VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 35th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)
Later: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia)
(Vice-Chairman)

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway): I take pleasure in introducing document A/C.1/39/L.27, which is a draft resolution concerning the holding in 1986 of the second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

On 30 July 1984 the Norwegian Government, whose representative had the honour to preside over the first Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons, sent a note to the depositary Powers of that Convention requesting them to communicate to the States parties a proposal that the second Review Conference should be held in 1986 and an appropriate procedural draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly at this session. The Norwegian proposal was made on the basis of the Final Declaration of the first Review Conference in 1980. The final Declaration stated, inter alia, that a second Review Conference should be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States parties not earlier than 1985 and, in any case, not later than 1990.

As of 29 October a total of 58 States parties had supported the proposal to hold the second Review Conference of the States parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons in 1986. As the Convention has 100 States parties, the proposal thus had the support of a majority of the States parties.

Against this background, Norway has taken the initiative of presenting a draft resolution to this session of the General Assembly. The draft resolution (A/C.1/39/L.27) has four preambular and two operative paragraphs.

In the first preambular paragraph we have made reference to resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, concerning the entry into force of the Convention on Biological Weapons. In the second preambular paragraph reference is made to article XII of the Convention, concerning the first Review Conference, which was held in 1980. In the third preambular paragraph we mention that the first Review Conference decided to hold the second Review Conference at the request of a majority of States parties not earlier than 1985 and, in any case, not later than 1990. In the fourth and final preambular paragraph we recall resolution 35/144 A,
in which the General Assembly welcomed the final Declaration of the first Review Conference.

Operative paragraph 1 states that, at the request of a majority of States parties, the second Review Conference will be held in 1986. It also mentions that a Preparatory Committee is to be established prior to holding the Review Conference. Operative paragraph 2 concerns the usual assistance which is to be provided by the Secretary-General.

The draft resolution, which I have the honour to introduce, is co-sponsored by 42 countries from all regional groups.

Before concluding, I should like to draw the Committee's attention to an informal meeting of the States parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons which was held in New York on 6 November. At that meeting it was decided that the Preparatory Committee of the Review Conference should be open to all States parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons and that the Preparatory Committee should have one session in Geneva during the week of 28 April to 2 May 1986.
(Mr. Vraalsen, Norway)

The Preparatory Committee should, of course, decide when in 1986 the Review Conference should be held. At the informal meeting of the States Parties on 6 November it was, however, agreed to communicate to the United Nations Secretariat that it was the opinion of the States Parties that the Review Conference should be held in Geneva during a three-week period, between 8 September and 3 October 1986.

Finally, on behalf of the sponsors, I express the hope that draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.27 will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. O'CONNOR (Ireland): I should like on behalf of the 10 Member States of the European Community to address item 65 (c) of the agenda, the Secretary-General's study on conventional disarmament. The Ten welcome this study and express their satisfaction that the study as a whole has been adopted by consensus. They consider that it represents an important contribution to efforts to identify practical approaches and realistic measures aimed at limiting and reducing conventional weapons and armed forces with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament. The international community could usefully build upon these approaches and measures.

The study rightly points out that while "Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority", Conventional disarmament is also a priority item "as the conventional arms race contributes significantly to tension and insecurity throughout the world, increases the risk of war, including ... nuclear war, and absorbs the greater part of global arms expenditures."

(A/39/348, para. 180)

The Ten consider that, as the study points out, the importance the international community attaches to the question of conventional disarmament has been overlooked, at a time when it deserves more urgent attention than has heretofore been the case.

The study indicates the gravity of the situation. Since 1945 there have been more than 150 armed conflicts, leading to over 20 million deaths and involving the peoples and territories of more than half the States Members of the United Nations. If current trends continue it is inevitable that there will be not only more and continued human suffering but also an unabated rise in the world's military expenditure, to the further detriment of social and economic development in the world. A halt to the arms race is a prerequisite for the achievement of more stable and balanced social and economic development for all countries.
In such circumstances, as the study points out, it is clear that negotiations for the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued concurrently with nuclear disarmament. While in general the States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in the process of conventional arms reductions, this does not diminish the responsibility of other States to seek reductions in conventional armament. In addition, we should recognize that, however much the present conventional arms race is related to the political climate between East and West, it is also, as the study demonstrates, related to tensions, conflicts and confrontations in other regions of the world. For this reason, the Ten can endorse the recommendations that all States should give consideration to evolving measures which would be conducive to conventional arms limitation and disarmament in their own particular circumstances.

The study also draws attention to the value and appropriateness of regional initiatives in the area of conventional disarmament. The Ten are currently engaged at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in efforts designed in a first stage to reduce tension and prevent surprise attack, thus paving the way to a second stage, where the participating States would continue their efforts to achieve measures for security and disarmament in Europe, in particular by controlled reductions of armaments. At the same time, those member States of the Ten directly involved are taking part in negotiations at Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions, with the aim of contributing to European security and international security in general, through the achievement of parity of force strengths in central Europe at a lower level.

Concrete measures in the field of conventional arms control and disarmament would have a positive effect of their own on international relations. Additionally, as the study points out, such a development would improve prospects for nuclear disarmament and consequently for international security, in its broadest and most significant sense.

