VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

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CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

ORGANIZATION OF WORK
The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46, 47, 53, 54, 56, 59, 60, 62, 64 and 142 (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now hear those delegations that want to explain their votes on the draft resolutions adopted this morning.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): I believe that the careful student of disarmament discussions, both here in the First Committee and in the Conference on Disarmament, would not have been surprised by Poland's vote on the draft resolutions contained in cluster 6. In my present statement I should like to address myself specifically to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71.

Allow me to state first of all that in the light of what can be read in the report of the Conference on Disarmament on the item on its agenda entitled "Nuclear-test ban", in particular in paragraphs 39, 43 and 48, we consider it a bit strange for the sponsors to include in the draft resolution the eighth preambular paragraph in its present wording, which suggests that the blame for the impasse should be attributed to all members of the Conference - as we all know, this is certainly not the case. This was indicated by a number of previous speakers on this draft resolution.

But the main issue is again the uncalled-for overemphasis, at this stage already, on the question of verification. While we appreciate the efforts made by Australia in the Conference on Disarmament when it submitted document CD/531, we are of the opinion that the wording of operative paragraph 4 attempts to prejudge in a rather arbitrary manner certain things that in our view should only be taken up and settled in the process of negotiations and makes the whole draft resolution severely unbalanced. This one-sided approach to important aspects of the problem, disregarding completely the position of a considerable number of States, left my delegation with no other choice but to vote against operative paragraph 4 and to abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 as a whole.

I am afraid that the position adopted by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 does not augur too well for the work of the Conference on Disarmament on this subject in 1985.
Mr. BUENTIG (German Democratic Republic): The delegation of the German Democratic Republic wishes to explain its vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.71, entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

While supporting the other two draft resolutions dealing with the subject of an immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, one of which is co-sponsored by the German Democratic Republic, we abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 as a whole and joined other delegations in voting against operative paragraph 4 of that draft resolution. Operative paragraph 4, which is the core of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, is formulated in such a way as to enable those who prevented substantial negotiations on this vital issue during the 1984 session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to continue their attempts to foster the belief that verification problems were blocking the road to the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. Instead of calling on the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly to negotiations with a view to elaborating a relevant treaty as a matter of the highest priority, emphasis is put on superficial discussions of such particular aspects of a treaty as monitoring of nuclear explosions and compliance with provisions which do not even exist. Once again, the authors of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 neglect the fact that today all the necessary technical prerequisites exist for the verification of compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Once again, an attempt is being made to avoid giving the Conference on Disarmament a clear negotiating mandate in accordance with the purpose of that Conference.

In explaining its vote on the predecessor of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 last year, my delegation noted that the operative paragraph of that draft resolution containing suggestions for a mandate for the Conference on Disarmament was considerably weaker than the already unsatisfactory formulations of resolution 37/73. Now we are facing the situation that the non-negotiating character of those provisions has been further strengthened. It cannot be said that this approach is in the interest of the early conclusion of a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.
Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The Argentine delegation wishes to explain briefly its vote on the three draft resolutions on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests which we adopted this morning.

The draft resolutions are really aimed at the same objective and have many common elements which do not exclude the possibility that in the not too remote future it will be possible for the General Assembly to adopt by a large majority one single draft resolution on this subject on which, with very few exceptions, there does in fact exist a broad consensus. Argentine voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.18 because, in its view, it satisfactorily reflects the essence of what should be done concerning this subject, that is, to negotiate urgently a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests. Argentina also voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.33, because it is aimed at the very same objective and because it includes various assertions which my delegation endorses. We therefore feel it unnecessary in this context to refer to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the eighth and ninth preambular paragraphs and in operative paragraph 4. My country's position on that Treaty is well known and therefore I wish to state our reservations concerning those paragraphs of this draft resolution.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, much of what it says has won the support of my delegation. As I said at the beginning of this brief statement, the differences between the three draft resolutions are slight, but draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 does contain an operative paragraph 4 with which my delegation disagrees.
I set forth at some length during the general debate in this Committee, most recently on 7 November last, the reasons why my delegation considers that negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty on this subject should take place immediately, as a matter of urgency, and why we think that prolonging discussion, without negotiation, on aspects of this problem is not only pointless and ineffective but even counter-productive.

For those reasons, which we shall not repeat now, my delegation unfortunately felt obliged to vote against paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 in order to be consistent with our position; and, consequently, we felt obliged to abstain on the draft resolution as a whole. We wish to make it clear, however, that we appreciate the constructive spirit and efforts exerted by the sponsors in the preparation of this draft resolution.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): The United States abstained on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, on the subject of a comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban treaty. I wish to make clear my Government's reasons for doing so.

There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone in this room regarding the position of the United States on the subject of a comprehensive test ban. As we have said on a number of occasions, a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of the United States, an objective which we shall seek to pursue within the context of broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures and improved verification capabilities.

The United States also believes, however, that there are a number of very serious verification problems related to a comprehensive test ban which the international community must focus on and resolve before negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty could hold any prospect of being productive. That is why we have directed and shall continue to direct the attention of the Conference on Disarmament to verification issues, issues which must be addressed in the first instance if real progress towards an effectively verifiable comprehensive-test-ban treaty is to be made. At the same time, we have pointed out that a comprehensive test ban raises a number of other serious problems at present. For these reasons, which have important national security implications, it is important to understand that our reliance on a credible nuclear deterrent has an essential bearing on the time-frame within which consideration can realistically be given to negotiation of a comprehensive test ban.
(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The draft resolution on which we just abstained characterizes a comprehensive test ban as being an "urgent need" and of the "greatest importance". We do not agree. A comprehensive test ban is an important objective, but not the most important objective. We stand ready to undertake the very difficult and time-consuming work which must precede negotiations. However, we believe it would be a mistake to imply that a comprehensive test ban was as urgent a matter as our efforts to reduce arsenals of weapons already in existence.

