VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 21st MEETING

Chairman: Mr. SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil)

later: Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia) (Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 11:15 a.m.

TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF MRS. INDIRA GANDHI, PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA

The CHAIRMAN: It is with an overwhelming sense of shock that the international community has received the news of the assassination of the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi has not only played a prominent role in the political and economic development of India, as well as in the promotion of the Non-Aligned Movement, of which she was currently the Chairman, but also contributed immensely to the advancement of international peace and security as a whole.

In extending our sincere condolences to the Government and people of India, we wish to express our conviction that the people of India, in continued co-operation with the countries of the world, will continue to labour tirelessly to enhance world peace and security for the benefit of all mankind. I believe that this will constitute the surest measure of the tribute to this esteemed leader.

I would like, therefore, on behalf of the First Committee of the General Assembly, and the other officers of the Committee, as well as on my own behalf, to convey to the representative of India, Ambassador Dubey, our heartfelt condolences on the loss of his country's great leader, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

I now request the members of the Committee to stand and observe a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of this great leader.

The members of the First Committee observed a minute of silence.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Iraq, who will speak on behalf of the Asian Group of States.

Mr. MAHBOUB (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of the Asian Group and on behalf of the delegation of my country, and personally, I wish to offer my sincere condolences to the delegation of India upon this great shock resulting from the assassination that has greatly offended us, the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and Chairman of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries.

We all remember, with great respect, the historical value of Mrs. Gandhi, as well as her positive and very privileged role in the improvement and development of international relations. We always remember her very moving statement, from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly, when she made an appeal to improve the international situation at present, and when she called on us to lay the foundations for co-operation and international security.
(Mr. Mahboub, Iraq)

The fact that she has now left us will leave a great vacuum on the international scene. Mrs. Gandhi is one of the most revered leaders in contemporary history and has worked with wisdom to strengthen the policy of international détente.

She has given the whole of her life over to the noblest human principles, not only in her own country but on a world-wide basis. We shall never forget her historic role in laying the foundations for and strengthening the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries. The Non-Aligned Movement has played a positive role and been of great influence in dealing with very serious and complex international situations.

The death of Mrs. Gandhi is a very great and true loss for all developing and peace-loving countries. We wish to reiterate our profound sorrow and grief at this great loss and we request the delegation of India to transmit to the Government of India, as well as to the people of India and to the family of Mrs. Gandhi, the great grief that the Asian Group feels as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Hungary, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Eastern European States.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): May I be permitted to express, in my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Eastern European States, to the people and delegation of India, the shock and heartfelt sympathy of our countries and peoples at the news of the passing away of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The untimely death of Mrs. Indira Gandhi represents a tremendous loss to the people of India, whose Government she led with great dedication, courage and distinction. In the many years of her leadership, India has made great progress in the field of economic, cultural and scientific development and has further enhanced its standing on the international scene.

The Non-Aligned Movement has lost, with the demise of its Chairman, a great leader who dedicated her whole life to the ideals of peace, international co-operation and uplifting the life of peoples.
She was a resolute fighter in the cause of independence and economic development, a friend of the exploited and the oppressed. The countries on whose behalf I have the honour to speak mourn in the demise of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi the loss of a great friend of our peoples and countries. We all highly appreciate what she did for the development of our countries' co-operation. We always considered her an outstanding personality in our common struggle against injustice and exploitation, a trusted and reliable friend in the service of peace and friendship among peoples.

We have deeply appreciated the activity of the Government of India, which under the outstanding leadership of the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has steadfastly and consistently advocated the cause of disarmament, and especially that of the prevention of nuclear war.

As the representative of Hungary I wish to express our acute sense of loss to our Indian friends at the passing away of a great leader who was a sincere and true friend of my country. Her personal contribution was a major factor in the further broadening and deepening of our two peoples' traditional ties of friendship.

The countries of the Eastern European Group of States remain convinced that the great people of India will find the strength and determination to continue progress on the road charted by their great departed leader. Let me finally assure them that the socialist countries of Eastern Europe will stand by the side of the people of India in these difficult and trying days.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Argentina, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Latin American States.

MR. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the Latin American States I speak with great sadness to express the feeling of profound sorrow with which we heard the news of the tragic death of Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

Once again, violence has claimed another victim, depriving India of a leader of great stature and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries whose presidency she held with great distinction, as well as the world of a very distinguished figure whose qualities were demonstrated on many occasions.

To list the international events in which she was a protagonist would take too much time. We are, however, all acquainted with them and appreciate them, as we
appreciate her important contributions to the progress of her country and the consideration of the important problems of international life.

May we express the hope that India, which has so many ties with Latin America that are constantly growing, will overcome this painful loss and that it will continue along the path of peace and development that Mrs. Gandhi always sought.

On behalf of the Latin American countries and on my own behalf, I wish to convey to the delegation of India, our most heartfelt condolences - which I would ask it to transmit to its Government and people and to the family of Mrs. Gandhi.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Sweden, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Western European and Other States.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): The delegations of the Group of Western European and Other States were stunned with shock and grief at the tragic news of the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

For almost two decades Mrs. Gandhi played a prominent role in world affairs as an inspiring Prime Minister of a great country, India, as a strong spokeswoman for the non-aligned nations and as a respected leader in the international community.

This heinous deed has left the world with a sense of great loss and outrage.

On behalf of the Group of Western European and Other States I should like to convey our most sincere condolences to Mrs. Gandhi's family, to the people and the Government of India and to our colleagues in the delegation of India.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Ethiopia, who will speak on behalf of the Group of African States.

Mr. HAGOS (Ethiopia): It is with a deep sense of sorrow and shock that the African Group at the United Nations heard of the sad and untimely passing of Her Excellency Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India. The late Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, played an historic and glorious role not only in the promotion and social advancement of her own people but also in the larger cause of the maintenance of international peace and security.

As an ardent advocate of the principles and policies of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, she gained our respect and admiration - indeed, the leadership of the Movement itself. She always articulated the hopes and aspirations of the third world with consistency. She always maintained that in this age of interdependence the world could not peacefully coexist for long
half-rich and half-poor. In this regard she always sought the solution in the establishment of a new international economic order.

Today the world has suffered the loss of one of the greatest statesmen of our century, a distinguished lady who valiantly fought for the cause of her own people and for humanity at large. I have no doubt that her supreme sacrifice will always be remembered and cherished by the international community. Her dedication to peace and progress shall inspire not only the people of India, but also of the entire world. We in the African Group therefore express our deep sympathy and condolences to the Government and the people of India and to the bereaved family in their hour of deep grief.

_The CHAIRMAN:_ I now call on the representative of the United States of America, who will speak on behalf of the host country.

_**Mr. EMERY** (United States of America):_ As representative of the host country I should like to take this opportunity to extend my delegation's deepest condolences to the delegation and people of India on yesterday's tragic events that resulted in the death of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

As the leader of the world's largest democracy, Mrs. Gandhi gained the respect and deep admiration of my country and of people around the world. As one of the first women to serve as Head of Government, Mrs. Gandhi was also an inspiration to women around the world. As always, our Government is horrified by this renewed evidence of the cost exacted by the scourge of terrorism upon free peoples everywhere.

_The CHAIRMAN:_ I now call on the representative of India.
Mr. DUBEY (India): On behalf of the delegation of India, as well as the Government and the people of India, I should like to express my profound gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, to the other officers of the Committee and to the entire Committee for the kind words of sympathy and solace that have been conveyed and the tribute paid to our departed leader, Prime Minister Shrimati Indira Gandhi. The tragedy that has befallen us is enormous. The news of her assassination has been received with deep shock and dismay by the people as a whole. The entire nation is plunged into grief, a grief that is shared all over the world. Your support will help us to sustain ourselves in this hour of travail.