Although the Group of Experts refrained in the study from making specific proposals concerning the precise subject, framework and timing of negotiations and other actions that can be taken, the Ten fully support the view contained in the study that any measures to be agreed should preserve undiminished security for all parties and should be accompanied by adequate verification arrangements.
Mr. O'Connor, Ireland:

The Ten believe that the study represents an important step in the direction of highlighting the issues and prospects for progress in the field of conventional disarmament. We believe that the impetus thus achieved should be built upon and that the question should be kept on the disarmament agenda. With this in mind, the Ten fully support the proposals contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.16 for the pursuit of this subject.

Mr. Qian Jiadong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): In the general debate in the General Assembly and in this Committee during the current session many countries have expressed grave concern over the trend for the arms race to be extended into outer space. They have called for early negotiations to reach agreement on timely and effective measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. This amply demonstrates the importance and urgency of the question.

In its statement on 23 October the Chinese delegation has already touched on this issue. Now, in the context of the discussion of specific items, I should like to elaborate further on some of our views.

Exploring the universe and harnessing the boundless cosmic space for the benefit of mankind has been the fond dream and ambitious goal of the human race for millennia. The rapid development of space science and technology has catapulted humanity into outer space, onto the moon and on its way to unveiling the mysteries of other planets. Today space science has found widespread applications in many aspects of human life. It is playing an ever greater role in promoting the economic and cultural development of nations.

The brilliant accomplishments of a scant two decades have shown the huge potentials of the peaceful use and exploration of outer space and have offered a glimpse of a bright future. Unfortunately, however, like other branches of advanced science and technology, space science has been used for military purposes from the very beginning.

With the intensification of their rivalry for military superiority, the super-Powers have gradually extended their arms race from the land, the sea and air space to outer space in a bid to control the earth from space.
In addition to the hundreds and thousands of military satellites of various kinds already launched, they are engaged in intensified research and development of space weapons endowed with massive destructive power. After years of testing, anti-satellite weapons have already acquired, to a certain extent, the capabilities of real warfare. In the mean time, a round of costly competition is unfolding to develop anti-ballistic missile systems. This race, if unchecked, is bound to further destabilize the already very unstable situation. As a result, the danger of war will not be lessened, but, on the contrary, will be further aggravated.

The history of disarmament negotiations demonstrates that it is relatively easier to stop the development of a weapon in its initial stages and much harder to prohibit it after its production and deployment. A Chinese proverb exhorts people to keep the windows in good shape before the rainstorms and not to dig a well only when one is dying of thirst.

On the whole, space weapons are at the present still in the research and development or testing stages. We should take speedy action at this critical juncture to stop in its tracks this ominous arms race fraught with dangers for mankind. Otherwise we will one day come to regret - but to what avail - an opportunity lost.

Three years have elapsed since the inscription of the item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" on the agenda of this Committee. A number of resolutions were adopted. Of special significance is the one adopted by an overwhelming majority at the last session, calling on the Conference on Disarmament to establish a working group early this year to negotiate on this issue. It is also hoped that the two space Powers could initiate bilateral talks on the same question at an early date. The two super-Powers, which not only possess military strength far above other countries but are right now in the process of testing and developing space weapons, should logically bear special responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space.

However, contrary to people's wishes, both multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and bilateral talks between the two space Powers on this question have, for one reason or another, failed to take place. The rivalry between them is undoubtedly still the fundamental obstacle.

This summer, attention was aroused for a time over the proposals and counter-proposals for outer space talks exchanged between the super-Powers. The
result is, however, nothing but disappointment. We have noted of late fresh expressions of willingness to undertake outer space talks in the statements of both the United States and the Soviet Union in this Committee. We hope that they are not again merely striking a posture but are truly ready to begin such talks in earnest in response to the wishes of the world's peoples, including their own. All nations have a vital stake in the question of outer space. Bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union cannot therefore be a substitute for multilateral negotiations. We share the view that bilateral and multilateral talks are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually reinforcing and complementary.

As the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should establish an ad hoc committee as soon as it resumes its work in 1985, to conduct negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

China has always maintained that outer space, as a common heritage of mankind, should be used solely for peaceful purposes. Nations should strengthen international co-operation to promote the exploration and peaceful use of outer space. In this context, the non-militarization of outer space should be the overall goal that nations should strive for.

Needless to say, this is a complex task. There exist divergencies of views on how to achieve this end, particularly on the question of military satellites. In view of this, we feel that we can start with the prohibition of space weapons, which directly threaten international security and stability, to achieve the non-weaponization, so to speak, of outer space, including the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of space weapons, leading to the complete destruction of all space weapons systems.

This is what the Chinese draft resolution on outer space has underlined, which is contained in document A/C.1/39/L.3. I hope that serious consideration will be given to it.

