VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 11th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Statements were made by:

Mr. Alzamora (Peru)
Mr. Pham Ngac (Viet-Nam)
Mr. Cromartie (United Kingdom)
Mr. Gyi (Burma)
Mr. Lautenschlager (Federal Republic of Germany)
Mr. Franceschi (Italy)
Mr. Kostov (Bulgaria)
The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 59 AND 145 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ALZAMORA (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, may I say how pleased my delegation is at your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. We also wish to congratulate the other officers of the Committee. We are certain that your extensive knowledge and well earned prestige as a skilful and persevering diplomat will decisively contribute to concrete results in the First Committee, which is called upon to set forth the bases for a world of peace and prosperity for all.

In its 40 years of existence, the United Nations has witnessed a proliferation of armed conflicts in peripheral areas which has cast doubt as to the effectiveness of the collective security system that was envisaged by the drafters of the San Francisco Charter. This phenomenon, which is extremely adverse for many third world peoples, is the result of the unprecedented situation created by the apocalyptic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That situation has led to the strategic concept of non-war which emanated as a result of the risk of mutually assured destruction, and the ensuing shift to the peripheral areas of the unending bipolar competition over a definition of spheres of influence.

In other words, the great paradox of our times is that the Charter of the United Nations, the last instrument of the pre-nuclear era, has had to preside over the new world of the military atom, which measures destruction in kilotons and megatons, a world in which we find coexistence between the dialectical contradiction between the armed peace of the few "haves" and the localized wars among some of the many "have nots".

As a corollary of this fact we find the continuous arms race which creates a process of self-destruction between the super-Powers and which gives rise to the egocentrical concept of security according to which, as the President of Peru said
before the General Assembly:

"[One's] own security involves the insecurity of others, but the arms race results in the insecurity of all." (A/40/PV.5)

Militarism does not, therefore, come to an end with the continuous and increasingly costly procurement of new more lethal and sophisticated weapons and delivery systems, but, rather, it becomes part and parcel of a way of development which is geared at boosting industrial growth by means of expanding the military industry, and subsequently indiscriminately exporting weapons. All of this has serious political and economic consequences for third world countries.

In order to quantify what this reality means in terms of development, suffice it to recall that the cost of a single nuclear submarine today equals the annual education budget of 23 developing countries, covering a total of 160 million school-age children.

The super-Powers, not happy with continuing this process of self-destruction, which has led already to the siting of approximately 50,000 nuclear warheads on land, sea and air, they are now ready to shift their dreams of domination to a new frontier, one which belongs to all mankind.

The militarization of outer space, through the use of anti-satellite weapons, and the anti-ballistic missile defence systems, becomes particularly serious, because on the one hand it implies breaking the balance of terror, which was created by a believable mutual destruction capability since it left open the possibility of a first-strike or the thesis of successful war. On the other hand, it brings with it the spectre of a new arms race, one which would be much more costly and much more destructive, in the quest for what would be at best a questionable supremacy in all spaces.

While the super-Powers, once again dashing the hopes the world had placed in global disarmament, expand their nuclear confrontation beyond the planet itself,
regional efforts, on the other hand, have been gradually freeing areas of the planet from the proliferation of nuclear dangers. Tlatelolco, Antarctica, and now the South Pacific, are expressions of the resolve of countries from various regions to adopt their own measures for peace and disarmament. They are stages in an irreversible process aimed at saving them from the nightmare of militarism and contamination.

This capacity for regional initiative is now focusing on other no less important aspects of the global disarmament process, as the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America consolidate their autonomy and assert their presence at the international level and decide to determine their own fate.

The seriousness of the arms race and the size of military expenditures make it a matter of urgency to reassess our commitment to the cause of disarmament more realistically and effectively.

The Programme of Action adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on 1 July 1978, at the conclusion of its special session devoted to disarmament, clearly and unequivocally established, as we all know, that priorities for disarmament negotiations were nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction including chemical weapons, conventional weapons, including those which can be considered extremely harmful or having indiscriminate effects, and reductions in the armed forces. Immediately following, it stated that nothing should prevent States from conducting negotiations simultaneously on all priority items.

With regard to nuclear disarmament, the end result of the seven years which have elapsed since then is frankly discouraging. The doctrine of arms control, which at a given moment allowed mankind to cherish the dream of a nuclear-weapon-free world, has become, due to undeniable facts, the doctrine of nuclear rearmament. It thus encourages the absurd thesis that it is possible to wage nuclear war and win.
The SALT I and SALT II agreements, which gave rise to so much expectation in the 1970s, now have precariously survived, thanks to a *modus vivendi* between the super-Powers which is about to be sacrificed to the temptation for what has come to be known as "star wars", which would be nothing but the beginning of a struggle in the whole of space for universal supremacy.

While it is true that the third Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted a final declaration which more or less expressed the concern of the Contracting Parties, that consensus will remain precarious so long as the nuclear Powers continue to evade their responsibility under article VI to adopt at an early date agreements to halt the arms race and begin nuclear disarmament. Therefore it becomes increasingly urgent to adopt a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests, which should be preceded by a moratorium on such tests, as the best way in which to ensure the success of the treaty negotiations.

It is also essential that the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that supply materials, equipment and nuclear technology adopt a common policy with regard to the implementation of safeguards in the importing States, regardless of whether or not the latter are Contracting Parties to the Treaty. Otherwise we should be favouring reverse discrimination which, far from promoting a greater number of adherents to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would promote the current *status quo*, which in some regions threatens the security of non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Peru was one of the first countries to implement the Treaty of Tlatelolco on its territory, as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Therefore, on the basis of these credentials, we have unquestionable moral authority in this matter, and we feel it is our duty to express our concern over the delay on the part of an
(Mr. Alzamora, Peru)

extra-hemispheric Power in ratifying Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. For the same reason, we appeal to the States of the region that have not yet done so to implement that regional instrument so that Latin America as a whole can in fact be a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

This interest in the successful conclusion of the Tlatelolco undertaking was strengthened on 6 August of this year, when the countries of the South Pacific Forum adopted in Rarotonga the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear devices in the South Pacific. Peru welcomes this courageous effort, which contributes to nuclear disarmament, and advocates the rapid entry into force of the treaty and the three supplementary protocols in all the countries concerned, which, among other beneficial effects, should end nuclear tests in Mururoa, the cessation of which Peru has been calling for since the 1960s.

The Conference on Disarmament has continued negotiations on a multilateral convention on the total and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction, and there is no doubt that considerable progress has been made. Nevertheless, we believe that the Geneva forum should be urged to finish its work promptly in view of the risk of the development and production of new, more lethal chemical weapons, possibly less susceptible of international verification. In keeping with this position, Peru, on 4 June of this year, signed the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, dated 17 June 1925, and on the following day it signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, dated 10 April 1972. In doing so, Peru wishes to express again its hope that Latin America will always remain free from these weapons of mass destruction and pledges its contribution and co-operation in the achievement of that goal.
The incessant increase in military expenditures, largely a result of increasing arms procurement, offers no alternative to developing countries but that of the halting of the arms race in the conventional field, so as to re-channel resources to the priority tasks of the overall development of their peoples.

With that purpose in mind, the President of Peru, Alan Garcia, proposed on 28 July of this year the concluding of a regional agreement on the reduction of arms expenditures and on a procurement freeze. This proposal, in essence, has been supported by the Latin American countries that are signatories of the Lima Declaration of 29 July and also the 101 non-aligned countries that took part in the Ministerial Conference in Luanda six weeks ago.

In addition to its adverse connotations for the viability of development, the amount of debt and the economic and social stability of the countries of the third world, the international arms trade, encouraged by the weapon-exporting Powers, has also adverse effects on our countries and the cause of disarmament in general, hampering our efforts to limit our very costly purchases and serves to neutralize the progress of negotiations on general disarmament while also hindering the regulation of conventional weapons. Thus it is contrary to the fundamental purposes of this Organization and weakens our credibility when, as non-nuclear countries, we advocate nuclear disarmament.

That is why we wish to bring about, with the support of the international community, the achievement of the purpose that we have all been advocating, that is, to devote to life, rather than death, those enormous resources. We should refuse in the future to be the objects of the machinations of the weapon sellers, public and private alike, who foster and poison our differences for their own advantage; and we should lay down the basis for an effective process for the limitation of weapons expenditures, so that we may respond to the aspirations of our peoples, which are overburdened by poverty and the wastage of resources on arms.
We developing countries cannot and should not have to wait for the large countries to begin the disarmament process - not only because our problems and our security requirements are qualitatively different but also because for those countries the arms build-up is not an alternative to development as it is for us. These are two totally different aspects of the problem.

Our initiatives - whether out of ignorance or naivety - do not attempt to detract from the efforts the international community is making in the cause of nuclear disarmament. Our efforts are designed to bring about that process of disarmament - conventional disarmament - which is not only our immediate problem but also one that it is within our means to resolve.
(Mr. Alzamora, Peru)

Because while it is true that we continue, as in the past 40 years, to be exposed to the danger of a nuclear explosion, it is also true that we are increasingly closer to the danger of a catastrophic social, political and economic explosion if we follow the insane path of competing among ourselves with more and more costly weapons as a result of the tensions being fomented among peoples - who desire only peace and fraternity - by the powerful international lobby of arms merchants.

