VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

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STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

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The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 65 AND 142 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ERDENECHULUUN (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian): In our first statement, on 30 October, the Mongolian delegation set forth its position on some of the most acute problems of today: removal of the nuclear threat, curbing the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, prevention of the militarization of outer space and its use exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.

Today our delegation intends to touch upon some other items on the First Committee's agenda dealing with the prohibition of chemical weapons, the reduction of military budgets and the relationship between disarmament and development.
The Mongolian delegation considers the prohibition of chemical weapons to be one of the most important tasks in the field of limiting the arms race and of disarmament. We have always come out in favour of the total prohibition of these weapons of mass destruction, their removal from the arsenals of States and their liquidation. The socialist countries have taken many initiatives in this direction, affording a realistic basis for a general solution of this problem. The most important are the main principles of a convention on the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, introduced in 1982 by the Soviet Union.

In the time elapsed since then, the USSR and the other socialist countries have constructively developed these stipulations, taking into account the views of other States. This, among other things, entails the inclusion in the convention of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, and a ban on the manufacture of those weapons in installations of peaceful chemical industries.

On the question of control over the elimination of chemical weapons, the USSR declared its readiness to have a constant presence of inspectors under international control or co-ordination of systematic international verifications on the spot. Unfortunately, these constructive initiatives were not met with the same flexibility and readiness by the Western participants in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in search of mutually acceptable solutions. Such a negative position was manifestly present in the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons introduced by the United States at the Conference on Disarmament in April of this year. We must note the fact that in the American draft convention there are obviously unacceptable and unrealistic stipulations which not only lead the negotiations into an impasse, but in fact move them backwards. This applies above all to the way in which the question of control over respect for the future convention is presented. For instance, the concept of a standing invitation, under which there would be free access to any installations, whether military or civilian, runs counter to the interests of the security of States and their sovereignty. Further, in the American draft, there are attempts made to bypass the prohibition of binary chemical weapons and some super-toxic chemical products, formerly designed for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, this draft does not provide for a general approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons. It does not take into account the need to prohibit herbicides for military purposes and irritant and toxic substances in any conflict.
We must say that the socialist countries are as interested as anybody else in the matter of control which will ensure strict and effective respect for the future convention. The realistic way to achieve this, to solve the problem of control, is proposed in the working documents of the socialist countries on the organization and activity of the consultative committee of the international organ for carrying out consultations, exchange of information and co-operation in verification of respect for the stipulations of the convention.

Speaking on this question, the Mongolian delegation would like to express its gratitude to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekeus, for his efforts as Chairman of the Special Committee.

We express the hope that negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons at the 1985 session of the Conference on Disarmament will move forward significantly. In this connection the Mongolian delegation wishes success to the future Chairman of the Special Committee, the representative of the Polish People's Republic, Ambassador Turbanski.

The problem of the reduction of military budgets of States, especially of States having important military potential, becomes ever more timely and requires practical measures. The escalation of the arms race, which, naturally is accompanied by increasing military expenditures, is a heavy burden on the economy of all countries, no matter their level of development. Therefore their reduction would most effectively contribute to slowing down the arms race and to transferring resources for the benefit of social and economic development in developing countries, among others.

My country considers it necessary to reach a concrete agreement on the freeze and reduction of military budgets. The proposals of the socialist countries in this matter are well known. We continue to consider that the most effective way to solve this problem would be the reduction of military budgets, either as a percentage or in absolute terms, and the scope could be negotiated. Progress in this field would, we think, be ensured by the proposals made in March of this year by the Warsaw Treaty States, in negotiations with the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), about the non-increase of military expenditures and their future reduction.
(Mr. Erdenechuluun, Mongolia)

However, despite efforts made to solve this problem, it is hard to see any tangible progress. Practical decisions are replaced by lengthy studies on the supposed comparability of military budgets and on military efforts and potentials of States. These concepts of openness, transparency, in our view are designed to conceal the true state of affairs, that is to say, the absence of political will to solve this problem.

