VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. ALATAS (Indonesia)

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Statements were made by:

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Miss Dever (Belgium)
Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Kapllani (Albania)
Mr. Campora (Argentina)
Mr. Florin (German Democratic Republic)
Mr. Swell (India)
The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69 AND 145 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

The CHAIRMAN: First, I wish to welcome the participants in the 1985 United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament. I am certain that their participation will enable them to contribute more effectively in the area of disarmament when they resume their duties in their respective posts.

Mr. SHAKER (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to express its pleasure that you are guiding the proceedings of our Committee. You represent a friendly people which has close links of fraternity with the Egyptian people and those relations are flourishing at the present time. Your experience and competence, which are well known, will give our proceedings a momentum which we hope will be conducive to achieving the positive results to which we aspire, so that our work may be embodied in constructive resolutions.

This is a year of significant anniversaries. It is 40 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 40 years since the end of the Second World War and 40 years since the foundation of the United Nations. Our memories of those events cause us to pause and reflect on what will be the condition of the world if the terrible arms race continues, whether in nuclear or conventional weapons. Most of the victims of the use of nuclear weapons cannot tell of their agony, but we can reach only one conclusion — that the use of nuclear weapons must be banned once and for all.

We see a ray of hope in 1985 represented by the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which confirmed the conviction that that Treaty, to which more than 130 countries have acceded, is one of the most important international instruments for assuring the fundamental security interests of the international community. The consensus Final Declaration of the Conference confirms the continuing validity of the three fundamental aims of
the Treaty, that is, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the halting of
the nuclear arms race; nuclear disarmament leading to general and complete
disarmament; and the development of international co-operation in the field of the
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Final Declaration of the Third
Review Conference is the result of a colossal effort on the part of all the parties
to the Treaty who participated in the Conference. Each party contributed to the
formulation of that valuable Final Declaration, which is indeed a joint one. The
Review Conference was a significant event not only in the field of disarmament and
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy but also as regards multilateral negotiations
in general.

I hope to be given the opportunity in the near future to deal in more detail
with the results of that Conference. However, I wish to confine myself now to
making it clear that the Conference did not limit itself to a review of the
application of the Treaty during the past five years but put forward new ideas. If
those ideas proved fruitful in the next few years they could lead to a
consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation régime as regards both control of
nuclear activity and nuclear disarmament, especially in relation to a comprehensive
test ban and the promotion of peaceful nuclear co-operation, which would be of
great benefit to all countries, but especially to the developing countries.
More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted, at its fourteenth session, resolution 1378 (XIV), dated 20 November 1959, confirming the fact that the aim of complete and general disarmament is the most important and the most urgent of our contemporary issues. Despite the persistence of the international community and the perseverance in its call to achieve this aim, and despite the increasing number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on disarmament, which now amount to 70 at the last session alone, it is quite evident that what has taken place to concretize this aim is virtually non-existent and at most scanty, being often limited to certain partial and modest steps.

There is no doubt that the most serious threat confronted by our world today is the threat of a nuclear war and the destruction it entails, to which no one is immune. Hence, the Final Act of the first special session devoted to disarmament in 1978 confirmed that the elimination of the breakout of a nuclear war is the most important one today. Preventing the outbreak of this war, as the Secretary-General stated in his statement before the second special session devoted to disarmament, is no longer an ethical necessity alone but a matter which has to do with the survival of the whole human race. Hence, the interests of Egypt in the issue are of practical and suitable measures to prevent a nuclear war.

In its response, contained in the report of the Secretary-General, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 39/148, Egypt indicated the special responsibility assumed by the nuclear Powers, since they possess and control nuclear weapons, to take the necessary measures to prevent a nuclear war, confirming at the same time the vital and important role which the United Nations, as well as the Conference on Disarmament, should assume in order to prevent a breakout of such a war. In its response, Egypt appealed to these Powers to bear their responsibilities fully in this respect and to take urgent measures that would
lead to the prevention of nuclear war, among them agreement on concrete arrangements to support and develop a means of communication among them, as well as consolidating confidence-building measures among the present military alliances. Egypt also confirmed the necessity of accelerating the steps leading to a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

Pending such a treaty, there should be an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons for a certain period. Proceeding from our belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertically and horizontally, would increase the risks of a nuclear war, we confirmed the fact that the nuclear Powers should meet their obligations concerning negotiating on the cessation of nuclear armament and on nuclear disarmament, and to be committed not to help the States whose nuclear programmes, as agreed by the international community, pose a threat to the security of their neighbouring countries. These are the countries which refuse to subject all their nuclear installations and programmes to international control.

There is at present an international controversy on the issue of the dependence of certain nuclear Powers on the deterrent balance in their relations. Hence, Egypt supported the proposal that a group of experts should conduct a study on deterrence and report to us next year. We wish to confirm from this rostrum that the trend of the non-aligned countries, and among them Egypt, is to renounce the policy of nuclear deterrence, which cannot continue at the expense of human beings and human civilization to the point that the destiny of civilization would remain hostage to the nuclear Powers.

This system entails, in the long run, the elements of its destruction and total collapse; hence, many countries refuse to accept its basic assumptions. These countries see that the deterrence theory is aggressive in nature and depends on power and would provide a basis for an unhindered arms race, especially the nuclear arms race.
The policy of nuclear deterrence pursued by certain States has priority in their doctrine concerning the disarmament conventions, especially the comprehensive test-ban Treaty, and the freezing of nuclear weapons, and their pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. My delegation maintains, in addition, that this feverish race nurtures the conventional arms race and thus leads to adherence to the deterrence theories, which lead once more to an increase in the risks of nuclear war and further tension in international relations.

Therefore, we wonder what wisdom lies behind the fact that the nuclear Powers are persisting in increasing their stockpiles of nuclear arms and their development, if each one of them has enough to destroy its adversary and even the whole world.

Thus, we propose that the cessation of the arms race would have similar parallel measures, such as reaching a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the conclusion of a treaty to ban the use of nuclear weapons, and another, to strengthen the guarantees of non-nuclear States.

We have called before for acceleration in providing security guarantees that are unlimited and that the nuclear States, pending the conclusion of this treaty, should deposit their documents of pledges at the Security Council, since this is a significant and vital step in the field of consolidating the security of non-nuclear States. If all mankind has an equal right to explore space and use it for exclusive peaceful purposes in a common interest, to harness the fruits of this exploration, and to serve the purposes of development and construction, there is no doubt that it is the right of man - who has seen this as a good omen - to view with extreme concern what is being witnessed; that is to say, the increasing rivalry, especially between the countries that have high technological capabilities, to enter into a race in order to develop the systems of their weapons in space.
(Mr. Shaker, Egypt)

Whereas war was limited to land, sea and air, outer space has become an arena for new operations in which it would be a new battlefield, and the strategy of States has gone beyond traditional geographical limits. In view of this, Egypt has advocated the peaceful uses of outer space. When the General Assembly adopted the Treaty on outer space in 1966, Egypt confirmed that outer space should be used for exclusively peaceful purposes, because humanity cannot afford to see a new arms race in outer space. In keeping with our consistent position and our understanding of the peaceful uses of outer space and the advantages that may accrue to humanity as a result, whether in remote sensing and the exploration of sources of water, energy and minerals - and Egypt has benefited greatly from that - we support any effort to confine the use of outer space to exclusively peaceful purposes in the interests of humanity as a whole.

Our realization of the grave dangers posed by dragging the world into an extension of the arms race into outer space and the resulting vast expenditures throughout the world that could have been directed to the economic development of developing countries, and the increase in the possibility of nuclear war in outer space - all this has urged Egypt from the beginning to mobilize all its efforts and to leave no stone unturned in calling upon the international community to assume its responsibility and to cease all attempts at the militarization of outer space.

On the basis of this premise, Egypt and Sri Lanka have played an active role in attempting to prevent the militarization of outer space. We welcome the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate for its proceedings. We hope that the ad hoc committee will provide certain suitable formulations concerning its mandate at the forthcoming meetings of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, so that it would be widened to deal with that very subject after it has made a study concerning the international agreement that are in effect in this respect.
Among the procedures that might contribute to vertical and horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Egypt realizes the importance of the Middle East region and the danger of leaving it to the changing policies that threaten international peace and security and further complicate the situation. I should like to remind the Committee of the efforts made by Egypt since 1974 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. I need not recall here in this Committee the relevant General Assembly resolutions, which now number 11, in addition to paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament, held in 1978. Since the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, these resolutions have been adopted by consensus. They have included two main kinds of procedures. First are those designed to preserve the status of the region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, avoiding any action by any State of the region or any nuclear-weapon State that might impede the achievement or the establishment of the zone. Foremost among these procedures is an appeal that all the States of the region should accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Secondly, there are procedures aimed at creating a momentum towards the achievement of the objective, including the non-production and non-acquisition of nuclear devices and the placing of all nuclear activities under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In this connection, it is worth mentioning that the report of the United Nations experts on Israeli nuclear armament has made it clear that Israel has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the threat emanating from the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region leads to further destabilization. Furthermore, we think that the implementation of the Declaration
on the Denuclearization of Africa calls for prompt action in the light of the
deteriorating situation inside South Africa itself and a concomitant escalation of
the aggressive policy adopted by the Pretoria Government with regard to the African
front-line States. Egypt, as an African State, denounces the open defiance of the
international will and the use of Namibian uranium to develop the nuclear
capabilities of South Africa.

The United Nations General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions
reflecting the deep concern of the international community over the nuclear
activities of both Israel and South Africa, which are not placed under the
safeguards system of IAEA. The General Conference of IAEA has also adopted
numerous resolutions calling upon the two States to place their nuclear facilities
under the safeguards system. What has been the fate of those resolutions? They
have all been completely ignored.

