VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 29th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. OYARCE (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): On this occasion I should like to speak on agenda item 55.

For my country, development issues have a very high and inescapable priority. To try to achieve peace in the midst of poverty is an illusion. The stark contrast between an affluent minority and an impoverished majority requires us to use various ways and means to revitalize the co-operation process in this field for the sake of universal and lasting peace.

The growing accumulation of weapons, together with an ostensible balance that preserves and guarantees security, has actually engendered a quest for an illusive strategic superiority that compromises peace and, inter alia, extends complex and multiple ramifications into the economies of the developing countries and is reflected with special gravity in the developing world, which bears the brunt of the distortions of the world monetary system and international trade.

The tenth special session of the General Assembly, which was devoted to disarmament, together with the submission of the study of the Group of Experts in 1981 on this subject began a renewed consideration of the relationship that exists between disarmament, development and international security and began to give new dimensions to co-operation within the United Nations.

That document stresses the need to emphasize the social and economic cost of military spending and identifies the benefits that would result from appropriate earmarking of military resources for civilian purposes.

In parallel fashion, my delegation has been following the treatment of this subject with attention, both in the Disarmament Commission, where specific recommendations were made in conformity with resolution 38/71, and in the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. From those studies interesting analytical foundations emerged for diplomatic negotiations approaching that development-to-disarmament link.

Conceptually speaking, my delegation is of the view that ideally this link should not be conceived on the basis of a dependence relationship, in other words, the lack of progress in one area justifying the lack of progress in the other.
Nevertheless, we understand that the force of circumstances weakens that approach and makes it necessary to consider other options that reflect a possible political compromise with disarmament in a pragmatic way.

But beyond this conceptual level, the fact that military spending should exceed $900 billion and that 70 per cent of this should be distributed over six countries, according to information supplied by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) constitutes the platform or springboard for examining what contribution disarmament can make to development.

Moreover, the rising curve of this spending has been felt with a particular intensity in the deficits of public budgets of the military Powers. This has had harmful effects on interest rates and on international finance.
This phenomenon, moreover, reveals a complex network of interdependence between the non-military sector and other areas of development. This situation takes on special gravity precisely because of the volume of military expenditure and is not one of the least factors involved in the monetary and trade problems faced by the world economy today.

There are many examples that can be cited to demonstrate how the present economic situation adversely affects the developing countries. But allow me to mention only the case of the high interest rates that our countries are having to pay, brought about in great measure by the large deficits that some of the developed countries have, the countries that have the greatest weight in the world economy. This latter factor leads us to think about the question of how much these high interest rates are contributing to financing the arms race and the net outflow of resources towards the developed countries.

All of these problems, which are intimately linked, require comprehensive treatment and practical expression at the appropriate political level. That is the sole reason why the developing countries have shown marked interest in debating these questions, which are of such vital importance to international peace and security, at an international conference. However, on the basis of the negative experience we have had in the various negotiations taking place in the North-South context, and within the United Nations system, one may very well ask whether the attitudes and postures adopted on those questions by the industrialized countries may also be adopted at this conference.

If that were the case, then that form would be nothing other than an obstacle to the North-South understanding that is so indispensable for making progress towards the new international economic order.

We hope that in the present debate the limited attention paid to certain aspects of this item simply reflects a question of emphasis in East-West relations, certain sensitive areas and perhaps an overloaded agenda and does not mean a lack of interest in strengthening and complementing in this way the valuable co-operation to development that these same sectors are making through bilateral and multilateral channels.

We trust that the responsibility of those who are struggling for a strategic superiority will enable them to pause for a moment and look at the reduced growth of the third world countries, which are not receiving any benefit from the growing economic activity that is being seen in some of the industrialized countries.
(Mr. Oyarce, Chile)

Quite the contrary, these countries continue to be affected by problems as crucial as low commodity prices and the lack of a solution to the debt problem. All of this leads us to think that it is indispensable to foster conditions appropriate for development. Among these, the releasing of military resources for civilian purposes, especially by the great Powers, and specifically the creation of a fund whose principal source of financing would not be voluntary contributions could promote that goal.

My country, together with a sizeable majority of the developing world, attaches the greatest importance to and places great hopes in a conference that could constitute a useful and constructive complement to the right to development.

It would be most regrettable if, out of a lack of political will by a few important countries, this initiative and these promising hopes were disappointed. If that form is established, it should not become a demagogic exercise lacking in solidarity, whose social costs would once again be absorbed by the developing countries.

Mr. Zachmann (German Democratic Republic): The debate we have had so far in the First Committee corroborates the impression that the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the guarantee of its use exclusively for peaceful purposes concerns all peoples. Never before has the number of States which are giving their views on this issue been so great. There is a growing awareness of the serious political, economic and military consequences of an arms race in outer space; it alarms people everywhere.

The causes of such a development are evident. Within a few decades the exploration and use of outer space have grown enormously. More and more people are getting involved and benefit from it. Today, however, the danger is increasing that this promising development will be stopped or even reversed. The threatening militarization of outer space jeopardizes the peoples' fundamental right to its peaceful use, a right which has already been anchored in several treaties. Such militarization would affect every aspect of our life.

We want to recall the far-reaching negative consequences which resulted from the production of the nuclear weapon and its first use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Let us not let a similar development happen with outer space weapons. This is not only a matter of heeding historical experience, but a vital necessity for mankind. It is a fact, however, that as far as the approach to the problem of the prevention
of an arms race in outer space is concerned, two opposite political lines are becoming apparent, as in the case of nuclear weapons.

The German Democratic Republic, like the overwhelming majority of States, vigorously advocates the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. In both the United Nations General Assembly and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, socialist and non-aligned countries have submitted numerous proposals aimed at averting these dangers. They are reflected in General Assembly resolutions 37/83 and 38/70, which aim at the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the conclusion of an agreement or agreements.

This year, the USSR has again proved its constructive approach to the task of securing the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind. With its initiative submitted in document A/C.1/39/L.1, which has the full support of my delegation, the USSR takes up and continues its earlier proposals. They have been further developed, taking into account proposals made by other States. In our view, this can only be considered as another sign of preparedness for negotiations and agreements.

These initiatives contain a set of measures of political, legal and material character, which would, when adopted and implemented, prevent the transformation of outer space into a new sphere of the arms race and bring about the reliably verified prohibition and elimination of a whole category of weapons.

But what is the reaction of the other side? Instead of trying to find reasonable solutions by way of negotiations, they have begun working at full speed to materialize the concept of "star wars". The reaction of the United States of America to the Soviet initiative of 29 June 1984 for bilateral negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space cannot but cause great concern.
Attempts to turn the facts upside down and to put the blame for aborting the
talks on the Soviet Union are futile and are detrimental to the cause at stake.
The fact is that the other side has not accepted the proposed subject for the talks
or negotiations in the proper sense of the word. Rather they have wanted to
introduce, through the back door, an issue the negotiating basis for which they
themselves had destroyed. The proposal regarding the imposition of a moratorium on
tests of anti-satellite weapons has, according to available information, also been
rejected. In other words, as in other cases, the opening of substantive
negotiations has been linked to unacceptable pre-conditions in order that this
should not take place.

The deployment of United States first-strike weapons in Western Europe, the
arms drive in outer space, and other arms build-up programmes all have but one
goal: to strive for the establishment of a first-strike potential and to make an
illusory attempt to achieve military supremacy.

The dangers of the so-called cosmic component of this objective are further
illustrated by facts such as the accelerated development of anti-satellite systems,
the intensive research and development in various categories of laser and
particle-beam weapons, the military use of space flights, and the accelerated
establishment and extension of outer space commands, installations which are meant
to make possible military operations and warfare in outer space and from outer
space against Earth.

This does not only have a direct and serious impact on international security;
when considering the enormous resources which are and would be swallowed up by the
arms drive in outer space, the proposals of the USSR are of the utmost importance.
Everybody is aware of how urgently these resources are needed for solving global
problems of mankind.

In the 1960s and 1970s, a treaty system was achieved which, as a whole, is
directed against the militarization of outer space. It includes the Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of 1963, the
outer space Treaty of 1967, the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement between
the USSR and the United States on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1972, the environmental modification Convention of
1976 and the Treaty on the moon of 1979, which has not yet entered into force.
The essence of these treaties is a ban on the testing and deployment in outer space of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the prohibition of space-based anti-ballistic missile systems. All these treaties are based on the principle of the exclusively peaceful use of outer space.

To ignore these treaties, deliberately to interpret them in a wrong way, or to carry out activities which contradict their letter and their spirit would amount, in our view, to a destruction of this treaty system and would impede the achievement of further agreements on which we can build. The main way to avert the danger of an arms race in outer space is, in the belief of the German Democratic Republic, to strengthen, observe and further develop the existing treaty system. It is of doubtful use to analyse so-called gaps in that set of treaties in endless discussions, instead of concentrating on further effective measures. The point is to begin negotiations immediately and to take up proposals such as: the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against Earth, as well as from Earth against objects in outer space; the banning and elimination of space attack systems, including space-based anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as any land-, air- or sea-based systems designed to destroy objects in outer space; and the elaboration of verifiable agreements on a bilateral and multilateral basis.

Therefore, the German Democratic Republic, like other States in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, urges the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a concrete negotiating mandate on agenda item 5. Unfortunately, the relevant proposals by socialist and non-aligned countries have so far been foiled by Western resistance. The argument that the first issue was the identification of problems is not convincing. We rather suspect that this was meant to be a delaying tactic. But time is pressing. The proposals of the USSR clearly identify the problems and offer concrete solutions suitable for negotiations. So, we do not see what there is still to identify. Whoever has other proposals can make them in the negotiating process.

The exploration and practical use of outer space through peaceful co-operation by the peoples opens up new dimensions for the creative activities of man. It offers great possibilities for the solution of global problems of mankind. Let us think of the exploration and comprehensive use of the natural resources of the
Earth, or of the fight against natural disasters. More than 60 per cent of all long-distance telephone calls crossing continents and oceans are transmitted through communication satellites; 120 States are using satellites for international and national transmissions; promising new substances, materials and technologies can be created in outer space. My delegation would like to refer here in particular to the fact that the USSR shares its advanced space technology with a great number of States through such programmes as INTERCOSMOS, INTERSPUTNIK and INTERVISION.

So, we can say that there is already a treasure of positive experience. Cosmonauts from various countries undertake joint space flights; international scientific and technological experiments and research work are carried out.

With the help of international search-and-rescue systems for ships and planes in distress, the lives of 223 people have been saved over the last two years.

Peaceful co-operation - and this is by no means a new experience - can help many dreams of mankind come true. For our country too the peaceful use of outer space is of great economic and social importance. The German Democratic Republic co-operates with many States, in such fields as the remote sensing of the Earth and in the analysis of the results.
We strongly advocate that the results of a peaceful exploration and use of outer space be made available to all States. It is in this light that we see the Soviet proposal on a future world-wide organization for the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes - and for that we do not need any laser battle stations, anti-satellite systems or "star wars".

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic expects, therefore, that this General Assembly session will reaffirm the clear mandate contained in resolution 38/70 and give the Geneva Conference on Disarmament the clear task to negotiate. The point is to avail ourselves of this opportunity and not to let this historic chance pass.

Mr. McDonagh (Ireland): Earlier in this session I had the opportunity to speak in the general debate of the Committee on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community. On this occasion I should like to treat briefly of a number of disarmament questions which are of particular concern to my country.

My delegation has repeatedly stated in the Committee the view of the Government of Ireland that in the disarmament area effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war must have the highest priority. We share the concern of the Secretary-General expressed in this year's report to the General Assembly that

"The past year has been a time of great-Power tension accentuated by a lack of progress in disarmament and arms control which has heightened fears of nuclear confrontation." (A/39/1, p. 2)

Indeed, beyond the lack of progress in disarmament and arms control, we are in a situation where the two super-Powers are no longer even engaged in negotiating the vital issues involved. It is regrettable that the great and unique challenge of our time, the prevention of nuclear war, is not being addressed with anything like the urgency which it requires. It is encouraging to hear it said that nuclear war is unthinkable. It would be much more encouraging to see determined efforts made at the negotiating table to curb and reverse a nuclear-arms race which seems to be increasingly out of control.

The year since we last met has been a very bad one for arms control and disarmament. The major arms control negotiations between the United States and the
Soviet Union, those on strategic nuclear forces and on intermediate-range nuclear forces, are still suspended. The nuclear Powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, are engaged in programmes of developing and deploying new nuclear weapons at a time when no effective negotiations are taking place anywhere about these matters. We seem to be in the presence of a vicious and mutually reinforcing circle of deployment and counter-deployment. It has not yet proved possible to get negotiations under way to avert the threat of a new and highly dangerous arms race in outer space. At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the only negotiations which have shown progress during the last year are those on a convention to outlaw chemical weapons.

In the interest of halting the further erosion of international security it is essential that dialogue between the super-Powers should be developed urgently. The negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces should be resumed with a genuine and manifest aim of succeeding; and by success we mean not only controlling the growth of armaments, but bringing about substantial reductions of nuclear weapons to the lowest possible level. If these negotiations are to succeed, it would seem on past experience that what is needed is more flexibility from nuclear-weapon States. Rigid or unrealistic positions are unlikely to lead to agreement.

Of course, disarmament cannot be the responsibility of the super-Powers alone. All States, not only the super-Powers, have a duty to work for an end to the arms race. We are, however, entitled to demand of the super-Powers that they play the major part - a part commensurate with their responsibilities - in turning back the dangerous course on which the world now seems set.

