VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 32nd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

(continued)

Statements were made by:

Mr. Albornoz (Ecuador)
Mr. Petrovsky (USSR)
Mr. Duarte (Brazil)
The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 65 AND 142 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ALBORNOZ (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): Permit me, Sir, to welcome you to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Your experience on this subject, which is an honour for Latin America, and your highly esteemed diplomatic qualifications augur well for the success of the work of this important body. I convey these wishes equally to the other officers of the Committee and of the Secretariat.

In the year which has elapsed since the last session we cannot say that the world situation has improved. On the contrary, tensions have been exacerbated, the foreign forces have continued to occupy territories which do not belong to them and there has been an undue increase in violence and in resources for military purposes. It is also shocking to see the movement towards nuclear confrontation embodied in the suicidal expenditure on conventional weapons and the growing proportion of that expenditure which takes place in the third world.

That is why, faithful to the principles which govern its international policy, the delegation of Ecuador will support the draft resolutions in the Committee which will lead the way to a prohibition of force in international relations, a strengthening of the mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the attainment of nuclear disarmament as a step prior to the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
It is clear that the logical and essential corollary to disarmament, namely, the ideal of the non-use of force in international relations, can be embodied in the system of the peaceful settlement of disputes as long as that system is operative, concrete and equipped with a mechanism that allows for true implementation of the relevant Articles of the Charter.

Ecuador is actively involved in the relationship between disarmament and the economic and social development of peoples and is convinced that the insane arms race is one of the principal factors underlying the international economic crisis that is having a particular effect on developing countries. Military expenditures in excess of $1.3 billion per minute are a genuine cause of inflation and are creating imbalances in international trade. The relationship between disarmament and development was recently given thorough consideration in document A/36/356, which contains a study that is valuable not only because of the wealth of data it contains but especially because of its analysis of the complex relationship between the prospects of achieving balanced and sustained world-wide economic and social development, on the one hand, and, on the other, the question of disarmament, through reallocating real resources. The main conclusion arrived at in that study is that:

"an effective relationship between disarmament and development can and must be established". (A/36/356, annex, para. 391)

Since 1981, when the First Committee was first seized of this study, nothing has been done to comply with any of its recommendations. On the contrary, the arms race has been increased in a dangerous and costly fashion. It is estimated that in 1983 global military expenditure exceeded the $800 billion level.

In speaking of development we must bear in mind that it is the loftiest aim of the world Organization, both because it means justice at the national and international levels and because it is the only way in which the better standards of life referred to in the Charter can be attained, a goal that is sought by peoples everywhere on our planet.

Without detracting from the importance of either peace or disarmament, which are basic purposes of the United Nations, they create the conditions and circumstances that are basic to the attainment of the supreme goal, that of development.
It is for that reason that anything that hinders development allows for the perpetuation of injustice and creates gaps that separate less-favoured peoples from others in the economic, social and cultural spheres.

That is why the arms race, which consumes such vast resources, must give way to activities designed to promote development. If we could move disarmament from the phase of debate to that of action we could free enormous sums, only a fraction of which would suffice to finance the activities most urgently required in the struggle against hunger, disease, illiteracy and unemployment.

The arms race represents a waste of natural, human and material resources. It is estimated that more than 70 million people are directly or indirectly engaged in military activities. It is estimated that last year one third or 12 per cent of the world production of 14 minerals was allotted to military consumption and that in some cases - oil, for example - the military complex was responsible for from a quarter to a third of world consumption.

Every minute 30 children die for lack of food and medicine, and every minute the world military budget absorbs $1.3 million, according to the publication World Military and Social Expenditures 1983.

The 1983 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) notes that during the period 1978-1982 world military expenditure increased by almost 4 per cent per annum as compared with the 2 per cent per annum figure recorded during the four preceding years. According to estimates made by SIPRI, world military expenditures in 1982 were in excess of $700 billion. For 1984, the sum was, as has already been noted, $800 billion. The major proportion of the total world military expenditure is made by the two major nuclear Powers. However, the SIPRI report also mentions that in recent years there has been a perceptible increase of more than 4 per cent per annum in military expenditures in such regions as the Middle East, southern Asia, the Far East - excluding China - Oceania and Latin America.

In his statement during the general debate this year, the Foreign Minister of Ecuador, Mr. Edgar Teran Teran, referring to the collective responsibilities for disarmament and development, said:

"The primary objective of the United Nations continues to be development and to attain this it is imperative to achieve peace, which has so often been disturbed and threatened in past years. Disarmament is not merely a
mechanical activity for dismantling war machinery: it must be a moral attitude, whereby respect for individuals and collectivities prevails over the imperatives of power. The kind of disarmament that must be attained is moral disarmament, that which eliminates the aggressive instinct from the actions and the conscience of man and which curbs the arrogance and desire for dominance of whoever feels strongest.

