GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Statements were made by:

Mr. van Schaik (Netherlands)
Mr. Lacleta (Spain)
Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria)
Mr. Minko-mi-Endamne (Gabon)
Mr. Fonseca (Angola)
The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69 AND 145 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): We have been asked not to spend time on flattering opening statements addressed to you, Mr. Chairman, and to other officers of the Committee and I shall respect that wish. I should just like to say that your efforts towards greater effectiveness in our proceedings, as illustrated by that request, are in our view evidence of your able chairmanship, in which we have full confidence.

Last week, my colleague Ambassador van der Stoel spoke here on behalf of the 10 countries of the European Community, as well as Portugal and Spain. It goes without saying that I fully endorse the views he expressed.

The United Nations is 40 years old: the question has already been raised as to whether the Organization is undergoing a mid-life crisis. What could such a notion, so fashionable these days, mean for the United Nations? My delegation would certainly not interpret it as meaning that the Organization has at most another 40 years to live. The Netherlands hopes and trusts that the United Nations - which is now already much older than its predecessor, the League of Nations - has the potential to live much longer.

But the comparison is apt in the sense that the United Nations has, with various ups and downs, reached a mature age - an age at which traits do not change easily. It has accomplished a great deal in its life up to now but it must ask itself some serious and troublesome questions regarding its functioning in the next decades.
(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

We do not disagree with those who argue that the United Nations is going through a crisis. But it is a sign of vitality that the Organization is asking itself some penetrating questions on how to remedy that situation. We commend the Secretary-General for the candour with which he approaches these problems, to which his annual reports, including this year's report, bear witness.

Addressing the General Assembly on 25 September, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. van den Broek, said:

"As for this Organization, I continue to believe that it has the capacity and the resilience to do better than its predecessor ... which gradually receded to the background while history ran its disastrous course. This Organization is better equipped to solve many of the major questions besetting the world than the League of Nations ever was." (A/40/PV.9, pp. 99-100)

So we have the equipment. The question is how to use it properly. In addressing that question, the Minister recommended a radical reduction of the number of resolutions, a restoration of the process of real negotiations on draft resolutions, the search for long-term progress instead of short-term advantage, and the translation of words into action once a truly negotiated resolution has been adopted.

In this context, I wish to make the suggestion, of special relevance to this Committee, that delegations, in the process of drafting a resolution, endeavour more than has been the practice, to approach not only colleagues in their own caucus but also, and at an early stage, those outside their own group. I am under no illusion that early consultations with a broader group of countries will always enable delegations to align different views, but I am convinced that on a number of subjects differences can be narrowed.
All of us would like to see one or more gigantic leaps forward in the direction of general disarmament, but I think this Assembly could already be proud if a few really meaningful small steps forward could be taken. Those small steps are necessary to improve the international climate, which in itself is a condition if large leaps are to be ventured. Rhetoric and polemical statements do not foster such a climate. I am glad to note that in this general debate many delegations have shown restraint in that respect.
(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

The principles of the United Nations Charter have lost nothing of their validity or their importance since they were drafted 40 years ago. I am thinking in particular of the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. If all States abided by those principles the world would be a better place to live in. As the Secretary-General says in his 1985 report:

"Forty years ago, with the lessons of the disastrous period leading up to the Second World War still vividly in mind, it was concluded that the old idea of achieving national security through a competitive armaments race led only to increasing general insecurity." (A/40/1, p.5)

As the Secretary-General says, the replacement of such a situation by a collective system of international peace and security has not been realized.

On the basis of political developments in Europe after the Second World War, the Netherlands, together with its allies, concluded that the fundamental values they stood for could best be protected by the foundation of a collective defence organization. The latter's charter is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter - the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence - and starts with the reaffirmation of faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Its strictly defensive nature has been repeated time and again, as in the Bonn Declaration of 1982, which states:

"None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack."

Solemn declarations of States deserve our careful attention. We welcome the following statement by General Secretary Gorbachev in his recent interview in Time magazine: "War will not come from the Soviet Union; we will never start a war." I should like to add, however, that the defensive nature of an alliance follows not only from its declarations but also from the military structure of the combined forces of that alliance.
(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the composition of its military forces leaves no doubt as to the intentions of the alliance and its incapacity to engage in military activities other than in its own defence.

For the Netherlands, one of the most important considerations regarding its security policy is that Western Europe is confronted with superiority in intermediate-range nuclear missiles, not to mention a continuing build-up of chemical and conventional weapons.

Since 1977 we have witnessed a substantial deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles by the Soviet Union. Those SS-20 missiles, in particular owing to their triple-warhead MIRVed character, pose an increased threat to targets in Western Europe. The Soviet Union has had a monopoly in this category of nuclear weapons for decades, but the SS-20s have been introduced in strategically completely different circumstances from those under which an earlier generation had been deployed. Indeed, in the mid-1970s, when the Soviet Union started deploying a new generation of intermediate-range missiles, it had already surpassed the United States in numbers of intercontinental missiles, as is evident from the provisions of the SALT I Treaty. The renewal and extension of the Soviet monopoly in land-based intermediate-range missiles caused the Western Alliance to take its so-called double-track decision of 1979.

On this issue the Netherlands has taken a position of the utmost restraint. In June 1984 we made a strong appeal to the Soviet Union to reverse the trend of an ever-increasing build-up of SS-20 missiles in that country, in which case we would be prepared to forgo deployment of intermediate-range missiles on our territory. Unfortunately, our participation in intermediate-range missile deployment now seems to be becoming inevitable, as our appeal has remained unheeded.

As regards the recent statement by Mr. Gorbachev, in Paris, concerning SS-20 deployment, I should like for the sake of clarity to reiterate the position of the North Atlantic Alliance, as also reflected in last year's decision by the Government
of the Netherlands that the threat posed by the entire mobile SS-20 force, which now totals 441 launchers, is indivisible. Therefore any agreement must bear on all SS-20s deployed by the Soviet Union.

The apparent recognition by the Soviet Union that British and French forces are not a topic for discussion in the bilateral United States/Soviet negotiations is in our view a welcome step which should improve the prospect of a separate intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement. My Government continues to uphold the view that in principle all armaments must eventually be made subject to arms control.

With others, we underline the great importance of the fact that new bilateral negotiations have started between the United States and the Soviet Union not only on intermediate-range nuclear weapons but also on strategic and space weapons. The proposals submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union for substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals seem to provide a potentially fruitful basis for concrete negotiations.

Ambassador van der Stoel, speaking on behalf of the Ten and Portugal and Spain on 17 October, mentioned the importance those countries attach to the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. We are pleased to note that last week delegations agreed in Stockholm on a structure for informal meetings. That opens the door to real, specific and concrete negotiations. As regards the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Vienna, I wish to endorse what my colleague Mr van der Stoel said.

I have been speaking about nuclear weapons because, as we all know, those are the most worrisome. This is not to belittle the risks posed by conventional weapons. Those are weapons that pose a very real threat and daily take the lives of soldiers and civilians, particularly in the third world. We consider it important that in this Committee more attention is being paid to conventional armaments.
I have been speaking in particular about the role of the two major Powers because, as so many have said, it is upon them that the main responsibility for curbing the nuclear arms race falls. In saying this, we do not wish to belittle the role of the United Nations and our First Committee. On the contrary, the General Assembly of the United Nations has been wrestling with the problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, from its very first day and its very first resolution.
At the eighth meeting of the General Assembly, in January 1946, the Prime
Minister of the Netherlands, the late Willem Schermerhorn, said:

"The secret of the explosive release of atomic energy is at present known
to a few Powers only, but it is certain that within a short time many other
Powers - small Powers included - will be the masters of the same - and perhaps
worse - possibilities."

And he warned that

"There are many who seem to believe that the frightful prospect of mass
annihilation by means of the explosive release of atomic energy is the true
stimulus for making the United Nations a success. It seems to me that those
who reason along these lines are allowing themselves to be led by fear, and
that this spirit will not be found capable of producing the spiritual forces
which are needed to create or restore healthy international relations."

(Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Plenary Meeting, p. 132)

The General Assembly was not led by fear but by reasoned concern when it
adopted its first resolutions on the prevention of the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons, among which the much-quoted resolution introduced by the Irish
delegation and adopted by consensus in 1961. Now, in 1985, after the successfully
concluded Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we can better discern the foresight
that inspired those proposals. The Review Conference again showed the
determination of the large majority of the world community to stop the further
dissemination of nuclear weapons and thereby strengthen global peace and security;
to freeze, as a first step, the number of nuclear-weapon States at five - the 1967
level - and thereafter to strive for nuclear disarmament.

The reaffirmation of the value of the Non-Proliferation Treaty through the
adoption by consensus of a substantive final document is for my country reason for
great satisfaction. In a co-operative atmosphere the values and shortcomings of
the Treaty could be discussed frankly and thoroughly. The Conference was of the
view that the objectives of the first two articles of the Treaty — those forbidding
Parties to transfer or to receive nuclear weapons — had been achieved. The
Conference also affirmed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty fostered the world-wide
peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it requested Parties to promote the further
implementation of article IV, thereby giving preferential treatment to
non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The Conference stressed that the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards were essential for the
prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Also, it recommended the
consideration of the separation of the civil and the military facilities in the
nuclear-weapon States in order to promote equal treatment of all Parties.

