VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 28th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

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Mr. Charles (Haiti)

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 65 AND 142 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. KORNEENKO (Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The First Committee is concluding its consideration of the vital questions of arms limitation and disarmament and it is quite legitimate that at the centre of our attention are the problems of preventing a nuclear holocaust, which is essential to all mankind. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR has already had an opportunity to set forth its views on some of these issues.

Today we should like to emphasize once again that the prevention of a nuclear conflict and guaranteeing peace are possible only by the cessation of the arms race, primarily the nuclear-arms race, and a reduction of the level of military confrontation. The way to this would be paved by action taken on the specific proposals put forward a few days ago by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. Chernenko, in replies to questions put by The Washington Post.
(Mr. Korneenko, Ukrainian SSR)

The Soviet Union proposes, first, that negotiations be undertaken in order to elaborate and conclude an agreement on the prevention of the militarization of outer space, including completely refraining from any anti-satellite systems and, as soon as negotiations start, a mutual moratorium would be placed upon the testing and deployment of arms in outer space. It has further been proposed that the nuclear Powers should freeze all existing nuclear weapons, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This would halt the nuclear-arms race. At the same time, it has been proposed that this freeze should be started first by the Soviet Union and by the United States.

Thirdly, there is a real possibility for work to be completed on an agreement on a complete ban on nuclear-weapons tests, which would put an end to the further refinement of those weapons. That proposal, which is applicable to all nuclear Powers, is addressed first and foremost to the United States.

Fourthly, it is essential that the nuclear Powers follow the example of the Soviet Union and undertake the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

All these proposals are the kernel of a broader set of Soviet proposals which have been entitled "Norms of conduct for nuclear Powers". As has been frequently emphasized, the adoption of these proposals, or at least some of them, would help to promote a considerable improvement in the international atmosphere, help to reduce tension and pave the way to putting an end to the arms race. The situation in the world is such that what we need now is not words but rather concrete and specific acts in order to eliminate the deadly danger which hangs over mankind. These actions would derive precisely from the adoption and implementation of the Soviet initiatives.

In its statement today, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would like to dwell on some other issues which have been discussed during the debate in the First Committee. The creation in various parts of the world of zones which would be free from nuclear weapons is becoming more and more topical. The creation of such zones is an important element in the struggle to strengthen security. Efforts in this area have already yielded certain results, but those efforts should be redoubled along all possible avenues, thus freeing the face of the earth from the nuclear pox. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR is in favour of the proposal to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in the northern part of Europe, in the Balkans, in other
parts of the European continent, in the Middle East and in Africa. In our opinion, it is extremely important also to follow up the initiative to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone along the battlefield which is the contact line of States belonging to the Warsaw Treaty and those belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

We consider that nuclear-weapon-free zones are one of the ways of bringing about a nuclear-weapon-free world. If they are set up, this would also have a very positive impact on strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime, help to strengthen guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and help to limit and to reverse the nuclear-arms race.

In this connection, I should like to emphasize that the Soviet Union has frequently declared that it will not use nuclear weapons against those States which have refrained from manufacturing or acquiring them and which have not allowed them to be located on their territory. An effective way of strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear States would be the conclusion of a relevant international convention and also bilateral agreements on this score between the nuclear Powers and those States which have no nuclear weapons on their territory.

In singling out the matter of prevention of nuclear war and the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, we are by no means detracting from the significance of other problems in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. A serious danger for mankind, for example, is to be seen in those arms which are normally called conventional, although, in their purpose and their characteristics, some of them have long ago ceased to be so. In this connection, the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community attach particular importance to the question of reducing conventional weapons and the number of armed forces. They have always advocated achieving mutually acceptable international agreements in this field, at both the global and the regional levels.

In this connection, I should like to emphasize the importance of the regional approach to questions of the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, particularly on the European continent. That is the purpose of the constructive proposals made by the socialist countries, which have, since June of last year, been on the table of the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The draft agreement on this submitted by the socialist countries constitutes the simplest and most appropriate
way of reaching an understanding, independent of the actual discrepancies in calculating the number of troops on both sides. The essence of this draft and a specific outline of practical actions in order to move these talks forward to genuine results are well known, and our delegation will not dwell on them. At the same time, we note with some regret that, whereas the socialist countries have indicated very clearly their aspiration to pave the way to an agreement, the NATO bloc, as previously, has avoided any constructive approach to the problem and has placed the Vienna talks in a deadlock. Instead of simplifying the procedure for this process, they have put forward new demands which have even further complicated the matter and have made it more difficult to achieve agreement. Instead of observing the principle of the equality of the parties and respect for their mutual interests, there have been attempts to win one-sided concessions from the socialist countries. Instead of a readiness not to take any steps which would raise the level of military confrontation in this part of the world, they have further escalated their armed forces and armaments. It is in this light that our delegation views the recent programme adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany to develop and strengthen its armed forces in the country from 1985 to the year 2000. Approximately DM 1 trillion have been used by the Bundeswehr to supply the army with the so-called new generation of weapons including Leopard III tanks, Mars-type artillery and Jaeger 90 military aeroplanes, Roland and Patriot rockets and many others.
An important stimulus to this militaristic programme was the abrogation by the Western European alliance of the last limitations on the production of military technology, including offensive weapons, which were imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War. There can be no doubt that this step on the part of the Western European alliance could be utilized in order to escalate the military potential of the Federal Republic of Germany and the further concentration of offensive weapons on the territory of that country.

Such actions, quite naturally, are hampering the achievement of any progress in resolving issues related to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. In the context of the reduction of conventional weapons, it would also be extremely important to continue the process of prohibiting, or at least limiting, the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Efforts along these lines should, we believe, be encouraged by the present session of the General Assembly.

An important contribution to reducing the military danger could be to curb the arms race in the seas and oceans of the world. This is a matter which is becoming particularly urgent in the light of the increase at the present time in military activity on the world's seas and oceans and the return to the gunboat policy, by which acts of aggression and provocation have been carried out against a number of coastal States, and a dangerous concentration of naval armadas off the shores of countries of the Near East, Central America and many others.

