VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 23rd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

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Mr. Shah Nawaz (Pakistan)
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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): During the present session of the First Committee many delegations have placed emphasis on the concept of geographical zones free of particular weapon systems. Indeed, there is now a wealth of such proposals, new ones being added to those that have already formed a topic of discussion over the past years. Zonal concepts have been elaborated in draft resolutions and draft statements and have also formed the subject, as we all know, of a United Nations disarmament study, which, however, had to be left incomplete.

The striking feature of this proliferation of zonal proposals is not their similarity but their differences. We are being told to approve big nuclear-weapon-free zones embracing entire world regions and very small zones; regional zones and subregional zones; zones in which all nuclear weapons would be banned and zones in which only some would be; zones in which the aim is the elimination of nuclear weapons already introduced into a particular region or zones where there are none and where their future introduction is to be prevented. In addition there are proposals also to establish zones free of other weapon systems, especially chemical weapons. Finally, there is the concept of zones of peace, where no specific type of weapon is addressed.

It is indeed a colourful mosaic of proposals. Obviously all of them seek to ride on the favourable image of the first major and successful venture in this domain, the nuclear-weapon-free zone created through the Treaty of Tlatelolco. No wonder that that great historic achievement inspires emulation, and it should. But apparently it has also inspired others who seek to cloak their one-sided and often
parochial proposal in the same aura of historic achievement, while conveniently
glossing over the differences that exist between various zonal concepts.

The bewildering number of zonal proposals must necessarily lead to confusion.
It is obviously necessary to remind oneself of the criteria by which the respective
merits or demerits of the individual proposals can be judged. In my present
statement I would like to contribute to such an analytical process, basing myself
on the conditions and prerequisites which the United Nations General Assembly, over
time, has established for the validity of such special security zones. The truth
that will emerge from my analysis will be that many proposals that we have heard
are arbitrary and meaningless from the security standpoint and that they are unable
to generate the positive effects which the General Assembly has foreseen as the
result of their creation.

The General Assembly has so far, for good reason, dealt only with the concept
of nuclear-weapon-free zones and has worked out definitions that can mainly be
found in General Assembly resolution 3472 B (XXX), of 1975, and the relevant
paragraph of the Final Document adopted at the first special session of the General
Assembly devoted to disarmament, of 1978. Less of a definition and less effort
have so far gone into the concept of zones of peace, where the Final Document, in
keeping with the looser, necessarily less constraining, nature of such zones leaves
the elaboration of the features of the zones to participating States. My emphasis
will therefore be on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

I need not recall the various elements of the definitions that have been
embodied in the aforementioned resolutions. Basically, the General Assembly makes
the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones dependent on arrangements freely
arrived at among the States of the regions concerned. The characteristics of each
region should be taken into account. In the wording of General Assembly resolution
3472 B (XXX),
"A 'nuclear-weapon-free-zone' shall ... be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States ... has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;

"(b) An international system of verification and control is established ..."

The Final Document of the first special session makes it clear that the establishment of zones, as "an important disarmament measure" (S/10-2, para. 33), must also be governed by the overriding commands of that document, which means that it must serve the attainment of the objective of security and that, in an equitable and balanced manner, it ensures the right of each State to security by ensuring also that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones is thus predicated on the maintenance of undiminished security for all.

It appears particularly important to me that three of the definitional elements contained in the aforementioned text - the definition of the region, the aspect of security and disarmament, and the verifiability of any future zone - be examined more closely in order to obtain useful criteria for assessing the various zonal proposals now under discussion.

The term "region" obviously refers, in normal usage as much as in the resolution texts, to a well-defined geographical entity of some considerable size. The Final Document presupposes that a "region" in that sense has specific
characteristics of its own and that it is somehow set off from other neighbouring regions. The enumeration of recommended nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Final Document is telling: apart from Latin America, the region governed by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the whole continent of Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia are listed as particularly appropriate for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. They are all zones of continental or near-continental proportions and of a special historical and cultural specificity. This reading is confirmed by the language of resolution 3472 B (XXX), which presupposes recognition by the General Assembly of particular, clearly identifiable zones and also stipulates that each zone must comprise a group of States - which means a certain number. There is thus an obvious requirement of a minimum size and of a certain organic relationship of the countries preparing to establish a zone. By the same token, nuclear-weapon-free zones could not be composed of bits and pieces of territory arbitrarily chosen merely to meet the vested military interests of this or that proponent.
From the mere reading of these guiding texts it would therefore appear absurd to claim that even a single State could decide to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the sense here discussed. It would, equally, be contradictory to the term "region" and the zonal concept as elaborated in the United Nations to recommend that a zone should be pieced together from parts of several States, thus not comprising their whole national territory. Such a variant is certainly not foreseen in the guiding texts.

The aforementioned interpretation of the concept of the region of which a zone might be formed may be somewhat semantic or formalistic. However, it derives its importance from the second important condition for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones: the security requirement.

If nuclear-weapon-free zones are to constitute important disarmament measures they must contribute to the undiminished security of all States forming the region, but also to the security of the international community at large. If one looks at international security, the dilemma, or even the ambiguity, of every free zone model becomes evident. The zone may help to diminish or eliminate certain threats within the zone, as well as threats that might emanate from the zone to countries outside. The zone concept as such, the elimination of nuclear weapons from the zone, or the undertaking not to introduce any such weapons in principle, does, however, leave the threat from outside intact.

