SECOND COMMITTEE
33rd meeting
held on
Thursday, 8 November 1984
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 33rd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

later: Mr. VEJVOVA (Czechoslovakia)
(Vice-Chairman)

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. EMERY (United States of America): Statements in this chamber over the past several weeks and the record of the resolutions that have been adopted at past sessions attest to the importance that the world community attaches to preventing a nuclear war.

My message to representatives is simple and unequivocal: the United States is doing and will continue to do all that it can to create a foundation for enduring world peace through a variety of measures - such as confidence-building, arms control and disarmament - and agreements that will enhance international security and stability. This task is President Reagan's highest priority.

We will pursue sound and workable arms control initiatives with the utmost determination, but we will not hesitate to differ on approaches that are not sound or do not hold out the prospect of effective, verifiable arguments that would contribute to security and stability at lower levels of armament. We will continue to resist those proposals which place a premium on the appearance of progress to the detriment of substance. Progress towards the goals embodied in the United Nations Charter and enhanced international security cannot be served in this fashion. A simplistic approach to disarmament can result only in cynicism and the subversion of our goals for transitory political gain.

There are essentially two scenarios of how a world war involving the use of nuclear weapons could occur: one is the possible escalation of a regional armed conflict, perhaps even between two States not possessing nuclear weapons; the second is the initiation of hostilities by one major Power against another, perhaps using the full range of weaponry from the onset of the hostilities or possibly initially utilizing only conventional weapons. I shall speak to the first point in later remarks. Today I shall address the possibility of intermediate confrontation between the major Powers.

Some of the most appealing initiatives for extricating ourselves from the threat of such a nuclear conflict include proposals such as pledging not to be the
(Mr. Emery, United States)

first to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, the non-use of nuclear weapons, or indeed negotiating a treaty on the total non-use of force. The nuclear freeze proposal also is related to these proposals, although it does not promise to deliver us immediately from the threat of nuclear war but, rather, purports to offer a starting-point from which nuclear disarmament can be pursued at a later time.
(Mr. Emery, United States)

My Government recognizes that these proposals may be superficially appealing but, as is well known to delegations gathered here, we have rejected them. What is my Government's rationale for this rejection?

The United States believes that to serve their objectives arms control agreements should satisfy four basic criteria: first, they must contribute to substantially reduced numbers of forces; secondly, they must enhance stability in the relationship between the major nuclear Powers; thirdly, they must be balanced; and, fourthly, they must be verifiable.

How then do these proposals satisfy the criteria I have just enumerated? First, the non-use or the non-first-use of nuclear weapons: such pledges do not result in the diminution of any military arsenal in their impact on stability if accepted at face value, and that may be deleterious. The nuclear option of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in its collective self-defence offsets conventional superiorities maintained by the other side. By supposedly removing the nuclear threat we may be inviting conventional conflict of horrible proportions. Also, given the conventional disparity, this proposal is far from balanced and, because it addresses only intentions, it is inherently unverifiable. This proposal therefore fails on all four points.

The non-use of force proposal presents a somewhat different situation. If this proposal merely suggests that Governments reiterate obligations already accepted, such as those contained in the United Nations Charter, then we are at a loss to understand the significance of the proposal. Indeed, we fear that such action may undermine or conflict with established instruments such as the Charter. We see no value in risking such an eventuality to no point, and no point in renegotiating the Charter. If, however, this proposal were to be made with the intention of elaborating measures which tend to enhance the effectiveness of such instruments as the Charter, for example, by negotiating confidence-building measures, then we would be willing to engage in such negotiations.

Finally, let us consider the so-called freeze. I understand the appeal of calls to freeze nuclear weapons first and then reduce them, but I am utterly convinced that it would not work that way. A freeze, by locking in existing Soviet military advantages and preventing us from modernizing our forces would reduce, perhaps eliminate, the Soviet incentives to negotiate in good faith. A freeze on all nuclear weapons would, moreover, prevent both the Soviets and the United States
from shifting to less threatening, clearly retaliatory, systems. Finally, to ensure that a freeze would even meet its stated goal it would have to be verifiable. Why waste time negotiating a balanced and verifiable freeze when our time could be put to better use by negotiating meaningful reductions in existing levels of forces?

My Government strongly supports the objective of reductions in nuclear arsenals and reiterates its appeal to the Soviet Union to return to the negotiations without pre-conditions. For these reasons, my Government believes that a nuclear freeze would work against the very objective its proponents espouse: a lessening of the threat of nuclear war.

What then is the course to a more secure and stable strategic balance? My Government believes it is through strict adherence to the United Nations Charter and the careful negotiation of agreements which, by their focus on specific concrete measures, will systematically reduce fear, tension and misunderstanding. While the United States shares the concern of all members concerning preventing war, and in particular nuclear war, we none the less reject the often repeated notion that the world is poised on a precipice so dangerous that insufficient time exists to consider the problem in a logical and organized manner. In the final analysis, we believe only a cautious and measured approach will allow us to understand, contain and eliminate the possibility of war, and in particular nuclear war, with a realistic sense of confidence and security.

The framers of the United Nations Charter sought to provide for a system of collective security and thereby remove the need for reliance on the use or threat of use of force for the maintenance of national and international security. It is my Government's opinion that the Charter as drafted protects the goals and aspirations of mankind provided its spirit and letter are both observed. Specifically, we draw the attention of this body to Article 2 (4), which prohibits any use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State. This prohibition is qualified only by the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, which is left untouched. It makes no provision for exceptions for ideological motives.

We therefore believe that, to achieve and maintain peace, aggression must not only be proscribed and condemned but must be deterred as well. Solutions to problems regardless of their complexity must be identified through consultation,
not conflict. We must address ourselves to relieving the tensions upon which the foundations of war are in fact built.

Danger comes, not so much from arms as from intentions. We note that several speakers have called upon Governments to show the political will to engage in negotiations that in their view would represent real breakthroughs in disarmament, rather than pursue measures aimed merely at reducing the risk of war. Alternatively, we call on nations to exhibit the will to act in conformity with the agreements in force.

The United States seriously pursues the negotiation of confidence-building measures, measures which by increasing transparency are intended to reduce uncertainty in evaluating the intentions of other States. The implementation of those measures is intended to moderate reactions in periods of tension and crisis. We find, however, that our past negotiating partners have defined these measures as confidence-reflecting, and therefore ignore their moral obligations during times of crisis and thus defeat the purpose of the negotiations. If these measures cannot be satisfactorily implemented, what are the prospects for grander initiatives?

There is value in seeking arms control agreements, but those we seek must genuinely enhance security and develop mutual understanding. Nuclear weapons are a fact of life - an unfortunate fact of life, I might add - and they cannot simply be wished away. The threat of war cannot be artificially divided into "nuclear" and "conventional". We must respond to the challenges of our times and the wishes of all people by working to remove the ignorance and suspicion which envelop threatenting aspects of our societies. The nuclear threat can be diminished, perhaps banished, but only if we all seek to honour our obligations under the United Nations Charter and work to strengthen the functioning of a collective security system.

If arms control, to be effective, is not simple, nor can it be quickly accomplished, or pursued as the only element of a nation's security policy. Vigilance must be maintained in the interest of stability, and herein lies the heart of American defence policy. Based on the understanding that arms control alone cannot resolve tension, and convinced that it is not arms that prompt aggression but the intentions of men and nations, the United States holds that war can be prevented, while peace is preserved and strengthened, through a policy of deterrence and co-operation. This policy has found its expression in both words and deeds over the past two decades, and we expect to be judged on this long-term record.
A number of speakers have characterized the actions of my Government and those actions taken in concert with allies as aggressive, destabilizing or provocative. We note that from our perspective there is no arms race; we draw attention to the fact that American and allied defence policies have been restrained. Our policy is defensive. Our restraint has not, however, been matched, and we are engaged in forced modernization, designed to maintain or restore the very balance and stability that I have spoken of several times. We are committed to maintaining our ability to ensure peace. We are willing, even eager, to resume negotiations aimed at preserving security and stability at reduced levels of armaments, both in Europe and world-wide.

The United States was prepared to initiate negotiations when the Soviets had already deployed 270 SS-20s, and we continued to negotiate as approximately 100 more were deployed. Our present deployments, especially given the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe over the past six years, can thus hardly have shattered any balance, as my Soviet colleague has charged.

Additionally, I must take exception to charges that the United States is developing a first-strike capability. This is simply not the case. In fact, past agreements, which allowed the Soviets a superiority in ballistic missile throw-weight on grounds that their technology lagged behind ours, have conferred an advantage in this area to the Soviet Union. Whatever the merits of that argument then, it has no validity now. The Soviets have caught up with and even surpassed us in some areas. The Soviet advantage in throw-weight has allowed them to deploy over 6,000 large and highly accurate warheads on their intercontinental ballistic missiles, thus conferring on them a massive and highly destabilizing advantage in their ability to attack hardened targets quickly.