Before turning to the next point, I should like to pay a tribute to the great
efforts which led to the conclusion of the Treaty on the declaration of the South
Pacific as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1985. That Treaty has renewed our belief
in the importance and possibility of establishing such zones in various parts of
the world. It provides a new glimmer of hope which prompts us to redouble our
efforts to establish nuclear-free zones, particularly in our region. We had hoped
that the Group of Experts which had been requested to prepare a study on the
establishment of such zones would have been able to conclude that study and submit
it to the General Assembly at its current session. Failure to complete such a
study should not in any way dissuade us from forging ahead towards the achievement
of the noble objective to which we aspire, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free
zones.
(Mr. Shaker, Egypt)

In the complete darkness now engulfing the nuclear-arms race, there is a glimmer of hope reflected in the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles, as well as outer space. We know very well that these negotiations will not change the world within a few months, but we hope that they will achieve a measure of progress, particularly after the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to be held in mid-November.
We hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will fully honour their previous bilateral nuclear agreements, on the one hand, and agree on the main outlines along which to forge ahead towards disarmament, on the other, in particular concerning the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Once again I would return to this important point in referring to the call by all parties to the non-proliferation Treaty - with the exception of the United States and the United Kingdom - at the Third Review Conference on the Treaty - upon all nuclear-weapon State parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and conclude a treaty banning these tests, as well as the call by the follow-up Conference on all nuclear-weapon States to participate promptly in the negotiations to conclude such a treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

We also hoped that the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building, Security and Disarmament Measures held in Europe would achieve further progress after a rapprochement between the different countries and that its follow-up meeting to be held in Vienna in the autumn of 1985 will be able fully to discharge its mandate and deal with disarmament in its real sense.

In conclusion I should like to refer to an important issue relating to the status and preparation of studies on confidence-building through international controls for verifying questions of disarmament. These are parallel and complementary issues necessary to accelerate the disarmament process. International confidence cannot be based on imposing a status quo through the use of brute force or declarations of intent without implementing them. International confidence can emanate only from our wisdom and political will to deal collectively and responsibly with our problems.
The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to extend, on behalf of the members of the Committee as well as on my own behalf, a most cordial welcome to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Miljan Komatina, who has joined us today. I am certain that the Committee will benefit from his vast experience in international diplomacy and profound knowledge of disarmament matters. We all look forward to his co-operation in dealing with the many important issues before this Committee.

Miss DEVER (Belgium) (interpretation from French): I should like, first of all, to join with other delegations and to address to you, Sir, my warmest congratulations on the occasion of your election as Chairman of this Committee. Your experience and well-known diplomatic talents will help you in this arduous and complex task. You may be assured of my delegation's help. Your election is also a tribute to your country, Indonesia, with which Belgium enjoys such excellent relations.

The efforts of the international community, when compared to the meagre results or failures which must be noted if we really want to draw up a balance-sheet of our work, show, if need be, that it does not suffice to call for disarmament, no matter how sincerely and generously such appeals are made.

My country fully subscribes to the objective of general and complete disarmament, no matter how distant this objective may be; but we do so on the premise that stages can be completed only to the extent that the international community is able to avoid the pitfalls of facile demagoguery and concentrate on what can really bring us closer to what has been up to now just an ideal. The objective is not so much disarmament per se as the contribution which the process of disarmament can make to the security of all and to the development of peoples in peace.
(Miss Dever, Belgium)

I refer to the statement made on behalf of the Ten and of Spain and Portugal by the representative of the Netherlands which faithfully reflects Belgium's position as to the general principles which should guide whatever the international community attempts to do in the field of disarmament.

Among these principles I would especially note not only security but also verification, transparency and respect for agreements, which are essential fields if we want to strengthen confidence, without which nothing is possible. I would even say that the lack of trust that today characterizes international relations is one of the main obstacles that we must overcome in order to promote control of armaments. I also see in that mistrust one of the main reasons for the arms race, which it must be admitted is developing while we are talking or trying to negotiate.

In his statement before the General Assembly, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs insisted on the importance attached by my country to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and more specifically to negotiations which leading to a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

Such a convention is, for Belgium which considers itself bound by a moral commitment inspired unfortunately by historical experiences of which it was a direct victim during the First World War, the only target for doing away once and for all with the scourge of chemical weapons; for us no alternative is conceivable. The need for a universal approach is ever more urgent in view of the fact that, unfortunately these inhuman weapons are being increasingly used.

Against the use of these weapons we have but one legal instrument, the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The United Nations must contribute towards strengthening the prestige and authority of that instrument. Belgium reaffirms its confidence in the Secretary-General as he carries out the task entrusted to him to that end at previous sessions of the General Assembly.
Belgium is also taking concrete action to put an end to the proliferation of chemical weapons with effective control of the export of certain chemical products. Furthermore, Belgium remains ready to co-operate at the international level to strengthen international control of world trade in chemical products, called "key precursors".

On 9 and 10 November, President Reagan will meet with Mr. Gorbachev. This summit, the first for a long time, is in itself an important event which my country welcomes. We express the hope that the meeting will lay the foundation for co-operation leading to an agreement that would effectively slow down or even reverse the race in strategic and medium-range weapons and prevent it in space, in conditions guaranteeing a balance of forces and stability for all.
Proposals have been put forward by the Soviet side. We have studied them with interest, in consultation with our allies. The fact that these Soviet counter-proposals have been submitted is in itself an important event. We consider them as a basis for negotiation, subject to modification and improvement.

Indeed, we must not forget that, in addition to elements that could be called positive - in particular the wish expressed to reduce arsenals substantially - there are others, such as a definition of what is strategic and what is not, whose effect would be to imperil the security of the alliance by causing disconnection between the United States and Europe, downgrading the latter to the level of a zone of decreased security. But the main thing is that the negotiations should continue in good faith, each partner having to take into account the legitimate security interests of the other and those of its allies.

With regard to the important problem of preventing an arms race in space, we must bear in mind that space is already militarized to a certain extent. That is due to the presence of satellites for military purposes and the existence of an anti-satellite capacity which has already been deployed by one side and is the object of research on the other. This capacity remains limited to a low orbit today, but what will be the case tomorrow? It appears important, in our view, that this problem be tackled without delay in order to establish, if not total prohibition - which, I think, would be difficult to verify - then at least rules of conduct that would guarantee access to space and security for all.

It is well known that the question of an anti-missile defence is one of great attention, not only because of the launching by the United States of the strategic defence initiative programme, but also in view of developments which have been
occurring for a long time in the USSR. If research is authorized within the anti-ballistic missile Treaty - and this seems incontrovertible - we must see to it that that research and, even more, the developments to which it could lead, especially if that should cause deployment, should aim also for greater stability and an effective reduction of offensive arsenals, beginning with the two super-Powers.

In the meantime, it seems to us that a reaffirmation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty and, even more, a common approach on the interpretation of that Treaty are important elements, because in the present state of affairs the Treaty is a protection the importance of which is clear to all. We are most happy with the recent statements made by the United States about a rigorous interpretation and strict application of the Treaty's elements.

Finally, the Geneva negotiations also have to do with intermediate nuclear forces, which are of direct interest to Europe and to my country in particular. We hope that those negotiations will continue and settle at the intermediate level, the fundamental question of a true balance between American and Soviet forces at the lowest level and, if possible, even at zero level.

The Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded its work a few weeks ago with the adoption of a final document. Belgium welcomes that positive and encouraging outcome for the Treaty's future and hopes that the nuclear Powers will act in accordance with undertakings resulting therefrom. That result is also an expression of the countries parties to the NPT of their confidence and firm will to see that instrument continue in force with its legal and moral authority. That should provide impetus for universal adherence.
Still in the nuclear field - in which the Conference on Disarmament has an important role to play - Belgium regrets that the Conference's work this year did not make any progress in the matter of the prohibition of nuclear tests. But there is a positive element that I should like to stress: the work of the Group of Seismologists can be continued, and that shows both the usefulness and importance of this work for many countries, including Belgium.

Faithful to the disarmament principles it advocates, especially verification, my Government is in favour of seeing the programme of seismic data exchange continue next year. It invites other countries to adopt the same attitude.

At the beginning of this statement I mentioned the principles which, in Belgium's view, should guide disarmament efforts in insisting on the importance of confidence-building measures. Within the framework of nuclear disarmament, I should like to recall the proposals on confidence-building measures made in the Conference on Disarmament by my country in April 1983 the aim of which was to build a climate of confidence and détente between the nuclear Powers so as considerably to reduce the risks of a nuclear conflict, without threatening their security. Belgium is aware of the existence of some of those measures among some nuclear-weapon countries, but it should like to work at having them apply to all the nuclear Powers. That would, in our view, be a considerable step forward towards nuclear disarmament.

Coming back to the problem of outer space, I should like to note a positive development which has made possible the creation of an ad hoc group with a mandate to examine possibilities. Belgium wishes to stress the usefulness of that work and the need to pursue the present study, aware of the bilateral aspect of the questions is being dealt with directly by the two countries most directly concerned. In the present state of affairs, this solution seems to be the most timely.
Another aspect of disarmament we hold dear is the regional approach. May I recall in this connection that the Secretary-General will submit a report on this point to the forty-second session of the General Assembly. My Government continues to follow closely present developments in the world in this matter in order, if need be, to encourage certain initiatives and efforts.

It is also within this framework that the Thirteenth Consultative Conference of the Members of the Antarctica Treaty was held in Brussels. The work of that Conference aims at intensifying existing efforts so that the sixth continent should remain a zone of non-militarization and peaceful international co-operation. Belgium will continue to strive to contribute concretely to see that objective respected.

It is useful to mention another forum dealing with the regional approach. I have in mind the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which has been meeting since 1984. Belgium, together with its allies, submitted there a set of measures that should contribute to creating a climate of understanding, confidence and transparency in the military field, leading to a climate of détente.
Belgium hopes that this initiative will be followed elsewhere in the world, so that this regional approach can be given a universal application.