As is known, the Soviet Union has, either individually or together with other socialist countries, frequently proposed that agreement be reached on a number of specific measures relating to the mutual reduction of the activities of naval military fleets and to the limitation and reduction of naval armaments, and also corresponding confidence-building measures, both in general and specifically in the regions of the Indian, Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and also the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf.

However, because of the position of the United States, which has declared virtually all the seas as a zone of vital interest to it and which has set up naval military bases throughout the world, the resolution of questions of the limitation of the naval arms race has as yet not moved from square one. The General Assembly of the United Nations, in resolution 38/188 F, appealed that multilateral
negotiations be initiated on this issue. Unlike the United States, which remained
deaf to this appeal, the Soviet Union proposed a number of specific measures which
could be the subject of talks on the limitation of naval activities and the
limitation and reduction of naval armaments and on spreading confidence-building
measures to the world's seas and oceans, particularly those areas where there is
the heaviest sea traffic and where conflicts are more likely. These proposals are
stated in some detail in the letter of Mr. Gromyko to the Secretary-General of the

During the discussion in the First Committee at the present session of the
United Nations General Assembly, important ideas were put forward on this matter by
the representative of Bulgaria, which, as the Committee knows, was one of the
initiators of General Assembly resolution 38/188 F.

Proceeding to practical action on the questions connected with limiting the
naval activities would also help to promote a solution to the long-overdue problem
of the convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean in order that
this area be turned into a region of peace.

We fully condemn the actions of those States which for many years now have
been preventing the implementation of this task, and we favour the holding of the
Conference on the Indian Ocean according to the timetable laid down by the General
Assembly.

There is hardly any need to prove that the arms race is fed by growing
military expenditure, which is becoming for peoples, whatever be their level of
economic development, a heavier and heavier burden which is holding up their
economic and social progress. For that reason, a reduction of military budgets
would be an effective contribution to the cessation of the arms race and promote
disarmament efforts. At the same time, the funds which are thus liberated could be
used to serve the needs of social and economic development, particularly that of
the developing countries.

The desire to achieve these goals underlies the proposal made by the States
parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), that negotiations be started on the question of the mutual
non-increase in military expenditures and their subsequent reduction, which was put
forward on 5 March 1984. This new initiative of the socialist countries provides,
inter alia, that there be a small symbolic simultaneous reduction of the military budgets of Warsaw Treaty and NATO States with a subsequent freeze on them for three years; a simultaneous reduction, as a first step, of the military budgets of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO States which possess nuclear weapons, to a sum to be agreed on in advance; a reduction of the military budgets of the States concerned in connection with specific disarmament measures; and, finally, an agreed establishment of maximum ceilings on military budgets which would be lower than the existing levels.

Naturally, agreements to reduce military budgets should be implemented in such a way as to ensure that all parties are quite certain they are being carried out. Of course, in putting forward this far-reaching initiative, the socialist countries have expressed their readiness also to study proposals on other measures regarding the non-increase and reduction of military expenditures. Since the solution of this problem concerns not only the members of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, other States could also be involved in the implementation of specific measures.

However, as is the case in other areas, the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries have met with fierce resistance on the part of a certain number of Western States. Instead of considering real ways and means of reducing military expenditures, they have insisted on the discussion of various models of accountancy and comparability, which are simply aimed at diverting our attention from the solution of the problem and the escalation of military budgets, particularly of the United States and other NATO countries.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would like to express the hope that this year the First Committee will adopt decisions which will make a genuine contribution to solving problems relating to the reduction of military budgets.

At the disarmament talks in Geneva and at the present session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, a great deal has been said about verification problems. Very frequently, however, this is simply discussed abstractly, and these matters are even brought up before the beginning of specific negotiations.

Really, this is simply a cover for an unwillingness to conduct serious negotiations. In this connection, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR holds the view that the question of verification should be taken up subject by subject. The form and the conditions for such verification should be determined depending on the specific subject-matter and the purposes of each specific agreement.
Without in any way detracting from the importance of verification, on which
the implementation of any agreement in the disarmament field must depend, and with
which we are no less concerned, and perhaps even more than some others, it should
be pointed out that the main points at issue are the actual practical measures
themselves, because if they do not exist, then what verification can we even think
of? What can be verified and why should it be verified?

The question of verification in general, taken in abstraction from any
specific situation or any specific object of verification and particular agreement,
has absolutely no meaning. It is quite natural that various agreements will take
various forms and have different methods of verification using certain specific
technical and other means. If, however, one of the parties to the talks is
virtually refusing to work on an agreement on disarmament measures as such, and at
the same time is insisting on work being done on verification measures, this can
only be regarded as an attempt to block the talks in general and an unwillingness
to conclude agreements.

This is precisely the course which has been followed by the representatives of
the United States on the question of the nuclear-weapon-test ban. It has continued
to block negotiations on some key issues in an agreement which would ban such tests.

Let us take the situation when an unwillingness even to start talks is masked
by assertions about the impossibility of monitoring the agreement, as has occurred
in the case of the proposal on the freeze on nuclear weapons. The fact that this
is simply a ploy to get out of serious talks has been indicated by many authorities
in this area, including authorities in the United States itself.
We can refer, in particular, to an article by the former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Research (Science and Technology), Herbert Scoville, Jr., that appeared in The New York Times on 25 October of this year, entitled "A Freeze Is Verifiable". In that article, the author quite clearly refuted the assertions of those opposed to a freeze and referred to statements on the impossibility of verifying such a freeze as mere "allegations".

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR believes that an immediate solution to the questions to which I have referred today on a basis acceptable to all States is called for by the realities of the present-day world. In this connection, the General Assembly is duty-bound to take steps to halt the arms race and to avert the nuclear threat. This - the adoption of specific practical measures - should be the goal of the recommendations that will shortly be submitted to this Committee for its approval. The only thing required is political will and abstention from attempts to gain unilateral advantages. Indeed, we do not need words; we need specific acts.

Like the other socialist countries, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is prepared to work according to those principles.

Mr. Pham Ngoc (Viet Nam): Last week, together with peoples of other lands, the Vietnamese people completed observance of Disarmament Week. Meetings, seminars and lectures were organized throughout the country, and people from all walks of life participated in them.