It is therefore indispensable, as the Final Document spells out, that the negotiations leading to a nuclear-weapon-free zone be accompanied by undertakings of outside States, in this case the nuclear-weapon States, to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

It remains true, however, that the security of the zone is dependent on the armaments situation outside and that, even in spite of such undertakings, the fact
that weapons arsenals are still in existence outside the zone and may in theory reach into the zone means that an implied threat continues to exist.

Whatever the positive value of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the confidence-building effect among the members of the zone and upon the outside world may be, nuclear-weapon-free zones are therefore not able to create unlimited, or even significantly enhanced protection. The reminder that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombs fell on what was practically a nuclear-weapon-free zone at the time may be trite, but it points to the security dilemma from which no free-zone model can extricate itself.

The very fact that the security of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is determined not solely by the internal régime of the zone but by threats from outside would also seem to support the concept of large regions as a prime subject for nuclear-weapon-free zones. Only the exemption of large areas from the nuclear factor can maximize the beneficial effect of nuclear-weapon-free zones, since it facilitates the restructuring of the total threat situation over time.

From the standpoint of undiminished security, a clear distinction will have to be drawn between proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones that comprise regions in which there are no nuclear weapons at present and other proposals that relate to areas in which nuclear weapons, whether one wishes it or not, already form part of the security equation of the countries involved. In this connection, the presence of military alliances is of great importance. The purpose of such alliances is obviously to extend positive security guarantee protection in case of military attack to all members of the alliance. The very raison d'être of an alliance would be impaired if areas of different degrees of security - and correspondingly different degrees of vulnerability - were introduced into the alliance web. This would make it compelling logic that membership in a security alliance which bases
its strategy on defensive forces that may also include nuclear weapons is not compatible with the undertakings to be assumed by zonal States.

It has rightly been argued that a State cannot be simultaneously a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, thereby enjoying a negative security guarantee, and a member of a military alliance with one or more nuclear-weapon States, thereby collecting a positive security guarantee. The same reasoning would hold true of those concepts that recommend the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free corridors that would cut through the national territory of individual States. Zones of different degrees of security - or, should I say, seeming security - in one and the same country obviously run counter to a Government's duty to guarantee the same measure of security to all its citizens.

The security requirement relates back to the concept of the region and the membership of a zone in another manner. If the Final Document requires that nuclear-weapon-free zones be based on an agreement freely arrived at among all States of the region concerned, that requirement is visibly based also on a notion of balance within the region. It would be contrary to the tenet of undiminished security if a zonal proposal would only contribute to constituting an encroachment upon the military balance and military stability of a region, since that would make a conflict more, rather than less, probable.

Some of the proposed new nuclear-weapon-free zones would border directly on the territory of one of the major military alliances. It is quite inconceivable that they would find acceptance without an appropriate geographical balance implying the same constraints, in military and geographical terms, for both alliances. Proposals that would exempt one of the two military systems from all real constraints while imposing the burden of the obligations inherent in the zone on others are manifestly at variance with the tenet of undiminished security.
The requirement that a nuclear-weapon-free zone be internationally verifiable is closely related to the security aspect. It is to be noted that several of the more controversial zonal projects that are being offered to us do not address the issue of verification at all. Obviously, the absence or presence of nuclear weapons can most easily be verified in areas where there are no nuclear weapons at present and where the States freely entering into the zonal agreement have subjected all their nuclear facilities to international control or shown their preparedness to accept such controls. By way of illustration one might point to the recent offers by Pakistan of the eventual acceptance of international safeguards and mutual inspection of nuclear facilities. They appear to be an exemplary step in the sense of facilitating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

Verification, while not posing insuperable barriers, might be more difficult to regulate in areas where nuclear weapons are already in evidence and are indeed part of the security equation in the region. Here the difficulty may lie in establishing a verification régime for all nuclear weapons, including the small and easily transportable battlefield nuclear weapons.

Those problems would be compounded if, deviating from the recommendations of the Final Document, a nuclear-weapon-free zone or corridor did not relate to all nuclear weapons, but precisely only to those that pose the greatest difficulties for verification. And the verification problem may become virtually insoluble when in addition - apart from the other contradictions contained in that proposal - it is proposed that the zone may run through a national territory otherwise characterized by a free flow of persons and goods.
The verification requirement is also of importance in relation to the negative security guarantees to be given by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Here again, in relation to some of the free-zone proposals which have been made, there is a notable absence of discussion of the kind of the verification constraints that the neighbouring nuclear-weapon Powers would be prepared to examine.

I have undertaken to discuss a wide and complicated field. It is obviously impossible to address all aspects of it, and I am sadly aware of the limitations under which I have to outline my argument. Yet, the conceptual groundwork which I have attempted to lay may already be sufficient to provide criteria for assessing the various zone proposals that have been made.