The United States favours solid, steady work on nuclear-testing issues, as on a number of other items on the arms-control agenda. If the essential groundwork that must be laid is not carried out, if some perceived urgency is offered as a reason for giving less than thorough attention to the details that affect the security of every person on earth, we shall not have addressed an "urgent need" and we shall not have accomplished anything of the "greatest importance".

The United States does not support this draft resolution, but this does not constitute opposition to a comprehensive test ban itself. Indeed, United States policy towards a comprehensive test ban is the same as it has been for years. United States commitment to that long-term objective is unchanged. At the same time, in order that there may be no misunderstanding as to the United States conviction that other items on the arms-control agenda are, in fact, more urgent and of at least as great importance as a comprehensive test ban, the United States abstained on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71.

Mr. de LA BAUME (France) (interpretation from French): The vote cast by the French delegation on the draft resolutions that we dealt with this morning in, respectively, documents A/C.1/39/L.18, A/C.1/39/L.33 and A/C.1/39/L.71, stems essentially from the oft-repeated position of the French Government on the question of nuclear tests.

A test ban, in our opinion, should be seen in the context of an effective nuclear-disarmament process, as is stated in paragraph 51 of the 1978 Final Document. The French Government could not, therefore, associate itself with any measures to reduce nuclear weapons unless the two main nuclear Powers themselves, by the scope of the reductions of their own arsenals, had created the conditions that would make it possible for France, in its turn, to undertake commitments as to the limitation of its nuclear capabilities and also, in this connection, commitments regarding its own nuclear tests. Since these conditions have not been
met, France is not and could not be in a position to participate in work undertaken to draw up a treaty to ban nuclear tests.

For that reason, the French delegation was unable to vote in favour of the draft resolutions to which I have referred, under which France would be involved in the negotiation of a treaty.

Mr. MacFHIonnBHAIIR (Ireland): In addition to its co-sponsorship of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.71, Ireland has voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.33, calling for the conclusion of a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time as a matter of the highest priority; and that contained in document A/C.1/39/L.18, calling for the elaboration and conclusion without delay of a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States.

Our support for these draft resolutions has not, however, been without reservation. With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33, while we share the appeal it makes for the immediate negotiation of a treaty, we do not believe that the question of the scope of such a treaty should be prejudiced to include only nuclear-weapon tests, when its political purpose is to give impetus to the negotiations themselves, which must inevitably examine the question of scope. Nor can my delegation endorse the association drawn in this draft resolution between the conclusion of a comprehensive-test-ban treaty and the continuing validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While we regret the continuing failure of the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the necessary political will to achieve a halt to testing, we cannot share the view contained in operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33 that a comprehensive-test-ban treaty is an indispensable element for the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a condition without which non-nuclear-weapon States cannot be expected to comply with the obligations to which they have bound themselves under that Treaty.
This contingent interpretation of compliance with the nuclear-test-ban Treaty simply does not reflect the genuine commitment and adherence which have characterized the implementation of their obligations by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties.

Ireland has also voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.18 calling for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests. We have done so because this text also represents a commitment to commence negotiations on this subject at the Conference on Disarmament. However, we do not accept that calls for negotiations on a test ban should be restricted to nuclear-weapons tests.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I should like to explain my delegation's abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 and its votes against draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.18 and L.33.

The British Government understands the wishes of many Member States to see early negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban. We continue to believe, however, that an essential preliminary to the beginning of negotiations is the reaching of some agreement on how to solve the outstanding and serious problems of verification, which continue to present a major obstacle to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban.

My delegation participated actively in the Working Group set up by the Committee on Disarmament in 1982 and 1983. We submitted two detailed papers, but one of them has not yet been discussed because of the refusal of some delegations to renew the mandate of the Working Group for the 1984 session of the Conference. However, in an effort to resume substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament on this issue, my delegation joined with others in proposing a broader draft mandate for an ad hoc committee which is reflected in operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71. My delegation voted in favour of that paragraph in the separate vote taken on it, and we were glad to have an opportunity to do so. Unfortunately, our willingness to compromise was not reciprocated by some other delegations, and the whole session went by without the re-establishment of a subsidiary body to discuss this important subject in detail. Our draft mandate remains on the table, and we hope that the interval before the Conference's next session will give delegations time to reconsider their approaches so that a practical discussion of the issues can begin again.
My delegation voted against draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.18 and L.33 because they call for immediate negotiations. They are also unacceptable to my delegation because they refer only to the question of nuclear-weapon tests and avoid the issue of how the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be dealt with in a comprehensive test ban. Discussions in Geneva have shown that there are fundamental differences of view on this point between delegations. There is no possibility of a successful negotiation on a comprehensive test ban unless this issue is resolved. In addition, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33 contains a proposal for a moratorium, which the United Kingdom has consistently rejected.

Mr. LIPATOV (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.18. It is our belief that curbing the arms race, and primarily the nuclear-arms race, and the cessation of the further refinement of nuclear weapons and the creation of new systems and types of such weapons will help to promote a treaty containing a general and complete prohibition on nuclear-weapon testing.

An important step in that direction would be made were all nuclear-weapon States to declare a moratorium on the conduct of any nuclear explosions. In connection with operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, the Ukrainian delegation would like to emphasize that responsibility for the weapons tests still being carried out lies fully with those States that have prevented the elaboration of a relevant international treaty in this regard and have rejected the proposal for a moratorium. We support the appeal to the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly to multinational negotiations with a view to banning all nuclear-weapons tests so that the General Assembly, by the time of its fortieth session, can have before it a finished draft to that end.