I referred earlier to the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. The Secretary-General has also noted in his report:

"It is only realistic to recognize that nuclear disarmament will depend primarily on agreement among the nations having nuclear weapons, especially, and beginning with, the most powerful." (A/39/1, p. 7)

But it is equally true, as the Secretary-General has pointed out, that in this field "... it is essential to utilize the full potential of multilateral and bilateral negotiations". (A/39/1, pp. 6-7)
In 1985 the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will meet for a Third Review Conference on the implementation of that Treaty. The NPT represents in many respects a model approach to the disarmament process in general and to the process of nuclear disarmament in particular. The Treaty came into being partly as a result of the acceptance by the principal nuclear Powers of undertakings to engage in negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. To this commitment by nuclear-Powers was joined a corresponding commitment by the non-nuclear-weapon States which became parties to the Treaty. Their commitment was not to enter into the nuclear-arms race. This combination of commitments had the objective of ensuring that nuclear weapons would not acquire a permanent and incremental role in the international order.

But what has happened to the common understanding reached nearly 20 years ago which was to provide a blueprint for nuclear disarmament? If the efficacy of this Treaty is to be judged only on the basis of its implementation by the 119 non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to it, then unquestionably it has been a major success. It is, of course, to be regretted that some States remained outside the framework of the NPT and it is a matter of concern that certain of them subsequently acquired nuclear weapons capability. However, the overwhelming majority of States have given the clearest demonstration of their determination to seek an end to the nuclear-arms race. They have shown this by accepting the restraints imposed by the Treaty. They have made clear their refusal to seek an illusory peace and security through acquisition of the most terrible weapons the world has known. They have refrained from following the nuclear weapons option although some of them might have had reason to believe that that option could tip the scales of power in their favour in their regional and international relationships.

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will, however, also be examining the manner in which the Treaty has been implemented by the nuclear-weapon States Parties, including the obligation to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament. At the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference I am confident we shall be able to agree that the nuclear-weapon States Parties have
been exemplary in support of the non-proliferation régime aimed at preventing the further horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. But at the same time it seems unlikely that we shall be able to conclude that the nuclear-weapon States Parties have discharged their obligations to proceed to the negotiated containment, curtailment and elimination of nuclear weapons. In the 16 years since the NPT was opened for signature it has become increasingly difficult to envisage the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. And the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty are entitled to point this out and to insist that the nuclear-weapons States should begin to meet their commitments under the Treaty in respect of ending the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The NPT contains the elements of a programme which, if implemented, would lead to nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons both in the atmosphere and underground would represent a very effective measure in terms of the NPT goal of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race. For many adherents to the NPT, Ireland among them, the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is an essential and practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and arms control. The reasoning behind this position is clear. A comprehensive test-ban treaty is urgently needed as a means of curbing the endless development and refinement of existing nuclear weapons. The closing-off of new avenues in the development of these weapons, together with the erosion, over time, of the reliability of existing stockpiles, would surely supply a significant impetus towards nuclear disarmament. Agreement to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty would constitute a concrete demonstration of a serious commitment to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

Given the central role of a test ban in the context of nuclear disarmament, it would be well to consider where we stand as the Third Review Conference of the parties to the NPT approaches. It is now 21 years since the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom affirmed in the partial test-ban Treaty their determination to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to that end. The trilateral negotiations which had been taking place between these countries fell victim, in 1980, to new strains and tensions in East-West relations. Since then, multilateral efforts to promote negotiations on the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban have been met with resistance from Powers whose assent is a prerequisite for progress.

As if those difficulties were not sufficient, there are others which have also appeared in the path of progress towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. There are States that argue that a distinction should be made between peaceful and non-peaceful explosions and devices. It appears to us that these States ignore what experience has taught, namely, that any nuclear explosive device ostensibly developed for peaceful purposes is also inherently capable of being used as a weapon. Some others would argue that a comprehensive test-ban treaty cannot be verified in present circumstances and that we should therefore not proceed to negotiate one for the moment. We would respond to this by pointing out that sophisticated means of verifying nuclear testing already exist and that, just as
the International Atomic Energy Agency improves and perfects its safeguards mechanisms, similarly subsequent refinement of existing verification methods can be envisaged in the case of a comprehensive test ban. In the meanwhile, however, we should not allow progress to become hostage to theoretical scenarios which distract attention from what is an underlying absence of political will. The goal is too important for all of us.

More recently, a step-by-step formula has been suggested whereby a progressive lowering of the threshold of permitted nuclear explosive devices would be agreed in accordance with improvement in multilateral verification capabilities. We fear that such an approach would lend a permanent status to the role of nuclear weapons in the international order by allowing low but militarily significant tests by the nuclear-weapon States to continue. This would perpetuate the existing asymmetry between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States, which was not envisaged in the NPT. A treaty based on this premise would also, as it were, give a kind of multilateral moral endorsement to explosions under the threshold conducted by States not subject to the restraints of the NPT.

When the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 was agreed it seemed that, at last, something was beginning to be done to deal with the nuclear threat. The sobering fact remains that far more tests have been carried out since 1963 than had been carried out before that date. While one must acknowledge the environmental benefits from the halting of testing in the atmosphere, as well as the benefits of a continued implementation of the threshold Treaty, a comprehensive test-ban treaty remains an urgent necessity if the qualitative improvement of nuclear weaponry, with all its destabilizing implications, is to be halted.

I should like now to turn to the question of outer space. This item is a relative newcomer to the agenda of the Committee, although the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has been in existence for many years. At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978 it was proposed that a protocol be annexed to the 1967 Treaty on outer space to impose a total ban on military activities, other than peaceful, in outer space. In April 1981 and again in 1983 the Soviet Union proposed draft treaties designed to eliminate any kind of weaponry from outer space and to prevent the militarization of outer space. Again in 1981, a number of Member States proposed in General Assembly resolution 36/97 C that the Committee on Disarmament begin consideration
of the question of negotiating agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and, in particular, to consider as a matter of priority the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems.

The justified upsurge in international concern at the possible further militarization of outer space is partly accounted for by the consideration that this is an area in which it is still possible to introduce control and rationality before it becomes the arena for a new and highly dangerous arms race. If we do not use our time wisely, the competitive development of space weapons will lead to greater international insecurity and to increased risks for all.

Certain satellite operations by the United States and the Soviet Union play an important role in the field of monitoring and communications, associated in particular with the stable disposition of nuclear forces and the verification of arms-control agreements. The anti-satellite weapons being developed by the Soviet Union and the United States threaten to endanger such satellites and the functions which they perform. Consequently, it seems clear that developments which threaten the immunity of these satellites should be halted.

Going beyond the question of anti-satellite weapons, the international community is now being asked to entertain the prospect of seeing outer space used in a manner that questions existing strategies and represents a search for ways to prevent the mutually assured destruction hitherto associated with the use of nuclear weapons. The wider international community generally has had little or no influence in the past on the development of nuclear strategies. This need not and should not deter the Assembly from voicing concern at the possible implications of what is happening now.

Concerned international scientific opinion is helping to develop public awareness of the implications both of the further development of anti-satellite systems and of the current research effort in the field of ballistic-missile defence technologies. A widely representative gathering of international scientists, the Council of the Pugwash Conference, has pointed out that the pursuit of ballistic-missile defence technologies will increase the danger of nuclear war by threatening the existing arms-control régime, including especially the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty, and by provoking further build-ups of offensive nuclear weapons of all types.
There is the danger, moreover, that if either super-power were to develop what it believed to be a successful ballistic-missile defence system involving beam weapons, then fears of an attempted nuclear first strike would be increased, and perhaps with cause.

There are those who would argue that the effect of such systems would be to make nuclear deterrence redundant through neutralizing the destructive power of nuclear weapons. This argument should in theory be attractive to those who believe that nuclear deterrence does not offer a stable long-term foundation for international peace and security. However, this approach to the militarization of outer space presupposes that a State developing the capacity to defend itself comprehensively against a nuclear attack would be permitted to reach the point of deployment without countermeasures by other States. Such a scenario seems to us inherently unlikely. The wish to avoid the possible consequences of a nuclear attack is certainly understandable, but we maintain the view that the developments in question could not be other than destabilizing and that the only way to avoid the consequences of a nuclear attack is by ensuring that a nuclear war never takes place.

We take some encouragement from the indications that the space Powers have begun to feel their way towards tackling these important questions. We hope that they will soon sit down to negotiations so that comprehensive agreements can be reached which would prevent the use of outer space for the military advantage of any State. No one needs an arms race in outer space.

I should like finally to refer to the question of chemical weapons, a matter to which my Government attaches considerable importance. This is the only area where disarmament negotiations seem to have shown some forward movement during the past year.

Irish Governments have consistently supported a total ban on these weapons. The conclusion of a ban would be timely. There appears to be a growing recognition by the principal chemical-weapons Powers in particular, but also by the international community in general, of the need for the early conclusion of such a ban. We have been encouraged by the tabling of a draft convention by the United States and by the acceptance in principle by the Soviet Union of continuous
on-site inspection of destruction of stocks. It remains to build on these indications of good will, and my Government hopes that all concerned will make the necessary efforts to overcome the difficulties which remain in the way of finalization of a convention.

Agreement on a chemical-weapons convention would not only be an important achievement in itself. It would be our hope that it would represent a breakthrough in multilateral disarmament negotiations which would inspire all concerned to redouble their efforts to reach agreement in other areas.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy): My delegation has already expressed its views concerning disarmament issues in the course of the general debate. I should now like to add some further comments on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in view of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, as the Committee is aware, will take place in September 1985 in Geneva.

In 1975 Italy ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty after careful scrutiny of its implications. In ratifying the Treaty, the Italian Government once again reiterated its commitment to nuclear disarmament, a goal whose achievement we advocate in all international forums.

It is our firm conviction that the main obligations resulting from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely, those enshrined in articles I and II, are still valid and that they must constitute the corner-stone of the process for achieving balanced nuclear disarmament at the lowest possible level.

We are fully aware of the limitations of sovereignty which adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty implies. This issue was the subject of a lively debate in the Italian Parliament at the time of the ratification of the Treaty. But the opinion that this is a reasonable price to be paid for the needs of international security was and still is overwhelming in my country.

We therefore strictly abide by the Treaty, and we fervently hope that those States which have so far refrained from adhering to it will reconsider their position in view of the benefits the Treaty provides for mankind.

In the same spirit we appreciate and commend the establishment of nuclear-free zones such as the one established in Latin America by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

It is my Government's view that all the obligations resulting from the Non-Proliferation Treaty are of equal importance and must be scrupulously implemented. We therefore regret the insufficient implementation of article VI and of the relevant tenth preambular paragraph of that Treaty. These provisions particularly concern the two major Powers, which in our opinion are bound to resume their talks with a view to the effective reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

It is highly regrettable that such important talks were unilaterally interrupted. On this subject the views of my Government are well known. They were clearly reiterated before this Committee on 22 October, in the course of the general debate.

It is also regrettable that all efforts aimed at the re-establishment of a subsidiary body of the Disarmament Conference on the subject of a nuclear-test ban proved unsuccessful at the last session. We express the sincere hope that at the beginning of the 1985 session substantive work on this subject will be resumed without further delay.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty contains not only obligations concerning the proliferation of nuclear weapons. One of its most important features is represented by the clauses providing for international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Technologically advanced States in the nuclear field, particularly nuclear-weapon countries, shall, under the safeguards provided for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), contribute to the technological advancement of other States, and of developing countries in particular, in the innumerable peaceful uses of nuclear energy, ranging from medical applications, the development of agricultural techniques, the production of electric power and so on. In fact, much is already being done both at the multilateral level - that is, within the framework of IAEA - and bilaterally. But more can still be done, and Italy is ready to do its part in this peaceful effort, according to appropriate devices which may be discussed at the forthcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The 1985 Review Conference will be an important one. It is being prepared with care, as has been evidenced by the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee held in Geneva under the able and effective chairmanship of
Ambassador Imai of Japan and Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia. The third and last session of that Committee is scheduled for next April. By then all necessary documents should be completed for consideration by the Preparatory Committee, and we are confident that the Secretariat will spare no effort in preparing balanced documentation which will provide an objective and factual background for the work of the Review Conference. In particular, this applies to those documents relating to the work of the Disarmament Conference.

Another important problem which may benefit from a preliminary informal discussion is the question of the format and character of the final document, or documents, of the Review Conference. We welcome the efforts that will be made to this end by the Chairmen of the three sessions of the Preparatory Committee. The Review Conference must be a successful one and must produce a meaningful final document acceptable to all. Needless to say, a spirit of co-operation and a willingness to make concessions will be needed. We are ready to do our part, and we are confident that the other contracting parties will act in the same manner. In particular, we express our fervent hope that in the mean time the two major nuclear Powers will create a climate conducive to the success of the Conference.
Mr. PASHKEVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): Today my delegation wishes to dwell on the important phenomenon in the present struggle for the cause of disarmament and the consolidation of international peace and security, that is, the mass participation of broad segments of the population of various countries to that end.

The heightened nuclear threat has caused increased alarm among various segments of the population as reflected in the massive anti-war and anti-missile protest movements. They have become a new and important political factor in international relations and a substantial part of the internal politics of States. The participants in those movements are calling for the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament; they are calling for co-operation among States for the sake of peace and stability, and a return to the policy of international détente.

There has come into being from within the anti-war movements the idea of declaring 6 August "Hiroshima Day", a day that would be a symbol uniting the efforts of all States, all peoples and all existing generations in the struggle against the threat of nuclear incineration. A number of delegations - in particular that of Bulgaria during the First Committee's work - have already advocated the notion that "Hiroshima Day" should be declared under United Nations auspices. We feel this is an idea that deserves full support, particularly since in August 1985 forty years will have elapsed since that dark day in the history of that town and of mankind.