The ardent desire of my people for peace and disarmament is unquestionable. They have suffered from the longest and most brutal war in history provoked by successive nuclear-weapon Powers. They are still living under the constant threat of another nuclear Power, but are more determined than ever to struggle for peace and wholeheartedly dedicated to disarmament, since they know that the outbreak of nuclear war would mean an end to civilization, to all human values and, indeed, an end to life on earth.

Due to my people's special concern about disarmament, my delegation feels duty-bound to address itself to all items under discussion in this Committee. However, speaking here for the second time, and after listening to the statements made by other delegations during the past three weeks, I wish at this time to share our views on disarmament negotiations specifically.
As we meet in this Committee to take stock of disarmament efforts, to discuss and to take decisions on what we should recommend to Member States and relevant bodies with regard to disarmament questions, we have the opportunity to look back with full consciousness of how far we have travelled and how much we have achieved. My delegation shares the concern of many others that we are now facing a most alarming situation. While the arms race – and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race – is galloping at a fearful speed, the danger of nuclear war is ever-more threatening. The disarmament negotiations, however, to our regret, are at a standstill. Fingers are no doubt being pointed at the United States for this state of things. The documents before us, and especially the report of the Conference on Disarmament, speak for themselves. The statements made in this Committee have also brought us to that unmistakeable conclusion. My delegation feels that it is necessary to go to some length to see what is really obstructing all disarmament efforts.

It was clear that, over the years of détente, many disarmament treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, were concluded, and their validity with regard to the disarmament efforts of the international community is beyond any doubt. The number of countries parties to those treaties has never ceased to increase. Those treaties remain as convincing milestones and as a good foundation for further endeavours.

However, since 1978, when the United States decided to launch a new round in the arms race, no new treaty has yet been seriously negotiated. The hard-won Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II treaty was signed in 1979, but soon became abortive. All disarmament forums have been suspended.

During this period we have witnessed the tremendous efforts of the socialist and non-aligned countries aimed at making disarmament negotiations move forward. Successive initiatives have been taken; repeated proposals have been put forth.

In 1978, on the initiative of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament – the first special session devoted to disarmament – was held. The Final Document was adopted. It laid down principles, a Programme of Action and machinery to promote negotiations on disarmament. Our Committee was assigned to deal in future
"only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions".  (resolution S-10/2, para. 117)

Another great effort was made by Member States at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982, but it was stonewalled by the United States. The long-awaited comprehensive programme on disarmament could not, therefore, be completed.

Most typical would be the case of the Committee - now the Conference - on Disarmament. In 1978 it was assigned the function of being a "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" (resolution S-10/2, para. 120). The Conference was deemed the most important body, enjoying the participation, for the first time, of all five nuclear-weapon countries, the Permanent Members of the Security Council. The composition of the Conference's membership was intentionally designed to make it most effective in negotiations. Member countries have delegated their best-qualified experts in disarmament fields. The Conference has an agenda with high priorities given to nuclear disarmament; its importance is intensified every year by successive General Assembly resolutions. The Conference has six months' work a year. It has established various ad hoc committees and has become the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations on disarmament.

But how has this machinery worked this year and, in fact, in the past six years? The reports it has produced every year and submitted to the General Assembly have registered no substantive progress.

The United States and a few other members of the Conference have rejected out of hand proposals jointly submitted by the Group of 21 and the socialist group. The principle of consensus, which was designed to help the Conference reach full agreement and ensure implementation, turned out to be a veto power exercised by a few who did not want to negotiate at all.

Since those countries lacked the political will, they systematically refused to negotiate, resorting to one pretext after another. They refused to negotiate or even to discuss, on the grounds that the proposals were either, they claimed, unrealistic, premature or polemical. They are opposed even to proposals on procedural matters. Their intransigent position has become more and more inadmissible to all delegations that have good faith in negotiations.
The poor performance of the Conference on Disarmament was dramatized even further by the fact that it failed to reach consensus on the enlargement of its membership. One country chose to obstruct the formula endorsed by all three groups. It is only natural that the obstacle to this enlargement of the membership should be removed.

The same situation was repeated in the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York, a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. During its session, from 7 May to 1 June 1984, the Commission could not make any tangible progress on any of the five substantive items on its agenda. The United States and some other Western countries expressed reservations on even the minimal results of the deliberations on item 4 of the Commission's agenda, concerning the various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. The United States has also prevented the Commission from making recommendations to the General Assembly on appropriate measures to counter South Africa's attempt to develop nuclear weapons, which would no doubt threaten the security of African countries and undermine the non-proliferation régime.

After long years of negotiations, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean was able to make some preliminary progress this year in its discussion of the agenda and procedures for the Conference on the Indian Ocean. However, it is clear that the United States and some others are still sticking to their familiar pretexts to oppose the convening of the Conference in Colombo in 1985. The position taken by the United States regarding the attempt of the non-aligned countries to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is a secret to no one. The United States has opposed and delayed the convening of that Conference year after year, while feverishly stepping up its military build-up in the region, particularly in Diego Garcia.

The escalation of the arms race and the stalemate at the disarmament negotiations have a direct bearing on the third-world countries. United States gunboat diplomacy and military superiority have been used to the utmost. The United States has drowned the Grenada revolution in blood and fire. It continues its threats against the independence and sovereignty of Nicaragua. Its military forces have devastated the land and cities of Lebanon. The United States rapid deployment forces were clearly set up for the purpose of intimidating and intervening in third-world countries. They serve as a constant deterrent to those
countries which try to get out of the grip of the United States and to develop an independent policy.

In addition to its direct military intervention, the United States has never ceased to deliver great amounts of sophisticated weapons to reactionary forces in different parts of the world. By so doing, it has started an arms race in those regions and has caused instability and incited subversive activities in Central America, the Middle East, southern Africa and South-East Asia. Under these circumstances, the third-world countries are compelled to spend more for their national defence, causing greater difficulties for their economic development.

It is indeed a crime that the United States has the luxury of spending a trillion dollars for a new system of outer space weapons while the world's peoples cannot have 1 per cent of that amount for food programmes.