Such hardened targets include missile silos, command posts and the like. This means that the Soviet Union has the only force in the world today that could be characterized as a genuine first-strike force, a situation which will not change when we deploy the MX, since the number we plan to deploy would be, objectively, insufficient for a first strike on the Soviet Union. Consequently, we must refute Soviet claims that the MX will give us a first-strike potential, and we repeat the fact that there is no reason not to resume negotiations. I say again: The United States is dedicated to the resumption of bilateral nuclear arms negotiations now, without preconditions.
In this discussion of the prevention of war - and, in particular, nuclear war - in the nuclear age, I would be remiss if I were to ignore the Soviet record of compliance with existing agreements. My Government has determined that the Soviet Union is violating the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the biological and toxin weapons Convention, the Helsinki Final Act, and two provisions of the second strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT II): telemetry encryption and a rule concerning modernization of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In addition, we have determined that the Soviet Union has almost certainly violated the Treaty on anti-ballistic missiles, probably violated the SALT II limit on new types, probably violated the SS-16 deployment prohibition of SALT II, and is likely to have violated the nuclear testing yield limit of the threshold test-ban Treaty.

Soviet non-compliance is a very serious matter. It calls into question the important security benefits from arms control, and it could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future, and it increases doubts about the reliability of the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner. It thus damages the chances of establishing a more constructive United States-Soviet relationship.

We shall continue to press our compliance concerns, and we shall ask here that we all commit ourselves to a genuine search for peace and security, not one that sweeps serious problems under the rug. At the same time, we shall not use these concerns to impede real and substantial progress.

As President Reagan said during his opening address to the General Assembly - and as the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, has repeated in his remarks to this Committee -

"... We are ready for constructive negotiations with the Soviet Union. We recognize that there is no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control and other issues between our two nations, which have the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it". (A/39/PV.4, p. 11)

President Reagan has proposed the establishment of a broad framework, within which step-by-step negotiations can proceed. This has been a consistent theme of the United States during the past four years. As President Reagan stated in May 1982, our challenge is to establish a framework in which sound East-West relations will endure. In the pursuit of such a long-range framework - a so-called
umbrella - the latest proposals of the United States to set broad, mutually agreed objectives for arms control over the next 20 years would make a solid contribution within a vista of progress in foreign policy. If realized, they would help guide the broader arms control process and monitor progress, or lack of progress, in continuing negotiations. This includes the relationship of offence to defence in strategic systems, the achievement of a real balance of forces in Europe, the reduction of the risk of surprise attack or war through miscalculation or inadvertent action, a complete ban on chemical weapons, and a host of other matters now on the agenda in multilateral arms control talks.

We are prepared to discuss arms control subjects in a comprehensive format. We are also prepared to discuss them piecemeal if the Soviets will not accept a comprehensive approach to these issues. We are prepared to meet immediately, without preconditions. We are open to new Soviet suggestions and proposals in all of these areas.

We are prepared also to wait if that must be the case. But we regret that the world community must wait as well.

Mr. Barnett (Jamaica): There is not much that can be said that has not already been said. But there is much to be done that has not been done. Jamaica must perform speak from the perspective of a small, non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon State, acutely conscious that it is not isolated from turmoil and tensions, and committed to an orderly and peaceful international society. There are principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and elsewhere which ought to guide the actions of the members of international society. But perhaps the frequent invocation of some of these principles - the sovereign equality of States, the non-use of force or threat of use of force, and others - has less to do with the genuine expectation that they will always be adhered to than with reminding ourselves that they are there.

If we do call for the observance of these principles, we do so with measured scepticism. In international society as organized at present there will always be threats, interventions, violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity, aggression, quasi-aggression and violence. Because the world is fraught with these disabilities - legacies of original sin perhaps - its citizens are in constant search for means to ameliorate them. The sincere and persistent hankering for arms
control and nuclear disarmament is an essential part of that search. They are necessary because we need to manage our affairs tolerably in order to live in a tolerable world.

Hence the importance of the work of this Committee. You, Mr. Chairman, whose unanimous election brings to the Committee experience and undoubted talent, have our warm congratulations and our unstinting support and best wishes as you guide our deliberations.
Again and again the point has been made that a seeming unending acquisition of more and more sophisticated nuclear weapons must inevitably lead to their use. The menace overhangs the lives of us all. Mutual assured destruction is a fact of life. Because of this simple but profoundly disturbing truth my country feels that arms control and disarmament measures in the nuclear field must be given the highest priority. No effort must be spared in striving to stop the nuclear arms race. We have been deeply dismayed that during the past year bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America have been suspended and that the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament have yielded meagre results. Nevertheless, we value these efforts. They must be continued. We urge the Conference to continue. We urge the super-Powers to continue. We fully understand the depth of the differences between both sides, but we also appreciate that each has understood the overwhelming opinion of the world that an international society dominated by the prospect of total annihilation cannot remain stable. Both sides must know that even without their strategic modernization programme, however they count, the destructive power available to each within the margins of error of their calculations is enough to satisfy any rational concept of deterrence.

A major first step would be a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The ban is both technologically feasible and politically advisable. It would be a specific acknowledgement that the opinion of mankind, of all those who do not possess nuclear weapons, means something to those who do. Naturally, we realize the need for an adequate verification system; that is essential. But much work has already been done on this aspect and the efforts of the Group of seismic Experts in seeking to provide an adequate technical background must be emphasized and can hardly be overestimated.

The persistence of the major nuclear Powers in seeking to devise new and more sophisticated weapons and systems makes one wonder whether they are aware that their persistence implies that the acquisition of nuclear weapons or capability is not in itself a bad thing either for themselves or for the rest of the world. For they could not with any sense of justice or logic mean to imply that other countries of the world are not as capable of restraint in the use of such weapons. Surely they cannot claim any moral superiority. If they can be restrained, why cannot others behave in like manner? Thus the fundamental assumption of the
non-proliferation régime, built on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is being questioned severely. Article VI is a commitment that has not been honoured. The forthcoming Review Conference on the Treaty must devote attention to the commitments undertaken by all parties in all the articles of the Treaty. Otherwise, one cannot expect the régime to persist in its one-sided application.

The inability of some States to improve their conventional forces in order to confront adequately their perceived adversaries in the field imposes a price on the international community. The consequent reliance on nuclear weapons to counter larger ground forces means that the rest of the world is automatically subject to the consequences of a nuclear reaction. There are of course the appropriate strategic doctrines to rationalize the situation. But it must be noted that, given the present disposition of certain Governments with respect to increasing and improving their own conventional forces, the rest of the world provides at the least a moral subsidy. It is therefore paradoxical that in certain instances it is necessary to improve conventional forces in order to arrive at nuclear arms control. This puts on its head one of the principles adopted at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Clearly, this does not mean that we can ignore the need to control the conventional arms race. There is little comfort in the oft-repeated assertion that nuclear deterrence has kept the peace. As we are aware, since 1945 there have been some 150 wars or armed conflicts, mostly among the third-world countries, on the territories of the third world, with the people of the third world the victims. Perhaps as many as 20 million have died, with additional immeasurable human suffering, crops damaged, lands scarred, economies destroyed. This is not peace. Yet the trade in conventional weapons continues apace and there seems to be no end in sight. It is Jamaica's view that regional initiatives can be usefully pursued to make progress on the restrictions of conventional weapons. Clearly, these initiatives cannot operate in a vacuum. They require political accommodation and a context of regional co-operation to facilitate the process.

One area where there seems to be some faint glimmer of hope in an otherwise bleak landscape is that of chemical weapons. Jamaica is very anxious that there should be an agreement banning the manufacture, acquisition, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. We are pleased to note that the United States has presented a draft text and that the representative of USSR has stated:
"We can reaffirm quite clearly our readiness today to work further for the early acquisition of an international convention on this issue."

We sincerely hope that the hesitant moves towards each other will lead to an embrace which will be fruitful. We urge both sides to be flexible and dedicated. A comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons would be a boon to the international society.

In our view, there can be no justification, none whatsoever, for attempts to bring the arms race to outer space. My Government is totally opposed to such a development. It would be a serious threat to international stability, would divert massive resources into a sterile search for security, which would be impossible to attain. Whatever may be the theoretical justifications and doctrinal rationalizations, the practical effect would be spiritual impoverishment and increased insecurity. But this is not a matter that is of interest only to the super-Powers; the entire world is involved. All the countries of the world have an abiding interest in this and cannot allow an area which is common to all to be appropriated by a few for warlike purposes whose consequences are bound to have a deleterious effect on the entire globe. We support a ban on anti-satellite weapons. We welcome the moves, tentative so far, of the super-Powers towards beginning talks on these issues.

It is this delegation's continuing hope that our deliberations here and elsewhere will have some result. We are not expecting miracles, but we do expect that right reason will prevail, to ensure that the inhabitants of this planet will be able to live in a tolerable world.