The deployment of United States cruise missiles in Britain and Italy and Pershing-2 missiles in West Germany has shown that militarist circles of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) view with cynical contempt the clearly expressed will of the majority of those countries' populations. As has been loudly proclaimed in the West, these new first-strike weapons are supposed "to protect freedom and democracy". Instead of that, Western Governments are now obliged to defend American missile bases from the wrath of their own populations, at the same time disregarding the elementary norms of democracy. Former Dutch Minister of Defence, Hans van Mierlo, according to The New York Times of 15 December 1983, correctly observed the following on this point:

"Either democracy will destroy nuclear armaments or nuclear armaments will destroy democracy."
Developments have shown that, in the dispute between democracy and the missiles, NATO has clearly come down on the side of the missiles.

In one of the United States statements, its representative lectured everyone on how Governments should respond to the voice of the people and how important it was for the movements of those fighting for peace to have free access to information. However, let us take a look at the true state of affairs in the United States. Public opinion surveys have shown that more than two-thirds of the population of the United States supports the idea of a nuclear freeze; however, the United States Administration is against it - and that, in their language, is what they call "heeding the will of the people". The Soviet Union has proposed to the United States that meetings of American and Soviet scientists should be held to discuss the consequences of the establishment of a far-reaching system of anti-missile defence, including space-based elements; the United States has not agreed. Is that what is called "free access to information"?

By deploying new first-strike nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the United States and NATO intend thus to undermine the anti-war protest movements among the population. However, hopes that just after the deployment of the first batch of United States missiles in various Western European countries the anti-missile movement would lose its mass appeal proved to be built on sand, as it were. In this respect, the following statement by Mr. Vogel of the SPD parliamentary faction in the West German Parliament is interesting:

"The missile debate has changed the consciousness of millions of Germans. It would be a mistake to assume that the debate is over."

Notwithstanding all the propagandistic ploys of the NATO leaders, public opinion in the countries of Western Europe has seen in the deployment of the new United States missiles precisely what it truly constitutes: a sharp and quite unprecedented rise in the threat of nuclear war. As we read in The Guardian:

"The United States cruise missile programme is the largest unilateral, qualitative and quantitative escalation of the arms race in the history of mankind."

The participants in the anti-missile movement in the new and considerably worsened situation now prevailing have arrived at the only possible conclusion: If one wants peace one must defend the cause of peace and fight for it with all one's might.
What has happened is precisely what was referred to by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade Chernenko, who said:
"... the greater the threat created for human civilization by the imperialist policy of constantly increasing tension, the more active become the forces for the protection of mankind."

After a certain period of "winter meditation", as it were, caused by the need to rethink new conditions that have come about as a result of the beginning of the deployment of United States missiles in Western Europe, spring and summer this year were again marked by a surge in mass protest movements advocating peace. The basic slogans on the basis of which the peace movement is again active show that, for the anti-war movement, the missile question is not closed at all and that participants in it have not reconciled themselves to the arrival of the post-Pershing era. The principal result of the emergence of anti-war sentiment among public opinion is that the forces of war cannot have things their own way; war has ceased to be inevitable. The influence of the mass peace movement has had a real effect in bringing that about.

During the course of the struggle the movement has acquired greater experience, breadth of vision and understanding of the tasks involved in the struggle for peace. Many movements and organizations born in the wave of the anti-missile movement are now going on to broader tasks in the sphere of the elimination of the nuclear danger, including demands for a freeze on nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the non-first use of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban, the inadmissibility of the militarization of space and other questions.
(Mr. Pashkevich, Byelorussian SSR)

The membership of the anti-war and anti-missile movement is broadening, too. A major achievement has been the active involvement of broad circles of the intelligentsia. Equipped with the right kind of information and knowledge, they have perceived the mounting nuclear threat particularly acutely, and this fact was manifested especially strikingly in March 1984 in Paris at an international meeting of the intelligentsia for peace and disarmament, which was held on the initiative of the French anti-war organization, the "Appeal of the Hundred".

The movement is now benefiting from the involvement of new masses of scientists who, proceeding from objective scientific facts, regardless of their ideological or political persuasion, have reached a common conclusion concerning the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. In this respect, the meeting of the presidents of virtually all the national academies of sciences now existing in the world, held in September 1982 in Rome on the initiative of the Papal Academy of Sciences, is quite an unprecedented phenomenon. At that meeting a joint declaration was signed, a declaration on the prevention of nuclear war, in which the most authoritative representatives of the scientific world of today categorically stated that science cannot offer the world any real defence against the consequences of nuclear war.

One rather specific international movement has come into being, that is, "World Doctors for the Prevention of Nuclear War". In June 1984 this movement held its fourth congress at Helsinki. More than 100,000 doctors from many countries of the world have already joined the movement, which has authoritatively stated that medicine will prove to be powerless after a nuclear conflict. Let us note in passing that the Soviet Union was the first country to carry out the decision of the third Amsterdam congress on adding to the Hippocratic Oath an obligation to fight against the threat of nuclear war. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in November 1983 confirmed the appropriate addition to the official text of the doctors' oath adopted in the Soviet Union.

The participation of youth in the struggle for peace at the present time is particularly significant. The younger generation today can rightly be called "the anti-war generation".

The unprecedented participation of women in the peace movement is a particularly significant feature in the current public affairs of the West. Unlike the past, when women's activities were primarily concentrated on feminist problems,
today women are ever more resolutely defending the most important thing, which is human life. The "Women's Peace Camp" near the British military base at Greenham Common, where the first United States Cruise missiles have been deployed, has become a symbol of valour and perseverance.

Prominent political and public figures and representatives of business circles and even military experts who only recently held posts in the armed forces of NATO are now taking part in the struggle for the preservation of peace. These persons are very well informed about the disastrous consequences for civilization of the use of nuclear weapons.

The participation of ecclesiastical figures who have great influence among the faithful is increasing in the anti-war movement.

All this places the leaders of the United States and NATO in a rather difficult situation. Until the recent past, they were inclined to say that the participants in the anti-war movement were just agents of Moscow. This is patently false. It is now impossible to silence the peace movement, which has truly become the most powerful public movement of our present age; nor is it possible to discredit it with slanderous assertions.

The statement by the British Defence Minister that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is a movement of loners in which the population takes no interest at all is also very far removed from the truth. If that is so, well then, what is there for the leaders of the United States and NATO to be concerned about? But they are undertaking and generously financing their own campaign, a campaign against disarmament. They started by trying to get people used to the idea of the acceptability of nuclear war, the possibility of limiting such a war, of instilling into people the notion that nuclear warfare is really not so terrible after all, it is not a disaster. In other words, they are trying to package the idea of nuclear war in such a way as to make it seem, if not attractive, then at least inoffensive. Attempts are being made to depict the participants in the anti-war movements as enemies of national security. Attempts are being made to force these movements off the true path, and those doing so do not shrink from any methods, including the planting of paid agents provocateurs. Particularly sophisticated efforts are being used to disrupt the anti-war movement from inside, to cause it to lose its direction and produce a schism in its members by implanting in it appropriate ideas, conceptions and slogans formulated in peace-loving phraseology.
They are quickly tacking together puppet groups with pro-nuclear slogans such as the notorious "Peace and Security with Pershings". At the same time, everything possible is being done to prevent any union or solidarity in action between the anti-war movements of the West and the peace movement in the socialist countries.

Lastly, those fighting for peace in the West are on the receiving end of police terror, intimidation and harsh repression. The blatant facts of police brutality against the participants in anti-nuclear demonstrations in the United States and a number of other countries which are their allies in NATO are well known.
Participants in the anti-war movements have been thrown in jail, have been fined heavily and dismissed from their work. Even Members of Parliament have been subjected to arrest and prosecution for participation in anti-missile demonstrations. For this purpose they are very quickly stripped of their parliamentary immunity. Members of the peace movement are met with the icy jets of water cannons; they are hounded in the press and subject to threats of physical assault, and orders to open fire on them and not to miss. Draconian laws are being used against them and special simplified procedures have been introduced to consider cases when they come before the courts, the purpose being to prevent them from explaining the political motives for their actions.

Despite all of this, the mass movements against nuclear weapons and for peace and disarmament continue to gain strength. This should be seen as evidence, proof, of the fact that the determination of peoples to stay alive in peace and co-operation is irrepressible. At the same time, the unconquerable desire of the masses of the population for peace is an important signal to the ruling circles of those countries which so far have been disregarding the peace-loving voice of public opinion and constantly raising the ante in the risky game of stepping up the nuclear danger, the militarization of space and the production of new generations of lethal armaments.

However, it is clear that the turning point in the international situation is not going to come of its own accord. One must struggle for it. In this, one is struggling not for some abstract ideals, not a dispute for its own sake. What is at stake here is the future, the very existence of mankind, and no one can afford to remain indifferent in this matter because it concerns everyone.

An important component part of the world's anti-war movement is the efforts of public opinion in the socialist countries. In the Byelorussian SSR, virtually the entire population, from children of school age up to old age pensioners participates in various anti-war activities - marches, rallies, demonstrations, meetings, peace lectures, peace vigils and various demonstrations. For example, within the framework of the week of activities for disarmament, held in October of this year in Minsk, there was a rally and demonstration of students in which 50,000 people took part. There was a massive meeting of medical workers and activists of the international movement, of Doctors for Peace and the Prevention of Nuclear War, and other events.
Joint mass demonstrations of the population have been held in border areas by representatives of Byelorussia, Russia, the Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland.

A number of representatives who have spoken in the First Committee have tried to cast aspersions on the anti-war movement in the socialist countries, making use of the fact that it is not aimed against the foreign or defence policies of the Governments of those States. We can say quite openly: Yes, the coincidence of aims of the public movement and the Government are not accidental. It is not accidental because our Government truly, in deeds, and not just words, expresses the yearnings of the people which endured all the horrors of the Second World War, a war which, it should be noted, came to us from the West. These are yearnings which can be mainly expressed in the words: "peace and not war".

May I be permitted to quote here the words of an ordinary Byelorussian, Lyubov Yakovlevna Karpovitch, words which she uttered during an anti-war demonstration of women, which was held in Minsk on 6 May 1984:

"I, a former inmate of the Oswiencin concentration camp, find it particularly painful to remember what I had to endure. In the concentration camp, I had to forget my first name, my last name, and remember only No. 79914, and a red triangle on a patch sewn on to my striped garment on the chest and sleeves. We were not considered to be people at all; we were burnt in ovens, starved to death, experimented on or shot.

"Now I am a teacher working in a humane, peaceful profession. For 40 years I have been telling my pupils of what I had to see and endure during the years of the war. I teach my children to be honest and industrious, to live and work conscientiously and to love their great fatherland ardently. How one would like to hope that my pupils have before them a bright future, a long and happy life. But for that what we need is peace. However, disregarding the will of the peoples, the United States has deployed new missiles right on the threshold of our country. There is no guarantee that in their reckless gambling with the fate of the world, they will not step over that boundary beyond which lies the end of mankind. This must not be allowed to happen."
In these words, words from the depth of the heart of an ordinary person, we find everything reflected as in a mirror: the harsh historical experience of our people, its hopes for the future and its determination to struggle for peace.

Our people have been actively participating in various kinds of events to promote the cause of peace and disarmament, within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign, Disarmament Week and so on. Tomorrow, members of the population will pour out onto the streets of towns and villages in a festive demonstration to observe the sixty-seventh anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and will once again show the unswerving unity of the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and the people.
The participants in those demonstrations will report on the achievements they have made at work and on their plans for the future. They will declare their support for the Leninist foreign policy of strengthening the peace and security of peoples and of broad international co-operation. They will speak out against the nuclear threat, the arms race and the militarization of outer space. They will demand the cessation of imperialist aggression and violence. They will demand the elimination of foci of tension and crisis situations in various parts of the world. They will make no bones about what they want. They will say yes to peace and no to war.

It is our duty at the United Nations to heed those demands and to adopt decisions responding to the desire of peoples for a world of peace, without wars and without weapons.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): In his statement of 22 October, my friend and colleague Ambassador Tonwe, speaking on behalf of the Nigerian delegation, paid a well-deserved tribute to you, Sir, on the occasion of your election as Chairman of the First Committee. Please permit me nevertheless to compliment you now on the efficient manner in which you have been guiding the Committee.

No one who has followed the debate in the General Assembly and the statements that have been made here in the First Committee can help but be alarmed by the gap between the consternation expressed about the state of the world on the one hand and the determination being exhibited to change things for the better on the other hand. By almost common consent - indeed, I should say, by common consent - the twin pillars on which the hope for maintaining world peace and security rests - disarmament and development - are in total disarray. The economic conditions in the greater part of the world are worse than they were when, 10 years ago, the United Nations launched the concept of the New International Economic Order.

The item on the critical economic situation in Africa, now before the General Assembly meeting in plenary, is a clear manifestation of the sad international economic disunity we face, a condition which has been made more intolerable by the discernible trend of a move away from commitment to multilateral co-operation. But development, of course, is a subject for another forum, notwithstanding my firm conviction about its close relationship with the main preoccupation of this Committee. I shall therefore not dwell on it any further.
(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

But how can anyone help being amazed by the close proximity between the outlay on armaments for 1983 - which is close to $800 billion - and the crushing indebtedness of the developing countries - again, $800 billion - which is threatening the viability of many of these debtor countries, quite apart from its effect on the international monetary system.

I accept, of course, that what is of immediate concern to us here in the First Committee is the threat not merely to one sector or even to one region, but to the totality of humanity, as a consequence of the current level of nuclear armaments. That will be the subject of my contribution this morning.