I conclude my statement by saying that we have all heard repeated pronouncements in favour of peace and disarmament, to the effect that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and that there is no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control. We have heard enough professions of good faith in disarmament negotiations, and we have also heard enough promises about making progress. What we really need now is the political will of the United States. I believe that only with that political will can we put the whole disarmament machinery back to work again.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation is pleased, Sir, to see in the Chair the representative of a great country with which France maintains the friendliest of relations, and a man who for several years now has been playing a very important role in the international community's work on disarmament, both here in the First Committee and in the Conference on Disarmament. This year, in fact, you served as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission with great distinction. Your authority, wisdom and experience are a guarantee that our work will be carried out in the best possible conditions. We express to you our warmest congratulations and our best wishes for success in the important task that lies before you.

On 19 October, the representative of Ireland made a statement on behalf of the members of the European Communities; that statement therefore expresses the views of the French delegation. I should like today to present our position in a more comprehensive way as regards certain aspects of the problems before this Committee.
Our task here is to speak about disarmament, to discuss the problems of disarmament, the difficulties it faces, possible progress and prospects. But we note that the problem which actually dominates our debate is that of peace; essentially, peace between the two biggest Powers and the alliances to which they belong. A war in such circumstances could, through escalation, lead to the use of nuclear weapons. That is why the prevention of nuclear war remains the key theme of the disarmament debate.

But is there a risk of war today, of war involving the nuclear Powers? Many of us would reply in the affirmative, condemning as the cause of a possible or probable conflict the deterioration in the international situation and the arms race.

The international situation continues to be marked by tension and polemics. East-West relations, to say the least, leave something to be desired. Acts of force continue: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the war between Iran and Iraq, and the use of violence in South-East Asia, Africa and Central America; the problems of the Middle East remain unresolved. These facts are cause for grave concern.

However, we see no imminent danger or acute crisis which in the short term could lead to the major conflict that all of us fear. The countries of the Atlantic alliance affirmed last year that none of their weapons would ever be used except in response to an attack; the countries members of the Warsaw Pact have affirmed their desire for peace, and we take note of their declarations.
On no side can we perceive any wish to break off contacts and all affirm their desire for dialogue, especially on disarmament. Finally, we do not see anywhere the nuclear panic that certain movements are still striving to create in the Western countries. But it goes without saying that the risk of conflict will be removed only if all States comply fully with the principles of the Charter and primarily the non-use of force or the threat of force.

It is the arms race which to many of us appears to be the possible cause of a major conflict. It is even said that it would inevitably lead to such a conflict. In our view it is not the mere existence of weapons that leads to conflicts. Conflicts are of political origin. In fact, the disarmament objective consists of gradually reducing weapons levels while maintaining the equilibrium necessary for security while the arms race, which is borne of mistrust, is aimed at maintaining those balances at an ever higher level. It becomes dangerous if it leads to destabilization which can give rise to the temptation to make use of force. Avoiding destabilization and maintaining or restoring stable equilibria is the problem at the heart of our work. Its solution is a condition for any progress towards disarmament. It is a problem which arises simultaneously in the nuclear sphere, in outer space, which is of primary importance today, and in the sphere of conventional weapons. The prevention of destabilization and the maintenance of stable equilibria are tasks that should be approached in a comprehensive way, bearing in mind the correlation between these various aspects of the security problem and the facts relevant to each of those aspects.

The French delegation has stressed here repeatedly the need for stable deterrence for the security of the region in which my country is located. It is to complement this deterrent effect and remedy a cause of destabilization that our allies in 1979 decided on the installation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to counterbalance the deployment by the Soviet Union of a new and powerful force without any equivalent in the West comprising primarily what are termed SS 20 missiles. It is to maintain the stabilizing effect of deterrence that France and its allies cannot accept a commitment on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. Such a commitment would have as its effect a strategic and political destabilization with incalculable consequences not only for the region in question but for the world as a whole.
Anti-missile weapons involve serious risks of destabilization. This is why their deployment was limited by the American-Soviet treaty of 1972. We attach great importance to the maintenance of its provisions and more generally to the preservation in this area of the conditions necessary for the maintenance of stable deterrence.

The arms race in outer space involves serious dangers of destabilization. The French Government has often expressed its concern in this respect, notably in the statement made by the French delegation to the Conference on Disarmament on 12 June. In putting forward its proposals the French Government was inspired by the twofold concern of preserving both the conditions for security and the broad perspectives of progress that the use of space for civilian purposes can open up for the international community. It is no longer possible today – nor would it be desirable – completely to eliminate the military use of outer space. Observation and communication satellites make a necessary contribution to strategic stability and they deserve to be protected.

The commitments to be assumed, primarily by the two major space Powers, should be aimed at avoiding the deployment in outer space of weapon systems which would have destabilizing effects, thus ensuring the indispensable maintenance of nuclear deterrence. Similarly, anti-satellite systems – and the Soviet Union possesses one – should be the subject of strict provisions ensuring in particular the complete prohibition of any systems that could reach high-orbit satellites whose preservation is of the utmost importance for the maintenance of strategic stability. It goes without saying that verification measures with regard to outer space are of crucial importance.

As to conventional weapons, the restoration of a balance in Europe would contribute to strengthening a stability which at present rests essentially upon the nuclear factor.

Avoiding destabilization and maintaining a stable equilibrium is a necessary objective, in particular in the East-West framework, because of nuclear and space factors, but it should be sought in all areas where the problem of security arises. Hence the importance attaching to the search for appropriate agreements between the States concerned in other regions of the world.
The French Government attaches the greatest importance to the opening or resumption of negotiations on the questions upon which I have touched and on others.

The French Government deeply regretted the breaking off of the nuclear negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union. We hope that they will be resumed at the earliest possible time and without pre-conditions. It is up to the Powers which possess approximately 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons to negotiate substantial and verifiable reductions between them. My Government has repeatedly explained the conditions under which France in turn could undertake its own commitments in this respect. For the present, the contacts resumed between the two major Powers and the statements on both sides expressing the desire to negotiate inspire some hope.

As to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we had hoped that the meeting scheduled for September in Vienna would be the beginning of a negotiating process. The statements made in recent weeks by both the Soviet and American sides suggest a common intention to open up such talks.

