VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 18th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

CONTENTS

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Statements were made by:

Mr. Alsaidi (Yemen)
Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Choudhury (Bangladesh)
Mr. Agstner (Austria)
Mr. Al-Alfi (Democratic Yemen)
Mr. Turkmen (Turkey)
Mr. Issacharoff (Israel)
The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 to 69 and 145 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ALSAIDI (Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): Since this is the first time I have spoken in the Committee, I should like first, Sir, to congratulate you, on behalf of the Yemen Arab Republic, on your election to the chairmanship of the Committee. This election is a demonstration of our confidence in you and the high esteem in which you are held, because of your diplomatic qualifications. We are very pleased to see a citizen of a country with which we have the closest of ties occupying that post.

I am also very pleased to express our congratulations to the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur.

The danger of the outbreak of nuclear war threatens man and civilization in general with annihilation, and could have the same harmful effects on those who contributed to the war and those who did not. It is impossible to justify a policy of escalation of the arms race, or a policy of deterrence, because of the threat to us all. The major Powers possess four kilos of TNT for every man on earth, while existing nuclear arsenals could destroy our world many times over. Yet some are attempting to develop other systems of weapons of mass destruction, believing their security or their prestige to be threatened. That is why other countries try to develop other weapons, so that the arms race is being extended even to outer space, the very source of man's existence.

Thus we are caught in a vicious circle, and that is why I say that there are no technical solutions to nuclear war, but only, as the representative of Mexico has pointed out, only a political solution to that problem.
My delegation believes that in order to get rid of these grim prospects threatening mankind it is essential to prepare as quickly as possible a treaty completely banning nuclear tests, curbing the arms race and prohibiting its extension to outer space. Those with the primary responsibility are the major powers.

Accordingly, we support the suspension of nuclear tests announced unilaterally by the Soviet Union and ask other States which have not yet taken similar measures to follow the example of the Soviet initiative in this respect.

My delegation also supports the initiative concerning respect for the principle of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. We welcome the results achieved by the Third Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We support the efforts to restrict the militarization of outer space and welcome international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space in the interest of all countries of the world.

The feeling of insecurity has prompted many poor States to develop new systems of weapons of mass destruction, which are very costly and weaken their economies. United Nations statistics show that there have been over 150 conflicts in the world since the Second World War, and the third-world States have been the stage for those conflicts. In 1983 developing countries imported weapons to the value of $26.5 billion, and between 1976 and 1980 imports of weapons by 20 States with very large debts in 1983 represented 25 per cent of the increase in their indebtedness.

That is why my delegation believes that it is high time to conclude an international treaty to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and to protect them from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would put constraints on the efforts of poor, non-nuclear-weapon States to obtain nuclear weapons since such efforts are a drain on their economies and have an impact at the social and economic levels.
The arms race increases tensions in international relations.

The two major Powers have practically secured military parity; none the less, the unbridled arms race is the rule in relations between those two countries. That is why we place great hopes in the meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan in Geneva in November. We hope that that meeting will lead in the medium term to an agreement in principle on the limitation of strategic weapons, the non-militarization of outer space and a comprehensive ban on radiological weapons.

Military expenditures have a serious effect on the economies of the developing countries and seriously threaten international peace and security. The international community is aware of this danger and that is why the General Assembly, on 11 December 1969, adopted resolution 2542 (XXIV). That resolution states that international security and development are two parts of the same equation. There is a very close link between disarmament and development, as indicated in United Nations document A/36/356. The arms build-up has a very bad effect in increasing unemployment. The various States have spent vast sums on weapons in the past 30 years. In 1983, between $750 and $800 billion was spent on armaments.
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has stated that that figure could exceed $800 billion in 1984. The world spends 80 per cent of that amount on conventional weapons, which comes to $130 for each man, woman and child in the world – more than the per capita income in many developing countries.

It is stated in document A/36/356 that:

"since the processes of arms accumulation and of development both require large-scale human and material resources and since resources are limited, pursuit of either process tends to deprive the other." (A/36/356, para. 34)

That is why those resources must be devoted to the social and economic development of the developing countries. And that is why we are gratified by the report of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which calls for a reallocation of resources.

We also support all proposals aimed at the realization of the aspirations of peoples with a view to the creation of conditions in which they can live in security and stability, a world free from hunger and disease.

With a view to curbing the arms race and making the best use if all human and material resources, my delegation supported General Assembly resolution 39/54, which was adopted by consensus, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. That resolution invites the countries concerned to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, calls upon all countries of the region to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and also invites those countries not to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories. My delegation furthermore supports all the activities of the United Nations aimed at the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yemen, in his statement before the General Assembly on 7 October 1985, had this to say:
"We believe that the Middle East is one of the most sensitive areas which should be free of nuclear weapons, and that there should be international guarantees not to introduce such weapons into this area. Their introduction would only increase existing tension in that area and exacerbate the present situation which is the result of the policies and practices of Israel . . ."

(A/40/PV.25, p. 19-20)

Although the General Assembly adopted resolution 39/54 by consensus, the Zionist entity continues its development of nuclear weapons, as indicated in document A/40/520. The situation in the Middle East is extremely tense and the Zionist entity is most secretive about its nuclear programme, thus adding to the prevailing tension and anxiety. We therefore ask the international community to bring every possible pressure to bear on the Zionist entity to induce it to place its nuclear installations under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

We make the same request with regard to the Pretoria régime, and ask the States that supply those two racist régimes with sophisticated weapons to refrain from doing so in order to preserve international peace and security.

The Declaration making the Indian Ocean a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as well as the convening of a conference for that purpose have the full support of my country's leaders.

We should also like to say that we support the idea of the holding of a Conference on the Indian Ocean during the first half of 1986. We believe that that Conference will help to overcome difficulties and create a climate conducive to the settlement of all outstanding issues.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country stated before the fortieth session of the General Assembly:

"In this respect, and since the time is close at hand for the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, I wish to reaffirm that my country
rejects the idea of any military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Arab Sea. I wish to support the call to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and security, free from foreign fleets and nuclear weapons. (A/40/PV.25, p.18) Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): As is known, the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty Organization met in Sofia on 22 and 23 October 1985 and adopted an important document, namely, the Statement entitled "The Elimination of the Nuclear Threat and a Turn for the Better in European and World Affairs". The representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the country that acted as host for the meeting, has in his statement has already drawn the Committee's attention to the peace initiatives and proposals made by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and to the basic elements contained in the Statement, which is to be distributed as an official United Nations document.

The Soviet delegation would like to refer specifically to the proposals contained in that document for measures by which the USSR and the United States, were they to implement them, could make a major contribution to efforts aimed at curbing both the nuclear and the conventional arms race.

