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Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

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Correction will be issued after the end of the session in a separate facsimile for each Committee.
The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. RAKOTONIAINA (Madagascar) (interpretation from French): In response to our Chairman's appeal, I shall confine myself to reaffirming how pleased my delegation is to be working under his enlightened and courteous leadership. I assure him, the other officers of the Committee and the members of the Secretariat that we shall co-operate to the full.

It is not always with a feeling of optimism that we participate in discussions on disarmament, in view of the meagre results that have been achieved as compared with our hopes and the recommendations contained in the resolutions that we adopt every year. Indeed, we recognize that disarmament is a complex task, and is dependent on factors and preconditions that are themselves of a complex nature. However, while no one can expect immediate or spectacular progress, it seems to us morally and politically indefensible to disregard indefinitely the will expressed so often by the vast majority of nations, if not all of them.

That unanimity was demonstrated in the statements made during the commemoration of our Organization's fortieth anniversary. Eminent leaders from all continents came to reaffirm their faith in the Organization and their adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter. At the same time, they issued a note of warning against the danger of nuclear conflict which would annihilate the human race and its civilizations, on the one hand, and, on the other, referred to the scandal of our century represented by the fact that astronomical sums are squandered on arms while hundreds of millions of human beings die of hunger, poverty and disease.
(Mr. Rakotoniaina, Madagascar)

In all good conscience, we cannot long continue to feign ignorance of the sincerity of their apprehensions and the justice of their claims when they call for the elimination of nuclear weapons and increased assistance to developing countries. At times we small countries are overcome by lethargy and disillusion about disarmament problems. In fact, we feel as if we have come up against a wall of misunderstanding when we protest about the insecurity in the world. In any event, that feeling of insecurity does not allow us to stand idly aside and leave it to others to take decisions for us simply because we are small countries.

That is the reason why we wish to reiterate our discouragement and concern at the lack of progress made in disarmament. Instead, we see an insane arms race. In the first place, no progress has been made in implementing the recommendations of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; yet the Final Document issued at that session it was adopted unanimously.
Secondly, on the multilateral level, the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament frequently stumbles on procedural questions. One has the feeling that questions of disarmament are now being shuttled back and forth between the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament. Thirdly, and lastly, we cannot say very much about bilateral negotiations, because very often we learn about them only when they are beginning or ending, although, in cases when they are broken off, much information is given out in the form of accusations and counter-accusations.

My delegation’s comments might seem sarcastic in a certain sense, but I am sure I am merely saying out loud what many others are thinking. What other attitude can we take when decisions and recommendations of the United Nations duly adopted unanimously remain only pious wishes? How should we behave and what language should we use when we complain about the insecurity and poverty in the world when the arms race is in full swing and may even reach outer space, unless it is already there? In this connection we welcome the imminent summit meeting between the two military super-Powers and express the hope that that meeting will contribute to the relaxation of international tension.

Extension of the arms race to outer space would truly be a desperate move that would shatter many things such as the so-called "balance of power" and what remains of the mutual trust between the big Powers.

To us such an extension would mean the continued existence of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence. Statements that activities to be carried out in outer space are merely part of basic research are not reassuring. The experience of the harnessing of the atom reminds us that from basic to applied science there is merely one step. In order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, we may as well act as of now and direct such activities in space towards purely peaceful pursuits. Countries able to do so should not embark on the militarization of outer
space, where desperate moves would then become the rule. Suspicion, distrust among States and international tension would then be the corollaries, and the danger of a nuclear conflict would be acute.

At the time of the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar developed some important ideas about the possible militarization of outer space. Since those ideas constitute a chain of interlocked reasoning, we do not wish to quote passages from it, but for all those interested in it, the statement is contained in General Assembly document A/40/PV.43 of 22 October 1985.

The fortieth anniversary of the United Nations was marked by the presence of many leaders of countries which have achieved independence since the creation of the Organization. Those statesmen reaffirmed their commitment to the Charter and appealed to other countries, including, of course, the founding Members of the United Nations, to abide strictly by the provisions of the Charter and to respect the Organization's resolutions and decisions. My delegation sincerely hopes that the United Nations will be able to play to the full the role expected of it in disarmament matters.

Mr. DUARTE (Brazil): Today I would like to address item 65 (h) of our agenda, on the prevention of nuclear war, and I would like also to comment on the current problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, since it adds to the danger of nuclear war.

When one refers to nuclear weapons, it is obvious that one deals with a rather different, and far more ominous, kind of threat than that posed by the means of destruction used until the final weeks of the Second World War.