The problem of reduction of military budgets is closely linked to the question of freeing resources for development. We consider that in the problem of links between disarmament and development, it is indispensable to take into account the fact that only realistic steps in the field of disarmament can create possibilities for transferring resources to solve social and economic problems in developing countries.

The Mongolian delegation is of the opinion that the proposal that there be a special conference to study various aspects of the relationship between disarmament and development - which in fact did not propose any disarmament measures - would not only be inappropriate but could also lead to having this sort of forum used by the opponents of disarmament to conceal their lack of will to take actual measures to limit armaments.

We hope that the First Committee will take a decision designed to ensure practical progress in this field.
Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): My delegation has already congratulated you, Sir, on your election to the responsible post of Chairman of the First Committee at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly. However, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey my personal congratulations to you and to the Vice-Chairmen, Mr. Vejvoda and Mr. Wegener - all of you being my friends and colleagues from Geneva - and to wish you success in the discharge of your responsibilities.

As the single multilateral body for disarmament negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament has a unique and very important role to play in the efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament. Its great potential to translate the deliberations on urgent and topical issues into practical steps is exemplified by the number of impressive agreements which the predecessors of the present Geneva Conference elaborated in the 1970s.

Analysis of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in 1984, as reflected in its report, confirms the impression left by previous reports, that, since the early 1980s, this important forum has been undergoing a profound crisis resulting in a complete stalemate in negotiations on the various items of its agenda. Throughout this period no agreements have been reached and not a single measure adopted to check the arms race and to bring about disarmament. Still worse, there has been some retreat on some of the issues before the Conference. The causes of this crisis are well known. They are rooted in the policies of well-known imperialist circles which have rejected the policy of détente and are seeking military superiority.

Because of their lack of political will, the delegations of some Western countries have taken an obstructionist position and have been unwilling to engage in serious and constructive dialogue. In 1984, the Conference has failed even to set the stage for negotiations on such priority issues as the prevention of nuclear war, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The significance of these issues for strengthening world peace and security and for improving the international climate is beyond any doubt. This has been confirmed clearly and unequivocally this year again by the discussion in the First Committee. Many speakers also indicated clearly who is responsible for the absence of any progress on those issues.
In my statement today I shall touch briefly on two items of the agenda and on the report of the Conference on Disarmament. The first agenda item is item 3 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

The delegation of my country, which was authorized to represent the socialist countries at the consultations intended to reach agreement on a mandate for a working body on this item, is deeply disappointed by the absence of political will on the part of certain Western States to start negotiations on appropriate practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Despite the consistent efforts and flexible approach of the socialist countries and the countries of the Group of 21, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to make even a single step forward.

The group of socialist countries, which drafted and submitted Conference document CD/484, has proposed ways and means to move beyond the stage of discussing the danger of nuclear war and to proceed to the point of finding a solution to the basic problems in this area. In that document, the socialist countries stressed the particular responsibility of nuclear-weapon States, and proposed that the conduct of those States be guided by specific norms.

The document contains a number of proposals aimed at strengthening international security, such as strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the avoidance of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and so forth. The proposals of the socialist countries are aimed specifically at removing the material basis for doctrines and concepts encouraging nuclear war. Of major importance in this respect are measures for freezing nuclear arsenals, for prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and for safeguarding against further proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. At the same time, as pointed out in that same document, the danger of nuclear war will be removed once and for all only if the road of nuclear disarmament and of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons is followed.