"Atomic explosions for warlike purposes are to be condemned wherever they take place and those in the South Pacific are of particular concern to my country. Given the danger which those tests represent for the ecological balance of the region, such explosions have been condemned by the South Pacific Permanent Commission, an organization comprising Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru."  (A/39/PV.13, p. 27)

With respect to this last point, we should like to mention that among the documents distributed to this Committee is one entitled "Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons", (A/39/343), in which the representatives of the countries members of the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific request the distribution of the declaration adopted by those countries on the French atomic explosions in the South Pacific on Mururoa Atoll, which constitute a serious threat to the marine environment and its natural resources, as well as the interests of the States members of the South-East Pacific Maritime System, which have also complained. Unfortunately, such tests were again carried out recently.

This agenda item relates to the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing which, in turn, relates to the need to conclude a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. The development of new and more destructive nuclear weapons and the proliferation of such weapons cannot be halted unless underground nuclear testing is halted. In spite of the fact that the partial test-ban Treaty was concluded more than 20 years ago, we have not yet been able to achieve the much-desired goal of comprehensive prohibition, which should be the focus of firm action by the Conference on Disarmament, particularly in view of the repeated appeals by the General Assembly and the important work done by the Group of Seismic Experts on the technical aspects of an appropriate system for the global verification of testing. What is most needed, of course, is the political will of States engaged in this disturbing practice.
(Mr. Albornoz, Ecuador)

With regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we have noted the intensive campaign being waged against it by the United States Secretary of States aware as he is of the fact that nuclear proliferation exacerbates political tensions among nations and increases regional insecurities instead of devoting the use of the atom to the many peaceful applications that have already been identified, among them medicine, agriculture or industrial-materials testing.
Mr. Shultz has told us that proliferation generates proliferation, and he has also emphasized the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency with regard to its priority tasks of promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy and developing the international system of safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to non-peaceful uses. To that end, since 1968 we have had the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to which 125 States are parties. Therefore, it is desirable that the largest possible number of countries sign that Treaty and in the case of the Western Hemisphere the Treaty of Tlatelolco also. All nuclear development programmes for peaceful purposes should be placed under the international safeguard system. This will be one of the items to be discussed at the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in 1985.

Ecuador advocates the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace and hopes that the example of Tlatelolco, which so far has been able to establish the only nuclear-weapon-free zone covering an extensive inhabited region of the earth, will be projected in its spirit and objectives to other regions of the world, such as Europe, southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean. The creation of new denuclearized zones, in accordance with the conditions stipulated in paragraph 64 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, would make a significant contribution to halting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of security in at least one specific region.

In resolution 37/99 the General Assembly decided that a study should be undertaken to review and supplement the "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects", in the light of information and experience accumulated since 1975. According to the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/39/400, the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones appointed for that task has been unable to reach agreement on the study within the time available, and therefore it has requested an extension of the time period in order to complete the work. We hope that that will be done, since this is an item of interest to many delegations and one to which my country attaches great importance.
(Mr. Albornoz, Ecuador)

There is great and widespread concern in the international community over the possible militarization of outer space. My delegation shares the concern expressed by the vast majority of the members of this Committee that outer space might become the scene of "star wars" or "cosmic wars" among the super-Powers. Such a prospect is unacceptable. The wise, logical and prudent course would be to initiate the necessary deliberations and negotiations in order to avoid an extension of the arms race to that new dimension in international law. Regrettably, that has not so far occurred, either at the bilateral level, that is to say, between the two major space Powers, or at the multilateral level, that is to say, at the Conference on Disarmament, where the lack of consensus has made it impossible to comply with the request contained in resolution 38/70, adopted by a vast majority, for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider this important matter. We trust that the Conference at its forthcoming sessions will be able to establish such a committee at an early date with a mandate which would allow it to initiate discussion and consideration of the complex aspects of this question. In the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on Outer Space, Ecuador has consistently supported that view.

Another task which can no longer be postponed is the conclusion of a treaty or convention on the effective and complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. My delegation notes with satisfaction the progress that has been made in the negotiations on this subject being carried on in the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament under the able leadership of Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden. We hope that future discussions and negotiations in that committee will lead to specific action so that we shall soon achieve a total prohibition of these dreadful weapons of mass destruction.

My delegation reserves the right to take part in the various aspects of the debate contemplated in the programme, and we trust that the clear statements and logical appeals for disarmament will bring about the results desired by our peoples, which as a whole represent the respected and concerned voice of the majority of mankind.
Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to share its views on a few specific problems which, as evidenced by the recently held debate, are of concern to most States members of our Committee. There is also a need to set the record straight on these issues, since attempts have been made to distort the situation with regard to them.