Mr. MEHLBIN (Denmark): Although speaking as a member of the Danish delegation, I make this statement in my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Experts, now dissolved, which assisted the Secretary-General in preparing the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces (A/39/348).
I think it is only proper to take as my point of departure a passage from the foreword by the Secretary-General:

"the apprehensions of many nations concerning their security are such that they feel impelled to spend valuable resources, which most can ill afford, for defence purposes rather than on pressing social and economic needs. At the same time, therefore, as efforts are made towards achieving nuclear disarmament, the broad international community, both outside and within the United Nations, should focus additional efforts on the need to find effective measures of conventional disarmament in order to assist in diverting the sinews of war towards the better goal of social and economic progress."

(A/39/348, p. 6)

This is a very pertinent observation which serves to put the subject-matter of the report in its right perspective. It is, indeed, highly desirable that all States seriously consider the very wise advice which these words of the Secretary-General provide and then act accordingly. I hope that the report will be of assistance to States which endeavour to do so.

We are all aware that the report before us represents the first effort at comprehensive consideration of the subject of conventional arms and armed forces since the creation of the United Nations nearly 40 years ago.

I am sure that we are equally aware that the individual positions on how to deal with the problems arising out of the conventional arms race were on many points quite far apart from each other at the outset of the work of the Group of Experts. If an illustration of this should be necessary, it is only necessary to cast a quick glance at the four working papers prepared by national delegations as contributions to the work of the Disarmament Commission and now annexed to the report by the Group of Experts.

It is against this background - the novelty of the effort and its built-in difficulties - that the report should be judged. Certainly, in preparing the report the Experts considered the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly - the first devoted entirely to disarmament - to be the centrepiece and the very foundation on which to build. This is borne out all through the text and by the fact that a number of relevant principles contained in the Final Document are quoted right at the beginning of the report. It would be repetitious and in this assembly certainly superfluous if I were to go over all the
observations in the report to which this led us. However, the important thing was, of course, for the Group to build something of its own upon this foundation, using the knowledge and the viewpoints of the various Experts and the collective ingenuity which might flow therefrom.

In this respect I think attention should be given in particular to the various approaches and possible measures described in the report and, last but not least, to its conclusions and recommendations, which are contained in chapter IV, including the list in paragraph 188 of subjects which could be the object of consultations and negotiations. I think it is fair to say that the report not only highlights the grave dangers posed by and the terrible cost in human and material terms stemming from the conventional arms race and conventional warfare, but also points to ways and means - be it in ever so general terms - for those Governments which try to initiate efforts to come to grips with the deadly serious problems posed by the conventional arms race. In so doing, the Group of Experts has not overlooked the very real difficulties flowing from the necessity to take due account of the legitimate security interests of all States concerned in any given situation.

There are always risks connected with selectivity. Be that as it may, I believe I am justified in making specific mention of a few points in the report, presenting what I would consider to be some of the most forward positions taken up by the Experts.

The report recognizes that negotiations are the classic approach to solving international problems peacefully and that conventional disarmament is no exception to this rule. However, the report points to the fact that parallel actions by mutual example and/or unilateral initiatives may in some cases recommend themselves as being at the same time feasible and useful in that they are less cumbersome to produce and may contribute to easing tensions, initiating or pursuing negotiations, and so on.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the global character of the conventional arms race, the report stresses that there are considerable benefits to be derived from regional approaches, and it reminds the reader that an earlier study found that conventional disarmament is a field in which the scope for regional initiatives is virtually unlimited.
Finally, the report refers to the legitimate concern of parties to disarmament negotiations to ensure approximate equality and parity as well as undiminished security for all. But the report also goes on to state that difficulties could be encountered in translating equality, parity or balance into numerical terms and that there might therefore be advantages in exploring additional avenues in the search for approaches to equity at successively lower levels of armaments.
(Mr. Mellbin, Denmark)

This is a line of thinking whose validity is borne out by experience. In the report itself it leads naturally to the observation that one possible avenue might be to deal, in a negotiating process, first of all with those force components or types of armaments that could be considered by the parties concerned as having a particularly threatening effect. If such an approach were taken, the prospects for conventional arms limitation and disarmament might be significantly enhanced.

Before concluding, I wish to make a few remarks relating to the work of the Group of Experts of which I had the privilege to be Chairman. As stated in the Group's report, it was adopted by consensus. I wish to take this opportunity to place on record my sincere recognition of the great efforts made by each and every member of the Group of Experts in the search for the middle ground upon which that consensus is based. I hope it is not unrealistic to assume that the Group's success in finding agreement on some very sensitive subjects is a demonstration that, given the necessary readiness to make compromises and accommodations, progress can be made in questions relating to conventional disarmament.

I also wish to express my thanks to the many members of the Secretariat who unstintingly gave us their assistance in many forms during the course of our work. A very special note of thanks must be given the Secretary of the Group, Mr. Derek Boothby, whose assistance was of great value to all of us - or, to be more precise, was indispensable to the outcome of the work of the Group of Experts.

It may be argued that the end product of the work of the Group was modest. However, as stated in the final paragraph of the report, it is the hope of the Group that the study will assist the international community in its search for effective measures of conventional arms limitations and disarmament. That search should be pursued, wherever possible, both inside and outside the United Nations. For, as the report says:

"The problem of the conventional arms race is urgent and requires concrete steps to be taken in the field of conventional disarmament."

(A/39/348, para. 188)

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): My statement today will be devoted to two specific subjects on the Committee's agenda: chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We have heard several speakers over the past two and a half weeks stress the importance which their Governments attach to reaching early agreement on a chemical
Mr. Butler, Australia

weapons convention. Such agreement is a priority objective of the Australian Government. An international convention preventing the use of chemical weapons and ensuring that such use is made impossible through the destruction of all chemical weapons is urgently required. This is particularly so because these weapons continue to exist, and reportedly in quantities and kinds greater than ever before. What is worse, these weapons continue to be used.

Such use was confirmed this year when the Secretary-General of the United Nations sent a team of experts to Iran to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in the war in the Gulf. An Australian scientist was a member of that team of experts.

The experts' report was unambiguous, unanimous and deeply disturbing. Mustard gas had been used in the Gulf war and, for the first time in documented history, a nerve agent, Tabun, had been used.

The findings of the experts confirm the imperative nature of the task being undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament. We believe there is a general will within the Conference to conclude a convention requiring the declaration and destruction of existing chemical weapons and the means of producing them. Such a convention would also prohibit the manufacture, stockpiling and use of such weapons and set up an effective system of international measures to demonstrate full compliance with all these provisions. The Conference has a solid foundation for developing the final text of such a convention.

From 1976 to 1980 the Soviet Union and the United States held extensive bilateral discussions on outlawing chemical weapons. Those discussions produced agreement on many issues fundamental to an all-embracing ban on chemical weapons, and this was communicated at the time to the then Committee on Disarmament in a joint paper. The Conference and its predecessor bodies also worked for many years towards this convention.

During the last three or four years the process has been carried further. A great deal of constructive work towards the convention was done by the Committee on Disarmament. Many States Members have made significant contributions. Well over 100 working papers covering many different aspects of matters essential to the convention have been submitted and discussed in the Committee on Disarmament.
This year, in the Conference on Disarmament, we have seen several important developments. Proposals have been made in the Conference which led us to believe that the attainment of a convention is within our grasp. If we are prepared collectively to make the effort to intensify and accelerate our work, that objective will be realized. The submission of a draft chemical weapons convention to the Conference by the United States in April of this year gave a new impetus to this objective. That draft drew on much of the extensive work already accomplished in the Conference on Disarmament. As stated by United States representatives, the draft is intended as a contribution to the work of the Conference. The United States has also stated that it is "ready and willing to consider any alternative approaches as long as they would satisfy our fundamental objective: an effective ban on chemical weapons."
Australia greatly appreciated that clear expression of the willingness of the United States to enter into negotiations with full commitment and good faith. By its action the United States also confirmed the stated and acknowledged role of the Conference. It validated the principle to which all members of the Conference are deeply attached: that arms control and disarmament agreements can be negotiated multilaterally, and must be, because the interests of all of us are involved.

The Soviet Union also made an important proposal during the 1984 session on the verification of the destruction of stockpiles. That proposal addressed one of the most difficult areas in the field of verification. We were encouraged by that proposal because it seemed to indicate a willingness on the Soviet Union's part to find negotiated answers to the problems of verification. We have also noted that in its recent statement to this Committee the Soviet delegation reaffirmed the Soviet Union's readiness to work further for the early conclusion of an international convention on chemical weapons.

The commitment of these two important countries to the negotiation of a convention, which we have heard reiterated during the course of this General Assembly session, is encouraging; but what will be of critical importance is that all concerned resolve now to negotiate in good faith. That negotiation will necessarily raise many issues of real contention and concern. The making of a convention on chemical weapons is a task of great magnitude, but because of the issues at stake, because the weapons concerned are terrible, because the security of all our peoples is involved, we must not be daunted by the magnitude of the exercise. The worst possible reason for refusing to do something that is essential is that it is "too hard". This will be hard, but it is vital and it must be done.