It is clear from the foregoing that the proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, in the Middle East, and in South Asia are fully - and indeed admirably - within the framework of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept. My delegation has consistently supported the approach aimed at the establishment of these zones and will continue to do so when the relevant draft resolutions come up for consideration in this Committee. I have already characterized the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as a great and worthy achievement. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the hope that, in accordance with paragraph 63 (b) of the Final Document, all countries of the Latin American hemisphere will make the Treaty fully applicable to themselves within the shortest possible time, and that other States entitled to do so will proceed with the signature and ratification of all the Additional Protocols to the Treaty. There is also no doubt that the actual establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Antarctica has made a great contribution to stability and peace in that region. It is equally true that the recently created
South Pacific nuclear zone falls fully within the definition of free zones as embodied in the Final Document of the first special session.

Various proposals for subregional nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe, however, do not meet the requirements which I have outlined. This is evident from the attempt to cut up the European continent in an arbitrary manner, taking insufficient account of the security relationship of the two military alliances and the need to preserve equal security within the whole territory of the Atlantic Alliance. All these zones are too limited in scope to reduce the danger of war or provide a dependable basis for the security of Europe. These proposals disregard the nuclear arsenals already stationed outside the proposed zones, especially in Eastern Europe, and obviously make no provision for their reduction. Nor do these proposals take the geographical asymmetry between the two major military alliances into consideration. They fail to provide for geographical balance as, for instance, in the case of the proposed Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone where no proposal has been made for the geographical inclusion of a balanced part of the adjacent districts of the Soviet Union, particularly heavily equipped with nuclear hardware, nor for the inclusion of the Norwegian Sea, a preferred thoroughfare and training ground for the Soviet Union's nuclear fleet. The East-West relationship and the forces of the two military alliances in Europe being what they are, such partial subregional nuclear-weapon-free zones, often arbitrarily delineated, could do nothing to enhance the security of European States at the present time. As the Foreign Minister of Norway has aptly stated, nuclear-weapon-free zones in that part of the world will be meaningful only if they contributed to mutual and balanced nuclear disarmament and thus served to enhance security, not diminish it.
The Final Document ignores the novel concepts of zones where only certain types of the nuclear weapons arsenals would be banned, and it does not recognize the concept of a zone free of chemical weapons. It is obvious that both these variants cannot hope to make any security contribution comparable to that of nuclear-weapon-free zones. However, if one wishes to probe them, at least in theory, one would probably have to apply analogies from the documents governing the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Here again, the fact that the proposed geographical scope is exceedingly narrow and that considerable arsenals of the same type of weapons would remain untouched outside the zone invalidates the concepts sufficiently. However, in addition, there are other arguments that might be adduced against these proposals.

The proposal for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear battlefield weapons in Central Europe disregards military realities. The proponents of such a zone argue that the mere possibility that forward-based nuclear systems could be overrun by a conventional attack would, in application of the principle of "use them or lose them", increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

However, on the Western side most forward-based nuclear-capable weapons are dual-capable, which means that they can be used both for conventional and nuclear warheads. The Warsaw Pact has also increasingly introduced weapons of this kind. The determining factor is not, therefore, whether the systems are nuclear-capable, but where the warheads are. Theatre-weapon nuclear warheads are not kept forward-based in the West. This is not necessary because they are highly mobile. The obligation not to introduce such nuclear ammunition into a particular area could therefore, in the event of an agreement, easily be violated and would then defy verification. In addition, the defensive use of nuclear weapons is in any case extremely closely regulated by the Western Alliance and depends on political
launch decisions under conditions of an armed attack. It is a rigorously maintained policy of the Atlantic Alliance to store nuclear weapons only at the level strictly required for the policy of deterrence. The Defence Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) therefore decided in 1983 to dismantle unilaterally 1,400 additional nuclear warheads of various types. Once this operation is completed, battlefield nuclear weapons on the NATO side will have reached an all-time low and will forcefully underline the policy of the Alliance increasingly to diminish its reliance on nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, and regrettably, the Soviet Union is rapidly increasing its arsenals of battlefield nuclear weapons.

The proposal for a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe has recently been renewed by the delegations of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. Information on the proposal and how it was received by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has been circulated in this Committee and is available in documents A/C.1/40/2 and A/C.1/40/8. It is my personal regret that, in renewing the proposal, its authors have not felt it necessary to address earlier arguments against the untenability of the proposal and that, indeed, no attempt is made to react to these arguments and to discuss them in a serious manner. The essential arguments against a zone free of chemical weapons in Europe are the following.

First, the proposal is militarily insignificant and provides a less effective solution to the problem of chemical weapons in both geographical and qualitative terms than the global ban which is the goal of the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Even if existing chemical weapons within the zone were to be credibly destroyed, and not simply transferred to a place beyond the confines of the proposed zone, they would remain intact outside, and the threat emanating from them would reach into the zone, despite its own renunciation of chemical weapons.
Secondly, the verification problems which at present beset the global negotiations on chemical weapons in Geneva not only would be identical or similar, but would be heightened in view of the easy mobility of chemical ammunition. The problem of access would have to be regulated as part of a verification package. Obviously any ammunition could readily be introduced into the free zone if indeed it has not remained hidden there in the first place. No adequate verification proposals for these additional difficulties have yet been made.