All these measures, as well as the ideas put forward by the countries of the Group of 21 regarding the prevention of nuclear war, have not been matched by any alternative proposals by the Western States. What is more, those States have thwarted the very examination of these proposals by an appropriate working body.
The second question on which I should like to dwell briefly is the negotiations in the working body - which a representative of my country had the honour to chair during its 1984 session - on strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The report of the Conference provides on this matter a lucid picture of the issues facing the relevant negotiations, and of the steps to be taken by States to ensure that headway is made in the efforts to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

As far as the difficulties are concerned, they stem first of all from the desire of one group of countries, including three nuclear-weapon States, to preserve the option of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, which, by virtue of their having forgone the acquisition of nuclear weapons and of not having allowed such weapons to be stationed on their territories, have every right to expect to have most effective guarantees, through legally binding arrangements, that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. It is high time that these countries, in order to bring about the long-awaited progress in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, heeded the insistent demands of the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States that they be provided with credible and unconditional security guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. A major positive contribution in this respect would undoubtedly be the renunciation of the strategy of a first nuclear strike, a step which, if taken by all nuclear-weapon Powers, as it has been taken by the Soviet Union and China, would actually mean the establishment of a ban on nuclear weapons in general, including on their use against all non-nuclear-weapon States. Unconditional security guarantees regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States - which cannot be a source of nuclear threat - should be part and parcel of an overall system of mandatory norms of conduct in relations among nuclear-weapon States, which bear primary responsibility for preventing nuclear war and saving mankind from its devastating consequences.
In pursuance of this position of principle, my country has been dealing with this issue for the last few years by submitting relevant draft resolutions on this matter to the General Assembly. At this session again, my delegation has submitted, on behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Angola, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Mongolia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam, and on behalf of my own country, draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.21, entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", which I have both the honour and, indeed, the privilege, to introduce now.

As in previous years, the current draft proceeds from the broadly held view that until nuclear disarmament on a global scale is achieved the international community must elaborate effective measures to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This strong preoccupation is expressed in the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution. There can be no doubt that the adoption of such agreed measures would constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The essence of our approach is set forth in the preambular paragraphs within the context of the need to implement the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

As to the operative part of the proposed draft resolution, it has primarily a procedural character. It seeks to facilitate the continuation of the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva with a view to their early completion with elaboration of an international convention, bearing also in mind the possibility of adopting some interim arrangements. It notes with satisfaction the fact that at the Conference on Disarmament there is once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention on this subject. It is also mentioned that there are some difficulties in this respect, of which I spoke earlier in my statement. As in last year's draft, regret is expressed that these specific difficulties related to differing perceptions of the security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as to the complex
nature of the issues involved, have once again prevented the Conference on Disarmament from making substantive progress towards the achievement of an agreement. My delegation holds the view that, as noted in the report of the Conference on Disarmament, this forum should continue to explore ways and means of overcoming these difficulties. Subsequently, we propose that the Conference on Disarmament go ahead with the negotiations, as recommended in the report of its 1984 session.

The Bulgarian delegation believes that, as at previous sessions, the draft resolutions submitted on this subject will have the support of all those countries which are guided by the urgent need of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This is fully in accordance with the legitimate interests of all nations throughout the world.

The negative assessment of the results of the work of the Conference on Disarmament in 1984 should not prevent us from noting that some useful work has been done in respect of issues such as prohibition of chemical weapons.

My delegation does not intend to comment on this issue in this statement, but would rather emphasize the urgent need for the Conference on Disarmament to proceed with its further discussions and speedy solution.

On the other hand, the negative assessment of the situation in the Conference on Disarmament should by no means lead to any slackening of our efforts in elaborating concrete measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and to bring about disarmament. As far as my delegation is concerned, we are ready to engage in a constructive dialogue for the purpose of achieving concrete meaningful results for the benefit of all mankind.

Mr. López (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation today will refer to the agenda items relating to the prevention of nuclear war, prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.

Most of the representatives who have spoken in the Committee have pointed out that the prevention of nuclear war is an urgent task which we must face with the greatest resolve. Although the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978 recognized the priority to be given to the adoption of concrete measures to avoid the outbreak of a world conflagration - which no doubt would be a nuclear war - neither at the bilateral nor the multilateral level has anything been done which might kindle our hopes.
In the first place, the Geneva talks, which were held for a short period of time, were used by the United States as a smokescreen to initiate its deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, which led to a break in the negotiations and to just countermeasures adopted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Secondly, the Conference on Disarmament has been prevented from initiating negotiations on the matter even though the majority of States in the Conference were in favour, as was the General Assembly of the United Nations. What are the reasons? The obstinate refusal of the self-styled "champions of democracy" to respect the feelings of the majority of the international community, or rather, to be more precise, the feelings of an overwhelming majority.

