States with outer-space capabilities, notably the two
super-Powers, which are poised on the brink of a new arms race in outer space, to
refrain from developing, testing and deploying outer-space weapons. Outer space is
the common heritage of mankind, which must be respected as such by all States
members of the international community. To this end, the two super-Powers must
take the lead in the Conference on Disarmament - the only multilateral disarmament
negotiating body - to negotiate an international agreement banning for all time the
extension of the arms race into outer space.
Zambia supports the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in any part of the world because they constitute collateral disarmament measures. In this regard, we commend the countries of the South Pacific Forum on the establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty which was opened for signature on 6 August 1985 in Rarotonga. This Treaty reflects the strong determination of the countries of that region to keep nuclear weapons out of their region for all time. The desire of the peoples of the South Pacific Forum to bar nuclear weapons from their region must be respected by all countries, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, regardless of their previous commitments in the nuclear field within that region.

The decision concerning the denuclearization of Africa is one of the most important collateral disarmament measures that free Africa as a whole has made to the cause of world peace. African countries recorded their commitment to the denuclearization of their continent in 1964 when they adopted, at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Cairo, a Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. By that declaration, African countries voluntarily and collectively forswore possession of nuclear weapons as a contribution to the cause of world peace and security.

However, since 1979, following the nuclear test conducted by the racist Pretoria régime, the denuclearization of Africa has been dealt a major blow. South Africa's nuclear capability flies in the face of the OAU Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa which was endorsed by the General Assembly in 1965. South Africa's nuclear capability is there to intimidate and blackmail African countries for their opposition to the odious system of apartheid. The Pretoria régime has therefore become a lethal danger not only to Africa but to international peace and security.
According to the Lomé Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the Regional Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa which was held last August in Lomé, Togo, peace and security is considered to be the highest priority objective of independent African States and the foundation of socio-economic development. But that priority objective will continue to elude Africa if African countries continue to face the menace of the apartheid régime with its nuclear arsenals. Apartheid must therefore be eradicated and South Africa's nuclear installations must be brought under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) without any further delay.

Meanwhile, we urge Israel and certain Western countries that co-operate with racist South Africa in the nuclear field to cease their perfidious collaboration. Any continued collaboration is nothing but a demonstration of their resigned indifference to the aspirations of the African peoples to rid their continent of the obnoxious system of apartheid and its nuclear weapons.

There are a number of other intermediary steps that are indispensable in efforts to slow down, halt and reverse the hitherto unbridled arms race. One such step is a comprehensive test ban. We support a comprehensive test ban because it would prohibit further testing of new nuclear weapons in all environments, including underground. Under a comprehensive test ban régime, there would not be any refinement of existing nuclear devices. A comprehensive test ban in place would render current nuclear weapons, if they go untested for a long time, obsolete.

Allied to the question of a comprehensive test ban is the moratorium on nuclear tests. A moratorium is an indispensable first step towards a comprehensive test ban in the sense that it would help in building confidence about the seriousness to end the runaway arms race. In this connection, Zambia applauds the unilateral initiative of the Soviet Union in announcing a nuclear-test moratorium,
beginning on 6 August 1985, up to the end of the year. Although we recognize that
this moratorium is of limited utility value when weighed against the backdrop of
the massive nuclear instruments in place today, it is our belief, none the less,
that it is a courageous step in the right direction. It deserves to be emulated as
a demonstration of commitment to the cause of world peace. It places the onus of
emulation upon the other nuclear-weapon Powers. Are they, or are they not going to
respond in kind, might we ask?

Just as we urge the other nuclear-weapon Powers to join the moratorium, we
also urge them, particularly the two super-Powers, to freeze the production,
stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons since they have more than enough in
their arsenals to destroy our planet many times over.

Another important collateral disarmament measure relates to the Declaration of
the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. When the decision to transform the Indian
Ocean into a zone of peace was endorsed by the General Assembly in 1971, all States
Members assumed a solemn obligation to transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of
peace. To date, however, the Indian Ocean area is still in the throes of
super-Power rivalry and competition. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction retain their ominous presence therein. And, above all, tension reigns
supreme in the area and the hopes aroused by the declaration of the area as a zone
of peace are as forlorn as they were 14 years ago.

Progress on the matter has been hampered by lack of consensus in the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Indian Ocean concerning the modalities for an International
Conference on the Indian Ocean to be held in Colombo. My delegation wishes to
reiterate its belief in the imperative necessity of the Colombo Conference. We
believe that it will be an invaluable first step towards the implementation of the
Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. We therefore appeal to those delegations that have thus far opposed the convening of the Conference by raising unnecessary procedural hurdles to display some magnanimity in the matter so that the Conference can take place in the first half of 1986 in Colombo.