The international community, of course, has not just suddenly become aware of this danger. Starting with the aftermath of the devastation wrought on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by those so-called crude bombs, the General Assembly expressed its concern in its very first resolution. But the genie was not confined to its bottle; unfortunately, it was allowed to escape. Not only that, it was allowed to proliferate.

In 1978 the General Assembly, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, agreed by consensus that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. To minimize the danger progressively, agreement was reached on a phased programme of negotiations, and the multilateral negotiating organ was revitalized. For the first time, all nuclear-weapon States agreed to participate in it. The commitment of 1978 was repeated in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade and in the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1982.

But as the General Assembly convened this year, two new elements of a most disturbing nature prevailed: The first is the increased deployment of nuclear weapons, coupled with the discontinuation of negotiations on these weapons, either bilaterally between the super-Powers or multilaterally in the Conference on Disarmament. The second is that the consequences of a nuclear war have been further scientifically documented. The conclusions reached at the Washington conference, in which over 100 scientists participated, and which were summarized in Carl Sagan's article "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe", have created a dramatic impact on our estimation of the survivability of a nuclear war. Let me quote a relevant segment from those conclusions:
"Recent estimates of the immediate deaths from blast, prompt radiation and fires in a major [nuclear] exchange in which cities were targeted range from several hundred million to 1.1 billion people .... Serious injuries requiring immediate medical attention (which would be largely unavailable) would be suffered by a comparably large number of people, perhaps an additional 1.1 billion. Thus it is possible that something approaching half the human population on the planet would be killed or seriously injured by the direct effects of a nuclear war."

This estimate of the initial victims, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. For the long-term effect will be more devastating. Social disruption and infrastructural destruction, leading to a lack of availability of food, fuel and medical services, will surely claim many more lives. The effect of such an exchange on the atmosphere, we are told, will likely be the production of a nuclear winter in both the northern and the southern hemispheres.

These scientific - not emotional or alarmist - conclusions should lead us to agree on the total inappropriateness of any strategic doctrine that includes the use of nuclear weapons. Such doctrines do not set upper limits on the arsenals required; they are based on a subjective perception of the capability, present and future, of the opponent. They tend rather to create a vicious cycle of deployment and counter-deployment in keeping with the fallacy - the "central fallacy" as Frank Blackaby of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute calls it - that there is some military need for parity in nuclear weapons deployment.

Speaking last week on the subject of chemical weapons, the representative of the United States confirmed Blackaby's view when he said that "To have an effective deterrent, the United States will not attempt to match the Soviet Union in quantities and types of chemical weapons. Instead our aim is to have the smallest, safest stockpile that would convince any State that it could gain no significant advantage from the use of chemical weapons against the United States or our allies". (A/C.1/39/PV.21, p. 31)
The two super-Powers have not, unfortunately, followed this precept in their nuclear doctrine and practices; I think they should. Subjective perception of each other's intentions has become the moving factor in pursuing nuclear-arms policies which the force of research and development would probably have made inevitable anyway. Global policy of the super-Powers seems to have taken over from the genuine security considerations of the early years of the nuclear era. The consequent distrust of each other's intentions has frustrated negotiating efforts and, obviously, has prevented agreements.
Since no super-power admits to a policy aimed at world domination, let us give them the benefit of doubt and assume that fear of attack by one on the other is the basic factor in their nuclear escalation. Then it should be logical to expect that both will wish to lessen that fear by agreement to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. Continuous build-up indicates a doubt about the reliability of nuclear weapons at any level to deter first strike. New defensive technologies which are constantly developed are the practical manifestation of fear that deterrence will fail.

The simplest explanation for the proposed militarization of outer space, we are told, is to render nuclear weapons obsolete, thus finally and openly knocking the bottom out of deterrence. Even as leverage, that is, to be one or two steps ahead of the adversary ostensibly to encourage negotiation, escalation does not work; the technological gap between the super-Powers is so short - much shorter than the time it takes to negotiate any arms limitation agreement. Leverage disappears in the course of negotiations and the vicious circle starts all over again.

It must be clear by now that on the basis of past experience there is no sensible alternative to genuine negotiations to arrest the nuclear-arms race before nuclear weapons wipe us all out; yet negotiations are at present not being undertaken.

When the world was confronted at the end of the First World War with what was then the ultimate weapon of mass destruction - chemical weapons - it adopted an approach which by and large seems to have worked. The 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which has effectively prohibited the use of those categories of weapons of mass destruction on a large scale, is a good example. The Protocol is remarkable in the simplicity of its provisions. It has only three preambular paragraphs. The first preambular paragraph states:

"Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world".

The third preambular paragraph states:

"To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations".
The operative part is equally remarkable in its simple provision. Paragraph 1 states that:

"... the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration."

Notwithstanding the directness and simplicity of the provisions of the Protocol, 105 countries, including all the present nuclear-weapon States, are parties.

There are no elaborate - nor, indeed any - provisions for verification; compliance rests essentially on the commitment of States to be bound alike in their conscience and practice.

Although there have been few reports of isolated use of chemical weapons in isolated cases nations have, indeed, by and large respected their commitment undertaken in the Protocol. The repugnance and revulsion which any proof of use would cause against the State so accused seems to have acted as an effective deterrent.

The effect of use of chemical weapons can be limited and given time detection may become very difficult as experience of some investigation of alleged use has shown. However, any use of nuclear weapons becomes immediately clear since not just the effect but even the use cannot be camouflaged.

Since the report of the Conference on Disarmament has again shown that the two super-Powers are not yet ready to begin the process of reducing their arsenals nor even to freeze them, the international community has a right to expect them at least to formalize the statements of their leaders that a nuclear war should never be waged, and in all cases this sentiment has been voiced.

I say, therefore, that it is about time that we adopt the simple approach of the 1925 Protocol in respect of nuclear weapons. The elements for such an approach are already available.

In the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the parties expressed their desire to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to put an
end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances. That was in respect of nuclear tests only. One can imagine what the implications are in respect of the use of nuclear weapons.

In the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the parties expressed their conviction:
"That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ultimately may even render the whole earth uninhabitable." (A/C.1/946, P. 3)

In the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, the parties were moved to consider:
"the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of all peoples".

In the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by consensus, all Member States of the United Nations agreed:
"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization" (S-10/2, para. 47)

and that:
"Removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day." (S-10/2, para. 18)

Except for the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, all the documents to which I have referred are legally binding instruments to which the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, including the two super-Powers, are parties. Even in the case of the Final Document, the manner of its adoption by consensus and the solemn reaffirmation of commitment to it at the second special session are indicative of the important status which it has acquired. Thus practically all Member States are parties to one binding instrument or the other, by which they have committed themselves to the avoidance of nuclear war and to nuclear disarmament.

Pending agreement on concrete measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons and considering that almost every Member State is a party to one or the other of the aforementioned instruments, the time has come to show the political will - that
is all that is needed - to make a legally binding commitment on the non-use of nuclear weapons.

To this end the General Assembly should consider at this session the possibility of convening a plenipotentiary conference to work out and adopt a protocol for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Alternatively the First Committee should be convened at the beginning of the fortieth session to act in the capacity of such a plenipotentiary conference. Whichever method is chosen, the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations next year will be an appropriate occasion on which to adopt such a protocol. The Disarmament Commission should act as the preparatory body to work out during its next session in 1985 a draft of such a simple protocol. The plenipotentiary conference can meet in New York in the period between the opening of the General Assembly and the usual beginning of the work of the First Committee in mid-October.

The First Committee at that session should consider adopting a resolution whose elements in the preambular part might be: the expression of deep alarm at the ever-growing threat of a nuclear war and the devastating consequences of such a war; an awareness of the determination of all States, including the nuclear-weapon States, to avoid a nuclear war; conviction that the prevention of a nuclear war is the most urgent task facing humanity; and its belief that, pending nuclear disarmament, it is necessary to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used under any circumstance.
(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

In its operative part the draft resolution would recommend the convening in 1985, as part of the activities marking the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, of a plenipotentiary conference to adopt a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. It would also give a directive to the Disarmament Commission to act at its next meeting in 1985 as a preparatory committee and to prepare a draft of the protocol.

Mr. DUARTE (Brazil): According to our programme of work, I should like to say a few words on agenda item 59 (a) with regard to the report of the Disarmament Commission, which was introduced last Friday by its Chairman, Ambassador Victor Gbeho of Ghana. My delegation fully agrees with Chairman Gbeho's assessment of the work of the Commission, especially on the need to implement fully the guidelines contained in General Assembly resolution 37/78 H and reiterated in resolution 38/183 E.

The Commission was once again unable to make final operative recommendations on any of the five substantive items on its agenda, a trend which threatens to become a chronic feature. The intention behind resolutions 37/78 H and 38/183 E was to help counter such a trend by making the work of the Commission more objective and focused on a smaller number of specific issues.

Let me now briefly discuss the work of the Commission at its 1984 session. We consider it a positive sign that this year the delegation that promoted the elaboration of guidelines on confidence-building measures by the Commission is now proposing that in 1985 the United Nations Disarmament Commission not deal substantively with this question but that it again be brought before the Commission for its final consideration in 1986. In our view the draft resolution to be adopted by the First Committee this year on consideration of the question of confidence-building measures by the Commission should confine itself strictly to procedure and avoid any mention of points of substance.

We are also glad that interested delegations are working right now to implement the recommendation by the Commission on the question of disarmament and development, namely, that the General Assembly be enabled to reach a broad measure of agreement on this subject. We wish those delegations success in their efforts so that the consideration of both questions may progress in other forums. The Commission also decided to refer the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability to the current session of the General Assembly. My delegation strongly hopes that the
experience of the Commission's deliberations on that item will facilitate progress in the General Assembly.

At its 1984 substantive session the Commission recommended the carrying over to its next session of only two of the five substantive items on its agenda. Those two were items 4 and 5. With regard to the other three items - namely, guidelines on confidence-building measures, disarmament and development and South Africa's nuclear capability - the Commission did not specifically recommend their inclusion in its 1985 agenda.

With regard to the issues under agenda item 4, my delegation has already expressed its view that the excessive generality of the formulation of that item makes more difficult, rather than promotes, the objective treatment of those issues. The work of the respective contact group has also suffered in the past two sessions of the Commission from inflexible positions and from the unnecessary submission of alternative or repetitive proposals.

My delegation has also made clear its views on the procedural treatment of agenda item 5 concerning the reduction of military budgets. In case progress is still not forthcoming in 1985, we would again suggest that the continued retention of this unresolved item in the Commission's agenda is counterproductive since it contributes to solidifying opposing views rather than to their accommodation.

According to the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, which was adopted in 1980 by consensus in General Assembly resolution 35/46, the Disarmament Commission should review and appraise, in time for the fortieth session of the General Assembly in 1985, the progress achieved in the implementation of the measures contained in the Declaration. Such a review and appraisal will certainly have a comprehensive scope and would provide an opportunity for a thorough assessment of current problems in the field of disarmament and also of the role of the United Nations in that sphere.

My delegation believes that it would be wise not to overburden the work of the deliberative body at its substantive sessions. The current agenda items 4 and 5, which the Commission itself recommended be carried over, and a new item on the review of the second Disarmament Decade which is already mandated by the General Assembly should make up the substantive agenda of the Commission for its 1985 session. In that way the General Assembly would be carrying forward the positive and action-oriented guidelines contained in resolutions 37/78 H and 38/183 E.
My delegation is ready to work with other interested delegations with the objective of enhancing the effectiveness of the Disarmament Commission, the important deliberative organ on questions of disarmament.

Mr. OHIAMI (Togo) (interpretation from French): In speaking for the first time in this body at this session, I should like on behalf of my delegation to convey to you, Sir, sincere congratulations on your unanimous election to the chairmanship of our Committee. For all of us who know your skill, abilities and wisdom, there can be no doubt that our work will be ably guided to a fruitful conclusion. Please be assured of my delegation's complete readiness to make a positive contribution to our work.

I should also like to congratulate the other officers of the Committee, Ambassador Henning Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador Milos Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, Vice-Chairmen, the Committee's Secretary, Mr. Kheradi, and Mr. Ngare Kessely of Chad, the Rapporteur, who have been selected to assist you in your responsible task. I should also like to pay tribute to Ambassador Tom Eric Vraalen of Norway, your predecessor, for the outstanding manner in which he guided the work of this Committee last year.

At this stage in our deliberations my delegation would like to make some comments on agenda items 55, 57, 59 and 60. The delegation of Togo shares with the overwhelming majority of speakers the feeling of unease that has prevailed in the world since the negotiations on disarmament came to a halt. That uncomfortable feeling is justified by the fact that today no one is safe from the disastrous consequences of some minor flare-up or some nuclear accident, whether intentional or unintentional.

Only the cessation of the arms race followed by complete disarmament can maintain and strengthen the international peace and security proclaimed in the Preamble of our Charter, which begins:

"We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind".

Indeed, it is surprising to realize that the human mind has already forgotten so much suffering.

Following the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the world took an oath never again to re-experience the horrors of the last two wars.
Today, with the feverish nuclear-arms race being waged by the great Powers, they should not lose sight of the fact that it is international peace and security that are seriously threatened. If perchance a clash were to occur between the nuclear Powers, it would spell the complete disintegration of our planet, including its human inhabitants, its flora and fauna.

Despite the very advanced technology and the continuous refinement of targeting and guidance systems in the nuclear-weapons area, the possibility of there being a limited nuclear war is virtually nil.