In nuclear war, what would be at stake are not the interests or the security of the nuclear-weapon States; what would be at stake would be the very survival of all of mankind. And that is why the urgent negotiation of appropriate and practical measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war is something of common interest to all. However, instead of confidence, there is intrigue; and instead of serious and constructive dialogue, there are actions aimed at fomenting tensions in the most diverse regions of the world.

Far from abating, the nuclear-arms race is being intensified with renewed vigour in both its quantitative and its qualitative aspects, and the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, limited nuclear war and the search for strategic superiority add to the risk of a nuclear holocaust. That is why it is necessary for nuclear-weapon States to renounce the use of such weapons - and in particular their first use - to agree to freeze nuclear armaments at current levels, to proceed immediately to reduce their number, and to come to the negotiating table to prepare a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapons tests in all environments and for all time.

There has also been systematic obstruction of the beginning of multilateral negotiations to end the stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The argument which is used to this end is that that question should be discussed solely in bilateral negotiations.

Nevertheless, we must point out in the first place that that position disregards the interest of all nations on disarmament matters, since it is precisely the security of all that is threatened.
Furthermore, that position denotes a clear lack of political will to undertake sincere dialogue. It is not by accident that those who hold that position are the very ones who base their security policy on the possibility of using nuclear weapons and those who began a new arms spiral by beginning the deployment of their sophisticated missiles in Europe. Those who now try to present themselves as advocates of bilateral negotiations for the obvious purpose of continuing to obstruct the work of the Conference on Disarmament are the same people who aborted those negotiations.

Multilateral negotiations should have been started long ago, since that is the genuine way in which we shall be able to find a general approach to the adoption of concrete disarmament measures and, in particular, to implement paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the 1978 special session on a truly universal basis. Of course, bilateral negotiations are important and they could contribute to the search for practical solutions at a given moment. But they would have to be serious negotiations based on the just principles of equal security for all and guaranteeing balance at ever lower levels of weapons. The search for military superiority must first be discarded.

It has also not been possible to initiate negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Here there is even an attempt to discount the achievements in the trilateral negotiations of the past.

In order to appreciate the obstacles which are being deliberately placed in the way of the Conference on Disarmament, suffice it to recall that in 1980 the parties to the trilateral negotiations reported as follows in the then Committee on Disarmament:

"The parties to the negotiations are trying to achieve a treaty which for decades has been receiving the highest priority in the area of arms limitation and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States continue to attach great importance to it. The three Governments have repeatedly expressed at the highest level the wish, which the international community fully shares, to conclude an agreement quickly."
"A series of resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament reflect the interest of the whole world to see States cease nuclear weapons tests. This has also been stated in the preambles of various international treaties on arms limitation which are currently in force. The importance of this question will be underlined again at the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which will be held in the near future.

"The objectives which the parties to the negotiations pursue through this treaty are important for all mankind. Specifically they aim at concluding a treaty which will be an important contribution to the realization of common objectives, such as slowing down the arms race, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthening international peace and security.

"The parties to the negotiations are aware of the great value to all mankind of a prohibition of nuclear-weapon-test explosions in all environments as well as the heavy responsibility they bear in the search for solutions to pending problems."

A quick reading of these paragraphs, in the light of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its work in 1984, is sufficient to understand that there is a marked lack of political will to negotiate and a great desire to hamper negotiations on the part of the United States and some of its allies.

Now there is no talk of prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. The wish is to speak only of tests in general. Many resolutions of the General Assembly and the preambles of some treaties which were mentioned in 1980 are now forgotten. It is now said at the highest level, not that an agreement must be concluded soon, but rather that the prohibition of testing is a long-term objective.

