VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTIETH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)
later: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)
(Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

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CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION UPON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: It is my intention to finish with the introduction of resolutions this week so that next week will be entirely devoted to action upon resolutions. Only in exceptional cases will delegations be allowed to speak on the introduction of resolutions next week.

Mr. TELLAIOV (Bulgaria): I wish to introduce today two draft resolutions. First, I have the honour and the privilege to introduce on behalf of the delegations of Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Poland, the Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam and my own country, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.55 entitled "Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans".

This draft resolution is a follow-up of resolution 38/188 F, by virtue of which the General Assembly was for the first time seized of an issue of overriding importance to all countries, namely, the curbing of the naval arms race. With the adoption of this resolution last year, the General Assembly expressed its concern at the growing threat to international peace and security posed by the continuing escalation of the naval arms race. The Assembly drew attention specifically to two alarming facts: first, the growing military presence and naval activities of some States in conflict areas or far from their own shores and its negative impact on developments in those regions and on the security of international sea lanes and, secondly, the ever more frequent use of naval forces for demonstration or use of force as a means of exerting pressure on sovereign States and of interfering in their internal affairs.

Expressing its firm conviction that urgent practical steps should be taken to cover effectively this new dangerous channel of the arms race, the Assembly recognized the urgent need to start negotiations on the limitation of naval activities, the limitation and reduction of naval armaments and the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans.
At the same time, the Assembly appealed to the major naval powers in particular to refrain from enlarging their naval activities in areas of conflict or tension, or far from their own shores. As a first step in the process of preparing for the negotiations, the Assembly invited Member States to present their views on the modalities of holding such negotiations. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity, on behalf of the sponsors, to thank all delegations of the countries which readily responded by sending their replies, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/39/419). The replies contain a large number of very useful and constructive ideas and proposals which will undoubtedly facilitate our future work.

It is against this background that the sponsors are presenting this year’s draft resolution. As far as the preambular part of the draft is concerned, it should be pointed out that it is along the lines of last year’s resolution. Since I have already dwelt on it in detail, there is hardly any need to repeat what has been said.

The operative part of the draft reaffirms, first of all, in paragraph 2, the basic objective: the need to hold negotiations in this field. In operative paragraph 1, it appeals once again to all States, in particular the major naval Powers, to refrain from enlarging their naval activities in areas of conflict or tension, or far from their own shores. Since there is broad recognition of the particular responsibility of the major naval Powers, the draft resolution invites them to consider the possibility of holding direct consultations with a view to preparing the opening of the negotiations at an early stage. Thus the draft resolution provides yet another opportunity to pursue this main objective.

When preparing the draft resolution, the sponsors considered the ideas contained in the replies of Member States as to how best to proceed further in this direction. While the majority of the replies themselves indicate overwhelming support for the holding of negotiations, it is obvious, nevertheless, that further discussions and deliberations on all the issues involved will be needed to prepare the ground for such negotiations. Hence, the sponsors decided to incorporate in the draft resolution the suggestion put forward by one delegation, and supported by a number of delegations during our debate, namely, to request the United Nations Disarmament Commission to consider this question.
Clearly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, by virtue of the mandate given to it by the General Assembly, provides the most appropriate forum for in-depth consideration of disarmament issues with the aim of making specific recommendations and facilitating future negotiations. Furthermore, the Disarmament Commission, being a body with universal membership, will provide for the broadest possible involvement of all interested States in the process of the preparatory work for conducting such negotiations.

The sponsors believe that there is sufficient basis for fruitful consideration of this question in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The report of the Secretary-General, as well as further replies of Member States, as provided for in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, will give strong impetus to the Commission's deliberations in 1985. Needless to say, other relevant documents could also be considered by the Commission in accordance with the established practice. The sponsors believe that the Commission's deliberations on this question should in no way be linked to or prejudiced by specific documents or concepts.

In the process of preparing this draft resolution, the sponsors have exerted considerable effort to consult as many interested delegations as possible and have gone to considerable lengths in trying to accommodate different views and ideas. The sponsors of the draft resolution hope that it will receive the support of all delegations which are genuinely interested in adopting and implementing effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and promoting real disarmament.

I turn now to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.17 entitled "World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities", which I am pleased to introduce on behalf of the delegations of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Romania, Viet Nam and my own country. As is well known, the main objective of the draft resolution has been to emphasize the usefulness of carrying out actions and activities as important manifestations of the will of world public opinion and as an effective concrete contribution to the achievement of the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign.

Since this is not the first time that we are presenting a draft resolution on this issue, I will avoid as much as possible going into detail on already familiar provisions and will instead draw the attention of the Committee to some new elements in the draft.
The idea of the need to harmonize the policies of Governments in the field of disarmament with the will of the people is not a new one; it has wide support in view of the broad recognition of the positive impact of the mobilization of world public opinion on behalf of disarmament. That is why the sponsors thought it necessary to incorporate this idea in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

Another new element in the draft is the request that wider publicity be given to the work of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament and especially to proposals of Member States and the action taken thereupon. The sponsors believe that a specific recommendation to this effect is well founded and that the informational activities of the respective Secretariat departments will thus be greatly enhanced.

On behalf of the sponsors, I wish to express the hope that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.17 will receive the widest support from the members of our Committee.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): It is to be regretted that this year again we have not had the opportunity to welcome a single draft agreement reached within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. This single multilateral negotiating organ has once again not been enabled to achieve substantive progress.

In the course of the last year there has been a considerable increase in weapon arsenals, particularly nuclear ones. The realization of plans regarding the deployment of new systems of nuclear weapons is under way. Various kinds of nuclear weapons are being developed, which increases the dangers of the outbreak of a nuclear war. At the same time, the talks on nuclear weapons between the two leading Powers have been interrupted.
The report submitted by the Conference this year clearly points to the conclusion that such a state of affairs was directly and negatively reflected in the Conference on Disarmament. The report stated, inter alia, that, in spite of the endeavours of an overwhelming majority of member States, the Conference had once again been prevented from achieving concrete results with regard to substantive issues on its agenda. We have to note again that some members of the Conference, and among them some nuclear-weapon States, continue to oppose the launching of negotiations on the priority issues of disarmament as established at the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. By doing so, those countries are assuming particular responsibility since they are preventing the Conference from fulfilling the mandate entrusted to it by the international community.

Such a situation has caused grave concern, since the Conference has not even started substantive negotiations on halting the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament, on the measures for the prevention of nuclear war, on the treaty on a nuclear-weapon-test ban, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space or regarding the solution of other acute issues on the agenda of the Conference.

The international community has on innumerable occasions warned that this trend must be stopped and that the way out is to be found in negotiations on the launching of disarmament. The appeal of the great majority of countries to halt the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, has never been more broad or resolute than today. Negotiations are a necessity imposed by an exceptionally dangerous reality. What we need now are concrete results from constructive negotiations, and not confrontation and mutual accusations.

Therefore the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.56, that is, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Madagascar, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire and Yugoslavia, would like strongly to underline once again that it is unacceptable to prevent the Conference from conducting negotiations on the most important issues of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. The sponsors firmly believe that the Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum for conducting such negotiations and that only in that way will the Conference affirm itself as a body for genuine multilateral negotiations.

Finally, I should like to express the conviction of the sponsors that this draft resolution will meet with the broadest possible support.
Mr. DUBEY (India): I have asked to speak in order to introduce two draft resolutions and one draft decision.

On behalf of the delegations of Algeria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Romania, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia, I should like to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.50 entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

Last year the General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority resolution 38/73 G on this subject. Two nuclear-weapon Powers, China and the Soviet Union, also voted for this resolution. This resolution reiterated its request to the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, on a priority basis, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. A draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons was annexed to resolution 38/73 G in order to provide a basis for negotiations. Unfortunately, as the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament this year shows, during the 1984 session of the Conference again no work was accomplished on this item. As the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is of critical importance both for prevention of nuclear war and for setting in motion a process of nuclear disarmament, we strongly believe that the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly should repeat, with the overwhelming support of an even greater majority of its Member States, its request to the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. That is the reason why we have submitted draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.50.

Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is not an idea born yesterday. Ever since the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the international community has been concerned with the threat of a repetition of Hiroshima which will be many times more destructive and devastating. This concern was given concrete expression more than 23 years ago when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration that:

"the use of nuclear ... weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations" (resolution 1653 (XVI), para. 1 (a))

and that:

"the use of nuclear ... weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general ..." (ibid., para. 1 (c))
Today the moral and logical force of that Declaration of 1961 is moving the vast majority of the peoples of the world, including the citizens of even those nuclear-weapon States which have so far declined to engage in negotiations for prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

While submitting this draft resolution, we are fully aware of the long history of past efforts. And yet we have the staunchest conviction that we must renew our plea and the General Assembly must reiterate its resolve to remove the danger of a nuclear war through the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. So grave is the peril facing mankind today owing to the existence of, and accretion to, nuclear arsenals that this Committee just cannot afford to give up its efforts, no matter how many times it may have to return to this subject.

As is stated in the preamble of this draft resolution, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be but a step in the direction which must ultimately lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But this is an essential step. We must not forget that the very existence of these arsenals is a threat to our collective existence and to the survival of our progeny. The forsaking of the use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States will not only avert the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war but it will also give credence to their oft-repeated declaration that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. It will be a concrete demonstration of their resolve in the Final Document to abolish these weapons altogether.

Secondly, I shall now beg your leave to introduce the second draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/39/L.49, submitted by my delegation. The subject matter of this resolution, namely, "Freeze on nuclear weapons", is equally crucial for the survival of mankind. This is the third successive year that we are submitting this resolution, and we do so because no action has so far been taken to comply with the provisions of the resolutions of the past two years. As in the past, the immediate goal we have in mind is to concentrate on two most crucial and easily identifiable elements which lie at the root of the nuclear-arms race. These are the production of nuclear weapons and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Our proposal for a freeze thus seeks, inter alia, a simultaneous total stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Our emphasis on these two elements of a nuclear-weapon freeze does not in the least imply that we are unmindful of the urgent need to ban the continued testing and
development of nuclear weapons. However, the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing has been on the agenda of all multilateral disarmament forums, including this Committee, for more than a quarter of a century and a number of resolutions have been adopted by the General Assembly on the subject.
The consideration underlying the submission of this draft resolution is that the freeze should be practical and should be quickly enforceable. With the stoppage of production of nuclear weapons and the cut-off in the production of fissionable material, all nuclear-weapon laboratories, reprocessing plants, enrichment facilities, and so forth, will become peaceful, which will make possible application of non-discriminatory safeguards on a universal basis. Thus, verification of a freeze would not pose insuperable problems.