I should once again quote the words of the President of my country who, at this session of the Assembly, stated:

"I am convinced that more human beings have died because the money channelled into weapons was not used to help them, than the sum of all the dead from all the wars that have occurred in our history." (A/40/Fv.5, p. 26)

Faced with an increasingly mindless militarism and departing further and further from the possibilities and true interests of our peoples, it is not only our right but our duty to do everything in our power to halt this fratricidal and suicidal arms race, even though this might not be in the interest of the arms merchants and their divisive and corrupting power. This is the growing resolve of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, who no longer wish to be the instrument and victim of the merchants of death or to fall prey to this new and fatal form of dependency.

We are doing what we believe to be just, rational and ethical. We have already started in Peru by reducing by half requests for more sophisticated and costly weapons in order to set an example, to overcome the inertia which has been a pretext for inaction, and to launch the process. This is a most important political and moral process and we are already fulfilling our responsibilities.

If we decry the fact, as we should continue to do, that we have not found in others a genuine willingness to disarm, we should show in a practical way that we
do have the will to do so. Let us vigorously carry out our regional processes at
the conventional level in the same way as we took the regional initiative on
denuclearization. We are at a turning point: pressure from suppliers is about to
push us into a new and irreversible stage of weapons sophistication. In the air,
on sea and on land, the options are open to tread the path of wisdom and
responsibility. But we cannot waste any time. Let us begin to consolidate,
through practical measures, the initiatives that have been proposed and build the
basis for mutual trust, which will buttress the process that is beginning and that
requires international support.

It is in this spirit that Peru welcomes the Lomé Declaration and Programme of
Action on Security, Disarmament and Development, recently adopted by the countries
members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with a view to drawing up
regional or subregional agreements for the reduction of military expenditures.

Peru wishes to reaffirm its keen interest in the International Conference on
the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which is to be held next
year, and is ready to play an active part in the future work of the Preparatory
Committee which, in our view, should be open to all Member States.

In conclusion, our delegation expresses its deep gratitude to the
Secretary-General for the timely presentation of reports on the reduction of
military budgets, security concepts and the naval arms race, which are being
carefully studied by our national authorities.

We do not doubt that man's inherent disposition to enter into dialogue and
each agreement when life is at stake will make considerable progress possible so
that we will be able to remember this year of the fortieth anniversary as a
monumental landmark in this march of solidarity towards peace and disarmament, and
that under your inspired leadership, Sir, our Committee will fulfil its very
important responsibilities.
Mr. PHAM NGAC (Viet Nam): At the outset, Sir, permit me to join previous speakers in warmly congratulating you on your election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. I wish also to extend my congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

My delegation concurs in the assessment, which was largely underscored during the debate in the plenary meetings of the current session of the General Assembly as well as in the First Committee, of the fact that our world has been managed for 40 years without a world war, but at the same time takes note of the sad reality that our world is still riven by conflicts and faces the unprecedented danger of a nuclear war.

It is a hard fact that the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects, runs counter to efforts to achieve a further relaxation of international tensions based on peaceful coexistence and trust between States and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding.

The continued and ever-intensifying arms race has caused us all grave concern, and almost every time that someone talks about the arms race the question is raised: who is responsible for it? To my delegation, an impartial answer requires that a distinction be made between those who have initiated and promoted the arms race and those upon whom the arms race has been imposed.

The realities of the past 40 years have unequivocally made clear that the United States has always been in the forefront of the development of new nuclear-weapon systems, which the international community has long been striving to get rid of. It was the first to manufacture the atomic bomb and actually to use it in 1945. It forged ahead in the nuclear-arms race in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s by building strategic bombers, nuclear-powered submarines, multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles and, in this decade, space weapons.
(Mr. Pham Ngoc, Viet Nam)

Within a very short period after the Second World War, it set up four military alliances and a network of military bases on all continents to deploy both its nuclear and conventional forces throughout the world.
Furthermore, those horrible weapon systems have always been accompanied by dangerous military doctrines – for example, "massive retaliation", "limited nuclear war", "strategic defence initiative" and "star wars". All those dangerous scenarios were planned with the ambition in mind that the initiator would enjoy overwhelming superiority so that it could "roll back" the socialist system, repress the national liberation movements and then proceed to world dominance.

There should be no nuclear weapons at all on our planet. But what would happen to peace and to peoples of the world if only the imperialists had a monopoly over nuclear weapons? Atomic bombs were indeed used in 1945 when one country had the monopoly over that type of weapon. Enormous human and material resources were expended to thwart imperialist ambitions and to establish a military-strategic equilibrium, thus enabling mankind to enjoy the longest period in this century without a world war.

Keen efforts are now being made to preserve the hard-won military-strategic equilibrium on the basis of reducing the level of armaments and the final elimination of nuclear weapons. That public opinion is aroused by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is understandable, since the deterrence doctrine based on the accumulation of nuclear weapons does not only pose a constant threat to the survival of mankind but also spurs on infinitely the costly arms race.

Of equal importance is full recognition of the persevering efforts made by the peace-loving countries in favour of disarmament. As soon as the first atomic bombs had been exploded proposals were made for outlawing that devastating weapon and using atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Proposals were also made for general and complete disarmament, banning nuclear-weapon tests, and so on. However, those proposals have been stonewalled not only at the negotiating table but also in deliberating forums such as this Committee of the General Assembly year in and year out.
The intransigence of those who seek military superiority has become most evident and consequently isolated them from the rest of the world. At the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, of the 50 draft resolutions voted on in the First Committee the United States voted against or abstained in the vote on 42 of them - that is, 84 per cent; and of 27 draft resolutions introduced by the non-aligned or neutral countries it refused to go along with 24 of them - that is, 89 per cent.

The hard realities of the nuclear and space age demand that talks should be held in a serious and constructive manner to prevent a nuclear holocaust and to stop and reverse the arms race. Attempts to use negotiations as a smokescreen for an arms race in outer space would torpedo the whole disarmament process. If it is admitted that nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought, there is clearly no alternative to peaceful coexistence and disarmament negotiations in good faith.

Viet Nam welcomes the opening of the new disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. We hold that the views expressed by States Members of this Organization, as well as those by millions upon millions of people elsewhere, should be taken into consideration. In this context, the new and concrete Soviet proposals are awaiting a positive response from the United States.

Early this year the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania met in New Delhi and reiterated their appeal for a halt to the nuclear arms race. They further emphasized that:

"Two specific steps today require special attention: the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test ban treaty." (A/40/114, annex, p.4)

Viet Nam fully supports the declarations made by those six distinguished leaders.
At its thirty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted - with only one abstention - resolution 39/59 in which it expressed its grave concern at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and called on all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation.

Preventing an arms race in outer space has become more urgent in view of the feverish so-called strategic defence initiative of a space Power. The developing countries will suffer most if co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space is hampered. In this connection, one can recall proposals for a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space or a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth.

The Soviet Union has submitted to this session of the General Assembly a plan for international co-operation in peaceful exploitation of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization. Since the Soviet Union and the United States have the largest nuclear arsenals and have achieved the greatest advances in the exploration of outer space, the outcome of the negotiations between the two countries in Geneva is of special significance. Nevertheless, in no way does it mean that there can be any doubt about the important role of multilateral forums, such as the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, in formulating universal and long-term measures to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. Viet Nam is pleased at the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on this question. Next year that Ad Hoc Committee should be allowed to assume a negotiating function.
The Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, made a thorough analysis of the nuclear test-ban issue in his statement before this Committee last week. No negotiations took place on this issue during the period 1980-1985. In view of the urgency of nuclear disarmament a moratorium on nuclear tests would serve as an important step in the process. The fact that the United States has declared a comprehensive nuclear test ban as a "long-term goal" has greatly frustrated the common efforts.

The recently concluded Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - with the deplorable exception of two participating nuclear Powers - called for a resumption of the trilateral talks. The Conference on Disarmament should establish during its next session a subsidiary body mandated to elaborate a treaty.

Pending a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet initiative for a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests constitutes a positive and timely contribution to curbing the nuclear arms race and creating favourable conditions for the early conclusion of such a treaty.
At this juncture, Viet Nam wishes to emphasize the following measures as urgent and practical for preventing a nuclear war:

First, renunciation by all States of the first use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States, which have not yet done so, should now unilaterally assume their obligations. This measure would increase confidence among States and lessen the nuclear danger. The commitments can be codified in an instrument of international law, thereby amounting to legal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We also advocate the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 39/63 H.

Secondly, a quantitative and qualitative freeze of the present nuclear arsenals. This process can be initiated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America with the other nuclear-weapon States following suit. In its recent resolutions, the United Nations established that at present there exist propitious conditions for such a freeze as there is overall rough parity between the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear military power.

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones has drawn the increased attention of the international community. Based on arrangements freely arrived at by the countries concerned in the region, nuclear-weapon-free zones not only serve the security interests of each individual country in the region but also of the world as a whole. If the proposals for a nuclear-free-zone status in various parts of Europe, as now planned for Northern Europe and the Balkans, were to become a reality, tensions would lessen and the danger of nuclear war would greatly recede on that continent. In the same spirit, Viet Nam supports the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific as advocated by the countries in the region and supported widely by other States.
At present, efforts are being exerted to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. In this connection, the Tenth Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam made clear in its declaration its willingness to co-operate with other South-East Asian States in carrying out this important initiative. Such a zone would not only benefit countries in this war-torn region but also contribute to world peace.