The work of the Conference on Disarmament requires particular attention on our part because of its link with the United Nations and its specific purpose, which is to negotiate universal agreements. I shall confine myself here to touching upon three questions on its agenda: chemical weapons, the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The question of chemical weapons is the only one which has been the subject of actual negotiations. It is of major importance to the international community. Chemical weapons exist. They can be produced by many countries and, what is more serious, they are used. The experience of this year emphasizes further the urgency of a treaty which provides for the complete elimination of chemical weapons. For the first time the negotiations begun in Geneva made significant progress. Important contributions were made, in particular the draft treaty put forward by the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George Bush. The acceptance by the Soviet delegation of the principle of continuous on-site inspection of destruction of stocks has opened up the way to an understanding on a crucial point.
The drafting of certain articles was begun; in-depth consultations usefully laid the groundwork for further progress. However, the difficulties remain considerable, in particular with regard to some aspects of verification: challenge inspections and control of non-production. The fact remains that this year negotiations did get off the ground and the conditions seemed to have been created to move on to a new phase.

If chemical weapons constituted practically the only subject of negotiations, political concerns focused very largely on other agenda items. Such was the case for the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, which is now a separate agenda item. Substantive differences of view in the Conference on this question did not make it possible to adopt a mandate for a possible subsidiary body. But, because of those very differences of view, the French delegation felt it was necessary that the fundamental questions covered by the item should be the subject of a comprehensive discussion, methodically conducted, which would promote mutual understanding of positions and could lead to certain conclusions.

For us, we shall address ourselves mainly to all questions pertaining to the prevention of war in general and conditions for security in the nuclear age. These are questions of great interest to all States, and the Conference on Disarmament provides an appropriate setting for their discussion. We hope that next year the Conference will reach agreement on the conditions under which such a discussion can proceed.

The agenda item on the prevention of an arms race in outer space was also the subject of proposals for consideration of the item in an ad hoc committee, but no agreement could be reached on the terms of its mandate. The French delegation regrets that very keenly. We expressed a very open attitude on that question. In our view, even with relatively restrictive language limited to the exploration and identification of the questions covered by the item, the ad hoc committee could have undertaken a useful task. Moreover, if bilateral negotiations between the two great Powers are indispensable, an important role falls to the Conference for discussion of a problem which henceforth is one of major interest to the international community. We hope that next year the Conference will be able to adopt appropriate methods.

Finally, I should like to touch upon a question which is of great interest to the French Government, that is, the admission of new members to the Conference on Disarmament. According to the Final Document of the first special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at regular intervals the Conference should undertake a reconsideration of its composition. The time for such a re-examination has arrived, and we welcomed the decision taken last year to admit four new member States. We regret that no agreement could be reached this year on the designation of those new members. We sincerely hope that the scheduled consultations will make it possible to proceed to this wider membership next year, in keeping with equity and the Conference's interests. The Conference would thus benefit from the contributions of States which have shown an active interest in disarmament work.

The French Government has constantly expressed its interest in conventional disarmament, which, in our view, is a matter that normally falls to regional initiatives. In this regard we attach special importance to the Stockholm Conference, held at the beginning of this year. Undoubtedly that Conference will only at a later stage take up the second phase of its work on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. In conformity with its mandate defined by the Madrid Conference, at present it is charged with negotiating confidence- and security-building measures that are verifiable, militarily significant, politically binding and would cover Europe as a whole. Specific and concrete proposals made by France and its Western partners respond to that definition and would fully serve the objective that is sought. Other proposals - some of a declaratory character and not covered by the Madrid mandate - were also put forward. Despite everything, we hope that progress will be possible along the lines previously agreed upon and that the Stockholm Conference will achieve substantial results at the session to be held in Vienna in 1986.

The outline of present or expected negotiations that I have just given does not inspire any great satisfaction, but it should not lead us to discouragement, especially if we bear in mind the dimension of the difficulties. The line of contacts has not been broken off and everyone recognizes the need for action.

The United Nations should find an area for action in the field of disarmament and it is desirable it should expand. The French authorities are very much interested in this subject; they have expressed certain initiatives on which I should like to touch briefly.

Two are designed to entrust to the United Nations responsibilities in the area of verification. The first, submitted in 1978, deals with a draft for a satellite control agency. That draft was the subject of three resolutions adopted by significant majorities; the latest adopted in 1982 was designed to call for the
preparation of a study on the institutional aspects of the project. Last year the Secretariat submitted a report introducing the study. It did not seem to us necessary to submit a new draft resolution on this subject this year, but the satellite agency project remains a timely one and we are convinced that the international community will lend its support. The years to come will no doubt provide elements justifying a further consideration which, we hope, will lead to the beginnings of a realization of this project.

The second of those initiatives had to do with a provisional procedure for the consideration of possible violations of the Geneva Protocol or customary rules of law prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Resolution 37/98 D, adopted for that purpose two years ago, provided for the preparation, by expert advisers under the authority of the Secretary-General, of a report on inquiry procedures and the gathering of documentation. That report was completed this year and distributed to Member States. Its submission complements the provisions for implementation of the procedure established in resolution 37/98 D. The events of last spring, the investigation carried out by the Secretary-General confirmed the usefulness of such a procedure. I stress that that procedure is not binding and adds nothing to the commitments undertaken by States parties to the Geneva Protocol; but it expresses the international community's vigilance to ensure that the Protocol is respected. We sincerely hope that appropriate provisions negotiated in Geneva will in the near future give binding force to effective verification measures having to do with the use of chemical weapons.

Another initiative relates to the institutional field. The project for a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research was approved by the General Assembly in 1979. The Institute, which has operated for four years, is very active, and I wish to pay a tribute to its Director, Mr. Liviu Bota. However, its definitive statutes have not yet been adopted. A draft resolution for that purpose will be submitted to the current session.
Its adoption will enshrine the Institute in its place within the United Nations system. It should give further impetus to its work and encourage Member States to provide financial assistance to it.