Mrs. Gandhi was done to death in a brutal and despicable act that has been universally condemned. She has made the supreme sacrifice of her life in the service of our country and in the cause of the unity and integrity of the Indian nation. She was an outstanding leader of our times. Her concerns touched not only every aspect of our national life but also reached out to the world beyond and the many problems affecting mankind. As Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement and Chairman of the last Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, she had dedicated herself to ever-more intensive efforts in favour of human survival, world peace and progress through international understanding and co-operation.

In her passing away the people of India have lost a trusted, beloved, courageous and enlightened leader. The world has lost a statesman of far-sighted vision, a true champion of the weak, the vulnerable and the oppressed, and an indomitable fighter for freedom and justice. Mrs. Indira Ghandi is no longer with us, but her spirit will endure to inspire us. Her memory will light our way in the coming years.

We will do our best to live up to the trust that has been reposed in our country for working with you in the cause of world peace and progress. Her indomitable courage, her great vision and the supreme sacrifice she has made will inspire us in this endeavour. This will also be the most fitting tribute that the nation can pay to her.

I should once again like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the other representatives in the Committee for the condolences and sentiments expressed. They will be duly conveyed to the Government and the people of India, as well as to the members of the bereaved family.
AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 65 AND 142 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Allow me, on behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, to express to the delegation of India our sincere sympathy and condolences. We are deeply shocked by the cowardly and heinous assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. She was a historic personality whose life and work were dedicated to the welfare of her people, the development of her country and world peace. As an outstanding leading figure of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and as its Chairman, Indira Gandhi gained high recognition and permanent merits as a courageous fighter for the principles of peaceful coexistence, against colonialism, racism and apartheid, and for peaceful and fruitful co-operation among the peoples.

The people of the German democratic Republic have lost a good friend. Indira Gandhi had a great personal share in the development of close friendly relations between the German Democratic Republic and India. The life and work of that great historic personality will never be forgotten in my country.

The debate that we have had so far in the First Committee again shows clearly that in the present complicated international conditions the highest priority must be given to achieving agreement on practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war. It is at the same time urgently necessary to expedite negotiations on the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction, above all chemical weapons. I should like to speak about some aspects of that issue.

Over the last few years the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has achieved a measure of progress on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The outline of a convention on chemical weapons has become visible. The socialist States have made a substantial contribution to that end. That is borne out, in particular, by the basic provisions of a convention on chemical weapons submitted by the USSR in 1982, which have subsequently been further developed by additional initiatives; thus the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union on 21 February of this year relating to the permanent international verification of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons also takes into account the ideas of other States and is directed towards advancing the negotiations. By a number of initiatives on the methodological
approach, the socialist countries have endeavoured to facilitate the transition to
direct drafting work on the convention in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical
Weapons.

Verification of compliance is no doubt an important aspect when drafting a
convention on chemical weapons. We advocate a realistic and balanced approach to
this problem. The aim is to guarantee the implementation of the convention in a
reliable way - no more and no less. This can be done by a verification system
based on a combination of national and international means.

On the other hand, extreme verification demands will only cause mistrust and
impede agreements. Unfortunately, the history of disarmament negotiations abounds
with similar examples. All too often the question of verification has been misused
to impede negotiations, to prevent agreements from coming into force or to question
existing agreements.

As far as verification of a ban on chemical weapons is concerned, the
fundamental principle of the Final Document of the first special session of the
General Assembly devoted to disarmament is valid here also, according to which the
forms and modalities of verification depend on the scope of the prohibition.
Obviously the point cannot be the arbitrary control of Government military installations or nationally-owned industries, but the certainty that chemical weapons have been destroyed and that there will be no further production of them. A reasonable and realistic verification system should strengthen confidence in compliance with the convention. This is not achieved by demands for an excessive verification system deterring States which, after all, voluntarily undertook international legal obligations. It would have disastrous consequences if mistrust were to become the underlying principle in handling international co-operation.

Inspections have to be strictly limited to fields which concern chemical weapons only. The objective of verification can neither be the so-called transparency of legitimate defence efforts of the other side nor interference with the civilian chemical industry. We want to warn of attempts to abuse the highly important prohibition of chemical weapons as a tool for aggressive political and military ambitions. This can only harm the concern to which we are all committed.

Finally, the verification mechanism must be feasible in terms of personnel and financial implications.

Proceeding from these principles, the German Democratic Republic, together with the other socialist States, has submitted a number of proposals for elaborating verification provisions of the chemical-weapons convention. Thus together we submitted last August in document CD/532 a comprehensive document for an international consultative committee in the framework of a future chemical-weapons convention. It takes up the ideas of many States and is, above all, directed toward a close co-operation between international and national organs in the implementation of the convention.

On the other hand, verification proposals such as the concept of open invitation are bound to set back the entire process of negotiation. That concept is in contradiction to fundamental principles of international law and to the consensus which has recently been developing in the Chemical Weapons Committee of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on the question of challenge inspections.

Instead of advancing the negotiations by seeking generally acceptable solutions, that is, starting from what unites us, one side is insisting on its unrealistic demands. Leading representatives of the Pentagon, indeed, insist that such so-called initiatives as the open invitation concept were indispensable for the United States and the sine qua non for an agreement. At the same time they
stick to their programme of an enforced chemical arms build-up, including the
production of new chemical weapons and, in particular, binary weapons.

Recently there has been increasing official support by the highest North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) representatives of plans for the extended
deployment of chemical weapons in NATO countries and the development of new
doctrines for their use. The extremely negative consequences of such a double game
for promising negotiations are obvious. They lead to the sober assessment that
chances for practical results have deteriorated since last April, despite the
devoted work done by Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden in his capacity as Chairman of the
Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Negotiations are doomed to stagnation from
the very outset when one side reacts to concessions of the other side by hardening
its own position.

The agreed mandate of the Chemical Weapons Committee is directed toward
transition to the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working
out the convention. Political will and common sense are necessary to achieve the
prohibition of chemical weapons as early as possible.

The United Nations General Assembly, therefore, has rightly urged in past
years that States intensify negotiations and refrain from any activities that might
impede them, in particular the production and deployment of binary and other new
types of chemical weapons.

All possibilities must be used to make progress in the elimination of these
dangerous weapons of mass destruction. Parallel measures in the regional field
would no doubt promote the negotiations on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical
weapons. This is the aim of the proposal made by the German Democratic Republic
together with the other Warsaw Treaty Member States on 10 January this year to
liberate Europe from chemical weapons. In that document, the Warsaw Treaty Member
States explicitly underlined that the initiative is meant to:

"make possible a substantial reduction of the risk of chemical war in Europe
and, consequently, throughout the world and the start of a reduction of
 arsenals of chemical weapons. Such steps are also urgently necessary in terms
of forestalling the possibility of a chemical weapons build-up in Europe and
preventing the dangerous cycle of a chemical arms race."
We would like to express our hope here that the NATO countries will not close their minds to this constructive proposal and will not let pass the chance to liberate Europe from chemical weapons.

My delegation expects that this session will give new impetus to intensified negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons with the aim of expediting the speedy elaboration of the chemical-weapons convention.