At the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi in March 1983 it was asserted that:

"... the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war. Disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is no longer a moral issue; it is an issue of human survival."

(A/38/132, para. 28)

I believe that this historic session of the General Assembly can make an important contribution to the prevention of nuclear war, to peace and development.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I should like first to congratulate you on your election to the Chair of this Committee and to pledge the support of my delegation to you and the officers of the Committee in bringing the work of the Committee to a successful conclusion. You have assumed this responsibility at a time of new hope for disarmament. As you yourself commented in your opening statement, a comparison of the international situation with that prevailing in the last two sessions of this Committee gives us grounds for cautious encouragement both in the field of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and also in the wider multilateral field.
(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

As regards the latter, many of us participated last month at Geneva in the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unlike its predecessor in 1980 the Review Conference agreed by consensus on a substantive Final Document. I should like to take the opportunity of congratulating Ambassador Shaker of Egypt on this successful result, which reflects credit on his role as President of the Conference. As the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe said in his statement to the General Assembly on 25 September, the British Government are particularly pleased with this successful outcome. We share fully the Conference's conviction that the Treaty is essential to international peace and security, and we support unreservedly the determination of its parties to enhance its implementation and further strengthen its authority.

My delegation believes that the successful outcome of the Conference reflects renewed recognition of the value of the Treaty not only to its parties but to the world as a whole. The conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty represented a notable joint achievement of this Assembly and of the single multilateral forum in Geneva which is now the Conference on Disarmament. The idea of such a Treaty to put a stop to the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons was born here in this Committee of the General Assembly with the resolution initiated by the Irish delegation in 1961. It took further shape with another General Assembly resolution, resolution 2028 (XIX) of 1965. Flesh was put on these bones by detailed negotiation in the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the product was commended for signature by this Assembly by a large majority in its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 1968. Since then it has attracted the widest adherence of any multilateral arms control treaty and now has a total of 130 parties, 17 of whom have acceded to the Treaty in the last five years. We hope that those countries which have not yet done so will come to recognize that it would be in
their own interests, as well as those of the world as a whole, if they were to join in this great international endeavour to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and thus contribute to averting the danger of nuclear war.

The Conference noted with satisfaction that the commitments in articles I, II and III of the Treaty had been met and had greatly helped to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives. The unique system of verification provided under article III by the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) commands wide confidence internationally and provides assurances to other parties and to the world as a whole of compliance with non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty. This unique and comprehensive system provides a model of the way in which measures of disarmament can be verified.
The Review Conference noted that IAEA safeguards activities had not hampered the economic, scientific and technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities, as was at one time feared by some. The Assembly will be addressing the annual report of the IAEA under another item of its agenda, but I think that it is worth emphasizing here in this Committee that not only has the Non-Proliferation Treaty not impeded development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; it has in fact given a valuable impetus to them. The Review Conference welcomed the successful operation of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programmes and its establishment, following a recommendation of the First Review Conference, of a mechanism to permit the channelling of extra budgetary funds to a wide variety of projects in developing States Parties to the Treaty. My own Government announced its intention to double between now and 1990 the funds we contribute to developing countries Parties to the Treaty by this mechanism through technical assistance projects administered by the IAEA.

Turning back to disarmament issues, the Review Conference concluded that the obligations of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament had not yet been achieved. As the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office told the Review Conference, we share the widely felt disappointment about the lack of progress towards this goal, but we are fully committed to the implementation of Article VI and have consistently worked for constructive arms control negotiations. However, we believe firmly that nuclear disarmament must begin with effective bilateral negotiations between the two Powers which, between them, possess 95 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons. We warmly welcomed the resumption of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva in the hope that effective agreement could be reached to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth.
The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are now engaged in these negotiations on a more comprehensive basis than ever before is our main source of new hope for the future. We all have a common interest in their success.

The United Kingdom continues to believe that these negotiations are the correct forum for discussing arms reduction by the super-Powers. My Government welcomes the initiative taken by the Soviet Union in putting forward its own proposals at these talks. We note that the United States had already made proposals at Geneva. It is only through serious consideration by each side of the other's proposals that progress will be made. As Sir Geoffrey Howe said recently, the time has come to stop firing rhetorical missiles and to move the arms control debate back where it belongs, which is in confidential discussions over the negotiating table. We urge the Soviet Union to recognize that unless there is a genuine negotiating process at Geneva, a genuine willingness to seek solutions to the real problems, the talks will not succeed.

Of course, the United Kingdom is not a party to these negotiations. It is important always to bear in mind the huge difference in scale between my country's nuclear capability and those of the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, the British nuclear deterrent represents less than 3 per cent of either of the super-Powers' strategic nuclear arsenals. It would therefore be absurd as things stand for us to seek to trade reductions with them. But as Sir Geoffrey Howe repeated recently:

"We have never said 'never'. On the contrary we have made it clear that, if Soviet and United States strategic nuclear arsenals were to be very substantially reduced, and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review her position and to consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the reduced threat."
My Government remains anxious to prevent an arms race in outer space. But we must be realistic about the military activities which already take place in space, about the impossibility of curbing research which is inherently unverifiable, and about the facts of technological progress. These facts cannot be ignored. We must take them fully into account in the arms control process. The position of my Government on the United States strategic defence initiative (SDI) is well known. It is based on the four points agreed last December between the British Prime Minister and President Reagan: first, the United States and Western aim is not to achieve superiority, but to maintain balance, taking account of any Soviet developments; secondly, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, be a matter for negotiation; thirdly, the overall aim is to enhance, and not to undermine, deterrence; and fourthly, East-West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. It is on that understanding that we give our full support to current United States research into strategic defence.

Coming now to this body, the First Committee of the General Assembly has an important part to play. It is a forum where all States, including those that are not participating directly in specific arms control and disarmament negotiations, can have their say. The United Nations Disarmament Commission is a similar if more modest body whose useful work we continue to support. In these bodies States can bring to bear their particular geographical, regional, security, social and economic perceptions in a potentially valuable way.

I say "potentially"; we regret the tendency to submit draft resolutions which are deliberately declaratory and unbalanced. Speaking in this Committee last year, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office deplored the move away from consensus in the work of the Committee and the frequent duplication and indeed
proliferation of resolutions. We support efforts to streamline the work of the First Committee and to make it more coherent. We also believe that the touchstones for resolutions coming from this Committee should be: first, are they the product of genuine dialogue, and secondly, will they help to advance practically the cause of arms control and disarmament? The fact that the resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding should not make for irresponsibility.

We hope that the session of the Committee in this anniversary year, coupled with a more hopeful international background, will produce a more credible and creditable set of recommendations than has sometimes been the case in the past. We have a number of ideas to put forward which we believe to be constructive, and we shall continue to look at the initiatives of others on their merits.

The First Committee is also a place which allows those involved in the various disarmament and arms control forums to inform others of such activities. As well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, to which I have already referred, the United Kingdom has participated actively at the regional level in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm and in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks in Vienna, as well as at the global level in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

In Central Europe there is the greatest concentration of conventional forces and armaments anywhere in the world. My Government is fully committed to doing everything it can to achieve balanced and verifiable reductions of this concentration, and to enhance stability and security at the lowest possible levels of forces. At the mutual and balanced force reductions talks in Vienna, we, together with our allies, have over the years put forward a number of constructive proposals designed to achieve a breakthrough in the talks. We have attempted to come to terms with the crucial issue of data, the issue that, according to the East, has been responsible for the frustratingly slow progress at Vienna.
(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

We have continued to offer a dialogue on verification, which is essential if we are to ensure that there is no room for mutual uncertainty or suspicion about compliance, but as yet there has been no corresponding readiness on the part of the Soviet bloc to co-operate. We need to know the level of forces in Central Europe. We need to have the ability to check that no significant changes can take place without our knowledge. I should have thought that such needs must be common to both West and East, if we are to achieve the degree of certainty necessary for real progress in negotiations on force reductions in Central Europe.

Arms control is not just about force reductions. A climate of confidence and trust is necessary if progress towards disarmament is to be made. At the Stockholm Conference on disarmament in Europe, my Government remains committed to negotiating and adopting a set of mutually complementary confidence and security building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. The confidence-building measures adopted at Helsinki in 1975 were a first step on the road to enhanced confidence and security in Europe. The Stockholm Conference represents a much needed opportunity to extend substantially the scope of those measures. The proposals put forward by my Government and its allies go directly to the heart of the issue. Concrete measures of the kind we propose will make confrontation less likely. They will raise the political cost of intimidation. They will be reciprocal, and verifiable, and by establishing increased openness about the nature and scope of military activities, they will create confidence and improve security. That is the purpose of the Conference. There are now welcome signs in Stockholm that the detailed discussions that have taken place in 1985 may yet lead to the sort of substantive progress we look for. My Government will certainly continue to negotiate seriously to that end.