The Netherlands welcomes the clear recommendation to establish an
internationally agreed effective system of international plutonium storage, because
we are convinced that special measures are required for future stocks of plutonium
in view of their potential as bomb material.

Notwithstanding the substantial achievements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
its implementation falls, in some respects, short of what may have been expected 15
years ago. This is especially so in relation to article VI. Not for the first
time, the central issue at this Conference too turned out to be the need for a
comprehensive test ban. Indeed, the Netherlands strongly regrets that a
comprehensive test ban has not yet been concluded, and we would welcome an early
resumption of the trilateral negotiations parallel to the ongoing bilateral
negotiations on deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. Both negotiations have high
priority.
In the meantime, the Netherlands considers the Soviet declaration concerning a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests a positive, though limited, step forward. But why not at the same time accept the United States invitation for yield verification on the spot, with a view to paving the way to a solution of problems of verification of nuclear tests? The Netherlands for its part will continue to make its contribution to improving the global capabilities of a seismic network. The international community can establish a useful and indispensable monitoring system, whatever the nuclear-weapon States arrange among themselves with respect to verification modalities.

From the viewpoint of regional non-proliferation, the notion of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas where nuclear weapons have not yet been introduced is of great importance. In May the Netherlands attended, as a Party to Protocol I, the General Conference of Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That meeting concluded in good harmony and reaffirmed the value of the Treaty. It would be a great achievement if, before the end of the Second Disarmament Decade, the Treaty fully entered into force.

The Netherlands is satisfied to note that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is no longer unique of its kind. Indeed, we welcome the establishment of the South Pacific nuclear-free zone. We commend the drafters of that treaty also for their flexibility, as expressed in the additional protocols to the treaty. We hope that subsequent talks will allow this new treaty gradually to gain in value.

As to nuclear items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, we regret that in the Conference no progress could be made on the subject, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". We understand that various proposals for a flexible set up for exploratory discussions were not that far apart. In view of the potentially global consequences of the nuclear-arms race, there should, in
our opinion, be room for structured multilateral consultations and discussions. The Conference on Disarmament can play a role, be it perhaps modest. It is too early to say now where discussions will lead us, but it would at least be useful to clarify the different views and positions.

Like prevention of nuclear war, the challenge of preventing an arms race in outer space is of global dimension. Mankind is at the threshold of an entirely new phase in the arms race. Technology develops at an extremely rapid rate. These technological developments have to be watched as closely as possible because of their political and military implications. The Netherlands attaches the utmost importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
As I said, we welcome the bilateral negotiations between the major space Powers – the United States and the Soviet Union. But we are also satisfied that this year it was possible to start substantial work on outer space in the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that next year the Ad Hoc Committee will be in a position to continue its work without delay.

In discussing issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Netherlands considers it important to keep in mind the time-scale within which developments could take shape. Priority in time should be given to anti-satellite weapons that can pose a threat to those satellites that have a stabilizing function. Efforts should be pragmatic because of the difficulties with adequate verification and the technical complexities of ASAT arms control. Verifiable limitations in combination with possible confidence-building measures seem to be called for in the future, so as to make anti-satellite warfare hardly an effective military option.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the intensive research efforts going on in the field of ballistic missile defence, including space-based systems. We agree that research within the strict limits of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty is appropriate. But if carried beyond the present stage of research, those efforts could in the next decades have far-reaching implications for arms control and stability. A conclusive analysis of the political and strategic implications of current research programmes at this stage would be premature. Continuing bilateral and multilateral discussions on these complicated matters are necessary. In any case, stability should not be undermined but enhanced.

The Netherlands does not believe that we should strive for total demilitarization of outer space. Many of the military satellites that are currently in outer space are not threatening peace, but are designed to prevent war. No useful purpose is served by prohibiting them. Instead, we think that
efforts should be directed at preventing those satellites from becoming an early target in case a war breaks out. We do not believe that such military use of outer space in any way prevents the peaceful use of outer space, as the Soviet Union seems to imply in its draft resolution.

Last but certainly not least amongst the topics of the Conference on Disarmament, I shall deal with chemical weapons. During the summer session, some useful progress was made in the work on a chemical weapons. That sounds reassuring, but it is not. From the end of the First World War until our time, chemical weapons have been used only on a limited scale. It is not difficult to explain why, but it would be a grave mistake to assume on that basis that the use of chemical weapons will be equally restrained in future. Recent events have indeed reminded us of the dreadful potential of chemical weapons. Political barriers against the use of chemical weapons have been eroding over the last decade. Technological developments and the spread of scientific know-how lower the threshold for acquiring chemical weapons considerably.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical weapons remains valuable, but it is not in itself sufficient. The time for reaching agreement on the conclusion of a chemical-weapon treaty banning the possession, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons is shorter than many of us think. In the years to come, an increasing number of countries may possess chemical weapons. This brings me to the suggestion recently made by the delegation of the Soviet Union to participate in formulating an international agreement on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. The sense of urgency to cope effectively with the danger of a further world-wide spread of the possession of chemical weapons in the years to come - a concern that seems to lie behind the Soviet suggestion - is fully shared by my delegation. However, in our view negotiations on the establishment of a non-proliferation treaty for chemical weapons do not seem to provide us with the
appropriate response to this concern. We should rather focus our attention on the conclusion of a comprehensive convention that will completely ban chemical weapons for all time. A substantial amount of work on this convention has already been done. Pending the conclusion of that convention, the Netherlands, jointly with other countries, has taken steps to co-ordinate export-control of certain compounds that could be abused for the production of chemical weapons. We call upon countries that have not yet done so to pursue a similar course.

We think the work on banning chemical weapons in all countries should be addressed with a greater sense of urgency. We have repeatedly stressed that negotiations should not be halted in the period during which the General Assembly is in session. We are happy that our pleas have led to the informal consultations that have just been concluded in Geneva. But we are convinced that such additional informal meetings still fall short of what is needed and we hope that next spring the Conference on Disarmament will discuss other formulas assuring a more rational use of time. We are convinced that following those more rational procedures the indeed still substantial difficulties that at present block the road to a chemical-weapon treaty can be resolved within a reasonable time span. But those negotiations should be buttressed by the firm political will of Governments permitting delegations to show a greater flexibility at the negotiating table.

Over the years the Netherlands has defended the position that a chemical-weapon treaty should provide for a good definition of the scope of the ban and for an effective system of verification and should allow for an adequate system of protection measures. We should not become prisoners of perfection. An effective verification system means a system that gives a reasonable assurance, a system that does not necessarily detect every production or diversion but does detect any militarily significant diversion or production and thereby constitutes a credible deterrence against violations of the treaty.
Not every disarmament treaty needs elaborate verification procedures. We are, for instance, not convinced of the need for elaborate verification provisions in a so-called traditional radiological-weapon treaty, even if it is always sensible explicitly to keep open the option of future elaboration of such provisions.

Verification remains a key concept in any militarily significant arms control and disarmament treaty, because parties must be assured that the others honour their treaty obligations; otherwise, treaties may be liable to create distrust rather than generate mutual trust. Differences about verification requirements are therefore the core of disarmament negotiations.

Views about verification may be intimately linked with the character of the society one lives in. Representatives of countries with more open societies will tend to demand a more elaborate verification régime than those of countries with less open societies. But countries should, in common, address the question what is necessary and what is sufficient for the purpose of verification of compliance with treaty obligations. Answers are not always evident. For the purpose of a chemical-weapon treaty, we could perhaps learn on various points from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I mention as examples the structure of an inspectorate and the rights and obligations of inspectors, the verification of non-production and the procedures to be followed for the inspection of declared production facilities. However, the handling of undeclared facilities and stocks is essentially different in the context of a chemical-weapon treaty. Therefore, an effective challenge inspection system will be a necessary element in verifying a comprehensive chemical-weapon ban.

Adequate verification, as well as greater transparency and openness in military affairs, can reduce mutual distrust. Therefore we welcome as a small but perhaps significant step the fact that this year for the first time Romania has given a certain insight into its military expenditures.
I close my statement by expressing the sincere hope of my delegation that at this session we shall succeed in dissipating some mutual distrust among delegations. I hope that we shall demonstrate the openness that the United States delegation asked for this morning and that together we shall be able to take some small steps forward. Thus we can make our modest contribution to the climate in which important negotiations elsewhere can prosper.

Mr. LACLETA (Spain)(interpretation from Spanish): First of all, since this is the first time that I have spoken in this Committee, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and the other officers of the Committee on your election to your responsible posts. I am confident that, under your wise leadership and if everyone makes a major effort, the First Committee will make progress, without forgetting that we shall have to operate efficiently if we are to meet the demands of this fortieth session of the General Assembly, which is a milestone in the life of the United Nations.