This picture would not be complete without mentioning the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of forces in Central Europe, even if only to say that after so many years of efforts success has still proved elusive. This will not prevent my Government from continuing its efforts with a view to finding a better balance of forces at a reduced level in Europe.

I have not attempted to draw up an exhaustive balance sheet of our action in the field of disarmament, nor to touch upon all the problems. I have only mentioned those which are of a priority nature for Belgium.

General and complete disarmament today and probably for a long time to come is only an aim which must inspire our efforts and stimulate our action. A cathedral is not built in a day; first the foundations must be laid. Hence the first is to create that without which nothing lasting can ever be accomplished.

It is in this spirit that my country intends to act pragmatically, but also with consistence, in the hope that in the fields I have touched upon progress will soon reward our efforts.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): In its previous statement the Soviet delegation set forth its ideas concerning both halting the stockpiling of nuclear and other weapons, and reducing their number, in other words, in relation to the "vertical" aspect of the problem of disarmament. Today we would like to follow that up by discussing a number of pressing problems concerning the limiting and curbing of the arms race, that is to say, problems relating to the "horizontal" aspect. Of course, such a division of these issues is to a substantial degree purely nominal since all measures in this system of co-ordinates should supplement and reinforce each other, leading up to the single goal of a world without weapons and wars.
In the nuclear and space age the link between arms limitation and reduction, on one hand, and preventing the spread of weapons on the other, is more obvious than ever before. This link manifests itself with a special force now, at a time when there is a threat of the arms race spreading to a new sphere of human endeavour, outer space, and reaching a qualitatively new stage. If the United States implements its plan for bringing new weapons into space, this race may accelerate to a cosmic speed, nullifying the "vertical" and "horizontal" constraints against it which have taken such a great effort to build.

The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems would become the first of the many victims of the proliferation of weapons into outer space. Every step towards the development of "star wars" weapons is contrary to the very essence, the letter and the spirit of this extremely important document which clearly and unequivocally bans the development, testing and deployment of space-based anti-ballistic missile systems or components. Every such step brings the world ever closer to the point of no return.

The Soviet Union proposes that the extension of the arms race to the high frontiers of space should be stopped before it becomes too late. The non-militarization of space will reliably guarantee that mankind's path to the boundless regions of outer space will increasingly become a broad avenue of peaceful co-operation for the benefit of all nations. Such a decision would be the only correct one. It would radically improve the atmosphere and contribute to strengthening existing agreements and concluding new ones on limiting and then reducing nuclear arms, with a view to their ultimate complete elimination everywhere.

The set of major initiatives announced by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, convincingly confirms our country's readiness for a practical solution consistent
with the objectives of the Geneva negotiations, as agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States, that is, not only to stop the arms race but also sharply to reduce the level of weapons and simultaneously to prevent an arms race in space.

I should like to stress once more - although we have already heard the same point convincingly made by the representative of Luxembourg, speaking on behalf of the Ten, in the plenary meeting - that the essence of the arrangement reached in January is the unbreakable tie between solving the two problems of nuclear weapons and space weapons.

Specifically, the Soviet Union proposes a complete ban on space strike weapons of both sides and a truly radical 50 per cent reduction of their nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. In accordance with the Soviet proposal, the total number of nuclear systems of the Soviet Union and the United States capable of reaching each other's territory would be, respectively, 1,250 and 1,680. Thus, the Soviet Union agreed that the United States should have a certain advantage in the number of delivery vehicles. The Soviet Union - and I should like to explain this to the Committee - is ready to accept this, bearing in mind that after the 50 per cent reduction of the delivery vehicles of the two sides both would have an equal number of nuclear warheads, 6,000 each and consequently, a rough strategic balance would be ensured. We would like to tell the Committee that the Soviet delegation in Geneva has put forward specific proposals on this question. We are deeply convinced that the implementation of those proposals would radically strengthen strategic stability and mutual trust.

We have already said that the Soviet moratorium on any nuclear explosions provides a basis for movement towards reducing nuclear arms and ensures conditions favourable to concluding an international treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Today we would like to emphasize to the
Committee that such a measure limiting the nuclear-arms race "vertically" would, if implemented, also contribute - as is recognized by practically everyone - to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union regards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons as one of the major battlefields - a kind of "second front" - in the struggle for removing the nuclear threat, curbing the arms race and strengthening international security on a regional and global level.
(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The importance of this peaceful front is obvious. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would result in a sharp destabilization of the situation in the world, a greater risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, an increased danger of the escalation of local conflicts into a global one and an acceleration of the nuclear arms race.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has a leading role to play in solving this problem. The Treaty, which was worked out through the collective efforts of many States, has proven in action its viability and effectiveness. Since its conclusion, not a single new nuclear-weapon State has appeared. In terms of the number of participants, this is the broadest arms limitation agreement to date. It has formed the basis for the international régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has effectively served the cause of peace.

As the principal instrument for preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States, the non-proliferation Treaty is equally in the best interests of all countries - large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, developed and developing. It successfully serves the dual purpose of providing a basis for the collective efforts of States in curbing the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and at the same time of ensuring favourable conditions for wide-ranging international co-operation in the peaceful uses of the atom.

As we are strongly in favour of further expanding and deepening such co-operation, the Soviet Union is working to ensure that the energy of the atom should in fact become the property of all mankind and serve exclusively the interests of peaceful construction. Such co-operation is necessary for solving the problem of the world's energy supply and other global problems, including economic ones. A great deal of credit in the practical solution of these problems is due to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
We evaluate the results of the Third Review Conference of the NPT as generally positive. Its Final Declaration reaffirms "the determination of States further to strengthen the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices". The participants in the Conference have stated that the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime "play a central role in contributing to regional and international peace and security". We also fully share the idea, expressed in the Final Declaration that, for the States to reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime, they should undertake constructive efforts to achieve progress in limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

We should like to stress that we consider that this unanimously adopted Declaration is not only a realistic document appraising the non-proliferation régime to prevent a nuclear war, but is also a programme for the future. This programme of future action applies to all those that agreed to its adoption.

A great deal of work has been done in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but even more remains to be done. One of the most important tasks at this stage is to strive to achieve the universality of the non-proliferation Treaty, in above all, for attracting all nuclear and "threshold" countries. One should not overlook the fact that certain countries in effect do not conceal their nuclear ambitions and evade participation in the Treaty. In this context, the assistance received by South Africa in its nuclear preparations from some Western countries, Israel and transnational corporations, as has already been mentioned in General Assembly resolutions, deserves strong condemnation. We also believe that it is necessary to call for an end to the co-operation in the nuclear field between the Western countries and Israel. All nuclear activities of South Africa and Israel should be placed under IAEA control. It is appropriate to point out, in this
regard, that the Third Review Conference of the NPT heard strong demands that all ties with Israel and South Africa in the nuclear field should be severed.

The Soviet Union has been consistently in favour of strengthening the non-proliferation régime in every possible way. We are convinced that this important task should be tackled jointly by both nuclear and non-nuclear States.

In response to the wishes of many non-nuclear countries and as an act of goodwill, the Soviet Union has taken a decision to place part of its peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA control. An agreement to this effect between our country and the Agency entered into force on 10 June 1985.

Recently - and I should like to inform the members of the Committee about this - the Agency's inspectors carried out their first inspection at the Soviet installations placed under IAEA safeguards. This step on our part should help to strengthen confidence among States, to enhance the prestige of the IAEA and further to improve its safeguards system and consolidate the international non-proliferation régime as a whole. At the same time, the agreement is a convincing example of how our country is putting into practice its basic commitment to control.

Acceptance by the Soviet Union of IAEA controls is another confirmation of its faithful observance of the obligations assumed and of its positive attitude - and I stress this - to international control when it actually serves the goals of arms limitation and disarmament.

We share the point of view expressed by many States during the current session that, within the complex of measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world is of particular importance. If this task could be accomplished, the map of the world would graphically show the emergence of increasingly numerous cases of security, a process in which nuclear weapons would gradually disappear from the
face of the earth. The establishment of nuclear-free zones is not a utopian goal. The efforts in that direction have already yielded some results. There is the Antarctic Treaty. There is also the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, the Tlatelolco Treaty, which created the first real nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union states in this forum that it views positively the recent decision by the Forum of South Pacific countries to declare their region a zone free of nuclear weapons.

Efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-free zones should be intensified. We support the statement contained in the Final Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held last September in Luanda, that the establishment of such zones in various parts of the world should be encouraged, having in mind as the final objective the ridding of the world of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Union understands the desire of many States to establish nuclear-free zones in various regions of our planet. The idea for such zones is gaining increasingly broad support, for example, in northern Europe, in the Balkans, South-East Asia, Africa and other parts of the world. We support the important initiatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, calling for the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

We view as fruitful the idea of establishing a nuclear-free corridor in Europe, on both sides of the dividing line between the two military-political groupings, where it would be prohibited to have or to stockpile nuclear weapons, prepare their deployment or conduct exercises imitating their use. The creation of such a corridor could begin in central Europe. The Soviet Union is ready to take part in negotiations on the establishment of the proposed zone, which should consider questions concerning its geographic scope and other questions including the verification of compliance by the parties with the obligations as regards such a zone.

The idea of a nuclear-free corridor is gaining momentum. It is meeting with support from broad segments of the population, scientists and political figures. Thus, the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Willie Brandt, has recently emphasized that the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the centre of Europe would be one of the most effective and advanced confidence-building measures which would have great political and military significance. We fully share this view of the sound politicians of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The complex of measures for the limitation of the dimensions of the arms race also includes finding a solution to the question of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. We believe that States which neither possess nuclear weapons nor have them on their territory are fully entitled to reliable
international legal guarantees that no nuclear weapons will be used against them.
The conclusion of an international convention for this purpose would be an
effective way to strengthen such guarantees.