We also strongly feel that an appeal for a freeze needs to be addressed to all nuclear-weapon States, and not merely to those with the largest nuclear arsenals, and that action on a freeze should be taken by all the nuclear-weapon States simultaneously. The urgency of a freeze flows from the escalation of the nuclear arms race and the very existence of nuclear weapons, wherever they are and whoever possesses them.

The basic motivation for singling out the proposal for a freeze from among the entire range of measures for nuclear disarmament lies in the simple realization that a halt to the nuclear arms race should be brought about immediately, without waiting for the meagre and always uncertain outcome of the protracted negotiations for nuclear arms reduction. The freeze is the very minimum that is required from the nuclear-weapon Powers. If the nuclear-weapon States are indeed concerned about the dangers of nuclear war, they should pay heed to the appeal of the overwhelming majority of mankind for the adoption of a simple, direct and immediately enforceable measure like the freeze on nuclear weapons. We therefore hope that our draft resolution this year will command the support of even a larger majority of delegations represented in this Committee and later in the General Assembly.

Finally, I should like to introduce document A/C.1/39/L.62, which contains a draft decision whereby the First Committee would give effect to the recommendations of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of document A/39/549. The Advisory Board has recommended that a study should be mandated by the General Assembly under the following title: "Deterrence: its implications for disarmament and the arms race, negotiated arms reductions and international security and other related matters". The Board has further recommended that the study should be carried out by a group of governmental experts. The draft decision contained in the document I have just introduced faithfully follows the agreement reached in the Advisory Board. It does not reopen
any issue or raise any controversy. Since eminent experts drawn from 23 countries have unanimously recommended the undertaking of this study, we hope that this draft decision will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): The purpose of this statement is to introduce to the First Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.71.

The title of the draft resolution is "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty". It has been drawn up primarily by Australia and New Zealand and is co-sponsored at present by 24 Member States.

The goal of bringing about an end to all nuclear testing is one to which the world community has been committed for over two decades. The Moscow Treaty of 1963 imposed a partial ban on nuclear testing and contained within it the pledge to work toward the discontinuance of all testing. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 recalled the same pledge. Subsequently, related treaties were drawn up - the threshold test ban treaty and the Treaty relating to peaceful nuclear explosions. What is now required to complete the régime of international law designed to end nuclear testing is a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Twenty-one years has been a long time to wait for the achievement of this goal and I want it to be clear that the position of the Australian Government is that a comprehensive test ban treaty is required, and is required urgently.

Our commitment to such a treaty is a practical one. Nothing is more urgent than to bring about an end to the nuclear arms race as it exists in its present form and to negotiate reductions - substantial reductions - in the number of nuclear weapons at present in existence. It is also of critical importance to the maintenance of peace and security that the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not already have them be absolutely restrained.

Those who helped write the Treaties which form the present régime of international law relating to nuclear testing knew what they were doing. They knew that an end to nuclear testing is a key - a key we must forge in order to lock out the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39 L.71 embodies practical steps to that end.

The text of the draft resolution is available for all to read and study. I shall therefore not take unnecessary time from this Committee's crowded agenda by going over points which are clear and obvious. I would draw attention, however, to operative paragraph 4. That paragraph is the core of the draft resolution.
Acting in accordance with the provisions of that paragraph, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva would establish an ad hoc committee which would resume immediately substantive work relating to a comprehensive test ban, with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject. The Conference would also decide to establish an international seismic monitoring network to monitor nuclear explosions and to determine the capability of such a network for monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Conference would also initiate detailed investigations of other measures required to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty.

Those are practical steps, the steps required to remove the remaining obstacles to a comprehensive test ban treaty.

My delegation is aware of a differing approach - the approach which calls for immediate negotiations. The Australian Government by no means rejects that objective. Indeed, Australian Government Ministers have made it clear that Australia wants to see such negotiations. But what is disturbing to us about other approaches, other draft resolutions which typically call for such negotiations, is that they tend to be restricted to negotiations on nuclear weapons tests alone. This is an important point about the Australia-New Zealand draft resolution and it is a point of contrast. Our call is for an end not just to nuclear weapons tests but to all nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time.

We are convinced that such work is within the province and the duty of the Conference on Disarmament. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament assigns to the Conference on Disarmament that authority and that responsibility. But the Conference on Disarmament, of necessity - and this was also decided by the General Assembly - works under the rule of consensus.
(Mr. Butler, Australia)

That decision was a wise one, because we all know that agreements of the kind that we await and expect from the Conference on Disarmament are vital because they affect the security of us all. Such agreements would not come into existence and would not be viable if they were not based on consensus.

It is in recognition of these facts, facts of great importance to us all, that Australia and New Zealand have worded this draft resolution in a way that is directed to practical action by the Conference on Disarmament - and we mean just that - practical action, as distinct from procedural posturing or procrastination.

I submit that our draft resolution - and possibly this draft resolution alone among all the resolutions on the subject of an end to nuclear testing - gives the possibility of progress through multilateral effort towards the goal that we all seek and to which we are all solemnly committed.

What we are looking for is practical progress, not a simple declaration which, while it might be attractive in principle, contains no real prospect of such progress.

In this sense we are asserting that we must all reject inertia - the enemy of progress. We cannot postpone progress in this field. There is no time to be lost.

A great co-operative effort is required to move towards an end to nuclear testing. The benefits of that move would be far-reaching and would extend beyond the vital necessity of bringing nuclear weapons under control. They would reach into the other urgent and great fields of human aspiration and endeavour - the maintenance of peace and the pursuit of economic and social justice for all people.

On behalf of the 24 sponsors of this draft resolution, I appeal to all members of the Committee to make that great effort and to join in supporting practical steps towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. I think no one doubts the need for such a treaty; the argument is only about how to meet that need.

There are times when we need assistance from less prosaic circles than those in which we, as officials, normally move. A Russian poet, Leonid Martynov, could well provide us with such assistance. In 1965 he wrote a poem entitled "The Destruction of the World", in which he said:

"and when I resolved to destroy the world ... for an instant only I plunged this world into immobility and all things at once leapt out of orbit; from sheer inertia all things fell apart".
This is our appeal: let us stop the inertia and get on with practical work towards a treaty that will bring about an end to all nuclear testing.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): In this statement I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32, sponsored by Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, Uruguay and Mexico, which deals with the question of a nuclear-arms freeze.

The content of the draft resolution is practically the same as that of General Assembly resolution 38/73 E, adopted on 15 December last year. I am sure that all representatives are familiar with it, so I shall mention only the main changes that we have incorporated in the draft resolution as compared with that resolution.

With regard to the preamble, I begin by noting that we have added a new paragraph, the fifth preambular paragraph, which recalls that in their Joint Declaration issued on 22 May this year the Heads of Government of six Member States of the United Nations, coming from five different continents - the countries were, in addition to Mexico, Argentina, Greece, India, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania - urged the nuclear-weapon States "as a necessary first step ... to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems". (A/39/277 p. 4)

Since bilateral negotiations aimed at a considerable reduction and a qualitative limitation of nuclear arms unfortunately have been suspended, the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs no longer speak of activating such negotiations, but, rather, emphasize the urgency of initiating or resuming them.

In the operative part, the scope of paragraph 1 (b) has been considerably broadened. In the new text the freeze "would be subject to appropriate measures and procedures of verification, such as those which have already been agreed by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, and those agreed upon in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva".

Paragraph 1 (c), instead of saying, as last year's resolution did, that the General Assembly expects other nuclear-weapon States to join in a freeze agreed to by the two major nuclear-weapon States, says that the General Assembly urges them to do so.
Finally, we have added two paragraphs, paragraphs 2 and 3. In paragraph 2 the Assembly notes with satisfaction that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has already submitted the report requested in General Assembly resolution 38/73 E. In paragraph 3 it hopes "that the other major nuclear-weapon State will find it possible to comply also with the request of the General Assembly before the closure of its thirty-ninth session".
I cannot find anything better to say in closing this brief statement than to make some comments about the contents of the ninth preambular paragraph, which proposes that the Assembly should express its firm conviction:

"that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an overall rough parity."

In my statement of 19 November 1982, in this First Committee, when introducing the draft resolution which served as a basis for resolution 37/100 B, I gave a detailed account of the various acts and authoritative views which were the basis for what the draft resolution states in that preambular paragraph. I shall not repeat that today, since it seems to me that would be redundant. I simply wish to recall one view of the many which I mentioned at the time, that of Professor Hans H. Bethe, who was the chief of the division of theoretical studies at the scientific laboratory of Los Alamos from 1943 to 1945. He was a member of the strategic military group advising the President of the United States from 1957 to 1969 and in 1967 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for studies on nuclear reactions in the stars. Professor Bethe, in testimony given on 13 May 1982 to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate said, inter alia:

"Various members of the Government have repeatedly stated that, in regard to strategic weapons, we are now in a situation of inferiority as compared with the Soviet Union and that we need to increase our armaments. In my opinion, there is no such inferiority. We have more nuclear warheads than the Soviet Union, and I consider that this is the most important measure of relative power.

"We are told that there is a vulnerability gap because the Soviet Union could use its long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles to destroy our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles ... Leaving aside the question of technological feasibility, I believe that a first strike would not give the Soviet Union any important military advantage.

"The reason for this is that intercontinental ballistic missiles represent only a quarter of our strategic nuclear force, calculated in terms of warheads. A quarter of our power is invested in invulnerable nuclear-powered submarine and another quarter in bombers, many of which, can
take off from their airfields, which are widely dispersed, in the event of an alert. Consequently we would have an adequate attack force, even if all our intercontinental ballistic missiles were destroyed." (A/C.1/37/PV.38, pp. 32 and 33-35)

By way of a conclusion of this estimate the distinguished scientist unequivocably stated:

"In summary:

"Our strategic forces are, if anything, superior to those of the Soviet Union.

"The greatest threat to our national security and to that of our allies is the grotesque size and the continuing growth of the nuclear arsenals on both sides.

"Those are the basic facts. Once they are recognized, the essential features of a rational policy of national security become obvious."