With regard to the draft resolution in A/C.1/39/L.71, we are of the opinion that not only does it fail to promote the bringing about of a speedy ban on nuclear-weapons testing, it attempts to distract the work of the Conference on Disarmament from its main purpose, by in particular proposing for its projected Ad Hoc Committee the type of mandate that would simply make the group counterproductive. This can only play into the hands of those who do not wish to have negotiations on nuclear-weapons tests held within the Conference on Disarmament.
(Mr. Lipatov, Ukrainian SSR)

For those reasons the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR voted against operative paragraph 4 of that draft resolution and abstained in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka): The Sri Lanka delegation voted in favour of all three of the draft resolutions in cluster 6 this morning. As a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33 it is particularly necessary for my delegation to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 on the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

We believe that the preambular paragraphs of that draft resolution are unimpeachable in their intentions and in the principles espoused. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty has been among our most cherished priorities in the field of disarmament and is made more urgent in the context of the Third Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be held next year. In addition, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 contains an acknowledgement of the role of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. However, operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution contains an unfortunate limitation on the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament on this important item. The Sri Lanka delegation believes that the Conference on Disarmament must undertake the tasks set out in operative paragraph 4 within the context of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and not outside it. Indeed, we doubt very seriously the practicability of undertaking the tasks set out in operative paragraph 4 (b) and (c) when the main task of initiating negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is not mentioned. This appears, therefore, to be a case of putting the cart before the horse.

We are aware, however, of the hard work and patient negotiations that have gone into the formulation of this draft resolution. We are also aware of the sincerity and deep concern of the sponsors over the need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We do not consider our disagreement on operative paragraph 4 to be significant enough to vitiate our endorsement of the general tone and direction of the draft resolution. That is why we voted in favour of the draft resolution despite the limited nature of operative paragraph 4.

Mr. Djokic (Yugoslavia): I should like to explain the vote of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 on the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Yugoslavia has for years worked for the urgent completion
of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We have actively participated in efforts aimed at achieving agreement on this exceptionally important issue, which would constitute a strong impetus to the halting of the nuclear-arms race and to the launching of nuclear disarmament.
For that reason, my delegation shares the view expressed in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 on the importance and urgency of concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty and on the great importance of the role that should be played by the Conference on Disarmament in the solution of this issue.

However, precisely because of the fact that my country attaches particular importance to this matter, we consider that negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament should focus on the substance of the issue of the prohibition of nuclear tests.

For those reasons we do not find acceptable the approach set out in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, which speaks of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, particularly in subparagraphs (b) and (c). In our view, the Conference on Disarmament is not the body within whose framework an international seismic monitoring network or an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity should be established.

My delegation, therefore, abstained in the separate vote on paragraph 4 of this draft resolution. Nevertheless, taking into account general objectives at whose realization this draft resolution is aimed, as well as the desire of its sponsors to contribute to the solution of this important issue, my delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 as a whole.

Mr. Oyarce (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation traditionally has encouraged initiatives aimed at reaching agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Moreover, like other delegations we think that this concern has not yet been linked to the necessary global approach which must be taken to this subject, including tests for which peaceful objectives—doubtful and giving rise to legitimate questions—are claimed.

The Permanent Commission for the South Pacific has stated its concern about and has made a blanket condemnation of nuclear explosions described as peaceful in a given maritime environment. The situation with regard to these explosions is well known and has led the countries members of the Commission to recognize the urgent need to negotiate and bring into force an agreement in this field. Such an agreement would be an important step in halting the nuclear-arms race and the qualitative improvement of these weapons, and in preventing the growth of existing nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons.
(Mr. Oyarce, Chile)

This concern is expressed in the preamble and certain operative paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, but unfortunately this philosophy, shared by my delegation, loses all balance in operative paragraph 4.

It is difficult to be unaware of the treatment of this subject, which is of high priority on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, resulting from the lack of political will on the part of one State. There have been sterile academic debates on such subjects as verification and other technical matters; these should not be allowed to block speedy achievement of a final agreement. Still less should they be used as delaying tactics.

The 1980 report of the Secretary-General shares the view that verification should not be an obstacle to the achievement of a final agreement, and highly regarded scientists endorse this. The report of the Conference on Disarmament also takes that view.

Obviously, the reasons for which certain nuclear Powers do not contribute to substantive negotiations are political in nature. It is equally obvious that for some countries such an agreement is but a long-term objective. There is no other way to explain the positions taken in the Conference on Disarmament, where the lack of political will on this important subject is cloaked in technical, sometimes incomprehensible, excuses.

My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, but abstained in the voting on paragraph 4, in order to show our concern regarding the need to strengthen the appeal repeatedly made by the General Assembly over the years to certain nuclear-weapon States to make an effort of political will and to negotiate a substantive agreement on this subject, in the conviction that continued nuclear-weapon tests can serve only to exacerbate the arms race and to increase the danger of nuclear war.

We must note with appreciation the honest effort to continue disarmament dialogue in the United Nations, a dialogue which involves the interests of all mankind.

My delegation also voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33 in spite of its reservations about the eighth and ninth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 4, which establish an unnecessary link with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. DEPASSE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): The Belgian delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33, in part because
the philosophy of verification which underlies that draft resolution is not satisfactory to us. I need only mention the third and fifth preambular paragraphs to show where our difficulty lies.