Mrs. GORDAH (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): First may I express the heartfelt condolences of Tunisia on the tragic passing away of the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. This cruel loss will be felt with great sorrow by the friendly people of India, to whom she devoted her life and policies. The Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries loses in the person of Mrs. Gandhi a Chairman who defended its cause with admirable dedication and faith. International peace and security, in the cause of which Mrs. Gandhi worked throughout her life, have lost an eloquent defender and a convinced activist. To the bereaved family of Mrs. Gandhi, to the friendly people of India and to the members of the delegation of India we wish to reiterate the expression of our most heartfelt condolences.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation is happy to see you presiding over our work. The links of friendship which bind your country to our own and your personal qualities, which we have all had occasion to appreciate here on more than one occasion, are additional reasons for our pleasure at your election to the office of Chairman of the Committee.

The large number of items relating to disarmament on the agenda of the Committee is evidence once again not only of the preoccupations of the international community faced with the scale of the arms race, but also over the scant progress which has been realized so far in this respect.

At each session my delegation, as well as the majority of other delegations, has expressed its uneasiness and profound concern over this situation. It has emphasized at each session the urgent need to adopt specific measures to achieve genuine disarmament.
(Mrs. Gordah, Tunisia)

Unfortunately, even if everything has been stated and restated and important resolutions adopted, very little has been done. Some might perhaps be overcome by a feeling of weariness, were it not for the real and renewed faith in the United Nations and its necessary and irreplaceable role, and if the stakes were not as high as the survival of mankind.

There was a time when disarmament, because of its complexity, was destined to remain, as it were, esoteric, reserved only to a few States by reason of their importance or, rather, the importance of their armaments, or because of their mastery of the complex problems of world armament. But today the principle characteristic of the problem of disarmament is its universality, primarily because of the fact that very few countries can escape the arms race in one form or another, whether they want to or not, and also because nuclear weapons, by reason of their increasingly massive number and destructive capabilities, have reached such a stage that no one can feel he is beyond the reach of the holocaust which a world war would constitute. This, of course, is not new. For some years now the power of one or the other of the nuclear giants has been measured in a new unit, namely, the capacity to destroy the planet many times over.

The level of sophistication achieved in nuclear weapons has extended their scope today to an area which yesterday was still a part of science fiction, namely, outer space. Human understanding cannot allow the militarization of space, particularly as a countermeasure to land-based nuclear armaments. That would be to respond to evil with evil, whereas an agreement to resume negotiations, which have been interrupted far too long, would be much more logical. This resumption of negotiations, which we hope will take place soon, will make it possible to unfreeze a situation which has been a paramount source of preoccupation. No progress, however, has thus far been achieved between the two super-Powers, either bilaterally or multilaterally. The present state of the arms race is a constant menace to international security, and it is dangerous to believe that the process of détente can have as one of its elements the pursuit of the theory of deterrence.

We continue to believe that the only realistic criterion is the principle of mutual security. This principle obliges the two great Powers to go beyond their political, strategic and technical differences, to take account, effectively and perceptively, of the aspirations of all the peoples of the world to live in peace and security.
Is it necessary to remind the Committee at this stage that we already have a rather impressive number of conventions and agreements? Strict compliance by all with the obligations flowing therefrom would definitely have spared us the situation in which we find ourselves today. I am thinking particularly of the convention on the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

We are on the eve of the Third Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and it is unfortunate to observe, as my delegation did on the eve of the Second Review Conference, that in spite of the provisions contained in the preamble to the Treaty and the urgent appeals of the international community, no substantial progress has been made on the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. This involves not only the credibility of the nuclear Powers but also the Treaty itself, which no longer enjoys — and not without reason — the confidence of part of the international community.

Is it not paradoxical to observe that the arsenals of the nuclear Powers have constantly grown in spite of the entry into force of treaties designed to promote general and complete disarmament.

I should like to recall in this connection that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is based on the mutual rights and obligations of all the contracting parties. It is only if the nuclear Powers recognize the correlation between their own obligations and those of non-nuclear-weapon States that the Treaty will have any chance of survival. The Review Conference should be able to arrive at a political consensus which would strengthen the non-proliferation régime, inspire confidence and pave the way towards universality.

International security today is indivisible and while the super-Powers have a special responsibility in this regard, all the nations of the world are involved. These nations are capable of understanding that the total elimination of all nuclear weapons and the achievement of general and complete disarmament cannot come about in the near future. It is therefore all the more urgent to reach agreement on a certain number of measures which were already defined at the first special session on disarmament to bring us closer to that goal. It is thus that the early conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests would be perceived as an important and positive step. These nations also expect the Conference on Disarmament at least to make some reassuring progress, even if it does not arrive at an agreement on the prohibition of all other weapons, whether they be chemical or radiological, and yet we have to note that the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva is marking time. We expect the members of that body to show the necessary good will to hasten the progress of their work. We also believe that by reconsidering its working methods the Conference on Disarmament will be in a better position to carry out the task entrusted to it. In this regard, in deciding to associate new Member States in its work, the Geneva Conference thus opens itself to new contributions which we hope will be positive. Its role as the sole multilateral negotiating forum appears to us to be irreplaceable.

Although nuclear disarmament has absolute priority, we are nevertheless equally concerned by the proliferation and sophistication of conventional weapons. Their striking ability is now becoming disproportionate and constitutes a direct threat to peace and security. The transfer of weapons, especially towards third world countries where hotbeds of tension abound constitutes for the industrialized countries a testing ground for weapons of mass destruction, a source of revenue and a means of maintaining a state of insecurity, whereas for the developing countries it means the mobilization of resources at the expense of development. Thus, we are prepared to consider with interest any proposal which would contribute to an equitable solution subject to the right of States to defend themselves and safeguard their national security. Any measures relating to the limitation, production and transfer of these weapons can only improve international relations and establish a climate of confidence between States, thereby easing the way towards general and complete disarmament.

Tunisia, which is African, Arab and Mediterranean, has every reason to be concerned at the course of events in these three regions, at whose crossroads it is located. In Africa, as in the Middle East, the declared will of States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones is coming up against the most formidable potential of the armaments including nuclear ones, in the hands of South Africa and Israel, which, apart from the close co-operation between them, continue, unfortunately, to be the recipients of external co-operation which strengthens them.

My country attaches the greatest importance to the development of the Mediterranean region and spares no effort to contribute to converting it into a zone of peace based upon respect for mutual sovereignty, solidarity and co-operation between the coastal States. The conference of non-aligned Mediterranean countries which was held in Malta in September last constitutes in
(Mrs. Gordah, Tunisia)

In this respect an important step towards the realization of this goal. We consider the Valetta Declaration, issued at the end of the Conference, to be a positive contribution towards the establishment of peace and co-operation around the Mediterranean basin. We are naturally aware that the crises and conflicts which continue to afflict the region represent so many obstacles to be overcome in this process which has now been started. We believe that the Mediterranean countries are very capable of making a major contribution to peace and détente in the region and by the same token of removing the Mediterranean from negative influences. By so doing, they are able to impose their will to turn this Sea into a zone of peace and prosperity protected from the arms race and external rivalries.
The policy of disarmament, to which all of us must devote ourselves, seeks not only to eliminate the danger of war but also to release human, natural and financial resources for economic and social development.

At a time when the economic recession is particularly detrimental to the countries of the third world which are fighting for the establishment of a more equitable economic order, and when a great part of mankind is still literally dying of hunger, the resources devoted to the destruction of all mankind are a constant ethical challenge.