Good prospects are also offered by the Soviet proposal that all nuclear-weapon
States should as a first step make similar statements which could be reinforced by
an authoritative decision of the United Nations Security Council on the non-use of
nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States which have no nuclear weapons
on their territory. The Soviet Union, as you know, has already unilaterally
assumed such an obligation. We are also ready to conclude with such States
bilateral agreements on guarantees.

The strengthening of the non-nuclear status of the sea-bed and the ocean floor
is of equal importance. We believe that it is necessary in particular to expand
participation in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
and in the Subsoil Thereof. Negotiations on additional measures to prevent an arms
race on the sea-bed should in our view be continued.

The horizontal dimension of the efforts to curb the arms race concerns not
only nuclear but also other weapons. Lately there has been an increased danger of
proliferation throughout the world of another kind of mass destruction weapon,
namely, chemical weapons, including their most recent types. For example, we
cannot but feel alarmed at the reports that the Pretoria régime, which stops at
nothing in order to preserve racism and colonialism in southern Africa, probably
has such weapons.
We do not conceal our particular concern over the existing plans to deploy binary chemical weapons in Western Europe. There have been reports that the United States is considering the possibility of deploying chemical weapons in other parts of the world as well. Being a dangerous and highly toxic type of chemical weapon, the binary weapon can be used for offensive purposes. Judging by the pronouncements of some top American military officials, the latest chemical weapons which they want to have in Europe are intended for use at the very beginning of hostilities in Europe, along with nuclear weapons, whose first use the United States has never renounced, as you know. That is the basis of American military plans and of plans by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

There is another important factor. The technology of binary weapons production and the specific way in which their components are stockpiled make verification and control infinitely more difficult and possibly even impossible. It is noteworthy that the advocates of unrestrained control prefer silence when this matter is being discussed. Such double standards again leave no room for common sense or logic.

The proliferation of chemical weapons, in our view, is not in anybody's interests, since it leads to higher risk of use of such weapons and is undeniably a danger to people and to the environment.

Were there a convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, such a danger would not exist. However, for a number of reasons which we have already outlined in our previous statements, there has been no decisive movement as yet towards the formulation of such a convention, and this is not our fault. Thus, besides accelerating the negotiations in Geneva - which remains the main task - we think it appropriate to use new additional possibilities, above all, to counter the proliferation of chemical weapons.
A legitimate question arises. If it were possible to agree on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, why not use the same method for chemical weapons? That would be in the general trend towards their prohibition. We should like to inform members of the Committee that the Soviet Union would be prepared to take part in working out an international agreement on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons.

In this context, creation of chemical-weapon-free zones seems to be a promising approach. We think that such zones could be created in Europe as well as in other regions of the world. In this connection, we wish to recall the proposal of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty aimed at ridding Europe of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union supports the constructive proposals of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, addressed to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, to create a chemical-weapon-free zone, and we are ready to do everything in our power to create such a zone in the centre of Europe. If it were established, the USSR, in accordance with its fundamental foreign policy principles, would be ready to guarantee and respect its status. Our guarantee would come into force if the United States, for its part, acted likewise.
But the question arises that perhaps this fruitful proposal which forms the basis of the proposals of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia could also be applied to other areas – the Mediterranean, for instance, and subsequently to the entire African continent.

We also regard the creation of such zones as an important step facilitating the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Certain other measures of a similar nature would also be helpful in this connection. The refusal of all States to transfer chemical weapons to anybody or to acquire them from anybody, as well as the non-deployment of such weapons on foreign territory, could also contribute to their non-proliferation. Obviously, it would be useful if all States were to refrain from prompting or encouraging anybody, and in any form, to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile chemical weapons or to use such weapons.

All these measures, taken together, should, in our opinion, help to strengthen the régime of the non-use of chemical weapons, and to bring closer agreement on the universal prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons.

Turning to another specific question of horizontal proliferation, we should like to say that the Soviet Union believes that all States which are not parties to the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons should ratify or accede to this Convention, and in the meantime should not transfer to anybody, either directly or indirectly, nor should they acquire or produce, microbiological and other biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery, covered by the above-mentioned Convention.

Our delegation has already outlined in the First Committee the ideas of the Soviet Union on a broad programme of measures for limiting and reducing conventional armaments and armed forces. Today we would like to draw attention to that aspect of these measures which has to do with the non-proliferation of
conventional armaments. This issue has been raised repeatedly by various countries including the developing countries which favoured the reduction in the level of density of conventional arms in various parts of the world.

We have often spoken in favour of resuming negotiations on the limitation of sales and supplies of conventional weapons. Having broken them off as far back as 1978, the United States has refused to resume them. It is stated outright in official United States documents that supplies of conventional weapons are "regarded as an important element in the United States global defense system and an integral element of its foreign policy".

We should like to state again that we are ready to conduct negotiations on the limitation of sales and supplies of conventional weapons both on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

Measures to prevent the proliferation of specific types of conventional weapons which can be considered as having an excessively injurious or indiscriminate effect are also of great importance. These are the types of weapons whose use is prohibited or limited by the international Convention on this question concluded in 1981. As the Committee knows, the USSR was among the first to sign and ratify that Convention. The fact that a number of States, including the United States, Great Britain and other militarily significant countries are delaying the process of ratifying the Convention, is in effect preventing it from becoming an effective instrument in limiting conventional weapons.

Another method of reducing the dimensional aspect of military activity is the creation of zones of peace in various regions of the world. The Soviet delegation has been authorized to state that the USSR is prepared to take part, together with other permanent members of the Security Council, in guaranteeing any agreements which may be reached in this respect. The Soviet Union is firmly in favour of implementing the resolution, adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the General
Assembly, on convening a conference in Colombo, in the first half of 1986, with a view to making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

We confirm our commitment to the policy of turning the Mediterranean region into a zone of peace, security and fruitful co-operation. And I should like to inform the members of the Committee that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of our Party, Comrade Gorbachev, has just made the following statement on this subject:

"Together with other States members of the Warsaw Treaty, the Soviet Union is in favour of renouncing the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon Mediterranean countries, and the adoption by the nuclear-weapon Powers of an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the deployment of such weapons on its territory. Long ago we came out in favour of withdrawing vessels carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union is also in favour of extending to that area the military and technical confidence-building measures which have already proved their worth in international politics, in conformity with the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. A positive role would, in our view, be played by limiting naval activities and naval armaments in that part of the world."

The Soviet Union wholeheartedly endorses the constructive position and peaceful initiatives of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea, which call for the establishment of mutual understanding and normalization of relations among the States of South-East Asia and the transformation of this region into a zone of peace and stability.

International legal obligations that would create in-depth barriers to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons could usefully be supplemented by a decision not to take any steps leading to an expansion of the spheres of activity
of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty or to the formation of any new political-military groupings. In the present situation such a decision would be of particular importance from the political, military, moral and psychological standpoint.

We have just heard that the edifice of disarmament can be constructed only after preliminary conditions have been satisfied. Indeed, the building of that edifice is taking a great deal of time, although the plans were agreed to by all present in this room as early as 1978. Everything was done. Everything was provided for, but the building of the edifice has been wilfully blocked by certain countries. Yet the enterprise will brook no further delay. We must start carrying out the plans of building the disarmament edifice on which we agreed as long ago as 1978.
Drawing attention to the urgent measures in the field of quantitative limitation of the arms race, the Soviet Union calls upon all States to join it in the efforts to open a kind of second front against the military danger. Not a single opportunity for joint practical steps that could prevent the worst must be wasted. Action is required urgently.

In the nuclear missile age peace cannot rest on military force alone, on the constant piling up of mountains of arms. What is needed is a different, bold approach which corresponds to the new realities in both the military and the political fields. Creating new means of annihilation will not solve the problems facing the international community today. The Soviet Union and its allies call upon the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to rise above the existing differences. The time has come to revise established concepts and abandon cold war stereotypes.

As Mikhail S. Gorbachev emphasized at the October 1985 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

"international developments have approached a point which cannot be passed unless crucial decisions are taken with a view to putting an end to the arms race and preventing the slide towards war. These decisions cannot be postponed without a risk of losing control over the dangerous processes which threaten the very survival of mankind. Curbing the forces of militarism and war and ensuring lasting peace and reliable security constitute the central problem of our time."

Mr. KAPLLANI (Albania): Sir, allow me at the outset, on behalf of the Albanian delegation, to congratulate you warmly upon your election as Chairman of this Committee, as well as the other officers to whom we have entrusted the task of guiding the deliberations of our Committee.

As far as the arms race is concerned, the year that has elapsed since the last
session was no different from the previous one. The spiral of the arms race has climbed steeply and the danger of war has increased. It is a fact that the history of mankind has known no other period to match the past four decades following the Second World War, during which the arms race has assumed such unprecedented proportions that the weapons of the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich seem today like children's toys when compared with the weapons which the super-Powers and those who are pushing the world towards war possess today.

Whoever follows realistically the present-day world developments cannot have the slightest doubt that this armament, unprecedented in history, is primarily a by-product of the imperialist and hegemonist policy of the two super-Powers - the United States and the Soviet Union. Now more than ever before we are all eye-witnesses of the course taken by them: an aggressive political course which has led to the militarization of life and the economy, to the unbridled arms race and to the continuous perfecting of all types of weapons. While some two or three years ago the commotion in the East and the West was all about the deployment of the new United States Pershing and cruise missiles and their Soviet counterparts, the SS-20 missiles, in Europe, nowadays we are faced with a new qualitative stage in the arms race: the militarization of space, otherwise known as "star wars".

Any objective appraisal of the militarist and adventurist course of the super-Powers leads to the conclusion that such a course makes the danger of mankind's being engulfed in the flames of an imperialist world war, not excluding the use of nuclear weapons, all the more imminent.