The third preambular paragraph is ambiguous. It states the conviction that the existing means of verification are adequate, but it does not specify the means to which it refers: Are these national means, or means which the international community could implement? If the former, we are convinced that national means are, regrettably, quite inadequate to carry out any credible kind of verification.

If, on the other hand, this paragraph refers to means which the international community might have available to it, we know that if these were to be put into place and used to best effect, with active and resolute participation by all States—particularly the geographically largest nuclear-weapon States—then verification might be possible. But this is patently not the case today, at least in the case of one of those States, which has shown great diffidence in its support of the joint establishment of extensive international verification machinery, which would be essential.

The fifth preambular paragraph appears to be totally irrelevant. We have the highest regard for the political authority of the Secretary-General, but we do not think that he possesses the scientific expertise necessary for him to state an opinion on this subject. We do not think, therefore, that he should be cited.
Furthermore, the overall philosophy underlying document A/C.1/39/L.33 appears to be somewhat strange, since those who assert that all the scientific and technological aspects of verification have been resolved include representatives of States which have not supported and, as far as I know, still do not support the proposal which the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan made personally at the Conference on Disarmament in connection with a ban on all nuclear explosions below the observability mark. If that threshold is zero, it would follow that the Japanese proposal would make it possible for all explosions to be prohibited. That being so, is it conceivable that those who claim that the present machinery is adequate are not sufficiently convinced of what they are asserting to draw all the political consequences which derive therefrom?

On the other hand, we voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, and specifically paragraph 4, because this clearly sets forth the kind of scientific and technical work which still has to be done before credible international verification can be achieved in the field of nuclear tests.

Mr. Mansfield (New Zealand): New Zealand remains firmly opposed to nuclear testing. We know that there are different approaches among us on some of the issues relating to the achievement of the goal of bringing about an end to all nuclear tests. We also know there is widespread support for that goal and that many delegations here reflected their support for that goal by voting in favour of all three draft resolutions before us. We welcome that. For our part, we also would have liked to be able to vote for all those draft resolutions. It is a matter of regret for us that we were not able to do so and I should like to explain the reasons for our position.

They stem from our strongly held view that what is needed, and needed urgently, is a comprehensive test-ban treaty that prohibits all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time. The draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.18 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests has from our point of view two significant deficiencies. First, the treaty it envisages would prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons only. As I pointed out in my earlier statements, we acknowledge that the issue of the scope of a test-ban treaty is one which must be fully discussed and resolved before a treaty can be concluded.

At the same time, we remain concerned by the fact that any nuclear device that causes an explosion can be used for warlike purposes and that therefore a ban that
is limited to the testing of nuclear weapons will not necessarily be completely effective.

Secondly, this draft resolution does not deal at all with the question of verification, which we believe is generally recognized to be an essential requirement for an effective test-ban treaty.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.33 on the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons has some similarities to the Australian and New Zealand draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.71, and there is much in it that we can support. But for us it has some of the same deficiencies as those I have referred to in respect of document A/C.1/39/L.18. Although it recognizes the need to prohibit all nuclear-test explosions, the treaty it envisages being negotiated is limited to the testing of nuclear weapons. The moratorium it calls for as an interim measure is likewise limited to the testing of nuclear weapons. More important, that moratorium is also limited to the three original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963: the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR. Those countries are no longer the only nuclear Powers and no longer the only countries engaged in testing. It will come as no surprise to all who have heard my previous statements in the Committee on this subject to learn that for our part we find this limitation of the proposed moratorium to only three of the nuclear Powers a particular inadequacy.

We also share the concern expressed by other delegations about the connection made in the draft resolution between progress towards a test ban and the maintenance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We have a further reservation which relates to both those draft resolutions and which is of a more general character. The fact is that nuclear testing cannot be ended without the agreement of all the countries that have a nuclear capability. To have any practical effect, a draft resolution on this subject must hold out some prospect of actual progress in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. In our view, neither the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.18 nor that in document A/C.1/39/L.33 meets this requirement. For example, the key element in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33 is the request to members of the Conference on Disarmament to exert their best endeavours in order that the Conference may transmit a draft treaty to the next session of the General Assembly.

It may not be possible for us to agree here on precisely how the Conference on Disarmament should go about its work on this subject. We cannot in any event bind
the Conference. It may be also that there are various ways in which suggestions for a working mandate in the Conference on Disarmament could be formulated but, for our part, we find a draft resolution that asks the Conference on Disarmament to do nothing more specific than use its best endeavours as inadequate. It seems to us that the use of that language is virtually an admission by its sponsors that the draft resolution will not in fact lead to any practical progress on this subject.

For all these reasons, New Zealand was obliged with regret to abstain in the voting on the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/39/L.18 and L.33.

Mr. KUNDA (Zambia): My delegation wishes to explain its vote in relation to the draft resolutions in cluster 6 on which action was taken this morning.

My delegation supports fully the concept of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is precisely for this reason that we voted positively on the three draft resolutions in cluster 6 relating to the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as an indispensable element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the unbridled arms race. We also share the belief that a comprehensive test ban could prevent the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons. My delegation would particularly like to see maximum effort exerted, especially by the nuclear States, to realize at an early stage the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In this connection, my delegation would like to see an early end to the unproductive wrangle on the issue of verification, since all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem, according to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, have been fully explored and only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement.

Having stated its support for the general thrust of the three draft resolutions under consideration, my delegation wishes to reserve its position on all those preambular and operative paragraphs of draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.33 and L.71 that touch on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We do so in accordance with our well-known stand on that Treaty.
Miss SEGARRA (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to make a brief explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, which the Committee adopted this morning. The delegation of Ecuador voted in favour of that draft resolution because we believe that the statements and objectives contained in the preamble and in some of its operative paragraphs are consistent with the position always taken by my delegation with regard to this matter. However, I should like to express the hope that the provisions of operative paragraph 4, on which we abstained in the separate vote, will not be a cause for delaying the process of negotiation on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, negotiations which are very concretely contemplated in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33 on the same subject, which my delegation co-sponsored.