(A/C.1/37/PV.38, p. 36)

I am convinced that this well-founded assessment by Professor Bethe is even more valid in 1984, than it was in 1982.

The co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.32, which I have just introduced, would like to believe that a calm and objective analysis of its text will lead the Committee to adopt it without the need for a vote, since we are convinced that it faithfully reflects the aspirations of mankind at present.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): On behalf of the delegations of the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mexico, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, I have the honour of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72, which deals with the relationship between disarmament and development. This draft is intended as a follow-up to resolution 38/71 B, adopted by consensus last year. Under that resolution the General Assembly invited Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and proposals concerning the relationship between disarmament and development and requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the replies received and to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.
The Disarmament Commission proceeded to take up this matter in a working group, and in this context it discussed a number of proposals. It reached agreed conclusions as to the growing size of and increase in military expenditure and the incongruity between that situation and the disquieting state of the world economy, as well as the impact of that situation on economic prospects throughout the world, particularly in the developing countries.

Finally, the members of the Commission recognized that international action, taking into account the close relationship between disarmament and development, would be beneficial for the world economy and particularly for the economies of the developing countries.
The Commission was not able to adopt any specific conclusions, particularly with regard to the conference proposals, which was one of the items on which, in resolution 38/71, Member States were invited to make their views known. I would remind the Committee that such a proposal was made last year in the General Assembly by the President of the French Republic.

However, the Commission recommended:

"that efforts should be continued to enable the General Assembly to reach, at its thirty-ninth session, a broad measure of agreement on this subject, taking into account the views expressed ...". (A/39/42, para. 27)

It is in the hope of encouraging such agreement that we have submitted the draft resolution which we are now introducing to the Committee.

In the third and sixth paragraphs of the draft resolution the conclusions agreed upon by the Commission are reproduced. In the fourth preambular paragraph the widely held view is expressed that the time has come for a comprehensive discussion on the subject at a high political level, in order to give practical expression to the relationship between development and disarmament. As we see it, it is necessary to consider this relationship in all its aspects, in particular the implications of military expenditure for the world economy and development, and to study in advance ways and means of allocating a substantial part of the resources released by disarmament measures to tasks of economic and social development, above all for the benefit of developing countries.

The sponsors of the draft resolution felt that by definition this discussion could take place only in an essentially political conference. This is the purport of the operative paragraph 1.

To this end we have sought to define the general purpose of such a conference. The first two items, which are set out in paragraph 2, deal, respectively, with general consideration of the relationship between disarmament and development, and an examination of the implications of military expenditure for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for the developing countries - consideration which should lead to appropriate conclusions and recommendations.

The third item concerns consideration of the ways and means of releasing additional resources, through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries.
Finally, paragraph 3 deals with the establishment of a preparatory committee to formulate and submit, by consensus, to the General Assembly, at its fortieth session, recommendations as to the provisional agenda, procedure, place, date and duration of the conference.

The sponsors of the draft resolution hope that it will win general support. Its adoption would represent a major step towards giving practical effect to the relationship between disarmament and development, which is accepted by all, in accordance with the Final Document of the 1978 special session and would usefully serve the cause of international solidarity.

Mr. DUBERY (India): I am speaking for the second time this afternoon to add a few words to what the representative of France has just said in introducing draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.72, on the relationship between disarmament and development.

The non-aligned and other developing countries are overwhelmingly in favour of this draft resolution. As the draft resolution notes, world-wide military expenditure has acquired staggering dimensions and the present trend is towards further rapid increase. The military expenditures of the nuclear-weapon and other militarily important States have reached a level at which they are adversely affecting the growth and stability of the world economy and have emerged as a key factor in the current global economic crisis.

It is well known that the developing countries have been the worst sufferers from this crisis. Even while recovery has been taking place quite vigorously in a few developed market economy countries and rather tentatively in other developed countries, the developing countries, by and large, are still confronted with acute economic problems. Moreover, even in the nuclear-weapon and other militarily important States, it is becoming increasingly evident that their current and increasingly higher levels of military expenditures cannot be sustained without disrupting their economic, social and even political structures. There is, therefore, massive public concern in these countries about their military expenditures and interest in knowing the full implications of these expenditures.

We therefore feel that the time is propitious for high-level political debate on the entire gamut of issues relating to this subject. That is why we regard the proposal made by the French President at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly for the convening of a conference on the subject to be most appropriate, imaginative and timely.
(Mr. Dubey, India)

We are of the view that such a conference, by making the world aware of the implications of military expenditures, would serve as a restraint on the present escalating arms race and spur and give momentum to our disarmament efforts. It would also be the first opportunity to consider ways and means of releasing additional resources, through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular for the developing countries.

For too long the General Assembly and other multilateral forums have been making general recommendations on this subject. The time has now come to give serious consideration to the modalities of implementing such recommendations. The proposed conference would be an important and long-awaited opportunity for this.

We believe that there is world-wide interest in such a conference. This is because the subject-matter is of a truly global character, affecting the peoples of all nations. We therefore sincerely hope that it will be possible for the General Assembly to adopt this resolution by consensus.

At the proposed conference, we should, in a constructive spirit, seek to understand the full gravity and implications of the problems created by massive military expenditure and not blame anyone for having created those problems. We should analyze, assess and reach conclusions of common interest to all nations and not make allegations and raise unnecessary controversies. In short, we should co-operate in the spirit of human solidarity and not engage in sterile confrontation.

We sincerely hope that all members of the Committee, particularly the two super-Powers, will view the proposed conference in that spirit and support the convening of the conference by voting for the draft resolution.
Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation would like to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Nuclear-weapon freeze", (A/C.1/39/L.25) and sponsored by the delegations of Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The subject dealt with in this draft resolution is an important and urgent one. At the present time it is difficult for anyone to deny that the world has already overstepped the boundary beyond which further build-up and improvement of nuclear weapons are not only dangerous but senseless. Recent sessions of the General Assembly have indicated that, whatever the diversity in approach, the idea of a nuclear-weapon freeze is one shared by the overwhelming majority of States. A very broad spectrum of public opinion throughout the world has come out in favour of such a freeze.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, not only was it among the first to support the idea of a nuclear-weapon freeze, but it put forward a concrete programme for such a freeze at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, when, on the Soviet initiative, resolution 38/76 was adopted. That resolution issued an urgent appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to proceed to freeze all nuclear weapons in their possession both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The fact that, in spite of the desire of the overwhelming majority of the world's States, agreement was not in fact reached on this question can be explained solely by the negative position taken by the United States and certain other Powers.

Corroboration of the fact that the need for such a step has become pressing can be seen in the joint declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, dated 22 May 1984, which takes a positive view of the draft resolution now before the Committee. In proposing that the General Assembly should reaffirm its appeal to all nuclear-weapon States to freeze, from a specific date, their nuclear arsenals on a global scale and under appropriate verification, we believe that such an appeal could serve as a further incentive to efforts to bring about the adoption of this comparatively simple but, at the same time, effective method of halting the nuclear-arms race.

The Soviet Union, for its part, has been and remains prepared to proceed to undertake such a step on a reciprocal basis. We hope that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.25 will receive broad support.
Mr. MANSFIELD (New Zealand): New Zealanders have long been deeply concerned about nuclear testing, particularly in the Pacific. In my statement during the Committee's general debate I spoke at some length about the dismay and frustration that is felt in New Zealand and in other countries in our region that one of the nuclear-weapon States continues to test its weapons in the South Pacific.

Today I want to speak in support of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, which is directed towards securing the early conclusion of a treaty that would bring to an end all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time. In so doing, I want to emphasize, as my Prime Minister did in speaking to the General Assembly, that New Zealand's advocacy of a comprehensive test-ban treaty does not stem solely from the fact that, despite our strong and repeated protests, testing continues in our part of the world. We want to see an end to all nuclear testing, wherever it occurs.

A comprehensive test-ban would retard technical advances in nuclear weapons. This would limit the growth of the nuclear arsenals built up by the present nuclear Powers and would avoid the destabilizing effects of improvements in nuclear weaponry. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would also, if universally adhered to, help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not currently possess them. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would demonstrate more clearly than any other step the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to the achievement of effective arms control and the ending of the arms race.

There are differences of approach among us on some of the issues relating to a comprehensive test-ban. But what is clear from all the resolutions on nuclear testing adopted by the Assembly over the years is that the goal of a comprehensive test-ban is one for which there is widespread support in the international community. Surely it is our agreement on this basic objective, rather than any differences of approach on the steps towards it, that should be uppermost in our minds when we consider the various ways in which the Assembly may take decisions on this subject.

For our part, we continue to believe that a treaty banning nuclear tests should be comprehensive, that is, it should ban all tests, by all States, in all environments for all time. We have difficulty with the suggestion made by some that a test-ban treaty could be limited to the testing of nuclear weapons. Our
worry is, quite simply, that any nuclear device that causes an explosion can be used for warlike purposes. We acknowledge, however, that this issue of scope is one of the important questions which has to be discussed fully and resolved before a treaty can be concluded.

Another such issue is verification. No arms-control or disarmament measure would be worth the paper it is written on if there is no means of checking whether its terms are being complied with. In the case of a comprehensive test-ban treaty it will be necessary for States to have confidence that nuclear explosions in contravention of the treaty will be detected. It is clear that a number of Governments already have a very highly developed capacity to detect nuclear explosions. But there are questions as to whether it is possible to detect small nuclear explosions, which today can be of considerable military significance. These questions also must be addressed.

In my statement in the Committee's general debate I foreshadowed that, with Australia, the New Zealand delegation would be submitting a draft resolution on the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The representative of Australia has introduced that draft resolution this afternoon. He has explained that the draft resolution ensures that the questions I have mentioned are taken into account. The draft resolution emphasizes the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty with the widest possible adherence. It urges the Conference on Disarmament to establish an Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of its 1985 session to get on with the business of reaching agreement on the issues of scope and verification and, with respect to these latter questions, to adopt some very practical steps leading towards such agreement.

The early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty continues to be a primary goal for New Zealand. In this year, as in the past, our advocacy of such a treaty represents a major part of our effort in the disarmament field. The Australia-New Zealand draft resolution may not fully satisfy every Member of the United Nations. It is, however, the product of our determined effort to achieve the highest possible level of agreement on this subject, and we, with our co-sponsors, believe it offers the best prospect for practical progress towards the accepted goal of ending all nuclear tests.
Mr. SHAKER (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of the delegation of Egypt I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.54, relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

The draft resolution submitted this year is identical to that adopted by the General Assembly last year, except for the following. The first preambular paragraph recalls the resolutions on the subject which were adopted by the General Assembly, including the ones adopted at the last session. The penultimate preambular paragraph states: "Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East"; it is a new paragraph that did not appear in last year's resolution. Another new paragraph is paragraph 6, which "Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of all concerned parties regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East".