Our work in this Committee not only helps to identify the priority areas where we should concentrate our joint efforts with a view to preventing nuclear war and curbing the arms race but also mirrors the political faces of States. What is important here is not merely what statements are made by any particular State. The nuclear-missile age requires a realistic and responsible approach to the key questions of international affairs, so that words on behalf of peace and disarmament are matched by concrete deeds and tangible actions to eliminate the nuclear threat. This is of fundamental importance at this time.
During the debate many expressed the view that the main reason behind the current world situation and the stalemate in the area of disarmament is the lack of trust in relations among States, above all between the USSR and the United States of America.

Representatives of both the United States and its closest allies have spoken of the need for an atmosphere of confidence and disarmament negotiations - what is more, of negotiations on nuclear weapons, outer space, offensive and defensive systems and chemical weapons. In words this sounds quite attractive, but in reality their position on arms limitation and reduction - and this applies above all to nuclear weapons - is one of deadlock. They are not only obstructing the way leading to new agreements but are also placing charges under those agreements which had been concluded earlier. They are simply refusing to conduct negotiations - provided, of course, they are negotiations that would really lead to curbing the arms race and to greater trust.

It is true that the task of creating an atmosphere of trust in international relations is urgent as never before; it is part of a broader problem of reducing the threat of war. There should be no ambiguity with regard to the reasons for the loss of trust, since otherwise it would be impossible to find ways of eliminating them. These reasons - and we must say this quite openly - lie in the lack of political will on the part of certain States to act - not just talk, but act - in the interest of solving the problem.

Take such a major issue as the renunciation of the doctrines and concepts of unleashing nuclear war. Many speakers in the debate have noted that such a measure would be a serious practical step towards reducing the threat of nuclear war and improving the international climate.

We have heard even representatives of the leading Power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) say here that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. However, legitimate questions arise in this connection: What is the worth of those words if they are not accompanied by the renunciation of the notorious NATO strategy of deterrence, which provides for the possibility of a first nuclear strike? Can those words, for instance, be construed as meaning that well-known defence directives for the fiscal years 1984-1988 have been revoked - directives designed to build up United States nuclear forces, that is, to build in
actual facts forces and systems for waging a nuclear war in such a way that they would have the capacity "to prevail and be able to make the Soviet Union seek an early end to the hostilities on terms favourable to the United States"? I should like to ask the United States delegation whether those directives have been revoked, or do the words uttered in this room mean that the United States and its allies are prepared to assume obligations as repeatedly urged by the General Assembly, and as has been done by the Soviet Union, obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to be a party to a convention banning the use of such weapons altogether?

The reply to those questions, as we all know, remains negative. One wonders what trust can exist in these circumstances.

The representative of Ghana, Ambassador Gbeho, rightly noted in his statement in this Committee that:

"If nuclear-weapon States genuinely believe in the search for real peace and security, they should openly commit themselves not to be the first to resort to the use of nuclear arms." (A/C.1/39/PV.11, p. 41)

It is clear that, unless reliance on a first nuclear strike is dropped, words about understanding the inadmissibility of nuclear war will remain nothing but words.

The strategy of deterrence, as was justly noted in his statement by the Ambassador of India, Mr. Dubey, is being used to justify the continued nuclear build-up. As we see, various propaganda ploys are also being utilized for that purpose. Thus, quite recently the United States spoke of some "window of vulnerability" supposedly undermining the "effectiveness of deterrence". However, when new programmes were launched to build up United States offensive nuclear forces the thesis of the "window of vulnerability" was discarded. Suddenly Washington found out that no such window ever existed, but the implementation of the programmes continues at an accelerated pace.

Therefore, it is not at all accidental that those who advocate the strategy of deterrence and who develop the doctrines and concepts of a limited or global blitzkrieg or protracted nuclear war and place those doctrines on an appropriate material basis are stubbornly resisting a nuclear-arms freeze.

Meanwhile, it is precisely the question of a nuclear freeze in connection with which words about the desire to limit nuclear arms ought to be backed up by deeds. I wish to draw the attention of representatives to a relevant document - A/39/623 -
recently circulated in the General Assembly which spells out the USSR position on this question. The statements of many countries have shown that most United Nations Members see a freeze as a priority measure which should be taken in order to check the growing nuclear threat. The representative of Zambia, Ambassador Kunda, noted that a freeze would halt the nuclear arms race and permit the maintenance of the approximate nuclear balance between the USSR and the United States.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is prepared immediately to institute a freeze on all its nuclear systems, provided that other nuclear Powers act likewise. An agreement on this matter would amount to a mutual halt in the build-up of all components of existing nuclear arsenals, including delivery systems and nuclear charges. By using that as a point of departure, it would be easier to begin their reduction until they are completely eliminated.