It is for no other reason that the community of nations agreed, in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament, that nuclear weapons pose "the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization" (resolution S-10/2, para. 47). In the same document the General Assembly further stated that preventing the threat of a nuclear war is "the most acute and urgent task of the present day" (ibid., para. 18). In his report pursuant to resolution 39/148 P, the Secretary-General stated: "The prevention of nuclear war is not an issue among many; it is the conditio sine qua non of all our endeavours" (A/40/498, para. 88). At the commemorative meeting of the First Committee on the occasion of Disarmament Week, last Thursday, 24 October, the President of the fortieth session of the General Assembly, Ambassador Jaime de Pinés, said: "There is no doubt that the proliferation, in all senses of the word, of the atomic weapon, increases the risk of nuclear confrontation" (A/C.1/40/PV.21, p.6).

Despite such unequivocal statements, recent attempts in this and other multilateral forums have tried, and still try, to distort the concerns and the common resolve they represent. Such attempts would, first, equate the prevention of nuclear war with that of any armed conflict, thus subverting agreed priorities; secondly they would justify and sanction resort to nuclear weapons, thus condoning the nuclear arms race, which increases the very danger of nuclear war; lastly, they would result in a serious, if surreptitious, dilution of the collective expression of will contained in the Final Document, which remains the most remarkable instrument of its kind.

The Brazilian delegation cannot welcome the resurgence of such attempts. Military confrontation, or the pursuit of individual security through the accumulation of weapons that endanger collective security, must not be allowed to appear in a favourable light, as something that would ultimately redeem itself because it would discourage conflict. The promotion of such one-sided concepts
only serves the narrow interests of the major military alliances. If the assumptions on which they are based are proven to be right, the nuclear and conventional arms race will stay with us for ever; and if they are proven to be wrong, then the future of mankind will remain hostage to current doctrines of military superiority. As has already been said, that is too important a problem to be left to the nuclear weapon Powers alone.

My delegation believes that the General Assembly must again issue clear guidelines to the Conference on Disarmament on the question of the prevention of nuclear war. This issue involves many aspects, and it may not be possible to cover all of them in a single agreement. But the difficulties of tackling the problem should not discourage us, or divert us from our goal.

It is imperative to achieve full compliance with the political commitment to search for multilaterally acceptable solutions for a question that affects the security of all countries. On this basis, an understanding on the basic elements at issue must be reached, so that the negotiating body can be enabled to initiate the task of identifying the areas where action is feasible, and take specific steps to negotiate appropriate agreements or to recommend other negotiating options. Nuclear war must be prevented, whether it springs from confrontation, from deliberate escalation, from accident or from sheer incompetence. Whatever the causes, the results will be the same, that is, no one would be around to take stock of the damage.
We have heard many comments on the outcome of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). I should also like to contribute a few observations of my delegation to the debate on the important question of non-proliferation.

My Government remains firmly committed to the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, be it in its horizontal, vertical or geographical dimensions. Brazil is determined to make full use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, we have signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which upholds the principle of such peaceful utilization, and we are committed not to act in any way contrary to the objectives of the Treaty.

But the commitment to utilize nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes cannot be assumed only by some, while others remain free to do as they wish. That is the main reason for Brazil not having signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. My Government cannot accept an agreement that aims at sanctioning discrimination and perpetuating imbalance among States which are entitled to be treated as equals in their mutual relations.

Brazil continues to believe that the principles adopted with the support of the super-Powers in Resolution 2028 of 1965, should have formed the basis for the negotiation of an acceptable non-proliferation agreement.

It is clear to us that the régime established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty has neither prevented the use of the atom for war nor encouraged its use for peace. The recent Third Review Conference itself recognized the increasing acceleration of the nuclear arms race. Its Final Act states:

"the destructive potentials of the nuclear-weapon States parties were undergoing continuing development, including a growing research and development component in military spending, continued nuclear testing, development of new delivery systems and their deployment."
(Mr. Duarte, Brazil)

It further notes, with a regret that my delegation also shares, that:

"the development and deployment of nuclear-weapon systems had continued during
the period of review."

I can think of no other source more authoritative to substantiate what my own
delegation has stressed over the years in this Committee and other disarmament
forums: the only kind of proliferation prevailing today, and legitimized by the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, is the one that is being carried out by the
nuclear-weapon Powers.

It is such existing proliferation that must be urgently addressed, so that
long overdue solutions can be adopted, as demanded by the whole community of
nations, and in accordance with the special responsibilities that the
nuclear-weapon States have acknowledged.

The philosophy underlying the prevailing concept of non-proliferation as
supported by the super-Powers and their allies, seems to have mesmerized them to
the point of its being presented as the panacea for the ills of multilateral
disarmament. We have of late heard proposals for a whole programme based on such
concepts of selective non-proliferation, not only for nuclear weapons, but also for
chemical and other classes of arms.

As far as one can judge from the general terms in which they were couched,
such proposals appear all too familiar. They seem to be predicated on the same
assumptions that inspired the co-drafters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: the
powerless would be called once again to accept further constraints, while the
powerful would be free to act as they saw fit.