Mr. AGSTNER (Austria): "I will ignore all ideas for new works and engines of war, the invention of which has reached its limits and for whose improvement I see no further hope." When Julius Frontinius, a chief military engineer, gave that advice to the Roman Emperor Vespasian nearly 1900 years ago, he made the same mistake as the Commissioner of the United States Office of Patents at the turn of this century, who declared that "everything that can be invented has been invented." They were not alone, as thousands of experts that came after them also could not imagine the future development of military technology. They certainly would never have been able to foresee that in the summer of 1945 mankind would for the first time test, and then deploy, nuclear weapons.
In the course of the next 40 years nearly 1,500 explosions of nuclear devices for testing purposes were to follow. More than one third of them took place in the atmosphere, the remainder under ground. Whereas the problem of radioactive fallout has been eliminated, the development and accumulation of nuclear weapons continue unabated. The nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers and the other nuclear Powers contain enough nuclear weaponry to blow up this planet and to bring life on earth to an end. The call for an end to nuclear explosions is not a new one and the issue has figured as a separate item on our agenda since 1957. We have so far adopted around 50 resolutions calling for an end to nuclear-weapon testing.

What has been achieved is the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. In that Treaty between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union those parties proclaimed in the preamble the principal aim of achieving general and complete disarmament and said that they were

"Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances." (ENDC/100/Rev.1)

The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban was also one of the issues raised in the negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In 1968, the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty recalled "the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,"

and included Article VI, which stipulated that

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament ..." (resolution 2373 (XXII)

My delegation is fully aware that verification constitutes an essential element of any treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons. Without a mutually agreed and adequate formula on verification no comprehensive test-ban treaty will be concluded. We believe, however, that a solution can be found. In this regard it is wise to recall that the Conference of Experts which met at Geneva in the summer of 1958 to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests concluded unanimously that it was technically feasible to establish an effective control system that could detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low-yield explosions from 1 to 5 kilotons.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events recommended as long ago as 1978 the establishment of a global network of 50 seismological stations and the carrying out of a practical exercise to test the proposed network. With the technological progress achieved in the course of the years, my delegation believes that the establishment of an almost fool-proof verification system should be possible, as the attainment of 100 per cent certainty will remain an illusory goal. My delegation took note of the proposals, already contained in the report of the aforementioned Expert Group, to set up a global network of seismic stations, to exchange seismic data and to provide for the possibility of on-site inspections upon request.

We should, however, not overlook the very simple truth that even the most elaborate verification system will be unable to replace the essential pre-condition of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty - indeed, of the conclusion of any treaty - that is to say, trust between the parties to the treaty. In the case of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is closely related to nuclear
disarmament, mutual trust between the two super-Powers will be essential. In this regard, we welcome the summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, and express our hope that it will pave the way to better understanding between the two Powers upon which mankind's future will depend. We should make it clear, however, that we do not advocate here that trust replace verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty altogether; but the most elaborate verification system without trust in the other party's complying with the treaty provisions will not be sufficient either. What is required, and we are confident that we shall see it in the future, is the right mix of trust and verification procedures.

We have taken note of recent far-reaching proposals by both sides aimed at radical reductions of existing nuclear arsenals and we hope that those proposals have been made in good faith and not to score points. My delegation believes that it should be possible to negotiate a settlement on the basis of those proposals and we call on both parties to go the proverbial extra mile, but not in opposite directions.

The heart of the problem of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty lies in the fact that no negotiations have taken place since the trilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, which started in 1977, were broken off in 1980. At that date the parties had already agreed that a variety of verification measures should be provided to enhance confidence that all parties to the treaty were complying strictly with it. The three negotiating parties had indeed gone far in breaking significant new ground concerning verification procedures. The arguments advanced today, that verification is the one issue which prevents the conclusion of a treaty in the short and medium term, do not sound convincing, in our view. After the regrettable breakdown of the trilateral talks, the Conference on Disarmament now carries on the important task
of seeking an urgent solution to this problem. Austria, which appreciates the
resumption of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union this
year in Geneva on a set of issues related to nuclear disarmament, regrets, however,
that so far substantial negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty have not
been resumed either in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament or in some
other forum. We deem the goal of reaching a comprehensive test-ban treaty far too
important for the raising of procedural problems to be tolerated.

My delegation, therefore, fully endorses the call of the States parties
participating in the Third Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation-Treaty for a
resumption of the trilateral talks and the call on the other nuclear-weapon States
to join in these negotiations in order to arrive at a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

In its statement on the issue of the comprehensive test-ban treaty at the
thirth-ninth session, the Austrian delegation fully endorsed the concept outlined
in the five-continent peace initiative of 22 May 1984 by the heads of State or
Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania. It was
suggested that the most reasonable line of action for the nuclear-weapon States to
take should begin with the halting of all testing, production and deployment of
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. This initiative was followed by the
Delhi Declaration of January 1985, which called for a complete halt in the testing,
production and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and of space
weapons, to be followed immediately by substantial reductions in nuclear forces.