The relationship between disarmament and development was the subject of a proposal submitted last year to the General Assembly by the President of France. Following upon this initiative, the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 38/71. In accordance with that resolution, Member States were invited to communicate their views and proposals concerning the relationship between disarmament and development, and it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the replies and make recommendations to the present session of the General Assembly. The Commission was unable to adopt conclusions dealing with substantive aspects, but it recommended that efforts should be continued to enable the General Assembly to arrive at a broad agreement on this subject, bearing in mind the views submitted in the report.

The French delegation sincerely hopes that this broad agreement will be embodied in a resolution and that that resolution will represent a step forward in work on the disarmament-development link. This great idea expressed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is indeed accepted by everyone and expresses a principle of solidarity which is much needed today.

Mr. SHUGUM (Jordan) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, I am pleased, since I am speaking here for the first time, to convey to you in the name of my country warmest congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee. I wish you, as well as the rest of the officers of the Committee, success in your efforts to make our debates fruitful.

Since Governments realized the dangers posed to the world, and after undergoing two world wars, the international community has sought to achieve full and complete disarmament, motivated by its knowledge of the extent of the dangers of those weapons, especially the nuclear ones, that are being produced and developed in the world. Despite the suffering and destruction that mankind has undergone, it has not yet been possible to achieve disarmament, despite the evident destructive capability of modern nuclear weapons, which may lead to the annihilation of mankind and the undermining of human civilization.
(Mr. Shugum, Jordan)

There is no doubt that the two super-Powers bear the greatest responsibility for this serious development, because of the inordinate degree of armaments between them and their insistence on measuring security in terms of the possession of the most sophisticated weapons. In addition, political will is lacking, that political will that grasps the grave dimensions of this development, as well as the necessity of working to achieve genuine disarmament so as to avert a cataclysmic world conflict.

The claim that a limited nuclear confrontation is possible denies the most rudimentary facts, because any use of nuclear weapons would be met by a counter-attack and consequently result in total nuclear war. The use of nuclear weapons will not only affect the nuclear-weapon States but will also extend to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Hence our support for the call for the inadmissibility of using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

It rests with the two super-Powers, entrusted by the Charter with the greatest responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, to co-operate and to implement the provisions of that Charter. Perhaps what has obstructed implementation of this matter is the proliferation of the policy of rivalry and confrontation between States and recourse to military force in their relations. The lack of balance and uneven capability have also led to the heightening of the arms race and the quest to possess more weapons, and especially nuclear weapons, further perfecting them and rendering them more destructive.

This Organization is the organ that should be used to resolve disputes and conflicts by peaceful means, to avert further exacerbating the situation of rivalry in the world.

Despite the dangers hanging over the world, the situation is still deteriorating. The persistence and proliferation of international hotbeds of tension and the increase in the possibility of confrontation between the super-Powers are a cause for sorrow in the world. This will lead other countries to threaten to use force and to seek to possess and develop weapons of mass destruction. Certain countries, willingly or unwillingly, will allocate a greater proportion of their resources to this end, instead of meeting the requirements for their economic and social development.
Year after year, military expenditures and social and economic allocations are increasingly becoming diametrically opposed. Reports indicate the spiralling of world expenditures on arms. It would be more useful to allocate these sums for the advancement of the economic and social condition of our world today; the result of this would be much more beneficial.

Hence my country welcomes the French proposal that an international conference be held to consider the link between disarmament and development. The two super-Powers have failed to set an example either in the field of genuine disarmament or in implementing the provisions of the Charter. They have closed their eyes to the conduct of some of their satellites which are committing acts that breach international peace and security. This has led to a situation where certain countries have found themselves compelled to allocate a certain large proportion of their limited resources to meet the requirements of legitimate self-defence, at the expense of economic and developmental priorities. My country, Jordan, is a case in point, devoting more than 30 per cent of its revenue to safeguarding its security and independence, as a result of Israeli actions in the area, relying on the support of one of the super-Powers.

In order to increase its stranglehold on the area, Israel has added nuclear weapons to its military arsenal in order to threaten the Arab world and compel it to accept its policy of fait accompli.

In the recent report of an American scholar, we learn that Israel has added no less than three or four warheads to its present capabilities and that it can now use between 10 and 20 nuclear bombs the size of those that were dropped upon Hiroshima. The aggressive approach of Israel is not limited to the occupation of Arab territories and the displacement of their population. It extends to aggression against economic installations, represented by its aggression against the nuclear reactor in Iraq, which was designed exclusively for peaceful purposes and which was under the complete safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Consistent with its desire to maintain international peace and security, Jordan has supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the Mediterranean area, provided that the nuclear danger of Israel be removed and provided that this preserves the right of the countries in the area to use
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, in such a way as to be in consonance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Jordan has also urged the countries of the area not to produce or possess nuclear weapons, or to allow any party to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory, and to agree to subject their military installations to the safeguards of IAEA.

I cannot fail in this respect to refer to the collaboration between the two racist régimes, Israel and South Africa, especially in the sphere of nuclear armaments, a matter which constitutes a danger not only to the Arab world and to Africa, but which will have far-reaching repercussions. Israel has not yet signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Among the dangers hanging over my country, Jordan, is another aggressive act on the part of Israel, that is, building a canal between the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean, a matter which aims, inter alia, at setting up more multi-purpose nuclear installations. This is not consonant with the efforts and international recommendations to turn the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Despite the heightening of international tension, my delegation thinks that the complex issue of disarmament should be dealt with through an international framework. The United Nations is the proper forum and has a major role to play in this respect.
We maintain that commitment to the principles of the United Nations and the Charter, especially on the part of the two super-Powers, will lead to the consolidation of international peace and security. The dangers we face compel us to consider appropriate measures in order to stop this rivalry.

Mr. CHARLES (Haiti) (interpretation from French): I wish to express our sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Our satisfaction is all the greater in that you represent a country which enjoys close links of friendship and co-operation with our own. You and the other officers of the Committee may rely upon my delegation's full co-operation.

For some time mankind has been experiencing one of the most difficult periods in its history, a period rife with tensions and conflicts, aggravated by the real danger of a nuclear holocaust. Indeed, never before has the arms race, notably the nuclear-arms race, reached such alarming proportions. All negotiations aimed at arms limitations and reductions have reached an impasse or are, quite simply, suspended. The legitimate aspirations to peace of virtually all peoples continue to be ignored. Vast sums and the most modern technology, far from advancing the economic, social and cultural progress of our peoples, are being squandered on means of massive destruction.