Regarding chemical weapons, for instance, multilateral negotiations on their
prohibition are already under way in the appropriate negotiating body, and the
prospect of their success seems not too distant as the major chemical-weapon Powers
realize that they may offer the last available chance. Initiatives for partial
measures, particularly if applicable only to regions not possessing such weapons, might result in the delay, or even in a halt, in the process of the negotiation of the convention, while the countries which possess chemical weapons would continue to improve their arsenals. It might then be too late, and chemical arsenals would have become the privilege of a few, just as it happened with nuclear weapons.

Progress in conventional disarmament should naturally follow suit to advances in other fields, with due account of the priorities laid down unambiguously in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. In this connection, it is to be hoped that meaningful results are achieved first in the geographical areas with the largest concentration of such weapons. Such is the case, for instance, of the region covered by the negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions or on confidence and security-building measures and on disarmament, two sets of talks which we hope will produce concrete disarmament measures. One should also keep in mind, in connection with conventional weapons, the report that we find in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook for 1985, that while military expenditures in most other countries fell in 1984 in relation to previous years, those of nuclear-weapon Powers consistently increased. In South America, for instance, total military expenditures for 1984 show a definite declining trend, down from absolute values already insignificant if compared with the amounts spent by the nuclear Powers and their allies.

Undoubtedly, bilateral and regional approaches may be of help to the disarmament process, when freely agreed upon and worked out by the parties directly involved, particularly in such heavily armed areas as mentioned above. But regional disarmament should not serve as a cover for the lack of effective measures on the part of those most responsible for the current dangerous situation in the field of international security. Nor can such concepts be geared to the purpose of
disarming the unarmed.

May I close my remarks by quoting from the words of President José Sarney of Brazil in his address to the General Assembly on 23 September:

"The peoples are aware that concessions made to the realities of power are a one-way process." (A/40/PV.4)

Not being responsible for the international climate of suspicion, hostility and confrontation prevailing today as a consequence of the politics of power and interference in the affairs of other States, the great majority of nations has no reason for being complacent with initiatives purporting to deal with the prevention of nuclear war, but which seem in fact designed to condone and perpetuate the present unsatisfactory and dangerous state of affairs.
Mr. NASHASHIBI (Jordan) (interpretation from Arabic): It gives me great pleasure on behalf of my delegation to congratulate our Chairman on his election. He represents a country with which mine, Jordan, has links of friendship and respect. I am confident that his experience and diplomatic expertise will be reflected in the positive results of the Committee's work. I also congratulate the other officers of the Committee and wish them all success in their endeavours aimed at a positive outcome to our proceedings this year, when the United Nations is marking the fortieth anniversary of its foundation.

Nuclear weapons have changed international security conditions. In the final analysis, the destinies of all States are affected by the increase in nuclear arsenals or by a lack of negotiation on the limitation of nuclear weapons. No State is immune to the increasing challenges and threats hanging over the security of the whole world. All States must participate in the search for constructive solutions to this grave problem. Since all States are exposed to the threat of annihilation, they should have an opportunity to express their views about efforts to achieve international security. The nuclear-weapon Powers, especially those with the largest nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility in the task of bringing about immediate disarmament.

The greatest danger confronted by the world today is that of an increase in nuclear armaments. The international community is considering ways and means of achieving complete disarmament, having realized the dangers of the weapons that are being developed and produced. The two super-Powers, possessing a colossal ability to produce these advanced weapons, are the ones mainly responsible for that grave development. It is therefore incumbent on the major Powers, which the Charter entrusts with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to co-operate in implementing the provisions of the Charter. One
(Mr. Nashashibi, Jordan)

obstacle standing in the way of the attainment of that goal is perhaps the intensification of the policy of competition and confrontation between States and their recourse to military might as a basis for their dealings with each other. Another reason is the lack of balance in capabilities, which led to the spiralling of the arms race and the quest to possess weapons, to nuclear weapons, to develop them and make them more effective.

Jordan regards the United Nations as the body that should be the instrument for the peaceful settlement of complex disputes, as the world must no longer be subjected to frightening competition and efforts to possess and develop those highly destructive weapons. Indeed such competition puts pressure on some countries to allocate the largest part of their resources to the acquisition of weapons instead of to economic and social development. Reports have indicated that the colossal amounts of money being spent on weapons, especially nuclear weapons, are increasing alarmingly year after year, to the detriment of the economic and social development of the developing countries.

For that reason my delegation welcomes the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, to be held in Paris in the middle of next year. And here I should like to refer to the Secretary-General's report on the relationship between disarmament and development (A/40/618), of 4 October 1985, which says that the world is spending an inconceivable amount for military purposes, part of which could be reallocated and used for humanitarian purposes. It is expected that world expenditures on armaments will reach a trillion dollars in 1985, which is about $3 billion a day. By comparison, assistance to population activities over the past 15 years through the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, which is
considered to be the largest multilateral source of such assistance, has totalled about $1 billion, equivalent to about eight hours of expenditure on weapons at the present level.

The arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, has reached unprecedented promotions. Humanity today faces the danger of self-annihilation owing to the massive stockpiling of the most destructive weapons ever produced. In order to avert the outbreak of nuclear war, it is imperative to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race. The countries with the most significant nuclear-weapon arsenals have a special responsibility to the world for nuclear disarmament and for reversing the nuclear-arms race, as well as for ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, other measures should be taken to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and reduce the danger of the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of their use. Here I would refer to the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on Israeli nuclear armament (A/40/520), of 9 August 1985, which says that States Members of the United Nations have over the years shown increasing concern about the danger of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East, particularly in view of reports that Israel may have developed a nuclear weapon capability.

At its thirty-ninth session the General Assembly, in resolution 39/147, of 17 December 1984, noted with concern Israel's persistent refusal to commit itself not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, despite repeated calls by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. The Assembly condemned Israel's continued refusal to implement Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and requested the Security Council to investigate Israel's nuclear activities and the collaboration of other States, parties and institutions in those
activities. It reiterated its request to the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to Israel's nuclear capabilities. It also reaffirmed its condemnation of the continuing nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa. That co-operation jeopardizes the security of the whole African continent.

I wish also to refer to the Secretary-General's report on Israeli nuclear armament (A/36/431), which says that Israel has strike aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
Reports indicate that the Jericho MD-660 and MD-62 ballistic missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and that other long-range missiles are under development.

Israel's propensity for aggression is not limited to its occupation of Arab territories and the displacement of their populations; it has extended to the act of aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was devoted to peaceful purposes and was subject to all safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

My country's delegation supported resolution 39/54 of 12 December 1984 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, in which the General Assembly again urged all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

My delegation also welcomed the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that Conference's reaffirmation that the Treaty - to which 130 countries have acceded - is the most important international convention on meeting the security interests of the international community.

Flouting international law and resolving disputes by recourse to force are grave matters that do not augur well for the search for lasting solutions to the problems of international security. That has led to what amounts to international anarchy, and this situation must end. All countries must observe in their actions the basic principles of law as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. Those are the loftiest of principles and are endorsed by all Member States.

All States have a commitment under international law to seek security, peace and international justice. All States should make unstinting, vigorous efforts to
strike a balance between their own national interests and the interests of the international community, in order to safeguard peaceful relations and co-operation among all States. The two super-Powers bear a special responsibility in this connection to promote the role and effectiveness of the United Nations, to respect the Charter and to deter aggressive States from persisting in their aggression, so that international confidence and tranquility may prevail in relations among States.

Mr. PHAM NGAC (Viet Nam): Two weeks ago, in my statement in this Committee, my delegation had the opportunity to set forth its views on various aspects of the arms race over the past 40 years and to touch upon the issues long accorded the highest priority by the international community, namely nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. Today it is our intention to discuss the disarmament negotiating process and a number of items on the agenda of the First Committee.

Whenever the disarmament process is brought under review, there will be consensus on the assessment that the process has not been a smooth one, and that it is lagging far behind the rapid pace of the arms race. But as the review proceeds disagreement will emerge as to the greatest of the stumbling blocks standing in the way of that process: whether it is a lack of openness, the incompetence of the disarmament machinery, or a lack of political will.

Prior to the Second World War, some negotiations were held and some arrangements made to limit armaments. But the two world wars that broke out in the first half of the century destroyed all those limited arrangements, except for the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. As we all know, during the period between the two world wars the system of the socialist States had not yet come into existence, while the vast continents of Asia and Africa languished under colonial rule. Consequently, the forces of peace were not strong enough to serve as
a mainstay of international peace and security, much less of disarmament efforts. For the same reason, it cannot be alleged that any "lack of openness" of the so-called closed societies led to the collapse of the pre-Second World War arms limitation arrangements. That was due rather to the policies pursued at that time by the imperialist Powers. Those arrangements were nothing more than part of their strategy to prevent one another from achieving a position sufficiently superior as to enable them completely to control the world colonial system.

Having gone through two destructive world wars within a very short span of time, the world's peoples aspire more than ever before to a lasting and durable peace and, especially, to a world which will never see another world war. Still, the warlike forces have again chosen to go against the universally expressed will and have pursued their arms race and their policy of the use of force, creating the world's first atomic bombs and becoming the first ever to use that type of weapon. But also, since the end of the Second World War historic changes have taken place in favour of the peace-loving forces: the emergence of a world socialist system whose political, social and economic interests lie in defending peace and preventing war, and the unprecedented growth of national liberation movements throughout the world. Since the late 1940s the United States has not enjoyed a nuclear monopoly and since the late 1950s it has not had the expectation of being able to launch a nuclear war with absolute impunity.