I have referred to talks going on in our own European region. Of course there are other initiatives at the regional level in other parts of the world. In his
speech to the General Assembly on 23 September, His Excellency the President of Peru referred to his country's recent call for an agreement to curtail severely arms spending in his region in the interest of development as well as of increasing security, and this morning we have heard further details of this idea from the representative of Peru. There have been proposals in the same direction from other countries in the Latin American region. Similarly, the countries of the Organization of African Unity recently held a regional conference at Lome in the Republic of Togo where a declaration on security, disarmament and development in Africa, as well as a programme of action, were adopted. Steps of this sort demonstrate that relevant proposals can be pursued by countries and groups of countries outside the East-West context.

The United Kingdom considers that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, under the right conditions, can contribute to regional stability, to non-proliferation and to disarmament in general. We have noted with interest the conclusion of the South Pacific nuclear-free-zone Treaty. We look forward to discussion with interested parties in due course.

Turning now to negotiations which are multilateral in the widest sense, the Conference on Disarmament has had a more useful year. There has been less time spent on sterile procedural debates, although regrettably there has still been some of that. On the positive side, the Conference was able this year to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and to begin serious work on the subject under the able guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt. This item was the newest and in many ways the most challenging issue confronting the Conference this year. Work on it took place against a background of existing and potential military use of outer space, and of the opening of bilateral negotiations, including space issues, between the United States and the Soviet Union to which I referred earlier. The work undertaken
revealed the complexity of the subject and the danger of taking literally imprecise formulations such as the "militarization" of space. It is clear that there are already military elements operating in space. A large proportion of space flights have military purposes - for example, 80 per cent of them in the case of the Soviet Union. Here as elsewhere on military matters, greater willingness to provide objective information would be welcome. Some military uses of outer space are, of course, beneficial. For example, national technical means of verification provided by military satellites make a very important contribution to the confidence necessary for effective arms control and disarmament measures. The examination of the subject in the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference revealed that a considerable, if not comprehensive, body of international law already imposes many restrictions and prohibitions on the military use of space, and a number of interesting proposals for additional measures, worthy of examination, were put forward. The Conference has made a good start, but much needs to be done. It is therefore necessary that the Conference should continue its multilateral work on outer space next year as an important complement to the bilateral negotiations.

Useful work was done in the Conference on Disarmament on some other items of its agenda. On radiological weapons and the protection of nuclear facilities there was a more constructive examination of the issues at stake. This has served in some respects, however, to underline the difficulties in seeking to go beyond the traditional definition of radiological weapons. On the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee succeeded in a good atmosphere in clearing up some of the outstanding points on the draft text in advance of next year's deadline to report to the General Assembly.

Regrettably, the Conference was once again unable to agree even on a framework of systematic consideration on some other important subjects. One was a nuclear-test ban. Despite the proposal by a group of States, including the
United Kingdom, which would have made possible "substantive examination of specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as those of compliance with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject", no mandate could be agreed for a subsidiary body on this subject. I remember that last year a large number of States voted in favour of paragraph 4 of resolution 39/53 which specified that the resumption of work at the Conference on Disarmament should take place on this very basis. The apparent determination of some countries to block proper consideration at the Conference on Disarmament of outstanding issues in the way of conclusion of a comprehensive test ban is therefore all the harder to understand. In our view, the issues which remain to be resolved before meaningful negotiations can be undertaken are scope, compliance and verification. As we have said before, we are not asking for 100 per cent verification, but we do expect serious examination of this complex, technical and absolutely vital issue. That is why we submitted at the Conference in July a paper on seismic monitoring for a comprehensive test ban which is a substantial technical contribution towards consideration of the subject. We look forward to proper examination of that paper. We hope that it will prove possible to re-establish an ad hoc committee in order to make progress on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament next year.

Another issue on its agenda on which the Conference did no substantive work was that on the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. Like everybody else, the United Kingdom recognizes the vital importance of preventing war, including nuclear war. We would have welcomed discussion on this matter in the Conference on Disarmament, and we are ready to try again next year. Meanwhile, the First Committee can contribute towards that end. We are grateful for the report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of nuclear war. It is a good
summary of the subject, and contains a valuable analysis of the common ground which
does exist. While we are sceptical of the value and scope of unenforceable
declarations of the sort advocated by some, we remain ready to discuss the subject
and to consider what further practical and realistic ideas may emerge to reduce the
danger of war, especially nuclear war.
I have left to last one subject of great importance where there is a real prospect of a successful multilateral negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. Of the subjects on the agenda of the Conference by far the most substantive progress has been made on chemical weapons, that is to say on the negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. We have celebrated this year the sixtieth anniversary of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons, which has been and remains of great value to mankind. We are all agreed on the need to buttress the Protocol by the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of the possession, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. During the past three years considerable progress has been made in the elaboration of such a convention. Successive reports of the Conference on Disarmament have mapped out a substantial and increasing area of common ground, much of it in treaty language.

My Government remains deeply concerned by the danger posed by chemical weapons. The evidence collected by the Secretary-General's group of specialists on the use of chemical weapons in the tragic conflict between Iran and Iraq has reminded us all of their dreadful potential. The Governments of the member States of the European Community have therefore joined with other Governments in imposing export controls on certain compounds which could be misused to make chemical weapons. Such controls do not, however, provide a complete solution to the fundamental problem, and we hope that the awful example of the use of these weapons in the Gulf War will accelerate the conclusion of a global, permanent, comprehensive and effective ban on their manufacture and possession.

Nearer home, my Government is gravely concerned at the large and growing stockpile of lethal chemical warfare agents built up by the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom unilaterally abandoned its own chemical weapons capability a quarter
of a century ago. The United States has not produced any chemical weapons for more than 15 years. The Soviet Union has not matched this restraint and during the extended moratorium observed by Western Governments, has added substantially to its own large stocks of chemical weapons.

My Government attaches great importance to the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. The United Kingdom delegation has submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a series of papers containing detailed ideas as a contribution to the negotiation of the convention. The two most recent of these were submitted during the 1985 session of the Conference. The first, on the verification of non-production of chemical weapons, completed a series of papers on ways to ensure that civil chemical industry is not misused for the manufacture of chemical weapons. The second contained detailed proposals for the organization which will be needed to implement a chemical-weapons convention. We hope that these proposals will contribute to agreement on an effective convention and in particular to the essential requirement of verification, to give assurance to each party of compliance by other parties with their obligations to destroy all their chemical weapons, and never to make them again.

During the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament useful progress was made in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, notably on the destruction of existing chemical weapons and on the categorization of compounds for the purpose of establishing an effective régime to prevent the diversion of material from the civil chemical industry to the manufacture of chemical weapons. We regretted therefore that it was not possible to continue the negotiations after the end of the session of the Conference on Disarmament. We welcome, however, the continuation of consultations by the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, in preparation for a further session of the
Committee in January; and I would like to pay a tribute to the work that he has
done and continues to do.

I am very grateful to the Conference on Disarmament for the confidence they
have reposed in me by appointing me as the Chairman of its Ad Hoc Committee on
Chemical Weapons for the 1986 session. My delegation and I will spare no effort to
discharge this responsibility and to contribute to the achievement in the
Conference on Disarmament of a chemical weapons convention, for early submission to
the General Assembly, to rid the world permanently of these horrible weapons.

Mr. GYI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is privileged to see the
work of the Committee being conducted under your Chairmanship, particularly as our
two countries have traditionally close and friendly relations. At the same time it
gives me great pleasure to extend our felicitations to the officers of the
Committee. And I would say that I am happy to be able to see again
Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, Ambassador Nzemgeya Bagbeni of Zaire, as it was
my privilege to work in close association with them in Geneva.

The work of the Committee this year assumes particular significance as the
United Nations commemorates its fortieth anniversary. It was only 40 years ago
that the world was endowed with a truly universal Organization to ensure that
nations could live under conditions of peace and security and could jointly promote
economic and social progress.

From the time that nation States came into existence successive civilizations
have attempted to regulate the code of conduct between them on issues of war and
peace. It was not even a century ago that international law lacked specific rules
prohibiting wars in general. Since then progressive development in international
law has led from the stage of the renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy of States to the complete banning of the threat or use of force under the
Charter of the United Nations. This indeed is a leap forward for mankind and augurs well for the safeguarding of the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States.

At the same time it is an unfortunate fact of our international life that the founding of the United Nations came almost at the same time as the nuclear age, for the Charter preceded the explosion of the first nuclear weapon by a few weeks.

Since then, the evolution of the international political system has not been conducive to States, particularly the small, the weak, the non-aligned and the unarmed, seeking to ensure their security through the Charter. It has been said that during the post-war period over 140 wars have been fought where millions of people have died, and almost all of this has taken place in the regions of the South. These facts bear witness to what I have just said.

The maintenance of the balance of power in the nuclear age and great Power rivalry in its geopolitical context affects the security of States in a variety of circumstances. An eminent statesman of our time once said that nuclear weapons have not only changed the meaning of warfare but also the very fundamental nature of human existence, and that the only thing that has not changed is the minds of men.

Efforts have been made to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons since the time there was but one nuclear-weapon State and a few nuclear weapons. Today there are five nuclear-weapon Powers and over 50,000 nuclear weapons, of which 98 per cent is in the possession of the super-Powers.
According to currently available literature, the two most significant military Powers have spent $9 trillion on defence. Together they spend over half of the world's military budget, although they represent 11 per cent of the world's population. It is also asserted that they export 50 per cent of arms in international trade, thus contributing to the regional dimension of the arms race.