As I speak in this Committee, I cannot fail to recall that a few weeks ago, on 28 September, the Head of the Spanish Government stated in the plenary General Assembly that the arms race constitutes one of the three major problems - the others being violations of human rights and the international economic crisis - facing today's world and, consequently, our Organization.

Perhaps this brief reminder is enough to indicate the Spanish delegation's interest in the subject of our debate and the efforts being made in the United Nations and in various other international forums to reach agreements designed to halt the arms race and promote balanced and verifiable disarmament that would provide an equal degree of common, shared security for all States at the lowest possible level of armaments.
We are well aware of the fact that the day is still far off when trust among States, the peaceful settlement of international disputes and effective machinery for collective security will make national arsenals unnecessary. But that does not mean we should abandon efforts to reduce the present absurdly high level of those arsenals and the needless waste of human and material resources aimed at achieving "security through competition", which could of course be replaced by "agreed, balanced and verifiable security".

When I began my statement in this Committee last year I spoke of the encouraging indications that the two States which bear the greatest responsibility in this area – because they are the ones with the greatest military resources, including enormous nuclear arsenals – might resume a dialogue aimed at ending their competition. Now we can only welcome the resumption of that dialogue, the results of which will undoubtedly be of great importance not just for those two States but for us all. Thus, we should all support and encourage, cautiously but hopefully, the continuance of those talks in the hope that they will lead to balanced agreements on the three subjects contained in the agreement of 8 January 1985.

We hope that the proposals that the two parties have presented or will present in the course of those talks will be considered in a genuine spirit of negotiation. Of course, the mere fact that a constructive dialogue is taking place between the major Powers will increase everyone's confidence and sense of security.
(Mr. Lacleta, Spain)

However, the problem of nuclear weapons is not the only one that should command our attention. The destabilizing effect of the continuing increase in conventional weapons has also greatly contributed to local and regional crises. The limitation and balanced reduction of conventional weapons - not only those of the major Powers but also those of all States - is an essential element in a balanced set of disarmament measures.

For this reason, nobody should be surprised that the Spanish Government is particularly interested in efforts being made on the African continent and also in Latin America aimed at reducing conventional weapons. In our opinion, efforts being made at a regional level are not incompatible with those that have already been made or will be made at a global level, and we support them decisively and in all forums.

The lack of success of efforts to bring about a reduction - balanced in its results - in the level of conventional weapons, including those of the nuclear-weapon Powers, is an obvious obstacle to efforts being made in the area of nuclear disarmament. As the Government of Spain indicated in its reply to the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/40/498, Spain, which is a country trying to prevent all forms of war, attaches particular importance to the negotiation of agreements for the reduction of arms, both nuclear and conventional, to the lowest level possible, in a gradual and balanced manner without jeopardizing the security of the States concerned. Any effort to prevent war - any form of war, including nuclear war - must have an impact on all questions pertaining to arms control as a whole.

I shall not dwell on the views that my Government shares with the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Portugal on such matters as the prevention of the arms race including the arms race in outer space. These views were presented on 17 October, on our behalf, by the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands.
(Mr. Lacleta, Spain)

But we should like to stress that, in our opinion, it is possible to divert the considerable resources which are at present invested in nuclear and conventional weapons - which we all hope will become useless - to other more productive purposes, and especially to promote international co-operation for development. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which is to be held next year, will clearly contribute to this objective. My delegation, which already participates in the Preparatory Committee for that Conference, is prepared to make major efforts along these lines.

Of course, it is not just a question of demonstrating the economic benefits that could be derived from broad and balanced disarmament. The study on concepts of security prepared by a group of experts under the auspices of the Secretary-General, distributed as document A/40/553, shows that a policy of security cannot be based exclusively on military might and narrow national interests but must be balanced by means of a radical improvement in international confidence, international co-operation and détente, as well as by complete respect for and compliance with existing agreements on arms control and the prohibition of certain types of weapons or means of combat.

I should like to stress here that Spain also agrees with many other countries which have expressed concern about the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have accepted the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for all our nuclear installations, all of which are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. I am pleased once again to state that my Government supports the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and notes with satisfaction that the articles of that Treaty which specify the obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon Powers have been successfully applied by States, including those which are not parties to the Treaty. On the other hand, we must express our
concern that other States are approaching the nuclear threshold, that the nuclear-weapon Powers are not applying article 6 of that Treaty satisfactorily, and that there has not been universal acceptance of the IAEA safeguards system.

Spain is a denuclearized country by decision of its Parliament, and consequently nuclear disarmament is a declared objective of the Spanish Government. For that reason we are also very much in favour of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. We regret that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has not made significant progress towards this goal. On the other hand, we fully share the view of those who believe that in this area, as in many others pertaining to disarmament, the existence of generally accepted and sufficiently reliable machinery and verification procedures is indispensable if we are to make progress on solutions to substantive issues. In this context we have taken note with great interest of the documents presented in Geneva by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany on the possibility of establishing a seismological detection network which might in future permit adequate verification of an agreement prohibiting underground experimental nuclear explosions. My country is prepared to co-operate fully in this area and we are trying to determine how best we can contribute to the study and installation of a seismological detection system. We hope that the working group responsible for this study will continue its work during the next session of the Conference on Disarmament.

We should like to add a few words about the work of the Conference on Disarmament aimed at preparing a draft convention prohibiting not only the use - which is already prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 - but also the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. My country, like others represented here, does not manufacture chemical weapons at the present time. For that reason, no one should be surprised at the great interest we display
in this draft convention. Progress has been slow, but the general outline of this future convention can already be made out, although there are a number of difficult problems that remain to be resolved, the foremost of which might well be the preparation of the lists of substances whose production will be prohibited or strictly regulated, together with the inseparable problems of verification of compliance.
At the present time I shall confine myself to saying that, in the opinion of my delegation, we cannot agree that efforts to bring about a complete ban should be converted into a selective ban covering only certain weapons, nor do we want a complete ban to be replaced by non-proliferation machinery. Nor do we not agree with solutions that concern only narrow geographical zones. We realize that a major effort has to be made. Serious difficulties will have to be overcome, but in order to eliminate chemical weapons completely a major effort deserves to be made and we should by no means be satisfied with partial solutions.

Before concluding, I wish to state that arms control is not sufficient to achieve the objectives of a just, peaceful and stable international society. We must also promote confidence, for confidence and security mutually strengthen each other and form the basis for progress in disarmament agreements. The mandate given by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures with respect to disarmament in Europe is very important. Détente does not lie exclusively with arms control; it depends on a drastic improvement in international confidence. We hope that the confidence-building and security measures to be adopted by the Stockholm Conference will be an appropriate expression of the unavoidable obligation not to use force in international relations.

It is only by determined complementary efforts in all these areas, including efforts to strengthen the role of this Organization, which is 40 years old this year, and only by perfecting the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes and collective security within the context of this Organization will it be possible for us one day to achieve the ambitious objectives being pursued by the United Nations and its Members.
Mr. TSVETKOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): As members know, on 22 and 23 October a meeting of the Advisory Political Committee of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty was held in Sofia. As representative of the host country, I should like to inform members of the contents of the Declaration that was unanimously adopted by the Sofia Summit, entitled "To eliminate the nuclear threat and to bring about a positive reversal of the situation in Europe and throughout the world".

The highest leaders of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Poland, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of Hungary and the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia studied in detail the situation in Europe and exchanged views on the key problems pertaining to international relations as a whole, while paying specific attention to the fundamental tasks involved in putting an end to the nuclear threat and in strengthening peace.

The Summit meeting carried out a detailed analysis of the international situation, whose developments and present stage were assessed in objective terms as follows.

International tension has increased seriously in the course of recent years. The world has drawn closer to the point where events may turn out to be beyond control.

The arms race has been proceeding at a staggering pace. The deployment of medium-range American missiles in many countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Western Europe has created a new dangerous situation on the continent and has induced the Soviet Union and certain socialist countries to take countermeasures.
A state of serious concern resulted from the possible threat of the arms race being extended to outer space, a situation which might well lead to a destabilization of the global strategic situation and to converting space into a new source of mortal danger for mankind.

The Declaration gives a clear reply to the question as to the underlying causes of the increase in tension and the threat of war. They are to be found in the policies of imperialism, particularly the policies of the United States, which has not concealed its desire for military superiority and to impose its will on other countries and peoples.

In contrast to that policy, the socialist countries reaffirm that they will never sacrifice the security of their peoples. They are not seeking to achieve military superiority, they will at the same time not allow military superiority to be imposed on them. They are resolutely opposed to the arms race and to its escalation and advocate a balance of forces at the lowest possible level.

The main purpose of their policy is, as it has always been, to remove the danger of a nuclear war, to reduce the level of military confrontation, and to promote the spirit of peaceful coexistence and détente in international relations.