Forty years after the atomic bomb was used by the United States imperialism against Hiroshima, the peoples of the world cannot be so naive as to think that Hiroshima was only a unique event which now belongs to past history. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the super-Powers and other imperialist Powers are always a means of threat and war.
This evaluation by Socialist Albania is not made from a purely pessimistic angle, nor is it made in order to take an original stand. Our position is based on a realistic analysis of the state of affairs and of the processes underlying present-day world developments. The super-Powers, which base their policies on the idea of exercising their rule and diktat over others, even their allies, are following the same road as those who headed the world towards slaughter.

In order to cover up this reality the super-Powers engage in elaborate and refined propaganda and large-scale political and psychological diversion so as to convince the peoples that they allegedly have to produce these weapons to safeguard world peace; that these weapons are allegedly needed to guarantee a strategic balance, which in turn makes a direct conflict between them impossible, thus averting a global conflagration. They even boastfully declare that it is thanks to this "balance of power" and the political "flexibility" allegedly shown by them that the world has been spared in these 40 years the horrors of an all-out war. However, if hitherto the world has not seen a global conflagration, let us not close our eyes and forget that all the local conflicts and wars that have been incited by the imperialist Powers and fought since the Second World War in various parts of the globe do not lag behind that war in terms of human victims and material losses. The super-Powers and other imperialist Powers have used these wars, in which different types of weapons have been employed, to test their new weapons and concepts of warfare. On the other hand, as an expression of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union for the division and redision of their spheres of influence and markets, these wars may one day become the prelude to a world conflagration.

The apologists of United States imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism, pseudo-experts and provocateur politicians, disseminate various kinds of theories
and doctrines according to which the unprecedented current development of weapons, accompanied by technical guarantees of mutual verification, could make possible the avoidance of an all-out war. But, if they are really being frank when speaking about avoiding an all-out war, why not decide on banning these weapons altogether?

There has been in recent years an obvious attempt at allegedly underlining the significance of the pledge by the nuclear Powers solemnly to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. They even speak of drawing up a convention on this matter. Those preaching almost ritualistically about its importance do not fail to explain to the rest of us that, if this pledge were to be made by all nuclear Powers, mankind would be approaching the stage of avoiding a nuclear war.

First, we should like to observe that, if past history and current developments can be regarded as serving as a good guide, there is little, if any, sound reason to believe that the imperialist Powers, and primarily the two super-Powers, can be trusted to comply with international law and norms, let alone their so-called pledges, however solemnly and pompously made. If their interests so dictate, they will not hesitate to violate and trample under foot any pledge or agreement, any international norms or laws.
Secondly, to come here every year and talk about the so-called significance of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, prompted allegedly by a concern for those not possessing nuclear weapons, cannot but produce a strong impression that all that is needed today is to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. Does this not obviously imply that conventional weapons are not a matter of great concern, that who uses them first or second is of less significance? This is totally unacceptable, not only for the aforementioned reasons, but also because the question arises: If it is not they who would be the first or, for that matter, the second to use nuclear weapons, who then would be? Would it be the rest of us who do not have such weapons at all? How can we trust such promises and pledges at a time when they continue to test and produce ever more sophisticated weapons? Therefore, such talk is mere sophistry and a play on words meant for propaganda. To trust the pledges of the super-Powers is but to deceive oneself.

We also hear the super-Powers state that they do not regard possession of nuclear weapons on their part as some kind of privilege; but, on the other hand, with their concrete policies and activities, they clearly show that they regard themselves as the only true guardians of international peace and security.

This amounts to admitting that the overwhelming majority of Member States comprising the United Nations General Assembly and not possessing nuclear weapons do not bear any responsibility for world peace and security but are mere spectators that helplessly watch the unfolding of world developments, waiting for the gift of peace to be presented to them by the super-Powers through the talks and deals they strike between them.

No, we do not believe that the destiny of peace is a matter concerning only the super-big or that it should be left in the hands of those wanting to rule the peoples and dominate the world.
The arms race and the arsenals for war are to be encountered, more than anywhere else, in Europe, upon which the super-Powers have imposed them through their political and military blocs - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty. This is, in the first place, a political diktat in an effort not to allow the European peoples to find the proper way to normalize the situation in their old continent and free it from the dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The arms race and the arms trade are also a colossal and profitable business for them to help them get out of the vicious circle of economic crisis by increasing weapons production and using it as an expedient for the so-called economic recovery. Deployment of Euromissiles and pressures exerted on the allies to endorse and participate in the "star wars" project are intended to involve them in the super-Powers' dangerous game. "Star wars" represents a new aspect in the frenzied arms race between the super-Powers and has become today an attractive topic for their propaganda. It is also a new alternative for giving fresh impetus to the arms race in the conditions of the crisis, ensuring fat profits for the military industries which, unlike civilian industry, works at full capacity. The intensive efforts to militarize space are also in full harmony with the permanent objective of the super-Powers to preserve their monopoly in the realm of armaments. Now that the nuclear-weapons club has grown bigger and the super-Powers' nuclear umbrella has to some extent lost its initial value, it is not accidental that they are working hard to add to this umbrella - if not to replace it - a "shield" in space that would increase the threat to the peoples' and the allies' dependence.

However, the hypocrisy and cynicism of the super-Powers know no limits: they are trying to present "star wars" as the most efficient means of saving mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. But naturally the question arises: If Washington and
Moscow are really as interested as they claim to be in the destiny of mankind and in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe, why should they do it with new types of weapons from space when we all know that their nuclear weapons are here on our planet? By erecting this "shield" in space, United States imperialism wishes, in addition to gaining supremacy over others, to prevent the efforts and ambitions of Western Europe from becoming an independent economic, military and technological power, to tighten the screws on its allies who, for their part, have not failed to express their concern that the "space shield" would leave them vulnerable to a possible nuclear attack. It is not in vain that the Americans are working hard to have their allies incorporated into this project. This is done with the purpose of lulling their fears as well as making them pay part of the costs of a dangerous enterprise that in the final analysis is in the interests of the United States. The Soviet Union, for its part, says that it is forced to accept this challenge although it is allegedly not engaged in developing such new weapons. In fact, it is making use of "star wars" as an argument against its main rival, the United Staters, and also to subjugate and blackmail its own allies.

Just as in other sessions of the General Assembly, here also in this First Committee we have become accustomed to seeing the United States and Soviet representatives come here with full dossiers. In them one can find elaborate and bombastic pronouncements from their stale propaganda arsenals, and also "proposals" on disarmament. Of late we have heard the highest officials of the United States and the Soviet Union speak here in the United Nations and outside on disarmament issues. At present they have been engaged in an intense propaganda campaign on these problems in order to convince world public opinion that their side is more interested in achieving disarmament than is the other, that if no results have been achieved so far the blame for it lies with the other side. But this kind of super-Power propaganda has become kind of ritualistic and boring. To the already
known disarmament vocabulary - such as SALT, START and so forth - new terms and phrases have been coined and added, such as SDI, nuclear freeze, moratorium and so forth. Chronologically speaking, mention can be made of their clamorous proposals made in 1963, 1971, 1974 or those made in recent years. They have also propagated the institutionalization of the talks between their experts in Geneva, Vienna and elsewhere. But what has come out of this odyssey of their talks? Nothing. They have in fact become demagogic forums resembling the mills that grind no grain but words and words alone.

The production of nuclear weapons has not stopped for a moment, in spite of agreements that are not lacking and that bear even the signatures of their Heads of States. In essence, either the "zero option", the "freeze", the "moratorium" or any other alternative offered from time to time by them have been part of a political game, also militarily calculated so as to find at any given moment those strategic limits, that parity and balance that would serve their dominant position in Europe and in the world, the intended preservation of their distance from others.

In our time, when the twenty-first century is knocking at the door and the arms-production technology cannot be compared even to that of a decade ago, to believe in the deceptive explanations of the super-Powers that such a development could lead to a new equilibrium that will exclude war is Utopian and is to fall into the super-Powers' trap and willy-nilly to play their game.

Their policy of "strategic balance" based on those concepts that proceed from a position of force is a dangerous policy of balance on the verge of war which may lead the world into catastrophe. Exposing such concepts, the unforgettable leader of the Albanian people, Comrade Enver Hoxha, has pointed out:
(Mr. Kapllani, Albania)

"The People's Socialist Republic of Albania does not accept and publicly exposes the so-called theory about the need to preserve the 'balance between the super-Powers' as a condition or a basis to avoid war and defend peace ..."

"Peace and international security in Europe and in the world at large are not achieved through the establishment of 'harmony' or 'balance' between the super-Powers, but through struggle against imperialist pressures and intervention, through efforts for the liberation of the peoples, through the strengthening of national independence and sovereignty."

In conclusion, the Albanian delegation reiterates its view that war, including nuclear war, is not fatally unavoidable. It can be prevented if the peoples and sovereign States become conscious of its danger and of their own strength. Progress can be made towards genuine disarmament if the aggressive political and military blocs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty are destroyed, if United States and Soviet bases and troops are withdrawn from Europe and the rest of the world, if all roads are blocked to their possibilities for inciting and undertaking aggressive wars.

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is the representative of Argentina and current President of the Conference on Disarmament, who will introduce the report of that body.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina)(interpretation from Spanish): May I begin by expressing to you, Sir, my warmest congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly. I am convinced that, under your able, skilful and wise guidance, the First Committee will be in a position to discharge fully its responsibilities during the fortieth session of the Assembly. May I also pledge you my fullest co-operation to ensure the success of your endeavours, both in my capacity as representative of Argentina in this Committee and in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament.
I have the honour to present the annual report of the Conference on 
Disarmament covering its 1985 session. That report, which is contained in 
document CD/642, has been circulated as an official record of the General Assembly, 
Supplement No. 27, under the symbol A/40/27.

Appendices to the report have also been circulated to all States Members of 
the United Nations in the various working languages as they were received from the 
United Nations Office in Geneva. Appendix II contains a list and text of documents 
issued by the Conference and appendix III contains an index of statements by 
country and subject and verbatim records of the Conference.