My delegation welcomes the joint message dated 24 October 1985 addressed to
the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by the Heads of State
or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic
of Tanzania, which has been distributed as document A/40/825. My delegation fully
shares the view expressed in this message that the problems of verification are difficult but not insurmountable and takes note of the proposal concerning third-party verification.
An important question related to a comprehensive test-ban treaty is of course what impact such a treaty might have on nuclear disarmament. We have heard many arguments to the effect that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have no impact whatsoever on nuclear disarmament in the short and medium term. We fully share the view expressed here by the representative of Australia that "those arguments are unconvincing ... nuclear-weapon States would not continue to conduct nuclear tests if they were not militarily significant".

(A/C.1/40/PV.13, pp. 39-40)

We are aware that nuclear arsenals will not be drastically cut as a result of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; what we shall see will be a gradual phasing out of that sort of weapon, as outdated nuclear weapons can no longer be replaced by more effective ones and will have to be destroyed. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would effectively hinder the development of new nuclear warheads, as it is impossible to produce and deploy new types of nuclear weapons without some - even minimal - testing. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would prevent not only vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon Powers but also horizontal proliferation. It would constitute a corner-stone of all efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament, which is a prerequisite if we are ever to achieve our final aim of general and complete disarmament.

The issue under consideration is not how to continue nuclear-weapon tests, nor how to conduct them at the lowest levels, nor yet how experts of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers could monitor each other's nuclear tests; it is also not one of carrying out nuclear-weapon tests in a not too densely populated area, with politicians watching them so as to certify their safety. The one and only issue under consideration is how to put an end once and for all to all nuclear tests, by all States, in all environments, and for all time.
Several pertinent proposals on how to achieve that goal are on record. The latest came from the representative of Australia, who proposed that the very least a nuclear-weapon Power could do was to register its nuclear tests with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Time is running out. If we want to pass on our planet and its resources to future generations, we have to act now. The survival of humanity will depend on the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Let us take the first step in that direction by a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The purpose of my statement is to introduce my draft resolution (A/C.1/40/L.9), of 1 November 1985, under agenda item 61 (h), entitled "Disarmament and international security".

We are deeply concerned about the continuing escalation of the arms race. We are in the fortieth anniversary year of the United Nations, and the arms race has been continuing all those 40 years. The draft resolution says that the General Assembly is deeply concerned about that and adds

"Considering that resolution 39/63 K of 12 December 1984 calls upon the Security Council to comply with Article 26 of the Charter and to hold a session of the Council for the consideration of the escalating arms race with a view to bringing it to a halt".

The Security Council has never dealt with the question of disarmament and the regulation of arms, although Article 26 of the Charter specifically provides that it "shall be responsible for formulating ... plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments".

When the Charter speaks about the General Assembly dealing with disarmament, it uses the word "may". Article 11 says:
"The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments".

So when the Charter speaks about the regulation of armaments it says that the General Assembly may consider it, whereas it says that the Security Council shall be responsible for dealing with the question.

As far as I know, the Security Council has never dealt with the question of disarmament, contrary to the provisions of the Charter and contrary to General Assembly resolution 39/63 K, adopted on 12 December last year, which calls upon the Security Council to comply with Article 26 and hold a series of meetings devoted to the consideration of the escalating arms race, with a view to bringing it to a halt. Those meetings have not been held. A year has already passed, and the Council has done nothing. It has ignored and bypassed the resolution adopted by the Committee and the General Assembly.

Therefore, my draft resolution brings to the attention of the Committee, and of course to the General Assembly, the fact that the Security Council has failed to comply with the Charter and with resolution 39/63 K. The draft resolution therefore calls upon the Security Council to comply with Article 26 and to hold a session, as provided for by the Charter and last year's resolution.

The Security Council is particularly concerned, and its members must conform with the requirements of that resolution to produce measures for the regulation of armaments as a step towards halting the ever-escalating arms race. We have the means of doing so through the Security Council which, the Charter says, shall proceed to the question of the regulation of armaments. Are we not to use it and wait for the General Assembly, which may or may not do it? Why is there this failure? A year has already passed since the resolution was adopted, and the
Security Council has done nothing towards stopping the arms race. Why has it not held a session to consider the question? If it holds such a session and decides that the matter is not for the Security Council, if it wants to violate the Charter, let it say so. Why is it keeping silent?

The purpose of the draft resolution is to bring to the attention of the Security Council that it must do something; it is obliged to do something under the Charter. I repeat that the Charter says in Article 26 that the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, whereas when it speaks about the General Assembly, and therefore this Committee and other bodies, it uses the word "may". Therefore, the obligation is entirely on the Security Council to proceed with the regulation of armaments.

That is the purpose of my draft resolution which I hope will be adopted by consensus or by an overwhelming majority.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the last speaker for this meeting. We are ending a little earlier than scheduled. May I express the hope that the time thus available will be well spent by delegations in accelerating the process of finalizing and submitting texts of draft resolutions, for which the deadline is tomorrow at 6 p.m.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.