Against this background, it is understandable that the climate of international relations should be deteriorating from day to day and that fear and insecurity are everywhere. However, while subscribing to the principle of collective responsibility, we believe that it is primarily up to the nuclear Powers to pursue negotiations to bring an end to the arms race and pursue the goal of general and complete disarmament to which we all aspire. We feel that the more serious the international situation, the more resolute should be negotiating efforts, on a priority basis, on the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation and reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Amongst these questions, that of nuclear disarmament is of the highest importance for my delegation.
It is unanimously recognized today that the strategic concepts of the 1960s have become obsolete and that limited nuclear war is now unthinkable. In fact, nuclear war cannot be won, and the President of the United States himself repeated this quite recently. From the Soviet side we have noted a unilateral commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. All this reveals a growing awareness of the danger leading to efforts to avert it. Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet taken the form of genuine political will. The great nuclear Powers feel compelled, for reasons of security, further to develop and refine their nuclear arsenals, which continue to grow.

In this connection the past year has been particularly disappointing, with the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the suspension of negotiations between the two super-Powers which followed that event. There can be no doubt that this fresh escalation resulting from the rivalry and confrontation of the two sides has contributed more than anything else to aggravating tensions and increasing general insecurity. Just as the rest of the international community, we are deeply concerned at this turn of events and we join with others in calling upon the parties to resume their dialogue without delay - which is the only way of creating the necessary climate for negotiations.

With regard to these negotiations, we also support the idea of participation by a representative of the Secretary-General, who could play a vital role in offering objective, intelligent and effective mediation enabling the parties to break out of the impasse they all too often reach. The framework for these negotiations has already been established through the various relevant General Assembly resolutions. By way of examples, I refer briefly to the following: resolution 37/72, calling for States members of the Committee on Disarmament immediately to undertake "multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests", and calling upon the States Parties to the 1963 Moscow Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons "by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoriums".

A second example is resolution 37/78 A, which requests "the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America to transmit to the Secretary-General a joint report or two separate reports on the stage reached in their ... negotiations".

A third example is resolution 37/78 C, calling upon the Committee on Disarmament "to elaborate a nuclear-disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament".

It is regrettable that these resolutions which offer a reasonable alternative to the vicious circle of the arms race have met with statements by the super-Powers aimed at convincing public opinion in their countries of the earnestness of their proposals and shifting responsibility for lack of progress on the other party.

In our view, the time has come for the parties concerned to rid themselves of their exaggerated security concerns. As we near the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, we are entitled to actions in good faith from all sides if we are to achieve our aim - to remove the danger of nuclear war - without which all progress realized in other areas would collapse like a house of cards.

As a beginning, the two super-Powers, which seem now to possess reliable verification techniques, could, in order to attest to their good faith and their unequivocal desire to achieve disarmament, agree on a nuclear freeze, in conformity with the 22 May 1984 Joint Declaration of Heads of State or Government of five continents.
Still within the framework of measures to limit or reverse the arms race, we feel that everything should be done to consolidate the non-proliferation régime. In this connection we believe that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones would serve the interests of international peace and security inasmuch as appropriate guarantees would be provided to States renouncing the nuclear option.

With regard to chemical weapons we give our fullest support to the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of these particularly fearsome weapons. It would be difficult to exaggerate the need for such a convention, as recent developments in the conflict between Iran and Iraq have shown. It is to be hoped that in spite of apparent differences of view at the Geneva Conference a consensus may emerge on this subject that can facilitate the negotiating process.

As for the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we are opposed to any deployment of weapons in that environment, which should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We are convinced that an extension of the arms race into outer space would not only greatly increase the risk of nuclear disaster but, worse, would further complicate negotiations aimed at arms limitation and reduction.

Of equally grave concern is the problem of the conventional arms race, which is one of the principal causes of instability in many areas of the world. The General Assembly has been considering the question of regulating and reducing conventional weapons ever since its 1946 session, and the question has continued to be included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission or its ad hoc committees. And yet, we are forced to note that results in this field have been disappointing, to say the least. It is estimated that the annual level of military expenditure will soon exceed the record figure of $1 trillion and that the share corresponding to conventional weapons represents four fifths of that sum. At the same time, we are witnessing an almost uninterrupted series of conflicts that are being waged with conventional weapons which, in addition to causing considerable material damage, result in vast losses of human life and untold suffering for the populations concerned. Unfortunately, since the end of the Second World War the developing countries have, in almost every case, been the theatre for such conflicts. The enormity of this shocking trend can be better appreciated when we observe that 450 million people in the world are either unemployed or underemployed.
and 1 person out of 10 is suffering from hunger or malnutrition. Nearly a fourth of mankind is living in conditions close to poverty.

We are therefore convinced, as is the Secretary-General in his report on the reduction of military budgets, that:

"The world would clearly benefit in many ways if national security could be achieved with a lower level of military expenditure, so that resources could be released to meet the many pressing economic and social needs throughout the world. Furthermore, a reallocation of resources from military to civil purposes would provide possibilities for an increase in the rate of world economic growth." (A/31/222/Rev.1, p. 13)

It would also be good if some of the savings thus achieved could be used to augment the currently inadequate levels of assistance to developing countries, which remains well below the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product set by the United Nations for international assistance by developed countries during the Second Development Decade.

In any event, it remains clear that conventional disarmament should fall within the framework of general and complete disarmament. That is the only appropriate approach if we do not wish to create imbalances in favour of one country or bloc and to the detriment of another. Against such a background, confidence between States will remain the key factor in the search for the consensus necessary to achieve our goal, which is to remove the danger created by the arms race so that, relieved of the spectre of war, mankind can turn to enjoying an era of real peace that will generate progress.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the last speaker for this afternoon. I shall now call upon those representatives who have asked to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

Mr. EMERY (United States of America): I am exercising our right of reply this afternoon in response to some remarks that were made this morning by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Vejvoda. I should say that I listened with some considerable interest to his remarks, and I must say that I have known Mr. Vejvoda to be a very sophisticated and knowledgeable individual who is very much committed to the cause of world peace. That is why I was particularly dismayed to note that he repeated several remarks which are mis-statements of fact concerning the United States position on chemical weapons.
Let me point out first of all that the United States has itself conducted a
15-year unilateral moratorium on the manufacture and construction of chemical
weapons. We have not added a thing to the United States chemical-weapons inventory
in that period of time and, in fact, a considerable amount of the United States
chemical-weapon stockpile has been destroyed.