It is precisely that attitude which obstructs the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the areas of highest priority, and it is precisely that attitude which led a large number of delegations to point out, in the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly this year, that the way in which the two Western States which had subscribed to the statement to which I have referred were proceeding was not compatible with that statement and showed that
what was lacking was a political decision to prohibit nuclear weapons tests, and that responsibility for paralysis in the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament rested exclusively with those States which refuse to adopt that decision.

We are, therefore, faced with a situation of deliberate paralysis brought about in all negotiations on nuclear disarmament and in all forums. We cannot be accomplices to this kind of behaviour, and the First Committee is called upon to dot the i's on these questions. We must reaffirm the negotiating role which has been given to the Conference on Disarmament and we must work to ensure that that role is duly performed. It is necessary to submit concrete and clear requests to the Conference on Disarmament so that it may complete its work and thus avoid the adoption of resolutions which seem to ignore the fact that Geneva is a place for negotiation. We must oppose such resolutions. To air views, we have the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the General Assembly.

MRS. THEORIN (Sweden): The world is faced with a choice. Either it can pursue the arms race and waste enormous sums of money or it can take a more responsible stance and move towards a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both.

This was one of the main conclusions in the United Nations study entitled "The relationship between disarmament and development". It is as valid today as it was in 1981.

In the study it was recommended that all Governments should assess the nature and magnitude of the economic and social costs of their military preparations so that the general public could be informed of them; identify and publish the benefits that would be derived from a reallocation of military resources to civilian use; make available to their populations and to the United Nations data on the military use of human and material resources; and make preparations and plans to facilitate a conversion of resources from the military sector to civilian purposes and inform the United Nations about this from time to time.
Sweden has pursued these recommendations by commissioning a report which has been prepared by my predecessor, Mrs. Inga Thorsson. The report has been forwarded to the Swedish Government, which is now in the process of studying it. The title of the report is "In Pursuit of Disarmament. Conversion from Military to Civilian Production in Sweden".

In his terms of reference for the report, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, inter alia, stated:

"Military spending is a burden on the economies and economic future of all countries. Today there is strong support for the view that the economic effects of military spending are mainly negative."
"Poverty, destitution and social conflict are rife in large parts of the world. Even today, undernourishment and hunger characterize the existence of at least 800 million people. Mass poverty and the growing economic and social gaps between and within nations are a direct threat to world peace. At the same time militarization is increasing in the third world. An ever-growing number of third-world States have built up modern armies, often with the support of one of the super-Powers.

"Nevertheless, the arms race is pursued primarily by the two super-Powers and their allies. Their arsenals, both conventional and nuclear, are constantly increasing. At the same time the world economy has been going through a serious crisis. Production has stagnated, world trade has slowed and unemployment has continued to rise. The transfer of resources for fundamental development purposes has been seriously affected, especially official development assistance to the poorest countries.

"Even if underdevelopment and world poverty have a number of structural economic and political causes, it is obvious that the arms race is devouring resources which could otherwise have been used in international development co-operation. A cutback of 4 to 5 per cent in world military expenditures would enable international development assistance to be increased twofold.

"In these circumstances it is more essential than ever that all countries help to create an awareness of the consequences of the arms race and participate in making balanced reductions in the defence sector in line with the goals agreed upon at the General Assembly in 1978 and 1982. The United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development is an important contribution to the work of increasing awareness of the economic and social consequences of the arms race. It is essential that its recommendations be pursued, particularly in the form of studies, carried out in individual countries, of the economic and social consequences of the defence efforts and of the possibility of a reallocation of resources in conjunction with any disarmament initiative by the great Powers."

The Minister for Foreign Affairs went on to propose the following as guidelines for the work to be carried out by the expert:
"International developments chiefly determine whether Sweden can reduce its defence spending. The experts should give examples of resources which Sweden, within the frame of unchanged security-policy goals - that is, the maintenance of our independence and security - could release on the basis of assumptions of different international disarmament alternatives.