The success achieved since the thirty-fifth session, held in 1980 - and here I am referring not only to the success achieved by Egypt but also to the success achieved by the General Assembly - in obtaining the adoption of resolutions by consensus has encouraged us to take another step forward so that we may make further progress in this area. In fact during the past five years we have been able to identify certain essential factors which have been accepted by all delegations. They are contained in the resolution that was adopted last year: the need for all States concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the requirement to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, the need for those States to declare their support for establishing such a zone and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council; and the requirement for those States, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of such weapons. Those are elements which have been adopted in previous years. In view of the fact that for five years now those elements have received support, we thought it was necessary to move towards the attainment of our objectives. In this regard we were encouraged by the decisions and resolutions adopted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in Malta and New York this year. The text of the Final Declaration adopted by the Mediterranean members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in September 1984 includes the following:
"the Ministers declare their full support for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East as a concrete measure designed to lessen tension and contribute to security in the Mediterranean region in conformity with the relevant General Assembly resolutions and resolution S-10/2 in particular. The Ministers called upon the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary-General to invest the necessary efforts and undertake concrete steps" - and I emphasize "concrete steps" - "to create conditions for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East". (A/39/526, para. 16)

At the meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegation of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, held in New York in October 1984, the Ministers and Heads of delegation called upon the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary-General to invest the necessary efforts and undertake concrete steps to create conditions for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(A/39/560, para. 62)

Thus there is a consensus in favour of making progress in this area and requesting the Secretary-General to play a role.

We hope that this draft resolution will mark a step forward, and that, with the new ideas in it I have mentioned, it will, like last year's draft resolution, be adopted by consensus. The attainment of the goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would contribute to the peace and stability of our region.

Mr. ROCHE (Canada): I am pleased to introduce, on behalf of its sponsors, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Canada, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.69, concerning "Studies on climatic effects of nuclear war". This draft resolution will be reissued as document A/C.1/39/L.69/Rev.1.

Few would doubt the grave implications of a generalized nuclear war for the continued survival of civilization as we now know it. Many have spoken on this point, and the immediate effects of a nuclear war are understood and spelled out in many United Nations documents, including the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament as well as the study commissioned by the Secretary-General several years ago on the possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, international instruments, ranging from the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the partial test-ban Treaty, bear witness in their
preambular paragraphs to the fact that there is a shared understanding about the implications of nuclear war. This shared understanding is also reflected in recent statements by responsible scientists from many countries that the climatic and ecological effects of nuclear war may be graver than was formerly anticipated: the world community has a duty to inform itself.

These implications have not, however, been fully examined by science; nor are the precise dimensions of the problem fully known or understood. There are converging theories, but there are also conflicting theories. Recent studies have suggested "nuclear winter", and indeed these studies have caused deep concern, even beyond the concern already existing over the catastrophic effects of nuclear war, leaving aside the possible damage done to the life of our planet.
Some of these scientific studies have entered the public domain, some are in preparation and others are projected. Canada believes that it is in the interest of the world community that these studies should be known to all Members of the United Nations. We need more facts.

For its part, Canada is ready to contribute. As a northern country, Canada is particularly sensitive to the climate, which has had a profound effect on how we live in Canada. Some even say that it has also contributed to moulding our national character. We are ready to make available a study now being undertaken by the Royal Society of Canada. We expect that the study will be completed for timely consideration, and that it will be a dispassionate contribution to a deeply troubling subject. In company with others, we are putting forward this draft resolution, to invite States Members of the United Nations to submit to the Secretary-General any reports or studies on large-scale climatic effects of a nuclear conflict.

There is another draft resolution before this body, also dealing with possible climatic effects of a nuclear winter, sponsored by India, Mexico and others and contained in document A/C.1/39/L.22. We believe that our two draft resolutions, A/C.1/39/L.69/Rev.1 and A/C.1/39/L.22, should be regarded as parallel draft resolutions, aimed at achieving in broad terms the same ends, although there are differences in the two draft resolutions concerning the means. Our draft resolution, for example, aims at affording the General Assembly all information relevant to possible climatic effects of a nuclear war, including nuclear winter, whereas A/C.1/39/L.22 focuses on one specific aspect of the problem. There are other differences between the two draft resolutions which are sufficient, we believe, to justify having two separate draft resolutions on this general subject.

However, we would hope and urge that these draft resolutions not be regarded as being in competition, but rather that the two draft resolutions together will command sufficient support to permit the General Assembly to consider, on the basis of greater information than is now available, the possible implications for the global climate of nuclear conflict.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): I have the honour, on behalf of my own delegation and also on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan and Norway, to introduce a draft resolution under agenda item 59 (f), "Prevention of nuclear war". A number of other delegations will shortly join the present list of sponsors.
The draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/39/L.40. It bears a double title: first, "Prevention of nuclear war including all related matters", which brings it into line with the formulation of the agenda item agreed upon by consensus in the Conference on Disarmament; then, "Prevention of war in the nuclear age", a title designed to reflect the draft resolution's comprehensive nature. In the view of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40, this latter formulation also provides an excellent description of the overriding task at hand, and they recommend its wider use.

To some, the introduction of this draft resolution may seem to be a departure from the past practices of the group of Western delegations; much of their work has thus far concentrated on the introduction of draft resolutions more limited in scope, aiming at the patient building over time of consensus on specific subjects. In reality, however, the present attempt on the part of the sponsors to make a real and serious contribution to one of the gravest problems of our time is part of a continuing process, the fruit of the long-standing preoccupation of the sponsoring delegations with the very central issues of our work in this Committee. Indeed, the draft resolution is a logical development from a working paper on the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war, submitted by my delegation, in conjunction with the delegations of the Netherlands and Japan, to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. In the same vein, the sponsors of the draft resolution, jointly with other delegations from their group, have made contributions to the work of the Conference on Disarmament in this area, as evidenced by an unbroken series of statements and a number of comprehensive working papers.

The authors of the draft resolution feel that the vital topic of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, requires a coherent overall perspective. We are aware of the gravity, but also of the complexity, of the task of preventing nuclear war - and, indeed, all war; the draft resolution is therefore multifaceted and detailed. Its comprehensive nature stems from the insight of the authors that the task of preventing war and, above all, nuclear war cannot be achieved by a few selected measures with mere surface appeal. There are no such panaceas. Prevention of war requires a much broader effort aiming at the reshaping of State behaviour, an effort commensurate with the risks of the nuclear
age. The draft resolution attempts to reflect this broader strategy, the key concepts of which are: the renunciation of force; restraint; balanced disarmament measures; and confidence-building.

Quickly going through the text of the draft resolution, I should like to highlight a number of its important provisions. In the first few preambular paragraphs, tribute is paid to the view so universally shared in this Committee and elsewhere that the prevention of nuclear war remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day. The significance of this statement is not reduced by the fact that the draft resolution also strives to prevent all other forms of armed conflict, not only because, in view of the relentless dynamics of arms technology, conventional wars become increasingly large in scale and cruel, but also because of the indissoluble conceptual link between a nuclear war and the risk of nuclear escalation that a conventional war harbours. Indeed, if one looks at the possible origins of a nuclear exchange, the most preoccupying scenario is the one by which a conventional conflict degenerates so as to involve the use of nuclear weapons. Any effective strategy for the prevention of nuclear war must therefore equally address the issue of conventional conflict. The problem, however, is one of balance. Neither of the two aspects - the nuclear or the conventional - must be overemphasized or given exclusive billing.

The present draft resolution attempts to strike a balance, underlining the priority of the prevention of nuclear war in view of its singularly terrifying aspects, but also stressing the imperative need, in the nuclear age, to prevent all wars. Critics of this stance, particularly those who wish to focus exclusively on nuclear war, must seriously ask themselves the question of whether their approach could not give rise to the mistaken conclusion that the provisions of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter are more applicable to some uses of force than to others. We must jointly strive to avoid the impression that anyone would wish to keep open his own option of an attack with conventional means.

I note with gratification that in the general debate in this Committee all but a few of the non-aligned countries also voiced their concern about the threat of conventional war, calling for measures of conventional disarmament.
Further paragraphs of the preamble recall relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and appropriate resolutions, in widely accepted language where possible, as well as some features of the current arms control scene. Special attention should be drawn to the ninth preambular paragraph, in which the primary responsibility of nuclear-weapon States for the prevention of war and nuclear disarmament is stressed, but in which it is also recalled that all States bear a collective responsibility to work towards these ends.

Operative paragraph 1 restates the overriding significance of the task of the prevention of war. Operative paragraph 2 recalls the supreme imperative in the conduct of international relations - the prohibition of the threat or use of force and of taking up arms other than in the exercise of self-defence. This paragraph, it should be noted, is so formulated as in no way to weaken or replace Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, but in it the Assembly urges all States, by appropriate peaceful behaviour, to abide by its tenets.

Operative paragraphs 3 and 4 attempt to instil the prevention of war as a priority objective in State behaviour and urge restraint in the reciprocal relationships to States.

Operative paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 clarify the role and the requirements of arms control and disarmament in their essential contribution to the prevention of war.

Operative paragraphs 8 and 9 spell out the significance of confidence-building measures, especially inasmuch as they contribute to an atmosphere of reassurance and trust and to the prevention of military conflicts caused by accident, miscalculation or communications failure.

Operative paragraph 10 recalls the significance of the principle of nuclear non-proliferation.

Operative paragraph 11 addresses a frequently voiced concern about the military policy of States, condemning in unambiguous language the quest for military superiority in place of balance, stability and undiminished security of States. This paragraph also makes clear that a nuclear war, whether it originates as a conflict with nuclear weapons or follows an escalation scenario, cannot be won
and, by implication, must never be fought. Operative paragraph 11 compresses a number of difficult strategic concepts into particularly concise language; the authors would not exclude a further slight rearrangement of the material in search of enhanced clarity.