Ms. MAUALA (Samoa): As this is my first intervention in this Committee, it is with pleasure that I express the congratulations of my Government and myself to you, Mr. Chairman, and the other officers both on your election and on your expert conduct of the Committee's business. Your long service in the cause of disarmament will, we are sure, continue to stand us in good stead.
I should like to speak this afternoon on the subject of nuclear testing, a matter which is dealt with under several specific topics on the agenda of our Committee this year. Indeed, the issue of nuclear testing has been a matter of high priority for all States which are concerned with the continuing escalation of the nuclear-arms race, and which sincerely see no alternative to steady progress towards nuclear disarmament if the safety of our planet and its inhabitants is to be assured in the future.

Samoa is a member of the South Pacific Forum, an association of South Pacific countries. Both individually and as a member of the Forum, Samoa has repeatedly made clear its opposition to continued nuclear testing, particularly nuclear-weapon testing, and most particularly that testing which is being carried out by France on the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls in the South Pacific.

At the South Pacific Forum meeting at Tuvalu in August this year, Samoa and the other 12 States of the Forum reiterated their strong opposition to the testing. The South Pacific Forum Heads of Government agreed at that meeting to work together on a treaty to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Such a treaty will be a clear indication from the South Pacific of our wish both to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to keep our region from becoming involved in nuclear rivalries.

It is a matter of most serious concern to us all that, as mentioned, the serene South Pacific environment is still being used for tests to produce weapons of destruction. The Prime Minister of Samoa, the Honourable Tofilau Eti Alesana, has stated that Samoa will do all it can, regionally, internationally and bilaterally, to ensure that the day will not be far away when France will heed the call by the people of the South Pacific to stop the continuous testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. We will not let recent reports (should they prove to be accurate) that France may intend to continue this testing for at least 15 more years discourage us but, rather, harden our resolve to see an end to this.
However, let it not be said that Samoa is selective in its approach to this most important question. Samoa is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and strongly supports that Treaty. It is not a perfect instrument and we recognize the validity of some of the criticisms of it. In our view, however, the Treaty plays a vital role in preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We are no less concerned, however, about the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expansion of existing arsenals already held by the nuclear-weapon States. It is for this reason that Samoa strongly supports calls for the immediate negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and we shall co-sponsor and support the draft resolution which will be brought to the General Assembly, through this Committee, under item 47 on our agenda, "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

Samoa is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament and it was most disturbed to learn that no progress whatsoever had been made in that forum in 1984 on the very item which occupies the number one position on the Conference's agenda - the negotiation of a nuclear-test ban. The 40 members of the Conference act on behalf of the entire international community. We would urge them to overcome at their next meeting whatever hurdles stood in the way of progress this year so that the Conference may move without delay to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The peoples of the Pacific traditionally reach decisions by consensus, the views of all are heard and taken into account. We call this the Pacific way and we urge the members of the Conference on Disarmament to find a way to move forward by consensus, so that negotiations on this vital treaty can begin without any further delay.

Samoa wants a nuclear-free Pacific; it wants an end to nuclear testing in the South Pacific; it wants an end to all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time. We will spare no efforts to ensure that this comes sooner rather than later, as later may indeed be too late.

Mr. TINCA (Romania): In one of our earlier statements we spoke more fully about the concern aroused by the staggering growth of military expenditures and the complex and extremely adverse political, economic and social effects of that phenomenon.
Romania continues to be firmly convinced that in all United Nations endeavours to reach genuine disarmament measures, and primarily nuclear disarmament, concerted efforts to freeze and reduce military budgets would contribute to curbing the arms race, strengthening confidence among States and creating a climate favourable for disarmament negotiations.

At the same time the reduction of military expenditures, as has been emphatically stressed during our debate, would certainly have a favourable impact on the economic and social development of all States and on the world economy as a whole. The reallocation to peaceful purposes of a portion of the vast resources swallowed up by the senseless arms race would make it possible to redress the economic situation and at the same time to support the economic and social development efforts of all States, especially the developing countries.

It can be said that the reduction of military budgets, an agenda item which this Committee has been considering for many years, has in the present international situation gained a distinct sense of urgency. The draft resolution (A/C.1/39/L.19) which I have the honour to introduce on behalf of the delegations of Austria, Bangladesh, Colombia, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Ireland, Malta, Nigeria, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay and my own country is intended to contribute to the attainment of that objective. It meets the need to continue action already undertaken within the framework of the United Nations to promote negotiation of effective agreements on the reduction of military budgets.

As in the past, our resolution is drafted around two main ideas.

The first idea is to try to address the urgency of the matter and, as contained in operative paragraph 4 it consists of an appeal which the General Assembly addresses to all States, in particular to the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures, with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. One cannot but stress here again the acute relevance of this important appeal.

There is no doubt that in circumstances where military expenditures are at once a consequence and an aggravating factor of the international situation and are increasing at an unprecedented pace, the appeal to restraint is of great political significance.
The second idea concerns the practical side of the matter. It relates to the concrete actions undertaken in this Committee and in the Disarmament Commission in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 34/83 F, which specifically provided that a new impetus should be given to endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned.

To this effect paragraph 5 of the draft resolution requests the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in accordance with that body's recommendation adopted by consensus at its session this year, to continue, at its next session in 1985, consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" on the basis of the relevant working paper annexed to its report as well as other proposals and ideas on the subject-matter, with a view to finalizing the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

Two preambular paragraphs contain the rationale behind this enterprise and place it in the broader context of United Nations endeavours in the field of reduction of military budgets.