The Declaration goes on to reiterate the fundamental positions of principle of the parties, namely, "that ideological differences should not impose themselves on international relations, thus undermining their stability, and that today, more than ever intensive interaction is essential among all States and among all forces that favour normalizing the international situation". That is a purpose of the vast majority of the proposals that have been put forward by the States members of the Warsaw Treaty as well as other peace-loving countries. Political dialogue among States with differing social systems, declarations made by realistic circles, actions of the anti-militarist movements and all peace-loving forces have indicated
that a return to détente and its extension to all spheres of international relations and a decisive breakthrough to a state of stable security and co-operation are quite within reach accessible.

The member States are convinced that in order to achieve such a breakthrough, the policy of force and confrontation must be ended. All States should strictly observe the principles of respect for independence and national sovereignty, the non-use of force or the threat of force, the inviolability of boundaries and of territorial integrity, of the peaceful settlement of disputes, of non-interference in internal affairs, of equality as well as the other norms which are generally recognized in international relations, and they should rule out all campaigns of defamation which seek to distort the situation in the country or its policies. Nothing can warrant interference in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples or the policy of State terrorism. No one should tamper with the sovereign right of every people to live and to work within the socio-political system that it has freely chosen.
The authors of the declaration have emphasized that what is needed to bring about this decisive change in international relations is a new political approach geared to the realities of the present day, as well as mutual dissuasion. Urgent steps are required capable of halting the arms race and preventing it from extending into outer space, in order to bring about a drastic reduction of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons.

Referring to the major importance of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, the participants at the meeting expressed their total support for the constructive attitude of the Soviet Union which is based on a practical solution designed to prevent the arms race from extending into outer space and to stop it on Earth, and also its new initiative towards an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States for a total ban on space strike weapons and for a drastic 50 per cent reduction in nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the other side.

The leaders of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty also felt that the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting should help to defuse the present dangerous tension in the world, to reduce the risk of war and make for mutually acceptable solutions aimed at stopping the arms race and at achieving genuine progress towards disarmament.

In this context, major importance is attached to the question of eliminating the nuclear danger, to the need to reverse the present dangerous course of events and to reduce military confrontation in Europe. The parties reaffirmed their conviction that European security, like international security as a whole, cannot be achieved through war and military power. In Europe a stable peace can only be achieved through détente, disarmament, the strengthening of confidence and the development of international co-operation.
The deployment of nuclear arms on the European continent must be stopped and steps should be taken to reduce them. The States signatories of the Warsaw Treaty want the continent to be totally freed from nuclear weapons, both intermediate range and tactical.

I should like particularly to emphasize the position taken by our countries on this specific point:

"The achievement of a separate pertinent agreement without a direct link to the problems of space and strategic weapons, would be an extremely important step conducive to more understanding on a speedier mutual reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe."

Hence the exceptional importance of the unilateral Soviet initiatives taken in a show of good will, such as the moratorium on the installation of medium-range Soviet missiles in Europe and the de-alerting of the additional Soviet SS-20 missiles which had been installed in the European part of the Soviet Union in response to the deployment of medium-range American missiles in Europe, becomes clear.

The declaration also brings out the importance at the present time of joint efforts on the part of all the States on the continent, particularly those belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty, towards reducing and eliminating nuclear arms in Europe, ensuring the success of negotiations on these problems, and avoiding nuclear war. The States on whose territories the deployment of medium-range missiles has been undertaken or is envisaged bear a great measure of responsibility for the fate of peace in Europe and throughout the world.
The Sofia summit meeting gave its full support to initiatives to establish nuclear-free zones in different parts of the European continent, particularly in northern Europe and the Balkans, as well as a denuclearized corridor in central Europe, along the demarcation line between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

Members of the Warsaw Treaty have reaffirmed the validity of their proposals to undertake direct negotiations with the NATO countries in order to conclude an agreement on the mutual non-use of military force and the preservation of peaceful relations; the non-increase and reduction of military expenditure; and the exemption of Europe from chemical weapons.

The validity of the proposal made by the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia on the creation in central Europe of a zone free from chemical weapons was also reaffirmed.

The States signatories of the Warsaw Treaty advocated a speedy and successful outcome to the negotiations in Vienna on the mutual reduction of armed forces and of armaments in central Europe, and proposed that this be started by reducing the number of Soviet and American troops.

They also declared themselves in favour of having the Stockholm Conference draw up as quickly as possible a set of substantive measures, both political and military, which would be mutually complementary and would help to strengthen confidence and security in Europe. They also favour promoting European co-operation in all areas, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Final Act of Helsinki.

Calls for a revision of the frontiers of European States and of their socio-political systems are so many attempts to undermine confidence, mutual understanding and good-neighbourliness. The post-war frontiers of Europe are inviolable. Any attempt to tamper with them, directly or indirectly, would
undermine the very foundations of peace in the continent and would endanger the peace and security of all nations. Respect for present-day territorial and political realities are a necessary prerequisite for normal relations between European States. In this context, the danger of a revival of revanchist forces, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, was referred to. Encouragement of revanchism by official or other authorities anywhere is against the interests of peace, détente and co-operation on the continent and against the agreements of the 1970s contained in the Final Act of Helsinki.

The summit meeting reiterated the paramount importance of the Conference which was held 10 years ago by the Heads of European States, the United States and Canada, which adopted the fundamental principles now forming the basis for security and co-operation in Europe. That Conference is a cogent example of political realism, of good will and of due consideration of the legitimate interests of all countries. The Final Act, imbued with the spirit of détente, has stood the test of time and, as was indicated by the recent meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki, it is still to be regarded as a programme for long-term European co-operation.

At the present time, it is vitally essential that political dialogue between the European countries be further expanded in different forms and at different levels, in order to improve the atmosphere in the continent and to enhance mutual trust. The States represented at the Sofia meeting stated that they were ready to look for new ways and means of economic, scientific and technical co-operation with the Western countries on the basis of equality and mutual advantage. They are also anxious to promote co-operation in such areas as the environment, culture, education and health. They have always favoured and continue to favour the full safeguarding of human rights in all spheres, while respecting State sovereignty.
The States signatories of the Warsaw Treaty will continue constructively to co-operate in the work of various forums in Europe and pursue their efforts to ensure that the Helsinki process, with its numerous aspects, can progress in a sound and balanced way.

The Summit Meeting devoted a great deal of attention to the major task incumbent on present generations, namely, to put a stop to the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and to undertake efforts to bring about disarmament.

A major practical contribution to complete this task would reside in the Soviet Union and the United States applying a series of measures of prime importance: putting an end to all work involved with designing, testing and deploying offensive space weapons and anti-satellite weapons; a freeze on all existing nuclear weapons at current levels while strictly limiting their degree of modernization; putting a stop to the manufacture, testing and deployment of new types of such weapons; stopping the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. All these measures could be realized before the drafting of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on all problems relevant to nuclear and space weapons.

The cessation of all nuclear explosions is another step needed towards halting the arms race. The Summit Meeting expressed its support for the unilateral action taken by the Soviet Union to cease all such explosions. The ball is now in the United States court, as the Declaration states.

The same purpose would be served by a commitment by the Soviet Union and the United States to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons of any kind on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States and from increasing or renewing stocks of nuclear weapons where they have already been deployed.
Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria

The United States and the Soviet Union could set a good example by checking the non-nuclear-weapons race.

The participants to the Summit have proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union undertake not to perfect or manufacture any new type of conventional weapons having equal destructive capacity to weapons of mass destruction.

They have also proposed a freeze of the armed forces of the USSR and the United States, including those outside their national territories, at the level obtaining on 1 January 1986.

With regard to arms limitation, an effective step would be the mutual levelling off of the military budgets of the Soviet Union and the United States, starting with the next fiscal year.

The Summit Meeting expressed support for the new proposal made by the Soviet Union on "International co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization", which is before the fortieth session of the General Assembly. Should this major initiative be followed up, it would be possible not only to ensure effective protection for mankind from the detrimental consequences of an arms race in outer space but also to join efforts for a decisive leap forward to new heights in science and technology for the well-being of all peoples.

In keeping with the complete and general elimination of nuclear weapons, the States at the Sofia Meeting stated that their previous proposals still remained valid, particularly the renunciation of the first use of such weapons, the general prohibition of nuclear tests and the prohibition of any kind of proliferation.

They believe that non-nuclear-weapon States on whose territories such weapons have not been deployed are entitled to safeguards provided by international law that such weapons will not be used against them.
In present conditions it is becoming more and more imperative to prohibit and completely eliminate chemical weapons, including the particularly dangerous binary variety. This is a task which can be accomplished, just as is the task of monitoring the implementation of any international agreement on this question, provided that realism and mutual good will prevail. An international agreement on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons would, in the view of participants at that Meeting, enhance the general efforts being made towards a total prohibition of these weapons, and they indicated their readiness to participate in the work involved in drawing up an agreement.

Once again they have appealed for the holding of substantive talks in order to reach agreements on the limitation or reduction, either globally or regionally, of conventional weapons in order to check the arms race on the seas and oceans.

They reaffirmed their unchanged position on the need to make further efforts at the international level with a view to the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories.