First of all, it is proposed that all work on the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons, including anti-satellite systems, should be suspended, that existing nuclear weapons should be frozen at their present quantitative level, while limiting as much as possible their modernization and at the same time ceasing the development, testing and deployment of new kinds and types of such weapons, and that the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe should be halted. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty believe that those steps could be implemented even before an agreement has been worked out between the USSR and the United States on the whole range of issues relating to nuclear and space weapons.
A joint commitment by the Soviet Union and the United States to refrain from stationing any nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at the present time, not to build up stockpiles of nuclear arms, and not to replace them by new weapons in those countries where such weapons have already been deployed, would serve the interest of stopping and reversing the arms race.
The participants in the meeting also endorsed the idea that the Soviet Union and the United States should undertake not to develop or manufacture new types of conventional arms whose destructive potential would be comparable to that of weapons of mass destruction.

Another new initiative calls for freezing as of 1 January 1986 the numerical strength of the armed forces personnel of the Soviet Union and the United States, including their forces stationed outside their national territories. The Sofia meeting also put forward a proposal to freeze, on a mutual basis, the military budgets of the Soviet Union and the United States, starting from the next fiscal year. We hope that those initiatives will be considered with due attention and a sense of responsibility, and in a constructive spirit.

The leaders of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty also reaffirmed that it was urgently necessary to implement such a measure as the cessation of any nuclear explosions in order to halt the arms race. Support was expressed for the moratorium on such explosions instituted unilaterally by the Soviet Union, and it was noted that it was now up to the United States to act.

One of the main subjects under discussion in the First Committee is the cessation and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. That is entirely justified. Nuclear-weapon tests, after all, serve as a kind of catalyst for the nuclear arms race. In many instances they provide a major and sometimes the only method of identifying ways and means of further developing nuclear weapons and studying the destructive effects of some types. Test results form the basis of the development of new, increasingly devastating and dangerous types and varieties of weapons and are a necessary stage towards their mass production. One example is the so-called neutron bomb — the enhanced radiation nuclear weapon, which, if used, would mainly affect the civilian population.
Let me refer to another recent example of the same kind but of a different order. In its drive to develop space strike weapons and a nationwide anti-ballistic missile system, the United States is considering X-ray lasers powered by the energy of a nuclear explosion as one of the possible components of such a system. Thus nuclear testing is becoming a part of the Star Wars programme, which, according to the claims of its architects, will render nuclear weapons obsolete and rid the world of them. But in fact it is leading to an uncontrolled nuclear arms race.

The Soviet Union has consistently believed that the earliest possible cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be in the interests of all mankind. Such a step would place a major barrier in the way of the further upgrading of that weapon of mass destruction while strengthening the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In effect, the nuclear arms race would be substantially slowed down. The prohibition of testing would considerably reduce the threat of a nuclear war. The representative of Sweden, Mrs. Theorin, quite correctly drew our attention to this, when she pointed out that the implementation of such a measure "would also degrade the reliability of existing warheads and thus render any first-strike calculations even more uncertain." (A/C.1/40/PV.4, p. 7)

Moreover, in the absence of testing, existing nuclear arsenals would be practically doomed to a gradual moral and physical obsolescence, because without modernization nuclear weapons lose their effectiveness and will eventually become extinct. The longer the period of non-testing, the faster this process will develop and the closer we will be to our goal of completely ridding mankind of the nuclear threat. Another important point is that this would release substantial resources that could be used for the purposes of creative endeavour and development.
All this is worth recalling today, because attempts are sometimes made, including here in the First Committee, to minimize the importance of this question, using as an excuse the assertion that prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons cannot be a substitute for an agreement on a direct reduction in their numbers. We agree; indeed, it cannot. The Soviet Union, far from favouring the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests as opposed to a reduction of such weapons, is in favour of progress not only in this but in all other areas, without exception, leading to the elimination of the nuclear threat.

The Soviet Union has proposed to the United States reaching agreement on the complete prohibition of space strike weapons and a radical 50 per cent reduction in the nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and the United States capable of reaching each other's territory. In order to facilitate an accord on an early interim mutual reduction of medium-range nuclear-weapon systems in Europe, we have proposed that an agreement to that effect should be concluded separately, without any direct link with the problems of space and strategic arms. In addition to the moratorium on the deployment in Europe of medium-range missiles announced by the Soviet Union, the number of SS-20 missiles we have on operational duty in the European zone has been reduced to 243.

We are in favour of meaningful negotiations on nuclear disarmament questions at multilateral forums as well. At the Conference on Disarmament the Soviet Union has proposed that work be begun on a programme of complete nuclear disarmament.

Thirty years ago, in 1955, the Soviet Union was the first of the nuclear Powers to call for the cessation of testing. A lot of water has passed under the bridge since then. The records of debates, studies and negotiations on that problem have filled tens of thousands of pages. One might legitimately say that it has been studied inside out.
The 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water was a major step towards solving the problem. In the mid-1970s the Soviet Union and the United States were able to draw up treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and on peaceful nuclear explosions, and by the end of 1980 practically all aspects of a treaty that would ban all nuclear-weapon tests were agreed upon at the tripartite negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. The joint report that they submitted to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament on 30 July 1980 states:

"The three negotiating parties have come far in their pursuit of a sound treaty ... They are determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion." (CD/130, p. 5)
I believe all this convincingly demonstrates that even then the problem of the test ban had — if one can use sports terminology — reached the final stretch, but the finishing line has not yet been crossed because some of the main participants have dropped out of the race. The Soviet-American agreements of 1974 and 1976 were not ratified and the tripartite negotiations were broken off — and it is well known to everyone in the Committee that that was not the fault of the Soviet Union. We have repeatedly proposed that these agreements should be ratified and the tripartite negotiations resumed. But each time the reply was negative.

There can be only one explanation for this — namely, the desire of the current United States Administration to carry out at any costs its large-scale military programmes for the build-up and qualitative upgrading of nuclear, and now also space strike, weapons in order to attain a position of military superiority. As a result, for five years now there has remained in the question of a test ban a situation that has been causing deep concern in the General Assembly and in the overwhelming majority of States.

In his report on the work of the Organization the Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar has emphasized that

"Today, a clear and vital signal of humanity's willingness to confront the nuclear challenge would be through agreement on a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty."