Let me remind representatives that our formal proposal that initially the USSR and the United States should agree between themselves to freeze their nuclear arms is still before the White House. Thus, readiness was clearly demonstrated to renounce all attempts to achieve military superiority - attempts that are undermining mutual trust in our world.

The United States and other NATO countries could by their deeds promote a nuclear-weapon test ban, which would also help to create an atmosphere of trust. The discussion held here has forcefully reaffirmed the conviction of the overwhelming majority of States that completion of the relevant agreement is a major route on the map of roads leading to the elimination of the nuclear threat.
No testing of nuclear weapons means that they will not be refined and the nuclear arms race will be slowed down. But that is precisely what the Western Powers do not want. They simply walked out of the trilateral talks between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States on banning nuclear-weapon tests, which were in their final phase, and are now doing all they can to prevent their resumption. It is they who have also blocked negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. They are also rejecting a moratorium which we have suggested on nuclear-weapon tests, pending a treaty. They do not want to ratify the treaties already signed on underground nuclear explosions. Instead of agreements in this area, we are being offered an exchange of observers who would simply register nuclear explosions. Willy-nilly the conclusion comes to mind that they want jointly to legalize or, to be more exact, to institutionalize nuclear-weapon tests, rather than banning them.

The views expressed at the current session by United States representatives regarding the problem of nuclear-weapon tests are also a direct extension of that policy. As before, they agree to discuss only those far-fetched or specially invented verification difficulties, rather than the real difficulties, which lend themselves to solution on the basis of the standing proposals by the Soviet Union and a number of other countries. We fully agree with the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Theorin, that:

"There are no insurmountable technical obstacles to verifying a comprehensive test-ban treaty. A State cannot use the alleged insufficient verification techniques as a pretext to refuse seriously to negotiate such a treaty." (A/C.1/39/PV.4, p. 16)

Many eminent specialists, including American specialists such as Mr. York, head of the United States delegation at the aforementioned trilateral negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-test ban, are unanimous in their view that there is a possibility of verifying the implementation of a nuclear weapon test-ban agreement. As we know, he said that, given the political will, it would be possible to reach a verifiable agreement to that effect in less than six months.

For its part, the United States is piling one verification problem upon another, not only to block a future agreement, but also to undermine the agreements already reached in this field. How, in these circumstances, can one give credence to statements by United States representatives regarding their supposed desire to solve the problem of halting nuclear-weapon tests?
The United States can prove the sincerity of such statements only by deeds, *inter alia*, by ratifying the Soviet-United States treaties on underground nuclear explosions, signed as far back as 1974 and 1976. United States agreement to hold talks aimed at the speedy conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests, including those at the Geneva Conference, would also be a deed to back words.

The degree to which practical deeds match words spoken in favour of disarmament also manifests itself in the question which we have repeatedly discussed in this Committee, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Suffice it to recall the basic facts. In June this year the USSR proposed to the United States that an agreement be reached on the prevention of the militarization of outer space. We received a reply, but what kind of reply? An attempt was made to change the very subject of negotiations. It was proposed that we discuss questions relating to nuclear weapons, that is, questions previously discussed in the Geneva negotiations and torpedoed by the United States itself. The United States has not only refused to remove the obstacles it has created by deploying new American missiles in Western Europe, but it also continues their deployment. As far as outer space is concerned, it has become clear that Washington is in effect prepared to discuss only some limits, some rules for the militarization of outer space.

The Soviet Union - and we wish to stress this once again at the meeting of this Committee - is ready to start negotiations with the United States in order to elaborate and conclude an agreement on the prevention of the militarization of outer space, including a complete renunciation of anti-satellite systems and a mutual moratorium on space-weapon tests and deployment, to be effective as of the start of the negotiations. That is the way we have formulated our proposal from the very beginning. It is now Washington's turn to respond. I should like to stress that fact, just as it is the case in other matters.

For a number of years now the General Assembly has been persistently calling for the prevention of a space arms race by the drafting of a relevant agreement or agreements and for the start of negotiations for that purpose at the Conference on Disarmament, as well as on a bilateral basis. It is important to find a solution to this problem. During the discussion in our Committee representatives of all major groups of States have spoken in support of this.
At the same time, it has to be noted that some States, speaking of the danger of a space arms race, hold their tongue when the time comes to pronounce themselves in favour of starting talks in Geneva with a view to preventing such a race. Instead, they speak incoherently about studying the problem. There is here again another clear case of a lack of willingness to back words with concrete practical deeds. Surely, attempts to tie in the problem of nuclear arms with that of outer space are further proof of that.