The opportunity to succeed in concluding a convention exists now, and it must be seized. We are encouraged that there are real and substantial prospects of making significant progress during 1985. This derives from the report which was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the end of the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament and, in particular, the recommendations contained in it. We note that a preliminary structure of a convention has been elaborated and that the process of drafting parts of the future convention in treaty language has commenced.
We consider that the content of the report and the recommendations provide a sound basis for pursuing actively the negotiation and resolution of outstanding matters at next year’s session. It will be important to intensify efforts in 1985 to resolve the differences of view which remain on specific issues and, at the same time, to continue the drafting process.

A critical task will be to resolve differences over the verification provisions. A striking example of this has arisen in connection with the United States draft convention and its provision for ad hoc and special on-site inspections. Some delegations have argued that the draft provisions make a distinction in the verification régime from one country to another, depending on the degree of State ownership of the chemical industry.

The Australian Government holds that the verification provisions of the future convention should apply with equal effectiveness to all countries, whatever their economic, social and political systems, and that comparable facilities should be subject to comparably effective controls, regardless of their ownership.

These are thoroughly legitimate and realistic considerations. With respect to them, we have noted that the United States has reiterated, in its statement made on 31 October in this Committee, that it is ready to work with others to ensure that its verification proposals apply fairly to differing economic and political systems.

We suggest that those delegations which are most concerned about these proposals should address the difficulties which they see in the United States draft by proposing alternative arrangements, by making concrete proposals which are equally effective but do not suffer from the problems they perceive in the present provisions. To do so would be an act of positive negotiation, and clearly such proposals would be considered positively.

We consider that the United States draft convention is particularly valuable in pointing to the standard of verification needed to ensure confidence that the obligations of the convention are being observed. We believe the United States proposals should be seriously studied by the Conference, as indeed should the proposals relating to a verification régime which have been or will be put forward by other delegations.
A verification régime that would ensure that the commitments which States enter into under the convention are being honoured is one of the three basic elements which the Australian Government believes are essential for an effective convention on chemical weapons. The other two elements are: first, the uncompromising prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and, secondly, provision for the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and for the prohibition of the future development and production of such weapons.

Valuable work has already been undertaken in the Conference on those two elements. We believe that, with further sustained effort next year, broad agreement will be reached on appropriate provisions for inclusion in a convention.

It is not, and must not be, beyond the ingenuity of the members of the Conference to find the required solutions to the outstanding problems in ways which will not compromise our respective national interests. What is required is that we work together collectively in the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum to achieve this important objective.

The Australian delegation will continue to participate actively in the negotiations in the Conference. The Australian Government is committed to the conclusion of a convention which will eliminate chemical weapons, a convention which will ensure that chemical weapons can never again be used.

The second subject I wish to address today is that of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

A number of speakers in the First Committee have stressed that preventive arms control measures, particularly with reference to outer space, are a major priority. No one doubts the proposition that prevention is better than cure, and history has demonstrated clearly that once weapons are developed and deployed it is very difficult to reverse the process.

My Government strongly supports the objective of international agreements to prevent such an arms race in outer space. The essential quality of these agreements is that they should be balanced and verifiable and should contribute to overall international stability.

In the Australian view, two of the major areas for consideration in this regard are those of anti-satellite systems and ballistic-missile defence systems. The Soviet Union already has an operational anti-satellite weapon, and the United States has commenced testing one of its own.
In his statement to the Conference on Disarmament on 7 August 1984 the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Hayden, welcomed the French initiative on outer space arms control, which called in part for the prevention of destabilizing activities in space without affecting military activities that contribute to strategic stability and those which may be instrumental in monitoring and controlling disarmament agreements.
Mr. Hayden also proposed, as an urgent item for exploration by the Conference on Disarmament, a consideration of the possibility of measures to protect from attack all satellites which contribute to the preservation of strategic stability and which can be instrumental in monitoring disarmament agreements. He also proposed that this protection be extended to ground stations which are essential to the operation of these satellites. This would be a potentially important confidence-building measure and would directly support the implementation of present arms control and future disarmament agreements; above all, it would contribute to the maintenance of stability until the required disarmament agreements were put into effect.

It is precisely because of this vital contribution that satellites make to security, stability and arms control that my Government supports the conclusion of agreements which would ban destabilizing of anti-satellite systems.

It is therefore particularly surprising to us to hear blanket or unspecific calls for the so-called demilitarization of outer space which would cut across the deployment of satellites, including those performing these important and stabilizing functions. Even more surprising is that the proponent of one such draft resolution itself has many satellites deployed for just such a purpose.

Current research efforts by both super-Powers in the second area - that of anti-ballistic missile defence - are also viewed with concern by my Government. We are aware that such research does not contravene the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, which permits both research and the construction on each side of a point defence system of up to 100 anti-ballistic missile launchers; but deployment on a nation-wide scale would be a clear violation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. Australia regards the anti-ballistic missile Treaty as one of the most important arms-control agreements in existence today.

The purpose behind present United States research on the possibility of developing a capability to intercept all incoming ballistic missiles seems clear to us. The question of whether it might be possible - I repeat "possible" - to replace the doctrine of security through assured defence is what is being explored. But what is not clear - and this is the subject of considerable debate - is whether such a goal can be achieved and whether efforts to achieve it might unintentionally create a more unstable situation than that which it seeks to replace.
(Mr. Butler, Australia)

We are aware that this question is an extremely complex one and one which is naturally tied to that of offensive systems themselves. Perhaps a simple way of illustrating this is by quoting the distinguished physicist Richard Garwin, who says of anti-ballistic missile research: "If we want to eliminate the threat of ballistic missiles, we should eliminate ballistic missiles."

As a means to resolve the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space and indeed its relationship with defensive systems, my Government places great importance on the recent United States response to the Soviet request of 29 June 1984 to the effect that the two sides should begin negotiations on outer space in Vienna. We understand that the United States has said that it will go to Vienna without preconditions. We hope that the Soviet Union will do the same and that, in that event, all dimensions of the arms race in outer space will be the subject of bilateral negotiations.

We are also convinced that bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union should be complemented by multilateral discussions in the appropriate international body - the Conference on Disarmament.

We were extremely disappointed that in 1984, in spite of strenuous efforts, the Conference was unable to reach consensus on a mandate for an ad hoc subsidiary body on this item. We supported an exploratory mandate on this item, and we did so because, in our view, that is the logical and practical way to proceed to meaningful negotiations. It is not enough simply to say of any new and complex subject "Let us negotiate a treaty. We know precisely what we are talking about and what we want."

At this stage I am not sure that that is true, and I would certainly like to take issue with the recent remark by the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia who, in his statement of 5 October 1984, referred to such exploration as an "academic discussion" which he said he wanted to avoid. I would contend that it is a necessary discussion which we must have. It is more than academic. We must have this discussion, if we are to negotiate acceptable agreements.

Let there be no mistake: my delegation is in favour of negotiations on all disarmament and arms-control questions. But calls for immediate negotiation of agreements in a new and relatively unexplored area are rather like the announcement by a person that he has decided to get married immediately but without knowing to
whom, where or why he would get married. One might question the basis for such unspecific eagerness.

We hope therefore that those delegations which profess such eagerness to negotiate arms-control agreements in this essential area at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva will reconsider their unspecific calls for an immediate negotiating mandate and will accept, instead, the practical and feasible approach that is and would be involved in an exploratory mandate.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): In my statement today I should like to raise a few ideas prompted by the last session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Our present debate has been marked by bitter and negative comments, often made about the Conference and its activity. My delegation's opinion is not favourable either, but I hasten to give clarification and point out that the Conference has a long history - though under a slightly different name - and a record of some achievements, even if they may be qualified only as modest compared with the task that the Conference faces.

The Conference's function of conducting multilateral negotiations on disarmament was precisely formulated and assigned to it by the General Assembly in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in 1978, which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982. My delegation's negative opinion is therefore not about the Conference on Disarmament itself but of the activity carried out within its framework during the last session. We share the view that the impasse in the Conference's work is very disquieting.
(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

It is a most alarming fact that, in spite of every effort by the great majority of the delegations, the Conference was unable to make meaningful progress in any question and, what is more, not even the institutional machinery was set up to create at least a semblance of work on the main issues like nuclear disarmament or the prevention of the militarization of outer space.

It is understandable that delegations concerned over such a state of affairs should be seeking a way out of this unfortunate situation. Hence the need to elaborate an authoritative definition of the notion of "negotiation" and the necessity of amending the "working procedures" of the Conference on Disarmament. I have no reason to doubt the integrity and genuine commitment of the delegations presenting the relevant proposals, and I agree with them that the effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament in all likehood can, and should be, improved. I refer to the said proposals not to provoke a dispute or to contest their being reasonable and timely, but to set out the position of the Hungarian delegation regarding the ways of breaking the deadlock. We do believe that the cause of the negative record of last session's performance does not lie primarily in the divergent interpretations of notions or in the inadequacy of the working procedures of the Conference on Disarmament. While progress in some areas was apparently prevented by debates about abstract notions - such as whether an exploratory mandate forms part of the negotiating process and so on - we must have it clearly in mind that no substantive progress was achieved even on issues not subjected to notional or procedural debates. We feel that in looking for a way out, the searchlight should be focused on the real inhibiting factors so that the way so found may be that which will actually overcome the deadlock. The Hungarian delegation, therefore, maintains its well-considered view that recovery from this situation depends exclusively on the political will of the negotiating parties to reach agreement. There are, in our view, two aspects in which such a will would be manifested during the negotiations.