They considered it essential to enhance the effectiveness of the present multilateral forums - the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the Stockholm Conference and the Vienna negotiations - and to undertake a fruitful discussion of problems related to arms limitation and disarmament which are not currently included in ongoing negotiations. There is no type of weapon they are not prepared to limit, reduce, withdraw from arsenals or destroy outright, on the basis of an agreement with other States, bearing in mind the principle of equality and equal security.

The States members of the Warsaw Treaty have always given close scrutiny to all constructive initiatives made on the problems of limiting and reducing armaments, and they will continue to do so.
They hope that the United Nations will make a more substantial contribution to halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament.

Created 40 years ago by the nations of the anti-Fascist coalition with the purpose of saving present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and preserving international peace and security, the United Nations has now become a universal Organization called upon fully to discharge its principal mission: to be the focus of international action to prevent war. The strict observance of the lofty purposes and principles proclaimed in the Charter is a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of peace.

During the exchange of views on other international issues, the senior leaders of the States members of the Warsaw Treaty underscored their willingness to co-operate actively with all interested parties in order to find the speediest possible solution to existing conflicts, in order to prevent the creation of new sources of tension in Africa, Asia and Latin America and in other parts of the world.

They have reaffirmed their fundamental position that peace is indivisible and that any local conflict can, in the present tense situation, easily degenerate into a major confrontation or even a world-wide confrontation, thus making it essential decisively to put an end to the imperialist policy of force and intervention in the internal affairs of others, to put an end to acts of aggression, to resolve conflicts and disputes among States by peaceful means, and fully to respect the right of each and every people to choose its own future.
(Mr. Tsvetkov, Bulgaria)

They condemn the acts of aggression against Nicaragua and stated that the problems of Central America, the Near East and other parts of the world should be resolved without foreign interference, by political means and, of course, free from any intervention, threat or pressure.

The States signatories of the Warsaw Treaty have confirmed their support for the efforts to transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and further to expand de-nuclearized zones.

They fully support the struggle of the people of Namibia for their self-determination and independence, the abolition of the criminal system of apartheid and the cessation of acts of aggression by the Pretoria régime against neighbouring countries and peoples.

They have supported the proposal made by the Socialist Republic of Romania at the fortieth session of the General Assembly that an appeal be made to States engaged in conflicts to put an end to hostilities and enter into negotiations as quickly as possible and that a further appeal be made to all States Members of the United Nations to resolve their conflicts and disputes by peaceful means.

They also expressed their total support for the efforts of the non-aligned countries to achieve peace, security, disarmament and the elimination of the threat of war, and they reaffirmed their readiness to co-operate fully with those countries.

They attach considerable importance to finding a solution to economic problems, to eradicating the vestiges of colonialism, to solving the problem of debt and to establishing a new international economic order on a just and democratic basis. They regard solving the problems of peace and guaranteeing international security to be closely related to the solution of other present-day world problems, namely, catching up in the economic sphere, eradicating vast areas of famine, poverty, epidemics and illiteracy, satisfying mankind's growing needs for
energy resources, commodities and foodstuffs, preserving the environment and exploring and making use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

They are convinced that in today's world scientific and technological co-operation on the international level should serve only peaceful purposes and that such co-operation should be global in character. It is only in that way that the progress being achieved by the genius of mankind can be directed towards serving the interests of all. A comprehensive programme for such co-operation could include the use of electronics, cybernetics, biotechnology, nuclear physics and other basic branches of modern science and technology in order to tackle problems for the benefit of everyone. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty stated their readiness to make a significant contribution to the elaboration and implementation of such a programme.

The Declaration of the Sofia meeting emphasized in its concluding section that there is no force - and history has proved this - capable of breaking the will of peoples struggling for their freedom and independence. Any attempt to destroy the socialist system is inevitably doomed to failure. The lessons of the Second World War have further confirmed that it is both necessary and possible to achieve active co-operation among States, including States belonging to different social systems, in order to combat aggression and war and to work towards overall peace and security. This is what we must do, before it is too late and before the bombs and the missiles have been launched.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty call upon the Governments and peoples of all the countries of Europe and of other continents to join efforts in the struggle against the danger of widespread destruction that now threatens mankind and invite them to resolve all problems, even the most acute, through political means, through negotiations and fruitful dialogue based on respect for the legitimate interests of all concerned. Differences in approach, political
differences and others should not be an obstacle to this. Acting in a concerted and active manner, the forces of peace are capable of averting a nuclear catastrophe and of guaranteeing the supreme rights of peoples, namely, the right to live in peace and to develop freely and independently.

Mr. MINKO-MI-ENDAMNE (Gabon) (interpretation from French): First of all, Mr. Chairman, your well-deserved election eloquently confirms what we said to ourselves at the conclusion of the work of the last session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Naval Disarmament in New York three months ago. We are happy to see you occupying the chairmanship of another body, particularly given the solemn circumstances here today. My sincere congratulations also go to the other officers of the Committee.

Today, the statement of the delegation of Gabon will focus on three specific points, namely, disarmament measures as a whole, the research and development sector that has been a basic impetus for the arms race and, lastly, the use of certain minerals for military purposes.

With regard to the first point, I would like to state that the international military complex - and by that I mean the European law of nations clique - is a power hierarchy based on war, on the notion of a permanent state of siege in a climate of fear and mutual hostility in which violence is the rule, to be followed by the suppression of freedom and human rights.

Upon signature of the Convention on the Law of the Sea at Montego Bay in Jamaica on 9 December 1982, the new world order began to play a large role on the seas, with all its resources and support bases.

The prospect of exploiting the important mineral resources of the oceans, including hydrocarbons, is causing much greed among the countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty.
Both parties, whose rule is constant suspicion, frequent battles and, at
times, mutual destruction, are permanently locked in a competition based on two
elements: first, the other side must not get ahead of the other in the realm of
weapon technology, and, secondly, no important region must come under the control
of the other side. From the inception of the cold war until today, those two
elements have not changed.

The current situation in the area of armament and disarmament prompts my
delegation to note that the military and political leaders of certain
industrialized countries are stubbornly continuing to harbour the mistaken belief
that nuclear weapons and the doctrine of nuclear war guarantee their security and
that they are not subject to the consequences of Murphy's Law, which stipulates
that if anything in a system can go wrong it will, sooner or later it will.
The conclusion that may be drawn from the recent study by experts and scientists is that it is not easy to control a nuclear war, that any attack involving the use of 1,000 nuclear devices of 100 megatons would bring about a nuclear winter in which all nations would be defeated - nobody being the victor - and that existing nuclear weapon command and control procedures are not completely accident-free. The fear that an adversary might launch a pre-emptive strike against land or sea-based missiles is therefore unfounded, since an attack of this nature would require more than 1,000 explosions and bring down a nuclear winter on the attacker himself.

It is clear that 3,000 nuclear warheads of 300 megatons would be more than enough to destroy every vestige of civilization. The arsenals of the heads of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty are totally unjustifiable, as are even more their efforts to increase them over the next decade.

Unfortunately, science helps men to kill one another on a massive scale. It does not bring wisdom as dictated by universal morality. We have a tendency to behave as if nature belonged to us. This is a mistake, for we belong to nature; that is the rule.

Horizontal proliferation was a concept that was exclusively applied to countries outside the European club wishing to acquire nuclear weapons and to use them in exercise of their sovereign rights. Nations which did not have such weapons have thus far held that vertical proliferation among the nuclear-weapon Powers brought pressure to bear on the others in the direction of horizontal proliferation.

At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, that argument was not accepted by the nuclear-weapon Powers. Today it has been proved that the number of officials in a position to launch a nuclear attack is increasing among the armed forces of the nuclear-weapon Powers in such a way
that we are witnessing an extremely high level of horizontal proliferation in the form of submarines that can launch nuclear missiles.

One measure beloved of the arms controllers is the creation of nuclear-free zones. We know that no area in the world, even one which is called nuclear-free, can escape the consequences of a nuclear winter in the event of a nuclear war between the nuclear-weapon Powers.

The disinformation campaign conducted by the advocates of nuclear proliferation regarding the developing countries, is that the plutonium obtained from reactors can, if it is in the hands of the latter, lead to horizontal proliferation. However, no country has yet made bombs with such plutonium. A member of the nuclear club managed it in 1965, but had to make very special efforts to do so, which clearly shows that this plutonium does not lend itself to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. If the plutonium obtained from reactors could be used to produce weapons, that nuclear-weapon Power would not have had to build new plants to produce military-grade plutonium; it could have used plutonium from the tremendous amounts produced by its reactors.

Consequently, the entire debate on nuclear arms control and disarmament is based on a campaign of disinformation which is carefully maintained by those who favour the proliferation of nuclear weapons with the complicity of the media in the industrialized world. Fortunately, various military leaders who were previously responsible for nuclear forces have, in their desire to provide objective information, affirmed that a nuclear war can be neither controlled nor won, that a nuclear winter might very well follow a nuclear war, that the command and control systems of nuclear forces, in particular maritime forces, is unsuitable and that the concept of nuclear-free zones is meaningless. To conceal the real problems, various political, military and industrial circles, as well as the mass media in
the industrialized countries, continue to talk about the horizontal proliferation of weapons, which sends the debate back to the logic of 20 years ago.