In this connection, it is fitting to recall that singling out the task of preventing the militarization of outer space as a separate problem made it possible to conclude the 1967 space treaty. That treaty solved an important problem. It banned the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space, thereby blocking in timely fashion one of the most dangerous paths towards the militarization of space, which is at the same time a potential channel of the nuclear-arms race. Such a solution did not impede the negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, but rather contributed to their successful conduct.
That example should be followed today as well. The prevention of the militarization of outer space is a major separate problem. As stressed by the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, we face here an enormous threat, posed both by the destructive potential of space weapons and by the fact that those weapons will consume huge amounts of resources and make it more difficult to arrive at solutions. This threat should be eliminated radically and without delay. The issue before us is that if we do not close the door on space weapons, close it now and firmly, it will be too late to do so tomorrow. That is why urgent measures should be adopted to prohibit for all time the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth as well as from the earth against outer space. In practical terms, that means banning a whole class of space attack weapons whose creation would sharply increase the threat of nuclear war.

The agreement proposed by the Soviet Union would not only prevent an arms race in outer space, but, no less important, would also help in solving the questions of limiting and reducing other strategic arms. We want to put special emphasis on this point.

In order to evade that agreement it is being proposed that negotiations be conducted only on separate space weapons systems, allowing retention of a free hand in speeding up space militarization programmes in other areas.

Yet one cannot solve just one half or one quarter of the problem of space arms. For example, one cannot ban one type of anti-satellite weapons and allow the development of another or ban only anti-satellite weapons and give the green light, so to speak, to the development of other types of space weapons. In either case it will be the same space arms race. The position of those who are attempting to escape a ban on the entire class of space attack weapons is actually motivated by a desire to legalize such a race. They have already begun to refine multi-purpose space attack systems – the ASAT system, for instance – which could be used both as anti-satellite and as anti-missile weapons. These are the real reasons why the United States is so stubbornly refusing to participate in negotiations proposed by the Soviet Union on the prevention of the militarization of outer space and does not agree to a mutual moratorium on the testing and deployment of space arms.

Washington's encroachment upon the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems is directly related to its intention to extend the
arms race to outer space. The programme adopted by the United States Administration to develop the so-called large-scale anti-ballistic missile defence system is totally incompatible with that major agreement. Washington is perfectly aware of that, but it is reasoning along the following lines: if the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is interfering, or could in any way interfere, with aggressive designs, including a desire to take cover behind an anti-ballistic missile shield against a retaliatory strike, so much the worse for that Treaty.

The United States side should realize the heavy burden of responsibility it is assuming for the consequences of these actions. Those who intend to violate agreements should not harbour any illusions about getting away with it. We wish, nevertheless, to express the hope that, ultimately, Washington will adopt a constructive attitude towards space issues.

The points we have just mentioned are without question the core of a broader set of measures whose adoption would demonstrate in actual fact the political good will of nuclear-weapon States. Such measures are envisaged in our proposal on certain norms governing the conduct of nuclear Powers in the present circumstances. We have had an opportunity to discuss this matter in detail. These norms are natural if one is pursuing the goals of peace, and not those of preparing for war. Their negotiation - or, to use the words of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the drafting of a code of State conduct - would go a long way towards the implementation of that Document and would be of overriding importance for a radical improvement of the international situation. As is known, all the nuclear Powers accepted that Final Document, including the United States. That is why we have every right to judge, on the basis of the attitude of those Powers towards the proposal on norms and on specific norms of conduct - not on the basis of general declarations - not only their desire to facilitate in practice the elimination of the nuclear threat but also their position regarding their international commitments.

We have cited here a few examples of where, and in what areas, States - above all nuclear States - could back with practical actions their statements about their desire to have peace and to save mankind from the nuclear threat. Unfortunately, however, this does not happen, and in this connection we wish also to point out the following.
It is obvious that, behind political and diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at subverting the efforts to limit and reduce arms, there always lie specific military build-up programmes. Those who are refusing to assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons are trying to create a first-strike capability. By rejecting the idea of a nuclear arms freeze they are piling up ever new mountains of weapons with an eye to disrupting the military and strategic balance. As they reject negotiations on the prevention of the militarization of outer space, they are drawing up plans to wage "star wars" and to create a large-scale anti-ballistic missile defence system - again in a bid to obtain military advantages. While thwarting negotiations on nuclear arms they are trying to tip the balance of power in their favour.

Is the deployment of new United States first-strike nuclear missiles in some Western European countries not another proof of that? Neither can those politicians in countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) who agreed to this and who are making their territory available for such missiles escape responsibility. There is, indeed, hardly any need to say that militarism, enmity and war psychosis are being exported - or, perhaps, imported - together with those missiles. For example, it can hardly be considered accidental that now that the deployment of United States missiles has started on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, that country has gained a possibility of developing and deploying its own long-range offensive arms, capable of threatening the security not only of neighbouring but also of distant States.
It is clear that the policy aimed at making the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany a springboard for delivering a first strike and at procuring its own offensive arms also cannot be reconciled with repeated statements by its representatives, in this Committee as well as elsewhere, that its military doctrine is exclusively "defensive" in nature. Those statements are also being clearly contradicted by the measures which are envisaged in the so-called long-term plan to rearm and upgrade the Bundeswehr, which is being provided with "new generation" weapons.