The report also states:

"Governments have to find the courage to take the first steps." (A/40/1, p. 8)

The Soviet Union has taken such a step: as of 6 August it established a unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions and called upon the United States to follow its example. This was not an easy or simple decision, nor was it by any means a propaganda ploy, as is being alleged by those who would like to forget the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Following such "logic", one could go as far
as to say that the conclusion on 6 August of the treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-free-zone in the South Pacific also belongs to the area of propaganda. We do of course believe that the countries that signed that treaty have indeed carried out extremely successful propaganda for peace.

In this connection the wise words of President Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania addressed to the General Assembly a month ago come to mind. Speaking about what was propaganda and what was not, he said:

"Let the United States challenge the Soviet Union to accept a much longer moratorium." (A/40/PV.13, p. 11)

I must say that we for our part would only welcome such American "propaganda".

In order to introduce the moratorium the Soviet Union had to suspend its testing programme without completing it. Before the moratorium was declared, the USSR had conducted this year approximately the same number of tests as the United States. Overall, the number of American tests exceeds those conducted by the USSR by one third. Nevertheless, I should like to emphasize that we took this unilateral step out of a desire to help break the vicious circle of the arms race. We have also taken note of the fact that a number of General Assembly resolutions, the latest of which was resolution 39/52, called upon the USSR, the United States and Great Britain to halt all nuclear tests either through a tripartite moratorium or through three separate unilateral moratoria.

The other side, which was informed of our decision in advance, has enough time - until 1 January 1986 - to study our proposal with all due seriousness and take a constructive decision. There is still some time left to do this. The Soviet delegation has instructions to assure the representatives of the First Committee that in case of a positive response from the United States we shall keep the moratorium in force even after 1 January next year.
We have also carefully studied related problems of verification. In our opinion - which is indeed shared by many others - the technical means already existing in the USSR and in the United States provide a necessary and quite adequate degree of assurance that a nuclear explosion, even of a fairly small yield, will be detected. Those who assert the contrary know this to be true. Incidentally, we have decided to halt all - may I emphasize, all - nuclear explosions, both military and peaceful, so that there can be no reason to wonder whether nuclear weapons are being tested under the guise of peaceful nuclear explosions.

In other words, the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions could become, should the United States decide to join it, a dress rehearsal for preparing an appropriate multilateral treaty. As Mikhail S. Gorbachev put it, "Our Goal is a general and complete ban on nuclear-weapons tests and not a breathing spell between explosions".

What did the United States undertake in response to the unilateral step of the USSR? It conducted a series of nuclear-weapons tests and sent an invitation to one such test. It has been claimed that the invitation was aimed at creating a basis for effective verification of limitations placed on underground tests. But if we are seriously and not simply in words talking about test verifications here, the basis for that already exists, including the two Soviet-American agreements on the subject. The 1974 Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear tests provides for a whole system of controls, including exchanges of data on calibration explosions, on the geology of test sites and so on. The 1976 Treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes goes even further in verification by providing in some circumstances for the presence - may I emphasize, even without a ceremonial invitation on behalf of the Head of State - of representatives of the other side equipped with extremely accurate instruments. Both sides stated that
they would not exceed the 150-kiloton threshold established for nuclear explosions. But if there is a desire to increase the effectiveness of verification of compliance with this threshold, the best way to proceed is to set in motion the verification provisions of the Treaties by ratifying them. The United States, however, would not agree to that.
Some delegations have drawn attention to the fact that unilateral steps aimed at halting nuclear explosions cannot provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of achieving a general and complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet delegation does not challenge that point of view; in fact, it completely shares it. The most effective solution, including that of the question of verification, is the elaboration and conclusion, as a matter of urgency, of an adequate treaty.

The USSR proposes a constructive programme for solving the whole range of problems pertaining to such a treaty, including those relating to the scope of the prohibition and to compliance and verification.

First of all, we believe that the treaty should ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons anywhere. It would also be quite possible to find a solution to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. It is the view of many States that modern technology has eliminated any major difference between nuclear weapons and peaceful explosive devices which could lead to the risk of circumventing the treaty, and that view would seem to be quite convincing. On the other hand, some say that one should not forever lock the door on potential benefits, particularly for non-nuclear States, from peaceful nuclear explosions, especially since that opportunity is provided for in article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are in favour of a solution taking into account both of those viewpoints. Participants in the test-ban treaty would refrain from carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions, pending the development of a generally acceptable procedure for conducting such explosions. Work on such a procedure would begin immediately after the adoption of the treaty.

A nuclear-test-ban treaty should, naturally, envisage adequate verification, and we are not talking only about the use by States of their national technical capabilities; not all countries have such capabilities. That is why the Soviet
Mr. Petrovsky, USSR

The Soviet Union proposes that consideration be given to the possibility of placing important information obtained through such methods at the disposal of parties to the treaty which do not possess national technical means. The international exchange of seismic data could become an important element in verification. Technical recommendations with respect to such exchange, and the creation of a global network comprising 50 seismic stations, have already been approved by the ad hoc group of scientific experts on the detection and identification of seismic events and are set out in its 1978 report to the Committee - now the Conference - on Disarmament.

We also envisage the possibility of having on-site inspections upon request. A committee of experts would be established to facilitate the international exchange of seismic data and other functions related to verification, including on-site inspection.

At the same time, the Soviet Union does not claim that its proposals represent some kind of ultimate truth. I would remind representatives that when Sweden put forward its initiative on supplementing the exchange of seismic data with an exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses and with the establishment of appropriate data banks, the Soviet Union stated its readiness to consider that initiative in the course of negotiations.

The crux of the whole problem is that no negotiations are taking place. What is being proposed in their stead is abstract discussion of various issues, primarily related to verification, completely divorced from the question of drawing up a treaty. For example, one cannot agree to the demand that development and perfection of a seismic control system should be a precondition for the preparation of a test-ban treaty. Work to improve such a system could go on forever. At the same time, the technology of nuclear tests would be growing more sophisticated, thus making verification more difficult.
But verification is not an issue. Experience gained at all previous negotiations, the views of eminent specialists and numerous General Assembly resolutions attest to that. I think, however, that the best testimony comes from the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Richard Wagner, Jr., who is responsible for nuclear arms programmes. He deserves thanks for that testimony. He has said that even if a comprehensive test ban were put under effective control, "it would not be in the United States national security interests". The same position was set forth in diplomatic terms in the United States statement at the Conference on Disarmament. The United States representative said that:

"A nuclear-test ban is the long-term objective in the field of comprehensive and verifiable reduction of nuclear weapons, of enhancing confidence-building measures, of keeping the nuclear deterrence potential at an acceptable level, and of better verification conditions." (CD/PV.316) It is clear that there are more qualifications in that statement than any actual readiness for talks. With such an approach, negotiations become much more than a long-term objective. It is not hard to see that what is meant is not a long-term objective, but actually a flat refusal even to seek such a ban.