The Conference's agenda for 1985 is contained in paragraph 10 of the report. 
That same paragraph also includes the programme of work for the first part of the 
annual session. The programme of work for the second part of the session appears 
in paragraph 12 of the report.

As may be seen from the activities carried out in the course of this year, all 
substantive questions on the agenda were duly considered on different occasions 
during this year's session. Thus, we should point out that in 1985 the Conference 
held a total of 364 plenary meetings, informal meetings, meetings of subsidiary 
bodies and informal consultations - a larger number of meetings than held in the 
past.

The Conference continues in the pre-negotiation stage with respect to the 
first items on its programme of work relating to the nuclear test ban, the 
cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of 
nuclear war, including all related matters. Special attention was given to better 
organization of the Conference's work on those three questions. Although views, 
suggestions and ideas were submitted on substantive areas of those items, it was 
not possible to reach agreement on organizational aspects in order to begin to deal 
with such questions.
I should point out that some progress was achieved on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, especially with regard to its definition, the elimination of arsenals, the implementation of national measures and the non-use of chemical weapons. The negotiations in the relevant subsidiary body were intensified in 1985 and it was agreed that they should resume between 13 and 31 January in the Ad Hoc Committee, before the start of the Conference's 1986 session. In addition, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee is carrying out consultations on a number of questions by way of preparation for the resumption of work on the appointed date.

This year the Conference succeeded in establishing, for the first time, a subsidiary body to consider agenda item 5 relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. That agreement paved the way for the consideration at the multilateral level of a question of paramount and critical importance the consideration of which should not be limited to the exclusive framework of bilateral negotiations because of its importance for all nations. That outstanding event facilitated frank and useful exchange of views and made it possible to identify a series of questions which will be the object of further consideration in the future. In this connection, I should like to draw attention to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which recognizes in its conclusions:

"... the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space ... consequently, all efforts to be made to assure that the substantive work on this agenda item ... will be pursued at the next session of the Conference." (A/40/27, p. 125, para. 56)
Although the position on the question of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States has not changed, on other questions new ideas were put forward - for instance, in the case of the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and radiological weapons. Those questions will be the object of renewed attention.
The Conference also made some progress in the preparation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, although a considerable number of questions are still unresolved. We must express our regret at the fact that it was not possible for the Conference to submit the full text of the comprehensive programme of disarmament for adoption at this session of the General Assembly as a contribution to the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations. I trust, however, that in keeping with the mandate given to the Conference by the General Assembly it will be possible at the next session to submit a draft which will command the consensus of the Conference on Disarmament.

Apart from all this, the Conference dealt with the expansion of its membership. This question is dealt with in paragraphs 16 to 19 of the Report where member States recognized its importance and urgency. The Conference reaffirmed its decision that its membership might be increased by not more than four States and agreed that candidates for membership should be nominated, two by the Group of 21, one by the Socialist Group and one by the Western Group, so as to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference. In this connection, it was agreed that the Conference should intensify its consultations with a view to taking a positive decision at its next annual session, and that it would inform accordingly the forty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The work of the Conference has obviously been affected by the events which characterize the prevailing international situation. With respect to such sensitive matters as disarmament it is not easy to achieve progress in a climate of confrontation or in a state of affairs where essential elements for a focus on co-operation are lacking. Despite such difficulties, the mere fact that some limited progress should have been achieved should be regarded as an achievement by the Conference.
As I pointed out in the statement I made at the final meeting, the Conference on Disarmament, in our view, is an essential instrument in the quest for solutions to the serious problems threatening peace. None of the prevailing political trends in the world today can do without the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament, in our view, represents an important stage in the evolution and development of appropriate institutional arrangements for the adoption of measures to promote general and complete disarmament under effective international control. While I realize that our procedures are far from perfect, we must, however, recognize that they reflect a growing democratization of the disarmament negotiations. I am convinced that notwithstanding the difficulties confronting the Conference, these views will be shared by members of the First Committee. Moreover, for the first time in the framework of multilateral disarmament negotiations, the five nuclear-weapon States are sitting around the same negotiating table. It is also within the present membership of the multilateral negotiating body that it has been possible for the group of non-aligned and neutral countries to have a majority largely reflecting their representation in the international community. There is not the slightest doubt that we must pursue efforts to improve the organization of our work. However, we cannot fail to acknowledge that we have made significant progress in the right direction.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Conference on Disarmament is the first multilateral negotiating body to assume the responsibility of including on its agenda the consideration of essential measures to halt the arms race. When partial measures agreed on by previous negotiating bodies are cited as an example of effectiveness, it should also be remembered that those bodies avoided the consideration of those measures without which we cannot speak of real disarmament.
The Conference on Disarmament is of paramount importance for the non-aligned and neutral countries, for it is there that the voices are heard of those who, while not being responsible for the holocaust, will nevertheless be among its victims. It is also important for them because it ensures that they have their say in decisions affecting their technological independence and legitimate demands for an end to the suicidal, useless and costly arms race. The non-aligned and neutral countries also bear special responsibility in the Conference, in particular in situations of political confrontation between military alliances. It is up to them to work for an understanding and a rapprochement of positions. They cannot refuse this role, and this applies in particular when dealing with questions where profound differences call for their intervention, not as mediators but as independent participants in political processes calling for dialogue and negotiation rather than confrontation and rivalry.

The Conference on Disarmament is also of importance for the nuclear-weapon States and for those Powers which have chosen the course of military alliances. In times of crisis and interruption of bilateral negotiations the Conference provides them with the sole available forum for global negotiations where they can express their concerns and aspirations in the search for mutually satisfactory arrangements. As militarily significant States the members of those alliances have a primary responsibility in ending the arms race and have no means other than the Conference on Disarmament for ratifying agreements in the international community.
Any international agreement on disarmament requiring the endorsement of the United Nations General Assembly must be negotiated and agreed on in the framework of that multilateral body so that the concerns of the various political trends present in the international community will be duly and properly met.

Lack of progress on some fundamental questions considered by the Conference, as in the case of nuclear questions, should not be attributed to the Conference as such, which has worked intensively to achieve concrete results. The lack of progress must be attributed to the international climate which has affected negotiations in other international forums as well. On the other hand, it is true that efforts to move forward in matters of disarmament cannot depend on the evolution of world affairs. Those efforts must continue and, in this connection, I nourish the hope that in the course of next year it will be possible for the Conference to decide to initiate negotiations on a number of matters that are critical for mankind. Survival in the nuclear age is a matter of concern to all and not merely to those that have the doubtful privilege of possessing nuclear weapons.

As President of the Conference I wish to state, as is customary, that I shall always be available to all delegations for consultations and exchanges of view relating to the future work of the Conference.

In conclusion, I must say for the record that I have the highest opinion of the performance of the Secretariat of the Conference under the effective and enlightened guidance of Ambassador Komatina and his deputy, Ambassador Berasategui. The Conference on Disarmament should be extremely grateful for the high technical and administrative level which characterizes those functions which call not only for effort and dedication, but also for imaginative capacity in providing appropriate assistance when dealing with complex matters.
Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (interpretation from Russian):
The year since the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations has been marked by new efforts aimed at reducing the danger of a nuclear war and at curbing the arms race. The beginning of the Soviet Union—United States negotiations instilled hope in peoples of the world that a turn for the better in the international situation was possible, that agreements could be reached to prevent an arms race in space and to curb it on our planet. Socialist, non-aligned and many other States this year again confirmed their will to achieve effective measures to prevent a nuclear war, to limit armaments and to bring about disarmament. As an example, I would cite the communiqué of the meeting of the leaders of member States of the Warsaw Treaty of 26 April, the well-known proposals of the Soviet Union, and particularly the far-reaching initiatives of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mikhail Gorbachev, of 3 October this year. I should also like to point to the Delhi Declaration and the Final Declaration of the meeting of foreign ministers of non-aligned States in Luanda.

The mass movement of peoples for peace and disarmament has become ever more active, as can be seen from the numerous conferences and statements of various non-governmental organizations, political parties and scientific, trade union and church organizations.

On the other hand, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, as a result of the unprecedented escalation of the arms race and increased international tension, peace on earth is threatened more today than it has ever been since the end of the Second World War.
The continuing deployment in Western Europe of nuclear first-strike-capability weapons have led to the further worsening of the situation in Europe and in the world as a whole. An incredible threat stems from attempts to extend the arms race to outer space. Those responsible for such a dangerous situation are well known. They are precisely those who plan the "star wars" programme, who follow military doctrines which accept the concept of the first use of nuclear weapons and, therefore, the unleashing of an all-destructive nuclear war.

Today all States, large and small, must solve a fundamental question: to continue the arms race, to transfer it to new areas, to continue to intensify the danger of war or, through the concerted action of all States, to strengthen international security and to ensure a more lasting peace for all peoples.

The parties to the Warsaw Treaty have given their response by stressing their firm will to prevent a nuclear war and to contribute to détente and international co-operation. They have confirmed that they do not wish to achieve military preponderance nor will they tolerate military preponderance over them. They are in favour of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. Stressing the demand that there be a wide front against a nuclear catastrophe is something which is fully in keeping with the lessons of the Second World War which were quite justly emphasized in particular this year.

In his message to the Prime Minister of Japan on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the use of the atomic bomb, the President of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, noted:

"Today, 40 years after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of Dresden and Magdeburg, the oath of peace sworn in 1945 is ever more timely
than ever before ... In order to repulse the threat of a nuclear catastrophe by a nuclear war, the German Democratic Republic is ready to co-operate with all forces of reason and realism for the victory of peace, détente and disarmament. Differences on various points or different points of view must not be an obstacle to peaceful co-operation when it is literally a matter for mankind to be or not to be."
The peoples of the world expect from this anniversary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations a new incentive in removing the threat of a nuclear war. They expect action to curb the arms race and to bring about disarmament.