That is why since its establishment the United Nations has adopted numerous resolutions calling upon the Powers that have mastered nuclear weaponry to reach an understanding in order to remove this threat. That is why in 1982 and 1983 122 relevant resolutions were adopted with that aim in mind. Other resolutions will no doubt emerge from the present session. Despite all the efforts exerted by the United Nations we have to admit that the arms race continues. Today it has reached inconceivable proportions. It is estimated that there exist 50,000 warheads, with a total explosive power of more than a million times that of the Hiroshima bomb, or 13 billion tons of TNT. At present there is not the slightest sign that the arms race is going to slow down. Negotiations between the two super-Powers have been broken off, while the World Disarmament Conference is meeting with obstacles in pursuing its tasks.

Against this background my delegation shares the views of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference contained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of document A/39/28. We would therefore subscribe to the proposal for a renewal of the mandate of the Committee, which, inter alia, should remain in close contact with the representatives of nuclear-weapon States in order as soon as possible to encourage a resumption of negotiations. The most appropriate approach to arriving at complete disarmament would be the achievement of a freeze on armaments, including their proliferation, followed by a gradual reduction of weapons and, finally, their complete destruction. At the same time a collective security system should be organized, bearing in mind the legitimate interests of all.

Turning now to agenda item 57, my delegation notes with concern that at a time when the entire international community is calling upon the great Powers to halt the arms race, South Africa has decided to acquire nuclear weapons. We believe that that decision runs counter to the will of all of Africa, which wishes to remain a nuclear-free continent.
On 20 December 1983 the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 38/181 B, condemning the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, including its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail. It reaffirms that the racist régime's acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Quite recently, the Ministers and Heads of Delegation of the non-aligned countries, meeting in New York from 1 to 5 October 1984, declared in their Final Communiqué that they were gravely concerned

"at the ever growing threat to peace and security posed by South Africa's rapidly increasing military arsenal and, in particular, its acquisition of nuclear weapons ...". (A/39/560, para. 27)

Racism and apartheid are being condemned throughout the world, but South Africa, in flagrant violation of and contempt for the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and other organizations, has made apartheid its legal régime.

Colonization is condemned everywhere, but South Africa continues its illegal occupation of Namibia.

The acquisition of such a weapon by South Africa thus constitutes a real danger, especially since the Pretoria authorities disregard the unanimous condemnations by the international community. In this respect, Pretoria's reply to the position of the Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community following on the constitutional reform and the election of Coloured and Indian Members of Parliament in South Africa leaves us in no doubt about South Africa's intention to pursue its apartheid policy even at the risk of resorting to the threat or use of nuclear weapons. This intention emerges clearly from document A/39/514, which contains a declaration by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa:

"The South African Government takes exception to the tone and content of the declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Economic Community of 11 September 1984. Events in South Africa, including the election of Coloured and Indian representatives that were recently held in South Africa, are manifestly an internal affair and therefore in no way the
concern of the Ten or any other outside authority. The declaration by the Ministers of the European Economic Community constitutes unreasonable and unacceptable interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic of South Africa. (A/39/514, para. 1)

Turning now to agenda item 60, I should like to refer to the World Disarmament Campaign. My delegation deeply appreciates the efforts exerted by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs under the guidance of Mr. Jan Martenson regarding the World Disarmament Campaign.

For non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly the developing countries, the World Disarmament Campaign constitutes an indispensable instrument for informing, interesting and convincing the populations of our various regions regarding the importance of the question and the need effectively to mobilize them to strive for disarmament.

My delegation is convinced that the World Disarmament Campaign will bring about a keener awareness among political leaders and Governments of the dangers of nuclear war. That is why my Government fully supports the objectives of the campaign at a time when negotiations between the great nuclear Powers have reached an impasse. We sincerely hope that the programmes contained in that Campaign will cover as many areas as possible so as to take into account the principle of universality. On an initiative of the President of Togo, General Gnassingbé Eyadema, a national seminar on peace and disarmament was held from 6 to 9 August 1984 in Lomé.

That seminar was attended by national and political administrative leaders. It was the first of its kind to be organized by a country that produces no nuclear weapons or warheads. This is indicative of the importance that my country, although underdeveloped, attaches to disarmament issues. Allow me in passing once again to express my delegation's appreciation to the Secretary-General, who was kind enough to make available for that seminar experts in the field whose assistance was invaluable.

The message the seminar addressed to the entire world, contained in document A/39/529, is an urgent appeal to all peoples to pool their efforts to achieve complete disarmament, because, despite the soothing statements of those who believe in the balance of terror, our anxiety remains since mankind is not immune to human or technical error. The danger of unintentional nuclear war is real.
Let us recall, finally, that the seminar adopted some recommendations, among them the following: the establishment in Lomé of a regional institute for peace and development research and the holding in Togo in 1985 - the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations - of a regional seminar on peace and disarmament bringing together States members of the West African Economic Community and of the Central African Economic Community, with the assistance of the United Nations.

When we discuss the question of the arms race we cannot underestimate its impact on the problems of economic, social and cultural development in the world. The developing countries have a contest to win against hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy and poverty. They are therefore right in feeling that they may lose that contest if more than 1,000,2000,000 remain ill-nourished and with an income of less than $150 per annum on which to live, while 0.5 per cent of the 1980 military expenditure, for example, would have been enough to cover all expenses for the agricultural machinery necessary to increase world food production and make up the food deficit of the low-income countries by 1990. Similarly, a modest additional contribution of $200 million - the price of two advanced bombers - would make it possible to eliminate illiteracy from the map in less than 10 years within the framework of international action for education.

An additional contribution of $500 million - that is, the price of a single aircraft carrier - would be more than enough to eliminate endemic diseases from the world.

It is in view of those considerations that my delegation supports every initiative to establish an international disarmament fund for development and welcomes the French proposal that a preparatory conference on the establishment of such a fund be held as soon as possible.

By considering the defence of the interests of all, by cultivating mutual confidence and by pooling all our resources, we will muster the necessary political will to consolidate international peace and security - because there will be no more San Francisco conferences after the next apocalypse.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of the United States of America.
Mr. MORAN (United States of America): My delegation has asked to be allowed to speak at this time simply to reserve its right to reply at a later time to the outrageous assertions contained in the statement of the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic earlier this morning.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.
VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 28th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

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Mr. Pham Ngoc (Viet Nam)
Mr. de la Gorce (France)
Mr. Shugum (Jordan)
Mr. Charles (Haiti)

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN
The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 65 AND 142 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. KORNEENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The First Committee is concluding its consideration of the vital questions of arms limitation and disarmament and it is quite legitimate that at the centre of our attention are the problems of preventing a nuclear holocaust, which is essential to all mankind. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR has already had an opportunity to set forth its views on some of these issues.

Today we should like to emphasize once again that the prevention of a nuclear conflict and guaranteeing peace are possible only by the cessation of the arms race, primarily the nuclear-arms race, and a reduction of the level of military confrontation. The way to this would be paved by action taken on the specific proposals put forward a few days ago by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. Chernenko, in replies to questions put by The Washington Post.
The Soviet Union proposes, first, that negotiations be undertaken in order to elaborate and conclude an agreement on the prevention of the militarization of outer space, including completely refraining from any anti-satellite systems and, as soon as negotiations start, a mutual moratorium would be placed upon the testing and deployment of arms in outer space. It has further been proposed that the nuclear Powers should freeze all existing nuclear weapons, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This would halt the nuclear-arms race. At the same time, it has been proposed that this freeze should be started first by the Soviet Union and by the United States.

Thirdly, there is a real possibility for work to be completed on an agreement on a complete ban on nuclear-weapons tests, which would put an end to the further refinement of those weapons. That proposal, which is applicable to all nuclear Powers, is addressed first and foremost to the United States.

Fourthly, it is essential that the nuclear Powers follow the example of the Soviet Union and undertake the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

All these proposals are the kernel of a broader set of Soviet proposals which have been entitled "Norms of conduct for nuclear Powers". As has been frequently emphasized, the adoption of these proposals, or at least some of them, would help to promote a considerable improvement in the international atmosphere, help to reduce tension and pave the way to putting an end to the arms race. The situation in the world is such that what we need now is not words but rather concrete and specific acts in order to eliminate the deadly danger which hangs over mankind. These actions would derive precisely from the adoption and implementation of the Soviet initiatives.

In its statement today, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would like to dwell on some other issues which have been discussed during the debate in the First Committee. The creation in various parts of the world of zones which would be free from nuclear weapons is becoming more and more topical. The creation of such zones is an important element in the struggle to strengthen security. Efforts in this area have already yielded certain results, but those efforts should be redoubled along all possible avenues, thus freeing the face of the earth from the nuclear pox. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR is in favour of the proposal to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in the northern part of Europe, in the Balkans, in other
parts of the European continent, in the Middle East and in Africa. In our opinion, it is extremely important also to follow up the initiative to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone along the battlefield which is the contact line of States belonging to the Warsaw Treaty and those belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

We consider that nuclear-weapon-free zones are one of the ways of bringing about a nuclear-weapon-free world. If they are set up, this would also have a very positive impact on strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime, help to strengthen guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and help to limit and to reverse the nuclear-arms race.

In this connection, I should like to emphasize that the Soviet Union has frequently declared that it will not use nuclear weapons against those States which have refrained from manufacturing or acquiring them and which have not allowed them to be located on their territory. An effective way of strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear States would be the conclusion of a relevant international convention and also bilateral agreements on this score between the nuclear Powers and those States which have no nuclear weapons on their territory.

In singling out the matter of prevention of nuclear war and the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, we are by no means detracting from the significance of other problems in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. A serious danger for mankind, for example, is to be seen in those arms which are normally called conventional, although, in their purpose and their characteristics, some of them have long ago ceased to be so. In this connection, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community attach particular importance to the question of reducing conventional weapons and the number of armed forces. They have always advocated achieving mutually acceptable international agreements in this field, at both the global and the regional levels.

In this connection, I should like to emphasize the importance of the regional approach to questions of the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, particularly on the European continent. That is the purpose of the constructive proposals made by the socialist countries, which have, since June of last year, been on the table of the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The draft agreement on this submitted by the socialist countries constitutes the simplest and most appropriate
way of reaching an understanding, independent of the actual discrepancies in calculating the number of troops on both sides. The essence of this draft and a specific outline of practical actions in order to move these talks forward to genuine results are well known, and our delegation will not dwell on them. At the same time, we note with some regret that, whereas the socialist countries have indicated very clearly their aspiration to pave the way to an agreement, the NATO bloc, as previously, has avoided any constructive approach to the problem and has placed the Vienna talks in a deadlock. Instead of simplifying the procedure for this process, they have put forward new demands which have even further complicated the matter and have made it more difficult to achieve agreement. Instead of observing the principle of the equality of the parties and respect for their mutual interests, there have been attempts to win one-sided concessions from the socialist countries. Instead of a readiness not to take any steps which would raise the level of military confrontation in this part of the world, they have further escalated their armed forces and armaments. It is in this light that our delegation views the recent programme adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany to develop and strengthen its armed forces in the country from 1985 to the year 2000. Approximately DM 1 trillion have been used by the Bundeswehr to supply the army with the so-called new generation of weapons including Leopard III tanks, Mars-type artillery and Jaeger 90 military aeroplanes, Roland and Patriot rockets and many others.
An important stimulus to this militaristic programme was the abrogation by the Western European alliance of the last limitations on the production of military technology, including offensive weapons, which were imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War. There can be no doubt that this step on the part of the Western European alliance could be utilized in order to escalate the military potential of the Federal Republic of Germany and the further concentration of offensive weapons on the territory of that country.

Such actions, quite naturally, are hampering the achievement of any progress in resolving issues related to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. In the context of the reduction of conventional weapons, it would also be extremely important to continue the process of prohibiting, or at least limiting, the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Efforts along these lines should, we believe, be encouraged by the present session of the General Assembly.

An important contribution to reducing the military danger could be to curb the arms race in the seas and oceans of the world. This is a matter which is becoming particularly urgent in the light of the increase at the present time in military activity on the world's seas and oceans and the return to the gunboat policy, by which acts of aggression and provocation have been carried out against a number of coastal States, and a dangerous concentration of naval armadas off the shores of countries of the Near East, Central America and many others.

As is known, the Soviet Union has, either individually or together with other socialist countries, frequently proposed that agreement be reached on a number of specific measures relating to the mutual reduction of the activities of naval military fleets and to the limitation and reduction of naval armaments, and also corresponding confidence-building measures, both in general and specifically in the regions of the Indian, Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and also the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf.

However, because of the position of the United States, which has declared virtually all the seas as a zone of vital interest to it and which has set up naval military bases throughout the world, the resolution of questions of the limitation of the naval arms race has as yet not moved from square one. The General Assembly of the United Nations, in resolution 38/188 F, appealed that multilateral
negotiations be initiated on this issue. Unlike the United States, which remained deaf to this appeal, the Soviet Union proposed a number of specific measures which could be the subject of talks on the limitation of naval activities and the limitation and reduction of naval armaments and on spreading confidence-building measures to the world's seas and oceans, particularly those areas where there is the heaviest sea traffic and where conflicts are more likely. These proposals are stated in some detail in the letter of Mr. Gromyko to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 6 April 1984.

During the discussion in the First Committee at the present session of the United Nations General Assembly, important ideas were put forward on this matter by the representative of Bulgaria, which, as the Committee knows, was one of the initiators of General Assembly resolution 38/188 F.

Proceeding to practical action on the questions connected with limiting the naval activities would also help to promote a solution to the long-overdue problem of the convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean in order that this area be turned into a region of peace.

We fully condemn the actions of those States which for many years now have been preventing the implementation of this task, and we favour the holding of the Conference on the Indian Ocean according to the timetable laid down by the General Assembly.