As the increasingly intense arms race places a heavy economic burden on all countries, and as a nuclear war, if one were ever to break out, would spare no one - no individual, no people - the peace movement has grown and spread from country to country, drawing in all strata of all societies.
During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of important agreements were concluded in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, among them: the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the 1971 sea-bed Treaty; the 1972 biological weapons Convention; and the strategic arms limitation agreements. Thus, it is obvious that the will of peace-loving States and movements the world over, based on a new alignment of forces, has enabled mankind to enjoy the longest period in this century without a world war and has permitted the conclusion and continued existence of a number of important disarmament agreements.
The disarmament machinery set up during the 1960s and 1970s was also an achievement of the peace-loving forces over the past four decades. New developments in the struggle will naturally require and lead to necessary changes in that machinery. At present, we have a rather appropriately constructed machinery for disarmament, composed of negotiating and deliberative bodies. These are the General Assembly with its three-month annual sessions, the Conference on Disarmament which has had sessions of nearly five months since 1979, the Disarmament Commission in New York which has one-month annual meetings, the United Nations Ad Hoc Committees on the Indian Ocean, the World Disarmament Conference and so forth. Currently, the Soviet Union and the United States are conducting bilateral negotiations on a range of issues related to space and nuclear weapons. So what is really needed now is a more sincere and constructive participation in the disarmament process by those who have long hindered it. We believe that it is also the main task facing us now if we are to speed up the disarmament process.

It is true that for the past few years the number of meetings of the First Committee, as well as the volume of resolutions adopted by the United Nations in the field of disarmament, have increased considerably. But we consider this situation as a reflection of the harder nature of the struggle for international peace, security and disarmament. We can see from the agenda of this Committee that, as long as attempts are made to prevent the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, to extend the arms race into outer space, to enhance the nuclear capability of the racist régime in South Africa or of the expansionist forces in the Middle East and so forth, the socialist, non-aligned and other peace-loving countries will persist in the discussion of those items and ask the General Assembly to adopt appropriate resolutions to deal with those attempts. Yet, in order "to improve the methods of work of the Committee and to increase the efficiency of the disarmament institutions" as claimed by some people, should we not discuss such issues any more?
(Mr. Pham Ngac, Viet Nam)

Reference has been made to the need for consensus in disarmament negotiations. In fact, it is only a small group of countries, or one country, that always goes against international consensus. To substantiate this argument, it is sufficient to examine the voting records on some of the resolutions adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, such as resolution 39/59 on the Prevention of an arms race in outer space, resolution 39/63 H on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, decision 39/423 on nuclear deterrence, resolutions 39/61 A and B on the Denuclearization of Africa as well as on the Nuclear Capability of South Africa.

Many issues on our agenda are either ripe for a solution or should be promptly dealt with before they become uncontrollable.

At their meeting last month, the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty organization made a number of important proposals aimed at promoting disarmament and strengthening international security. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam has accorded full support to those proposals, and my delegation believes that a serious response should be given to them.

My delegation also highly appreciates the proposal made on 24 October 1985 by the six leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania for a 12-month moratorium on all nuclear tests.

Let me now turn to the work of some multilateral disarmament organs. As to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, Viet Nam has studied this year's report of the Conference and has also listened with interest to the introduction to that report made two weeks earlier by the Ambassador of Argentina, Mr. Mario Campora.

In my previous statement, I dealt at some length with the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Progress can be expected as well from subsidiary bodies with clear negotiating mandates for those questions.
(Mr. Pham Ngœc, Viet Nam)

My delegation regrets that the Conference was once again not allowed to establish subsidiary bodies on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as the prevention of nuclear war. As the only multilateral negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament has its role to play in elaborating practical measures aimed at halting the nuclear-arms race and removing the threat of nuclear war.

With regard to another item on the agenda of the Conference, that is, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons", some new ideas were put forth during the past year. My delegation hopes that negotiations will be conducted at the next session of the Conference, so that early agreements can be concluded on issues relating to this item.

In the past, Viet Nam has given its constant support to the Comprehensive Disarmament Programme. As in preceding years, this year Viet Nam participated in the discussion on this item at the Conference.

We have noted the initial progress made in the work on a chemical weapons ban. The grave ecological and human consequences of the chemical warfare carried out by the United States for more than a decade from 1960 to 1971 during its war of aggression against Viet Nam, strongly testifies to the need for a convention outlawing chemical weapons. The need for such a convention is even more urgent in view of current feverish plans to manufacture binary weapons and enlarge chemical weapons arsenals in Europe. As in the case of a nuclear-test ban, excessive verification was used as a pretext to justify the negative attitude at the negotiating table.

Nineteen-eighty-five was the sixth year that an annual session of the Disarmament Commission ended without any tangible result. We all know the reasons for the deadlock on the three issues that have been assigned by the General Assembly to the Commission since its inception in 1979, namely, the nuclear-arms
race and nuclear disarmament, consideration of a general approach to nuclear and
conventional disarmament, reduction of military budgets, and the nuclear capability
of South Africa. Some countries not only obstinately chose to prevent the
Commission from identifying relevant effective and concrete measures, but even
attempted to revise the Final Document adopted by the first special session devoted
to disarmament in 1978. Those same countries obstructed efforts aimed at making
appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly concerning effective and
concrete measures to deal with the threat arising from South Africa's nuclear
capability.