In this connection, I would note a recent statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Cromartie, who said that a pre-condition for serious negotiations on a test ban would be the settlement of questions relating to the scope of prohibition, compliance and verification. All the participants in the tripartite talks called for an early conclusion of such a treaty, but I would recall that at that time the position of the United Kingdom was entirely different. But after those negotiations were suspended - for which the United Kingdom was partly responsible - its position appeared to change, but hardly in a productive direction. Meanwhile, there is no doubt that the United Kingdom could make a contribution to the process of moving towards negotiations on this subject and conducting them successfully.
It is deeds, not words that testify to a devotion to the policy of peace and disarmament. The approach of the Soviet Union to the issue of finding a practical solution to the nuclear-test ban problem fully reflects a unity of words and deeds. We are ready to deal with this issue immediately, in any forum, but, naturally, on the basis of reciprocity and taking into account work already accomplished.

First, the Soviet Union is ready to extend beyond 1 January 1986 its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests, if the United States joins in that moratorium.

Secondly, we are ready even now immediately to resume the tripartite talks to negotiate the specific text of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, and to take part in the multilateral talks in the Conference on Disarmament, in conformity with the recent appeal of the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Thirdly, we stand ready to ratify, immediately and on the basis of reciprocity, the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-American agreements.

Discussions in the First Committee clearly show that it is time to move from words to deeds, for the overwhelming majority of delegations participating in the debate came out in favour of an early start of negotiations on the long-standing question of a nuclear-test ban and stated that deeds should replace words. States which shy away from negotiations on this problem or sabotage solutions to it are thus dissociating themselves from the international community and are assuming a grave responsibility towards the entire world.

We are convinced that the deadlock in the search for a solution to the problem of halting and banning nuclear tests must be broken. We believe that the General Assembly at its current session should make a strong demand that that problem be solved without further delay.
Mr. Choudhury (Bangladesh): I convey my delegation's warmest felicitations to you, Sir, on your unanimous election as Chairman of this important Committee. We are convinced that your long and distinguished career will ensure well-guided deliberations in the Committee during this session. My congratulations go also to the officers of the Committee on their well-deserved election.

The current session is historic as it marks the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations. This great world body, which rose from the ashes of the Second World War, has withstood the test of time and given the world 40 years of freedom from a global conflict. But mankind has yet to secure the peace that it has aspired to. We live from crisis to crisis, and our world today is fraught with fear and tension, with conflict and confrontation wreaking in many parts of our small planet untold human suffering, death and destruction. Our failure to take effective action over the years in the sphere of disarmament makes this situation potentially more volatile and risky. Disarmament and international security are closely interlinked. A sense of insecurity among nations has led only to armaments, which in turn created greater insecurity leading to more armaments. Contrary to the wish of the vast majority of the peoples of the world, the arms race, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, registered a phenomenal growth in the past years. The continued accumulation of most sophisticated and lethal weapons by the super-Powers and other militarily significant States has brought mankind close to the edge of the precipice of self-destruction. The current global nuclear arsenals, estimated to be over 50,000 warheads, can destroy the world many times over. In such a grim situation what we need is a real understanding of the fact that a nuclear war cannot be won and hence must never be fought and a willingness on the part of all concerned to engage in positive dialogue and meaningful negotiations.
It is in this context that we have expressed our satisfaction at the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers in Geneva. We sincerely hope that the forthcoming meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will achieve meaningful and tangible results, which in turn will have a favourable impact on global disarmament efforts and the lessening of world tension.

While we take note of this positive development, my delegation would like to emphasize once again that the question of disarmament, which has global dimensions and implications, can be addressed only in a multilateral context. The United Nations therefore has a central role and primary responsibility in halting and reversing the arms race with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament. Disarmament is a moral imperative in this nuclear age and we should make every effort to strengthen the United Nations machinery in this vital field. To that end, the effectiveness of the principal United Nations disarmament bodies, such as the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament, should be enhanced. In recognition of the particular role and function of the Conference on Disarmament, Bangladesh has applied for membership of that body.

Bangladesh is firmly committed to general and complete disarmament. We are equally convinced that there can be no durable global peace except through the elimination and destruction of nuclear weapons and their stockpiles. It is in pursuance of that conviction that Bangladesh acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty some six years ago. We are however disturbed to note that a cherished objective of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has still remained unfulfilled and that nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, continued unchecked. It is now universally recognized that limitation of nuclear armaments and other weapons of mass destruction is an essential first step in creating an atmosphere of trust and confidence and the relaxation of global tension. There is no denying the fact
that primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament rests with the two super-Powers, which between themselves control 95 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons. These nuclear-weapon States have made mankind hostage to their mutual mistrust and self-perceived security. The vast majority of States that do not possess any nuclear weapons cannot accept the existing situation.

The Bangladesh delegation has consistently maintained that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty is a vital first step in our common endeavour to reverse the nuclear-arms race. We have also urged that pending the conclusion of such a treaty all States should refrain from the testing of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and that there should be a freeze on the production, deployment, research and development of nuclear weapons. This process should be followed by a gradual reduction of all nuclear arsenals; the question of verification, like all other important questions, can be resolved through negotiations. The vast majority of Member States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty in keeping with their treaty obligations have not acquired nuclear weapons. They are legitimately demanding that effective and credible assurances should be extended to them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The recently concluded Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been able to adopt a Final Declaration by consensus. My delegation believes that this is a reaffirmation of the conviction of the signatories that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most important instrument in safeguarding our basic security interests. Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear-weapon development, of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and joint efforts towards nuclear disarmament are three basic rules of the Treaty have again been vindicated. It is our earnest hope that the nuclear-weapon States will heed the appeal to resume negotiations for an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.
It is a matter of grave concern to all of us that, while we are trying to curb
the nuclear-arms race, attempts are being made to use outer space for military
purposes, adding yet another dimension to the nuclear armaments spiral. The
international community has urged time and again that all such attempts should be
halted and that outer space should be declared a common heritage of mankind. But,
regrettably, the super-Powers have put forward their respective strategic doctrines
on this issue. While pronouncing ourselves unequivocally and strongly against an
arms race in outer space, we should call upon the Conference on Disarmament to
undertake urgent negotiations with a view to adopting concrete and effective
measures to halt this new area of proliferation. The subject deserves our priority
attention, and any delay or procrastination on our part would inevitably complicate
the situation, making it more difficult to reach an agreement in future.