There is hardly any need to prove that the arms race is fed by growing military expenditure, which is becoming for peoples, whatever be their level of economic development, a heavier and heavier burden which is holding up their economic and social progress. For that reason, a reduction of military budgets would be an effective contribution to the cessation of the arms race and promote disarmament efforts. At the same time, the funds which are thus liberated could be used to serve the needs of social and economic development, particularly that of the developing countries.

The desire to achieve these goals underlies the proposal made by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), that negotiations be started on the question of the mutual non-increase in military expenditures and their subsequent reduction, which was put forward on 5 March 1984. This new initiative of the socialist countries provides,
inter alia, that there be a small symbolic simultaneous reduction of the military budgets of Warsaw Treaty and NATO States with a subsequent freeze on them for three years; a simultaneous reduction, as a first step, of the military budgets of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO States which possess nuclear weapons, to a sum to be agreed on in advance; a reduction of the military budgets of the States concerned in connection with specific disarmament measures; and, finally, an agreed establishment of maximum ceilings on military budgets which would be lower than the existing levels.

Naturally, agreements to reduce military budgets should be implemented in such a way as to ensure that all parties are quite certain they are being carried out. Of course, in putting forward this far-reaching initiative, the socialist countries have expressed their readiness also to study proposals on other measures regarding the non-increase and reduction of military expenditures. Since the solution of this problem concerns not only the members of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, other States could also be involved in the implementation of specific measures.

However, as is the case in other areas, the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries have met with fierce resistance on the part of a certain number of Western States. Instead of considering real ways and means of reducing military expenditures, they have insisted on the discussion of various models of accountancy and comparability, which are simply aimed at diverting our attention from the solution of the problem and the escalation of military budgets, particularly of the United States and other NATO countries.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would like to express the hope that this year the First Committee will adopt decisions which will make a genuine contribution to solving problems relating to the reduction of military budgets.

At the disarmament talks in Geneva and at the present session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, a great deal has been said about verification problems. Very frequently, however, this is simply discussed abstractly, and these matters are even brought up before the beginning of specific negotiations.

Really, this is simply a cover for an unwillingness to conduct serious negotiations. In this connection, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR holds the view that the question of verification should be taken up subject by subject. The form and the conditions for such verification should be determined depending on the specific subject-matter and the purposes of each specific agreement.
Without in any way detracting from the importance of verification, on which
the implementation of any agreement in the disarmament field must depend, and with
which we are no less concerned, and perhaps even more than some others, it should
be pointed out that the main points at issue are the actual practical measures
themselves, because if they do not exist, then what verification can we even think
of? What can be verified and why should it be verified?

The question of verification in general, taken in abstraction from any
specific situation or any specific object of verification and particular agreement,
has absolutely no meaning. It is quite natural that various agreements will take
various forms and have different methods of verification using certain specific
technical and other means. If, however, one of the parties to the talks is
virtually refusing to work on an agreement on disarmament measures as such, and at
the same time is insisting on work being done on verification measures, this can
only be regarded as an attempt to block the talks in general and an unwillingness
to conclude agreements.

This is precisely the course which has been followed by the representatives of
the United States on the question of the nuclear-weapon-test ban. It has continued
to block negotiations on some key issues in an agreement which would ban such tests.

Let us take the situation when an unwillingness even to start talks is masked
by assertions about the impossibility of monitoring the agreement, as has occurred
in the case of the proposal on the freeze on nuclear weapons. The fact that this
is simply a ploy to get out of serious talks has been indicated by many authorities
in this area, including authorities in the United States itself.
(Mr. Korneenko, Ukrainian SSR)

We can refer, in particular, to an article by the former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Research (Science and Technology), Herbert Scoville, Jr., that appeared in *The New York Times* on 25 October of this year, entitled "A Freeze Is Verifiable". In that article, the author quite clearly refuted the assertions of those opposed to a freeze and referred to statements on the impossibility of verifying such a freeze as mere "allegations".

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR believes that an immediate solution to the questions to which I have referred today on a basis acceptable to all States is called for by the realities of the present-day world. In this connection, the General Assembly is duty-bound to take steps to halt the arms race and to avert the nuclear threat. This - the adoption of specific practical measures - should be the goal of the recommendations that will shortly be submitted to this Committee for its approval. The only thing required is political will and abstention from attempts to gain unilateral advantages. Indeed, we do not need words; we need specific acts.

Like the other socialist countries, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is prepared to work according to those principles.

**Mr. Pham Ngoc (Viet Nam):** Last week, together with peoples of other lands, the Vietnamese people completed observance of Disarmament Week. Meetings, seminars and lectures were organized throughout the country, and people from all walks of life participated in them.

The ardent desire of my people for peace and disarmament is unquestionable. They have suffered from the longest and most brutal war in history provoked by successive nuclear-weapon Powers. They are still living under the constant threat of another nuclear Power, but are more determined than ever to struggle for peace and wholeheartedly dedicated to disarmament, since they know that the outbreak of nuclear war would mean an end to civilization, to all human values and, indeed, an end to life on earth.

Due to my people's special concern about disarmament, my delegation feels duty-bound to address itself to all items under discussion in this Committee. However, speaking here for the second time, and after listening to the statements made by other delegations during the past three weeks, I wish at this time to share our views on disarmament negotiations specifically.
As we meet in this Committee to take stock of disarmament efforts, to discuss and to take decisions on what we should recommend to Member States and relevant bodies with regard to disarmament questions, we have the opportunity to look back with full consciousness of how far we have travelled and how much we have achieved.

My delegation shares the concern of many others that we are now facing a most alarming situation. While the arms race - and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race - is galloping at a fearful speed, the danger of nuclear war is ever-more threatening. The disarmament negotiations, however, to our regret, are at a standstill. Fingers are no doubt being pointed at the United States for this state of things. The documents before us, and especially the report of the Conference on Disarmament, speak for themselves. The statements made in this Committee have also brought us to that unmistakeable conclusion. My delegation feels that it is necessary to go to some length to see what is really obstructing all disarmament efforts.

It was clear that, over the years of détente, many disarmament treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, were concluded, and their validity with regard to the disarmament efforts of the international community is beyond any doubt. The number of countries parties to those treaties has never ceased to increase. Those treaties remain as convincing milestones and as a good foundation for further endeavours.

However, since 1978, when the United States decided to launch a new round in the arms race, no new treaty has yet been seriously negotiated. The hard-won Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II treaty was signed in 1979, but soon became abortive. All disarmament forums have been suspended.

During this period we have witnessed the tremendous efforts of the socialist and non-aligned countries aimed at making disarmament negotiations move forward. Successive initiatives have been taken; repeated proposals have been put forth.

In 1978, on the initiative of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - the first special session devoted to disarmament - was held. The Final Document was adopted. It laid down principles, a Programme of Action and machinery to promote negotiations on disarmament. Our Committee was assigned to deal in future
"only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions". (resolution S-10/2, para. 117)

Another great effort was made by Member States at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982, but it was stonewalled by the United States. The long-awaited comprehensive programme on disarmament could not, therefore, be completed.

Most typical would be the case of the Committee - now the Conference - on Disarmament. In 1978 it was assigned the function of being a "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" (resolution S-10/2, para. 120). The Conference was deemed the most important body, enjoying the participation, for the first time, of all five nuclear-weapon countries, the Permanent Members of the Security Council. The composition of the Conference's membership was intentionally designed to make it most effective in negotiations. Member countries have delegated their best-qualified experts in disarmament fields. The Conference has an agenda with high priorities given to nuclear disarmament; its importance is intensified every year by successive General Assembly resolutions. The Conference has six months' work a year. It has established various ad hoc committees and has become the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations on disarmament.

But how has this machinery worked this year and, in fact, in the past six years? The reports it has produced every year and submitted to the General Assembly have registered no substantive progress.

The United States and a few other members of the Conference have rejected out of hand proposals jointly submitted by the Group of 21 and the socialist group. The principle of consensus, which was designed to help the Conference reach full agreement and ensure implementation, turned out to be a veto power exercised by a few who did not want to negotiate at all.

Since those countries lacked the political will, they systematically refused to negotiate, resorting to one pretext after another. They refused to negotiate or even to discuss, on the grounds that the proposals were either, they claimed, unrealistic, premature or polemical. They are opposed even to proposals on procedural matters. Their intransigent position has become more and more inadmissible to all delegations that have good faith in negotiations.
The poor performance of the Conference on Disarmament was dramatized even further by the fact that it failed to reach consensus on the enlargement of its membership. One country chose to obstruct the formula endorsed by all three groups. It is only natural that the obstacle to this enlargement of the membership should be removed.

The same situation was repeated in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York, a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. During its session, from 7 May to 1 June 1984, the Commission could not make any tangible progress on any of the five substantive items on its agenda. The United States and some other Western countries expressed reservations on even the minimal results of the deliberations on item 4 of the Commission's agenda, concerning the various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. The United States has also prevented the Commission from making recommendations to the General Assembly on appropriate measures to counter South Africa's attempt to develop nuclear weapons, which would no doubt threaten the security of African countries and undermine the non-proliferation régime.

After long years of negotiations, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean was able to make some preliminary progress this year in its discussion of the agenda and procedures for the Conference on the Indian Ocean. However, it is clear that the United States and some others are still sticking to their familiar pretexts to oppose the convening of the Conference in Colombo in 1985. The position taken by the United States regarding the attempt of the non-aligned countries to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is a secret to no one. The United States has opposed and delayed the convening of that Conference year after year, while feverishly stepping up its military build-up in the region, particularly in Diego Garcia.

The escalation of the arms race and the stalemate at the disarmament negotiations have a direct bearing on the third-world countries. United States gunboat diplomacy and military superiority have been used to the utmost. The United States has drowned the Grenada revolution in blood and fire. It continues its threats against the independence and sovereignty of Nicaragua. Its military forces have devastated the land and cities of Lebanon. The United States rapid deployment forces were clearly set up for the purpose of intimidating and intervening in third-world countries. They serve as a constant deterrent to those
countries which try to get out of the grip of the United States and to develop an independent policy.

In addition to its direct military intervention, the United States has never ceased to deliver great amounts of sophisticated weapons to reactionary forces in different parts of the world. By so doing, it has started an arms race in those regions and has caused instability and incited subversive activities in Central America, the Middle East, southern Africa and South-East Asia. Under these circumstances, the third-world countries are compelled to spend more for their national defence, causing greater difficulties for their economic development.

It is indeed a crime that the United States has the luxury of spending a trillion dollars for a new system of outer space weapons while the world's peoples cannot have 1 per cent of that amount for food programmes.

I conclude my statement by saying that we have all heard repeated pronouncements in favour of peace and disarmament, to the effect that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and that there is no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control. We have heard enough professions of good faith in disarmament negotiations, and we have also heard enough promises about making progress. What we really need now is the political will of the United States. I believe that only with that political will can we put the whole disarmament machinery back to work again.

Mr. de la Gorce (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation is pleased, Sir, to see in the Chair the representative of a great country with which France maintains the friendliest of relations, and a man who for several years now has been playing a very important role in the international community's work on disarmament, both here in the First Committee and in the Conference on Disarmament. This year, in fact, you served as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission with great distinction. Your authority, wisdom and experience are a guarantee that our work will be carried out in the best possible conditions. We express to you our warmest congratulations and our best wishes for success in the important task that lies before you.

On 19 October, the representative of Ireland made a statement on behalf of the members of the European Communities; that statement therefore expresses the views of the French delegation. I should like today to present our position in a more comprehensive way as regards certain aspects of the problems before this Committee.
Our task here is to speak about disarmament, to discuss the problems of disarmament, the difficulties it faces, possible progress and prospects. But we note that the problem which actually dominates our debate is that of peace: essentially, peace between the two biggest Powers and the alliances to which they belong. A war in such circumstances could, through escalation, lead to the use of nuclear weapons. That is why the prevention of nuclear war remains the key theme of the disarmament debate.

But is there a risk of war today, of war involving the nuclear Powers? Many of us would reply in the affirmative, condemning as the cause of a possible or probable conflict the deterioration in the international situation and the arms race.

The international situation continues to be marked by tension and polemics. East-West relations, to say the least, leave something to be desired. Acts of force continue: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the war between Iran and Iraq, and the use of violence in South-East Asia, Africa and Central America; the problems of the Middle East remain unresolved. These facts are cause for grave concern.

However, we see no imminent danger or acute crisis which in the short term could lead to the major conflict that all of us fear. The countries of the Atlantic alliance affirmed last year that none of their weapons would ever be used except in response to an attack; the countries members of the Warsaw Pact have affirmed their desire for peace, and we take note of their declarations.
On no side can we perceive any wish to break off contacts and all affirm their desire for dialogue, especially on disarmament. Finally, we do not see anywhere the nuclear panic that certain movements are still striving to create in the Western countries. But it goes without saying that the risk of conflict will be removed only if all States comply fully with the principles of the Charter and primarily the non-use of force or the threat of force.

It is the arms race which to many of us appears to be the possible cause of a major conflict. It is even said that it would inevitably lead to such a conflict. In our view it is not the mere existence of weapons that leads to conflicts. Conflicts are of political origin. In fact, the disarmament objective consists of gradually reducing weapons levels while maintaining the equilibrium necessary for security while the arms race, which is borne of mistrust, is aimed at maintaining those balances at an ever higher level. It becomes dangerous if it leads to destabilization which can give rise to the temptation to make use of force. Avoiding destabilization and maintaining or restoring stable equilibria is the problem at the heart of our work. Its solution is a condition for any progress towards disarmament. It is a problem which arises simultaneously in the nuclear sphere, in outer space, which is of primary importance today, and in the sphere of conventional weapons. The prevention of destabilization and the maintenance of stable equilibria are tasks that should be approached in a comprehensive way, bearing in mind the correlation between these various aspects of the security problem and the facts relevant to each of those aspects.