My delegation considers as useful the discussion in the Commission on the
question of curbing the naval arms race, since it provides an opportunity for all
countries to exchange views on the subject, thus laying the initial basis for
subsequent negotiations. The discussion has shown increased international concern
over the growing threat to peace, international security and global stability posed
by the continuing escalation of the naval arms race. After two years of work, the
group of governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to
resolution 38/188 G to carry out a study on the naval arms race, has submitted its
final report. We believe that the study had consumed a great deal of energy of all
the members of the group, and of the Chairman of this Committee as Chairman of the
group. We are also convinced that greater efforts should now be made towards
elaborating urgent and effective measures to curb the naval arms race.
Except for the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, 1985 can hardly be called a successful year for some of the other important ad hoc committees of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. With regard to the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, four of the five nuclear-weapon States still refused to participate in the work of the Committee and cast doubt upon the significance of the widely supported idea for convening the World Disarmament Conference. Some progress was achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, such as the basic agreement on the agenda and rules of procedures for the Conference on the Indian Ocean. Yet, the Committee was not able to complete its preparatory work for holding the Conference in 1986. Fourteen years have passed since the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. We hope that this session of the General Assembly will take the necessary decisions so as to bring about an early convening of the conference.

Before concluding my statement today I wish to speak briefly on the question of conventional weapons.

For a long time now the use of conventional weapons has been cause for great concern for all countries, especially the developing countries. It is well known who has repeatedly conducted wars of aggression with this kind of weapon, in violation of the independence and sovereignty of nations over the past 40 years. It is also well known who carried out the longest and bloodiest war of aggression with all kinds of weapons, short of nuclear weapons, against the Vietnamese people. The recent phenomenon of certain circles raising their voices against conventional weapons does not at all mean more respect on their part for the independence, sovereignty and security of other nations. In fact, all that only serves as part of their design to divert attention from the pressing international issues, namely, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the prevention of
(Mr. Pham Ngoc, Viet Nam)

nuclear war and of an arms race in outer space. Moreover, in so doing they hope to
diminish international criticism of their dangerous doctrine of "nuclear
deterrence". In this connection, during the first two weeks of the general debate
in the Committee, representatives of some countries in South-East Asia resorted to
distortions while referring to the situation in the region. It should be recalled
that those countries have a long record of lending a helping hand to outside Powers
in the latter's wars of aggression against my country, Viet Nam, and other
countries in Indo-China.

After long years of persistent efforts, the international community has
clearly established the goals as well as the priorities for its struggle for peace
and disarmament. We hope that the fortieth session of the General Assembly will
not only reaffirm the achievements obtained so far in that struggle but also
greatly intensify it.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The next speaker is the
Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, who
will introduce its report.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): In my capacity as current Chairman of the United
Nations Disarmament Commission I have the honour to introduce the report of the
Commission, contained in document A/40/42. It consists of four chapters and
annexes, which are the product of the Commission's deliberations on the various
disarmament subjects on its agenda at the 1985 substantive session. The
conclusions and recommendations emanating from this year's session are contained in
Chapter IV of the report.

The 1985 session was organized in accordance with the mandate of the
Disarmament Commission as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the
first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as
the guidelines set by the thirty-seventh and thirty-ninth sessions of the General
Assembly in resolutions 37/78 H and 39/148 R, by which the Commission was requested to direct its attention at each substantive sessions to specific subjects and to make concrete recommendations on such subjects to the subsequent session of the General Assembly.

During its 1985 substantive session, the specific recommendations made by the Commission to the fortieth session of the General Assembly were adopted by consensus, as indicated in paragraph 26 of the report. However, it is a matter of regret that the Commission was unable to conclude consideration of or even make any substantive headway on the items, which have now been on its agenda for many years.

As I pointed out at the concluding meeting of the Commission on 31 May 1985, the only subject on our agenda on which we were able to conclude our work pertained to the mid-point review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. Work on items concerning reduction of military budgets and South Africa's nuclear capability remain in suspense. They could have been satisfactorily concluded if delegations had demonstrated greater flexibility and a sense of reasonableness. On the arms race and nuclear disarmament the Commission is practically required to formulate a mini-comprehensive programme of disarmament. This has obvious difficulties. At this point in time, therefore, it may be worth while considering the possibility of narrowing the terms of reference of this subject. This could take the form of elaborating, to begin with, recommendations on the prevention of nuclear war, as was suggested by the Chairman of the Commission at its 1983 session. This approach would enable the Commission to sharpen its focus on this very important subject with all its attendant advantages.