Thirdly, regionally limited negotiations would necessarily slow down the negotiation process in Geneva, or possibly lead to its stagnation since certain expectations relating to the rapid conclusion of the talks might be directed towards the new negotiating forum. The countries of the third world which should, as recent developments show, be interested in a global chemical weapons ban in at least the same manner as Europeans would be deprived of their possibility of making their imprint felt in the ongoing negotiations. In the view of the German Government it is inconceivable, that a European solution be sought, at the expense of those countries outside of the proposed zone that face a similar or even an increased threat of the use of chemical weapons in the future.

In the view of my Government there is thus no alternative to a rapid and determined promotion of a world-wide comprehensive ban on chemical weapons such as now being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Today my delegation wishes to address itself to item 57 of our Committee's agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". As was stated by the Hungarian delegation on 23 October before this Committee, we were extremely concerned at the idea of placing weapons in outer space or developing systems of weapons capable of space warfare. At different
forums we have already expressed those considerations which, in my Government's judgement, make the placement of weapons in outer space a highly dangerous move. At this point I should like to sum up only the main considerations that guide us.

First, testing and deployment of weapons in outer space would undoubtedly lead to a new, steep and long-lasting rise in the spiral of the arms race.

Secondly, even at its early stage it would undermine the existing strategic balance, an important factor in averting nuclear war, thus making a nuclear conflagration more likely to occur.

To these military-political considerations I must add one of a purely technical nature. The emplacement in outer space of highly sophisticated systems needs a great degree of pre-programming, given their distance and speed. That makes such devices react in an almost autonomous way. On the other hand, given the fact that space weapons are supposed to fly at enormous velocities, the time of reaction may fall to fractions of a second, preventing "Presidential" or any other human intervention in case of a technical failure or misunderstanding.

This aspect has engaged the attention of public opinion and Governments in a vast majority of countries, practically of all countries, as was evidenced by the General Assembly's acceptance last year of the resolution entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" (resolution A/39/59), a resolution to which Hungary had the honour to be a sponsor. Alas, the only real effect it produced was the establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament, with a very limited mandate that allowed only preliminary discussions without bringing nearer the phase of real negotiation of an agreement on keeping outer space free of weapons. In the meantime, and in parallel with the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament, the real processes going on in the world made the situation even more alarming.
Work on different concrete weapon systems with the explicit and sole aim of placing them in outer space, or making them capable of striking objects in outer space, has been going on unceasingly. As the list of results, if I may use this unsuitable word, would be too long, I shall mention only a few examples of the last two months.

On 6 September, a successful experiment was conducted, in which a high-energy chemical laser beam blew up a Titan booster sitting on the ground;

On 13 September, we were informed of an anti-satellite weapon test conducted by the Pentagon;

On 3 October, the press announced the first successful tracking of a missile with a land-based laser beam.

All this activity, aimed as it was said at producing a so-called defensive shield, was coupled with recent news about the preparation of "New Nuclear Forces", a programme for the modernization of strategic nuclear forces approved in October 1981, and the news heralded the delivery of the first of the new B-1 bombers, the preparation of missile silos for the first MX missiles, and so on.

These processes did not relieve us of our uneasiness but, on the contrary, caused us deep anxiety. This feeling was only increased by a recently growing tendency towards a shift in the interpretation by one of the parties of certain arms limitation agreements. I have in mind the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in the first place.

Last year, in an arms control impact statement to Congress, the United States Administration said a treaty prohibition on developing, testing and deploying space-based anti-ballistic missile systems and components applied to directed-energy technologies or any technology used for that purpose. This year, the same source announced that, under a new interpretation of the Treaty, full
development and testing of advanced-technology weapons was permitted. I am not qualified to render justice in a discussion going on within the United States Administration. Instead, I rely completely on the opinion of such an outstanding expert as Gerald C. Smith, who characterized this change as a repudiation of the Administration's former position as well as that of all previous Administrations that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty bars development and testing of space-based strategic defences, or components thereof, that use lasers, particle beams and other types of non-traditional technology.

Now I hasten to make it clear that, Hungary not being a Party to the Treaty, we are not trying, nor do we feel authorized to try, to interpret the Treaty in question. That remains the prerogative of the Parties to the Treaty. In mentioning these alarming signs we want only to express our consternation at this approach to the interpretation of the Treaty. Beside the fact that the ABM Treaty deals, in its article 5, explicitly with this question - and that was amply cited by many speakers before me in both the General Assembly and our Committee - there is an Agreed Statement D of the Parties devoted precisely to treatment of such cases. More than that, the Treaty anticipated that problem and provided for machinery of consultations to clarify any such situation. It did so by creating a bilateral Standing Consultative Commission.
We can, of course, imagine that situations may arise in which interpretation is needed, or an examination or re-examination of interpretations may be necessary. But, given the Treaty, the Agreed Statement and the existence of a Standing Consultative Commission, the only correct procedure according to international law would have been to undertake such consultations with the other Contracting Party before - I emphasize that - actions were taken on the basis of the new interpretation. Unfortunately that was not the case.