Tunisia, which has supported the establishment of a disarmament-development fund, has already had occasion to express its views with respect to its establishment and modalities. While the political approach to the disarmament-development relationship no longer needs to be emphasized, the machinery for the transfer of resources thus liberated to development is still pending. That is why we place great hope in the holding of a conference that would deal with all the aspects of the question.

Genuine divergencies of interest based on differing political convictions continue to be an obstacle to disarmament. While declarations of intention on the part of the two super-Powers to resume their negotiations are comforting, in no way do they diminish our conviction that the appropriate framework for such negotiations must be an international forum. All countries, without exception, have emphasized on more than one occasion, and particularly at the first special session on disarmament, the central and important role of the United Nations in this respect.

Mr. EMERY (United States of America): Sir, since this is the first time that I have spoken under your chairmanship, on behalf of my delegation I should like first of all, to join with Kenneth Adelman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in welcoming you as Chairman. Your distinguished service in a variety of multilateral forums with the task of addressing the important questions now before us bodes well for our session. My delegation is committed to working co-operatively with you for the success of our mutual efforts.

Before beginning my statement, I should like to add my personal feelings of grief and revulsion at the horribly, barbaric assassination of Indira Gandhi that has so recently taken place. It was my privilege to meet Mrs. Gandhi in 1980 while on a trip to India as a member of the United States Congress. We in the delegation
Mr. Emery, United States

...were very impressed with her sincere concern for her country and the people of the world. I should like to express my own feelings of great sadness at the loss of one of the most significant world leaders of our time.

I have asked to speak today to address an issue of great importance to all of us: the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, which we are addressing under item 64 of the current agenda. I intend to focus particularly on the important and timely question of preparing a convention on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their ultimate destruction.

One of the oldest arms control agreements still in force, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibits the use of chemical weapons in warfare. More recently, in 1972, the biological and toxin weapons Convention was signed. That agreement forbids the production, stockpiling or transfer of biological or toxin weapons. And today, efforts are under way in Geneva in the Conference on Disarmament which, if successful, will ban an entire category of weapons - chemical weapons - from the arsenals of the world.

If these were the only facts they might paint a bright vista. Regrettably, however, they are not the only facts. As the Vice-President of the United States and former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, George Bush, has noted:

"Unfortunately, despite the horror that these weapons evoke in all decent men and women, and despite the specific prohibitions, such as the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention, there have been repeated instances of use over the past six decades, against combatants and innocent civilians alike - always, I might note, against those least able to defend themselves or retaliate against such an attack."

These are the sad facts and we cannot ignore them, despite the attempts of some to turn recent history on its head. The grim reality should energize our mutual efforts in reaching an early agreement on an effective and verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.

The United States has dedicated its most serious and persistent efforts to this end - a dedication reaffirmed by Vice-President Bush before the Conference on Disarmament last April, when he submitted a draft convention banning entirely the possession, production, acquisition, retention or transfer of chemical weapons. The fundamental objective of United States policy in this area is to ensure that chemical weapons are never used. We believe that the most effective way to achieve...
this objective is through a complete, effective, and verifiable ban on chemical weapons on a global basis, including the destruction of existing stockpiles and production facilities as well.

Yet sadly enough, and despite this sincere expression of United States resolve, we have heard in this room from the Soviet Union and several of its allies that "the blame for the failure thus far to reach an agreement at the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons lies entirely with the United States". Quite frankly, that assertion is not consistent with the facts. It is patently clear, I note with great disappointment, that the Soviet delegation prefers to ignore some of these facts. Perhaps, too, it makes the mistaken assumption that other delegations have not been listening either. In any case, we regret that the Soviet Union has not listened carefully, has apparently not understood or has simply refused to face the facts laid out by the United States representative to the Conference on Disarmament last summer when he provided a clear and full exposition of United States policy in a series of five statements.

Allow me carefully and forcefully to restate the American conviction that all chemical weapons must be banned; to reaffirm our deepest interest in negotiating a treaty to accomplish this most worthy goal; and to urge our Soviet colleagues to set shallow rhetoric aside and to meet with us to resolve our differences on this matter. We are willing to consider any sensible approach and discuss any feasible alternative that will allow these horrible, inhumane weapons to be eradicated for all time.

Before outlining the policy that guides the United States in the negotiations in Geneva on a chemical weapons ban, however, I would like to dispense with one of the more remarkable assertions made by the Soviet Union in its 25 October statement before this Committee. It alleged that the United States was relying on a further build-up of chemical weapons and was thereby pursuing "what in effect amounts to an obstructionist policy".

The facts are, as all students of this weaponry know, that for more than 15 years the United States has exercised restraint in the field of chemical weapons. During that time, up to this instant, we have not added to our arsenal at all and, as Vice-President Bush said in Geneva, we will continue to show restraint.
(Mr. Emery, United States)

I shall give some more facts. The Soviet Union has the world's largest, best-equipped and best-trained military force for waging chemical warfare. The extensive modernization and growth of the Soviet armed forces include a dynamic and viable programme to strengthen the Soviet Union's chemical warfare capabilities. Again, let me stress the fact that, because restraint on the part of the United States, regrettably, has not induced all other States to exercise comparable restraint, we are now taking steps to prepare for the possibility that, in the absence of a comprehensive ban, modern chemical weapons might have to be produced.

I shall state some more facts. To have an effective deterrent, the United States will not attempt to match the Soviet Union in quantities and type of chemical weapons. Instead our aim is to have the smallest, safest stockpile that would convince any State that it could gain no significant advantage from the use of chemical weapons against the United States or our allies.

We should not be fooled by rhetoric and posturing. Soviet doctrine states that the user of chemical weapons would gain a significant military advantage in a conventional conflict. This, combined with reports of the actual use of chemical and toxin weapons by several States in several areas, reminds us that it is not at all certain that such weapons will not be used to grotesque and barbaric effect unless we all act now to remove them from the world's arsenals for ever.

The United States continues to believe that we must do all we can to achieve a treaty that eliminates any need for new production of chemical weapons by any side. The United States wants to ensure that such weapons will never be developed or used again.

Last April the United States introduced in the Conference on Disarmament a draft convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. While many in this room are familiar with our initiative, we believe that our motivations in submitting it, as well as its basic thrust, bear repetition in the First Committee. We wish all countries to understand United States policy and our commitment to achieving an effective ban on chemical weapons. A recounting is particularly important inasmuch as at least one of the parties to the Geneva negotiations has apparently chosen, so far, to ignore our statements and explanations.

The United States draft convention contains our proposals for the contents of an agreement that would provide a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons.
This draft was introduced not to impede the Conference's work but rather to accelerate it and was the latest in a series of United States efforts and initiatives towards that goal. The draft drew on much of the extensive work already accomplished in the Conference on Disarmament and the United States representative to the Conference on Disarmament noted in his statement of 21 June that it was "intended as a contribution to the Conference's work". We did not, and do not, claim a monopoly on creativity and I would like to reiterate the statement made by the United States representative in the Conference at that time that the United States is "ready and willing to consider any alternative approaches as long as they would satisfy our fundamental objective: an effective ban on chemical weapons".