Operative paragraph 12 refers to the ongoing work on the prevention of nuclear war in the Conference on Disarmament, requesting the Conference to continue and to act forcefully in the implementation of its current agenda. The paragraph refrains, however, from dealing with the particular institutional problems at the Conference on Disarmament, which, in the opinion of the authors, are for the Conference itself to settle. Several of the sponsors have, however, in the course of the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament, gone on record with their position as to the best format for intensifying work on the agenda item on prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. May I, on their behalf, take this opportunity to express the hope that an appropriate work format for the consideration of the agenda item quickly be found on the resumption of the Conference's work early in 1985.

Operative paragraph 13 makes provision, as is customary, for the inclusion of the subject in next year's agenda of the General Assembly. The implied suggestion is that the agenda item be titled in accordance with the formulation so felicitously adopted by the Conference on Disarmament.

Let me revert to an earlier passage in my statement. On behalf of the sponsors I should like to convey the feeling that the present draft resolution is a serious and important contribution. Its text has been arrived at after long and earnest consultations among the sponsors, but also reflects a broader consensus among the members of the Western group.

The draft, however, is not the translation of parochial or geographically limited interests into resolution language. The sponsors are convinced that the ground rules for behaviour in the nuclear age which the draft resolution recommends are suitable for universal adoption and application. In their view, the draft resolution provides the necessary structure for a comprehensive strategy for the prevention of war in the nuclear age. With this conviction, they appeal to all delegations to look at this text as a serious contribution, worthy of close and careful examination and, ultimately, support.
The draft resolution thus purports to enhance international security, stability and peace world-wide. It is natural and legitimate that it is also fully compatible with - and indeed reflects - the basic security premises of the 16 democratic, peace-loving countries of the Atlantic Alliance and those associated with it. Let me briefly look at it from this angle.

The countries that support the present draft resolution have arrived at their defence policy, designed to protect their security and freedom as well as their capability to contribute to economic progress within and beyond their frontiers and stability on a larger world scale, after the intensive internal debates that are the hallmark of free parliamentarian systems. This sincere effort entitles these countries to hope that their particular perspective will be taken seriously and not brushed aside. They ask for a fair reading of their views.

In this context, I should like to voice regret that in the course of the general debate in our Committee some of the basic security premises of the members of the Western group have not always received the earnest and sober assessment they deserve. Too often the necessary analytical effort has been replaced by apodictic judgement. We wish the members of this Committee to do justice to the effective contribution to peace and stability which the group of Western countries has made in the past and continues to make. It is the hope of these countries that their sincere will to contribute to stability and peace in the world in the nuclear age, and mindful of its risks, will be acknowledged. The basic premises of Western security policy threaten no one. By discouraging attack they help to remove the menace of war in all its forms.

It is important that the right questions be asked. All member States - and this includes the non-aligned countries - should be careful to assess their own security needs in real terms, but also to understand the security position of the countries of which mine is one. They should assess the value of military stability in all parts of the world and the contribution this stability makes to their own development process in political and economic terms.

The authors of the draft resolution invite dialogue and comment on the vital matters that form the subject of their text. They are prepared to entertain any constructive amendment that might be proposed to them and that would help to
reinforce the purpose of the draft resolution. It is the hope and intention of my delegation and of the other sponsors, to put this draft resolution, amended where necessary, to the vote at the appropriate time. We are not prepared, however, to see the thrust of this draft resolution, important and serious as it is in our view, blunted by amendments that would not appear supportive of its overall purpose. We look forward to co-operation and help from a great number of delegations.

In conclusion, I should like to stress the importance the sponsors of the draft resolution attach to having their views on this vital subject on record.
Mr. BUTLER (Australia): The subject of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40, which has just been introduced by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, a resolution which Australia has co-sponsored, is a subject which involves the most important question of our age: the prevention of war and particularly the prevention of nuclear war.

Disastrous wars have been fought in this century, and that is why the Charter of our Organization begins with the commitment to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

The same commitment is reiterated in the first preambular paragraph of our draft resolution.

Nobody in this room questions the validity of the Articles of the Charter of the United Nations. Nobody in this room questions the fact that the maintenance of peace, and thus the prevention of nuclear war, and indeed all wars, is the most important issue facing us in this world today.

Too many resources which could have been directed towards development, towards attaining a decent standard of living for all people, have been directed towards expenditure on wars. Too many lives have been wasted because nations have not abided by the principles which are now contained in the Charter of the United Nations. Our draft resolution reiterates therefore the fundamental beliefs enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. These are: that war should not be viewed as an instrument in settling international disputes; that the use and the threat of use of force should be eliminated from international life; that the critical goals of securing peace and of preventing nuclear war and any armed conflict must be accompanied by full recognition of the dignity of man, of basic freedoms and of the right of national self-determination.

These clearly are goals upon which none of us disagree. We are committed to them by our adherence to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Too many nuclear weapons have been used in this century. And that number of nuclear weapons was two. A vastly larger number of those weapons, some 50,000 more, now exist. It is for this reason that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, devoted to disarmament, delineated the necessity for and outlined the process of nuclear disarmament.

In our draft resolution we emphasize the validity of the conclusions of that document. If there is no war then there is no nuclear war. That is what our draft resolution states, that is what we are committed to under the principles of the Charter and that is what is expressed in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session.
Our draft resolution derives directly from these facts. The logic is simple, the logistics perhaps not, but our case is clear. To prevent all war is to prevent nuclear war.

But how should this be done? Just as the Charter demands, all nations should act with restraint in their dealings with other nations. They should respect the territorial integrity of all States and they should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the stated purposes of the United Nations.

Our draft resolution expresses one central conviction, and it is in operative paragraph 11: that is, that a nuclear war is not winnable. Such a war must never be fought. The question is how, granted all of our commitments to the principles of the Charter and granted all of our convictions that a nuclear war must never be fought, how can we bring about, practically, measures which will ensure that it is not?

Our draft resolution suggests some answers to this vital question. For example, we emphasize the importance of concluding agreements on militarily significant and verifiable reductions of armaments and forces, including nuclear armaments, and of achieving a stable military balance, globally and regionally, at the lowest possible levels.

We also call upon the United States and the Soviet Union to reach effective agreements which would reduce to the lowest possible levels their strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, with a view, when possible, and as soon as possible, to their final and complete elimination.

We are also acutely aware, as I think is every Member State, that agreements should be meaningful. That is why we stress in our draft resolution the need for openness and an enhancement of mutual knowledge about military activities and other confidence-building measures. That is why we emphasize the necessity for balance and for verifiable agreements. After all, it is only if these conditions apply to such agreements that they can contribute effectively to the prevention of nuclear war.

We do not ask - and I wish to stress this fact - for what some have described as utopian verification requirements. We ask simply and honestly for agreements which enable all to be reasonably sure of compliance. Any other form of agreement would contribute little to the prevention of nuclear war.
I would like to reiterate that the prevention of nuclear war is one of the most urgent tasks we face today. This is stated in the draft resolution. We attach great importance, for this reason, to appropriate negotiations between those parties most concerned on all measures which would contribute to the prevention of nuclear war. We also believe, however, that it is the collective responsibility of all States to work towards these ends. This too is a concept integral to our draft.

In this respect we place great value on the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. In my Government's opinion, it can and should negotiate practical measures on the prevention of nuclear war. That is the point of operative paragraph 12 of our draft resolution, which requests the Conference to continue substantive consideration of these items.

Our colleague, the Ambassador of India, Mr. Dubey, stressed in his statement on this subject to the Conference on Disarmament, on 31 July 1984 that a substantive consideration of this item, by this Conference, leading to negotiations with a view to reaching agreement or agreements, is essential and brooks no delay.

The Australian delegation endorses those remarks. My delegation has co-sponsored this item because Australia is deeply concerned with the prevention of all war and particularly with the prevention of nuclear war. We are concerned to see a substantive and meaningful discussion of this item in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
Like most delegations we cannot accept the paralysis of the Conference on this question. What this draft resolution represents is an attempt by the co-sponsors and others to demonstrate their belief that the prevention of nuclear war should be the subject of serious work in the Conference on Disarmament.

We have couched our approach directly within the context of the Charter and the Final Document of the first special session. We ask all Member States to look at our draft resolution in that light and in the light of our common commitment to the Charter.

Negotiations on such important questions as the prevention of war and the prevention of nuclear war are not simple matters, and we acknowledge this. But we must not be dissuaded from our task and our responsibility by the complexity of the questions we face.

In appealing to others to support draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40, I should like to conclude by quoting from the speech made in Moscow on 29 May 1984 by Mr. Bill Hayden, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said:

"In the nuclear age the choice is no longer between peace and war, but between peace and extinction. We must therefore learn to live together or we will surely die together."

Mr. ENOO (Cameroon): I am taking the responsibility of presenting three draft resolutions at once, in order to save time. In each case, I shall announce the capacity in which I am speaking. The three draft resolutions are A/C.1/39/L.41, L.44 and L.51, and I shall take them in that order.

First, I shall introduce draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.41, entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". Sponsors of the draft resolution come from a wide variety of regions and backgrounds. They are: Bahamas, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, Guyana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Singapore, Togo, Uganda and Zaire.

Our draft resolution is essentially procedural. It does not seek to take sides on any of the specific problems in the disarmament field. Rather, it aims at reviewing the role of our Organization in this entire field with a view to rendering it more effective.
My delegation has already had the opportunity to refer to this issue on two previous occasions at the current Assembly session. In his statement in the plenary meeting on 8 October 1984, the Cameroonian Foreign Minister stressed, on the one hand, that:

"disarmament is the essential path we must take in order to attain the primary objective of the United Nations, the maintenance of international peace and security." (A/39/PV.24, p. 26)

At the same time, he regretted, on the other hand, that despite many efforts over many years progress in the disarmament field has been extremely limited, with States instead continuing to stockpile weapons of increasing deadliness and to carry out military research to produce even more sophisticated weapons. Noting that the international community has frequently reaffirmed the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the disarmament field, and expressing Cameroon's conviction that the United Nations, especially in the view of small countries like ours, constitutes the ideal framework for global negotiations in the interests of our collective security, the Cameroonian Foreign Minister proposed that next year's observance of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, four decades after the end of the Second World War, should provide a good opportunity to undertake an exhaustive examination of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Such a review, the Minister believed, would make it possible to identify new ways and means of making the role of the United Nations more effective, with a view to promoting substantial progress in the field of disarmament.

In my statement before this Committee on 22 October 1984, I also had occasion to address this same subject and to elaborate to some extent on what my Minister had earlier said on it in his statement in plenary meeting.