As justification for the strategic defence initiative, we are told that the strategic balance - or, as some call it, deterrence based on nuclear weapons, is a terrifying formula for assuring peace. We are told further that the United States Administration, starting from that proposition - which, true as it is, does not change the standing of the strategic balance - opted for a programme creating a defence system that would ultimately make the basis of the strategic balance doctrine obsolete. That was, in our opinion, the worst of many possible scenarios to choose, because its most probable outcome would be, not the elimination of nuclear weapons, but a situation in which either Power or both would have a defence of limited capability and larger offensive arsenals than those now existing, coupled with the feeling that the first strike seemed the safest course, with all the implications of that view. My delegation finds it incomprehensible that we should approach the goal of making nuclear weapons obsolete in such a roundabout way, when the more direct option is self-evident: that of dismantling the strategic forces, beginning by radically reducing them along the lines proposed by the Soviet Union.

It was in the light of what I have just said that we supported all the efforts made here last year to keep outer space free of all weapons, and this year we support, for the same reasons, the proposal of the Soviet Union, which is
complementary to it, that there be international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space. Over and above those considerations, we have every reason to lend our support to it, firstly, because we agree with the idea that international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space is conceivable only in conditions of an outer space free of weapons; and, secondly, because it seems to us that such co-operation could be useful to medium-sized and small countries. There are many aspects of possible benefit from such co-operation. We ourselves find the idea of utilizing space technologies to solve various problems of economic development of particular interest.

All in all, my delegation is of the view that the only rational scenario leads through negotiations aimed at reducing and finally eliminating nuclear weapons and keeping outer space free of weapons. Therefore, we look forward with expectation to the Geneva Summit Meeting. We expect the parties to lay a sound foundation there for working out an effective and radical agreement to that effect. We hope that such an agreement will pave the way for a more productive negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament, too. We trust that the General Assembly will, on the recommendation of the First Committee, move in the same direction.

**Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan):** The purpose of my intervention is to offer some observations of my delegation on agenda item 57, prevention of an arms race in outer space. Recent developments clearly indicate that mankind is today on the threshold of a new arena of the arms race - the infinite zone of outer space. Having already used the heavens as a testing range for inter-continental ballistic missiles, the major space Powers have recently initiated the deployment of space-based anti-satellite weaponry, and, most seriously, there now exist plans to introduce sophisticated anti-ballistic missile weapon systems in outer space by the next decade.
It was in response to such ominous developments that the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session unanimously declared that outer space was to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and called upon States with major space capabilities to contribute actively towards that objective. It also requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. Those appeals have since been reiterated at each successive session of the General Assembly, and we are sure that they will be reiterated at this historic fortieth session. However, despite those repeated endorsements, the ideal of preserving outer space as a zone of peace has steadily receded, perhaps never to be attained.

The fact that the Conference on Disarmament has taken three years to commence preliminary examination of the subject, and even then with a mandate which falls far short of the objectives set for it by the General Assembly, only reveals the apathy with which this crucial issue has been treated. Specifically, the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, set up by the Conference on Disarmament, have been limited in scope to an examination of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in this sphere, and have not entailed any substantive negotiations towards an agreement or agreements that would prevent the militarization of outer space.

As a non-aligned and developing country, Pakistan strongly believes that outer space is the common heritage of mankind, and as such should be preserved for exclusively peaceful purposes, which would serve the interests of all nations equally. We look with trepidation at the far-reaching and dangerous consequences of the militarization of outer space, which will become an accomplished fact if contemporary developments in weapons technology remain unchecked. Not only will
this zone be transformed into a new arena of competition and conflict, but the
global arms race will be accelerated, both vertically and horizontally, at the cost
of existing space law and arms control agreements.

The evolution of an entirely new generation of weapons, as well as their
counter-force systems, will magnify the prevailing asymmetries in military
capabilities between the space Powers and their respective allies on the one hand
and the non-aligned and neutral States on the other, thereby heightening the latter
States' strategic vulnerability. Space-weapons technology may be introduced into
regions that do not directly involve the two major space Powers, which will
destabilize regional as well as global security. Also, the militarization of outer
space by the major Powers will necessarily enlarge their existing control of the
uses of outer space, such as surveillance and reconnaissance activities,
particularly at the expense of the non-aligned and neutral States.

In the view of the Pakistan delegation, there are certain fundamental lacunae
and weaknesses in the existing politico-legal international régime, which need to
be urgently addressed. As a first step, it is necessary to identify and overcome
these weaknesses. Our endeavour should be to evolve a lasting and comprehensive
régime in outer space so as to ensure its peaceful and equitable use in the
interest of mankind as a whole. May I submit some considerations in that regard.

First, those concerned must realize that the extension of their strategic
competition into space will neither ensure nor enhance their security. Despite
technological advances, there is no such thing as the ultimate weapon - even for
defensive purposes. The pursuit of such a chimera through the militarization of
outer space would only intensify the arms race and take the world a step closer to
Armageddon.
The space Powers must accept that reality. They must demonstrate that they have the political vision not only to prevent the further militarization of outer space but also to redress the damage already done. They must recognize that the narrow pursuit of their own interests in this sphere cannot take precedence over the interests of the international community.

Secondly, the concentration of space technology in only a few countries has generated the exclusive and inequitable use of that technology. Satellite surveillance and reconnaissance activities, for example, have been used to gather vital information about non-aligned and neutral States. Those States have not been given access to that information. They are unable to share data gathered through satellite reconnaissance verifying compliance by member States with bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements. Their commercial telecommunication facilities have become permanently vulnerable to interference.