Miss MAUALA (Samoa): I should like to explain the reasons why Samoa abstained this morning in the voting on the draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.18 and L.33.

Nuclear testing is an issue of major importance to Samoa, which, together with other countries of the Pacific, has repeatedly called for an end to such testing in our region. Because of our concern about continued testing, Samoa fully supports efforts that will encourage practical progress towards the goal of ending all nuclear testing. For that reason, Samoa, together with other countries of the South Pacific, co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71. We were not able to support draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.18 and L.33 for two principal reasons.

First, the scope of the proposed ban in those draft resolutions does not accord with what we think is necessary for an effective test ban. Unless all nuclear explosions, not just nuclear-weapon-test explosions, are prohibited, the international community can have no guarantee that a test ban will be effective. Secondly, neither draft resolution adequately addresses the requirements of verification, which are essential to the effectiveness of a test ban.

As a country in the Pacific, Samoa has an additional difficulty with draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33. We could support a call for a general moratorium on testing by all nuclear-weapon States. We are not able to support a call that is limited to only three of the nuclear-weapon States and excludes a call for a moratorium on French testing, testing which is of primary concern to my country.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would like to explain the reasons which caused us to vote as we did on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.33 and L.71.
The Byelorussian SSR believes it is very important to secure a speedy comprehensive test-ban treaty as an important step towards putting an end to the further refinement of these weapons and finally bringing about nuclear disarmament. In this connection we attach great importance to the need for there to be an immediate beginning to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on matters of substance for the immediate drafting of an international agreement on this subject.

As we see it, operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 does not constitute any incentive for the initiation of such talks. Furthermore, undue significance, completely divorced from the importance of concluding a treaty, is given to the technical aspects. At the present stage this can only be regarded as maintaining nuclear-weapon tests as they are whereas the international community needs urgent, practical steps to put an end to and prohibit all forms of nuclear-weapon testing. As a result of that, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR voted against that paragraph of the draft resolution in the separate vote and abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71 as a whole.

The situation which has arisen in the Conference on Disarmament as far as the nuclear-weapon-test ban is concerned cannot but be a cause of concern. We are particularly alarmed by the refusal of certain States to conduct negotiations directly on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests whereas, as has been stated by a number of competent experts as well as by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as far back as 1982, there are no technical reasons for such an agreement not to be concluded.

A negative factor has also been the absence of any moratorium so far on all nuclear-weapon tests, which has constantly been appealed for by the United Nations General Assembly. We are aware of who it is that still refuses to ratify treaties which were signed in 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as well as the resumption of the tripartite talks on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which has frequently been appealed for by delegations during the discussions and which the Soviet Union has shown itself consistently to be ready for. In the light of the importance of achieving the purposes of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the Byelorussian SSR supported draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33, which on the whole serves those purposes, and became a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.18.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I have asked to speak in order to explain Australia's vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.18 and L.33, relating to a nuclear-test ban. Australia attaches very great importance to a treaty to end all nuclear testing but we found it necessary today to abstain in the vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.18 and L.33. Those abstentions did not signal any lack of support for resolutions which promote the objective of an end to all nuclear testing, but we abstained in the vote on the two draft resolutions because neither of them went far enough. Both draft resolutions called simply for a treaty to end nuclear-weapon testing and nuclear-weapon testing only. Australia's view is that what is urgently needed is a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, that is, one which would end all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time. That is the clear objective of the draft resolution which Australia and New Zealand submitted and which was co-sponsored by some 25 other delegations.

In our view, quite simply, a ban on nuclear-weapon testing is not enough. Any treaty banning nuclear testing should be truly comprehensive and should cover all nuclear tests, including so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. We do not believe that the environmental impact of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions would be in any way different from those undertaken in connection with weapons production.
Furthermore, weapon-related benefits can be obtained from test explosions conducted for ostensibly peaceful purposes.

The two draft resolutions in question, in our view, had other shortcomings as well. For example, the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.33 called for a resumption of the trilateral negotiations. While we regretted that those negotiations came to an end, Australia believes that it is now inappropriate to emphasize their resumption. We must take another course. Those talks involved only three of the five nuclear-weapon States. In particular, China and France were not parties to those negotiations.

On the other hand, all five nuclear-weapon States are members of the Conference on Disarmament, and it is in that body that work on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban must proceed. The subject of a nuclear-test ban is in fact the first item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and that clearly emphasizes the importance we all attach to the issue. Australia is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and has worked with great energy to find ways in which the Conference may be able to start work in a practical way in order to ensure that we move towards the development of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.71 sought to do precisely that: to take practical steps towards the development of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I want to mention that a further area of difficulty which we encountered with regard to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.33 was the call for a moratorium. That call was quite limited. It called on only three of the five nuclear-weapon States to stop testing. It excluded the testing programmes of the other two nuclear-weapon States, including one which is of particular concern to Australia and to the countries of the Pacific region.