As I explained at that time, we believe that on the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations some stock-taking is necessary to look at what we are doing in this critically important field and to examine possible ways and means of improving on it, especially in the light of the very limited achievements over the past 40 years and the urgent need for substantive progress.

We recognize that a number of important and commendable structural and institutional improvements have been made within the context of the United Nations role in the field of disarmament. Many of these improvements came about as a
result of the first review undertaken by the General Assembly in this field some nine years ago. It is our conviction that immediate focus in our collective endeavour must be on the fullest and most constructive use of the resources and structures of the United Nations system in the field of disarmament. If the regrettable impasse and deadlock in disarmament efforts have demonstrated anything, it is perhaps above all that, notwithstanding the importance that may be attached to the institutional arrangements and reforms so far established, notwithstanding the large number of studies carried out and meetings held, these should be neither confused with nor made to replace concrete, substantive results.

Our primary concern is not so much the quantity as the quality of the work done. It is not a question of things rightly done but rather of doing the right things. We have no doubt that the United Nations has efficiently carried out its various activities in the field of disarmament so far, but has the United Nations been effective in this field?

A review of the United Nations role in the field of disarmament is not a panacea for the lack of progress in this field; nor is it meant to replace substantive deliberations and negotiations. Rather, it is meant to assist and enhance those efforts by clearly identifying ways and means by which the Organization's role in this field can be more effectively discharged. The review should provide an opportunity for infusing meaning and substance into the notion that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. Otherwise, the concept would remain a powerless vehicle which could serve only to erode further the already fragile credibility of the Organization in the eyes of the public.

The fortieth anniversary of the birth of the Organization would be an especially auspicious occasion for such a review. While contributing to rekindling and refocusing world attention on the primary purpose of the United Nations - namely, to maintain international peace and security - the observance of that anniversary should be seen also as a historic juncture in the life of the Organization and as an occasion for a deep and sober reflection on and evaluation of its achievements, difficulties, potential and prospects. In the disarmament field, we believe that the Organization can and must do a lot more in today's world, overshadowed by the ghastly threat of nuclear annihilation.
(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

As I emphasized in my earlier statement, on 22 October 1984, we believe that disarmament is a question of security and is, therefore, of interest to all countries. Progress in this domain requires co-operation and participation by all. The process of democratization and equal participation has already begun and must be actively encouraged. A more effective United Nations role in this field would help to ensure that opportunities were provided for accommodating the concerns and interests of all Member States in all relevant disarmament discussions and negotiations. It would also ensure that the role and contribution of the Secretariat was in accordance with the requirements of Member States. Therefore, the world forum of the United Nations, with its objective of universality, should be utilized more fully and more constructively in the disarmament field.

As I stated earlier, our draft resolution is essentially procedural. I wish to add that it is also non-controversial and does not have any financial implications. Most of its provisions are drawn from the consensus text of the Final Document and from General Assembly resolutions 3484 B (XXX) of 12 December 1975 and 31/90 of 14 December 1976, dealing with the first review, which the Assembly undertook in 1976, of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

The operative paragraphs are quite straightforward. The approach is based on the experience of the first review. However, instead of calling for an ad hoc committee to be set up to carry out the review, we have requested the Disarmament Commission to undertake this function. Our approach in this case is based on our belief that all Member States must be given the opportunity to participate directly in the consideration of a question of such importance as the review of the role of the United Nations in such a major field of United Nations activities as disarmament. Moreover, as the Disarmament Commission is an existing organ, our approach would not entail any additional strains on the already tight budget of the United Nations.

Some comments have been made to us by friendly delegations that wished to co-sponsor this draft resolution. Matters of substance do not appear to be involved in those comments, and I assure them that I shall be glad to consider the comments. In the meantime, we commend this draft resolution to the attention of all Member States and hope that it will be supported by consensus.
Speaking now as the current Chairman of the African Group, I wish to introduce the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/39/L.44 and A/C.1/39/L.51, dealing with agenda item 57, on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. In our view, these two draft resolutions should be considered together, as has been the practice in recent years, and especially since the nuclear capability of South Africa directly affects the implementation of the Declaration.

The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 20 years ago, at the first regular session of the OAU, held in Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964. It reflected and symbolized, as it continues to do today, Africa's desire to live in peace and its commitment to a non-nuclear world.

Africa's grave concern over the threat of nuclear war is universally shared, by peace-loving peoples the world over. Africa as a continent has provided a haven for those seeking new and more congenial lands afar in which to settle, to grow and to practise ideals not offered by their home countries, in their own continents.

It has also been the wish of generations of Africans - and, it would appear, also of the Maker of the Universe Himself - that the fruits of the earth be enjoyed by mankind as a whole. We must note that Africa has never waged war against the other continents, in any history that is relevant to our current struggle for international peace and security, within the new international community.

The existence of weapons of mass destruction is by its very nature an irritant to peace. Nuclear weapons are products of the misguided use of the fruits of scientific research and the attainments of technology. Africa has contributed to genuine economic and social development elsewhere, and it therefore does not deserve to be converted into an arena for the manufacture, use or dissemination of nuclear weapons.

All those nations that appeal strongly for non-proliferation can, with a clear conscience, support this draft resolution, and they must do so. All peace-seeking peoples must join in denouncing the new centre of aggression against civilized thinking. At a moment when the world is seeking sanity in disarmament, South Africa is building up so-called arsenals of weapons, and weapons that are among the most deadly. This is not only a threat to us Africans; the trigger-happy racists may be expected to provide an excuse for making even tenser an already tense
world. It is in the utmost security interest of all nations that no opportunity be given to an unruly régime, with such arrogance and so many active illusions, to join the ranks of other, more powerful nations - which, however, are already tamed by the full knowledge of the scope and magnitude of the horror of nuclear weapons.

The two draft resolutions under consideration are designed to ensure the implementation of the solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.51, in particular, seeks to remove the main obstacle to such implementation - namely, South Africa's nuclear capability.

We take note with appreciation of the report prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, on the continued development of South Africa's capability. We are alarmed that, as the report shows, South Africa continues to have the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons. At the same time, we regret that the Disarmament Commission was again this year unable to achieve a consensus on recommendations for dealing with South Africa's nuclear capability. We appeal for effective co-operation from all States and the United Nations system, including the International Atomic Agency, to assist the efforts of the Organization of African Unity to attain this objective of a nuclear-weapon-free Africa.

I would point out the sixth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.51 seems to have been reproduced incorrectly. A corrigendum will be issued in due course. In the meantime, I shall read out the correct text of that preambular paragraph:

"Taking note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 'South Africa's nuclear capability', undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity,".

We hope that this important draft resolution, which states the matter so clearly and simply, and draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.44 will receive the full support of this Committee.
Mr. SHAHABI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Making warfare as humanitarian as possible has long been the concern of humanitarian as well as military circles in all nations. Today that concern is more than ever paramount, for at least two reasons.

First, by using weapons of mass destruction it is possible to inflict a much higher level of unnecessary injury than anything that could be inflicted 70 years or so ago. In this context, chemical weapons have a very special place, because they are easy to produce and not difficult to use; least developed countries can find ways to make them. There is no need for any proof of that.

Secondly, the scars of two world wars are still deep in the minds of many in the world who either were terrified witnesses of the bombing of civilian areas, the use of poisonous weapons and resort to other inhuman weapons or have somehow been touched by the human sufferings of those times.

Draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.46 has been produced by a country that has itself been, and continues to be, even today, the victim of the use of chemical weapons. We have learned the suffering caused by chemical weapons and the extent of their use, and we can see the gloomy future in store for all mankind if such inhuman acts as their use continue.

The draft resolution is intended to contribute to the cause of disarmament and, more important, to the cause of humanity. All of us gathered here in this Committee have assumed duties to preserve and defend the cause of humanity, from which flows disarmament, the annihilation of weapons of mass destruction and the will to ban chemical weapons. Many representatives here are genuinely committed to achieving those ends. I say to them: "Here you are: a draft resolution completely based on realities, one which touches in a very sincere way on the horrible realities and dangers of our time."

The draft resolution would banish for all time thoughts of initiating chemical warfare. By supporting it, representatives will directly contribute to the cause of the non-use of chemical weapons, and thus render all chemical weapons obsolete.

Adoption of the draft resolution would show clearly, even to the most obstinate users of such weapons, or to any would-be user, that their supposed blank cheques to employ chemical weapons have no credibility in the eyes of the international community.

We do not like to use chemical weapons; in fact, we hate to resort to such acts. Even under the current circumstances, with which representatives are familiar, our leaders have persisted in their stance of not using poisonous
weapons. It is not hard to remember what was being done to our cities and other
civilian areas by systematic bombardments, until a few months ago. For 40 months,
under very serious conditions brought about by a high number of civilian casualties
as a result of the bombardment of towns and cities, our leaders did not allow
retaliation in kind. Instead, they called for widespread efforts to disseminate
nationally and internationally information on the extent of the crimes, giving
various warnings against the continuation of those war crimes. Many other
political means were also employed to halt those untold crimes.

Lack of necessary attention by the international community made such an
impression on the criminal that he felt able to continue his evil acts. That
dead-end situation, of many sufferings and much horror, imposed upon us what our
leaders hated to command - that is, retaliation in kind.

I ask representatives not to allow the use of chemical weapons against Iran
once again to reach a point at which there is only one way out. I beg the
Committee to allow the highly necessary respect for the 1925 Geneva Protocol to
continue.

The draft resolution, entitled "Preventive measures against the further use of
chemical weapons", is the result of many hours of consultation with a large number
of delegations having a wide range of views and concerns. My delegation owes them
a great deal for their recommendations and advice.

In the preambular part of the draft resolution, we recall General Assembly
resolution 37/98 B, unanimously adopted on 13 December 1982, reaffirming the
necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of
the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
Also in the preambular part of the draft resolution we take note with deep concern of the recent report (S/16433) of the specialists appointed by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the use of chemical weapons.

The next paragraph states that the General Assembly is seriously alarmed by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists confirming the allegations that chemical weapons have been used.

In operative paragraph 1 we strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons reported by the mission of specialists in March 1984 and express abhorrence towards repetition of such an act wherever and whenever it may occur.

Paragraph 2 takes note with appreciation of the Secretary-General's initiatives and efforts which made the successful investigation of the use possible, and for his humanitarian and timely appeal of 29 June 1984 to the Governments concerned to undertake a solemn commitment not to use chemical weapons.