Moreover, the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, has become a site of deployment, and thus a potential launch-pad for the possible use not only of nuclear and conventional, but also of chemical weapons.

This too cannot but cause legitimate concern among the European peoples. Indeed, chemical weapons are being brought into the Federal Republic of Germany by a country which for almost 50 years has been evading participation in an international agreement banning their use and which resorted extensively to poisonous substances during its aggression against the Vietnamese people. Now that it has at its disposal the most powerful arsenal of chemical weapons in the world, capable of destroying all life on earth several times over, it has conducted dangerous experiments, and its new Army Field Manual provides "for a combination of conventional, nuclear, chemical and electronic means of warfare". Is this not why the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, including the Federal Republic of Germany, are rejecting the proposal of Warsaw Treaty countries to rid Europe completely of chemical weapons? Is this not why they are adopting at the Conference on Disarmament a position which not only blocks but also sets back for many years the negotiations on banning chemical weapons?

The build-up of United States military strategic systems also continues in areas close to the Soviet borders in the Far East. Military co-operation between the United States, Japan and South Korea is expanding with an eye to establishing some kind of an eastern NATO affiliate. There is a policy of reviving Japanese militarism.

All that is far from contributing to confidence-building, to the improvement of prospects for achieving disarmament agreements. An openly avowed policy aimed at undermining earlier arms limitation and reduction agreements, inter alia, through circumvention, non-compliance and at times open violation of such
agreements, is not conducive to achieving that either. Unseemly techniques are being used for that purpose: blame is shifted onto the other side for one's own sins in order to try to cover up and even justify one's own behaviour.

Washington's current stand on the problem of halting the arms race and disarmament could be summed up as follows: the road to disarmament passes through an unchecked escalation of the arms race. Absurdity? Indeed, utter absurdity, by every rule of logic and common sense, but it is this absurdity that has now been made the basis of United States policy on major issues of war and peace and that some of its allies.

It is this policy of the United States and its actions that are posing a threat to peace. Andrei A. Gromyko, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, noted:

"The nature of this policy cannot be concealed by any statements of peaceful intentions which have of late been emanating from Washington, because they are not being backed by deeds".

During the debate much has been said about the verification of arms limitations. I would like to address this question too.

Given United States policies, which I just mentioned, we are interested - no less than the United States and, perhaps, even more - in having reliable verification, which should be consonant with specific arms limitation and disarmament measures, as was generally agreed at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and attempts to reopen this issue are, at least, puzzling.

When international agreements are drafted on arms limitation and disarmament, the Soviet side actively and constructively participates in working out appropriate measures to instill confidence in compliance by the parties with the obligations they assume. This is true of all the existing agreements now in force to which the Soviet Union is a party. Quite recently, negotiations which had started on our initiative between representatives of the USSR and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on placing part of Soviet peaceful nuclear activities under the Agency's safeguards, have resulted in the completion of a draft agreement on the subject.

The USSR policy on verification is a far-reaching policy which goes so far as to provide for the establishment of general and complete control when general and
complete disarmament is achieved. In principle, we do not rule out the possibility
of creating appropriate international mechanisms for the verification of compliance
with far-reaching real disarmament measures if the need for this is dictated by the
substance of the disarmament measures themselves. I should like to remind the
Committee that the Soviet plan of general and complete disarmament, submitted to
the United Nations in the early 1960s, envisaged the establishment of an
international verification agency. However, we believed and continue to believe
that verification measures isolated from arms limitation agreements are unjustified
and can only harm the cause of disarmament.

The question of verification should not be made the subject of an unscrupulous
game or exploited in order to block negotiations on specific arms limitation and
dismament measures or undermine the earlier agreements on such measures.
Meanwhile, this is exactly what the policy of the United States and some of its
allies looks like; figuratively speaking, they would like to avoid having a penny's
worth of arms limitation but have a million dollars' worth of control. The
representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose, spoke very much
to the point when he said that such demands arise from some kind of doctrine of
deterrence with regard to violations of agreements, as if States did not enter into
such agreements voluntarily. And the proposals for making information available on
the military capabilities of States, in isolation from the preparation and
implementation of measures of military détente and disarmament, can only amount to
a doctrine of espionage.