Let me also say, in response to Mr. Vejvoda's remarks relative to our alleged
intention to fit Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missiles with chemical-weapon
warheads, that that is completely false; we have no plans to do that, we have not
done it, and that is what we would call a red herring - it is not even remotely in
the plans of the Pentagon or the United States Government or any allies to do that.

Finally, let me say that, with regard to the modernization programme that has
been referred to, any plans to add additional weapons to the United States arsenal
in the first place were only contingency plans in case a treaty was not negotiated
that would result in the reduction and hopeful elimination of all chemical weapons,
but also that funds for the manufacture and construction of any chemical warfare
equipment in any event was removed from legislation by the United States Congress
in this last session. In fact, I am well aware of that issue because I followed it
very closely in my capacity as Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. The only chemical-weapons funds that were provided by Congress during this
past session were, in fact, for defensive measures: new suits and equipment to
protect American military personnel against the use of chemical weapons, but not so
much as a dime for any offensive activities at all.

Let me say that the Soviets have, in fact, invested in considerable inventory
of modern chemical-weapons equipment during the same 15-year period that I referred
to earlier, equipment to fit their systems with chemical-weapons capabilities from
mortars to long-range tactical missiles - larger warheads, longer range, with
capabilities for deeper penetration. Let me say that during all of that time the
United States has built nothing and added nothing and, in fact, has destroyed
chemical-weapons munitions rather than adding to that capability.
We have also had a number of reports of chemical-weapons use, which we find very disturbing indeed; this, of course, has been brought to the attention of the United Nations and other related bodies from time to time.

Let me say that we have taken a very active role in our efforts to reduce the threat of chemical warfare. The Vice-President spoke to the Conference on Disarmament in February 1983, issuing the detailed views of the United States on the subject. We followed with our illustrative procedures for dismantling and destroying chemical weapons in July 1983. In November 1983 we sponsored a demonstration at Tooele, Utah, a United States chemical-weapons experimental facility – which I attended and helped to sponsor, as a matter of fact – that demonstrated to the Conference on Disarmament the techniques available and those that can be readily used to destroy existing chemical weapons. I should say parenthetically that neither the Soviet Union nor Czechoslovakia chose to attend, although an invitation was extended to all participants in the Conference on Disarmament.

Finally, of course, in April of last year, the Vice-President put forward in Geneva the United States draft treaty on chemical weapons, which we believe is a very important first step to achieving the goal that all of us share, regardless of our views: the elimination of chemical weapons wherever they may exist and the elimination of that horrible threat to world peace.

Over and over and over we have said: "Give us an alternative to those portions of our chemical weapons draft treaty that you do not agree to". We have asked the Soviet Union and its allies time and time again to give us their alternative views and ideas; and we would be happy to consider them in a very constructive light. We think that it is possible and, in fact, necessary that these various nations that participate in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament should sit down at the negotiating table and work out a text that will allow us to eliminate chemical weapons for all time.

We believe that it is possible to do that. We think it is essential that the nations of the world band together and find an answer to this horrible problem so that at no time in the future will American citizens or Soviet citizens or the citizens of any other nation on earth face the threat of chemical-weapons use and the horror and the terror that it brings to innocent people throughout the world.

We think that this is a very important project, one that is well within the grasp of this Organization, and an essential goal that all of us must strive to
reach. As I said in Geneva, and as United States representatives have said over and over and over again, we are not wedded to any particular proposal. We do not insist that any particular language be adopted. What we do ask is that the people of this body band together and find a solution to this problem. We are open to any ideas, any suggestions, whether they come from the East, whether they come from the West, whether they come from the group of non-aligned nations - which of course has as much to be concerned about in this area as any group of people on the face of the earth.

We hope and pray that these nations will find the courage and the resources and the interest to come forward with answers, to come forward with ideas, to share their views with us, so that we can sit down in Geneva and negotiate a treaty that can accomplish one of the most important goals that this body can possibly adopt: the elimination of these horrible weapons, providing some safety for the people in all areas of the world who may be threatened with chemical-weapons use, which we think is abhorrent, disgraceful and totally unnecessary in any context that a peace-loving nation might consider.

I regret that it has been necessary to issue this right of reply. But let me say on behalf of my Government that we are totally committed to finding a solution to this problem. If we are going to find a solution to this problem we must do more than simply parrot dogma; we must do more than simply read papers to each other; we must do more than stand on the statements that have been made before by leaders and by their surrogates. We have to reach out to one another; we have to try things that have not been tried before; we have to look at the substance of the issue to find solutions to this problem.

I for one believe it can be done. President Reagan believes it can be done. Vice-President Bush believes it can be done. And I believe that the concerns are the same in the East as they are in the West, and that if we work together we have the capability, we have the necessity, to find the solution to these problems. I hope that this body will be the catalyst that will make this wish a reality.

I promise that the United States and its allies will be found to be not only partners but leaders in the effort to accomplish this goal.

**Mr. VEJVOĐA (Czechoslovakia):** I am very grateful to the representative of the United States for the reply he just made to my statement. I do not intend to exercise the right of reply to the right of reply, and so forth. I want only to say that we socialist countries, and Czechoslovakia in particular, are ready to
work on the substance of the issue at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament. We think that deeds are more important than words. We look forward to next year's session of the Conference to see proof that everything that has been said will be manifested in effective action and in real preparatory work on the treaty on chemical weapons.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: Members will recall that it has been decided that Monday, 12 November, at 6 p.m. will be the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions. I urge delegations to submit their draft resolutions, especially those that have financial or administrative implications, as soon as possible for processing by the Secretariat. I also urge delegations to submit their draft resolutions as soon as possible during the course of this week so that we can have more time for considering and taking action on those draft resolutions.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.