One of the major problems which the world is facing at the present time is that, whereas the strategic logic of the 1960s and 1970s based on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear-free zones, and the survival of arsenals was disseminated effectively throughout the world, thanks to the vast amounts of money poured into this exercise by those who wanted to achieve nuclear hegemony and to speed up the nuclear-arms race, the logic of the argument at the present time against such classical wisdom does not produce the same volume of documents, whose dissemination is not getting the same kind of support as did the nuclear logic of 20 years ago.

With respect to the second point, namely, research and development, I would point out that industries involved in this sector, namely the sector of death, employ over half a million scientists, in other words one-half of all scientists in the world.

Generally speaking, an unprecedented increase in military expenditure and in the arms race has occurred in the twentieth century. It has been calculated that, since the beginning of this century, the world has spent $7,500 billion, which is, about $2,500 per capita today - the amount earned by nationals of many developing countries throughout their entire life.

The cost of "improving" weapons, namely, the amount spent in the world on military research and development, is about $25 billion per annum, or about four times the amount spent on medical research throughout the world. More than 400,000 researchers, physicians and highly-qualified engineers, i.e. about half of all scientists and technicians in the world, are engaged in refining techniques exterminating the human race. Before the Second World War, that sector was
receiving less than 1 per cent of expenditure on armaments; now it gets
15 per cent, if not more. Investments have increased four to five times faster
than the growth of rate of total military expenditure. The annual budget of that
sector at the present time is $70 to $80 billion, three times more than the
official assistance made available to the materially underdeveloped countries.

It need hardly be said that this arms race is incompatible with efforts to
establish a new international economic order which we want to be just, democratic
and lasting for all, and should bring about real equality for peoples, States and
promote civilization, which is precisely the objective of the United Nations.
Gabon considers that the fabulous energy and resources which are at present wasted
on this arms race must be made available for the peaceful economic and social
development of all mankind. To embark upon this path would most certainly enhance
the political and moral authority of the United Nations and restore full meaning to
the idea underlying the United Nations.

Ten years after the World Food Conference of 1974 in Rome, where all the
nations of the world solemnly affirmed:

"... we must today proclaim a bold initiative: that in the next 10 years no
child will go to bed hungry, that no family will be afraid of lacking bread,
that no individual will see his future and his abilities impaired by
malnutrition".

In 1984, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) stated bitterly:

"Tonight, even more children go to bed hungry and risk having their abilities
impaired than on the evening when these words were pronounced."

More than 700 million people suffer from hunger today, whereas the world is
producing plenty of food for everyone. Even worse, the industrialized countries,
not knowing what to do with their agricultural surpluses, are spending incredible
amounts of money to discourage their farmers from producing.
Like the other non-aligned countries, my country therefore asks those seven countries responsible for 85 per cent of military expenditures in the world to try and realize the vital importance of such a reallocation to development. We fully recognize that the problems of disarmament are difficult to solve because of their complexity and the stakes involved, but we feel that disarmament is not a Utopian dream, despite all the difficulties involved.

As one author said, "It is unrealistic to establish in principle that general and complete disarmament can never be achieved. This pseudo-wisdom is just a sign of a lazy mind".

Although the United States and the Soviet Union, with the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries respectively, have played a considerable part in the constant, costly and sterile fuelling of the arms race, we must also note that unhappily military expenditures of the materially underdeveloped countries themselves have for the past 20 years risen faster than the average rate elsewhere.

We must come out against the statement that our world has lived in peace since the end of the Second World War. We are losing sight of the fact that, while the Third World War did not break out during the past 30 years, the world has seen more than 140 armed conflicts, mainly in underdeveloped areas, and due principally to East-West rivalry and opposing strategies.

The fact that the materially underdeveloped countries have to waste their developmental efforts in military expenditures is an inherent part of the imperialist East-West strategy and the reactions it provokes, but this results in reducing the energies that should be available for establishing a new international economic order.

As regards the third point, the use of certain minerals for military purposes, in 1980 from 3 to 11 per cent of the world's production of 14 non-energy-producing minerals was assigned to military purposes. I refer in particular to the following
minerals: aluminium, 16.3 per cent; chrome, 3.9 per cent; copper, 11 per cent; fluorine, 6 per cent; iron, 5.1 per cent; lead, 8.1 per cent; manganese, 2.1 per cent; mercury, 4.5 per cent; nickel, 6.3 per cent; platinum, 5.6 per cent; silver, 6 per cent; tin, 5.1 per cent; tungsten, 3.6 per cent, and zinc, 6 per cent.

World consumption for military purposes of aluminium, copper, nickel and platinum has exceeded the demand for those minerals in Africa, Asia— including China, and Latin America taken together. The utilization of oil for military purposes, including direct consumption by defence industries, has been estimated as close to the amount consumed by all the developing countries.

These are the most striking features of this international order, where the wealth of a minority is at the expense of the poverty of the majority. International law clearly reflects this order, the order of terror and poverty, whose foundations it has served only to strengthen. Under cover of indifference or neutrality, it is a permissive order designed for the liberal, planned or directed economies, all based on the freedom of some peoples to exploit others.

This is in keeping with the ninth commandment of the first basket of the Helsinki Final Act, namely, the development of co-operation among "civilized" States to promote mutual understanding and confidence and security in Europe, the main object being to preserve, by all possible means, the Berlin and Yalta legacy by carrying out doctrines and policies directed to unilateral security.

East Europe and West Europe have succeeded, in a prudent-fashion, in accordance with the principle of the organized diversion, in recognizing their legitimate mutual interests under the heading of security, and the aims of exploitation and acquisition clearly override the requirements of co-operation and development at the world level.
Men are not distinguishable essentially by differences of language, the
clothes they wear, the countries they live in or the dignities conferred on them.
The whole world is one vast republic, in which each nation is a family and each
individual a child.

I should like to share with the Assembly the profundity of a dialogue that is
part of the spiritual and moral development of Africans:

"Who are you?"

"I am land and water, together with something else that I must pass on,
something that links me to the past, to those who live today and to those who
will live tomorrow ..."

"Who are you?"

"I am nothing without you, I am nothing without them. When I arrived, I
was in their hands; they were there to greet me. When I leave, I shall be in
their hands; they will be there to lead me away."

Gabon believes that pride, fanaticism, prejudice and many other
backward-looking vices must yield to love for mankind.

One of the many quotations from the words of President Kennedy reads: "The
Great Society must eliminate poverty, raise the living standards of all, help to
abolish prejudices and bring greater happiness to men in a fraternal and
humanitarian spirit."

In conclusion I should like to share with you one question put by
President Kaunda of Zambia made at St. James' Church in Piccadilly in Great Britain
on 27 March 1983. He asked,

"If Jesus Christ, the incarnation of love and God's loving kindness
towards all men, returned among us today, would He give his blessing to the
nuclear weapons of the Christian West or the non-Christian East?"
Mr. FONSECA (Angola) (interpretation from French): Since I am speaking for the first time in the First Committee, I should like on behalf of the Angolan delegation, to extend to you, Sir, our warmest congratulations on your election as Chairman of this important body of the United Nations. I assure you of the full co-operation of the Angolan delegation throughout our work here.

I also wish to congratulate the Vice-Chairmen and Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia of the Republic of Cuba, Mr. Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya of the Republic of Zaire, and Mr. Yannis Souliotis of Greece.

I should like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to Ambassador Souza e Silva of Brazil on the skill and talent with which he conducted our work last year.

Yesterday we celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, which has proved to be an essential instrument for maintaining international peace and security based on a relative overall equilibrium in the world.

This year also marked the fortieth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which gave rise to a catastrophe that is well known to all of us, and hence to the moral and material efforts of mankind to avert the much-feared outbreak of a nuclear war.

The volume and power of the nuclear weapons now amassed in those countries that produce them, and in non-producing countries which have agreed to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories would mean that the result of such a war would be the almost total extermination of the human race.
The prevention of a nuclear holocaust, therefore, is in conformity with the wishes and feelings of peoples throughout the world. Hence, we believe that the nuclear Powers should initiate regular and constructive negotiations to achieve détente in their mutual relations, since what they do has an impact on the general international situation.

The People's Republic of Angola will support any proposal designed to lead to a qualitative and quantitative freeze of nuclear arsenals, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon test explosions, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones of peace, and the conclusion of a treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons.

In the course of the past 40 years, which have passed without a new world war, we have nevertheless seen preparations for nuclear war going on systematically and deliberately. The imperialist States are stepping up to an unprecedented extent their programmes for the accumulation of both nuclear and conventional weapons of all types.

As Mr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President of the People's Republic of Angola, stated:

"Mankind is in a particularly dangerous situation because of the increase of warlike activity on the part of imperialism and the race to acquire ever more sophisticated weapons and their adaptation for use in space, which would make a reality of the 'star wars' concept."