For if the Soviet Union and other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty accept
the concept of "transparency" of the activities of armed forces - the concept which
is the basis of these proposals and which is being imposed by the United States in
Stockholm - Washington would be assured, so to speak, of a "legitimate", legalized
gathering of intelligence data on military capabilities. Furthermore, this process
would be unilateral in United States thinking because Washington's scenario exempts
United States territory from "transparency". This is typical of the United States position.
In this Committee an attempt has been made under the pretext of verification to go even further. In fact, an unprecedented claim has been advanced to impose on other countries an internal structure - which one State considers to be the so-called open society, if the Committee will forgive me for using these words - as a preliminary condition for trust and consequently for agreements on arms limitation and reduction. Furthermore, it should be noted that the notorious "open society" talked about by United States representatives is open actually for the propaganda of war and closed, as The New York Times showed convincingly two or three days ago, for the dissemination of ideas to limit arms, for example, anti-satellite arms.

Indeed, generally speaking, the pretensions to interfere in the internal affairs of other States advanced by Washington's representative who honoured this Committee with his visit can hardly be seen as evidence of a genuine desire for improving the international climate or as a willingness by the United States to engage in serious talks on arms limitation with the Soviet Union on a just and mutually acceptable basis.

In the mean time there is in the world - and the debate here has confirmed this - a widely prevalent sentiment in favour of a change for the better in Soviet-American relations. This reflects, in our view, a growing awareness of the importance of these relations, especially in the current international situation.

Lately, statements have also been emanating from the American side regarding a willingness to have more constructive relations with the Soviet Union. However, the answer to the question as to whether that is a tribute to transient considerations or something more substantial should be provided by the United States itself through practical deeds. Andrei A. Gromyko pointed out on 6 November:

"There are possibilities for that. The question is whether Washington will use them. In any event, those who have been - and will be - formulating United States policy will have to make an effort to render their words in favour of better Soviet-American relations more credible since the Administration has lost a great deal of credibility over the last few years."

In this context the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs recalled the words of Konstantin U. Chernenko:
"We are in favour of good relations with the United States and past experience shows that they can be good."

The work of this Committee now enters a new and responsible stage - the stage of decision making. As at the previous stage the work now must be constructive. We cannot possibly toe the line of those advocates of peace through strength, who are trying to pass off the increasingly higher piles of weapons as a foundation of peace. Such a kind of peace would be founded on a volcano after whose eruption no one would survive to repudiate such an absurd approach. Such an approach must be rejected today. In this connection I recall a documentary film about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima which I saw in the memorial museum of that city this year. At the end of the film we hear these words:

"After the next nuclear bombing there will be no such film: for no one will be left to make it."

Every thinking man now realizes that he and mankind as a whole face a choice between life and death. It is either the arms race and the danger of a catastrophe or disarmament and peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems. There is no other choice.

It is important that the decisions we are going to take should clearly express the will of an overwhelming majority of States and all peoples to prevent and then eliminate the possibility of nuclear war and to ensure security primarily through real disarmament measures, as provided for in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We would like to assure the Committee that the Soviet delegation will play a most active and constructive role in such work.

**Mr. Duarte** (Brazil): In accordance with our programme of work, I would like to address today items 45, 48, 49 and 65 (a), all dealing with nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Not too long ago, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was generally regarded as a positive development. Such was the case, for instance, when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was concluded in 1967. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa in 1964 and the continuing efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East also received widespread support.
Recently, a group of States in the South Pacific announced their intention to work to achieve a similar objective in their region, and this also gave cause for satisfaction.

Despite that, the experience of past achievements in this field indicates that the attitudes and behaviour of the nuclear-weapon Powers provide increasing cause for concern and endanger the general support for the free zones. The ideas, principles and commitments agreed to in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones are being methodically and relentlessly eroded to suit the particular interests of the nuclear-weapon Powers. This became evident, for instance, in the work of the expert group charged with preparing a study on all aspects of nuclear-weapon-free zones. An extension of its commission for one more year has been proposed. Perhaps that delay will give the experts time to reflect on a few important points.
One of those points is the real significance of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. That instrument should not be looked upon solely from the perspective of its importance as a measure to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The main undertaking of the parties is expressed in article 1 of the Treaty, namely:

"to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction". (A/C.1/946, p. 5)

The chief objective of the Treaty is thus the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this sense, it is a positive undertaking. The prohibitions spelled out in the same article of the Treaty are consequences of that major positive objective.

This is not to say, of course, that the non-proliferation role of the Treaty of Tlatelolco should be downplayed. On the contrary, such an objective must be strictly respected by the parties to the Treaty and by the signatories to the two Additional Protocols. The negative undertakings of the parties include the prohibition of their own acquisition of nuclear weapons and also the prohibition and prevention in their respective territories of:

"The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons ... by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way." (A/C.1/946, p. 5)

In that manner the negotiators of the Treaty sought not only to curb horizontal proliferation in the region but also to prohibit any form of introduction of nuclear weapons into the zone defined by the Treaty. They were concerned with the prevention of another form of proliferation engaged in by the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves, and particularly by the two super-Powers, namely, the geographical dissemination of their nuclear weapons.