Such a discriminatory system can be rectified only by the establishment of an international agency entrusted with the task of conducting space reconnaissance and surveillance, from which any country could obtain information relevant to its needs. That organization could function also as an impartial mechanism to verify compliance with international agreements in a manner that would overcome the credibility gap which characterizes existing national technical means of verification. Another important task for such an agency would be to monitor and provide advance information on crisis situations, thereby enhancing the peace-keeping role of the United Nations. Hence, careful and serious consideration should be given by the international community to the various proposals that have been presented regarding the creation of such an organization.
Thirdly, the existing legal régime relating to outer space is a significant code of conduct in that zone, but is not sufficiently comprehensive. Apart from the need to correlate contemporary space law with the state of new technological developments, certain fundamental yet ambiguous concepts require clarification. Article IV of the 1967 outer space Treaty, for instance, does not explicitly establish that the whole of outer space is reserved for peaceful purposes. It applies that criterion only to the moon and other celestial bodies, whereas the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, in the real sense, implies that the whole of outer space should be declared a denuclearized zone for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Similarly, terms such as "peaceful purposes" and "weapons of mass destruction" remain imprecise, thereby permitting selective interpretations. It is, for instance, necessary to identify whether "peaceful purposes" implies non-aggressive or non-military actions in outer space, and whether "weapons of mass destruction" are to be defined only in their traditionally accepted sense of being nuclear, biological and radiological weapons, despite the fact that current space technology has developed its own systems that could be used as crucial components linked to weapons of mass destruction.

The delegation of Pakistan appreciates that a quest for a comprehensive and universally accepted framework to prevent an arms race in outer space would consume much time and effort. Therefore, it may be both necessary and beneficial for the international community to agree to certain interim measures that could contribute to limiting the militarization of outer space. In this regard, we should like to endorse the proposals calling for a moratorium on the testing, production and deployment of new space weaponry such as high-altitude anti-satellite weapons as well as systems involved in deploying a space-based ballistic missile defence.
However, we must all realize that limited measures serve only a limited purpose for a limited period of time. Consequently, the international community should not lose sight of the long-term objectives relating to outer space. We must react to the new dangers now, before the spiral of the arms race in space gathers a momentum of its own, beyond the control of reason or rationality.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (interpretation from French): In my last statement, I had occasion to state my country's position on the questions of the elimination of the military threat, arms limitation and disarmament, and, in particular, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I wish today to make a few supplementary comments on that subject.

The international community's deep concern at the dangerous plans to extend the arms race into outer space has been expressed in General Assembly resolution 39/59, adopted at the thirty-ninth session by an absolute majority. In that resolution, the General Assembly reaffirmed its earlier decisions and called upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. That resolution also reaffirmed that outer space must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and should not become an arena for the arms race.

If I am not mistaken, that was the first time that a United Nations document recalled the duty of all States to refrain from the threat of the use of force in their space activities.

The General Assembly has thus taken an important stand on the non-militarization of outer space. But, contrary to the will and aspirations of the international community, United States militarist circles do not want to
abandon their plans to convert outer space into an arena for the arms race or their attempts thus to gain military superiority. Those plans are developed in the guise of the creation of a large-scale anti-missile defence system for the territory of the United States.

It is well known that the 1972 USSR-United States Treaty on the limitation of anti-missile defence systems prohibits the development, testing and deployment of anti-missile defence systems or their components, including those based in outer space. The two Parties agreed that restrictive measures for the limitation of anti-missile defence systems would make it possible to progress towards the limitation and reduction of offensive strategic weapons. Thus, they both recognized that there was a close link between offensive and defensive strategic weapons. It was no coincidence that the anti-missile defence Treaty and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) between the Soviet Union and the United States were concluded simultaneously.

However, Washington appears to present the facts as though the two Parties in 1972 achieved those agreements not because they acknowledged the danger of the development and improvement of anti-missile defence systems as a catalyst for the arms race, but solely because it was technologically impossible at that time to create sufficiently effective anti-missile defence systems.
In his statement on 28 October the representative of Nepal, Mr. Jai Pratap Rana, in this context has expressed the opinion that the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty (ABM) prohibits not only the technology of the time but also future technology based on new physical principles. The stand adopted by high officials of the United States Administration favouring a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty and their frequent statements on the subject have no other purpose than to open up the way towards the development of the so-called strategic defence initiative.

As my colleague from Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter, has already so eloquently and elegantly put it, interpreting this Treaty is the prerogative of the parties to it; but one should not forget that it constitutes the corner-stone of all processes of nuclear arms limitation and reduction, which is the concern of everyone. In this regard I should like to stress that respect for this Treaty and its strict application is of capital importance in preventing an arms race in outer space.

The strategic defence initiative, which has been called "defensive" to disguise its true nature, is in fact aimed at developing a new kind of weapon - the space strike weapon. The proponents of this programme are continuing their attempts to have it accepted as an innocuous research programme. It is difficult to believe that tens of billions of dollars are required for the sole purpose of carrying out research to establish whether the creation of space strike weapons is possible. The scope of the efforts linked to achieving the strategic defence initiative goes beyond - bearing in mind the enormous sums that have been earmarked for the purpose - not only the research facilities, but it also surpasses many times the cost of the Manhattan project and the Apollo programme, the two largest programmes ever undertaken by the United States.