The expert appointed should concentrate on the following: describing the nature and magnitude of Sweden's present defence efforts in economic and social terms; giving examples of defence resources which, in the event of varying degrees of disarmament in our part of the world, can be converted to other purposes; stating the feasibility of defence-sector conversion and its problems in different peace perspectives and stating how a conversion of resources from defence to civilian use might also make a contribution to Sweden's international development co-operation with the developing countries."

I shall now give a brief summary of the report, which will be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and also sent to all the Permanent Missions to the United Nations.

The report describes the components of Sweden's total defence, the most important of which are military defence, civil defence and economic defence. It also describes in some detail the Swedish defence industry.

Sweden has a comparatively large defence-industrial sector. Its breadth corresponds to that of the defence industries in the largest West-European countries. Most of the equipment procured by the Swedish armed forces is produced by the domestic defence industry. There is a widespread political acceptance of the fact that Sweden's policy of neutrality would be less credible were Sweden to become too dependent on foreign defence equipment.

In her report Mrs. Thorsson focused on the role played by the defence sector in Sweden's economy. Approximately 8 per cent of total State expenditures is devoted to defence, which makes it a significant sector of the economy. Mrs. Thorsson also analysed the social cost of defence, that is to say, costs exceeding budgetary expenditures.
The report goes on to analyse the effects of defence spending on economic growth. Some 90,000 people are directly dependent on the defence sector for their jobs. Of these, some 52,000 are employed by the defence forces and the remainder in defence-related trade and industry.

Mrs. Thorsson takes as a theoretical point of departure for her analysis a scenario in which, by the year 2015, the major military alliances would have reduced the size of their forces by about 50 per cent. Under such circumstances it is assumed that Sweden could reduce its military defence by about 50 per cent. This means that the number of military personnel would be cut in half. The same goes for the civilian personnel employed by the armed forces. The number of jobs in the defence industry would also be sharply reduced. All in all, some 1,500 people would have to leave their jobs in the defence sector each year, over 25 years, as a result of disarmament.

This would involve less than 1 per cent of Sweden's labour force. From a macroeconomic point of view, conversion would thus scarcely represent any serious problems. Mrs. Thorsson, however, considers that other factors play a decisive role. Disarmament is a political process which, if it is to succeed, must be strongly supported by the entire population and backed up by a firm political will. Disarmament must not be prevented or slowed down because of fears that it will produce unemployment or other economic difficulties. Defence-sector employees should not experience disarmament as a threat to their future.

An important conclusion in the report is that conversion of the defence industry is technically possible and economically advantageous. The report expresses the opinion that it is important to begin planning defence-industry conversion even now, when global disarmament seems to be a distant possibility. To this end, Mrs. Thorsson suggests in her report a number of measures which can be taken in order to plan for a conversion from military to civilian production.

The report and its various recommendations have now been circulated to a number of Government agencies, local authorities, trade unions and other organizations in order that the Government may study their viewpoints when defining its policy in this field.
Let me quote a statement by President Eisenhower. He said:
"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired,
signifies, in a final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed,
from those who are cold and are not clothed."

These wise words remain valid — and may they never be forgotten.

Even if the prospects for disarmament seem bleak today, it should not be
assumed that they will never change for the better. All over the world there is a
strong and growing body of public opinion in favour of disarmament. An increasing
number of political leaders are beginning to understand that the security and
well-being of their populations are more likely to be guaranteed by a reduction in,
rather than by an increase in, armaments. The huge cost of armaments has become a
burden for many nations. Important social and economic needs are not being met,
partly because of the large resources diverted to the arms race. These, as well as
other factors, make disarmament a necessity as well as a possibility.

If we want to turn the arms race into disarmament we need to plan for
disarmament. If we want to plan for disarmament we need a political programme.
But, above all, we need the political will.
Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I have the honour of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.14, on agenda item 45, concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which is known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It is sponsored by the delegations of the following 20 States, all of which are parties to the Treaty: Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Mexico.