It has also been asserted that the arms race can be attributed to lack of confidence and trust. That may be the case, but what we are also witnessing today is that the arms race itself has become a major source of international tensions and conflicts.

The current policy thinking prevailing among certain nuclear-weapon States is to place reliance on nuclear weapons for the prevention of a global war. We do not know if this precarious state of affairs has contributed at all to averting a global conflict, but it has certainly not prevented wars and conflicts of a regional character, which are indeed symptoms of the frailties of the present international system, and unless radical measures are taken by States that hold special responsibilities the point may be reached when decision makers may no longer be able to control events, and the consequences would be catastrophic.

A crisis of planetary survival confronts all mankind. This inescapable dilemma of confronting the nuclear danger is a shared destiny of all nations and peoples. The foremost concern of States is the protection of their security interests. Between nations the notion of security is a subjective factor. For the super-Powers, security is projected as the increasing accumulation of nuclear weapons and the extension of their geopolitical interests. For the vast majority of States of the third world, security means the defence of their national sovereignty and independence and sustenance of their daily lives. This inequity of security creates a wide chasm that needs to be bridged, and in this context we
cannot fail to note what the Secretary-General mentioned in his report to the General Assembly at the fortieth session, which stated:

"There can be no question that, at the global level, between the poles of the massive and sophisticated nuclear weaponry of the major Powers and the desperation of the underprivileged or the dispossessed, there often lies a great vacuum of legitimacy and respected authority. Our most urgent challenge is to fill that vacuum through determined efforts to build a working international political system in which all participate - a system which not only will guarantee survival and order, but will make our planet run more evenly in the interests of all of its inhabitants". *(A/40/1, p. 2)*

The fortieth anniversary compels us to realize that the nuclear age has imposed grave burdens on the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security would require not only "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" but also to ensure the survival of mankind from the threat of nuclear annihilation. This indeed would call for the extension of the legal principle embodied in the Charter, through the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, as first affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 1653 (XVI) of 1961, that any State using nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the United Nations Charter and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization.

Past efforts on disarmament at the bilateral as well as the multilateral level have resulted in a number of agreements, and their importance as security and political measures cannot be underrated. They constitute an infrastructure on which further disarmament measures need to be built upon, and that would require trust and confidence in the adherence to these agreements. However, the agreements reached so far have not been able to slow down the momentum of the arms race or to halt and reverse it, in spite of the fact that more than 3,000 diplomatic meetings
have taken place at the bilateral level. There have been assertions that the politics of arms control often intensify rather than dampen the arms race, and there may be a ring of truth in this, as it is seen that contradictory aims are being pursued by the intensification of the arms race while negotiations are in progress.

My delegation would like to reiterate that, in order not to defeat the purpose of the negotiations, measures reducing tensions, creating confidence between States and facilitating the success of the negotiations should also be pursued. Such measures should not be a substitute for disarmament agreements and, in view of their interim nature, verification should not become a problem. They should constitute informal constraints on nuclear and space arms, such as a moratorium on nuclear tests and a halt on the testing of space weapons.

The year 1985 can be said to be the year of revival of the bilateral negotiations, and this should give a renewed sense of hopefulness, as the year preceding it had witnessed an abeyance of the bilateral talks, and the disarmament process can be said to have then been at its lowest ebb. We share the international community's hope for a positive outcome of the summit meeting in November, and this historic opportunity should not be lost. At the same time, the complementary nature of multilateral efforts in the First Committee, with its comprehensive international representation, as well as the Conference on Disarmament in its role as the only negotiating multilateral forum, requires intensification of efforts in these forums.

The Group of 21, in its statement on 21 February this year, has urged all members to make full use of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating forum in order that real progress on disarmament can finally be made. It is also worth recalling that the statement emphasized that all peoples of the world have a vital
interest in disarmament negotiations, the right to participate on an equal footing in disarmament negotiations affecting their security and an inherent right to contribute to their success.

In the past, bilateral and multilateral negotiations have been supportive of each other and, to give but one example in view of its importance and topicality, one instance is the Treaty on Outer Space of 1967. Efforts at both the multilateral and the bilateral level have led to the successful conclusion of that treaty. The beginning of this year has seen the commencement of bilateral negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, with its interrelationship to nuclear issues. In the Conference on Disarmament it has been possible, by the establishment of an ad hoc committee, to initiate the process of conducting an in-depth exploration of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is important that the momentum of the discussions should be maintained when the Conference convenes next year.

Arms prevention in outer space is an issue that concerns the security of all States. In my delegation's view, and we have already stated this on several occasions in some detail, the objective should be to maintain and further consolidate the existing body of international law with a view to seeking a comprehensive régime for the banning of weapons from outer space.
Mr. LAUTENSCHLAGER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, first of all I should like to extend to you and to the other officers of the Committee my delegation's congratulations and my own on your elections to your demanding offices. I am confident that under your able guidance this Committee will make further progress in its important work.

On 17 October, the representative of the Netherlands made a comprehensive statement on behalf of the 10 States of the European Community and of Portugal and Spain. My delegation shares the views he put forward and would like to add a few observations to his statement.

One year ago, speaking on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, I emphasized to this Committee that, precisely in a phase where East-West relations were particularly difficult, intensive efforts to achieve arms control were more necessary than ever. At that time I expressed the hope that a new comprehensive dialogue would materialize between West and East that would serve the interests of all nations.

Developments since then have justified this hope. The start of the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in accordance with the agreement reached on 8 January 1985 opens up new prospects for arms control. It has meant that negotiations are now taking place on more aspects of arms control than ever before and that the balance of military power in its entirety has been drawn into the arms control dialogue.

According to the agreement of 8 January 1985, the objective of the Geneva negotiations is to work out effective agreements aimed at

"preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth and limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability".
These are far-reaching aims we support unreservedly. We believe they make clear that, over and above specific arrangements, the goal is to achieve more permanent and stable relations between the United States and the USSR and between West and East in general. The agreement of 8 January 1985 thus creates a framework for new intensive efforts for East-West accords which serve the purpose of co-operatively safeguarding peace and actively preventing war.

As far as the Geneva negotiations in detail are concerned, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany takes the view that the main purpose of these negotiations is to bring about a limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. The growth of nuclear potentials since the early 1970s is a matter of serious concern. It has done much to provoke the search for new types of space-based options. Accordingly, as the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasized in the General Assembly on 26 September 1985,

"Drastic and reliably verifiable reductions in nuclear offensive potentials will therefore necessarily influence the need for, and the scope of, future defensive weapons". (A/40/PV.10, p. 27)

We hope for early progress in Geneva. In our opinion, results must accord with the agreed aim of strategic stability, while taking account of the connection between offensive and defensive weapons, and must give due consideration to the legitimate European security interests. Strategic stability is a complex equation, whose individual elements must be correctly assigned and which should contain as few unknown factors as possible. It is of particular importance to us that no differing levels of security be created for Europe and the United States and that no grey areas emerge below the long-range intermediate nuclear forces.

We welcome the fact that, following the most recent Soviet proposals, both sides have put into real terms the willingness to make drastic reductions in their
nuclear arsenals. It is vital now to investigate in the negotiations all possibilities for a balanced reduction of offensive weapons in a flexible give-and-take process.

In this context the forthcoming meeting between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev assumes high importance. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has long been advocating such a summit meeting. It hopes that the meeting will not only impart impetus to arms control but also start a process that will create a better and more robust basis for relations between East and West. But let us be fully aware that the complexity of the aims and substance of the Geneva negotiations necessitates patience. It would be illusory to expect quick results. There are no easy solutions for the difficult problems to be solved in Geneva.

The military use of space is one of the main subjects of the present discussion. It is not always borne in mind that space has long been used for military purposes. In East and West it is indeed an important element of the existing security structure.

The vital thing is to prevent an arms race in space that would destabilize the security situation. To this end, co-operative solutions are indispensable; these must be negotiated in Geneva.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that militarization of space would render reductions in offensive weaponry impossible. However, we must not overlook the fact that the relationship between defensive weaponry wherever they are deployed and offensive weaponry is a mutual relationship, each affecting the other. The nature and quantity of offensive weapons have an impact on defensive systems and vice versa. The joint declaration by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of 8 January 1985 expressly recognizes this intrinsic
interrelation between offensive and defensive arms, referring it for discussion to
the procedural framework of the Geneva negotiations.

That is why it is unjustified to focus merely on the repercussions which the
guest for new defensive systems might have on the reduction of offensive arms. In
conformity with the declaration of 8 January 1985, the questions of a reduction of
nuclear weapons and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space must be
discussed and resolved in context.

As to the peaceful use of space, extensive international co-operation has long
been taking place and includes the countries of the third world. It has stemmed
largely from the initiative of Western countries, which began at an early stage to
co-operate with the countries of the third world, in particular in the field of
space research, where practical benefits are obtainable.

The West did not make this co-operation subject to the fulfilment of
pre-conditions. We do not want the development achieved up to now to be obstructed
by being linked, as the Soviet Union has suggested, to the questionable proviso of
a demilitarization of space. Furthermore, it must be doubted whether the proposed
new central organization can respond so flexibly, efficiently and cost-effectively
to the needs of the majority of interested nations as have the forms of
co-operation hitherto established.
The moratorium on nuclear tests declared by the Soviet Union fails to make any contribution to a solution of the nuclear questions that are at the centre of the debate today. A more balanced nuclear relationship and hence greater stability conducive to peace can be achieved only through results at the Geneva negotiations. Nor will a solution to the problem of verification, which has for years been at the forefront of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, be promoted by the Soviet test moratorium.