First, there should be a real will to pursue negotiations with no preconditions attached; and, secondly, it should be evident in a readiness, a disposition to bring positions closer together, to draw one's own position nearer that of one's partners, not the other way round.
Concerning the first thesis, namely, negotiations really without preconditions, as I understand the case, I do not find it fair play on the part of a negotiating party, which is directly participating in a given negotiation and is thus in a position to influence its outcome at first hand, to make one of its future steps conditional on the negative outcome of negotiations. In such cases I can hardly resist thinking that setting such a condition serves only to give the particular negotiating party a free hand to take a decision or, more specifically, to confirm its pre-adopted decision by taking a position that is bound to preclude the possibility of a negotiated accord. I would add that if the decision so adopted threatened the security of the other party, the latter would have no interest in a negative outcome of negotiations and hence cannot be held responsible; nor is it to be blamed.

Now I should like to say a few words on the other criterion reflecting a genuine willingness for agreement, namely, the will to bring positions closer together. This may be well illustrated in the record of negotiations to prohibit chemical weapons. At the beginning of the last session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet delegation announced a change in its position on a very significant issue to move that position closer to the posture of its opposing negotiating partners. All participants in the Conference regarded that move as a significant one, seeking a rapprochement of positions. At the same time the delegation of the United States announced its intention to present a comprehensive draft convention. I do not wish to dwell on the fact that the time from announcement to presentation was little short of two months, during which our Conference, "waiting for Godot", was idle on that topic. The waiting developed an even more negative aspect in that, in the draft finally presented, there was a highly important passage worded in such a way that the respective positions moved much farther apart instead of closer. If I add that the said wording was, and is, obviously unacceptable, it will perhaps become understandable that my delegation was greatly concerned to hear, in the statement of the United States delegation on 31 October in this Committee the following words:

"... we are now taking steps to prepare for the possibility that, in the absence of a comprehensive ban, modern chemical weapons might have to be produced." (A/C.1/39/PV.21, p. 31)
Once again I can hardly resist thinking that what we have here is another built-in condition with the aim of ensuring leeway for a pre-determined later action.

The lesson to be drawn from all this - and this concludes my statement - is that the debate about notions and working procedures, which I admit is undoubtedly of some importance, cannot move the disarmament negotiations out of their present stalemate. The only way out leads through a manifestation by the participating States, in our case by one of the participating States, of a will to come to an agreement and to bring their respective positions closer. We do hope that the debates in the General Assembly and in the First Committee will work in this direction and that we shall be able next year to witness such a manifestation of will in the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. O'Connor (Ireland): On behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community, I wish to address item 64 of our agenda on chemical and bacteriological weapons.

For the Ten, the conclusion of a convention to outlaw chemical weapons for all time has long been a priority in the field of disarmament, and a number of recent developments underscore the need for the early conclusion of such an instrument.

The last year has witnessed the use of chemical weapons and attendant human suffering in the Gulf war. The Ten share the sentiments of the Secretary-General when he deplored the unanimous conclusions of the investigative team which he set up, substantiating the allegations that chemical weapons had been used.

The Ten fully support the investigation undertaken by the Secretary-General in exercise of his responsibilities into the allegations of such use, and in establishing that chemical weapons had indeed been used.

The Ten recall that an earlier investigation by the Secretary-General, pursuant to resolution 35/144 C, into allegations of the use of chemical weapons had not been afforded the necessary access to the areas concerned.

They condemn the use of all chemical weapons and urge all parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to observe the generally recognized principles and rules of international law applicable to armed conflicts. As a demonstration of their abhorrence of the use of these weapons, the Ten, for their part, have recently taken measures to control the export of certain industrial chemical substances which could be abused for the production of chemical weapons.
The Ten's deep concern regarding the use of such weapons has resulted in a shared perception on their part that certain interim measures are required to give effect to the implementation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the norms of customary international law prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. With this in mind, the Ten strongly supported the proposal contained in General Assembly resolution 37/98 D, which requested the Secretary-General to devise procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of information concerning activities that might constitute such a violation.

The Ten welcome the report (A/39/486) by the Secretary-General on procedures for achieving a rapid and effective investigation in cases where chemical weapons are alleged to have been used. They consider that the modalities proposed in that report offer the international community a useful mechanism for establishing the facts in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons, as referred to in resolution 37/98 D. Lack of an objective mechanism to establish with certainty when and where such weapons have been used would, in our view, only contribute to increasing international tension and could contribute to the proliferation of these weapons.

The Ten wish to emphasize that the conclusion of an adequately verifiable chemical weapons convention banning chemical weapons world-wide remains the only sure way to eliminate these weapons for all time, and the Ten will continue their active support for and contribution to the attainment of this goal. The immediacy of the need to conclude a convention is reinforced by the concern at the possible further proliferation and use of these weapons, by the existence of such large stockpiles of these weapons and the preparations for their use, and by uncertainty regarding future development in this field.

As we have already stated in the general debate, the Ten believe that three elements in particular are essential for a chemical weapons convention to be fully effective: first, a reaffirmation of the prohibition of the use of these weapons; secondly, provision for the destruction of existing stocks and production facilities and the prohibition of the future development and production of such weapons; and thirdly, an adequate verification régime which ensures that these treaty commitments are being honoured. The international verification system should be balanced and reciprocal, with a degree of intrusiveness and a level of inspection commensurate with the requirements of effective implementation.
Member States of the European Community have contributed actively to the work on a chemical weapons convention at the Conference on Disarmament, *inter alia* through the submission of a number of important proposals. They will continue to do so.

The Ten welcome the openings demonstrated at the Conference on Disarmament in this past year by the principal chemical weapons Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In particular, the Ten welcome the submission by the United States of a draft convention to prohibit chemical weapons and the forthcomingness which this represents in the search for a convention acceptable to all.

The Ten would also like to acknowledge the contribution of the Soviet Union to the pursuit of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, in particular by its agreement to provisions for continuous on-site inspection of the destruction of stocks. The Ten hope that in the coming year the Soviet Union will see its way to building upon this central aspect of the proposed convention by adopting a similar approach to the requisite verification mechanisms for the destruction of production facilities and the non-production of such weapons, as well as to an effective arrangement for verification by challenge, mechanisms without which no convention could be concluded.

The Ten recognize the difficulties which remain to be overcome before mechanisms acceptable to all can be agreed upon. In particular, we must seek ways and means to achieve a set of discrete controls which, while preventing chemical weapons production, will at the same time uphold the legitimate and necessary pursuit by the civil chemical industry of its ongoing activities.

Finally, the Ten wish to see the Conference on Disarmament so order its work programme - *inter alia* by increasing the time during the year that it devotes to this subject - as to permit the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date.

**Mr. Wegener** (Federal Republic of Germany): I take pleasure in introducing a draft resolution on confidence-building measures. This draft resolution, which will shortly be available to delegations in all working languages, has been sponsored by a wide and representative group of over 30 delegations. Since the composition of this group of sponsors is largely identical with that of the group which was identified with resolution 38/73 A, also on
confidence-building measures, at the thirty-eighth session, I shall refrain from reading out the complete list.

Delegations will recall that the United Nations Disarmament Commission, during its 1983 and 1984 sessions, was entrusted with the elaboration of guidelines for confidence-building measures and their implementation. They will also recall that an intensive work process, with broad participation by a great number of delegations, has taken place during both those years. This is the first time that, in accordance with the demands in the Final Document and of a number of consensus resolutions of the General Assembly, an in-depth discussion of the subject of this item of the disarmament agenda has taken place. It is also the first time that detailed and concrete texts have been elaborated in a body with full United Nations membership. Equally, it is the first time that a United Nations study in the disarmament field has been fully translated into action by a United Nations body.

Unfortunately, and in spite of considerable effort, the Disarmament Commission was unable to finalize its work during the 1984 session. The time allotted to the Commission was too brief for it to cover the wide range of conceptual and political problems that it encountered. It was recognized that additional time was necessary to fulfill the mandate of the General Assembly, as contained in resolution 38/73 A, and to adopt the full range of consensus guidelines. The work accomplished, however, provides a robust basis for the hope that the guidelines can be completed at only one additional meeting of the Disarmament Commission.

This hope is based in particular upon the number of detailed draft prescriptions which the Commission was able to elaborate. While there has been no formal consensus on the material, it can very well be maintained that the draft guidelines have taken shape and that their structure and a good deal of their substantive content meet with widespread approval among the United Nations membership. Some of the basic definition issues, and some of the principles that are to govern in the field of confidence-building measures are now well established, among them the role and status of confidence-building measures and, especially, their relationship to disarmament measures. It was, for instance, unanimously held in the Commission and it is absolutely uncontested that
confidence-building measures must be neither a substitute for nor a pre-condition of disarmament measures and must not divert attention from them. It was recognized that their potential for creating favourable conditions for progress in this field should be fully utilized in all regions of the world in so far as they may facilitate, and do not impair in any way, the adoption of disarmament measures.
At the end of the 1984 session of the Disarmament Commission, the Chairman of
the relevant Working Group put before the Commission a composite draft, embodying
widely-held views on the future shape and content of the guidelines. Substantial
support from many delegations, coming from different regional backgrounds, was
expressed for this draft. It should, however, also be noted that a number of
differences of view persisted and that it was impossible at the Commission's
1984 session to deal with a number of amendments that had been proposed to the
draft guidelines and were duly embodied in the report of the Disarmament Commission.