In order to place this question in its proper context, it should be recalled that when this Latin American instrument was introduced in the General Assembly at its twenty-second session the Assembly welcomed the Treaty "with special satisfaction" and declared that that instrument constituted "an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security". The Assembly then called upon all States:

"to give their full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoys the universal observance to which its lofty principles and noble aims entitle it" (resolution 2286 (XXII)).

Eleven years later, in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly, after affirming that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones constituted "an important disarmament measure" (resolution S-10/2, para. 33) and that therefore:

"The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons" (resolution S-10/2, para. 61),
then stressed that it would be "especially desirable" that certain measures be taken, among the most important of which would be:

"Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so" (resolution S-10/2, para. 63).
Since that time the Assembly year after year has been adopting resolutions which, since 1981, have been addressed solely to France, since the other three States which de jure or de facto have international responsibility for territories such as those envisaged in Additional Protocol I have already become parties to the instrument.

In view of that fact, on 22 November 1982, in introducing the draft which was to become resolution 37/71, I expressed the amazement of the sponsors of the draft that it should be precisely France, the only Latin country entitled to become a party to Additional Protocol I, that did not seem to be amenable to participating in one of the most important contributions of Latin America to international order, as the Treaty of Tlatelolco is generally considered to be.

Last year, in introducing in the First Committee, during the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, a new draft resolution, which was to become resolution 38/61 of 15 December 1983, I expressed the deep disappointment of the States sponsoring the draft at the fact that France had disregarded the appeals of the Assembly contained in the resolution of the previous year, which I have just quoted, and then I went on to state the following:

"We truly regret that. We should like to believe that it was due to the fact that those who are in charge of French foreign policy - for lack of time or because of the pressure of other high-priority issues - have placed the matter into the hands of a bureaucracy which cannot take the initiative and which is ruled by inertia.

"As General Assembly resolutions have so often said, and as the present draft resolution also says, Additional Protocol I is designed to make it possible for the peoples which inhabit certain territories falling within the ambit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco to gain the benefits of the Treaty by the accession to that Protocol by 'those States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories'.

"In addition to their obligation to take seriously the interests of the populations of those territories, those States must, in cases such as the one I have just described, bear fully in mind the unequivocal position of the sovereign States of the Latin American sub-continent - which, it must not be forgotten, make up a geographical part of those territories - a position which, in light of the provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, especially its preamble and its article I, may be defined as unshakeably supporting the need for a Latin America which is protected by a régime dictating the total absence of nuclear weapons".  (A/C.1/38/PV.33, p. 50)
We find no better way in which to conclude this brief statement than to stress once again what we said at that time and which I have just recalled. We hope that on this occasion the addressee of this draft resolution will finally heed the Assembly's appeal as formulated in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution and which reads as follows:

"Once more urges France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times and which appears all the more advisable, since France is the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is open that is not yet party to it." (A/C.1/39/L.14)

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations", contained in document A/C.1/39/L.5, on behalf of the delegations of Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

I believe that all members of this Committee accept that the subject with which this draft resolution deals is one of vital concern to all of us. Few would deny that negotiations on nuclear-arms limitation between the two Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals is among the most important of all the issues facing the world and this session of the United Nations General Assembly.

My delegation and others sponsored a draft resolution at last year's session of the General Assembly which was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 85 in favour and 18 against - resolution 38/183 P - urging the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to bring their bilateral arms negotiations to a successful conclusion. As we all know, this has not happened and the two negotiations in progress this time last year were subsequently disrupted. At the present time there are no bilateral nuclear arms negotiations in progress between the two countries.

I am sure we would all agree that this is a matter of great and widespread concern and that this situation makes a further resolution on this subject all the more important. The aim of this draft resolution is to give the two Governments concerned the maximum encouragement to resume negotiations as soon as possible in whatever way seems to them most likely to lead to early agreement. The sponsors have therefore prepared a text to this effect, deliberately couched in direct but even-handed and encouraging language.
The sponsors believe that a strong and, if possible, united vote for this draft resolution from members of the General Assembly can only be beneficial in promoting the resumption of these vital negotiations. They hope, therefore, that representatives of all countries that share our concern to bring about a resumption of negotiations on these issues, in which we all have a vital interest, will support this proposal.