A certain imperialist Power is today taking steps that might well lead to the militarization of outer space by introducing new technologies for the development of offensive and defensive weapon systems. As was noted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of non-aligned countries when they met this year in Luanda:

"The guaranteeing of security by means of strategic defence is as much of an illusion as reliance on nuclear deterrence. Such dependence on 'strategic
(Mr. Fonseca, Angola)

defence' threatens to exacerbate rather than mitigate the present world instability, which is caused by the threat of mutual destruction and has led to the unprecedented escalation of the nuclear-arms race."

In this context, we cannot but condemn the measures taken by a certain group of Western States with a view to militarizing outer space so that it can subsequently be transformed into an outpost for warfare against our planet.

Outer space should become the common heritage of mankind and be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes to serve the well-being of all peoples and countries, whatever their level of economic, social and scientific development, while remaining accessible to all States. If there is to be progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, outer space must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Thus we welcome the forthcoming resumption of American-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and the meeting that is to take place next month in Geneva between President Reagan of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev.

Regional initiatives on the creation of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace deserve the support of the international community, since such zones could contribute to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to disarmament.

As far as the denuclearization of our continent is concerned, Angola reiterates its view that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted in 1964 by the Heads of State or Government of the Organization of African Unity, is a major, practical step towards prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the preservation of international peace and security.
Nevertheless, certain States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Israel, in an attempt to undermine efforts to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, are thwarting the efforts of independent African States to bring about disarmament, peace and security both internationally and in the region.

Using as a pretext the "vital interests of the West" and the "constructive engagement" with Pretoria, certain NATO countries and Israel, in violation of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on an arms embargo, have helped to bring about a massive build-up of the South African military machinery and continue to co-operate actively with the racists, in the military and nuclear spheres. They have also helped the apartheid State to acquire its present nuclear-weapon capability.

There are even representatives of certain Western countries who have cynically declared that their States and transnational corporations co-operate with South Africa in the nuclear sphere for purely peaceful purposes and that they are opposed to any discrimination. Such assertions will never pull the wool over our eyes. South Africa does not need all its present nuclear energy. South African nuclear technology was established by its Western allies for commercial and military purposes. Such co-operation undoubtedly represents an imminent danger to international peace and security.

The racist régime in South Africa is one of the main causes of insecurity, aggression, economic instability and the arms race in Africa. In recent years the South African régime has taken steps to speed up its militarization, by means of major defence expenditure. This increased from $321 million in 1971 to approximately $4 billion in 1984 - which proves how anxious the illegal apartheid
régime is to become a regional military Power capable of imposing its policy of diktat by force of arms on the independent countries of that region.

The South African régime is a real threat to regional and international peace and security, particularly since it has acquired the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons and is continuing to step up its military capacity for purposes of aggression and blackmail.
(Mr. Fonseca, Angola)

In this connection, we recall the position of South Africa regarding the use of its nuclear potential for military purposes as expressed in a statement made by its Minister of Finance:

"If South Africa wishes to use its nuclear capability for other than peaceful means it will have no trouble doing so, if it sees fit and if it decides."

The nuclear co-operation of some Western countries with racist régimes necessarily involves an increased risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and could lead to nuclear terrorism. The Western countries which are developing such co-operation with the racists would also be responsible for that form of terrorism.

Despite the numerous appeals of the international community, South Africa has hitherto refused to conclude appropriate International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard agreements designed to prevent the use of nuclear materials for other than peaceful purpose, namely, to manufacture weapons. So far none of the countries allies of South Africa has been able to persuade the racists to subject all their nuclear installations immediately to inspection by the IAEA. In our view, the credibility of any non-proliferation régime depends essentially on the attitude taken by the nuclear-weapon States. Thus if there is to be any progress in this field, it is essential that nuclear-weapon States renounce the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It should be noted that the high-level regional Conference on security, disarmament and development, which was held in Lomé, Togo, from 13 to 16 August this year, expressed its deep disquiet at the active co-operation between the racist South African régime, Israel and certain Western countries in the establishment and constant development of the nuclear-weapon capability of South Africa. The Conference felt that such collaboration exacerbated the already
explosive situation in the region and therefore firmly condemned it. It made an urgent appeal to the Government of the United States and the Governments of other States which contribute, either directly or indirectly, to strengthening the apartheid régime's nuclear capability to refrain from giving it any kind of aid or assistance, and to take a positive attitude in favour of a just and final solution to the conflict in southern Africa in accordance with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

We believe that the immediate accession of Namibia to independence, in conformity with Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and the elimination of the abhorrent system of apartheid in South Africa would considerably reduce tension and conflict in southern Africa and in conditions of common security, would be of greater prospects of disarmament and development in Africa.

At the present time, the racist troops illegally occupying the Territory of Namibia, which have committed and continue to commit crimes of war and genocide against the peoples of southern Africa, are also continuing to occupy certain parts of the territory of our country, the People's Republic of Angola, in violation of the national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of our State. We therefore continue to demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory and to struggle against the expansionist designs of Pretoria.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

I remind members of the Committee that the number of interventions in exercise of the right of reply is limited to two per speaker and that the first intervention should be limited to 10 minutes and the second to five minutes.
Mr. JESSEL (France) (interpretation from French): I have asked to exercise the right of reply because my country has been mentioned specifically by two speakers this morning in connection with the nuclear tests which France is carrying out.

First, certain comments were made by the representative of Australia. He said that he took no pleasure in getting into a controversy with France. I can say exactly the same thing as regards his country. He also recalled that in the course of two world wars tens of thousands of Australians laid down their lives for a cause common to both countries. During those two conflicts more than 2 million Frenchmen died, to which should be added innumerable wounded and the enormous moral and material damage.

It was precisely to avoid a repetition of that ordeal that my country was prompted to acquire the necessary means to deter any possible aggressor. It is to maintain the indispensable minimum of credibility that these tests have been undertaken, and only to the extent strictly necessary to ensure our own security.

In this connection, our colleague from Australia described the scientific assurances given regarding the harmlessness of these tests as rather unconvincing. For the present, however, I think it is a question not so much of assurances as simply of the results supported by figures of detailed and frequent inquiries, some of them by foreign scientists, the conclusions of which are quite clear. These are, therefore, facts. It is for the future that we can talk on the basis of those reports of extrapolations or assurances. There is a case there, I believe, but if the representative of Australia refuses to take these facts into account, that undoubtedly means that he intends to take not a scientific but a political attitude. I am quite prepared to follow him on to that ground if necessary and I want to say in this connection that we too are very anxious to make progress towards disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.
And it is in that context that, as we see it, we should view the reduction and the cessation of tests.

The President of the French Republic himself two years ago, before the General Assembly, laid down the conditions under which France might one day also become involved in the process of the reduction of nuclear weapons; and our Minister for Foreign Affairs also reiterated that same view in the statement he made yesterday morning at the fortieth anniversary celebration of the founding of the United Nations.

What I have just said is equally valid to a large extent in connection with the criticisms that were levelled by the representative of Ghana on the same issue. I note with regret that those criticisms seem to be addressed specifically to France, although throughout the world there are other experimental centres that are indeed much closer to Ghana and where there are nuclear tests more numerous and more powerful than those France is carrying out.

However, I also note, in conclusion - and this time with gratification, the very positive comments the representative of Ghana was kind enough to make in connection with the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and the participation of his country at that Conference.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I should like to intervene briefly, in right of reply, to what has just been said. The Ambassador of France commenced his reply by talking about the need for the assurance of the security of France. I want to recall that in my statement this morning I made it clear that we have no question about the need for the assurance of the security of France and, in that context, I pointed out that tens of thousands of Australians had died during this century in defence of, inter alia, the security of France.
I should like also to make it clear that, as we all know, the right to provide for national security is provided for and enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

In my statement this morning, I made it clear that we Australians take no pleasure in entering into an argument with France, and I am grateful to Ambassador Jessel for recalling what I said on that subject this morning. One of the reasons for this is that many Australians have great regard for the French and for French culture. I have to say honestly that we are sometimes unsure that such regard is reciprocated, especially when our policies and our attitudes are misrepresented by statements made in the public arena in France.

The statement I made this morning was scheduled to be made some time ago, and none of us could have known that France had also scheduled another event of far greater significance within the last 24 hours. I am referring to the fact that yesterday France yet again conducted a nuclear explosion at Mururoa. The test involved lasted for some 70 seconds and had a yield of approximately five kilotons. Now France did not tell us this. The data I have just quoted has, as its source, the New Zealand seismological station at Rarotonga.

On the question of the nuclear-arms race - and it is relevant - I should like to mention that the Socialist International, of which France, Australia and New Zealand are members, met in Vienna a few weeks ago, from 15 to 17 October this year. That meeting of the Socialist International issued an appeal on disarmament, and one section of that appeal reads as follows:

"Governments must now realize that security needs cannot be satisfied by innovations in weapons technology and further arms build-up. It is not the quality of weapons, but the quality of politics, which must be improved. Disarmament, peaceful co-operation and détente are the only reasonable answers to the dangers facing mankind."
The Socialist International is, of course, a heterogeneous body, but it is bound together by a common belief in certain basic principles of democratic socialism. Democratic Socialists in Australia and, indeed, many other thoughtful Australians often ask how France can reconcile its stated attachment to those principles with its policy on nuclear testing.