Paragraph 3 emphatically calls upon those concerned to respond positively and immediately to the Secretary-General's appeal of 29 June 1984.

Finally, paragraph 4 requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts in preventing, investigating and reporting to the General Assembly on any further use of chemical weapons.

The draft resolution is now in a form in which it could make a great contribution to the cause of disarmament, under agenda item 64, "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons", and we sincerely ask for the Committee's support for this draft resolution.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I simply wish to make a few comments on document A/C.1/39/L.73, which contains the statement of the Secretary-General on the financial implications of adopting the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.13, sponsored by the delegation of Finland, which, in response to a request by the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts for more time to complete the study on nuclear-weapon-free zones, envisages an extension of the deadline for submission of that report.

My comments do not relate to the draft resolution itself, which has the full support of my delegation. Document A/C.1/39/L.73 contains the financial estimates prepared by the Secretariat, and of course my delegation would not discuss these amounts. Those financial implications are based on the budgeting which is detailed
in document A/C.1/39/L.73, according to which the Group of Experts would hold a
single session in 1985. That session would last three weeks and the dates for the
meetings of the Group in New York would be from 21 January to 8 February 1985. I
should like to make some very brief comments on those three points.

I shall begin with the last point: the dates, 21 January to 8 February 1985.
Those dates overlap with the beginning of the session of the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva, and at least some of the members of the Group of
Governmental Experts are involved in the work of that Conference too.

Secondly, the session would last three weeks; my delegation has firm doubts as
to the advisability of providing for such a long session. Virtually all members of
the Group have other important activities for which they are responsible and it
would be difficult for most of them to be absent from those activities for a
three-week period. In some cases that might mean that they would not be able to be
present throughout the entire session of the Group or important reasons might make
it necessary for them to leave before the end of that session.

Thirdly, these estimates envisage the possibility of a single session of the
Group of Governmental Experts. My delegation would indeed be quite satisfied if we
could reach a happy conclusion of the Group's work with one additional session
only, but I do not think we should discard the possibility of its not being able to
finish its work in a single session, especially if members of the Group cannot
remain in the session for three weeks, particularly for the final week of work.

As I say, if the work could be finished in only one more session, so much the
better, but if it is necessary for the report of the Group of Experts to be
submitted at the fortieth session of the General Assembly, the Group of Experts
will have to take into account the fact that there would be no budgetary estimates
for another session.

I think the matter the Group of Governmental Experts is considering is
extremely important and all necessary measures should be taken to ensure that the
Group's work may be satisfactorily concluded within an appropriate time frame.

I simply wished to express those views with regard to the estimates and
especially with regard to the assumptions on which they are based. I should like
to ask the Secretariat to reconsider these estimates, especially what is budgeted,
in the light of the comments I have just made.
Mr. MAHBOUB (Iraq): I have the honour of introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/39/L.47, submitted on 12 November 1984 under agenda item 59 (g), entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session - Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session".
We have listened with great interest to many representatives who have stressed the fact that the question of disarmament is of vital importance to all peoples of the world. I should like to recall also that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly has affirmed that "all States have the duty to contribute to the efforts in the field of disarmament" and that all States Members of the United Nations "have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations".

Furthermore, the General Assembly at its last session adopted resolution 38/183 F in which it called on the Governments of all Member States to contribute substantially to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field. However, as is well known, States that are not among the 40 members of the Conference on Disarmament, which is the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, cannot exercise their rights or fulfil their duties in any manner without the approval of all 40 members of the Conference. That is according to the special interpretation of the rule of consensus which is being uniquely followed in the Conference on Disarmament.

In spite of the facts that my delegation is fully aware of the major difficulties which the rule of consensus is causing in the sphere of disarmament, this simple and straightforward draft resolution does not aim at changing or amending the rules of procedure, but is designed merely to make it possible for non-Member States of the Conference on Disarmament, who are the vast majority of the States Members of the United Nations, to exercise their right and fulfil their duties as referred to in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and in other relevant resolutions. This is the only way in which a non-Member State of the Conference on Disarmament can make the contribution required of it to disarmament. What is disturbing is that the prevailing practice in the Conference on Disarmament prevents non-Member States even from making a statement on an agenda item and accordingly institutes a rule which does not conform to the basic democratic traditions of the United Nations. In fact, the said practice in relation to the simple right to speak, or to make a reply to accusations, was upheld even in situations where a single member of the Conference on Disarmament objected to the implementation of this right.
The basic thrust of the draft resolution is intended to remedy the situation in the interests of fairness and the democratic traditions of this Organization. Thus in operative paragraph 2 the General Assembly,

"Requests the member States of the Conference on Disarmament not to misuse the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament so as to prevent non-Member States from participating in the work of the plenary sessions of the Conference on Disarmament."

This is undoubtedly the only way that would enable the Conference on Disarmament to accomplish the task entrusted to it.

Finally, it is the firm hope of my Government that resolution A/C.1/39/L.47 will receive the necessary support to remedy this situation.

Mr. Issraelyan (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to make some comments on a number of draft resolutions placed before the Committee for its consideration, many of which were co-sponsored by the Soviet Union. In many of these draft resolutions - for example, L.1, L.3, L.5, L.8, L.9, L.12, L.15, L.18, L.20, L.21, L.24, L.26 and so on - reference is made to the need through negotiations to devise practical ways and means of bringing about disarmament, and at the same time particular responsibility in this connection is imputed frequently to the Soviet Union and to the United States.

We have also noted a rather paradoxical fact: those States which torpedo negotiations or object to conducting negotiations in a single multilateral negotiating body, that is, the Conference on Disarmament, in the General Assembly shed crocodile tears on the absence of negotiations. But what do we really need in order that these draft resolutions to which I have just referred, and which contain an appeal for negotiations, should not turn out to be merely meaningless scraps of paper? For the work of the negotiating machinery to be successful - that is, for the machinery not to work fruitlessly but to yield a genuine and real output in the form of agreements which serve to limit the arms race in its various ramifications - it is essential that all States participating in it should clearly and unambiguously express their willingness and their desire to achieve the purposes of the negotiations: that is, that they should express their readiness to devise and adopt specific measures towards those purposes.
We are convinced that agreements to participate in the talks - and, 
a fortiori, invitations to negotiations which are accompanied by statements to the 
effect that at those talks we should not focus on the elaboration of practical 
disarmament measures but simply on general discussions on individual aspects of 
particular problems - not only do not promote a solution to these problems but, 
indeed, even cause considerable harm to the process of disarmament. Can we 
conceive, for example, that any political willingness exists, to solve the nuclear 
test-ban problem, if individual States declare their readiness not to conduct 
negotiations but only to consider - and that in rather general terms - matters 
which would stem from such a step, at the same time declaring that the measure in 
itself is simply a long-term objective?
It is precisely that approach to the solution of this extremely important problem that is reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, submitted by a number of Western countries. I would recall that in 1982, after many years of procrastination, the United States delegation agreed to set up within the Conference on Disarmament an ad hoc body to deal with this urgent issue. That agreement was, however, made contingent upon the adoption of a limited mandate for the ad hoc body that did not include a discussion of all the provisions of a future comprehensive test-ban treaty or, in fact, any discussions at all about the drafting of such a treaty.

Everyone here is well aware how this all turned out. The Conference on Disarmament was made powerless to conduct serious talks on this problem. We are convinced that were we to act in accordance with the recommendations contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.71, which preclude once again the possibility of the Conference's conducting any practical work on the drafting of a treaty banning nuclear-weapons tests, it would be tantamount to protracting the existing stalemate. In that connection we share the conviction of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.33 that:

"the existing means of verification are adequate to ensure compliance with a nuclear test ban and that their alleged absence is nothing but an excuse for further development and refinement of nuclear weapons".

Can there really be a serious intention to ban weapons in outer space if the declared readiness to participate in discussions on that subject is accompanied not only by statements to the effect that, in principle, that problem is insoluble but also by the adoption of a series of programmes aimed at the militarization of outer space, programmes that are projected several decades into the future?

This is obviously the position underlying draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.61, which does not, indeed, even make any reference to any talks on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are convinced that talks can be successful only if States that declare their readiness to participate in them back up such declarations by submitting concrete and constructive proposals and ideas, the discussion of which might eventually lead to the elaboration of tangible ways and means of arms limitation.
Of course, we do not deny that negotiations on matters bearing directly on the security interests of States may indeed prove difficult, and it is not out of the question that participants may at times start from positions that may be far removed. At the same time, however, we are convinced that if there is a sincere desire to conclude such talks successfully, the formulation of even the initial positions - if, of course, a breakdown is not pre-programmed into the negotiations from the outset - should be made on a realistic basis, with constructive account taken of the positions of other parties. As we see it, the purpose of such negotiations is to reduce the differing positions of the parties to a common denominator, that is, to a mutually acceptable agreement.

It is quite natural that the process of finding, as it were, a middle path towards a solution should presuppose some movement towards a common ground. An approach based on a take-it-or-leave-it attitude cannot, by its very nature, lead to any success in negotiations.

The resolution of problems of arms limitation and disarmament is brought to an even more inextricable impasse when such a take-it-or-leave-it attitude is accompanied by the issuance of a number of ultimatums. We are told: "Either accept our position or we will proceed to deploy new forms of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction". Such an attitude, which would, indeed, be more appropriate to talks between victor and vanquished, is naturally no way to conduct negotiations between States with equal rights. It is no way to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union either.

The Soviet Union, while stating its desire to achieve genuine agreement on disarmament, has always stressed that it will never conduct negotiations at gunpoint.

I should like to amplify another point that undoubtedly has an influence on the overall atmosphere of negotiations and, thus, an effect on the prospects for their successful conclusion. I am referring to the fact that a large number of the draft resolutions before us contain appeals for negotiations. Recently the American side has made assertions to the effect that the Soviet Union "almost certainly has violated one agreement", or that "it has probably violated some other" or "perhaps it has violated a third". At the same time, absolutely no evidence is produced in support of such fictions. We can only regard this as an
obvious attempt to misrepresent the situation as to who is really fulfilling his international commitments and who is ignoring them and simply not carrying them out, who is circumventing them and even violating them.