The United States initiative has been subjected to scathing criticism and outright rejection by at least one party to the Geneva negotiations - the Soviet Union. Sadly, no constructive comments or serious and considered proposals have been put forward in response. Rather the Soviet Union has failed even to elaborate in clear terms on its own initiative of two years ago. We believe that our draft, the product of serious study and deliberation, merits a serious and studied response. We are still waiting and we hope that something more constructive that could facilitate progress in our negotiations will be forthcoming during the 1985 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

In our statements before the Conference on Disarmament last summer, the United States delegation outlined four types of issues which must be dealt with in a ban on chemical weapons and how the United States draft convention approached each of those issues. The issues are: first, what a party to the convention is prohibited from doing - or in other words, what it must not do; second, what a party may do; third, what a party must do; and fourth, the verification measures that will be necessary to provide confidence that States are in fact complying with their obligations.

The first set of issues involves what a party must not do under a chemical-weapons ban or, in other terms, what must be prohibited by a ban. The basic premise is that a party should not have anything to do with chemical weapons. This is expressed by the first article of the United States draft convention. The parties must not develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile,
retain or transfer chemical weapons. The key to the scope of this prohibition is an understanding of what is meant by the term "chemical weapons", which is defined in article II of our draft.

Certain chemicals are specifically excluded from this definition, namely, less toxic chemicals that are used for domestic law enforcement and domestic riot control purposes. Also excluded are less toxic chemicals used as herbicides. However, the hostile use of such chemicals as herbicides is already effectively banned by international law.

The scope of the definition of "chemical weapons" also includes munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or harm through the release of various chemicals. Finally, the definition of "chemical weapons" includes any equipment or chemical specifically designed to be used in conjunction with such munitions or devices. This article also provides an obligation not to conduct other activities in preparation for the use of chemical weapons. Article I would also prohibit the use of chemical weapons in any armed conflict. This provision was incorporated in recognition of the importance attached by States to a provision banning the use of chemical weapons. The language proposed by the United States provides for a comprehensive ban without undermining the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The prohibition in the United States draft is similar to, but distinct from, the prohibition contained in that Protocol.

Finally, in article I of the United States draft is an undertaking not to assist, encourage or induce anyone, directly or indirectly, to engage in activities prohibited to the parties. This, in essence, is a non-circumvention clause. It means that no party could circumvent the convention by aiding any other States, organizations or individuals in doing something that it could not itself do under the convention.

Contrary to the assertions made by the Soviet Union that "this draft does not have the scope of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons", the United States draft convention contains a comprehensive set of provisions designed to prevent chemical warfare.

The second issue concerns certain "permitted activities", which are not included in the proposed ban, certain things that a party may in fact do. Our primary objective is to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical
(Mr. Emery, United States)

weapons, but another important objective is that the legitimate, peaceful chemical activities in our countries should be allowed to continue and expand without being unduly hindered by a chemical-weapons convention. These legitimate, peaceful uses of toxic chemicals generally are referred to as uses for "permitted purposes", a term defined in paragraph 8 of article II of our draft convention. The United States proposal for regulations a certain degree of which is required for "permitted activities", and their implementation, is presented in article II and annex III of our draft convention.

We believe that permitted activities should include those related to the peaceful uses of chemicals in our chemical industries and to protective activities. We also include as a "permitted purpose" any military purpose that does not make use of the chemical action of a toxic chemical to cause death or injury. This provision would not provide a party with a capability for chemical warfare, since the chemicals involved are not suitable for this purpose.

There are two other reasonable activities that would be allowed under the United States draft convention. It would allow one party to assist another in the destruction of chemical weapons and it specifically protects activities for economic and technical development and co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities, including the exchange of toxic chemicals and equipment for peaceful purposes, from undue interference.

Though it is important not to hamper unduly the activities of our chemical industries, we must also ensure that such industries are not used for the clandestine production of chemical weapons. This important issue is still unresolved in the negotiations. We hope that in our efforts to develop a general approach for providing assurance of the proper use of a party's chemical industry, the constructive and comprehensive proposals that have been made by several delegations at the Conference on Disarmament will receive a considered response. Progress is particularly elusive when members of delegations have chosen not to participate actively.

The third issue involves what a party must do under such a ban. There are two main actions that a party is required to take under the convention. A party must supply detailed information on its chemical weapons, chemical-weapons production facilities and other activities that relate to its capability to wage chemical warfare, including a declaration of its activities related to chemical weapons and of the areas and facilities where these activities take place.
Once that information has been provided, the draft convention provides that a party must destroy its chemical weapons and those production facilities that have a direct relationship to its chemical warfare capability. These two actions, along with the other provisions of the draft agreement, provide for a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons.

The fourth of the major issues involved in a comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons is that of verification. It is on this issue that the Soviet Union has centred its primary attack on the United States draft convention, an unfounded attack, I must regrettably say, that we have heard before.

Let me digress for a few minutes and make reference to the comments made this morning by the representative of the German Democratic Republic. Let me say that we do not look at verification as being a dilatory tactic. We see it as absolutely necessary to raise the level of confidence of all parties that the rules of any draft convention are being followed. Regrettably, I must say that there is a certain level of mistrust in the world. We wish it were not so. But I think it is absolutely essential for us to build into our draft conventions and ultimate agreements provisions that will raise levels of confidence and to reduce the mistrust; otherwise, I fear that any attempt at a treaty would not be successful.

Let me say also that our verification provisions, as we envision them, are not what has been referred to on occasion as some sort of legalized espionage. We are not interested in spying. We are interested in determining beyond any reasonable doubt that the rules and regulations set down to ban chemical weapons forever are in fact being followed by all parties; and that in fact is the key to raising levels of confidence and guaranteeing that such a ban would be successful and would apply to all environments, at all times, and to all possibilities of circumvention.

The United States readily admits that it is seeking an effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. To seek something less than a verifiable ban would be to make a mockery of the arduous efforts of the negotiators from many countries in Geneva. As Ambassador Fields said in his 12 July address before the Conference on Disarmament:

"Chemical weapons are much too dangerous a means of warfare to permit any uncertainty in an agreement banning these weapons. An agreement with the objective of banning chemical weapons that is not effectively verifiable would
be less than worthless. It would, in fact, be dangerous. If such an
agreement entered into force, there would be inevitable and continuous concern
and uncertainty whether the other parties to the agreement were living up to
their commitments. The uncertainties and lack of confidence that would flow
from such an agreement would create tensions in the international community
and could weaken confidence in other existing and proposed arms control
agreements. This situation must and can be avoided." (CD/PV.272, p. 12)
To meet the need for an effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons, the United
States has proposed a régime of systematic international on-site verification, a
proposal that has drawn largely on the work that has been accomplished to date in
the Conference on Disarmament. This system would be applied to chemical weapons
and their production facilities, as well as to other facilities that are designated
in the draft convention. We believe that this régime will ensure that declared
chemical weapons and their production facilities are destroyed and that prohibited
activities do not take place at other declared locations and facilities. The
systematic international on-site verification régime, however, is inadequate by
itself to provide the necessary assurances of compliance required for an agreement
banning chemical weapons. It must be complemented by an effective challenge
inspection system, comprising a range of actions that can be taken by a party to
resolve compliance concerns.

The United States draft convention incorporates a number of provisions for
dealing with compliance questions. These provisions are contained in
articles IX, X, and XI, as well as in annex II. Taken together, these provisions
would provide an effective system for resolving compliance concerns. The most
talked about provisions are those of article X, which apply procedures for special
on-site inspection to any facility either already subject to systematic on-site
inspection pursuant to other articles of the convention or to any facility or
location owned or controlled by the Government of a party, including military
facilities. For these locations and facilities, a party to the convention is
deemed to have issued an "open invitation" with regard to the possibility of their
inspection. This proposal is a bold and unprecedented one. As Vice-President Bush
said:
"The United States is willing to open for international inspection, on short notice, all of its military or government-owned or government-controlled facilities. This pledge is not made lightly. We make it because it is indispensable to an effective chemical-weapons ban."