Mr. ENGO (Cameroon): Our delegation wishes to make some comments on agenda item 60 (c), entitled "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament".

Disarmament education is indeed education for peace. By starting the Fellowship Programme in 1979, the United Nations embarked on a programme for peace. The effects of the very useful training course established under the Programme have been felt in the foreign ministries and permanent missions of the United Nations membership here.

As recipients of disarmament fellowships, developing countries, including my nation, Cameroon, can attest to the practical benefits that have been derived from the Programme. The experience gained by the fellows from the Programme has enhanced their Government's capacities for desirable participation in the examination of the critical issues in the field of disarmament.

We are glad to see that the programme of activities has developed remarkably well and that in actual terms the Programme has expanded quantitatively and qualitatively. We are pleased to note that the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States of America have joined the growing number of States which have already invited participants in the Programme to their respective countries for important activities, such as lectures, discussions and visits to such historic sites as Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

We are completely satisfied with the manner in which the Programme has been implemented so far. As we said in our earlier statement in this Committee on 22 October of this year, we continue to support the Programme because we believe it renders a valuable service in facilitating the participation of all countries in disarmament deliberations and negotiations.
STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: In my statement at the Committee's organizational meeting on 15 October, I noted my distinguished predecessor's efforts at streamlining and improving the working methods of the First Committee during its 1983 session. I also recalled Ambassador Vraalsen's closing statement last year when he remarked that there was general support for continuing the process of streamlining and rationalizing the Committee's consideration of disarmament items. On that basis I announced my intention to conduct consultations on ways and means to push forward that process and to report to the Committee accordingly.

As a result of those consultations, I suggest that the objective of our endeavour this year for future improvement could focus exclusively on the Committee's agenda. I am convinced, both from my consultations and from my own thought on the matter, that we should aim at putting together a more concise agenda in order to avoid, as much as possible, overlapping of items.

We know that the Main Committees of the General Assembly do not elaborate their own agenda but simply receive from the parent body the list of items that they must consider during the session. We know also that the First Committee's current agenda is perhaps the most crowded of all the Main Committees of the General Assembly. The importance and complexity of the questions of disarmament and international security are obviously one of the reasons for this state of affairs. Any exercise towards procedural improvement cannot ignore that fact but, rather, should promote the orderly and effective treatment of such important and complex questions. This implies, of course, respect for the general rules under which this Committee works.
(The Chairman)

A glance at our agenda for the past few sessions will suffice to convince anyone of its many shortcomings. One glaring inconvenience, from an organizational point of view, is that the substantive questions of disarmament are grouped under several different headings, which often correspond to different forums dealing with disarmament matters. As a result, the substantive questions appear more than once under different headings, a situation which does not favour orderly and objective examination and discussion. Duplication of substantive sub-items also often results in an increase of the workload of the Committee, which might profit from a reorganization of the mere listing of the questions before it, that is, what we usually call the agenda for each session.

In accordance with the general desire for improvement, and with those objectives in mind, I also consulted on the format under which the Committee might usefully start looking into ways and means to achieve such objectives. My greatest concern was to ensure that all delegations would have an equal opportunity to participate in the common effort, and that no delegation would be prevented from making its ideas and concerns known to the Committee.

My suggestion is, therefore, that the Bureau of the First Committee receive written contributions by delegations or groups of delegations, and that such contributions be compiled with the help of the Secretariat. I would then issue an informal working paper containing the compilation, so that all delegations would have a chance to study it thoroughly. The Committee could then decide to devote some time at its 1985 session to the discussion of the suggestions, with a view to taking decisions within its competence or to making specific recommendations to the General Assembly, either at its fortieth session or at a later date.

Those are the proposals I wish to make to the Committee on the question of improving its working methods. If they are agreeable to the Committee, I shall proceed accordingly. In any case, I shall report back to the Committee before the closing of our current session.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.