Though the Conference on Disarmament has been negotiating for the last five
years, it is a pity that we have not yet been able to conclude a convention banning
the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, acquisition and use of chemical
weapons. We are, however, encouraged to note the progress that the Conference has
been able to achieve in this regard during recent months. We feel strongly that
the present momentum must be maintained and we call upon all the parties, in
particular the major Powers, to show the necessary political will facilitating an
early conclusion of a convention that would effectively and comprehensively ban
this weapon and provide for international machinery to ensure its full compliance.

Another area of serious concern to the Bangladesh delegation is the phenomenal
growth in the conventional-arms race, which has resulted in death and destruction
to so many millions. Even at this moment, armed conflicts and wars are being waged
in various parts of the world. The issue of conventional disarmament therefore
should get our equal attention.
Our failure in the past to act firmly and decisively has led to an unprecedented expansion of the conventional arms race. Furthermore, highly sophisticated conventional weapons have recently been developed which, in terms of their lethal effects, can be hardly distinguished from nuclear weapons. The United Nations report on various aspects of the conventional arms race deserves our serious and urgent consideration.

The close and direct relationship between disarmament and development is now universally recognized. The General Assembly, particularly at its tenth special session and first special session devoted to disarmament, clearly established that link and pointed out how scarce global resources were continuously being diverted to the arms race at the cost of the urgent needs of development, particularly of the developing countries. The conclusions of the highly commended Thorsson report, initiated by the first special session devoted to disarmament on this question, have affirmed this yet again. Yet the arms race continues unabated. Current global expenditure on armaments is estimated to have reached the trillion dollar mark, and seriously affects the development prospects of all nations.

Bangladesh, a least developed country, has acutely felt that the huge material, technical and human resources which are being wasted on a potentially destructive purpose like the armaments race, should be more fruitfully used to eliminate poverty and to promote development. Such redirection would help developed as well as developing countries through the promotion of political and economic security. We have consistently attached particular importance to the question of the close interrelationship between disarmament and development, and have made sincere attempts to contribute to deliberations on the subject. It is our earnest hope that this Committee will fully support the successful convening of the proposed International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament
and Development in Paris next year, as recommended by the Preparatory Committee which met a few months ago.

My delegation firmly believes that no effort aimed at effective disarmament will ever be successful unless steps are taken to relax international tension and build up confidence. We therefore expressed our conviction, at preceding sessions, that regional and international peace and security would be promoted through the creation of zones of peace and nuclear-weapons-free zones in various parts of the world. Such zones would have to take into account the interrelated aspects of eliminating the presence of, and threat from, external Powers and the maintenance of security among regional States.

As a littoral State, we have attached great importance to the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean region and have called for the early convening of the United Nations Conference in Colombo. It is a matter of deep regret that the Committee has not yet been able to achieve any meaningful progress in either substantive or organizational fields. The political and security climate in the region has increased the urgency of convening the Conference at an early date. We also believe that the active participation and full co-operation of the littoral and hinterland States, the major maritime users and the permanent members of the Security Council, are essential to the success of the Colombo Conference.

In our own region, Bangladesh has been making relentless efforts to promote peace and stability through the creation of a climate of trust, understanding and co-operation. Our aim of creating a regional co-operation forum among the countries of the South Asian region is a clear example of the sincerity and earnestness of our purpose in this regard. The Heads of State and Government of seven South Asian countries, namely, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and Bangladesh, are meeting at the first-ever summit on 7 and 8 December
this year in our capital city of Dhaka. I had the opportunity of visiting the capitals of these countries recently and saw for myself the enthusiasm and expectations that have been aroused by this positive development.

On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, it is our earnest hope that, in recognition of the grave danger that mankind faces today, the Committee will engage in genuine disarmament efforts with a view to ushering in an era of global peace and security. It is our common responsibility, and we urge all States, particularly the most powerful ones, to display moderation and vision. Scientific innovation and technological breakthroughs have placed vast powers and potentials at our disposal. It should be our sacred responsibility to use them judiciously for the betterment of the human race instead of wasting them on an armaments race. If we succeed in making a start towards that end during the current session, it may be the most fitting respect that we can pay to this great world body on this historic occasion.

MR. AGSTNER (Austria): My delegation would today like to comment briefly on agenda item 63 - "Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons" - a subject to which the Austrian Government has always attached great importance. It is also a subject that offers real prospects of successful multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, which will hopefully lead to the conclusion of a convention banning these awesome and heinous weapons.

This year we celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. This legal instrument, which was signed by Austria, as one of the first parties, proved its importance during the Second World War and remains of great value, although it does not contain any verification clauses. Austria, which as much as 30 years ago, in 1955, renounced
(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

the possession of chemical weapons, was also an original party to the
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.
Austria therefore fully subscribes to the urgent need to conclude a convention
banning the possession, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Austria, which is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, was, as in
past years, invited by the Geneva Conference to participate in its work,
particularly in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

During the last three years considerable progress has been achieved in the
elaboration of a convention, which can easily be ascertained when looking through
the reports of the Conference, which reflect an ever-increasing area of common
ground in treaty formulation. We note with appreciation that, during the summer
session of the Conference, the Ad Hoc Committee made progress in such important
areas as the destruction of existing chemical weapons and key precursors.

The Austrian Government is deeply concerned by the danger posed by chemical
weapons. The evidence collected on their use by the Secretary-General's group of
experts, which included an Austrian specialist, served as a reminder to all of us
of the urgency of the total elimination of this kind of weapon. I should like to
point out that quite a number of victims of chemical agents used in a still ongoing
war were treated in Austrian hospitals. This humanitarian aid created an awareness
among the general public of the danger of chemical weapons, which had hitherto been
restricted to experts.

In listening to the statements during the general debate of the Committee, it
was heartening to hear that all speakers agreed on the need for the speedy
conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention. Until its conclusion and entry into
force, it has been suggested, that we could envisage the creation of
chemical-weapon-free zones. Proposals to create a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, where the greatest stockpiles of chemical weapons on our globe are to be found in the arsenals of the two super-Powers and their allies, were submitted recently.

In this regard, my delegation takes note with interest of all efforts and initiatives aimed at the establishment on a regional basis, or between neighbours, of a chemical-weapon-free zone. This is particularly true when the region concerned is our immediate neighbourhood - Central Europe. Such steps should, however, not be taken in isolation but within a wider framework embracing the thinning-out of conventional weapons in general. Apart from the military implications of such measures, their confidence-building character would recommend them to all those interested in the decrease of tension and increase of confidence. These regional achievements must not be considered as the goal, but only as a step towards a world-wide ban on chemical weapons.
(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

My delegation is aware of the stockpiles built up in recent years. Unfortunately, this has now led to another spiral in the arms race. This course must be altered so that, on a basis of negotiations, a moratorium can be agreed upon as a step towards the reduction and elimination of chemical weapons. Otherwise, there is a danger that the declared intentions to deploy more effective chemical weapons could lead other countries to follow suit.