In this connection, the Federal Government submitted proposals to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament a few months ago that are designed to contribute to a solution of the problem of verifying a comprehensive test ban and to bring a comprehensive test ban nearer to realization. Those proposals advocate a world-wide seismological system for monitoring nuclear explosions, and we are convinced that the development and progressive improvement of such a system, in line with advances in seismic technology, would resolve major outstanding issues connected with the recording of nuclear explosions. This applies in particular to the recording of low-yield nuclear tests and the prevention of attempts to conceal nuclear tests.

Efforts to strengthen strategic stability and to take action to prevent war between West and East would be incomplete without parallel endeavours to create a more stable balance between conventional potentials in Europe. This purpose is served by the Vienna negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions in Central Europe and the Stockholm negotiations on confidence and security building measures. As regards the Stockholm negotiations we see good prospects for substantial results next year through agreement on specific measures applicable to all Europe. Such a result would, through greater openness, create greater confidence and, therefore, predictability. We are prepared, in connection with
measures that translate the existing ban on the use of force into specific arrangements, to reaffirm solemnly our existing undertaking to refrain from the threat or use of force. The renunciation of force must apply everywhere and in respect of everyone.

The effort to achieve results in the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva and the multilateral negotiations between West and East constitutes a major arms-control task for coming years. In the view of my Government it is essential to ensure, step by step, that everything possible is done to prevent war by strengthening military stability between West and East in all spheres. Efforts must also be made to ensure the prevention of war by reducing arms and troops to the lowest possible levels. Those efforts take account of the realization that, in the nuclear age, reliable security can no longer be based solely on autonomous measures but must be supplemented by a serious endeavour to find a co-operative solution to security problems in line with the legitimate interests of all concerned. The likelihood that these efforts will achieve lasting success depends on the extent to which they can become part of a general improvement of relations between West and East and of broad co-operation in all spheres.

All those concerned are called upon to help make progress possible. But efforts to bring about lasting stability between West and East at a lower level of forces do not merely serve the interests of those immediately concerned. My Government also regards such efforts as a contribution to the world-wide prevention of war.

Since it views things this way, my Government actively supports the co-operative efforts made by non-European countries, along with West and East, to achieve greater global stability. A recent example of successful arms-control efforts on a world-wide scale is the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the fact that, in their Final Document, the participants in the Review Conference described the Treaty as indispensable to peace and international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We regard as particularly important the view expressed by all participants that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a central contribution to the safeguarding of peace and the prevention of nuclear war.

A further essential matter here is the negotiation of a global ban on chemical weapons by the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. We welcome the progress made there in recent years, but also wish to express our conviction that these efforts must be stepped up so that those weapons that have been outlawed for years can finally be eliminated completely. In view of the most recent proposals aimed at a regional solution for chemical weapons in Europe, we should like to reaffirm our belief that there is no practical alternative to negotiations on a world-wide ban on chemical weapons. In regional negotiations, the solution of the problem of verification would be even more difficult, and greater security could not be achieved in that way. The solution of the current problem of the use of chemical weapons must be deferred still further.

Another important subject in this context is confidence building by means of concrete measures which make the military conduct of States more transparent, reduce the causes of distrust and misjudgements and in this way promote results in the field of arms control. For this reason, the Federal Republic of Germany seized the initiative several years ago in elaborating guidelines for globally and regionally applicable confidence-building measures. We hope that the discussion of this subject by the United Nations Disarmament Commission will be completed in 1986, and that a set of guidelines for confidence-building measures can then be submitted to the United Nations.
World-wide efforts to control arms must be supplemented by regional efforts. Herein lies, we believe, an important starting-point for the attempt to solve the problem of conventional forces outside Europe.

The armed conflicts that have taken place since the Second World War - well over 100 in number - have been waged with conventional weapons. The lion's share of the enormous sums spent every year on armaments goes on conventional weapons. In his report to the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Secretary-General has stated:

"While the fear of nuclear weapons is pervasive because of their potentially global devastating effects, it is conventional weapons that every day claim countless lives." (A/40/1, p. 8)

Regional efforts should, in our view, be focused primarily on the reduction and limitation of conventional potentials. There have lately been new ideas for improvements in this direction. The resolutions adopted by the Regional Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa, held a short time ago in Lomé, are encouraging. Also of particular interest is the initiative of the President of Peru who, on 28 July 1985, proposed negotiations on a regional agreement for the reduction of conventional weapons and military expenditure.

The four decades since the Second World War, and not least the 40-year history of the United Nations, have taught us that stability and peaceful co-operation must be sought, even in conditions of sustained antagonism between East and West, and irrespective of numerous conflicts in the rest of the world. Tangible results from arms-control efforts and greater stability throughout the world must be possible even in the face of deep-seated differences. In our age, one interest, namely, that of preventing any war, must predominate over all others.
(Mr. Lautenschlager, Federal Republic of Germany)

We surely all agree here in our assessment of the effects of a nuclear war which would threaten the very existence of mankind. But in view of the destructive power of modern weapons, even wars waged without nuclear weapons would have devastating effects.

Solutions can only be reached through negotiations. Negotiations, however, presuppose that each party will take account of the other's legitimate security interests. In addition, they require willingness to be open and transparent as well as to observe arms control agreements and make them verifiable. In short, they require more trust among all States and active efforts to build real confidence.

If progress is achieved in each of these three areas, we shall then be able to develop those new global structures for the preservation of peace that are needed today and that will be all the more necessary in the world of tomorrow.

Mr. FRANCESCHI (Italy): First of all, Mr. Chairman, may I also address to you and to the other officers of the Committee our warmest congratulations on your unanimous election. We are confident that under your skilled guidance the Committee will be able to make significant progress in its consideration of the numerous and complex issues on its agenda. My delegation stands ready for its part to contribute in a constructive spirit to the success of your work.

The Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, on behalf of the Ten members of the European Community, of Portugal and of Spain, reviewed last Tuesday the most important items on the Committee's agenda. I wish to associate myself fully with the views he expressed and to confine this statement to some additional remarks on those questions to which Italy attaches particular importance.
This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, an Organization created in the aftermath of the Second World War for the purpose of providing an effective instrument to promote international peace and security and to prevent future conflicts. Forty years later, we must recognize that, although global war has been prevented, the goal of ensuring a stable and peaceful world based on mutual co-operation and understanding has not been attained. This is an urgent matter for reflection on the part of the United Nations as a whole, but particularly within the First Committee, where issues directly related to international peace and security are debated.

The fortieth anniversary of the United Nations provides us with a unique opportunity to review our past activities and to assess to what extent an increasingly frequent attitude of benign neglect towards the search for consensus on issues which are crucial to the security of some of us, together with the pursuance - even if in good faith - of comprehensive but unrealistic goals are responsible for lost opportunities, as well as for the lack of progress in all major disarmament negotiations.

The prevention of war, particularly in the nuclear age, is clearly the main goal towards which all activities of an Organization like the United Nations should be aimed. Arms control and arms reduction, economic development, cultural exchanges, are all means through which security perceptions can be modified and international tensions lessened, thus reducing the risks of war. Complete disarmament under effective international control is obviously the most basic condition for preventing war. For all the time needed to achieve this fundamental goal a balance of forces at the lowest possible level of armaments, both nuclear and conventional, will continue to be of the utmost importance. Only with this goal in mind will nuclear weapons continue to play a role for the future by compensating for the huge imbalances existing in conventional forces. Italy being
among those countries which regard nuclear deterrence as relevant to its national security does nonetheless consider with apprehension the dangers inherent in an irresponsible and unnecessary proliferation of nuclear armaments. Obviously, security requirements are different in the various regions of the world, and different are the solutions given by each country to its own security problems. Italy respects this variety of approaches to security issues and does not attempt to interfere with the ways in which other countries protect their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. We therefore feel entitled to very much the same respect for our own policies, and we hope that this year the First Committee will handle this delicate question in a more constructive spirit than at the previous session, thus paving the way to substantive consideration of the issue of the prevention of war in the Conference on Disarmament.

As I have already said, preventing war is a complex task. Among the priority goals to be pursued the prevention of both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons is at the top of the list. Italy was therefore deeply satisfied by the successful outcome of the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the consensus achieved on the Final Document. We think that this outcome provides a sound basis for our debates on issues on which the Conference highlighted the existence of widespread concerns. This is particularly true for the very important issue of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, on which the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament have been unable for years to achieve even a limited measure of consensus.

We believe that it does not really serve a useful purpose to view a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a means to bring about reductions in nuclear weapons and their gradual elimination. These goals can be achieved much more rapidly through ongoing negotiations if there is the political determination to
pursue them seriously. At the same time, it is difficult to deny the existence of a linkage between nuclear testing and the structure of the forces ensuring the existing balance on which international peace and security are based. Progress towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty is therefore bound to be a complex endeavour which will very much run parallel to progress in nuclear arms reduction. While efforts in this direction must be continued and even intensified, a gradual approach based on consideration of this issue in its proper perspective and in all its aspects, including verification, seems to us to be the most realistic and constructive one. In our view, the work of the group of seismic experts established by the Conference on Disarmament has been very relevant to such a gradual approach, and we believe that the group should continue its activity under an updated mandate. Moreover, it seems logical to pay due attention to the problem of observance of existing constraints on testing. The frequency of complaints by both parties to the threshold Treaty of 1974 on their respective compliance with their obligations under the Treaty itself are clear evidence of the inadequacy of its verification system and of the need for urgent bilateral negotiations to complement it with appropriate verifications measures, including on-site inspections.

The prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, however important, should not divert attention from the increasingly urgent need to put a cap on the nuclear arms race and to reverse it. It is maybe a good omen that this fortieth anniversary of our Organization coincides with the resumption of bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms. My Government welcomed the agreement reached in Geneva on 8 January 1985, and expressed its full support for the goals of the negotiations, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its termination on Earth, the reduction of nuclear armaments, both strategic and intermediate range and the
strengthening of strategic stability. Recent developments at the negotiating table in Geneva are encouraging in so far as they could have set the stage for a constructive discussion of the parties' position on concrete issue and for progress in the talks. We are obviously aware of the complexity of the problems which are discussed in Geneva and particularly of the fact that only balanced reductions of nuclear armaments to equal levels can effectively contribute to strategic stability. The conditions for such an outcome are not yet present at the negotiating table in Geneva, and we very much hope that the November meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will provide the political impulse still needed in the negotiations.
The issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space plays a crucial role in the Geneva negotiations, as well as in this Committee and in the debates in the Conference on Disarmament. May I first of all express Italy's great satisfaction at the agreement reached this year, after long discussions at the Conference on Disarmament on the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee to consider this question. The Italian delegation in Geneva has also played its part in promoting this positive development. We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee, working on a consensus basis, can now make an important contribution to constructive consideration of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, thus responding to the attention with which this question is followed by the public all over the world.

For our part, we think that a debate on this issue and on the programmes undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States should be based on a clear understanding of their purposes. In regard to the United States strategic defence initiative, which is the best known, albeit not necessarily the most advanced of these programmes, we think that a judgement on the project should take into account both its actual configuration and the intentions stated, as well as the commitments made by the United States Government. According to these, the purpose of the research is not to seek ways to extend or transfer a conflict from Earth to space, but to deny the use of space for the purpose of waging a nuclear war on Earth. From this standpoint it is difficult to see how the project would run counter to the basic assumption underlying the deliberations in the General Assembly that space should be used for peaceful purposes. Moreover, we should bear in mind that research into defensive systems is consistent with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and that a ban on research is difficult to envisage because it would not be verifiable even by the most intrusive standards of verification.
The real problem which arises from the Soviet and the United States research programmes, in our view, is how the potential results of those programmes can be handled without destabilizing implications or, in other words, in a way that would enhance strategic stability. We think that, given the time which lies ahead before research yields concrete results, the main task of the negotiators in Geneva should be to devote their attention to this aspect of the problem and to work out a co-operative approach to it that would prevent destabilizing developments. The objection that such an approach would result in the legitimation of research activities is not convincing, in our view, because these activities are legitimate under the ABM Treaty, which is the only international instrument relevant in this regard. The fact is that technological progress is a reality which cannot be stopped or disregarded. Therefore, in Geneva efforts should be aimed at devising, in the light of this reality, effective ways to strengthen strategic stability through consistent reductions of nuclear armaments in order to equal levels and to establish a mutually acceptable offence-defence relationship that would prevent an arms race in outer space.

In this connection, I would like to say a few words on the proposal which has been submitted under item 145 of our agenda, but which is closely related to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We have looked into this proposal with great care and have listened with attention to the arguments which have been used to support it both in this Committee and on a bilateral basis. From whatever standpoint we look at it, however, we fail to understand how the proposal can relate in a constructive way to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee established just a few months ago by the Conference on Disarmament and to the bilateral negotiations going on in Geneva. We also wonder whether it would be wise to postpone, as would de facto be the case if the proposal were approved, all substantive discussions on space issues to a time very near the end of this
decade. Consensus would anyhow be the necessary prerequisite for such a complex
decade. Consensus would anyhow be the necessary prerequisite for such a complex
deavour to prove fruitful to this end.

Altogether, we feel that the approach to the question of the prevention of an
arms race in outer space followed so far by the General Assembly remains the most
thoughtful and constructive one. The General Assembly has endeavoured over the
past years progressively to enlarge the area of consensus on a single text intended
to cover and harmonize the positions of all Member States. This result has not yet
been completely achieved and setbacks are always possible. We think that this
Committee should pursue the line followed so far, bearing in mind how delicate the
balance to be achieved on this issue really is. As in the past, we stand ready,
for our part, to make a constructive contribution to this effort, in the light also
of the positive effects it would have on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in Geneva.

The Geneva Conference is entrusted with the negotiation of a comprehensive ban
on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, which, in our view, is
one of the most important and urgent goals to be pursued through the disarmament
process. We appreciate the limited progress made this year by the Conference on
this question. However, we deeply regret that no parallel progress was made on the
substantive issues which have so far proved the main obstacles to an agreement.
Indeed, it is high time for the Conference to tackle these issues with the
seriousness, the determination and the constructive approach they require. It is no
exaggeration to say that the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament as a
negotiating forum is to a large extent at stake in this endeavour.

The difficulties met by the Conference in reaching agreement on an effective
verification system associated with a ban on chemical weapons are a matter of
particular concern. A ban on chemical weapons happens to be an instance in which
even the highly intrusive verification measures required to ensure effective
compliance should not be a matter of controversy since the purpose of such a ban
would be the complete elimination of chemical weapons world-wide and no residual military capabilities would be allowed in this field. The problem lies essentially in a general reluctance on the part of the Conference on Disarmament to face the fact that the increased sophistication of armaments and its impact on the arms balance has magnified the verification requirements of disarmament agreements.

The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament contains an explicit provision according to which in order to facilitate the conclusion of disarmament agreements and to create confidence States should accept appropriate provisions for verification of such agreements. The disarmament process would probably benefit from a review and an updating by the Conference on Disarmament of the notion of appropriateness in the light of the ever-increasing sophistication and danger of modern weapons. More generally, greater transparency in military activities would significantly help the disarmament process by ensuring compliance with treaty obligations, obviating the very serious implications of non-compliance and creating the necessary atmosphere of confidence among States, particularly among those which are parties to disarmament negotiations. The scientific community could also make an important contribution to greater openness and transparency.

I would like to close these remarks by addressing the subject of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which is due to meet in Paris in 1986. We believe the Conference will be a most important event and that no effort should be spared to ensure its adequate preparation. We were very much satisfied with the smooth and constructive work done and with the conclusions reached by the Preparatory Committee for the Conference at its first session and we look forward to making a positive contribution to the work of its next substantive session. The Conference will offer a unique opportunity in a single forum to deal with and to consider in their
interrelationship the most urgent problems of our time, the constant increase in military expenditures to levels which are clearly becoming unbearable and the parallel inadequacy of the resources devoted to growing development requirements. It will be a powerful reminder to the conscience of mankind of the distortions which currently prevail in the allocation of resources as between military arsenals and development purposes and it could also greatly help in identifying effective ways to modify the security needs and perceptions which are at the root of a growing demand for weapons.

For all these reasons, Italy looks forward to this important event, which could have far-reaching effects in promoting the cause of development and in strengthening current tentative trends towards significant arms reduction and disarmament.
Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): In its statement my delegation would like to focus its attention on the issues of nuclear disarmament and the non-militarization of outer space, which at the present political moment has acquired key importance.

In his message to the Third Review Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, stated:

"Forty years ago, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in ruins. Smoke hung over the desolate wastelands. The survivors were exposed to the incurable afflictions of atomic radiation. Still today, thousands touched by that frightful phenomenon are burdened with an agonizing existence and demonstrate the horror caused by the use of what now must be seen as two small, primitive and inefficient atomic bombs."

Even today the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki continues to be a horrible reminder of the danger looming over mankind. This tragedy underlines the unbearable burden of responsibility that would be borne by those statesmen and circles who dared to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Its memory is also an enduring incentive to those who are searching for ways of saving the world from nuclear destruction.

Four decades have proved to be insufficient time for certain imperialist circles to accept the futility and destructiveness of their policies of nuclear blackmail and pursuit of military superiority over the socialist countries. Throughout this entire period, from the moment of the production and use of the first atomic bomb and at all stages of the deployment of new systems of nuclear weapons, the initiation of each new round of the nuclear arms race has been justified by "concern" for the maintenance of peace and security.
Today, however, it has become perfectly clear that a nuclear conflict would have disastrous consequences for all States and nations and would imperil the very existence of mankind. The General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly affirmed that peace cannot be maintained, nor national security strengthened, through an endless acceleration of the arms race and the introduction of increasingly more sophisticated nuclear and other arms, including space weapons.

In paragraph 47 of the Final Document of its tenth special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly declared firmly and explicitly:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons." (General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 47)

It is our deep conviction that the salutary way to preserve peace and to avert a nuclear catastrophe is, as was pointed out in the communiqué of the Gromyko-Shultz meeting of last January, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its cessation on Earth, and the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms until their ultimate elimination.