Finally, I should like to turn to the question of verification. It is quite clear that no treaty satisfactory to all States will be concluded unless all concerned are satisfied that its provisions will be respected. This means simply that adequate verification measures must be built into the treaty. The Australian-New Zealand draft in document A/C.1/39/L.71 addresses that issue. We were sorry to see that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.18, presented by the Soviet Union and a number of other Member States, contained no reference to verification. The Soviet draft resolution was therefore reduced to being a declaratory statement, and we doubt that that statement will lead to any concrete progress in the direction of a test ban of any sort.
I wish to conclude by expressing the gratitude of my delegation for the response that was given in the voting process this morning to the draft resolution that had been presented in document A/C.1/39/L.71. As I have already indicated, we and the other sponsors believe that that draft resolution provides for practical progress towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The CHAIRMAN: There being no further explanations of vote, the Committee has now concluded consideration of and action on the three draft resolutions contained in cluster 6.

In accordance with our decision this morning, the Committee will now take up draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.67/Rev.2, which was introduced by the delegation of Cyprus at the 37th meeting, on 14 November 1984. I have been asked by the sponsors of that draft resolution to request that it be adopted without a vote. Does any delegation request a vote on the draft resolution?

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): We would request a vote on this draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: A recorded vote has been requested on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.67/Rev.2.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against: None

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Rwanda, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.67/Rev.2 was adopted by 99 votes to none, with 22 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Australia was pleased to be able to vote in favour of the draft resolution proposed by Cyprus on disarmament and international security, which calls for the holding of a session of the Security Council to consider the escalating arms race with a view to bringing it to a halt.

Australia was elected this year by the General Assembly to membership in the Security Council, and we are especially mindful that that unique body of the United Nations system is charged specifically with the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Council's record in fulfilling its role in the maintenance of international peace and security has in recent times been the subject of some criticism. Some have suggested that its role has fallen short of the aspirations which were drafted into the Charter in 1945.
(Mr. Butler, Australia)

In Australia's view this does not mean that we should despair at the situation; on the contrary, we believe that in our increasingly interdependent world there is no sensible alternative to multilateral efforts to solve problems - and problems, above all, touching upon issues of international peace and security. Australia will work within the Security Council - and specifically at a special session of the Council - for the adoption of the progress that this draft resolution foresees, that is, for concrete measures for progress in the vital area of disarmament.

Following Australia's election to the Security Council this year, the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Bob Hawke, made some remarks which signalled the way in which Australia would approach its membership in the Security Council. He noted that the Security Council is heavily dependent upon the degree of commitment on the part of the five permanent members to make the Council work. This in turn, he said, depends heavily on the state of relations between them and particularly the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this context, Australia has welcomed signs that the United States and the Soviet Union may be moving towards a better state of relations, especially in the field of disarmament and arms control. We believe this gives us hope in 1985 that we may see further progress - the progress for which we have all waited - and we hope that such co-operation between those two great States will manifest itself in active participation in a special session of the Security Council of the kind called for in the draft resolution that we have just adopted.

The Prime Minister of Australia also noted that nuclear-weapon States alone do not have the right to determine the destiny of mankind. Every nation has the right and the responsibility to be heard on the fundamental issues of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament and for our part, we Australians are determined to exercise that right and that responsibility to the fullest extent. The Australian Government's readiness to undertake the obligations of membership in the Security Council reflects our commitment to the United Nations and our determination that Australia should make a worthwhile contribution to the role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has concluded consideration of and action on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.67/Rev.2.

The Committee will now take up draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1. I call on those delegations that wish to explain their vote before the vote.
Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): I have asked to speak in order to explain the vote my delegation will cast on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1 on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations.

My Government was pleased to be able to support another draft resolution on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5, which has already been adopted in the First Committee. We supported it because we endorsed the call that bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations be resumed without delay or pre-conditions. We noted in our explanation of vote on that draft resolution that the United States would spare no effort in seeking attainment of the final objective of such negotiations. We take considerable satisfaction in the agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union and announced on 22 November. That announcement noted that the two sides:

"have agreed to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer-space arms".

To this end representatives of the United States and the USSR will meet in Geneva on 7 and 8 January 1985. These talks will focus on the pressing issues of strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons and outer-space weaponry.

As President Reagan said, this "is the first step on what will be a long and difficult road".

Assistant-to-the-President McFarlane, in making this announcement, reaffirmed that the United States is "ready to talk and listen to alternative ideas on the other side".

Features characteristic of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5, which my Government supported, are, regrettably, not contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1. Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 placed no pre-conditions on the commencement of negotiations or on the negotiations themselves nor did it prescribe the specific subjects for negotiation or the procedures for the negotiations. This objective and impartial approach, however, is not reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1. In its fourth preambular paragraph, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1 states that the negotiations, prior to interruption, were not producing the desired results. My Government firmly rejects that assertion. The United States was committed to achieving substantial results in those negotiations and they may well have been achieved had the negotiations not been disrupted. The
fifth preambular paragraph recalls the United Nations General Assembly request for a nuclear freeze. For reasons already stated by the United States delegation, my Government cannot support calls for a nuclear freeze. The President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, addressed the General Assembly on 24 September this year. Kenneth Adelman, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, also spoke before this Committee on 25 October. Others in our delegation have discussed these important issues before the Committee and on 22 November, in both Washington and Moscow, the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union announced agreement to enter into new negotiations. The request contained in operative paragraph 1 for a report on the status of the situation concerning bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations is accordingly odd, to say the very least. Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1 provide both procedural and substantive suggestions for the conduct of these negotiations. We believe that in order to achieve the success so vitally desired by all States, the negotiating partners, who, as acknowledged in paragraph 48 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, bear a special responsibility in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, must be granted leeway and flexibility in pursuit of these objectives. The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union will meet in January to discuss these matters. We wonder whether the approaches recommended in this draft resolution will contribute to our common objectives. Negotiations on such delicate, sensitive and complex matters so vital to security require a degree of confidentiality. Premature disclosure or open discussion of each and every proposal made at the negotiating table could jeopardize the success of such negotiations.