The Soviet Union has said in its statement of 25 October before this Committee that:

"It would be a mistake to believe that by proposing this absurd system of verification the United States is ready to have such verification applied to itself as well ... Such verification would only apply to plants that 'belong to governments or are government-controlled'." (A/C.1/39/PV.13, p. 11)

In this regard I would like to repeat what was said by Ambassador Fields in the Conference on Disarmament on 17 July of this year, in order to set the record straight:

"... My Government did not take the decision lightly to include this 'open invitation' provision in our draft convention. There would be no question that the United States is willing to accept the consequences of these provisions. I hope that other States will display a like amount of political will and accept this 'open invitation' concept, because it is essential for an effective chemical-weapons ban."

Parenthetically, let me also say that on several occasions, including a United Nations-sponsored conference in Leningrad last summer, in answer to similar questions, I stated, as have other American representatives on other occasions, that we do not intend to apply this provision in any way that is uneven or unfair whatsoever. We expect that all appropriate United States facilities be opened for the same sort of inspection, and we are not trying to hide behind some clever interpretation or clever writing of the language to escape for ourselves the obligations that we expect of others.

Ambassador Fields went on to say:

"I would also like to respond to some criticisms that have been publicly voiced concerning the article X provisions on special on-site inspection. The statement has been made that, since the provision applies to government-owned or government-controlled facilities, it discriminates against some economic and political systems. The argument seems to be that, since the civilian
chemical industries in some socialist countries are owned by the Government, these facilities would be subject to article X, whereas the chemical industries in the United States or other Western nations, since they are privately owned, would not be covered by article X. In passing, I would like to note that the countries voicing this and other criticisms of the convention have done so without accepting the invitation of my delegation to meet with any interested delegation to explain fully our draft convention. If they had availed themselves of this opportunity to meet with us, this matter could have been clarified privately. Article X covers not only those locations and facilities that are owned by the Government but also those controlled by the Government, whether through contract, or other obligations, or regulatory requirements. The privately-owned chemical industries of the United States are so heavily regulated by the United States Government that this equates to the term 'controlled' as used in the draft convention. Thus, the private chemical industry of the United States is fully subject to the inspection provisions of article X" - as I have stated.

"In addition, I will repeat a statement made many times by myself and other representatives of the United States Government. No imbalance in inspection obligations is either desired, intended, or contained in any provisions of the United States draft convention banning chemical weapons. My delegation welcomes any suggestions concerning ways to improve the procedures for the 'open invitation' inspections, as long as an equivalent level of confidence is maintained. It is easy to criticize a proposal. It is much harder to work out mutually acceptable solutions to difficult problems. I hope that delegations that have concerns about the 'open invitation' approach of article X will join with us in a constructive manner to seek effective solutions."

Frankly, after this clear exposition of our position, what is "absurd" is that three months later we are still hearing the same unfounded contentions from the Soviet Union and some of its allies.
I realize that in my statement today I have gone into some considerable detail concerning the United States approach to the chemical weapons negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. I have done so in order to clarify the United States commitment to, and actions towards, the achievement of a chemical weapons ban. The fact is that the United States has adopted "a serious, businesslike approach". Unfortunately such an approach has been painfully lacking on the part of some States.

The United States believes that the time for meaningful negotiations to which not just most but all the participants in the negotiations are dedicated is long overdue. The United States has reaffirmed its commitment to the achievement of a complete, effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, a commitment reaffirmed with the introduction of a comprehensive draft convention banning chemical weapons. President Reagan, in his statement before the General Assembly last month, again stated that the United States remains committed to the elimination of this entire category of weapons. The United States is willing to do whatever is necessary to conclude successfully an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban, a ban which would advance the cause of peace, human dignity and the security of all nations. The United States commitment has been supplemented by deeds. From the Soviet side we have yet to receive a response to the offer made by Vice-President Bush on 18 April, and since repeated, to meet with Soviet delegation members in Geneva to explain any provisions that might have been unclear. Nor has the Soviet Union appeared to take any account of the explanations provided by the United States. The United States initiative has instead been the subject of rhetorical questions and critical comments from the Soviet side. We are still waiting for a constructive, positive response. To meet the hopes and desires of the peoples of the world, we hope that one will be forthcoming soon.

The Soviet representative in his 25 October statement said that the USSR is "prepared to continue to co-operate constructively with all other States interested in solving this problem ..." (A/C.1/39/PV.13, p. 13)

Although we take issue with the use of the word "continue" since we believe it would be, rather, a "commencement", we none the less take hope from this statement and look forward to a constructive dialogue that will lead to the sort of convention that all reasonable people desire.

Mr. Kitlu (Kenya): Allow me to join other delegations that have spoken before me in conveying my delegation's deepest condolences to the Indian delegation
on the untimely death of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's dynamic and dedicated leadership has been a great inspiration to the international community, in particular the third world. Her opposition to the diabolical policy of apartheid was greatly appreciated, not only by Africa but by all peace-loving nations. She will be greatly missed by us all.

It gives my delegation great pleasure to extend to you, Sir, our congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. We are confident that your rich diplomatic experience and well-known knowledge of the problem before the Committee is the best guarantee that this Committee will complete its work satisfactorily. The wide-ranging consultations you have so far undertaken on ways to improve the work of this Committee have won our admiration and meet with our approval.

We also extend our congratulations to the other officers of the Committee. My delegation will lend to you and to your officers its full co-operation in the discharge of your responsibilities.

Let me also pay a special tribute to Ambassador Vraalsen, who guided the work of this Committee last year with diplomatic acumen and wisdom.

This session is being convened against the usual background of a grave situation marked by intensified East-West confrontations and continued deterioration of international relations that have brought to a virtual standstill all disarmament negotiations. None the less it is most reassuring that the international community seems determined not to despair in its pursuit of the goal of resolving the problems that impede disarmament, which would ultimately provide a peaceful world in which to live. All efforts at curbing the present-day spiralling of the arms race and responding to the imperative need to halt and reverse it, however circumspect in their scope, are therefore praiseworthy and deserve to be sustained and strengthened.

Nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war must remain the priority of this international body. Today the whole of mankind is faced with the threat of self-extinction emanating from the readiness of States to use force in pursuit of their defence postures. The pursuit of the nuclear weapon option as the sole instrument for resolving conflicts not only undermines the basic provision of the United Nations Charter according to which all States shall refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force against any State, but in fact has had the effect of distorting the possibilities offered by socio-economic options.
What we are witnessing today is a crisis of confidence born of mutual mistrust in inter-State relations. The cold-war syndrome is increasingly manifested and emphasized by the super-Powers. The only solution left is the application of cohesive international measures to redress this state of affairs so as to reverse the current situation into a process of relaxing tensions and of détente. My delegation regrets that a consensus on how best to approach the question of the prevention of nuclear war, and all other kinds of war has so far eluded the international community.

In this context Kenya is concerned by the increasing sophistication of conventional armaments, which are currently threatening fearful developments. The problems posed by such weapons should not be overlooked when considering the prevention of nuclear and other kinds of war.