Verification will constitute an essential element of any effective chemical-weapon convention. It is not surprising that this issue presents major obstacles in the search for the convention. We do not ignore the fact that verification seems particularly difficult with respect to chemical weapons since they can be distinguished from ordinary weapons only at close range. The problem of how to distinguish plants producing chemicals for civilian and industrial uses from those producing chemicals for military uses has also to be resolved. In this regard it is wise to recall the Seveso incident and last year's tragedy at Bhopal which should serve as a reminder of the dangers inherent in plants producing chemical agents solely for industrial purposes.

For a chemical-weapon convention to be successful and in order to avoid violations as we have witnessed in the case of the Geneva Protocol it will be essential to agree on a verification system whereby compliance and non-compliance with the convention can be unmistakably established. My delegation is, however, fully aware that in such a complex issue it will be impossible to ensure a 100 per cent certainty of compliance and we were reassured in this view when the representative of her Britannic Majesty, although referring to verification involved in the comprehensive test-ban treaty, stated that he was not asking for 100 per cent verification but does expect serious examination of this complex technical and absolutely vital issue. We are confident that with such an approach
(Mr. Agstner, Austria)

the Conference on Disarmament will arrive at generally acceptable and adequate verification measures.

When commenting on the issue of chemical weapons we should not forget that research and development might result in technical innovation, outstripping the pace of the ongoing negotiations. As already stated earlier, we cannot but question, in this connection, the wisdom of the decision to start production of new and evermore effective types of chemical weapons. We should also bear in mind the danger of the proliferation of chemical weapons. Nearly every country is in a position today to produce such weapons. A long time ago former Secretary-General of the United Nations U Thant warned of this danger, viewing chemical weapons as the nuclear bomb of small countries.

So far, the negotiations on a chemical-weapon convention in Geneva have been the only area where we see a good chance of success. In view of the progress already achieved we express our conviction that those efforts should be stepped up to allow for the earliest possible conclusion of a chemical-weapon convention.

In conclusion my delegation expresses the hope that the next session of the Ad Hoc Committee will achieve the desired progress and be able to solve the important question of verification. A convention banning chemical weapons will indeed be a most significant contribution to the International Year of Peace, which we are commemorating next year. We wish Ambassador Cromartie all success in the important task as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1986. We should also like to call on the members of this Committee to always bear in mind the heavy responsibilities they have in eliminating this terrible weapon to make this world safer and better.

Mr. AL-ALFI (Democratic Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): It gives me great pleasure to express to the Chairman our warmest congratulations on his
election to the chairmanship of the First Committee at the current session. We are confident that he will contribute to the success of the work of this Committee.

We also express our felicitations to the officers of the Committee. We reaffirm our willingness to co-operate with them fully in the discharge of their tasks.

The work of the First Committee at this session acquires particular importance because it coincides with the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations. In the light of the international situation which is characterized by the aggressive policy adopted by the colonialist Powers, the continuous use of force and interference in international affairs, the deterioration of international relations as a result of the disregard for the Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States – we hope that this anniversary will represent an impetus to exert concrete efforts to strengthen the United Nations in its role in settling present international problems.

The first step in that direction should be a recommitment to the United Nations and the principles of its Charter, and should be represented by consolidating the effort of the United Nations to realize the principal objective of its Charter "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Hence, the great importance of efforts made by the United Nations to eradicate the danger of nuclear war, the halting of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race in all fields, including the prevention of the militarization of outer space, and the prohibition of the testing of all nuclear weapons and their complete eradication, so as to achieve the aspirations of our peoples to complete and general disarmament under international effective control.
This is particularly so because on the fortieth anniversary of the first use of the atomic bomb, there is increasing concern and fear that humanity is engaged in self-destruction.

Our concern is increasing over the status quo concerning the objective on which the international community is unanimous, that is to say, halting the arms race. This objective was reflected in the concluding document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which also set forth the international strategy for disarmament.

Despite the numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on disarmament at the thirty-ninth session, and the preceding sessions as well, we note that there has been no progress in changing the deteriorating international relations and in achieving disarmament. On the contrary, some countries, particularly the United States, persists in flagrant militarism based on confrontation and military and strategic supremacy through the escalation of the arms race, particularly, the nuclear arms race, the development of new systems of mass destruction weapons, the direct threat to States and national liberation movements, and the violation of the rights of peoples and their freedoms and advancement.
Our main task is to redouble our efforts so that the United Nations may discharge its primary responsibility for establishing peace, strengthening security and fulfilling the aspirations of our peoples. In that connection, we must recognize the increasing interdependence of States and the fact that there is no alternative today to the policy of coexistence, détente and co-operation between States, on a footing of equality, irrespective of their military or economic power, their economic or social systems and their size or geographic location. We must also reaffirm our condemnation of State terrorism as a way of dealing with other States and peoples, and ensure that countries desist from committing any acts designed to change or undermine by force the socio-political systems of other States or destabilize and overturn their Governments.

The Third Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has recently completed its work in Geneva. We congratulate the Chairman, Ambassador Ibrahim Shaker, on the success achieved there. The Conference emphasized the success of the Treaty and its vital role over the years in preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also emphasized the validity and usefulness of the Treaty, the fruit of international efforts to eliminate the risks of nuclear war, which threaten mankind and civilization with extinction, and to curb the nuclear-arms race. However, that did not prevent the parties expressing deep concern about the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitment to continue in good faith negotiations on effective measures to halt the nuclear-arms race at an early date and achieve nuclear disarmament, and to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

At the bilateral level, while the new negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States give rise to some hope, particularly if the two parties
adhere to the agreement of last January concerning the nature of the negotiations, it is unfortunately undeniable that in the recent past no results have been achieved in halting the nuclear-arms race. We hope that the summit meeting to be held next month between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, and President Reagan of the United States will lead to positive results, so that that objective may be attained.

In the Conference on Disarmament no agreement has been reached on any draft convention on disarmament. Substantive multilateral negotiations on urgent matters have not started, despite the priorities that were unanimously approved at the tenth special session of the General Assembly. We believe that it is urgently necessary to take practical measures to eliminate the risks of nuclear war and achieve nuclear disarmament, beginning with multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament as called for in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session. Moreover, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament multilateral negotiations should start on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban. We also consider it necessary to resume negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

We believe that all efforts to halt the nuclear-arms race are organically related to our task of preventing the militarization of outer space. We call for the acceleration of efforts towards a treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. As a first step, agreement should be reached on the inclusion of the declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers in that regard in a legally binding instrument.