The first one expresses the conviction of the General Assembly that identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures.

As was certainly noticed, the draft resolution requests the Disarmament Commission to finalize the identification and elaboration of these principles in 1985. It is our belief that the Commission might be in a position to solve in a generally acceptable manner the few problems that still remain pending and thus fulfil its mandate next year. In this regard, of particular relevance is the appeal contained in the third operative paragraph, by which the General Assembly calls upon all Member States, in particular the most heavily armed States, to reinforce their readiness to co-operate in a constructive manner, with a view to reaching agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures.
Finally, the draft resolution expresses the deep concern of Member States about the ever spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations, as well as the conviction that the freezing and reduction of military budgets would have favourable consequences on the world economic and financial situation, and might facilitate efforts made to increase international assistance for the developing countries.

One of the most important provisions of the draft resolution reaffirms the need emphasized by a large majority of delegations here in this Committee and in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, namely, that the human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.
The draft resolution clearly demonstrates the concern of the sponsors and their efforts to contribute to the harmonization of the views expressed by States on the reduction of military budgets. Therefore, it contains only non-controversial ideas and provisions that have appeared in resolutions and recommendations adopted by consensus by the General Assembly or by the Disarmament Commission on the question of the reduction of military budgets.

It is our firm conviction that we shall be able to begin negotiations and reach specific agreements on the reduction of military budgets only through a constructive and flexible approach likely to foster the identification of the elements capable of promoting convergence among the various ways of proceeding in this sensitive area.

In conclusion, the delegation of Romania wishes to thank all the delegations which participated in the preparation of the draft resolution and, in particular, those which joined in sponsoring it. The consultations we have held on the text of the draft resolution, as well as the non-controversial nature of its provisions, lead us to hope that it will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia): My delegation has asked to speak today to address itself to item 55, "Relationship between disarmament and development", and item 57, "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

On the first point, for more than two decades, the General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions appealing for the reduction of military spending and the utilization of the funds released for social and economic purposes. These appeals, which, ipso facto, linked or associated disarmament with development, were a tacit recognition that it was wrong to squander resources on armaments while the basic needs of so many people remained unmet. More recently, there has been a perceptible movement towards the view of a deeper incompatibility between the arms race and the economic and social needs and aspirations of the peoples of the world.

It was in this context that my delegation welcomed resolution 38/71 B, which requested the Disarmament Commission to include this item in its agenda. That resolution focused attention on the need to view the disarmament-development link in a dynamic economic environment.

Much of the work on this question has concentrated primarily on the utilization of resources for military purposes, the economic and social consequences of the continuing arms race and the conversion and redeployment of
resources. Thus, studies by the United Nations have been forward-looking and policy-oriented and placed special emphasis on both the desirability and the feasibility of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of the developing countries. Their findings have also awakened leaders and the public at large to the prohibitive cost of armaments to the entire international system.

The continuing arms race and growing military expenditures have already taken a heavy toll on the economies of all nations. The continued squandering of unconscionable sums not only profoundly affects the economies of the industrialized world and the international economic system, but also manifests itself in the decline of official development assistance, which continues to be regarded as an act of charity rather than an obligation and one of self-interest in an increasingly interdependent world. Therefore, any consideration of this item must go beyond pointing out the negative impact of military expenditures on disarmament. Rather, our attention should be more usefully focused on how positive, causal linkages between disarmament and development can be established and strengthened at the national, regional and international levels. Our approach should be directed towards the identification of key issues for policy formulation to ensure that the resources released from military budgets will, in fact, be utilized for badly needed development.

Furthermore, a strategy for directing the resources gained from disarmament towards development can only be built on the basis of an explicit recognition of economic interdependence. A programme for global economic development built on the firm foundation of substantial arms reductions has become an imperative necessity.

In view of the ramifications inherent in the relationship between disarmament and development, my delegation has endorsed and continues to endorse the proposal for the convening of an international conference for a comprehensive discussion of the issues involved at a high political level. These include modalities for reallocation of military resources, assessment of the nature and magnitude of short-term and long-term economic and social costs attributable to military preparations, as well as consideration of proposals concerning institutional arrangements for the transfer of resources released through disarmament measures to the developing countries. We are confident that the conference could initiate
action on a number of critical areas and formulate policies for the benefit of all mankind, thereby ensuring common security and common prosperity.

The second item to which my delegation wishes to address itself today is item 57: "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

It was two decades ago that the Heads of State or Government of Africa declared their continent to be free of nuclear weapons, the first such historic initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Subsequently, the United Nations endorsed that solemn Declaration and called upon all Member States to respect and accede to the overwhelming will of the African States.

However, over the years the Declaration has been gradually and systematically undermined and frustrated by South Africa's nefarious nuclear programmes, which, even from the initial stages, bore ominous implications as to the intentions of the racist régime.

Indonesia has long been concerned with this dangerous trend, considering South Africa's abhorrent apartheid policy and wanton behaviour towards its neighbours, flouting world public opinion, which has made it a kind of outcast in the community of nations.