The development of the "star wars" programme will inevitably lead to the appearance of space weapons. This means that the arms race will grow out of all
proportion, absorbing immense material and intellectual resources, and lead to an unprecedented increase in military expenditures which are already astronomical.

The facts show that each new development in the arms race, habitually initiated by the United States, has never contributed to a slowdown in the arms race but, on the contrary, always led to increasing the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Hence it is not serious, to say the least, to assert that the creation of space weapons can stop the arms race and strengthen peace and security. In our view, such assertions are aimed at disguising the true goal of the "star wars" programme and justifying an unbridled speeding up of the arms race.

Mongolia is convinced that what can and must make it possible to eliminate the threat of war, stem and reverse the arms race and, eventually, do away with means of mass destruction is not the development of increasingly sophisticated weapons but, rather, political efforts and practical and serious negotiations.

In order to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space and to reduce the threat of nuclear war, it is important to ban anti-satellite weapons. We express once again our regret that in spite of the unilateral moratorium declared by the USSR on the first deployment of anti-satellite weapons in outer space, which has been in force since August 1983, the United States of America recently tested the anti-satellite system ASAT against a real object in space which was used as the target.

In the view of experts, it is possible to develop a dual-purpose weapon which can be used against both satellites and ballistic missiles. That is why the development and testing of anti-satellite systems could be used against objects in outer space in contravention of the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the destruction of one party's satellites that are used for observation and communications would make it possible for the other party to hope "to blind its adversary" and to place that adversary in a state of uncertainty. Thus an attack against a satellite can be
described as an act of aggression and as preparation for a first strike with nuclear weapons.

All these considerations bring me to draw just one conclusion: the prohibition and elimination of space strike forces, including anti-satellite systems and anti-missile systems based in outer space, constitutes an extremely important task.

On the initiative of the USSR, the question of international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of outer space in conditions of its non-militarization has been included on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly. That peace initiative is part of the consistent efforts made by the USSR to prevent an arms race in outer space and to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union's proposal is concrete, practical and realistic. It is a timely proposal that contributes significantly to the efforts of the international community to keep outer space free of weapons. Its sense and objective respond to the higher interests of mankind; it makes it possible to establish and develop wide-ranging international co-operation in the field of the exploitation and use of outer space exclusively for peaceful and creative purposes for the good of all States and all peoples. The proposal is based on the idea of an organic link, an interdependence, between the non-militarization of outer space and its peaceful exploitation. International co-operation as proposed by the USSR is only possible in the framework of the non-militarization of outer space. In our view, those conditions exist today, since there are as yet no strike weapons in outer space. That is why no time must be lost in taking immediate practical measures to prohibit an arms race in outer space and to establish and develop international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of that environment.
The Soviet proposal contains basic guidelines for co-operation in outer space and for the creation of a mechanism to carry out that co-operation. In order to consider those questions and all other questions related to the peaceful uses of outer space, it has been proposed that in 1987 at the latest an international conference be convened, and for that purpose that a preparatory committee be established that would be open to all States. Mongolia supports these proposals without reservations and invites the General Assembly to support their implementation.

United Nations decisions on the development of international co-operation in the field of the exploitation of outer space in conditions of its non-militarization taken in accordance with the Soviet proposal will be an important contribution to the solution of the primary problem of our contemporary day – the prevention of an arms race in outer space – making it possible to develop broad international co-operation in the uses of outer space for peaceful purposes.
Practical measures for the carrying out of this task can be developed and taken through complementary bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

Mongolia attaches great importance to the Soviet-American negotiations that began in March this year in Geneva on the whole range of issues concerning nuclear and space weapons. In their joint declaration of 8 January 1985 the parties set as the objective of the negotiations the preparation of effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and putting an end to the arms race on Earth, eliminating and reducing nuclear weapons and strengthening strategic stability.

The specific proposals put forward in the negotiations by the USSR and its unilateral acts of goodwill are completely in keeping with the objectives of the January agreement and create a solid material basis that could guarantee the success of those negotiations. We believe that the United States of America should demonstrate the same goodwill and respond positively to the USSR's constructive initiatives.

Mongolia is pleased that the Conference on Disarmament succeeded this year in establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Like many others, Mongolia participated actively in that undertaking. We continue to believe that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, must, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 39/59, undertake practical negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or several agreements, as appropriate, designed to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

We are convinced that measures prohibiting the militarization of outer space would create the indispensable, favourable conditions for the development of effective international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.
Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): On behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community and of Portugal and Spain, I wish to address agenda item 69, concerning the relationship between disarmament and development.

We share the concern of the international community at the high level of military expenditure in the world. This high level of defence expenditure is currently being borne by many Member States of the United Nations. The costs involved are difficult to reconcile with the needs of so many, in particular those of the developing countries. The Ten, Portugal and Spain are mindful of the triangular relationship between disarmament, security and development.