The French delegation has stressed here repeatedly the need for stable deterrence for the security of the region in which my country is located. It is to complement this deterrent effect and remedy a cause of destabilization that our allies in 1979 decided on the installation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to counterbalance the deployment by the Soviet Union of a new and powerful force without any equivalent in the West comprising primarily what are termed SS 20 missiles. It is to maintain the stabilizing effect of deterrence that France and its allies cannot accept a commitment on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. Such a commitment would have as its effect a strategic and political destabilization with incalculable consequences not only for the region in question but for the world as a whole.
Anti-missile weapons involve serious risks of destabilization. This is why their deployment was limited by the American-Soviet treaty of 1972. We attach great importance to the maintenance of its provisions and more generally to the preservation in this area of the conditions necessary for the maintenance of stable deterrence.

The arms race in outer space involves serious dangers of destabilization. The French Government has often expressed its concern in this respect, notably in the statement made by the French delegation to the Conference on Disarmament on 12 June. In putting forward its proposals the French Government was inspired by the twofold concern of preserving both the conditions for security and the broad perspectives of progress that the use of space for civilian purposes can open up for the international community. It is no longer possible today - nor would it be desirable - completely to eliminate the military use of outer space. Observation and communication satellites make a necessary contribution to strategic stability and they deserve to be protected.

The commitments to be assumed, primarily by the two major space Powers, should be aimed at avoiding the deployment in outer space of weapon systems which would have destabilizing effects, thus ensuring the indispensable maintenance of nuclear deterrence. Similarly, anti-satellite systems - and the Soviet Union possesses one - should be the subject of strict provisions ensuring in particular the complete prohibition of any systems that could reach high-orbit satellites whose preservation is of the utmost importance for the maintenance of strategic stability. It goes without saying that verification measures with regard to outer space are of crucial importance.

As to conventional weapons, the restoration of a balance in Europe would contribute to strengthening a stability which at present rests essentially upon the nuclear factor.

Avoiding destabilization and maintaining a stable equilibrium is a necessary objective, in particular in the East-West framework, because of nuclear and space factors, but it should be sought in all areas where the problem of security arises. Hence the importance attaching to the search for appropriate agreements between the States concerned in other regions of the world.
The French Government attaches the greatest importance to the opening or resumption of negotiations on the questions upon which I have touched and on others.

The French Government deeply regretted the breaking off of the nuclear negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union. We hope that they will be resumed at the earliest possible time and without pre-conditions. It is up to the Powers which possess approximately 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons to negotiate substantial and verifiable reductions between them. My Government has repeatedly explained the conditions under which France in turn could undertake its own commitments in this respect. For the present, the contacts resumed between the two major Powers and the statements on both sides expressing the desire to negotiate inspire some hope.

As to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we had hoped that the meeting scheduled for September in Vienna would be the beginning of a negotiating process. The statements made in recent weeks by both the Soviet and American sides suggest a common intention to open up such talks.

The work of the Conference on Disarmament requires particular attention on our part because of its link with the United Nations and its specific purpose, which is to negotiate universal agreements. I shall confine myself here to touching upon three questions on its agenda: chemical weapons, the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The question of chemical weapons is the only one which has been the subject of actual negotiations. It is of major importance to the international community. Chemical weapons exist. They can be produced by many countries and, what is more serious, they are used. The experience of this year emphasizes further the urgency of a treaty which provides for the complete elimination of chemical weapons. For the first time the negotiations begun in Geneva made significant progress. Important contributions were made, in particular the draft treaty put forward by the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush. The acceptance by the Soviet delegation of the principle of continuous on-site inspection of destruction of stocks has opened up the way to an understanding on a crucial point.
(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

The drafting of certain articles was begun; in-depth consultations usefully laid the groundwork for further progress. However, the difficulties remain considerable, in particular with regard to some aspects of verification: challenge inspections and control of non-production. The fact remains that this year negotiations did get off the ground and the conditions seemed to have been created to move on to a new phase.

If chemical weapons constituted practically the only subject of negotiations, political concerns focused very largely on other agenda items. Such was the case for the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, which is now a separate agenda item. Substantive differences of view in the Conference on this question did not make it possible to adopt a mandate for a possible subsidiary body. But, because of those very differences of view, the French delegation felt it was necessary that the fundamental questions covered by the item should be the subject of a comprehensive discussion, methodically conducted, which would promote mutual understanding of positions and could lead to certain conclusions.

For us, we shall address ourselves mainly to all questions pertaining to the prevention of war in general and conditions for security in the nuclear age. These are questions of great interest to all States, and the Conference on Disarmament provides an appropriate setting for their discussion. We hope that next year the Conference will reach agreement on the conditions under which such a discussion can proceed.

The agenda item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space was also the subject of proposals for consideration of the item in an ad hoc committee, but no agreement could be reached on the terms of its mandate. The French delegation regrets that very keenly. We expressed a very open attitude on that question. In our view, even with relatively restrictive language limited to the exploration and identification of the questions covered by the item, the ad hoc committee could have undertaken a useful task. Moreover, if bilateral negotiations between the two great Powers are indispensable, an important role falls to the Conference for discussion of a problem which henceforth is one of major interest to the international community. We hope that next year the Conference will be able to adopt appropriate methods.

Finally, I should like to touch upon a question which is of great interest to the French Government, that is, the admission of new members to the Conference on Disarmament. According to the Final Document of the first special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at regular intervals the Conference should undertake a reconsideration of its composition. The time for such a re-examination has arrived, and we welcomed the decision taken last year to admit four new member States. We regret that no agreement could be reached this year on the designation of those new members. We sincerely hope that the scheduled consultations will make it possible to proceed to this wider membership next year, in keeping with equity and the Conference's interests. The Conference would thus benefit from the contributions of States which have shown an active interest in disarmament work.

The French Government has constantly expressed its interest in conventional disarmament, which, in our view, is a matter that normally falls to regional initiatives. In this regard we attach special importance to the Stockholm Conference, held at the beginning of this year. Undoubtedly that Conference will only at a later stage take up the second phase of its work on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. In conformity with its mandate defined by the Madrid Conference, at present it is charged with negotiating confidence- and security-building measures that are verifiable, militarily significant, politically binding and would cover Europe as a whole. Specific and concrete proposals made by France and its Western partners respond to that definition and would fully serve the objective that is sought. Other proposals - some of a declaratory character and not covered by the Madrid mandate - were also put forward. Despite everything, we hope that progress will be possible along the lines previously agreed upon and that the Stockholm Conference will achieve substantial results at the session to be held in Vienna in 1986.

The outline of present or expected negotiations that I have just given does not inspire any great satisfaction, but it should not lead us to discouragement, especially if we bear in mind the dimension of the difficulties. The line of contacts has not been broken off and everyone recognizes the need for action.

The United Nations should find an area for action in the field of disarmament and it is desirable it should expand. The French authorities are very much interested in this subject; they have expressed certain initiatives on which I should like to touch briefly.

Two are designed to entrust to the United Nations responsibilities in the area of verification. The first, submitted in 1978, deals with a draft for a satellite control agency. That draft was the subject of three resolutions adopted by significant majorities; the latest adopted in 1982 was designed to call for the
preparation of a study on the institutional aspects of the project. Last year the Secretariat submitted a report introducing the study. It did not seem to us necessary to submit a new draft resolution on this subject this year, but the satellite agency project remains a timely one and we are convinced that the international community will lend its support. The years to come will no doubt provide elements justifying a further consideration which, we hope, will lead to the beginnings of a realization of this project.

The second of those initiatives had to do with a provisional procedure for the consideration of possible violations of the Geneva Protocol or customary rules of law prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Resolution 37/98 D, adopted for that purpose two years ago, provided for the preparation, by expert advisers under the authority of the Secretary-General, of a report on inquiry procedures and the gathering of documentation. That report was completed this year and distributed to Member States. Its submission complements the provisions for implementation of the procedure established in resolution 37/98 D. The events of last spring, the investigation carried out by the Secretary-General confirmed the usefulness of such a procedure. I stress that that procedure is not binding and adds nothing to the commitments undertaken by States parties to the Geneva Protocol; but it expresses the international community’s vigilance to ensure that the Protocol is respected. We sincerely hope that appropriate provisions negotiated in Geneva will in the near future give binding force to effective verification measures having to do with the use of chemical weapons.

Another initiative relates to the institutional field. The project for a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research was approved by the General Assembly in 1979. The Institute, which has operated for four years, is very active, and I wish to pay a tribute to its Director, Mr. Liviu Bota. However, its definitive statutes have not yet been adopted. A draft resolution for that purpose will be submitted to the current session.
Its adoption will enshrine the Institute in its place within the United Nations system. It should give further impetus to its work and encourage Member States to provide financial assistance to it.

The relationship between disarmament and development was the subject of a proposal submitted last year to the General Assembly by the President of France. Following upon this initiative, the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 38/71. In accordance with that resolution, Member States were invited to communicate their views and proposals concerning the relationship between disarmament and development, and it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the replies and make recommendations to the present session of the General Assembly. The Commission was unable to adopt conclusions dealing with substantive aspects, but it recommended that efforts should be continued to enable the General Assembly to arrive at a broad agreement on this subject, bearing in mind the views submitted in the report.

The French delegation sincerely hopes that this broad agreement will be embodied in a resolution and that that resolution will represent a step forward in work on the disarmament-development link. This great idea expressed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is indeed accepted by everyone and expresses a principle of solidarity which is much needed today.

Mr. SHUGUM (Jordan) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, I am pleased, since I am speaking here for the first time, to convey to you in the name of my country warmest congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee. I wish you, as well as the rest of the officers of the Committee, success in your efforts to make our debates fruitful.

Since Governments realized the dangers posed to the world, and after undergoing two world wars, the international community has sought to achieve full and complete disarmament, motivated by its knowledge of the extent of the dangers of those weapons, especially the nuclear ones, that are being produced and developed in the world. Despite the suffering and destruction that mankind has undergone, it has not yet been possible to achieve disarmament, despite the evident destructive capability of modern nuclear weapons, which may lead to the annihilation of mankind and the undermining of human civilization.
There is no doubt that the two super-Powers bear the greatest responsibility for this serious development, because of the inordinate degree of armaments between them and their insistence on measuring security in terms of the possession of the most sophisticated weapons. In addition, political will is lacking, that political will that grasps the grave dimensions of this development, as well as the necessity of working to achieve genuine disarmament so as to avert a cataclysmic world conflict.

The claim that a limited nuclear confrontation is possible denies the most rudimentary facts, because any use of nuclear weapons would be met by a counter-attack and consequently result in total nuclear war. The use of nuclear weapons will not only affect the nuclear-weapon States but will also extend to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Hence our support for the call for the inadmissibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

It rests with the two super-Powers, entrusted by the Charter with the greatest responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, to co-operate and to implement the provisions of that Charter. Perhaps what has obstructed implementation of this matter is the proliferation of the policy of rivalry and confrontation between States and recourse to military force in their relations. The lack of balance and uneven capability have also led to the heightening of the arms race and the quest to possess more weapons, and especially nuclear weapons, further perfecting them and rendering them more destructive.

This Organization is the organ that should be used to resolve disputes and conflicts by peaceful means, to avert further exacerbating the situation of rivalry in the world.

Despite the dangers hanging over the world, the situation is still deteriorating. The persistence and proliferation of international hotbeds of tension and the increase in the possibility of confrontation between the super-Powers are a cause for sorrow in the world. This will lead other countries to threaten to use force and to seek to possess and develop weapons of mass destruction. Certain countries, willingly or unwillingly, will allocate a greater proportion of their resources to this end, instead of meeting the requirements for their economic and social development.
Year after year, military expenditures and social and economic allocations are increasingly becoming diametrically opposed. Reports indicate the spiralling of world expenditures on arms. It would be more useful to allocate these sums for the advancement of the economic and social condition of our world today; the result of this would be much more beneficial.

Hence my country welcomes the French proposal that an international conference be held to consider the link between disarmament and development. The two super-Powers have failed to set an example either in the field of genuine disarmament or in implementing the provisions of the Charter. They have closed their eyes to the conduct of some of their satellites which are committing acts that breach international peace and security. This has led to a situation where certain countries have found themselves compelled to allocate a certain large proportion of their limited resources to meet the requirements of legitimate self-defence, at the expense of economic and developmental priorities. My country, Jordan, is a case in point, devoting more than 30 per cent of its revenue to safeguarding its security and independence, as a result of Israeli actions in the area, relying on the support of one of the super-Powers.

In order to increase its stranglehold on the area, Israel has added nuclear weapons to its military arsenal in order to threaten the Arab world and compel it to accept its policy of fait accompli.

In the recent report of an American scholar, we learn that Israel has added no less than three or four warheads to its present capabilities and that it can now use between 10 and 20 nuclear bombs the size of those that were dropped upon Hiroshima. The aggressive approach of Israel is not limited to the occupation of Arab territories and the displacement of their population. It extends to aggression against economic installations, represented by its aggression against the nuclear reactor in Iraq, which was designed exclusively for peaceful purposes and which was under the complete safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Consistent with its desire to maintain international peace and security, Jordan has supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the Mediterranean area, provided that the nuclear danger of Israel be removed and provided that this preserves the right of the countries in the area to use
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, in such a way as to be in consonance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Jordan has also urged the countries of the area not to produce or possess nuclear weapons, or to allow any party to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory, and to agree to subject their military installations to the safeguards of IAEA.