In this particular regard, our apprehension, like that of so many other Member States, is based on Pretoria's obstinate refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place all of its nuclear installations under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). South Africa's reliance on its military power in its relations with regional States, reflecting its utter disregard for the sanctity of the United Nations Charter, and the ultimate confrontation that the racist régime faces in South Africa itself clearly establish the inherent instability of that régime, which is likely to provoke it to use its nuclear capability to produce nuclear weapons in a desperate attempt to impose apartheid and to blackmail the region.

Indeed, the implications are considerable, as a threat to both the security of African States and international peace and security. Furthermore, South Africa's ambition to achieve a nuclear-weapons capability, if it has not already done so, is fully confirmed by the findings contained in the report of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in co-operation with the disarmament bodies of the United Nations Secretariat (A/39/470).
(Mr. Sutowardojo, Indonesia)

According to the data and information contained therein, South Africa has enhanced its nuclear capability in crucial areas such as accelerated exploitation of Namibia's uranium resources and their enrichment, which is an essential component of its nuclear weapons programme. Hence, it is on the threshold of nuclear-weapons-grade fuel production. In the research and development field, it has established a new nuclear research centre and has adopted legislation to restructure the control and management of all of its nuclear programmes. Taken together, the inescapable conclusion is that South Africa's technical capability has reached a point where it can independently acquire nuclear armaments.

The massive accumulation of armaments by the racist régime and the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons present a dangerous obstacle not only to the declared objective of a demilitarized Africa but also to the realization of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Moreover, nuclear weapons in the hands of a renegade régime such as South Africa, which has no regard for norms of civilized behaviour, which massacres its own citizens, which maintains its colonial grip over Namibia and which arbitrarily attacks its neighbours cannot be tolerated by this or any other organization dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, South Africa must be compelled to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and accept an internationally binding commitment to non-proliferation. To this end, the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa must be extended to include all materials and technology that have or may have nuclear application. It is imperative, therefore, that those States that continue to turn a blind eye to the dangerous consequences of the situation should henceforth cease any assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the apartheid régime's nuclear capability. We believe that this course of action offers the only chance to force South Africa to come to its senses.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): On behalf of the co-sponsors, I should like to introduce three draft resolutions on agenda item 59; namely, a draft resolution (A/C.1/39/L.8) referring to nuclear weapons in all aspects; a draft resolution (A/C.1/39/L.20) regarding the qualitative aspect of the nuclear arms race - that is, the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon; and, finally, a draft resolution (A/C.1/39/L.12) on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war.
The foregoing draft resolutions have one point in common: they are aimed at averting the danger of a nuclear war by taking effective measures and at promoting nuclear disarmament. This corresponds, at the same time, with a basic demand which, in the Committee's general debate, was advocated by all or almost all delegations.

The accelerating arms race, especially in the nuclear field, not only leads to a reduction of international security, not only endangers the existence of humanity, but also is a main obstacle to the building of confidence between States and is the main reason for the unsatisfactory progress in the field of disarmament as a whole.

Mere declarations of good intentions are not sufficient. They must be corroborated by deeds. We share the view that we need, not propaganda resolutions, but action-related guidelines by the United Nations for the negotiating process. That is the leitmotiv of the foregoing draft resolutions that we are submitting.

The second point the draft resolutions have in common is the wide identity of their contents with those of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

Allow me to make some detailed remarks about the draft resolutions.

The draft resolution on nuclear weapons in all aspects, contained in document A/C.1/39/L.8, is based on fundamental assessments and tasks of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. It also points explicitly to the important six-State declaration and its appeal to the nuclear-weapon States.

The draft resolution underlines once again that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. It further refers to the necessity to put a stop to the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. Consequently, the draft resolution is directed against all nuclear doctrines aimed at the unleashing of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons.

Expressing regret that the Conference on Disarmament was prevented from holding negotiations on this fundamental question, the draft resolution in operative paragraph 1 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament "to proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and especially to begin the elaboration of practical measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear
disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, including a nuclear disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc committee".

(A/C.1/39/L.8, para. 1)

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.20 proceeds from the necessity to end not only the quantitative but also the qualitative arms race in the field of nuclear weapons. This is also in accordance with paragraph 50, and especially subparagraph (a), of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. We are faced with the fact that a third generation of nuclear weapons is already being developed, including the production of nuclear warheads with specific characteristics. This lowers the nuclear threshold and serves, inter alia, to give material form to aggressive nuclear doctrines. A prototype of that development is the neutron nuclear weapon. It is meant for deployment and use in Europe and in other regions of the world.

The main concern of the draft resolution submitted in document A/C.1/39/L.20 is the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of the neutron weapon. Operative paragraph 1 calls for relevant negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. We take into account the organic interrelationship of the prohibition of the neutron weapon and the entire process of nuclear disarmament; this was taken into consideration also in the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to discuss the prohibition of the neutron nuclear weapon under agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The prohibition of that weapon alone would not by itself, of course, end the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, but it would be an effective step in that direction.
Of course, we are striving for the prohibition of the neutron nuclear weapon everywhere. Therefore, all States, and especially all nuclear-weapon States, are called upon to participate in the preparation of a convention. Certainly, nobody can claim that such an approach is one-sided.