For even at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was still being elaborated, it had already become clear to the international community that the main danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons would come precisely from the existing nuclear-weapon Powers. History, and subsequent experience, only confirmed that concern. The nuclear-weapon Powers, and particularly the two super-Powers, have been actively engaged in the most unbridled proliferation of nuclear weapons, aided and abetted
by their allies and condoned by the discriminatory régime embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A fundamental element for the success of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is the assurance of respect by the nuclear Powers for the status of the zone. In the case of the zone created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, that aim was to be achieved through the two Additional Protocols, in which the five nuclear-weapon Powers undertook important legal commitments. Unfortunately, confidence in the sincerity and good faith of those commitments was shaken by the reservations and self-serving interpretations attached by the nuclear-weapon Powers upon signing the Additional Protocols.

More recently, other serious events have contributed to the further erosion of confidence in the will of the nuclear-weapon Powers to live up to their undertakings. The doubts and uncertainties raised during the conflict over the Malvinas Islands have not yet been fully dispelled. As long as the nuclear-weapon Powers consider it to be their right to disseminate nuclear weapons on land, air and sea throughout the globe and claim the shield of secrecy, confidence can hardly be enhanced.

Much has been said lately in multilateral-disarmament forums on the questions of secrecy and confidence and, hence, on the importance of effective verification of agreements in the field of disarmament. The representative of the United States, Mr. David Emery, speaking on 31 October in the context of the verification of a chemical-weapons ban, said:

"an agreement with the objective of banning chemical weapons that is not effectively verifiable would be less than worthless. It would, in fact, be dangerous."

He continued:

"The uncertainties and lack of confidence that would flow from such an agreement would create tensions in the international community and could weaken confidence in other existing and proposed arms control agreements."

(A/C.1/39/PV.21, p. 37)

My delegation entirely shares that opinion. Indeed, we would submit that those words apply, in general, to all agreements in the field of disarmament and not only to the individual case of the chemical-weapons ban. I am certain that no one could take exception to this view.
Verification is certainly not an end in itself, nor is it something that can be considered in abstract. It is nevertheless a key element of success for agreements in the field of disarmament as long as it is geared to the specific scope, objectives and characteristics of each individual agreement. It is obvious that the parties to an agreement must be satisfied that the obligations assumed are being complied with by all other parties and that this is a condition for the credibility and longevity of the agreement itself.

In the system established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco both the non-nuclear States within the zone and the five extrazonal nuclear-weapons States have assumed obligations, but the mechanism of verification applies only to the non-nuclear States within the zone. Compliance by the nuclear-weapons Powers with their commitments under the two Additional Protocols cannot be adequately verified. Such a situation can only endanger the effectiveness and credibility of the only existing nuclear-weapons-free zone in an inhabited region. It also jeopardizes the prospects for the establishment of new nuclear-weapons-free zones. The ongoing and unchecked geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the commitment to respect the status of a nuclear-weapons-free zone.

Another instance in which confidence can be increased or restored through adequate verification procedures is provided by that inexhaustible source of inequalities, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that instrument, the only parties subject to a régime of verification are the non-nuclear parties, which are forbidden to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. The nuclear-weapons parties are, of course, exempt from any such obligation. They are free to proliferate as they see fit. But the Treaty also stipulated another obligation: the non-nuclear parties undertook not to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons or of control over such weapons, while the nuclear parties undertook not to transfer such weapons or control over such weapons. This did not - and, in fact, was not intended to - prevent the super-Powers from disseminating their own weapons all over the world. They even argue, with the support of their allies, that such proliferation is legitimate and even desirable for the maintenance of peace. But, given the recent upsurge of nuclear-weapons deployments in several countries in Europe, one may ask how the other parties to the instrument - and, for that matter, the international community as a whole - can be satisfied that the provisions of the
Treaty regarding the transfer of weapons and of control over them are not being violated. In the absence of any mechanisms to verify compliance with these provisions, one would imagine that the proliferating nuclear-weapon party and the non-nuclear-weapon party that accepts the spread of nuclear weapons to its territory would regulate the conditions of the deployment in bilateral agreements. Do any agreements to this effect exist between nuclear and non-nuclear parties? If so, can other parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty - as well as those not party to it - be confident that the number of countries actually capable of utilizing nuclear weapons is not increasing as a consequence of that new form of proliferation? Is verification something that nuclear-weapon Powers must remain forever immune to?

These questions and doubts should be seriously considered by all those who profess their concern over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They are also questions that bear directly on the current difficulties connected with existing and proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.