The conclusion of specific treaties and conventions in these fields, the preparation of a comprehensive programme for disarmament and the elimination of impediments to the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive ban on chemical
weapons would represent a significant contribution to disarmament. In that connection, we highly appreciate the positive and constructive initiatives of the Soviet Union and its unilateral adoption of a series of measures in order to make some progress in the curbing of the arms race and in nuclear disarmament. Those initiatives include its commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, its efforts to halt the production of and ban nuclear weapons and its declaration of readiness to reduce its nuclear arsenal.

We also express our support for, and appreciation of, the constructive decision of the Soviet Union to put a unilateral freeze on nuclear explosions and its pledge to extend that freeze beyond the beginning of next January if other nuclear Powers desist from carrying out nuclear explosions. We hope that that measure will be paralleled by similar steps by other nuclear-weapon Powers, particularly the United States, so that the dangerous rivalry in building up nuclear arsenals may end.

The prevention of nuclear war is a prerequisite for any efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament under strict international control, to ensure the success of all efforts to meet economic and social challenges in the field of development and to achieve the progress, prosperity, security and stability to which we aspire. We call for a demonstration of the political will to solve the problems related to disarmament in a way that will make it possible to use other means to achieve economic and social development in all countries, particularly the developing countries.
We all agree that the bleak picture of poverty and deprivation in which the majority of the world's people live today, when huge expenditures are wasted on armaments, underscores the urgent need to curb the arms race and proceed to disarmament and to divert the enormous human and material resources currently being squandered in military fields to economic and social development, so as to meet the interests of our peoples and raise their standards of living.

In this connection we welcomed General Assembly resolution 39/160 of 17 December 1984, calling for the convening of an International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. We wish also to express our appreciation for the results achieved in the Preparatory Committee for the Conference. We look forward with interest to the convening of the Conference in Paris in 1986, at which we hope for positive results in order to devote the resources saved through disarmament to serving the economic and social development of all States, particularly that of the developing States which so urgently need such resources.

General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control is still the ultimate goal we hope disarmament efforts will achieve. To attain this goal and to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, we have supported the efforts made by the United Nations to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. In this context we regret that the group of governmental experts on nuclear-weapon-free zones appointed by the Secretary-General to carry out a study to review and update the comprehensive study of the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 37/99 F of 13 December 1982, was unable to complete that study in the allotted time, although the time-limit was extended last year.
While renewing our support for the United Nations efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, we wish to stress our deep concern over the acquisition by the two racist régimes - in Pretoria and in Tel Aviv - of a nuclear-weapons production capability and the ensuing threat to Arab and African States and peoples and to peace and security in the Middle East and Africa in particular and in the world as a whole. We call upon the international community to condemn Israel for its development of nuclear weapons and for its acquisition of the capability to produce and acquire such weapons - which was confirmed by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research included in its report in document A/40/520, dated 9 August 1985, relating to Israeli nuclear armament. It had been previously confirmed by the Secretary-General in his report on the same question in document A/37/434.

The international community must realize the serious implications of the development of nuclear capability by Israel, particularly in the light of the Israeli record which is replete with disregard and defiance of its will. We call upon all States also to cut off at once any co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field.

We believe that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East requires the three main prerequisites set forth in United Nations resolutions, particularly resolutions of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. These conditions are clear and can be summed up as follows: firstly, calling upon Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); secondly, calling upon Israel to subject all its nuclear activities to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and, thirdly, Israel should desist from developing, producing or testing nuclear weapons, or acquiring them in any other way, and also desist from introducing any nuclear weapons or devices into Israel or the territories under its occupation.
As for the African continent, the development of a nuclear capability by the South African racist régime also threatens international peace and security. We believe that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964, would represent an important measure in ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthening international peace and security. The activities of South Africa in the nuclear field, like all its other aggressive activities, ultimately seek to perpetuate and entrench its policy of apartheid through the development of suppressive and aggressive capabilities in an attempt to frustrate the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the African continent in general and the peoples of South Africa and Namibia in particular.

While reaffirming our condemnation of the South African régime for having acquired nuclear capability, we call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain totally from collaborating with the racist régime until it has acceded to the Non-Proliferation-Treaty and declared publicly that it will not develop, test, manufacture or acquire any nuclear weapons and until it has accepted the comprehensive safeguards of the IAEA and subjected all its nuclear facilities to such safeguards.

We deem it necessary to promote co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an important element in the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. In this connection the important question of acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and easing restrictions for such acquisition helps to extend the benefits of nuclear energy to developing countries and to meet the needs of these countries for such energy in order to alleviate their problems in the field of development. In the meantime, we express deep concern at the fact that, under the pretext of co-operation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, certain Western countries are providing the two racist régimes in South Africa and Israel with the necessary technology to help these régimes develop a capability to manufacture and produce nuclear weapons, when these countries are refusing to co-operate with certain States that are subjecting their peaceful nuclear facilities to the safeguards of the IAEA.
In the light of the 1981 Israeli attack against Iraqi nuclear installations subject to IAEA safeguards, and in the light of continued Israeli threats to repeat such attacks, it has become apparent that there is a need to protect nuclear installations. That issue should be given due attention so that it will be possible to arrive at the measures necessary to prevent the repetition of such serious acts of aggression.

As a littoral State of the Indian Ocean, Democratic Yemen is deeply concerned at the increasing threats and grave developments in the Indian Ocean region. We are concerned too at the exacerbation of tension owing to a stepped up and expanded United States military presence in the area, leading to the intensification of the arms race in the region and undermining peace and security there and throughout the world.

That concern is all the greater because of recent reports concerning the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Indian Ocean region. We reaffirm our belief that the adoption of concrete measures to secure the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would make a significant contribution to eliminating the danger facing the region and would improve the chances for peace and stability in the area. In that context, we hope that the Conference on the Indian Ocean will take place during the first half of 1986, as decided at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. We reject all the attempts to postpone the Conference again and to hamper its work, made by the same circles which attempted to hamper the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and to prevent it from completing its preparatory work for the Conference by exploiting the issue of consensus to achieve their objectives counter to the desire and will of the majority of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee. We believe that
the Conference on the Indian Ocean constitutes a necessary practical measure to ensure the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

We call for the resumption of constructive efforts, through the exercise of political will, to achieve the objectives of that Declaration.

We have great hopes and expectations that at this fortieth session the General Assembly will adopt substantive measures to achieve the goals for which we are meeting. That is a common responsibility requiring a concerted effort. Hesitation in facing up to the dangers besetting us and threatening the very existence of mankind will serve the interests of no State. It will, on the contrary, lead to negative results, and we shall witness a nuclear catastrophe in which mankind and its civilization will be threatened with annihilation.