I cannot fail in this respect to refer to the collaboration between the two racist régimes, Israel and South Africa, especially in the sphere of nuclear armaments, a matter which constitutes a danger not only to the Arab world and to Africa, but which will have far-reaching repercussions. Israel has not yet signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Among the dangers hanging over my country, Jordan, is another aggressive act on the part of Israel, that is, building a canal between the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean, a matter which aims, inter alia, at setting up more multi-purpose nuclear installations. This is not consonant with the efforts and international recommendations to turn the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Despite the heightening of international tension, my delegation thinks that the complex issue of disarmament should be dealt with through an international framework. The United Nations is the proper forum and has a major role to play in this respect.
We maintain that commitment to the principles of the United Nations and the Charter, especially on the part of the two super-Powers, will lead to the consolidation of international peace and security. The dangers we face compel us to consider appropriate measures in order to stop this rivalry.

Mr. CHARLES (Haiti) (interpretation from French): I wish to express our sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Our satisfaction is all the greater in that you represent a country which enjoys close links of friendship and co-operation with our own. You and the other officers of the Committee may rely upon my delegation's full co-operation.

For some time mankind has been experiencing one of the most difficult periods in its history, a period rife with tensions and conflicts, aggravated by the real danger of a nuclear holocaust. Indeed, never before has the arms race, notably the nuclear-arms race, reached such alarming proportions. All negotiations aimed at arms limitations and reductions have reached an impasse or are, quite simply, suspended. The legitimate aspirations to peace of virtually all peoples continue to be ignored. Vast sums and the most modern technology, far from advancing the economic, social and cultural progress of our peoples, are being squandered on means of massive destruction.

Against this background, it is understandable that the climate of international relations should be deteriorating from day to day and that fear and insecurity are everywhere. However, while subscribing to the principle of collective responsibility, we believe that it is primarily up to the nuclear Powers to pursue negotiations to bring an end to the arms race and pursue the goal of general and complete disarmament to which we all aspire. We feel that the more serious the international situation, the more resolute should be negotiating efforts, on a priority basis, on the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation and reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Amongst these questions, that of nuclear disarmament is of the highest importance for my delegation.
It is unanimously recognized today that the strategic concepts of the 1960s have become obsolete and that limited nuclear war is now unthinkable. In fact, nuclear war cannot be won, and the President of the United States himself repeated this quite recently. From the Soviet side we have noted a unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. All this reveals a growing awareness of the danger leading to efforts to avert it. Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet taken the form of genuine political will. The great nuclear Powers feel compelled, for reasons of security, further to develop and refine their nuclear arsenals, which continue to grow.

In this connection the past year has been particularly disappointing, with the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the suspension of negotiations between the two super-Powers which followed that event. There can be no doubt that this fresh escalation resulting from the rivalry and confrontation of the two sides has contributed more than anything else to aggravating tensions and increasing general insecurity. Just as the rest of the international community, we are deeply concerned at this turn of events and we join with others in calling upon the parties to resume their dialogue without delay - which is the only way of creating the necessary climate for negotiations.

With regard to these negotiations, we also support the idea of participation by a representative of the Secretary-General, who could play a vital role in offering objective, intelligent and effective mediation enabling the parties to break out of the impasse they all too often reach. The framework for these negotiations has already been established through the various relevant General Assembly resolutions. By way of examples, I refer briefly to the following: resolution 37/72, calling for States members of the Committee on Disarmament immediately to undertake "multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests", and calling upon the States Parties to the 1963 Moscow Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons "by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoriums".
A second example is resolution 37/78 A, which requests "the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America to transmit to the Secretary-General a joint report or two separate reports on the stage reached in their ... negotiations".

A third example is resolution 37/78 C, calling upon the Committee on Disarmament "to elaborate a nuclear-disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament".

It is regrettable that these resolutions which offer a reasonable alternative to the vicious circle of the arms race have met with statements by the super-Powers aimed at convincing public opinion in their countries of the earnestness of their proposals and shifting responsibility for lack of progress on the other party.

In our view, the time has come for the parties concerned to rid themselves of their exaggerated security concerns. As we near the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, we are entitled to actions in good faith from all sides if we are to achieve our aim - to remove the danger of nuclear war - without which all progress realized in other areas would collapse like a house of cards.

As a beginning, the two super-Powers, which seem now to possess reliable verification techniques, could, in order to attest to their good faith and their unequivocal desire to achieve disarmament, agree on a nuclear freeze, in conformity with the 22 May 1984 Joint Declaration of Heads of State or Government of five continents.
Still within the framework of measures to limit or reverse the arms race, we feel that everything should be done to consolidate the non-proliferation régime. In this connection we believe that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones would serve the interests of international peace and security inasmuch as appropriate guarantees would be provided to States renouncing the nuclear option.

With regard to chemical weapons we give our fullest support to the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of these particularly fearsome weapons. It would be difficult to exaggerate the need for such a convention, as recent developments in the conflict between Iran and Iraq have shown. It is to be hoped that in spite of apparent differences of view at the Geneva Conference a consensus may emerge on this subject that can facilitate the negotiating process.

As for the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we are opposed to any deployment of weapons in that environment, which should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We are convinced that an extension of the arms race into outer space would not only greatly increase the risk of nuclear disaster but, worse, would further complicate negotiations aimed at arms limitation and reduction.

Of equally grave concern is the problem of the conventional arms race, which is one of the principal causes of instability in many areas of the world. The General Assembly has been considering the question of regulating and reducing conventional weapons ever since its 1946 session, and the question has continued to be included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission or its ad hoc committees. And yet, we are forced to note that results in this field have been disappointing, to say the least. It is estimated that the annual level of military expenditure will soon exceed the record figure of $1 trillion and that the share corresponding to conventional weapons represents four fifths of that sum. At the same time, we are witnessing an almost uninterrupted series of conflicts that are being waged with conventional weapons which, in addition to causing considerable material damage, result in vast losses of human life and untold suffering for the populations concerned. Unfortunately, since the end of the Second World War the developing countries have, in almost every case, been the theatre for such conflicts. The enormity of this shocking trend can be better appreciated when we observe that 450 million people in the world are either unemployed or underemployed
and 1 person out of 10 is suffering from hunger or malnutrition. Nearly a fourth of mankind is living in conditions close to poverty.

We are therefore convinced, as is the Secretary-General in his report on the reduction of military budgets, that:

"The world would clearly benefit in many ways if national security could be achieved with a lower level of military expenditure, so that resources could be released to meet the many pressing economic and social needs throughout the world. Furthermore, a reallocation of resources from military to civil purposes would provide possibilities for an increase in the rate of world economic growth." (A/31/222/Rev.1, p. 13)

It would also be good if some of the savings thus achieved could be used to augment the currently inadequate levels of assistance to developing countries, which remains well below the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product set by the United Nations for international assistance by developed countries during the Second Development Decade.

In any event, it remains clear that conventional disarmament should fall within the framework of general and complete disarmament. That is the only appropriate approach if we do not wish to create imbalances in favour of one country or bloc and to the detriment of another. Against such a background, confidence between States will remain the key factor in the search for the consensus necessary to achieve our goal, which is to remove the danger created by the arms race so that, relieved of the spectre of war, mankind can turn to enjoying an era of real peace that will generate progress.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the last speaker for this afternoon. I shall now call upon those representatives who have asked to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

Mr. EMERY (United States of America): I am exercising our right of reply this afternoon in response to some remarks that were made this morning by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Vejvoda. I should say that I listened with some considerable interest to his remarks, and I must say that I have known Mr. Vejvoda to be a very sophisticated and knowledgeable individual who is very much committed to the cause of world peace. That is why I was particularly dismayed to note that he repeated several remarks which are mis-statements of fact concerning the United States position on chemical weapons.
Let me point out first of all that the United States has itself conducted a 15-year unilateral moratorium on the manufacture and construction of chemical weapons. We have not added a thing to the United States chemical-weapons inventory in that period of time and, in fact, a considerable amount of the United States chemical-weapon stockpile has been destroyed.

Let me also say, in response to Mr. Vejvoda's remarks relative to our alleged intention to fit Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missiles with chemical-weapon warheads, that that is completely false; we have no plans to do that, we have not done it, and that is what we would call a red herring - it is not even remotely in the plans of the Pentagon or the United States Government or any allies to do that.

Finally, let me say that, with regard to the modernization programme that has been referred to, any plans to add additional weapons to the United States arsenal in the first place were only contingency plans in case a treaty was not negotiated that would result in the reduction and hopeful elimination of all chemical weapons, but also that funds for the manufacture and construction of any chemical warfare equipment in any event was removed from legislation by the United States Congress in this last session. In fact, I am well aware of that issue because I followed it very closely in my capacity as Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The only chemical-weapons funds that were provided by Congress during this past session were, in fact, for defensive measures: new suits and equipment to protect American military personnel against the use of chemical weapons, but not so much as a dime for any offensive activities at all.

Let me say that the Soviets have, in fact, invested in considerable inventory of modern chemical-weapons equipment during the same 15-year period that I referred to earlier, equipment to fit their systems with chemical-weapons capabilities from mortars to long-range tactical missiles - larger warheads, longer range, with capabilities for deeper penetration. Let me say that during all of that time the United States has built nothing and added nothing and, in fact, has destroyed chemical-weapons munitions rather than adding to that capability.
We have also had a number of reports of chemical-weapons use, which we find very disturbing indeed; this, of course, has been brought to the attention of the United Nations and other related bodies from time to time.

Let me say that we have taken a very active role in our efforts to reduce the threat of chemical warfare. The Vice-President spoke to the Conference on Disarmament in February 1983, issuing the detailed views of the United States on the subject. We followed with our illustrative procedures for dismantling and destroying chemical weapons in July 1983. In November 1983 we sponsored a demonstration at Tooele, Utah, a United States chemical-weapons experimental facility - which I attended and helped to sponsor, as a matter of fact - that demonstrated to the Conference on Disarmament the techniques available and those that can be readily used to destroy existing chemical weapons. I should say parenthetically that neither the Soviet Union nor Czechoslovakia chose to attend, although an invitation was extended to all participants in the Conference on Disarmament.

Finally, of course, in April of last year, the Vice-President put forward in Geneva the United States draft treaty on chemical weapons, which we believe is a very important first step to achieving the goal that all of us share, regardless of our views: the elimination of chemical weapons wherever they may exist and the elimination of that horrible threat to world peace.

Over and over and over we have said: "Give us an alternative to those portions of our chemical weapons draft treaty that you do not agree to". We have asked the Soviet Union and its allies time and time again to give us their alternative views and ideas; and we would be happy to consider them in a very constructive light. We think that it is possible and, in fact, necessary that these various nations that participate in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament should sit down at the negotiating table and work out a text that will allow us to eliminate chemical weapons for all time.

We believe that it is possible to do that. We think it is essential that the nations of the world band together and find an answer to this horrible problem so that at no time in the future will American citizens or Soviet citizens or the citizens of any other nation on earth face the threat of chemical-weapons use and the horror and the terror that it brings to innocent people throughout the world.

We think that this is a very important project, one that is well within the grasp of this Organization, and an essential goal that all of us must strive to
reach. As I said in Geneva, and as United States representatives have said over and over and over again, we are not wedded to any particular proposal. We do not insist that any particular language be adopted. What we do ask is that the people of this body band together and find a solution to this problem. We are open to any ideas, any suggestions, whether they come from the East, whether they come from the West, whether they come from the group of non-aligned nations - which of course has as much to be concerned about in this area as any group of people on the face of the earth.

We hope and pray that these nations will find the courage and the resources and the interest to come forward with answers, to come forward with ideas, to share their views with us, so that we can sit down in Geneva and negotiate a treaty that can accomplish one of the most important goals that this body can possibly adopt: the elimination of these horrible weapons, providing some safety for the people in all areas of the world who may be threatened with chemical-weapons use, which we think is abhorrent, disgraceful and totally unnecessary in any context that a peace-loving nation might consider.

I regret that it has been necessary to issue this right of reply. But let me say on behalf of my Government that we are totally committed to finding a solution to this problem. If we are going to find a solution to this problem we must do more than simply parrot dogma; we must do more than simply read papers to each other; we must do more than stand on the statements that have been made before by leaders and by their surrogates. We have to reach out to one another; we have to try things that have not been tried before; we have to look at the substance of the issue to find solutions to this problem.

I for one believe it can be done. President Reagan believes it can be done. Vice-President Bush believes it can be done. And I believe that the concerns are the same in the East as they are in the West, and that if we work together we have the capability, we have the necessity, to find the solution to these problems. I hope that this body will be the catalyst that will make this wish a reality.

I promise that the United States and its allies will be found to be not only partners but leaders in the effort to accomplish this goal.

Mr. VEJUVDA (Czechoslovakia): I am very grateful to the representative of the United States for the reply he just made to my statement. I do not intend to exercise the right of reply to the right of reply, and so forth. I want only to say that we socialist countries, and Czechoslovakia in particular, are ready to
work on the substance of the issue at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament. We think that deeds are more important than words. We look forward to next year's session of the Conference to see proof that everything that has been said will be manifested in effective action and in real preparatory work on the treaty on chemical weapons.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: Members will recall that it has been decided that Monday, 12 November, at 6 p.m. will be the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions. I urge delegations to submit their draft resolutions, especially those that have financial or administrative implications, as soon as possible for processing by the Secretariat. I also urge delegations to submit their draft resolutions as soon as possible during the course of this week so that we can have more time for considering and taking action on those draft resolutions.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.