For these reasons, my delegation is compelled to oppose draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1.
The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1, which was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 40th meeting, on 15 November, and is sponsored by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Bahamas, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Rwanda, Spain, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1 was adopted by 93 votes to 11, with 22 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on representatives who have asked to be allowed to explain their vote after the voting.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1. In that connection we should like to make the following statement.
First, we have great sympathy for the motives of the sponsors of this draft resolution - the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia - in submitting it to the Committee. The Soviet Union has always been and continues to be a firm advocate of political dialogue. The reasons why the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear weapons were broken off in 1983 have frequently been explained by the Soviet side.

The Soviet Union could have supported a number of the provisions of the draft resolution that has just been adopted. This is particularly true of the appeal made to the major nuclear-weapon States to proclaim a freeze. Also, we appreciate and understand the reasons for operative paragraph 4, which emphasizes the importance of this problem and makes the point that it is not only the national interests of the two negotiating parties that are at stake but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world.

As is known, the Soviet Union voted against draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5. We explained the reasons for our negative vote at that time. We should like to confirm them in connection with the present draft resolution. At the same time, we would draw attention to the fact that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.5 referred to the resumption of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, which, as is known, were broken off - for reasons, I repeat, that I have already gone into on previous occasions.

Furthermore, I would draw the attention of members of the Committee to the communique, published in the press, stating that the Soviet Union and the United States of America had agreed to enter into new negotiations - I repeat: new negotiations - with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms. The communique also stated that, in order to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, and the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Shultz, would meet in Geneva on 7 and 8 January 1985.

The Soviet Union, for its part, is prepared, as before, to seek, devise and draw up on all these matters the most radical possible solutions, the sort of solutions allowing for some progress towards the total prohibition, and eventually the elimination, of nuclear weapons.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy): My delegation regrets that it had to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1, whereas last year we abstained on a similar
draft resolution, concerning bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations. We felt compelled to change our vote because the present draft text includes concepts and language that are in clear contradiction with some basic positions of the Italian Government.

First of all, we cannot accept the reference to the proclamation by the General Assembly, through resolutions that we have consistently opposed, of a freeze embracing, inter alia, a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, while deployments which have already taken place are implicitly condoned. The Italian Government has already had the opportunity of explaining in many forums why and how a freeze would prejudice its vital security interests and those of other Western European countries, and why it would constitute in present circumstances a prize for rearment initiatives which have resulted in serious imbalances.

Secondly, my delegation does not concur with the judgement that prior to their interruption it had already become evident that the negotiations were not producing the desired results. Had this been true, there would have been no reason to regret the interruption of the bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations. Since it is not so, however, the Italian Government sincerely deplores that interruption and hopes that the resumption of the negotiations will take place as soon as possible, without pre-conditions and in a constructive spirit. Only through dialogue can we hope to reach satisfactory solutions to difficult questions which involve the security interests of many countries and of international peace. That is why Italy particularly welcomed the most recent positive development concerning the prospects for such a dialogue.
The CHAIRMAN: There are no others wishing to speak in explanation of vote after the vote. The Committee has therefore concluded its consideration of and action upon draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1.

The Committee will now turn to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.64, which was introduced by the representative of Argentina at the 37th meeting of the Committee, on 14 November. It is sponsored by Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sudan, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

I call upon the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, who has asked to explain his vote before the voting.

Mr. MARTYNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): In connection with the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.64, on the prevention of nuclear war, which was introduced on behalf of the sponsors by the delegation of Argentina, my delegation would like to make the following statement.

We are deeply convinced that the task of preventing nuclear war is the main one confronting us at the present time, the search for a solution to that problem should therefore be the object of the most strenuous efforts of all States, both large and small. The extremely high priority of that task is quite properly reflected in the preambular section of the draft resolution before us. In order to avert the threat of nuclear war and to eliminate the possibility of such a threat, it is essential that determined, specific and effective steps be taken. It is important that specific talks be held immediately to devise such steps. Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.64 requests as a matter of priority that such negotiations be initiated at the Conference on Disarmament. In the light of the present conditions, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR regards the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.64 to be extremely important, and we will vote in favour of it. We appeal to all delegations genuinely eager to see immediate and resolute steps taken to prevent nuclear war to support this extremely important draft resolution also.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no other delegations wishing to make statements in explanation of vote before the vote. The Committee will now proceed to vote upon draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.64.

A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.64 was adopted by 116 votes to 5, with 13 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of France, who wishes to explain his vote.

Mr. de la Gorce (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation voted against draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.64. That negative vote, however, does not mean that the French delegation is opposed to the discussion of the question on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

We are convinced that in-depth discussions of the problems connected with that item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament would still be extremely useful, and we very much hope that a solution will be found with regard to the framework in which that subject should be discussed. We think, however, that the wording of the draft resolution just adopted goes beyond what is desirable in connection with the range and objectives of those in-depth discussions, which, in our view, should take place at the Conference on Disarmament.
We believe that in the present circumstances the terms of the draft resolution are not in keeping with the actual possibilities for such a discussion at the Conference on Disarmament. In particular, it is, to say the least, premature to contemplate negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war *per se*.

In any event, we believe that examination of this question calls for an in-depth discussion with a view to identifying what can actually be done within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament with regard to a subject which, as we all know, is bound to give rise to objections of a fundamental nature. We are of the opinion that the subject is not at present ripe for the opening of negotiations.
The CHAIRMAN: We have thus concluded consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.64.

We turn now to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.66, which was introduced by the representative of Nigeria at the 39th meeting, held on 15 November.