Seen against this background, the Ten, Portugal and Spain favour the vigorous pursuit of balanced and verifiable arms limitation and disarmament measures. They share the view of the Secretary-General of the United Nations expressed in his yearly report to the General Assembly that

"We must push for practical measures for multilateral disarmament, including regional plans, bearing in mind the link between disarmament and development."

(A/40/1, p. 8)

We think it important, however, to bear in mind that, while we should promote the transfer of resources released through disarmament for development purposes, the argument should not be turned around. Progress in the transfer of such resources should not be held hostage to progress in arms control. It is important to remember that a number of worthwhile disarmament measures may not immediately release sizeable resources for deployment elsewhere. Our efforts in this area, therefore, should not detract from the overriding need to reach the development assistance targets which have been set internationally.

The Ten, Portugal and Spain recall the terms of paragraph 35 of the Final Document, which reads:
"resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries." (S-10/2, para. 35)

One way in which additional resources for development assistance might be made available could be as part of a programme of resource reallocations arising as a result of savings accruing from balanced and verifiable measures of arms limitation and disarmament.

The Ten, Portugal and Spain believe that any evaluation of the impact of world military expenditure on the world economic system and development and of the contribution which a reduction in arms and military expenditure could make to development tasks requires a reliable data base.

The Ten, Portugal and Spain welcome the fact that in the wake of General Assembly resolution 39/160 a process has been set in motion to prepare for an International Conference to consider the relationship between disarmament and development from the various angles from which that resolution considers this question. Member States of the Ten and Portugal and Spain participated actively in the first session of the Preparatory Committee, which was held here in New York from 29 July to 9 August 1985. We are pleased to note that the Preparatory Committee was able to agree on a number of recommendations to the General Assembly on the organizational aspects of the forthcoming Conference, such as the Conference's agenda, its rules of procedure and the modalities for preparing the substantive work of the Conference.

We sincerely hope that the examination of these questions will enable us to set out a course acceptable to all. Our work on the relationship between disarmament and development should serve the common interest, the interest of both
the developed countries and the developing countries. It should give expression to the interdependence and solidarity that characterize the international community of our time and thus contribute to progress in the economic and social fields, as well as in the sphere of security.

We look forward to the fruitful continuation of the process of preparing the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which is scheduled to take place in the summer of next year. That process is the subject of a draft resolution to be submitted, as we understand it, at the present session of the First Committee. The Ten, Portugal and Spain pledge their unstinting efforts to ensure a successful outcome of that Conference, the initiative for which came from one of the Ten.
Mr. MINKO-MI-ENDAMNE (Gabon) (interpretation from French): Our commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations should encourage us to draw up a balance sheet of the international situation in the field of security, disarmament and development.

Unfortunately, my delegation must note that the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in February 1932 continues, because of the maintenance of the status quo in Europe about matters of procedure - some wanting security before disarmament, and others the opposite - and the twin needs of the cold war, as I mentioned on 25 October.

We all know that the United Nations was based on the assumption that the communists and non-communists of Europe would find it possible to agree to construct a world free from tensions, in other words to agree upon a common ethic reflecting the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Therefore disarmament, in all its forms, has become a concrete objective under the Charter.

The idea behind the United Nations was that the task of achieving world peace and that of construction and reconstruction in a new world would still ideological differences and thus make possible agreement between the two super-Powers and their allies, but instead after 40 difficult years of existence the Organization remains a cold-war arena. It can therefore be said that disarmament is above all a moral and psychological problem, for a State is materially disarmed only if it is morally disarmed, and it will agree to limit its armaments or disarm only if it feels secure. The primary problem, therefore, is that of political will, in other words motivation. It is thus impossible to envisage security without disarmament, as the whole world lives in a state of non-war - and that is not peace.

The ball is therefore in the court of the nuclear-weapon Powers; it is up to them to prove their good faith and their spiritual maturity in our common endeavour of building up a sound world, that is, the moral and material improvement of mankind which is the sacred mission of the United Nations.
As I said in my previous statement, security, disarmament and development cannot be conceived on the basis of policies and doctrines of unilateral security but only on the basis of collective security in a fraternal union, to the exclusion of any military objectives that foster only fear and mistrust.

The report of the group of governmental experts on naval disarmament, submitted to us this morning, can be improved upon. It is of the same order as many other reports of groups of experts, such as the Brandt and Thornsson reports which, unfortunately, have not been implemented despite the substantial resources made available for this purpose. All those reports — let us recognize it courageously — are a flagrant reflection of the laissez-aller and laissez-faire that have been imprinted on the United Nations during the 40 years of its existence by the nuclear Powers; the Organization's balance sheet as regards questions of security, disarmament and development has naturally remained negative and the United Nations has consequently become ineffective despite the warnings that have been sounded many times.

Without chauvinism, hatred, fear, contempt, rancour and a spirit of revenge — and in the memory of those who founded the Organization — let us give all those reports the meaning and significance they deserve.

As the centre to which all crises are referred, but also the repository of all our hopes, the United Nations is the only privileged forum for universal and equal dialogue. It must therefore be allowed to play its role and be strengthened in matters of security, disarmament and development in accordance with the objectives of the Charter. It is in that framework that the Lomé Declaration and Programme of Action on security, disarmament and development in Africa — one of the many felicitous regional initiatives to be taken — was conceived.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.