The view was expressed unanimously that, given the encouraging character of
the work of the Disarmament Commission so far, the work should be continued and
concluded. The question remained open as to when that supplementary and final
exercise should take place. My delegation has gathered from intensive
consultations that the general wisdom recommends a slight pause for reflection in
order to allow delegations and their Governments time to formulate views on the
report of the 1984 session of the Disarmament Commission and to probe some of the
proposed guidelines and other views in the practical application of
confidence-building measures in various regions. My delegation concurs in the
usefulness of this small interval of time before the consideration of the subject
is resumed.

The present draft resolution translates this view into operative terms. It
suggests that the United Nations Disarmament Commission continue and conclude its
work on guidelines for confidence-building measures, not at its 1985 session, but
at its 1986 session. This solution offers the distinct possibility that the
Commission, at the prescribed time, will bring this project to fruition.

In keeping with this operative goal, the draft resolution has been drafted in
merely procedural terms. It takes its language from the agreed recommendations of
the Disarmament Commission in this field. In faithfully following these agreed
texts, the draft resolution purports to avoid controversy and to make it possible
for the Committee to accept it without a vote.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with General Assembly resolution 477 (V) of
1 November 1950, I now call on the observer of the League of Arab States,
Ambassador Clovis Maksoud.
Mr. MAKSOUD (League of Arab States) (interpretation from Arabic): May I at the outset convey to you, Sir, most cordial congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee. This election is a tangible expression of the international community's recognition of your wide experience in disarmament matters and your diplomatic skill. Your election is a tribute to your friendly country, Brazil, and its efforts in this field.

I wish to express the appreciation and gratitude of the League of Arab States to you and to the members of the First Committee for according me the privilege to address this Committee, which deals with disarmament and related international security questions.

At the insistence of international opinion and in response to the conscience of mankind and the desire and aspiration of all the peoples and Governments of the world, the first special session devoted to disarmament stated in the Final Document that

"The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament."

while

"The First Committee of the General Assembly should deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related international security issues". (resolution S-10/2, paras. 115, 117)

Six years have elapsed since that session in 1978. Despite the ever-growing international public opinion against the arms race, the debates on arms control and disarmament have led to further breakthroughs although the international community is committed to the issue of complete and general disarmament.

Regrettably, no improvement has been achieved since that time. The nuclear arms build-up has continued unabated. No international balanced and verifiable agreements, which are feasible, have been concluded on the development of new sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons.

We are on the threshold of extending the arms race to outer space. A new generation of space-based weapons is imminent, with destabilizing consequences, conventional weapons having also become more complex and more destructive than ever. We can also see that the financial, technical and human resources put at the service of the arms race are increasing year after year at a rate much faster than those for international development.
I would be remiss if in speaking on the disarmament items, I did not mention the organic relationship between disarmament and development, which takes on added importance and urgency in the light of the astronomical increase in military expenditures, since such expenditures are detrimental to the development of natural and human resources, especially in the developing countries, and seriously affect the international political situation and economic relations.

Developments on the international scene during the past few years—whether in the field of technology for new systems of weapons, and the ensuing arms race or with regard to bilateral talks on arms control and United Nations efforts—have led to the collapse of the principle of deterrence or of the balance of terror as a concept of international security that is now untenable. No one doubts that there is now unanimity on the principle of collective security being the only logical and practical alternative to what is known as the balance of terror, including the renunciation of dividing the world into two blocs. This division no longer reflects the reality of the international situation, given the establishment and the growth of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, to which the majority of the countries of the world belong, including all the countries members of the League of Arab States.

On this basis, and proceeding from the premise of collective responsibility, which is a direct concept of collective security, all the States of the world, especially the nuclear-weapon countries, should shoulder their responsibilities and accelerate progress in the disarmament negotiations, especially those on nuclear weapons. We know full well that there have been many obstacles strewn in the way of disarmament negotiations over the years, but lack of will is the most pernicious of all and has led to a negative atmosphere.
Confidence-building measures, we maintain, can be divided into two parts. The first is virtually limited to commitment to principles and laws already in force, the foremost of which is renunciation of the threat or use of force in international relations. Respect for and commitment to this principle is a duty and obligation imposed and governed by membership in the United Nations. The second part is a confidence-building process based on proving political will practically and continuously. It is a stage that follows a declaration of intention and a statement of principles, and these should take place reciprocally.

More than six years ago the General Assembly, in the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted a declaration by consensus and without reservation stating that humanity was facing a menace unprecedented in its history, the menace of extinction and annihilation in the event of the outbreak of nuclear war. The General Assembly therefore decided that the elimination of nuclear war was the most urgent task that faces us today.

The League of Arab States, on the basis of its charter and the principles and objectives of its foundation, supports the insistent demands of the peoples of the world for nuclear and conventional disarmament and the limitation of the arms race, as well as for the harnessing of the human and natural resources of all States to ensure comprehensive development which would provide a decent standard of living for individuals in every society.

Given its commitment to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the League of Arab States supports the quest of the international community to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and in Africa and to declare the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea as zones of peace.

As concerns the denuclearization of the Middle East, it has been proved to Members of the United Nations that the main obstacle to achieving such an end lies in Israel's intransigence, its continuous refusal to submit its nuclear installations to international control and its reluctance to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Therefore, the League of Arab States maintains that States must commit themselves to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and cease to participate in any form of collaboration with Israel and South Africa which might reinforce their nuclear capability. The Security Council should assume its full
responsibilities in order to avert the danger posed by the nuclear capabilities of
Israel and South Africa, and their collaboration, which would be against the
interests of international peace and security.

It is, indeed, ironic that Israeli officials state that Israel is ready to
enter into negotiations and to sign a treaty with all its neighbours in the Middle
East, provided that such a treaty were similar to the Tlatelolco Treaty for Latin
America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in the area
of Latin America. It was signed in Mexico on 14 February 1967. Our response to
this observation is as follows.

First, the signatories to that Treaty were in a more fortunate position,
because their territories were completely free of nuclear weapons. This obliged
them to assume the responsibility of preserving that position in their own
interests and in the interest of all mankind. That situation, however, is
different from the one prevailing in the Middle East, because Israel possesses, or
has the capability for producing, nuclear weapons. Thus, the main assumption that
the area is free of nuclear weapons - the assumption on which the Treaty of
Tlatelolco is based - does not apply in the Middle East.

Secondly, the Tlatelolco Treaty was signed with the aim of preserving that
special situation, that is, the maintenance of Latin America as a
nuclear-weapon-free area.

Thirdly, the Treaty stipulates that the countries of Latin America must
exercise their right to acquire nuclear energy to the maximum degree possible with
a view to accelerating their economic and social development in an equitable and
just manner. Israel denied this right to the Arab countries when it attacked the
nuclear reactor which Iraq had erected for peaceful purposes.

The Tlatelolco Treaty derived from resolution 1911 (XVIII) which considered
that Latin America would remain a denuclearized area. The resolution declared that
initiatives for the denuclearization of Latin America should proceed in the light
of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of regional agreements.

Israel's record in the United Nations indicates unambiguously its refusal to
comply with any of the United Nations resolutions, especially those which call for
the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East or those dealing
with Israel's nuclear weapons.
We are fully convinced that all regional organizations, and intergovernmental organizations that seek to strengthen co-operation with the United Nations, are ready and willing to participate and, together with other States Members of the United Nations, to disseminate information, hold seminars and undertake educational and other information activities in the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign and its associated activities, which have the aim of reinforcing the role of the international community in its efforts to avert the threat of nuclear war that hovers over the world.

The aforementioned activities are founded on the resolution of the General Assembly which called for closer co-operation and co-ordination in international peace and security between the League of Arab States and the United Nations. As stipulated in the recommendations and conclusions agreed upon in the joint meeting, held at Tunis from 28 June to 1 July 1984 between the two secretariats,

"Within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign initiated by the United Nations General Assembly, consideration should be given to the holding of a seminar in the Arab region, as is being done in other regions, for the purpose of informing, educating and generating public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitations and disarmament". (A/38/299, para. 2 (b))
The League of Arab States hopes that the provisions of that paragraph can be implemented in the very near future in the interests of world peace.

**The CHAIRMAN**: We have heard the last statement for this afternoon's meeting. I shall now call upon representatives who wish to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

**Mr. WEGENER** (Federal Republic of Germany): The Soviet delegation used its statement at this morning's meeting to level a number of accusations at the defence policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Without exception, those accusations and the insinuations that accompanied them are unfounded. To the extent that they have been made on earlier occasions they have been repeatedly refuted by my Government.