With regard to the organization of work of the Commission in 1985, until this year the Commission had been relatively free of procedural and organizational hurdles. This was not the case at the 1985 substantive session. In the event a
great deal of time and effort had to be spent on devising ambivalent work formats in order to satisfy conflicting interests. This, in my view, is tantamount to a negation of our responsibilities, and it is my hope that the experience of this year will not be repeated.

Additionally, the Commission, I believe, can usefully limit the number of items on its agenda and devote its maximum effort to those on which chances for reaching agreement are better than on other items. A proliferation of agenda items only results in less time being available for each item.
It is extremely important to keep in mind that the Disarmament Commission is a deliberative body and that its function is to draft guidelines, principles and general recommendations, not to negotiate international legally binding instruments. That, in my view, should enable delegations to approach the Commission's work with the flexibility that is essential to achieve even a modicum of success. Having said that, I should like to add that despite the difficulties the Commission encountered in organizing the programme of work for its subsidiary bodies, it was able to allot the time available to it in a balanced manner to the various subsidiary bodies.

Before I conclude, may I take this opportunity to convey to all delegations, and particularly to the officers of the Committee and the Chairmen of the working groups, my grateful thanks for their ungrudging and invaluable co-operation and assistance in fulfilling the responsibilities entrusted by the General Assembly to the 1985 session of the Disarmament Commission.

Mr. van Schaik (Netherlands): Permit me, after my statement this morning, to speak again now at the end of the day on behalf of the 10 States members of the European Community, Portugal and Spain. I assure the Committee that the frequency of my statements today does not provide a precedent for the days to come.

I should now like to make a few observations on agenda item 61 (d), entitled "Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures". The Ten, Portugal and Spain hold the view that, in a world characterized by political tensions, a world in which the threat or use of force has become an almost daily event, the concept of confidence building is of particular importance. We believe that this concept deserves serious attention not only in the global context but also in the regional context.
Confidence-building measures should not be seen as a substitute for disarmament; however, they contribute to the creation of a favourable climate, particularly in times of slow progress or even stagnation in the disarmament process, for bringing about agreements on arms limitation or disarmament measures, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security.

In our view, respect for the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter is fundamental to the concept of confidence-building. I am referring in particular to respect for the sovereign equality of States, refraining from the threat or use of force, respect for the territorial integrity of States, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention, respect for human rights, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and co-operation among States. Strict compliance by States with those principles will in itself have a confidence-building effect.

The Ten, Portugal and Spain believe that specific confidence-building measures ought to be considered as well. Their immediate objective is to reduce and, to the extent possible, eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding and miscalculations in respect of the military activities of other States. To be effective such confidence-building measures ought to be of a concrete nature and politically binding. In considering such measures we should be aware that mere declarations of intent or repetition of generally recognized principles cannot effectively do away with suspicions or perceived threats. The implementation of confidence-building measures should be accompanied by verification procedures commensurate with the scope of the confidence-building measures in question, and should not lead at any stage of the confidence-building process to the obtainment of unilateral advantages.
Confidence is built over time in a process of gradual implementation of measures agreed upon by States. Such a process will gain its momentum and facilitate agreement on further confidence-building measures until a comprehensive network of confidence-building measures is established which, in turn, provides a solid ground for more far-reaching agreements in the field of international security.

One of the major causes of insecurity and mistrust is the lack of reliable information on military activities of other States. For that reason, confidence-building measures require the provision of reliable information through enhanced knowledge of military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security.

The kind of measures that we have in mind are particularly appropriate for treatment in a regional context. The Ten, Portugal and Spain are actively participating in the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe which is at present being held in Stockholm. The countries on whose behalf I speak look forward to an early agreement on a set of politically binding, militarily significant and verifiable confidence and security-building measures covering the whole of Europe. Such a set of measures should be designed to diminish the risk of military confrontation in that part of the world and to pave the way for more far-reaching measures. The successful outcome of the Conference would lay the basis for a second stage in which efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, in particular by controlled reductions of armaments, could be fruitfully continued.

United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/63 E requests the Disarmament Commission to continue and conclude during its 1986 session the work on the elaboration of guidelines for confidence-building measures. We share the opinion
expressed in that resolution that the Disarmament Commission accomplished useful work during its 1983 and 1984 sessions. We welcome the fact that, on a large number of important questions, agreement has already been reached and a first comprehensive elaboration has been presented in the form of the Chairman's composite draft. In our view a solid basis exists on which the United Nations Disarmament Commission can continue and conclude its work on the elaboration of guidelines for confidence-building measures. We look forward to that task. The Ten, Portugal and Spain believe that the large majority of Member States share the view that a successful conclusion of this exercise would make a valuable contribution to promotion of the concept of confidence-building measures and thus to international peace and security.
The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): Some representatives have asked for the floor in exercise of their right of reply. I should like to remind all delegations that, under the rules of procedure, only two statements are authorized, the first not to exceed 10 minutes and the second, 5 minutes.