First, one must intensify negotiations to limit armaments and bring about disarmament, that is to say, carry them out in a businesslike and serious manner on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The agreement between the United Socialist Party of the German Democratic Republic and the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany on a draft agreement to create in Europe a zone free of chemical weapons is an example of the fact that positive results are possible if all participants in negotiations really want success.

Secondly, it is necessary to create the best possible conditions to succeed in negotiations. This requires maximum moderation of the participants in such negotiations, especially renouncing measures which would result in intensifying the arms race and strengthening military confrontation. Only thus can one overcome the phenomenon so often regretted in the Committee that the arms race is far ahead of negotiations. With a moratorium on all nuclear explosions and several further unilateral steps taken in recent years, the USSR has carried out this task. A positive reply on the part of the United States of America would significantly contribute to success in the Soviet-American negotiations and in the forthcoming summit meeting.

Thirdly, progress can be achieved in curbing armaments only if the foundation already created is not destroyed. The centre of attention is held by further efforts and stronger implementation of multilateral or bilateral agreements, already achieved, to limit armaments, to effect disarmament and to keep alive the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament of the General Assembly. That is why we welcome the readiness of the USSR to ratify on a mutual
basis the Soviet-American treaties on limiting underground nuclear-weapon tests and underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. Nothing must threaten the Soviet-American treaty on limiting anti-ballistic missiles.

The Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty significantly stressed the importance and the vital nature of this most important multilateral agreement on the limitation of armaments. Immediate implementation of proposals contained in the Final Document would contribute to further strengthening the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

States possessing nuclear weapons are certainly especially responsible for reducing the threat of a nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament. At the same time, all other States must and can contribute to reaching that objective. That is why we are in favour of parallel bilateral and multilateral negotiations. In present conditions, the German Democratic Republic attaches priority to the following measures:

1. Curbing of the arms race or its prevention in space;
2. Full and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests;
3. Adoption of practical measures to prevent a nuclear war, such as a non-first use pledge;
4. Freezing of nuclear arsenals and a shift towards nuclear disarmament;
5. Strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
6. Total prohibition of chemical weapons.

The German Democratic Republic attaches great importance to the creation in Europe and in other parts of the world of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons. Therefore we highly value the conclusion of a treaty on such a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific as an important step towards limiting
nuclear arms. The German Democratic Republic will intensify its efforts with a view to the creation in central Europe of a zone free from tactical nuclear weapons.

Having made a proposal for negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany for the creation of a zone free from chemical weapons, the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have confirmed their will to strengthen confidence and security in the centre of Europe and to contribute to the speedy conclusion of a convention on the full prohibition of chemical weapons.

I should like now to speak on two problems which are of major importance for curbing the arms race and preventing a nuclear war. I have in mind preventing the arms race in space and the full prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The plan to create space-strike weapons and a large-scale anti-ballistic-missile system with a space-basing mode is tantamount to an illusory but extremely dangerous attempt to achieve military preponderance. Space weapons would to a large extent increase the danger of the unleashing of a nuclear war. This is based on a strategic goal of this plan, under the guise of an anti-missile shield based in space, to be able with impunity to deal a first-strike with nuclear and space weapons. Practice has shown that this is not an abstract matter of theoretical disquisitions. Having recently tested a new anti-satellite weapon, having created a unified space command, one of the parties has embarked on the fateful road of the militarization of outer space.
So-called strategic defence threatens not only the treaty between the USSR and the United States limiting anti-ballistic missiles systems, and the whole process of the limitation of armaments and disarmament, but would lead to destabilizing the strategic situation. The exploration and exploitation of space for peaceful purposes would be seriously threatened. This cannot be concealed behind statements of well-known circles that, participation in the strategic defence initiative programme is allegedly essential to achieve advanced technology and that guarantees are possible which would exclude dangerous consequences of that programme.

There can be no doubt that the programme is fraught with the danger of speeding up the arms race in an unprecedented manner. Those who participate assume an extremely heavy responsibility for their people and for the whole of mankind. It is not yet too late to stop this perilous beginning. Reason dictates that by measures of a preventative character, one should prevent the dissemination of the arms race to space and to exclude the creation of a qualitatively new weapon.

The path to this decision can be seen in the general and all-embracing draft treaties presented in this field by the USSR in 1981 and in 1983. The Soviet Union proposed that on bilateral negotiations a moratorium be established for the creation of space-strike weapons. This would considerably increase the chances of success. By the same token, one should effectively use the possibilities of multilateral negotiations, in the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, to prevent an arms race in space. However, the desire to transform the negotiations into interminable discussions for or against space weapons would run counter to this goal, as would talk about the need to agree about the rules of the militarization of space. This is a direct continuation of the line which for 10 years of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament have prevented a serious discussion of the question of the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction.
Ten years ago the proposal of the socialist States concerning preventative prohibition of radiation weapons was rejected. Today, nobody will gainsay the danger of that component of the concept of the so-called "star wars".

With its proposal about international co-operation in the field of the peaceful exploitation of space in conditions of its non-militarization, the USSR continues its efforts aimed at solving one of the key problems of our times. To the so-called "star wars", it opposes the concept of peace and co-operation in space. This is a timely response to the demands contained in General Assembly resolutions that outer space be used for exclusively peaceful goals. The Soviet draft treaties about preventing the arms race in space, and the programme presented by the Soviet Union about the peaceful uses of space are a single whole. They are consonant with the key interests of mankind and are designed at uniting the efforts of all States with a view to ensuring a peaceful exploitation of space.

Indeed, the use of space technology for peaceful purposes would open up large-scale prospects for solving the economic and social problems on earth. There would be greater opportunities for supporting developing countries in their will to overcome their economic backwardness. The proposals of the Soviet Union about the convening of an international conference, and about the creation of an international organization on space, are designed to contribute to international co-operation for the exploration and exploitation of space for peaceful purposes.

The efforts in the field of disarmament are also greatly served by the idea that this organization be entrusted with the task of overseeing respect for agreements about non-militarization of space. That would open up new possibilities to ensure trustworthy control over existing agreements. It would certainly be useful, when creating such an organization, to take into account the experience achieved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in matters of
international co-operation and control. Speedy conclusion of a treaty on the full and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be of decisive importance for putting an end to the nuclear-arms race.

That is why it is quite understandable that the Third Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stressed the great priority that should be attached to such a step. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the moratorium introduced by the USSR on 6 August of this year pertaining to any nuclear explosions as a step aiming at improving conditions for the conclusion of an agreement.

If the United States, and then other nuclear States, follow the example of the Soviet Union, such a large-scale moratorium would guarantee successful negotiations to conclude a treaty on a complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. Thus these States concerned, possessing nuclear weapons, would carry out their obligation for the general cessation of nuclear-weapon tests enshrined in international agreements and in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

During the work of the Conference on Disarmament, of the First Committee, and other bodies, one side again used so-called verification questions as a pretext to prevent, through lengthy technical discussions, the total prohibition of nuclear arsenals. In this connection I would like to draw attention to the following. First, in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, all States recognized the principle according to which the form of control would be determined by the scope of the corresponding agreement. Therefore, there is no question that separately from fundamental discussions, there be discussions on verification for the establishment of a control system without the conclusion of an agreement for full prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.
Secondly, political or technical questions related to such an agreement have for more than 25 years been discussed from every possible angle. At the end of the 1970s there were tripartite negotiations which almost completed the text of a treaty. Now the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has on the table all-embracing draft treaties submitted by the Soviet Union and Sweden. Therefore, we do not need any discussions on its non-compulsory nature or for or against control measures. We need negotiations to work out a treaty to put an end to nuclear-weapon tests, especially since it has been proved that even today every possibility exists to ensure effective verification of compliance with a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests.

The third Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was quite justified in appealing to the nuclear States to resume tripartite negotiations and take part in discussions leading to negotiations to be carried out in the Conference on Disarmament. The German Democratic Republic would like to see the United Nations General Assembly at this session adopt a resolution calling for such negotiations to be started.

Mr. SWELL (India): Sir, I congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this important Committee. May I say that you have assumed this responsibility at a memorable and should I say also, crucial time; and, if at the end of it all we emerge from our labours with concrete ideas for global peace and disarmament on which we can all agree, we shall have done a fine job. In your conduct of the proceedings of the Committee, Mr. Chairman, you will have the full co-operation of my delegation.

Mr. Chairman, in your opening observations to this Committee you spoke with anguish of the fact that global disarmament, except in respect of biological
weapons, was a mirage that kept on receding from us. You echoed the feeling of all humankind. The other day we had the opportunity of listening to the representative of Sweden, who spoke of the frustration, the hopelessness and the fear of the whole generation of young people who saw no future for themselves because of the shadow of a nuclear war, occurring by accident or design. This is a most dangerous thing. Everything stems from the human mind. A frustrated person who has lost all hope for himself can commit any crime without batting an eyelid about the consequences. We have to free man from this incubus. We can do it if we have the will, if the sovereign States have the political and the moral will. I am reminded of Shakespeare, who said: "it is not in our stars, dear Brutus, but in ourselves that we are underlings".

Forty years ago the world was a prey to anger, fear, frustration and destruction and stood before ideological divides that seemed unbridgeable. Yet it came together and founded this United Nations, whose fortieth year we are commemorating and which in these 40 years has provided a forum, the only forum, where nations come to talk, to discuss, to find solutions, rather than fight over differences. But for the United Nations, we might perhaps have destroyed our planet by this time.