Today the readiness of States to undertake and support practical measures to achieve this goal is the acid test of their policy and their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The overwhelming majority of Member States have called firmly for the adoption of such practical measures. The Soviet Union, with the support of the other socialist countries, has put forward a series of constructive and realistic initiatives and proposals with the aim of curbing the nuclear arms race and of limiting and reducing nuclear arsenals. Moreover, the Soviet Union has taken a number of important unilateral steps as a manifestation of its good will and
readiness to contribute to reaching mutually acceptable agreements. There are also important proposals put forward by non-aligned and other States.

The implementation of these initiatives and proposals would be conducive to making headway towards the paramount goal of eliminating nuclear weapons once and for all, towards strengthening international peace and security and achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The proposal of the Soviet Union for the non-militarization of outer space is of particular - or, should I say, of key - importance in the whole set of necessary and constructive proposals. And if my delegation, like many others, devotes particular attention to this question, it is because the implementation of the plans for the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons would open up a new round of the vicious spiral of the arms race and would render meaningless all other efforts to decrease the danger of war and to save the world from impending disaster. As Mikhail S. Gorbachev said in his interview for Time magazine:

"If there is no ban on the militarization of space, if an arms race in space is not prevented, nothing else will work. That is our firm position and it is based on our assessment, an assessment that we regard as being highly responsible, an assessment that takes into account not only our own interests but the interests of the United States as well. We are prepared to negotiate, but not about space weapons or about what specific types of space weapons could be deployed into space. We are prepared to negotiate on preventing an arms race in space."

The principal obstacle to the non-militarization of outer space is undoubtedly the so-called strategic defence initiative of the United States. This initiative, better known as "Star Wars", is being promoted as a "new approach" to the arms control process and, in the words of Secretary of Defense Weinberger, as one of the three pillars which the new United States defence strategy for the 1990s would be
based upon. The strategic defence initiative is being sold to the American public as some kind of panacea and as a grandiose, costly but effective solution to the problem of avoiding a nuclear catastrophe. Moreover, this matter is being presented in an amazingly simplistic and primitive manner, manipulating the dreams of people for a safe world and deliverance from nuclear weapons. Thus, for example, the term "defence" is used to dispel suspicions of aggressive intent. The programme is recommended as a "non-nuclear" one, in order to set it apart from the nuclear threat, and is even praised for being "moral" and "life-saving" as opposed to the current doctrine of mutual assured destruction. There has been candid talk that the latter doctrine, now branded as "obsolete", was more suitable in the period of clear United States military superiority. As a matter of fact, a powerful propaganda campaign has been set in motion and used as a smokescreen to conceal the real objectives of the strategic defence initiative. However, as the Los Angeles Times wrote, the secret of the "Star Wars" programme is that it is intended for defence of weapons and not of populations, and its goal is to deny the Russians and preserve for the Americans the ability to threaten the other side.
The assertions that the strategic defence initiative comprises "non-nuclear defence" against a nuclear attack are unfounded and misleading. The definition of "non-nuclear" should exclude the use of nuclear weapons. It is already well-known, however, that one of the most cherished weapons in the strategic defence initiative arsenal would be the X-laser, which is powered by a nuclear explosion. The official silence and half-truths about this inconvenient fact speak volumes about the true character of the "star wars" programme.

The proponents of the strategic defence initiative acknowledge themselves that the prospect for an absolutely reliable defence is non-existent. Hence comes the chain of effects leading to the very core of this design. There is no truth in the assertion that the strategic defence initiative would not involve nuclear weapons. This is revealed even by the fact that along with the efforts to develop a wide-scale anti-ballistic missile defence, a total modernization of the offensive arsenal is proceeding apace. In essence, the strategic defence initiative has been designed as a complement to the strategic offensive potential. Its objective is to ensure a first-strike capability without fear of retaliation. In other words, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction is being replaced by the doctrine of assured destruction of the potential adversary.

In the final analysis, the strategic defence initiative programme is leading to the creation of an entirely new class of offensive armaments, space strike weapons, which would increase the threat of a nuclear conflict. It is evident even now that the planned non-nuclear strikes against nuclear targets are tantamount to contemplation of a nuclear attack. Another question arises here, that of the responsibility of non-nuclear-weapon States which participate in the development of weapons which could unleash a nuclear war.
There is only one conclusion to be drawn. The strategic defence initiative has nothing to do with the goals of curtailing and reducing nuclear arsenals. Its implementation would inevitably initiate a new, even more dangerous round of the nuclear arms race and would make it irreversible. The strategic defence initiative poses a threat to everything positive which was achieved during the 70's in the field of security with the concerted efforts of the USSR and the United States of America. This concerns, first and foremost, SALT-2. It is perfectly clear that renunciation of the limits on strategic arms is incompatible with professed readiness for their reduction.

Today there is a serious threat to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which respected experts, including some in the United States, regard as the most important agreement between the two great Powers for continuation of the SALT process and for precluding the possibility of extension of the arms race into new areas. Highly responsible figures in the West qualify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the cornerstone of the still unstable arc of security. In spite of murky assurances that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would be observed, it is already considered by many as one of the victims of the strategic defence initiative. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty seems to be falling prey to the same policy which proclaims that the treaties on arms limitation would be respected as much and as long as they do not clash with the implementation of the military programmes of the Pentagon.

Recently, various representatives of the United States Administration have begun to talk about "restrictive" and "broad" interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We are all familiar with the basic legal rule that any interpretation of a treaty should be done in keeping with, and not contrary to, the principal purposes of the treaty. Hence, we cannot fail to concur with the
commentary of *The New York Times* of 17 October of this year, which pointed out that "... neither of the two interpretations of the treaty are really 'restrictive' or fully comply with the terms of the accord". The so-called "restrictive" interpretation "was clearly designed to permit the currently contemplated star wars programme to proceed without legal impediment for the foreseeable future".

*(The New York Times, 17 October 1985, p.4)*

I would like also to dwell upon another exceedingly important question, that of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests. This question continues to be one of the most timely and urgent tasks in the field of nuclear disarmament. If put into practice, this measure would have a direct effect on curbing the arms race, particularly in its qualitative aspects. In his statement of 14 October 1985, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, enumerated the many resolutions whereby the General Assembly has called for the carrying out of this task.

It would be appropriate to recall here the appeal of the Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, who, in December 1984, stated before the General Assembly:

"I appeal for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test ban treaty. No single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive test ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament."

*(A/39/PV.97, p.122)*

Unlike the assertion that we heard today from one delegation, we are firmly convinced that the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear test explosions declared by the Soviet Union is a bold and resolute manifestation of good political will. It has furnished most propitious conditions for speeding up the drafting and adoption of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, should the other nuclear-weapon States follow this positive example. A truly historic opportunity for concluding such a treaty is at hand which must not be missed.
It has already become known that the United States has no intention of joining in the Soviet moratorium or of agreeing to a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. To justify such obstructionism, it has so far emphasized in particular the argument that a comprehensive test ban cannot be adequately verified. Prevailing expert opinion, however, points otherwise. Recently, authoritative pronouncements have been made to the effect that verification is not the only or, for that matter, the main reason for this negative stand. It has been pointed out, as in pages of The New York Times of 4 October this year, that even had it been possible to reach agreement on verification means and control, the United States would nevertheless have been determined to continue its nuclear-weapon tests since a comprehensive test ban allegedly would not be in the interests of the United States.

A number of other similar arguments have been likewise advanced. The contention that a test ban would not prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is spurious and utterly at variance with the opinion of the overwhelming majority of States. Also, it has been alleged that the Soviet proposal is unacceptable since the USSR is far ahead of the United States of America in the development and modernization of nuclear weapons. This is in conflict, above all, with the fact that so far the United States has conducted a third more nuclear-weapon tests than the Soviet Union. United States Administration experts are unanimous that American nuclear warheads are superior in a number of important respects over Soviet warheads. It has been further acknowledged that a test ban would have an insignificant effect on the MX and Midgetman programmes since their basic testing has already been completed. To a large extent, the same can be said of the Trident 2 programme.
It has already been firmly stated that no more tests are necessary for maintaining the reliability of the existing stockpiles of nuclear warheads.

The argument that a nuclear-test ban is of secondary importance, and that therefore priority should be accorded to the reduction of nuclear arms, also does not stand up.

Other arguments against a comprehensive nuclear-test ban can also be brought up, but all such arguments are extremely unconvincing and only reflect the desire to continue with nuclear tests for the purpose of developing new generations of nuclear arms for the arsenals on Earth and for strategic defence initiative deployments in outer space. They are based solely on the futile belief that a large-scale arms race can best ensure one's security.

The new Soviet initiative reaffirms the readiness of the USSR to resume the nuclear-test-ban talks which were suspended by the Western side. It has also indicated its willingness to consider a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty initially to enter into effect for only three of the nuclear-weapon States if the other two should not be ready to join the treaty at this stage.

More than ever, the time is ripe now for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This question has been the subject of discussion in various forums for more than 25 years and is the best researched problem in the field of disarmament. The draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union in 1983 is a sound basis for negotiations. Sweden's draft treaty of the same year also contains valuable ideas on the subject. It is high time for the nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so to demonstrate explicitly and categorically their intention of negotiating the conclusion of such a treaty, thus responding to the urgent need for a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests and to the demand of the vast majority of peoples in the world that this be done without delay.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.