Mr. ISSACHAROFF (Israel): As the representative of Iraq, in his statement at this morning's meeting, devoted a large part of his contribution to the general debate to attacking my country, I feel compelled to exercise the delegation of Israel's right of reply. Before making the following points, I would like to say that I feel sometimes honoured not to be counted a friend of a country whose bigotry borders on the surreal.

First, let me say that my country is proud to be a Zionist State and I am privileged to be able to represent it. For the benefit, however, of those delegations who might look in vain for a State Member of the United Nations under the appellation employed by the Iraqi representative, I would like to point out that the name of my country is Israel.

Secondly, the Iraqi representative urges the diversion of funds from armaments to development. If this fortunate contingency were to come about, may I suggest that Iraq would not qualify as a beneficiary. It has squandered massive resources in the war it unleashed on Iran five years ago, a war which by now has claimed over 1 million casualties. In addition, while oil prices were high, Iraq did not lift a finger to benefit developing countries, which had to pay more for oil and consequently for manufactured goods, so that Iraq could become rich and embark on its costly war.

Thirdly, on the matter of the alleged nuclear collaboration with South Africa, allow me to emphasize and reiterate my Government's position that it is Israel's adamant policy to have no relations with South Africa in the nuclear field. No such co-operation exists, no matter how convenient it is for Iraq and other States to perpetuate this myth. Concerning, however, Iraq's dealings with South Africa,
I would like to refer the distinguished representatives of this Committee to document A/40/455 of 3 July 1985 and document A/40/464 of 5 July 1985, which quotes reliable sources, including Africa Confidential dated 10 April 1985, stating that Iraq recently purchased 100 G-5 155-mm howitzers from South Africa.

Fourthly, on Israel and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) I yesterday quoted in extenso the statements of the Vice-Premier of Israel committing Israel to the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Any request to Israel to join the NPT should be addressed by Iraq to all those among the States friendly to it which have so far elected not to adhere to that Treaty for one reason or another.

Fifthly, the Iraqi representative, having used such terms as "aggression" and "threats to the peace" went on to state that he supported a convention on the prohibition of the manufacture, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. I suppose his country would sign such a convention as it signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and still have no inhibition against waging chemical warfare, as it has done repeatedly in the war with Iran over the last five years. This is a matter of United Nations record, and I refer to document S/16433, which stated that: "Chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs have been used in the areas inspected in Iran by the specialists".

May I conclude by remarking that, if there are bounds to the measure of bigotry and falsehood which this Committee can be expected to suffer, the Iraqis have clearly placed themselves out of bounds.

Mr. MAHBOUB (Iraq) ((interpretation from Arabic): The representative of the Zionist entity mentioned that the name of his country is Israel and he calls upon others to call his country by that name. The question which now arises is, which Israel? The United Nations itself has repeatedly stated that it does not
recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. And if the United Nations itself does not recognize the capital of this entity how can its representative expect others to recognize it? The United Nations has repeatedly condemned and denounced the annexation of the Golan Heights to what is called Israel. This is also another aspect that is not recognized by the United Nations. The United Nations has also denounced the occupation of the West Bank, which is also a part of what is Israel. And if the United Nations does not recognize this, how can it be recognized by others?

This entity has gained no recognition for its capital or for its territory, and those who preside over it are those who brought all the problems upon the region. They were the first to bring in terrorism, the terrorism which was used by the Zionist entity to expel the Palestinians from their homeland. We have got accustomed to the fact that, whenever the new ruling clique in Tel Aviv is attacked and whenever a reference is made to mistreatment of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab lands, the answer is always that there is a war between Iran and Iraq. Instead of responding to the question or to the charges made against them, they often refer to other matters and places. If it is said that there is co-operation between the Zionist entity and South Africa, they say that there is an explosion happening somewhere else. Thus the Zionist entity often avoids any answer about the crimes it perpetrates and refers to some problems happening somewhere else.

As for the allegation by the representative of the Zionist entity that Iraq purchases armaments from the racist régime of South Africa, my Government has before refuted such an allegation and made it clear that it is baseless and unfounded. The representative of the Zionist entity imagined that by making such accusations he will shirk the responsibility for the crimes committed by the Zionist régime.
(Mr. Mahboub, Iraq)

As for the observance by the Zionist entity of the NPT, there is an English proverb which says "The proof of the pudding is in the eating." If Israel is really committed, it should accede to this Treaty on the one hand and subject its nuclear facilities to the international supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the other. The representative of the Zionist entity also asked why Iraq did not also direct this advice to other countries which are friendly to Iraq and which have not so far acceded to the NPT, but those other countries have not launched an attack like that made by the Zionist entity against the Iraqi nuclear facilities, which are completely devoted to peaceful purposes, as the IAEA confirmed.

My delegation finds it futile to respond to all the baseless allegations made by the representative of the Zionist entity.

The meeting rose at 4.50 pm.