Mr. NANNAN (Nigeria): In my delegation's statements of 6 and 15 November this year, we explained the deep concerns that had led us to make the proposal contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.66. It is not my intention to repeat what was said in those two statements. Suffice it to say that we are pleased that the same concern has been manifested in the statements of other delegations.

The urgent need to reach to reach agreement on measures of nuclear disarmament is exceeded only by our preoccupation that these terrible weapons should not be used in the interim. While reliance has been placed so far on the good sense and, of course, on the self-interest of the nuclear-weapon States, especially the two super-Powers, it cannot be presumed that this situation will continue to prevail as long as each retains the option of use. That is why countries like mine, which are non-nuclear-weapon States - and which, indeed, have renounced the right ever to become nuclear-weapon States through their signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty - demand as of right legally binding assurances that they will not have to suffer the consequences of any nuclear war. Although such a war may not have anything to do with them, and although no nuclear attack may be aimed directly at them, it is abundantly clear that they will still suffer the consequences.

Over the years, several suggestions have been made about how to prevent the use of nuclear weapons pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. We have watched helplessly as some nuclear-weapon States have frustrated the full consideration and adoption of these suggestions. For how long are we expected to walk the present nuclear tightrope with equanimity as if that were the only choice?

The proposal contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.66 is intended to make a contribution to the resolution of the impasse in which the international community finds itself. My delegation has been encouraged by the many kind and constructive comments made to it; we are equally mindful of the other comments. While there is no doubt about the adoption of the draft resolution in its present form, we are sympathetic to those well-meaning delegations which have pleaded for a little more time to observe further reaction to proposals similar to ours, which, in the past, have been hampered by the use of procedural tricks.

We therefore request that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.66 not be put to the vote at this time.
The CHAIRMAN: In view of the statement of the representative of Nigeria, the Committee has concluded its consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.66.

Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas): My delegation wishes to place on record that had it been present, it would have cast the following votes: it would have voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.36, L.58/Rev.1, L.59, L.62 and L.72/Rev.1 and would have abstained in the votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.10/Rev.1, L.15, L.20 and L.24.

Mr. SOR (Cameroon): My delegation wishes to state its position on draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.40 and L.50, contained in cluster 7. These draft resolutions, in general, deal with the question of the prevention of nuclear war.

Both in plenary meetings and in this Committee the Cameroon delegation has already had occasion to reaffirm its policy against the use of force in international relations and in favour of genuine disarmament, which we see as a central factor in the quest for international peace and security. The threat of nuclear war is, without a doubt, the most serious danger to the survival of mankind and his civilization. Nuclear disarmament, therefore, must remain an issue of the highest priority for the international community as a whole.

It is against this background that my delegation considered draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.40 and L.50. Our support for these draft resolutions is based on their fundamental thrust, which is aimed at engaging the international community in efforts to prevent the threat of collective nuclear annihilation.

My delegation would have preferred it for the General Assembly to be presented with a single draft resolution enjoying the widest possible support on this important subject, which affects all countries. It is a matter of some concern to us that, although draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.40 and L.50 deal essentially with the same problem, they recommend broadly differing approaches to dealing with it. It seems to us that this situation is not conducive to meaningful and substantive progress towards the realization of the common goal of preventing nuclear conflict.

Our affirmative votes for draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.40 and L.50 do not necessarily mean endorsement of the procedures and approaches recommended therein or of any negotiating position.

In this connection, the Cameroon delegation wishes again to emphasize the importance it attaches to urgent and effective efforts towards genuine progress. We have noted with much interest and anticipation recent reports on the planned resumption in January 1985 of bilateral United States-USSR nuclear-disarmament
talks. We hope that these talks will result in substantive progress towards nuclear disarmament in particular and international peace and security in general. We shall be following these developments with keen interest.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: It had been my intention to conclude consideration of and action upon all disarmament items by tomorrow noon. Unfortunately, two draft resolutions – A/C.1/39/L.30 and L.45 – are still awaiting a decision by the Fifth Committee regarding their financial implications. I have been informed by the Secretariat that the Fifth Committee will be taking up those two draft resolutions at its meeting tomorrow morning; we shall thus be able to consider them tomorrow afternoon.
Apart from those two draft resolutions, we still have pending the following draft resolutions to be acted upon: A/C.1/39/L.22, L.40, L.69/Rev.1, L.46/Rev.1, L.1, L.3, L.37/Rev.2, L.61 and the draft resolution contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, under item 62 of the agenda. As I said, as we have to meet tomorrow afternoon, we could dispose of all those draft resolutions, we can take consideration and action upon all those draft resolutions in one single meeting. For that reason, we shall not meet in the morning but we shall meet in the afternoon, tomorrow at 3 p.m.

In accordance with our programme of work and timetable, on Wednesday, 28 November, the Committee will proceed to take up agenda item 66, "question of Antarctica". This phase of our work will consist of a general debate, as well as consideration of and action upon the draft resolution or resolutions under that item, and is scheduled to end on Friday, 30 November. In order fully to utilize the time devoted to the consideration of this agenda item, I invite delegations kindly to inscribe their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible so that we may be able to close the list of speakers for the general debate on Wednesday at 1 p.m., 28 November.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.
The CHAIRMAN: We have thus concluded consideration of and action on
draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.37/Rev.2. We still have pending the decision on
item 62; "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of
Peace". We shall not have interpretation as from this moment and so we cannot
proceed this evening. It is therefore my intention to take up this last question
for action at our meeting tomorrow afternoon.

At 10.30 a.m. tomorrow the Committee will take up the item on Antarctica and
at 3 p.m. it will take up the item on the Indian Ocean.

The meeting rose at 7.10 p.m.