Document A/C.1/39/L.12 contains a draft resolution on the question of non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war. The starting point is the undeniable fact that, as stated in the fifth preambular paragraph:

"...the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons". (A/C.1/39/L.12)

The renunciation of the first use of such weapons would, nevertheless, constitute a significant and urgent step to counter the danger of a nuclear war. This idea is gaining ground worldwide. It finds its expression also in a relevant appeal in the Final Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Delegation of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

The draft resolution refers to the well-known statements of two nuclear-weapon States, namely the Soviet Union and China, on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the hope is expressed that the other nuclear-weapon States will also undertake such pledges. This joint renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons could also be laid down in a multilateral agreement. Therefore, the draft resolution in operative paragraph 3 requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character containing the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Finally, on behalf of the sponsors, permit me to thank all delegations, which, in the course of comprehensive consultations, have contributed their help in drafting the texts of the resolutions I have introduced.

Mr. Khan (Pakistan): I am speaking today to introduce two draft resolutions which have been circulated as documents A/C.1/39/L.6 and A/C.1/39/L.7. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.6, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia", has been submitted under agenda item 49. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.7, with the title "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", has been submitted under agenda item 52.
As part of its overall interest in disarmament issues, Pakistan has consistently given its support to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. Our position arises from the conviction that pending the realization of the crucial objective of nuclear disarmament, the establishment of such zones can play an important role in preventing nuclear proliferation and in providing a degree of assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States of the region concerned regarding their security. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament reflected these views when it recognized that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constituted an important disarmament measure and called upon nuclear-weapon States to give undertakings to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the region. These are as valid today as they were in 1978.

The Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries has also given its support to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. The political declaration issued at the conclusion of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, called for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan shares with other States of South Asia a deep commitment to the goal of keeping the region free of nuclear weapons. This commitment has been expressed in declarations at the highest level by the States of the region. We feel, therefore, that appropriate conditions for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia exist.

Keeping in view the foregoing considerations, Pakistan took the initiative at the 1974 session of the General Assembly for the establishment of such a zone in the region of South Asia. Since then this issue has come up regularly at subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. We continue to hope that the adoption of the resolution on the subject by the General Assembly will encourage the States of the region to enter into consultations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. We are introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.6 again this year with the same objective in mind.
The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.6 is along the same lines as the corresponding resolution 38/65, which was adopted by the General Assembly last year. In its preambular paragraphs, inter alia, it recognizes the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and general and complete disarmament. This draft resolution, in its operative paragraphs, urges the States of South Asia, and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested, to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to this objective.

We hope that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.6 will receive widespread support in the First Committee and in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly.

The second draft resolution that my delegation has the privilege to introduce deals with the subject of the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In a world where total nuclear disarmament, unfortunately, still remains a distant goal, the importance of credible assurances of a binding character to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons cannot be overemphasized, so as to meet the legitimate security concerns of these States and to minimize the incentives for nuclear proliferation. We are convinced that until such time as nuclear weapons are totally eliminated, the nuclear Powers are under an obligation to extend security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

For these assurances to be credible, it is necessary that they be contained in an international legal instrument of a binding character. In our view, unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States on the subject, although useful to some extent, are not sufficient to meet the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States and, therefore, cannot be considered as an acceptable substitute for effective and credible negative security assurances.
We must, therefore, continue our efforts for the elaboration and conclusion of an international agreement of a binding character to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has actively co-operated with other delegations in the Conference on Disarmament for finalizing such an international agreement. It is a matter of deep disappointment to us that the Ad Hoc Committee on the subject established by the Conference on Disarmament has failed to register any progress in that direction despite the fact that there is no objection in principle in the Conference on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. What has hindered progress is the inability of the Conference to agree on a common formula which is acceptable to all for the purpose of providing credible and effective negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. We consider it important, therefore, that the General Assembly call upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to reach agreement on a formula which would enable it to elaborate and conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/39/L.7 has been prepared along the lines of earlier resolutions on the subject which have been adopted by the General Assembly at preceding sessions on the initiative of Pakistan. The resolution, in its preambular part, recognizes the need for effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also takes note of the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament on the subject. In its operative part the draft resolution, inter alia, recommends that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Last year the corresponding draft resolution was adopted in the plenary meeting by 141 votes in favour, none against and 6 abstentions. We hope this year the draft resolution contained in document L.7 can be adopted unanimously.

Mr. Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany): I intend to devote my statement to agenda item 59 (f) on the prevention of nuclear war, but I will also touch on a number of related matters.
In his address to the General Assembly on 26 September, Foreign Minister Genscher stated:

"... negotiations must take place. This principle must apply everywhere and in respect of all weapons. No weapons system must be excepted. No one may consider only his own security interests; the legitimate interests of others must also be acknowledged. No one may seek security at the expense of others." (A/39/PV.8, pp. 16-17)

In his statement to the First Committee on 23 October, Ambassador Lautenschlager added:

"These postulates are consistent with the demands which have to be made on security and peace policy in our time. They do not require anything unacceptable from either side. They point the direction in which we can all move together." (A/C.1/39/PV.11, p. 27)

The delegates of the Soviet Union, Ambassadors Troyanovsky and Petrovsky, in their statements before this body, have voiced criticism of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies.