Such an underhanded manoeuvre - and I do not think we can call it anything else - is aimed at one thing and one thing only, namely, to preserve the freedom of action of those employing it to carry out their own military programmes through circumvention, non-observance and sometimes direct violation of previously reached agreements. It is perfectly obvious that such acts cannot be regarded as consonant with statements that express a desire to achieve constructive relations with the Soviet Union and a readiness to reach agreement on matters relating to arms limitation and reduction.

These are a few of the points the Soviet delegation wished to make in connection with the prerequisites for successful negotiations. Negotiations should not be an end in themselves. If negotiations are held simply for the sake of negotiating, if they are used simply as a smokescreen to mask the implementation of militaristic programmes and attempts to gain military supremacy, then they can lead to nothing but harm. I would like at this juncture to quote a statement made by President Chernenko, who said:

"The desire to achieve military supremacy and the desire to hold honest business-like talks on questions affecting the national security of the parties involved are completely incompatible."

On the eve of voting on draft resolutions containing appeals for negotiations, I should like to state once again that the Soviet Union is open to free, frank and business-like discussions. We do not need to be invited to enter into such discussions, for we have always advocated - and we continue to advocate - political dialogue.
As soon as those who for reasons of expediency use "negotiations" as a mere watchword confirm their stated readiness for negotiations by tangible actions, the Soviet Union will not be found wanting.

We thought it was important to dwell on this matter, since the existing negotiating machinery, as we see it, has fully proved itself, and the main point now is to ensure that it yields practical results. That is particularly true of the Conference on Disarmament. Its agenda encompasses virtually all matters relating to curbing the arms race; and whether it can elaborate genuine measures to avert nuclear war, to bring about nuclear disarmament, to prohibit chemical weapons, to prevent the militarization of outer space and so on is entirely contingent upon whether it is given the opportunity to have concrete negotiations on those respective problems.

We believe that an index of the sincerity of the statements by countries that they are ready for negotiations, proof of the fact that their words do not diverge from their deeds, would be whether they favour very clear mandates for the conduct of such negotiations and the pursuit of specific objectives of arms limitation, and that would apply to matters already considered at the Conference on Disarmament, questions concerning the Indian Ocean or any other problems to which the peoples of the world are clamouring for solutions.

Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I have the honour now to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.26/Rev.1, which is sponsored by Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico.

The draft begins by recalling the fundamental fact that the General Assembly, at its first special session devoted to disarmament:

"approved by consensus a Declaration, contained in the Final Document of that session, in which, inter alia, it proclaimed that, in order effectively to discharge the central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament which belong to the United Nations in accordance with its Charter, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations."

The following preambular paragraph also recalls that at the second special session devoted to disarmament, which was held in 1982, Member States reiterated their solemn commitment to implement the Final Document, which had been agreed to four years earlier.
The third preambular paragraph of the revised draft resolution expresses regret at:

"the interruption of the two series of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations begun on 30 November 1981 and 29 June 1982, respectively, between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America".

The next paragraph says that it is deplored that:

"prior to such interruption, it had already become evident that the negotiations were not producing the desired results".

We have added a new paragraph, which is the fifth and last preambular paragraph, which states that the General Assembly bears in mind that on several occasions it had requested:

"the major nuclear-weapon States to proclaim a freeze embracing, inter alia, a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles".

The operative part of the draft resolution contains new language, while some parts repeat the language we used in last year's resolution. The new parts are in paragraphs 1 and 3. Paragraph 1 states:

"Requests the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to inform the General Assembly, before the closure of its thirty-ninth session, on the reasons for the interruption of their negotiations, the present situation and the prospects for their resumption".

Paragraph 3 includes a suggestion which could be very fruitful. It invites the Governments I have mentioned to consider:

"the advisability of conducting henceforward their bilateral negotiations in a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament whose membership could be limited to themselves, a possibility which was expressly contemplated when article 25 of the rules of procedure of the Committee - now the Conference - on Disarmament was approved".

The provisions we are repeating are in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the draft resolution. The first of those two paragraphs states that it "urges again" the United States and the Soviet Union to:

"examine immediately, as a way out from the present impasse, the possibility of combining into a single forum the two series of negotiations which they had been carrying out and of broadening their scope so as to embrace also the 'tactical' or 'battlefield' nuclear weapons".
Paragraph 4, whose importance could not be overemphasized, states that the Assembly reiterates:

"once more its request to the two negotiating parties that they bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake in this question".
The sponsors of this draft resolution - which we are certain will be adopted by the General Assembly - are firmly convinced that if those to whom it is addressed were to heed the urgings of the international community's most representative body, the situation the Assembly will consider next year under the item "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations" will be very different from the situation we so deplore today.

Mr. EMERY (United States of America): I wish to make a very brief response to remarks made a few minutes ago by the representative of the Soviet Union. It is not my intention to belabour this point because I know that it would also be a discourtesy to the Chairman, who has issued an invitation to a reception this evening. Let me simply point out a few differences of opinion that we have with our Soviet colleagues over some points that the representative of the Soviet Union raised a few minutes ago.

First of all, let me simply restate a point that I have made in this room on several other occasions this fall, that is, that the United States of America and its allies do not look at the question of verification and compliance as some frivolous way of objecting to important decisions that should be made in this body, or in the Conference on Disarmament, or in any other international forum. We do not look at it as a way to frustrate negotiations that quite properly should take place, but we look upon verification and compliance problems as a very serious matter indeed that speaks to the heart of our ability to control the development and use of weapons.

When we raise questions of compliance it is not simply to find ways to throw mud at our Soviet colleagues, but instead to point out that in arms control agreements that have been entered into by both nations, and other nations, in some cases there are doubts: there are doubts about what we see and what we hear; there are doubts about the performance of one country or another country. And in the future, when we adopt resolutions in this body, or adopt resolutions and take action on negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and other forums, and when the United States and the Soviet Union sit down at the negotiating table to work out what we earnestly hope will be lasting agreements, we will take into account the absolute necessity of writing those agreements in such a way that doubt and mistrust are minimized, because only by minimizing that doubt and mistrust can we guarantee the security that both the United States and the Soviet Union desire, that is, security in the knowledge that neither side has the capability of violating those agreements in a way that threatens the other's national security.
or national interests without the other side having ample warning and, of course, preventing that from happening by means of various accepted international methods.

We mention verification and compliance for those reasons only, because we believe they need to be considered much more earnestly and fully than they have been considered in the past. We are not, as I have said, trying to find ways to frustrate the work of this body or other bodies, but we believe they should be an integral and effective part of arms control negotiations. Because only if we can have a very high level of confidence that agreements cannot be violated to the detriment of the parties involved can we have enough confidence in our national security under various negotiations to build, on the record of negotiation, a future that will be secure and that will encourage moving on to even more comprehensive and more significant arms control agreements in the future.

Let me conclude my remarks simply by saying that we earnestly hope that the Soviet Union will join us at the negotiating table in negotiating a reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. We are ready to go back to the negotiating table on those issues at any time that the Soviet Union is willing to return, and we earnestly hope that will be very soon.

We make that invitation with no pre-conditions. We recognize that there are divisions of opinion that exist between the two countries that are going to have to be resolved in an earnest and straightforward way. But the only way that can be done is by our facing each other over the negotiating table. Merely issuing rights of reply or making speeches at each other or reading the papers at each other is not going to resolve those fundamental issues. Only by negotiating face to face will we resolve them, and we very much hope that the Soviet Union will respond in kind and that we can begin again that very, very important work of negotiating an end to the nuclear-arms race, work that has been begun and which the people of the world so earnestly expect us to follow through on.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): First of all, I did not touch on questions of verification; that was not the subject of today's discussion. As to our attitude to verification, we have frequently had occasion to explain to our partners, including the United States, that we are no less - and perhaps even more - concerned about having effective verification.
In this connection I cannot fail to recall the inescapable historical fact that Soviet troops have never trampled the soil of the United States, while United States soldiers, during the civil war, did indeed set foot on Soviet territory. We therefore have more than adequate reasons for demanding effective verification, supervision and monitoring of the fulfilment of any agreement.

But the essence of the matter is that our experience of negotiations has shown that the United States side is systematically hardening its position on the question of verification. Obviously, we could not fail to conclude that that position is being hardened simply in order to break off the talks. Given the opportunity, I could cite a number of such negotiations to prove my point. One example concerns chemical weapons: for eight years the United States position on the question of verification systematically became harder and harder.

I too would like to end on an optimistic note. We are ready for negotiations. We are ready to negotiate with all States, without any exception whatsoever, including the United States. But I want the United States side to understand that, unfortunately, experience of past negotiations has shown that questions of verification in particular are becoming an artificial obstacle to the achievement of agreement. If that is understood, and if we see concrete acts confirming a desire to meet the position of the Soviet Union, then there is no doubt that the prospects for both bilateral and multilateral negotiations will be improved.
The CHAIRMAN: We have finished another phase of our work, which is the introduction of draft resolutions and comments on them. We shall come to the next phase of our work on Monday, when the Committee will take action on those draft resolutions. In that connection, I am distributing to the Committee clusters of the 72 draft resolutions that have been submitted so far. Those clusters, as I explained before, were drawn up according to certain criteria which seemed to me to be the most logical and which also followed the pattern of last year. There will be no indication of the days on which those draft resolutions will be acted upon because it is my intention to take one cluster after another, as soon as they have been decided upon.

I have to point out a slight typing error on page 6 of the draft resolution introduced by the delegation of Pakistan, which will be corrected. I apologize to the delegation of Pakistan for the error.

Having said that, I hope that we shall now be able to proceed with the second phase of our work, as we have done thus far, even though it is a more difficult one and we have to take decisions on 72 resolutions.

Mr. KHERADI (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to inform the Committee that the following countries have become co-sponsors of the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/39/L.11, Byelorussian SSR and Ukrainian SSR; A/C.1/39/L.17, Byelorussian SSR and Ukrainian SSR; A/C.1/39/L.21, Democratic Yemen and Ethiopia; A/C.1/39/L.22, Romania; A/C.1/39/L.24, German Democratic Republic; A/C.1/39/L.34, Byelorussian SSR; A/C.1/39/L.40, Denmark; A/C.1/39/L.41, Djibouti; A/C.1/39/L.52, Ecuador; A/C.1/39/L.59, Djibouti; A/C.1/39/L.60, Burkina Faso; A/C.1/39/L.63, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; A/C.1/39/L.70, Uruguay; and A/C.1/39/L.71, Brunei Darussalam, Portugal, Sierra Leone and Singapore.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.