Kenya has always supported the idea of establishing zones of peace in various regions of the world as a positive effort towards eliminating the super-Power rivalry for spheres of influence and preventing potential regional conflicts. It is in this vein that Kenya has consistently articulated its position on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. We support the convening of the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean, as scheduled, in 1985. Such an international conference on this subject would bring together all the States and maritime Powers concerned to harmonize their views and resolve the issues that are impeding the establishment of a zone of peace in the area. We believe that the success of such a conference would be facilitated by a firm commitment by the countries of the region, the great Powers and the maritime users to the principles of the Declaration. Kenya has called and will continue to call for the implementation of the Declaration.

My country fully supports the objectives of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, as first envisaged in July 1964 in Cairo by the Heads of State at the Organization of African Unity summit meeting. However, we are increasingly concerned by the growing South African nuclear threat to the African region in particular.
The gravity of the implications of South Africa's nuclear capability cannot be overemphasized. Not only does it attempt to frustrate the Declaration of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) but more important it poses a direct threat to regional and international security, especially the security and independence of free African States opposed to the apartheid régime's odious racial policies. However, it is regrettable that, despite several appeals by the international community, including the General Assembly, the Security Council has so far been prevented from taking enforcement action against South Africa. In addition, certain countries have continued to collaborate with South Africa in that field, by such means as the transfer of nuclear facilities and other related equipment.

My delegation has reiterated on several occasions our concern that nuclear disarmament constitutes the most effective security assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Regrettably, however, there has been no significant genuine political willingness on the part of the nuclear States to guarantee in clear and categorical terms that non-nuclear-weapon States will never be subjected to attacks with nuclear weapons. For whatever reasons those guarantees have not been granted. Kenya shares the view that there is an urgent need to reach agreement on a "common formula" which could be accommodated in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

It is my delegation's view that one of the greatest problems for world security is the continuous technological modernization of nuclear arsenals. Today we are in a very profoundly destabilized security situation owing to the qualitative nuclear build-up. It is therefore imperative that the issue of a ban on nuclear tests must be addressed. It is now over 20 years since the Partial Test Ban Treaty came into force banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. Yet, no real steps have been taken towards agreement on a comprehensive test ban, which would be an effective barrier against developing a new and improved generation of nuclear systems and so enhance the efforts to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. We share the view that the verification arrangements can be adequately negotiated and accommodated in the final treaty. Recent breakthroughs in seismological science and other inspection methods of verification of nuclear weapons provide an adequate and feasible basis in this regard. However, the nuclear Powers bear a special responsibility to initiate the
line of action that would finally lead to a comprehensive test ban that would strengthen the non-proliferation régime now under review.

Kenya shares the conviction that there is a need for urgent multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament through mutually negotiated measures. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament are long overdue, and in any event, because of their limited scope and the number of parties involved, bilateral negotiations can never replace or nullify a genuine multilateral search for concrete disarmament measures. Kenya fully shares the view stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the nuclear arms race, far from contributing to strengthening the security of all States, on the contrary weakens it and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

On the other hand, progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament would help to ensure international peace and security and improve the international climate, which would in turn facilitate further progress. We are also convinced that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for maintaining the balance of international peace, only contributes to the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments, leading to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. We discount the premise that there are moral and political justifications for making the whole world's security depend on the state of relations existing among the nuclear-weapon States.

In the area of chemical weapons, considerable progress has been made in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We share the optimism that a comprehensive convention which would outlaw for ever the development, production, stockpiling, storage and use of those terrible weapons and provide for the destruction of existing stocks can be effectively concluded and internationally respected. In this context, Kenya welcomes the efforts of the Government of the United States of America, among others, in submitting a draft convention last year and the Soviet Union's acceptance of the principle of on-site inspections of the destruction of existing stocks.

Kenya has repeatedly pointed out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space has acquired particular urgency. Today it has become apparent that there is an overriding need to prevent the process of militarization of outer space from
assuming irreversible proportions. The first step in that direction should be to discontinue immediately any existing programmes to nuclearize outer space. It is regrettable that all previous efforts have failed to result in an acceptable and binding legal instrument ensuring that outer space is preserved as the common heritage of mankind and does not become another area for military competition. It is the view of my delegation that, although the super-Powers bear a special responsibility with regard to the demilitarization of outer space, the subject remains a collective and multilateral one concerning which all States share the responsibility of taking appropriate measures, as succinctly stated in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation warmly welcomes the inclusion in our agenda of the item on disarmament and development. Most of us know that enormous research work has been done on the present-day utilization of resources for military purposes and the economic and social effects of continuing the arms race. Other studies have placed special emphasis on both the desirability and the feasibility of the reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes, following disarmament measures.

The industrialized nations account for three quarters of the estimated $700 billion global military expenditures. The allocation of such sums not only profoundly affects the international economic system but also manifests itself in the decline of official development assistance in terms of donor gross national product and in the growing tendency towards protectionism. This item must therefore be addressed to focus attention on how positive causal links between disarmament and development can be established internationally at all levels.
Kenya believes that there is an intrinsic correlation between disarmament progress and development issues. This relationship has increased importance and becomes even more necessary in the light of the unbridled increase in military expenditures at the expense of all natural and human development, particularly in third-world nations.

It is widely acknowledged that the arms build-up on the one hand and development on the other are in a competitive relationship, particularly in terms of their claims on scarce resources of both finance and highly skilled manpower. The catalytic effects of disarmament are bound to contribute to the growth and stability of the world economy and lead to the channelling of some of the released resources for the benefit of developing countries. To that end Kenya will support any initiative aimed at a decision during this session to convene an international conference on disarmament and development under the United Nations auspices.

On a final note we should also like to associate ourselves with other delegations who have called on the great Powers to resume their negotiations on arms reduction talks. This resumption of negotiations should be undertaken in a spirit of genuine reciprocal political good will if the negotiations are to succeed.

Mr. SIBAY (Turkey): First I should like to express the great sorrow of the Turkish Government and people at the death of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, one of the great leaders of our times. Such dastardly acts bring to our attention once again a phenomenon with which modern societies have to cope, namely, terrorism, which is one of the scourges that seem to afflict us all.

Since this is the first time the Turkish delegation has spoken here at this session of the General Assembly, permit me, Sir, to state at the outset my delegation's pleasure at seeing you in the Chair. We would like to offer you and to the other officers of the Committee our warm congratulations. I wish to assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation.

The present session is meeting once again at a time when international relations remain strained. The situation in the Middle East continues to be a cause for grave concern. The war between Iran and Iraq, two of Turkey's neighbours, presents yet another major source of tension and danger in our region. We continue to be deeply concerned about the situation in Afghanistan and the continuing tragedy of its brave people, with which Turkey has always enjoyed brotherly relations.
On the other hand, although there is an increasing awareness of the dangers of arms competition in the nuclear and conventional fields, major disarmament negotiations remain suspended or are moving forward at such an insignificant pace that progress is not visible to the naked eye. As if this is not bad enough, some observers seriously think that some of the most important of the existing agreements are not being properly observed or in fact are being violated.

Due to its geopolitical situation and historical experience, Turkey has always attached vital importance to its security requirements. Being on the dividing line of two alliances and a member of one of them, Turkey's objective is, and remains, to have an adequate defence capability as well as balanced and verifiable arms control, with arms reduction steps to be taken in conjunction with a policy of dialogue and confidence building.

Although the international situation in general and East-West relations in particular continue to be tense, all is not bleak on the horizon.

We welcomed the recent proposals made by President Reagan in his address to the General Assembly a few weeks ago. He reaffirmed his country's willingness to enter into constructive negotiations with the Soviet Union.