This prompts me to make the following observations. The key argument in the Soviet presentation is that a further build-up of nuclear weapons with their well-known destructive potential will raise the risk of nuclear war to an alarming extent. In the Soviet view such danger arises in proportion to the size of the arsenals. Let me extract the implications of this statement.

Although the Soviet delegation is silent on this matter, the Soviet Union is also building nuclear weapons and, if we can believe generally available reliable material, at an even faster rate than the United States. The production rate of the SS20 missiles since 1976 - to name only one system - is certainly a case in point. But then the inevitable conclusion is that the Soviet Union would also and equally, if not more, contribute to a steadily rising risk of nuclear conflagration.

Another inconsistency stemming from the heightened danger which in the Soviet view derives from the mere accumulation of nuclear weapons alone would seem to lie in the fact that the Soviet Union - as supposed remedies to the present situation - mainly proposes strategies that would leave these nuclear arsenals fully in place.
One great difficulty with the proposal for a nuclear non-first-use policy is that the arsenals are not reduced but fully maintained. Equally, the freeze solidifies present arsenals instead of providing incentives for, and leading to, substantial reduction.

A third contradiction must be cited in this context. Ambassador Petrovsky has made a strong plea for the need — in spite of the Soviet freeze policy — to arrive at agreed, negotiated reductions. In fact, the Soviet readiness for such negotiations is consistently stressed, and certainly most welcome. On the other hand, it is categorically announced that the Soviet Union will not resume negotiations on the most important of these nuclear negotiations — those that would appear to have the potential for particularly rapid and thorough reductions and, indeed, for the elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons.

Another argument on the Soviet side stresses the great danger that emanates from continued nuclear testing. This argument serves as a basis for the Soviet insistence on the rapid conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

My delegation fully agrees with the need to arrive at an adequately verifiable nuclear-test-ban treaty and has been supportive of every effective step leading in that direction. However, it would appear difficult to reconcile the Soviet statement with the fact that the Soviet Union has consistently operated nuclear tests in recent years in numbers that exceed the testing activities of all other nuclear-weapon States taken together. The last two years are no exception to this long-term practice. The Swedish representative, Ambassador Theorin, has recalled the statistical material internationally available to this effect.

Another inconsistency pertains to the theory of nuclear warfare, where the Soviet Union insists — and rightly so — that a limited nuclear war is impossible and nobody will be spared once a nuclear exchange has started. In these circumstances it is difficult to see how the United States, in Ambassador Petrovsky's statement, could be suspected of wanting to "stay on the sidelines in a nuclear war and sit it out across the ocean" (A/C.1/39/PV.6, p. 31) while a nuclear catastrophe devastated Europe.

Another inconsistency lies in the perennial Soviet call for the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States. In reality a comprehensive and openly admitted effort is under way to deploy in great numbers the most modern and accurate nuclear weapons in a number of non-nuclear-weapon States in Eastern Europe.
Digressing from my nuclear topic for a moment, I should also like to point to an inconsistency regarding chemical weapons, where the Soviet representatives have made much of the tremendous danger that arises from the accumulation - or any new production - of chemical weapons, while it is an uncontested fact that Eastern States continue to possess and produce chemical weapons.
In addition to pointing out those inconsistencies, and there must certainly be more, I should like to make the following rectifications.

My delegation finds it unfortunate that the Soviet delegation has now reverted to calling the very limited number of intermediate-range weapons in Western Europe first-strike weapons. On the basis of a thorough discussion of the subject in the final phase of the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet delegation has renounced that mistaken use of the term, as is evidenced by the wording of the annual report of the Conference. Now the term has repeatedly been used again, and this calls for some clarification. The technical definition of a first-strike weapon is clear. Apart from accuracy, yield, flying time and targeting speed - definitional elements Ambassador Petrovsky uses himself in one of his statements - certain other qualities like range, throw weight and numbers are equally indispensable. Pershing and Cruise missiles are far from meeting that technical definition. There cannot be the slightest doubt that all Western intermediate-range nuclear-force weapons are deliberately conceived to comprise only the westernmost part of the Soviet Union within their range. Furthermore, the deliberately limited stationing would make this type of weapon totally unfit for any supposed first-strike purpose.

Ambassador Petrovsky has qualified the armed services of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundeswehr, as "the main strike force of the Western military bloc in Europe", asserting that it continues to undergo vigorous rearmament and modernization. Obviously he wanted to imply that the Bundeswehr disposes of an offensive capability. This is untrue, as can be proved by the following facts. On the basis of its structure, the weapon systems available to it, the manuals and actual training guiding the activities of military personnel, as well as overall capability, the Bundeswehr, in sharp contrast with armed forces to the east of it, is manifestly incapable of engaging in aggression. In our open system, these facts can be inspected by everyone. Like all armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Bundeswehr does not possess a logistic system enabling its troops to operate and to be supplied on the territory of a possible adversary, let alone to conduct large-scale operations on such territory.