The existence of the equivalent of 1 million Hiroshima bombs, increased military spending, the proliferation and qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arsenals, and plans to militarize outer space force us to reassess the present situation and to adopt measures to achieve our peoples' aspiration to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and in such a way as to lead to prosperity and advancement for all.

Mr. TURKMEN (Turkey): Let me, first, express our congratulations to the Chairman, Ambassador Alatas, and to you, Sir, and the other officers of the First Committee.

The important statements we heard from world leaders during the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations unanimously reflected the deep concern over the continuation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, over its possible acceleration and expansion to new areas, and over the tremendous cost of armaments to the detriment of economic and social development.
(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

The fortieth year of the United Nations is an appropriate landmark at which to make a fresh effort gradually to change this trend. The ever-growing nuclear threat and the awesome proportions of the arms race make determined efforts and urgent progress imperative.

In recent years, the mood of insecurity, fed by a general lack of confidence as well as by actions which have compounded mistrust in the international field, has cast a dark shadow over international relations and has severely restricted the chances of genuine disarmament efforts. It has become clear that a more constructive and stable East-West relationship is the key to an improved international atmosphere. This has to be coupled with a serious search for a military balance at the lowest possible level of forces. There should be meaningful progress in checking nuclear confrontation, and the arms race should not be extended to new areas.

It is in that light that we have welcomed the negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on their strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons and on defence and space systems. The scope of those negotiations is wide. It encompasses all the main elements of the East-West military balance, and its purpose is well defined in the agreement of 8 January 1985. The objective of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening stability has the unanimous and strong support of the international community. We consider the submission of new Soviet proposals for a reduction of nuclear arsenals to be of great significance. Now that both sides have submitted their respective proposals, we hope that they will soon be prepared to proceed to work out effective agreements in the three areas under discussion. Progress in these negotiations will have a positive impact on the stability of international relations, and will make progress in related areas, on a wider scale, a possibility.
The nuclear Powers of the world, and in particular the two super-Powers, have assumed responsibilities relating directly to the interests of the international community as a whole and to the fate and future of mankind. The whole world expects a greater spirit of accommodation to prevail and a better understanding evolve between the United States and the Soviet Union at the forthcoming summit meeting. We hope the summit will lead the way to concrete steps in the field of the reduction of nuclear armaments, bringing the strategic balance to a much lower level.

We share the concern overwhelmingly expressed here at the prospect of an arms race in outer space. We hope that this issue too will be tackled constructively in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Outer space should be preserved as a domain for peaceful research, exploration and use for the benefit of all countries. The questions that have arisen with regard to the relationship between offensive systems and the possibility of new defence technologies should, in our view, be the subject of serious negotiations.
In the multilateral context of the Conference on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should also proceed with the examination of the multilateral aspects of this question.

Since last year we have noted with caution that there seems to be the beginning of a new momentum to disarmament. In this regard, we have welcomed the successful conclusion of the Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the adoption by consensus of a substantial Final Declaration. This result underlines the strong support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. We hope that all countries that have not yet done so will adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and we fully endorse the call for an early negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Progress on other aspects of arms limitation and disarmament, at both the global and regional level through balanced and verifiable agreements, is required to enhance collective security.

In the global context, a world-wide comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons represents a very urgent task, particularly in view of the proliferation and use of these weapons. In the Conference on Disarmament, progress towards a convention on chemical weapons has remained limited. There is an urgent need to intensify negotiations in this area in order to resolve present difficulties.

On the regional level the two sets of negotiations in Vienna and Stockholm on mutual and balanced force reductions and on confidence and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe are of an importance exceeding the bounds of the continent itself. Concrete progress in both forums could contribute to greater international stability and security by reducing the risk of military confrontation.
in Europe. Militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence and security-building measures to be agreed on in Stockholm could open the way to more extensive measures.

With regard to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, I should like to reiterate our view that we continue to regard this in principle as a measure that is applicable to certain parts of the world and could contribute to non-proliferation. We believe that, beside the reliability of relationships within a contemplated zone, the particular geographic, political and military characteristics of both such zones and adjacent areas play a significant role in determining their possible benefits. We welcome the conclusion of the Treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in the South East Pacific and hope that this Treaty will respond to the basic expectations of the countries of the region.

Finally, I should like to express our interest in the ongoing examination of the relationship between disarmament and development. The significance of a possible reallocation of resources from the military sector to economic and social development efforts is obvious. Despite the indispensable basic value of establishing such a link, we recognize that this will require a major effort of reorientation in the approach to disarmament. We have noted the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and we hope that the international conference next summer will contribute to a better understanding in this area of fundamental importance for the future.

The CHAIRMAN ((interpretation from French): I have received a request from the representative of Israel to exercise his right of reply.

I should like to remind representatives that the procedure in this respect
allows only two statements, the first of which is limited to 10 minutes and the second to 5 minutes duration.

I now call on the representative of Israel.

Mr. ISSACHAROFF (Israel): I regret at this stage having to exercise my right of reply as I do not wish to become engaged in a polemical debate. I do, however, feel obliged to relate to the Syrian representative's statement this morning in which he levelled at my country various unfounded allegations.

First, I should like to emphasize that Israel's consistent support for the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is a matter of record in the various bodies of the United Nations. The Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, on 2 October 1985 reiterated in the General Assembly Israel's support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East based on direct and free negotiations between the States concerned. He also indicated Israel's willingness to initiate such negotiations without delay or preconditions. Israel has in addition joined the consensus on this item in the First Committee in recent years.

Secondly, I take great exception to the Syrian representative's referring to my country in the terms in which he did. Israel has consistently denounced racism and apartheid at all times and in all international forums. This is only natural, as the Jewish people are a people who have suffered more from murderous racism than any other people. As the representative of Syria has chosen to refer to Israel in the way in which he did, I wish to bring to the attention of the other representatives page A 3 of today's The New York Times which quotes the West German magazine Bunte in its interview with the infamous nazi war criminal Alois Brunner, who has resided in Syria for the last three decades and who until recently was "a close security" adviser to Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of President al-Assad of
(Mr. Issacharoff, Israel)

Syria*. Brunner is a former SS officer, a one-time assistant to Adolph Eichmann and "is held responsible for sending more than 120,000 Austrian, German, French, Slovak and Czech Jews to nazi death camps". I would therefore suggest to the Syrian representative that he would do well to examine racism in his own country before he begins falsely accusing others of this despicable practice.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.