Foreign Minister Genscher clarified my country's policy in the course of his recent statement during the general debate in the General Assembly. His statement leaves no doubt with regard to the peaceful character of the policies of my Government. Mr. Genscher also said:

"polemics against the peaceful intentions of other nations poison the political atmosphere". *(A/39/PV.8, p. 19-20)*

I am distressed that the Soviet representative has again indulged in defamation, damaging the earnestness and credibility of our work in this Committee, unperturbed by sound argument and unperturbed by the truth. I also regret the damage he has wilfully done to the relations between our two countries.

My delegation intends to correct the false accusations contained in the Soviet statement in the course of a more detailed presentation, for which it has already put its name on the list of speakers.

**Mr. DEPASSE** (Belgium) (interpretation from French): I must categorically reject the accusations made in such an unrestrained manner this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union against the Government of my country, which was a party to the decisions taken by the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in December 1979. Those accusations were such that I could refute them simply by quoting Talleyrand's, who said that that which is exaggerated does not exist, but I will be more specific and say that Belgium does not export - to use the words of the Soviet representative - "militarism, enmity and war psychosis" *(A/C.1/39/PV.32, p. 29-30).*
Belgium does, however, regard itself as threatened by the systematic deployment of Soviet SS-20s - ultra-modern weapons capable of destroying several times over in a first strike and in 20 minutes all the military targets in Western Europe.

In the face of that immediate and terrifying threat, Belgium would indeed opt for negotiation. If that negotiation failed, military means would obviously have to be deployed to deter aggression, but those means are much smaller in number and strategic capacity than those deployed by the Soviet Union. And, lastly, Belgium does indeed consider that it is legitimate for the General Assembly of the United Nations to call upon the Soviet Union in 1984 - as it did in 1983 - to resume without pre-conditions the negotiations it walked out of unilaterally.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): I should like to reply to a statement this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Petrovsky, in which he mentioned that

"Military co-operation between the United States, Japan and South Korea is expanding with an eye to establishing some kind of an eastern North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) affiliate. There is a policy of reviving Japanese militarism." (A/C.1/39/PV.32, p. 32)

We were extremely disturbed and distressed to hear this deliberate misinterpretation and distortion of our nation's defence policy from a person we thought should be more knowledgeable about the subject, and we have therefore requested this opportunity to clarify our position for the sake of removing any possible misunderstanding or misapprehension.

First, as has been stated on many occasions and in various forums, our nation's defence policy is a purely defensive one, and we have committed ourselves not to become a military Power that might pose a threat to any of our neighbouring countries. We shall also continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons of any kind. From these basic positions of our defence policy it should be absolutely clear that there is no policy, as Mr. Petrovsky claims, of reviving Japanese militarism.
Secondly, we categorically reject as untrue the proposition that our nation, together with the Republic of Korea and the United States, is working to establish "some kind of an eastern NATO affiliate". I have already stated my country's defence policies in some depth and it seems unnecessary to repeat them again. Rather, I should like to use this opportunity to point out that there has been a continued military build-up by the Soviet Union in close proximity to our country, which development we are following with very serious concern.

In concluding, I should again stress that Ambassador Petrovsky's statements are distortions of my country's defence policy and that such remarks are truly distressing, particularly since he had the opportunity to visit my country and see things at first hand earlier this year. As I stated during the general debate:

"it is imperative that nations with different views and positions should have an accurate understanding of the views and positions of the others".

(A/C.1/39/PV.10, p. 31)

Mr. Issrablyan (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to take this opportunity to welcome you, Sir, and to congratulate you on your election to the chairmanship of our Committee. Although I am doing so rather late in the day, I do so with great pleasure.

I should like to refer to some of the statements that have been made today. I recall in this connection a fine French saying according to which one does not talk about rope in the house of a hanged man.
That saying came to my mind when I was listening to the statement made by the representative of the United States. Among other things, he referred to the unreliability of the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner. That was said by none other than a representative of a State which, having first signed a number of international agreements, then refused to ratify them.

For two years there were difficult and painstaking negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States which led to the successful conclusion in 1974 of a treaty placing a ceiling on underground nuclear-weapon-test explosions. These were serious negotiations. Then, at the level of the President of the United States and the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, the signing took place. After long talks which took another two years, in 1976 another bilateral treaty was signed, also by the President of the United States and the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. That treaty also has not come into force. For seven long and difficult years, we had negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons, which led in 1979 to a satisfactory conclusion — to the satisfaction of the United States, it seems, if only because President Carter signed the treaty — as had President Brezhnev also. That treaty also has not come into force. Does this indicate that the United States is a reliable negotiating partner?

Secondly, the unreliability of the Soviet Union was referred to by the representative of the United States, a State which unilaterally, without any explanations whatever, broke off six rounds — I emphasize "six rounds" — of bilateral negotiations and did so often in the most offhand way. I am stating this because as head of the Soviet delegation I happened to go one day to the Geneva negotiations and I was informed by telephone that my negotiating partner was not going to come, because there would not be any negotiations. They had simply been terminated. Does this show any sort of reliability on the part of the United States as a negotiating partner?

Thirdly, the unreliability of the Soviet Union is referred to by the representative of a State which puts forward proposals which are clearly unacceptable in order to torpedo the talks, as in the case of the last two rounds of bilateral negotiations.

Finally, we are hearing this from the mouth of the representative of a State which from year to year is hardening its position, which does not do anything to
accommodate but rather turns its back on its negotiating partner and, essentially, simply deadlocks the negotiations.

I am saying this with a full sense of responsibility, because I have participated in the negotiations with the United States on the banning of chemical weapons since 1976. If one compares the United States draft and the United States position in 1976 on the question of a chemical weapons ban with the draft put forward in 1984, one can see how much harder the position of the United States has become. I think I need not go into detail, because I am sure anyone can easily compare the proposal made by the United States in 1983 with that made in 1984. Here again we see that there has been a constant hardening of a position, which could only lead to the undermining of the negotiations and their breakdown. So talking about the unreliability of the Soviet Union really reminds me of the French saying to which I referred.

The representative of the United States alleged that the United States was prepared to undertake constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union. I should like, through you, Sir, to say that this is not the way to constructive negotiations. Making the sort of statement made by Mr. Emery today is not the way to go about seeking constructive negotiations. There will be no constructive negotiations when the representative of the United States indulges in absolutely unwarranted and baseless slander and expresses absolutely unwarranted suspicions. That is not the way to enable us to have any constructive negotiations, and I want him to understand that full well.

We favour constructive negotiations. We have proved this. We have tried to take into account the positions of other States, including that of the United States, and I believe there is no need for any further proof of that. If the United States is really anxious to hold constructive negotiations, let it demonstrate this through its actions and give up statements of the kind we have just heard, which will not lead to any negotiations.

Today Ambassador Wegener quoted a statement - perhaps I am mistaken, as I heard it through the interpretation - by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that polemics poison the atmosphere. I think we can agree with that. I entirely concur with that. Slander and polemics of this kind do not lead to any constructive negotiations. I want to be quite blunt about saying that.
Mr. EMERY (United States of America): As representative of the United States I can hardly allow this opportunity to pass without countering some of the remarks of my friend and colleague, the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Let me also quote a fable. This one, I should say, is Russian folklore. It is the story of Peter and the Wolf, with which I am sure many members of the Committee will be familiar. A young man continued to alarm the local townsmen by claiming that a wolf was at the door, until finally they no longer believed that what he was saying was true. As I have sat here during the past several weeks and listened to the statements or read the statements of the Soviet Union and some of its allies, I have found them generally to be most polemical and in some cases controversial in the extreme. In most cases there have been statements to which I could have replied on several occasions, as could many of our allies. But we have shown some sense of restraint - as I said yesterday, for the simple reason that we thought that the business of this body was better served by focusing on issues of substance rather than trying to impress one another with the level of our voices or the viciousness with which we might reply.

Let me say, however, that when it comes to crying "wolf" the Soviet delegation has been very good. It has continually talked about constructive negotiations, but I would remind the Committee that it was the Soviet delegation that chose to walk away from the negotiating table in Geneva, to walk away from its obligation to negotiate on limitations on intermediate-range nuclear-force missiles, to walk away from its obligation to negotiate on the limitation of strategic weapons, and to pull back its own invitation to the United States, which the United States accepted, to negotiate or at least to discuss the possibility of negotiating various issues relating to outer space. That, I would say, is not an indication of a sincere interest in constructive negotiations but an illustration of the fact that the Soviet Union is unable to face issues when the issues are in fact most difficult to address, which is precisely the time when responsible States must focus on issues in a constructive manner.
Let me also say that, during the past two years or so while I was associated with the arms-control Agency and dealt in several international forums, I heard time and time again a number of Soviet speakers continue to cite the increasing risk of war - I am told even to the extent that citizens of the Soviet Union have become inordinately alarmed at the propaganda that has been provided in that regard.