Ambassador Petrovsky also alleged, with regard to the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany after the limited deployment of United States intermediate-range
nuclear weapons, that the country had now secured the possibility of developing and deploying its own long-range offensive arms capable of threatening the security of neighbouring and of distant States. I assume that this totally unfounded assertion by Ambassador Petrovsky relates to the recent decision by the Western European Union to lift a number of outdated control provisions concerning certain conventional weapons. The Federal Government has, on several occasions, firmly rejected Soviet criticism and insinuations in connection with that decision, noting, inter alia, that weapons that are not at the disposal of the Federal Republic of Germany and whose production is not envisaged are in these criticisms described by the Soviet Union as offensive, while the Soviet Union itself possesses such weapons in large numbers.

In respect of the Western European Union decision, I should also like to cite the following from a declaration by Foreign Minister Genscher before Parliament on 8 November 1984:

"The decision taken by the Western European Union in no way affects the renunciation by the Federal Government of production of atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The controls by the Western European Union relating to this renunciation continue. I appeal to those States that see fit to criticize the Western European Union decision on the lifting of restrictions for the Federal Republic of Germany to cease their polemics against the Federal Republic and, instead, to follow our example and accept corresponding unilateral restrictions, thus contributing in a substantial manner to disarmament in Europe."

Echoing Minister Genscher's appeal, I should like to voice the hope that those allegations which I have rectified will from now on be banned from the official declarations of the Soviet Union and its allies, in deference to truth and the requirements of serious and responsible debate.

It is fitting that I conclude on a positive note. As in politics in general, the seriousness of the disarmament subject demands that we continue to attempt to discover the common basis of our endeavour. Ambassadors Troyanovsky and Petrovsky, taking a cue from General Secretary Chernenko, have frequently spoken of the code of behaviour that should govern relations between States, and specifically nuclear-weapon States. While I might not agree on the contents of such a code as they propose it, it is important that the true core of this proposition be
recognized. Weapons do not make war; the danger of conflict arises from the combination of weapons and non-peaceful behaviour. In the nuclear age it is important that a collective attempt be made to reshape state behaviour, commensurate with the risks and the demands of our time. One important element of a strategy for the prevention of nuclear war, and indeed all war, is therefore consistently peaceful conflict-free behaviour. My delegation has frequently spoken of the necessity for the universal adoption of a "code of non-aggressivity". It should be our task in the future, while actively promoting nuclear disarmament in terms of substantial reductions of arsenals to the lowest possible level, with undiminished security for all States, to agree on these essential behavioural standards. The renunciation of force and the agreement on effective and verifiable confidence-building measures would be two of the important components of such a strategy. It would be the hope of my delegation that the forthcoming in-depth consideration of the agenda item on the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, in the Conference on Disarmament at its 1985 session will provide all delegations, including the Soviet delegation and my own, an opportunity to grind out the common viewpoints on this important side of our endeavour.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: Following discussions among the officers of the Committee, I should like to propose the timetable for our work for next week.

As we have already decided, the period devoted to statements on specific agenda items and continuation of the general debate shall end next Monday, 12 November. The deadline for submitting draft resolutions on all disarmament items shall expire on that same day at 6 p.m. As we know, the draft resolution on the Indian Ocean, under item 62, is being prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and does not depend, therefore, on any single delegation. I am advised that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean may require additional time in order to finalize an agreed text, and therefore I suggest that the First Committee grant an extension of the deadline in the specific case of that draft resolution.
(The Chairman)

As for the timetable, the Committee will organize its meetings next week as follows.

On Monday, 12 November, there will be no morning meeting, in order to allow more time for delegations to finalize consultations regarding their draft texts. The Committee will meet in the afternoon, at 3 p.m. As I have said, the deadline for submitting draft resolutions on items 45 to 65 and 142 is 6 p.m. on Monday, 12 November.

On Tuesday, 13 November, there will be no meeting, either in the morning or in the afternoon. This will give additional time for delegations to study the texts already circulated.

On Wednesday, 14 November, and Thursday, 15 November, the Committee will meet both in the morning and in the afternoon, mainly for statements introducing draft resolutions and for comments on such drafts.

Finally, on Friday, 16 November, the Committee will take action on the draft resolutions included in the first cluster.

I am not in a position to indicate now which draft resolutions will be included in that first cluster. I intend to raise the matter for discussion at the next meeting of the officers of the Committee, which I have scheduled for the morning of Monday, 12 November. I shall indicate to the Committee the resolutions to be included in the first cluster at the opening of the meeting of the Committee on the morning of Wednesday, 14 November. In that way, delegations will be informed two days in advance which drafts will be up for action on Friday, 16 November.

The criterion for the inclusion of draft resolutions in that first cluster will be their degree of preparation - that is, whether they are considered to be in their final form - without prejudging the kind of action to be taken on them by the Committee.

These are my proposals for the organization of our work next week. I shall present similar organizational proposals for the subsequent weeks in due course, in any case allowing sufficient time for delegations to prepare in advance for the work ahead.

I take it that the Committee agrees with my proposals, and I shall act accordingly.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.