It is our earnest hope that the Soviet Union will seize this opportunity and commence meaningful negotiations on a wide spectrum. In this context we are encouraged by the high-level contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union, by the recently published views of General Secretary Chernenko and by some of the statements made in the Committee.

Some of the speakers who have preceded us in the debate have elaborated on the dangers of nuclear war, and have pointed their fingers accusingly at the increasing number of nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war are a source of great concern to us all. But, while emphasizing these important issues, one tends sometimes to get carried away and overlook some of the other realities behind our more immediate preoccupations.

In our opinion, these instruments of death and destruction have also been instrumental in giving us one of the longest periods of peace. If one takes into consideration one of the other realities of our times, namely, the imbalance in conventional weapons between the East and the West, one would have to concede that the concept of deterrence has worked and a global conflict was successfully avoided.
The presence of deterrence has not been effectual in stopping any of the 150 or so armed conflicts in which, according to the report of experts in a recently published United Nations study, 20 million people have lost their lives since the end of the Second World War. It was not meant to be. But it has deterred a global conflict between the two blocs, the consequences of which would have been far more devastating.

The strategy of deterrence for the foreseeable future will have to be one of the pillars of our defence and security.

Unless we take proper note of the critical interrelationship between imbalance in conventional weapons and nuclear disarmament, we would be doing a disservice to our cause. Nowhere has this point been more relevant than in Europe on the divide between the two major alliances.

I need not remind anybody that all the armed conflicts that took place in the last 40 years or so were fought with conventional weapons. The present danger to our mind remains the escalation of some such conflict into a nuclear one.

The continuing deployment of the new triple-warheaded Soviet intermediate range missiles since 1977, in addition to SS-3s and SS-4s, has increased the existing threat against Western security. Failing to stem this new development, countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in December 1979 had no alternative but to take the dual-track decision which was in essence a decision, to give the negotiations a fair chance.
However, during the time span to the end of 1983, it was not possible to arrange negotiated limitations on these new weapons. Thus the installation of the new American intermediate-range weapons had to start.

The Government whose new missiles constituted an additional threat to all the territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1977 took this opportunity to suspend not only negotiations concerning the intermediate-range missiles but the START negotiations concerning strategic forces.

We cannot, in all earnestness, understand the position taken by the Soviet Union, which continues to insist on the withdrawal of the new American missiles which were deployed to eliminate a destabilizing imbalance. It is our fervent hope that these bilateral negotiations will soon be resumed, thus creating the right climate for a more productive negotiating process in international forums. To this end, last year the Turkish delegation, with a number of Western delegations, sponsored a resolution which was adopted by an overwhelming majority, asking the two sides to resume their negotiations without preconditions. The sentiments behind this resolution are, if anything, even more valid today.

The continuation of the atmosphere of tension in international relations has once again underlined the inherent dangers of the prevailing atmosphere of mistrust that continues to afflict the international community. At this stage, building mutual trust and establishing a feeling of confidence seem to us of primordial importance. The objective of confidence-building should thus be not only to contribute to the enhancement of peace and security but also to facilitate the adoption of effectively verifiable disarmament and arms limitation measures.

It is our considered opinion that the recent successful conclusion of the Madrid follow-up session of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the convening in Stockholm of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe could contribute to the re-establishment of such an atmosphere, thus also making possible the adoption of militarily significant binding, and verifiable confidence-building measures.

Such a positive outcome of the regional application of the concept of confidence-building measures in an area where the two previous world conflicts started, which is still one of the main theatres of tension between the East and the West, would not only have consequences in an area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, but would have worldwide relevance in reducing tensions. The
successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference would also, it is to be hoped, pave the way for a second phase, that of disarmament in Europe.

Turkey has supported the idea of establishing zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones wherever and whenever possible and feasible in practice. Undoubtedly, this necessitates as a prior condition an adequate level of co-operation, understanding and confidence between the countries of the region in question. In other instances, Turkey has taken the position that the introduction of nuclear weapons to certain areas was a result of the general confrontation and lack of confidence prevailing in that particular part of the world. The presence of such weapons in Europe, as well as the Balkans, is, in the Turkish view, a direct consequence of the lack of adequate security in this part of the globe, and the elimination of the consequences would be possible only through the elimination of the causes. Turkey considers that the security of the Balkans is directly related to that of Europe as a whole and that one cannot be isolated from the other. Security cannot, therefore, be attained by establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans while this region continues to be under a major threat from other regions close by.

An area where the most dire predictions of the doomsayers did not come true concerns the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which will be reviewed next year. The number of nuclear countries has remained at five and horizontal proliferation did not materialize. On the other hand, vertical proliferation has continued unabated and the nuclear-weapon States have generally chosen to neglect their other most important duties arising from the Treaty, one of which concerns their obligation to negotiate. That this was at times due to existing tensions during the past decades in no way eliminates their solemn duty to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals. No number of excuses or shifting the blame on this subject would really satisfy the other members of the international community. Furthermore, this unforgivable negligence might in time tempt some parties or non-parties to this most important instrument to acquire their own nuclear weapons on the assumption that they were serving their own best national interests. This possibility must not for a moment escape the attention of the existing nuclear countries and must be the single most important reason for them to negotiate seriously, first to end the nuclear arms race and then to reduce and eventually eliminate existing stockpiles.
Another important issue before us is the use of outer space. The outer space Treaty has underlined the importance of mankind's common interest in research and the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. This Treaty prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space and the use of celestial bodies for the installation of military facilities and the testing of weapons. Throughout the general debate held here in our Committee various speakers have expressed their fears of a further extension of the arms race into the heavens and the ensuing destabilizing effects of such a development.

On the other hand, most of the speakers have neglected to address themselves to the stabilizing effects of some of the existing systems in orbit at the moment which substantially contribute to the verification of some of the important agreements now in force, to the avoidance of potentially serious misunderstandings between the East and the West, to early warning and to communications - thus incomparably increasing global stability and security.

It is a source of great regret for us that it has so far not been possible for countries which bear special responsibility in this field to come together.
Use of space is another area which is directly related to some of the sensitive areas concerning disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. The realization of this fact would, in our opinion, promote a pragmatic approach to this vitally important issue, thus enabling it to be dealt with to the advantage of us all. In other words, speed and realism are of great importance. This is one area where advances in technology may outstrip the ability of even the best-intentioned statesmen and diplomats to negotiate. It would be to the advantage of the world community if this point were always kept in mind.

Another issue once again before us this year is the question of Antarctica.

The Turkish Government is of the view that the Antarctic Treaty system represents one of the most successful examples of co-operation between States with different systems. We attach the utmost importance to the objectives and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty as stated in the preamble to it, that is, it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord. In this context, Turkey attaches equal importance to articles I and V of the Antarctic Treaty, which explicitly set forth principles for the non-militarization and non-nuclearization of Antarctica and which, through a uniquely effective system of verification, represent a major contribution to safeguarding peace and stability.

We also attach importance to the provisions of the Treaty dealing with the protection of its unique environment.

On this occasion we also wish to encourage the signatories to the Antarctic Treaty to increase their efforts for international scientific co-operation and the widest possible dissemination of the results.

The task before us is, and remains, a difficult one. As we said last year in our statement in the First Committee, a safe course of action to follow would be to forego intellectual romanticism and, at times, linguistic deception in favour of simple, sheer realism.

In the short run, the wisest course we might adopt could be to accept the realities of the world we live in, however unpleasant they may be, and to start changing them with one firm step at a time, to be followed by many such steps into the foreseeable future.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.