Today another such opportunity is before us. Our science and technology have opened new frontiers to man's activity and progress. The deep oceans are yielding up their mysteries and their wealth for the good of man. We have been able to set up an international régime for the sea-bed and the ocean floors. We have learned to understand our environment better. In Antarctica an international treaty has worked effectively to safeguard that icy continent and preserve climatic conditions world-wide.
What remains now is the sky - outer space, if you like - which has been there since the beginning of time, up to which man has looked since he began his existence on the planet, which has been the source of his life, solar energy. Shall we black out the sky by nuclear blasts, shall we bring on a nuclear winter to destroy all life? Or shall we avail ourselves collectively, as children of this earth, of exciting new possibilities of economic and scientific activities in space? This to me is the crux of the question around which discussion on disarmament, which should be global and complete, should revolve.
Instead of disarmament, however, we have armament. We talk glibly of nuclear non-proliferation. What we mean is horizontal non-proliferation by which we seek to disarm the unarmed, whereas nuclear-weapon States, especially those with major space capabilities, continue to proliferate their nuclear weapons vertically. Nuclear armament has reached the frontiers of outer space. New vocabularies describing new generations of weapons - high-energy lasers, particle beam weapons, radio frequency weapons, directed energy weapons, kinetic energy weapons - have gained currency. We are reaching the unknown with our destructive capability. Thus far our engagements have been only on earth or in the waters. Now it will be in space if we do not halt. Space, which had traditionally been thought of as a seat of paradise where all good souls go, will rain death and destruction on us. Ordinary words, thought processes, also seem to have undergone a change. It was offensive weapons against offensive weapons, missiles against missiles, warheads against warheads that, we were told, held the balance of terror and preserved the peace. Now, we are told differently, that it is defensive weapons against offensive weapons, a missile using new physical principles shooting down an oncoming missile with nuclear warheads, that will preserve the peace, a balance of safety rather than a balance of terror. What guarantee is there that these missiles based in space will fire only on oncoming missiles and not on missiles stationed on Earth or on Earth installations and thus unleash a nuclear war? What guarantee is there that this so-called balance of safety will better safeguard and preserve world peace than the balance of terror?

As we see it, the arms race in outer space will only add another dimension to the nuclear armaments file, and this dimension calls for a more massive transfer of resources on a large scale from economic development to the creation of new offensive-defensive systems and new weapons. Estimates of such expenditure by one
country alone is made in terms of trillions. Hundreds of millions of children in the world go to bed hungry, die of preventable diseases; hundreds of millions of people perish of malnutrition or starvation. Can we expect them to continue so to perish without anger and resentment? In this situation do we wonder why so many countries have revolutions and are unstable? Shall we wonder when these internal upheavals lead to regional conflicts, and when such conflicts are in-built in the economic situations of those countries and regions can we expect to contain them by "paxes" without drawing in the intervention of one super-Power or another and confrontation with the other, thus again bringing about the possibility of a nuclear conflict? In a large number of cases, these conflicts have also been due to the strategic concepts and interests that flow from super-Power rivalry. Thus the world has lived from crisis to crisis. We hold our breath and we ask, where will it end? There is and seems to be no answer.

It is in this context that we look forward to the summit in Geneva next month between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. In this connection our Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, speaking at the inaugural session of the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government in the Bahamas a couple of days ago, said that the summit would be crucial for an earnest process of substantial disarmament. He called for a bold agreement to do away with nuclear weapons as "even a limited nuclear war will cause limitless disaster".

Man today is almost a god. He has control of the atom, of molecules, of isotopes. He can refashion the world. He can conquer diseases. He even hopes to remake himself through gene splicing and recombinant DNA. Can he not turn away from destruction to constructive existence? He can without doubt. Let us seize the moment, let us grasp the hour. There is a chance. We have nothing to fear but fear itself, and I am reminded of Omar Khayyam, who said:
"O Love, if you and I with fate could conspire
To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,
Would we not shatter it to bits and then
Rebuild it nearer our heart's desire?"

My country has consistently and passionately been for peace and disarmament. The Father of our Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, taught us to fight for the dignity and freedom of peoples, for the dignity and freedom of the individual, but not to hate those who may have oppressed us. Our first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was among the architects of the five principles of Panchsheel - sovereignty of all nations, respect for their territorial integrity, non-interference in their internal affairs, non-aggression and peaceful coexistence. Our late lamented Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, had consistently followed that path. Our present Prime Minister is doing the same, adding youth, vitality and dynamism.
(Mr. Swell, India)

India has signed and ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the non-use of chemical and biological weapons, the partial test-ban Treaty, the outer space Treaty, the biological weapons Convention, the sea-bed Treaty, the Convention on the prohibition of military use of environmental modification techniques, and the inhumane weapons Convention, and we shall work persistently for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the reduction and dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction.

The ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical-weapon convention are a matter of considerable importance and priority for India. We earnestly wish to see the speediest conclusion of those negotiations. India remains committed to the search for general and complete disarmament.

We reiterate that we cannot remain unconcerned about the efforts of nuclear-weapon States to legitimize the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their use or threat of use. The history of the past 18 years since the so-called nuclear non-proliferation Treaty was concluded provides grim and telling testimony of the cynical manner in which depository States of the NPT have ignored and even violated their obligations under the Treaty. The developments have fully borne out our well-founded fears that agreements such as the NPT would only constitute a charter for unrestrained vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States and has conferred upon them special status and even accorded prestige for the maintenance and escalation of their nuclear arsenals. The recent Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT revealed once again the fatuity of the so-called good faith promise of nuclear-weapon States to negotiate on a nuclear-weapon-test ban.
There is a parallelism of discrimination between the provisions of the NPT and proposals encouraged by nuclear-weapon States for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world. Those proposals would only provide a rationale and indeed justify the present world order in which a couple or more nuclear-weapon States are jeopardizing the continuation of the human species itself. The 50,000 nuclear warheads in existence can destroy the entire globe several times over. Recent findings about a nuclear winter and other environmental consequences of the use of nuclear weapons convey in no uncertain terms that a nuclear war would have global dimensions and that it cannot be effectively tackled in partial or regional terms. Can a nuclear blast and its radioactive fall-out be stopped at the borders of a State or region? Proposals for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, therefore, are unrealistic in the context of a spiralling nuclear arms race. The nuclear-weapon States themselves appear to realize that when they reject proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones involving their own territories or those of their allies. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States appear to show scant regard for nuclear-weapon-free zones when it conflicts with their strategic interests.

For over 20 years the General Assembly has declared the possession of nuclear weapons and their use as a crime against humanity. Year after year we have made attempts to declare nuclear weapons illegal and to prohibit their use in any circumstances. These proposals have received the overwhelming support of the vast majority of the Members of the United Nations. Yet some of the principal parties in the nuclear arms race have cynically ignored these proposals. We are aware that by simple prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and outlawing their possession we will not bring about their elimination. However, by stripping those weapons of
the prestige conferred on them and reiterating its condemnation of their use as a monstrous crime against humanity, the General Assembly will help in catalysing a process towards their elimination.

To halt the nuclear arms race, no measure has received so much attention as a nuclear-weapon-test ban to limit not only the modernization of nuclear arsenals but also their size. There is thus the most urgent need today for initiating negotiations for a nuclear-test ban, and the First Committee should unanimously adopt a draft resolution, in this fortieth anniversary year of the United Nations, designed to launch serious negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. No problem, no pretext, no concern, should postpone or truncate this endeavour.

A freeze on nuclear weapons is yet another measure for adoption by the international community to cope with and contain the nuclear peril. India has been submitting draft resolutions calling for a nuclear-weapon freeze for the past three years, and we attach high priority to the adoption of this measure. We have heard arguments about the alleged unverifiability of a nuclear-weapon freeze from precisely those nations which otherwise claim to favour reductions in nuclear weapons. How can reductions be verifiable while a freeze remains unverifiable? The same machinery with which reductions can be verified can serve equally well to verify the freeze. It has been our view that a freeze is not an end in itself but a crucial measure that would put an end to devious arguments for modernization of weapon systems. As the symposium organized in New York this year by the Third World Foundation concluded in its final statement:

"Such a freeze would raise the level of trust among States, ease international tension and create a favourable atmosphere for drastic reductions of nuclear arsenals."
During the past two years, the First Committee has devoted a great deal of attention to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolutions adopted had the unprecedented support of as many as 147 to 150 Members of the General Assembly. Still the Conference on Disarmament, the sole negotiating body in the field of disarmament, has remained bogged down in the aimless exercise of examining whether the existing international instruments are adequate to prevent the extension of the arms race into space, and despite a clear mandate from the General Assembly to negotiate an agreement for this purpose a few powerful nations have refused to heed that mandate.
In the meanwhile, new weapon systems being planned for outer space are going through a speedy gestation period. We have already lost three years, thanks to the rigid stand taken by these States. We do not have much more time. New and most deadly weapon systems are already shifting from drawing boards, laboratories and research to test sites and demonstrations. This year the General Assembly should pronounce itself strongly and unequivocally against this arms race into outer space and should unanimously call on the Conference on Disarmament to undertake urgent negotiations for preventing it.

Lastly, recent developments have confirmed that the global economic crisis is not of a cyclical nature but is rooted in structural problems. The astronomical sums being wasted by the most developed nations on military expenditures may have led to severe structural problems in their own economies which have in turn, through global interdependence, affected the economies of other developed nations and also developing countries. The relationship between disarmament and development has accordingly assumed critical importance for the world community. The Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development successfully concluded its first session this year. It is gratifying to note that the Preparatory Committee unanimously adopted the recommendations on the provisional agenda, rules of procedure, venue, date and duration of the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. The task before us in the First Committee now is to facilitate further the preparatory process for the holding of this international conference next year. The report of the Preparatory Committee contains the main elements of action required from the General Assembly. We sincerely hope that by earnestly expediting action on the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee the General Assembly will make crucial contributions to international efforts to resolve this important issue.
(Mr. Swell, India)

We have just started our commemoration of the 40 years of the United Nations. Let it not be the completion of 40 years, important as they may be, that we celebrate but the beginning of the next 40 years.

The meeting rose at 2.05 p.m.