I referred earlier to statements made in the public arena in France, and I should like to bring to the attention of the French delegation - and I do this respectfully - and to this Committee, one such example. I have in mind an article published in the French newspaper Le Monde, in its edition of 25 October, that is, today. The article is from a special correspondent at Mururoa. He begins by saying:

"We are in France here. It is French territory and it is normal that the Head of the French Government should be able to come here."

The article goes on:

"Arriving from Paris after less than 14 hours' flight, the Prime Minister was accompanied by the Minister for Defence, Mr. Paul Quiles and by the Secretary of State responsible for the prevention of major natural and man-made risks, Mr. Haroun Tazieff. Several parliamentarians from the majority and the opposition were part of the delegation, but the absence of any representative of the Polynesian Territorial Assembly was notable. Mr. Gaston Flosse, President of the Territorial Government and Mr. Jacky Teuria, President of the Territorial Assembly, both linked to the same party, had sent their regrets."

May I make the point that a more balanced rendering of the trip that has been made would have been following 14 hours' flight, not "after less than 14 hours". What place in Metropolitan France is anything like 14 hours' flight by jet plane
from Paris? If I can say this in a good-humored way, perhaps Minister Tazieff's heavy responsibilities would be lightened if a key part of the so-called man-made risks that form a part of his portfolio were to be removed. It was no less interesting, too, that apparently representatives of the Polynesian Territorial Assembly were "otherwise engaged" when this latest test took place. But returning to the Le Monde article, it states further:

"Messrs. Fabius and Quiles were to be present at a nuclear test on Thursday, 24 October, on the exposed crown of the atoll. On this occasion the Minister for Defence, who invited some journalists to be present, indicated that it was, to his knowledge, a 'world première', and he enjoined the other nuclear Powers of the world to follow France's example."

Finally, the article reports that the French Atomic Energy Commission reiterated to Mr. Fabius:

"the necessity for the tests to be continued for decades to come. A score or so of experiments are indispensable for each type of nuclear weapon."
(Mr. Butler, Australia)

I did make the point in my statement this morning that nuclear testing is militarily significant. That is why it should stop. May I say I am grateful to the representative of the French Atomic Energy Commission for confirming this view, that they are militarily significant. But I make the point again, that is why they should stop. The Le Monde article also asserts in conclusion that:

"On the atoll, Greenpeace is now only a bad memory."

I ask: for whom is it merely a bad memory?

Following the conduct of this latest French test, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bill Hayden, deplored news of the test. In so doing, Mr. Hayden disputed French claims - and claims that have now been repeated today - that the report by scientists from Australia, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand who visited Mururoa Atoll in 1983 established that the nuclear tests were "completely harmless". Mr. Hayden said the tests had not been given a long-term environmental bill of health. The countries of the South Pacific, unlike France, had no option but to be in the region for a very long time.

I should like to recall that this morning, in talking about the long-term effects of these tests, I mentioned not only radiological but also possible geo-physical effects. I want to make it clear that Mr. Hayden also noted in his statement today that:

"There had recently been a number of high level visits from France to the test site, including by a political delegation led by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Defence, which had observed the latest tests."

Mr. Hayden commented that:

"The presence of French political leaders at Mururoa Atoll could not legitimize France's nuclear testing programme there."
The attitude of the peoples of the Pacific whose homes and futures are in that region, and whose opposition to testing was clear and deep, was the single significant opinion on this issue. Finally, Mr. Hayden also stated:

"Pending a comprehensive test ban, the least the world had a right to expect was that the location of tests would be limited to the home territory of a nuclear-weapon State, rather than exported to nuclear-free regions."

In this context, may I conclude by saying that I believe it is true that suitable test sites in the Massif Central are almost one hour's flying time from Paris by jet plane.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Both the statement by the representative of Bulgaria and a text which he circulated at about that time, namely the Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member States of 23 October 1985, contain references to "revanchist forces" which allegedly are at work in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The allegations contained in these statements are unfounded. I reject them. They are a blatant misrepresentation of the policy of dialogue, co-operation and the building of confidence and peace which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has followed from its very inception.

Let me in refutation quote a brief passage from Minister Genscher, who described the relevant aspects of our policy before the General Assembly as follows:

"The Federal Republic of Germany respects the territorial integrity of all States within their present boundaries. It proceeds from the existing situation in Europe. It makes no territorial claims on anyone and will not do so in the future either. The Federal Republic of Germany considers the borders of all States to be inviolable and will continue to do so."

(A/39/PV.8, p. 19-20)
Mr. SIMPSON (Ghana): At this late hour I have no intention of prolonging the debate, but permit me to make a couple of brief comments on the statement made by the representative of France.

If I have understood him rightly, the representative of France defended the nuclear tests which that country is carrying on in the South Pacific on the grounds that those tests are also carried out by other countries elsewhere in the world.

My comments this morning were specifically in relation to the South Pacific and the nuclear-free zone Treaty that has been established there. However, I must say that certainly two wrongs do not make a right. Therefore, if others are committing an offence elsewhere, it does not in our view entitle France to do the same in the South Pacific. As a matter of fact, my comments this morning were more than charitable, given the newspaper reports this morning with regard to what has happened to the Greenpeace ship in the South Pacific.

I must add, however, that Ghana is opposed to and condemns all nuclear test explosions wherever they may occur.

I must finally thank the representative of France for his expression of appreciation of my comments this morning with regard to the forthcoming Conference on the relationship between disarmament and development.

Mr. HALACHEV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from Russian): In connection with the statement just made by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, I should like to say the following.

First, our delegation does not wish to get involved in any confrontation which would destroy the constructive spirit and atmosphere which has prevailed up to now in our Committee.

Secondly, I should like to draw to your attention the fact that was what said by my Ambassador precisely reflects the text of the Declaration of the Political Advisory Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, and I shall repeat that text in English.
(Mr. Halachev, Bulgaria)

"The calls for revising the borders of European States or their socio-political systems are in contravention of the strengthening of trust and mutual understanding, of good-neighbourly relations in Europe. Post-war borders in Europe are inviolable. Any attempt to encroach directly or indirectly upon them would mean to undermine the foundations of the peaceful set-up in Europe and would endanger peace and security of peoples."
Respect for the present territorial and political realities is a necessary prerequisite for normal relations among European States.

"In this connection, the danger of a revival of revanchist forces, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, was pointed out."

(continued in Russian)

The socialist countries are no less interested in developing dialogue and co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany. The text that I have just read out reflects the considered opinion of the leaders of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

Mr. JESSEL (France) (interpretation from French): I do not intend to prolong the debate, but I should like to make one comment.

Our Organization is based on respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of every Member State. Therefore, I do not like to hear the kinds of things I have just heard. The Pacific Territories are an integral part of the French Republic, and I cannot accept the attempt to introduce some sort of distinction, limitation or equivocation as regards that sovereignty on the grounds of the distance that might separate certain parts of the territory from the capital of the country concerned. I do not think that any Member State would be prepared to accept that kind of proposition with regard to itself.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): My Bulgarian colleague thought it useful, in a comment on my comment, to reiterate his insulting remark. That should make me repeat the correction, but I shall abstain from doing so, on the grounds that the truth once pronounced remains the truth and also that hostile propaganda with no basis in fact does not become more true when it is repeated twice or even more often.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): May I say briefly, and also without wishing to prolong the debate, that I was fascinated to read Le Monde's minimization of the distances involved within the French Republic. I utterly reject any suggestion that I questioned what constituted the totality of the French Republic. I tried to point out—perhaps too obliquely, so let me say it more directly—that there are sites within what my Minister has called the home country where nuclear testing could be conducted safely. The point we had made about nuclear testing in the Pacific is that it is in our part of the world and now within the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone.

But there is probably a simple way for me to make this point so that there is no confusion or lack of clarity, and it is to put it in the voice of tens of thousands of Australians who repeatedly ask "If French nuclear testing is so safe, why isn't it done in metropolitan France?"

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has now concluded the first phase of its work.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: Beginning Monday, 28 October, the Committee will proceed to the next phase of its work, namely, statements on specific disarmament agenda items and continuation of the general debate as necessary. Accordingly, the period from 28 October to 8 November will be devoted mainly to statements on specific items, without, however, precluding the right of any delegation to make statements of a general character during that same period, particularly if it did not have that opportunity during the first phase.

In order to make optimum use of the time allocated for this phase of the Committee's work, I urge those delegations that wish to address the Committee during that period to put their names on the list being maintained for that purpose.
Furthermore, I should like to recall that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items has been set at 6 p.m. on 7 November. Nevertheless, I wish to urge those delegations that intend to submit draft resolutions to do so at the earliest possible date and to proceed also to introduce them, if possible, during the next phase of our work, so that other delegations may address their comments to those draft resolutions.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.