If in fact it is true that there is an increasing risk of war and that tensions between East and West are worse now than ever before - a contention which my Government and I deny - then that is precisely the time when responsible States of all shades of opinion should be going to the negotiating table, not running and hiding from it. This is one of the greatest differences of opinion that we share with our friends from the East - an apparent unwillingness to focus on these critical issues at exactly a time when it is necessary to come together and work them out in great detail.

With respect to my remarks a few minutes ago about compliance, one of the most important issues on which we must focus in this body and other international forums that deal with treaties and understandings between States is the importance of building a level and measure of understanding and trust in good faith. Unfortunately - and we regret it very much - a simple handshake will not do; mistrust, regrettably, is too high. We, as nations, must build into our treaties and actions provisions that will increase our ability to know that beyond any shadow of a doubt each side is abiding by the commitments that it has signed.

We regret to notice that on several occasions some of the obligations entered into by the Soviet Union have, unfortunately, been violated. We know of a number of occasions where it has violated the provisions that I referred to a few minutes ago. We know that some of their underground nuclear tests have ventured - which is, of course, a violation of the limited test-ban Treaty. We know of a number of cases with regard to various other agreements signed by the Soviet Union that have been questionable, at least. I shall not elaborate them here; I mentioned them in my statement and I do not think that it serves any purpose to replough old ground.

But the fact of the matter is that we have serious questions. We feel it is necessary to raise them, not because we wish to be vindictive, not because we wish to raise the level of rhetoric or tension, but because we wish to underscore that in treaties that we sign and agreements that we enter into with the Soviet Union - whether on nuclear arms negotiations, chemical weapons negotiations, matters
relating to mutual and balanced force reduction talks or any other agreement that
we may seek to enter into - we must be guaranteed that the rules will be followed.
We think that the Soviet Union will respect that from their point of view as well.

We know very well that in the past the Soviet Union was faced with similar
questions with respect to some agreements it signed with Hitler at the time of the
Second World War - such as the non-aggression pact, which was unverifiable and was
violated a short time later. That is a prime example of the problem that arises
when one puts too much faith in an unverifiable agreement. I think the Soviet
Union will recognize that as a very good example of the sort of trouble that one
can face when one signs agreements that are in fact not verifiable.

This has been a rather harsh exchange, and I regret it. It is somewhat in
contrast to the rather measured remarks that I have delivered in this room during
the past several weeks. I think most persons who know me and have worked with me
recognize that I do not particularly care for polemics and that I would much rather
deal with individuals and nations as respected, honourable partners, with a higher
level of rhetoric and in mutual respect and regard. But the fact of the matter is
that my delegation and I have become fairly disturbed at some of the rhetoric and
unnecessary polemics we have heard in this chamber. I just want to remind the
members of the First Committee, and especially our Soviet colleagues, that we are
ready, willing and able to carry out polemical exchanges at higher levels if in
fact that is warranted. I hope it is not warranted any further.

Let me simply say that we remain a responsible negotiating partner. We intend
to sit down with the Soviets anywhere and anytime to discuss these particular
issues, and we hope that during the next several months the Soviets will reconsider
their refusal to come back to the negotiating table, because we believe that their
interests, our interests, the interests of peace and the interests of humanity will
be better served if we sit down and discuss ways to resolve the arms race, rather
than sit in this room and insult and accuse each other of various things. That
adds volumes to the record but nothing to arms control, stability and the
disarmament that all of us have worked for all our lives.

The CHAIRMAN: As I note that we are entering a second round of rights of
reply, I remind representatives that, in accordance with the relevant General
Assembly decision, the number of statements in exercise of the right of reply for
any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two and that the second
statement should be limited to five minutes.
Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The United States representative said so much that it would take me a whole hour to reply to him, but since there is a time-limit I shall refer only to some of the matters about which he and others have spoken.

First, the negotiations on nuclear-arms limitation in Europe and the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments were torpedoed by the United States and broken off for only one reason – and I hope this is perfectly well understood. They were torpedoed because the United States refused to honour the agreed statement of principle on parity and equal security, signed by the President of the United States and the President of the Soviet Union. It was for that reason that the talks broke down.

With regard to the second point – also referred to by the Australian and many other delegations – on the question of bilateral talks on the demilitarization of outer space, some would have it that the Soviet Union proposed something and the United States joyfully accepted, and then the Soviet Union refused to undertake negotiations. That bears absolutely no resemblance to reality. It is as though the Soviet Union had proposed that negotiations be held and that we discuss, say, French Literature; and the United States Government said: "Yes, we are ready; let us undertake negotiations, but let us talk about a Hollywood film production."
That was the state of affairs. We proposed one subject, approval was given supposedly on the content of the talks, then a completely different proposal was made at the time. So to say that the United States accepted our proposal is completely incorrect; in reality, that does not accord with the facts.

I turn now to references about negotiations. As representatives know, talks are not an end in themselves. I do not think that talks are any kind of panacea. Many talks have been deadlockied, many have had a negative impact and many of them have in fact served simply as a camouflage for various other types of unsavoury activity.
Finally, there have been talks on capitulation: perhaps the United States wants that kind of talks; but they cannot have that sort of talks with us, because we are in favour of negotiations which would lead to a result on the basis of the principles on which we have agreed. Those are the kind of talks we are prepared for.

Now, as far as the Second World War is concerned, probably my American colleague at that time was quite a young person, if not in fact a child. I should like to remind him that during the Second World War, the Soviet Union fought against Hitler and did not sign treaties with him. The cost of that war can sometimes be read about in American textbooks, but that is quite a different issue. Perhaps we can talk about history in the corridors with the representative of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of the United States in further exercise of the right of reply, with the same understanding of the rules which I stated before.

Mr. EMERY (United States of America): There is one matter that I am sure we can agree on, and that is that during the Second World War I was not even born. That does not, however, change the facts of history which I have mentioned.

But let me move on more seriously to a few matters which I should like briefly to mention. First of all, with respect to a much more recent event when we were all very much alive, during the time that the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces first came into prominence, the Western Alliance was very concerned that the Soviet Union was deploying and continuing to deploy in very significant numbers these new SS-20 missiles, a movement which we considered to be very provocative because it introduced into the European theatre a new kind of weapon. It was more accurate, more sophisticated, mobile, with multiple warheads and so on, all of which were at least one and maybe several orders of magnitude greater in terms of threat, survivability, accuracy and the like, than anything that had been introduced previously, a situation we could not tolerate, and the Soviets certainly ought to understand that. Consequently, we devised a two-track formula that would ask the Soviets to join us in good faith negotiations at the bargaining table in Geneva, to eliminate an entire class of weapons, to eliminate them in their entirety and, second, to devise a method by which the Western Alliance could counter these deployments, which of course we have started to do.
But one of the more difficult aspects of this series of events during the last several years has been the fact that during the time that we were negotiating and encouraging the Soviets to come to the negotiating table, they in fact were building and deploying more and more of these weapons, and they continue to do so. That of course is even more provocative, and if the United States and the Western Alliance had decided that they would behave in the same way and refuse to go to the negotiating table under those circumstances, the talks would never have began.

I mention that for a very important reason: no matter what epithets we may use here, no matter what unpleasant remarks we may make about one another, the fundamental fact exists: we can talk to each other in the corridors here in New York, we can read statements at each other and we can make either complimentary or insulting remarks, sadly to no avail. The way the issues are to be resolved to the benefit of the Soviet Union, the United States and all people on this earth who aspire to live in peace with one another and focus their attention on social programmes and the needs of human beings - life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness - is for us to be willing to sit down and negotiate. When we leave the negotiating table because we cannot stand the heat or because the issues appear to be too difficult to resolve, we merely postpone the day when the solutions to these problems are to be found.

Let me say with all sincerity, in the least polemical and the least offensive manner that I can, that we are ready to go back to the negotiating table on these subjects and others just as soon as our Soviet colleagues are able to do that. We want to start today if possible to find ways to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons arrayed between East and West, to find ways to eliminate these missiles in Europe from both sides, because we know that that is the aspiration of people in Europe and all through the world, to eliminate those weapons that threaten the Far East, that threaten peaceful people in Europe. We want to negotiate an end to chemical weapons. We want to sit down and work out formulas that will allow us to reduce the number of conventional forces in Europe. There are many other areas that members of this body, their peoples and their Governments, have aspired to address, to promote safety, peace, freedom, and allow individuals, whether they are mighty or humble, to live in peace with one another, without the threat of nuclear annihilation or the threat of conventional war destroying their livelihood. That is the goal that we are here to try to achieve.
(Mr. Emery, United States)

We are hoping that the Soviet Union will join with us, and that their allies will join with our allies, to make this wish a reality, rather than merely a debating topic for this forum.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the Committee that tomorrow I shall have two announcements to make, one by the end of our morning meeting and the other at the afternoon meeting. First, I shall report to the Committee on my consultations on the rearrangement of the Committee's agenda. Secondly, I shall make an announcement about the programme of work of the Committee for next week.

Finally, as I have been informed by delegations that consultations are going on for the preparation of draft resolutions, our meeting tomorrow will start at 11 a.m.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.