VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 11th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Vice-Chairman)

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Statements were made by:

Mr. Dubey (India)
Mr. Lautenschlager (Federal Republic of Germany)
Mr. Gbeho (Ghana)
Mr. Gauci (Malta)
Mr. Essy (Ivory Coast)
Mr. Qian Jiadong (China)
The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 65 AND 142 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. DUHEY (India): I should like to extend our sincerest felicitations to Ambassador Souza e Silva on his election to the high office of Chairman of the First Committee. We have long admired him as an outstanding diplomat with extraordinary insight into disarmament matters and vast experience of the United Nations system. Our two countries have traditional bonds of friendship which have been strengthened by our common desire to strive for global peace and prosperity. We look forward to a fruitful outcome of the Committee's deliberations under his stewardship and assure him of the Indian delegation's unstinted co-operation.

I should like also to congratulate the other officers of the Committee on their election to their posts.

I take this opportunity also to acknowledge with gratitude the remarkably efficient and pleasant manner in which Ambassador Tom Vraalsen of Norway guided the Committee's work last year.

The Committee is meeting at a time when there is a complete stalemate in disarmament negotiations. There is not a single forum, bilateral or multilateral, in which negotiations are under way for halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and reversing the armament process. The arms race is continuing unabated, with the development and deployment of nuclear arms of great accuracy, shorter flying time and greater lethal power, with a whole new generation of nuclear weapons having already made their appearance in the arsenals or the weapon laboratories of the super-Powers and with the extension of the nuclear-arms race into outer space. There is also a dedicated attempt to develop unverifiable nuclear weapons which could make nuclear disarmament impossible in future, given the insistence of the nuclear-weapon Powers on foolproof verification. In spite of the recent very welcome attempt to resume high-level political contacts between the two super-Powers, the new cold war still continues to bedevil international political relations. Whereas, on the one hand, no disarmament treaties are seriously being negotiated, on the other hand, existing agreements on disarmament are under attack, with the super-Powers levelling charges and counter-charges of violations of these agreements.
The United Nations General Assembly, acutely aware of the peril for mankind of the nuclear arms race, effectively discharged its responsibility last year in unambiguous terms by adopting resolutions by an overwhelming majority on such critical aspects of nuclear disarmament as the non-use of nuclear weapons, freeze on those weapons, prevention of nuclear war, prevention of the arms race into outer space and banning nuclear-weapon tests. The resolution on the non-use of nuclear weapons was supported by as many as 126 nations, that on freeze on nuclear weapons by 124, that on prevention of nuclear war by 128, and that on the prevention of an arms race in outer space by all the representatives in this Assembly except two.

In spite of this overwhelming mandate given by the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament could not act on any of the resolutions in terms of even making a beginning towards negotiating agreement or agreements on these crucial issues. The report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly is a sombre story of the total stalemate reached in that body and its dismal failure to come to grips with any of the critical issues on its agenda. This state of affairs has been brought about not because of any ambiguity in the way the General Assembly pronounced itself on the issues nor because of any want of spirit of accommodation on the part of the vast majority of the countries represented in the Conference on Disarmament, but simply because of the unwillingness of a few important countries to use this multilateral forum for conducting negotiations.
On the most critical issue before the Conference - and for that matter, before mankind - that is, prevention of nuclear war, the non-aligned and neutral countries went to the extent of proposing a non-negotiating mandate in order at least to have a discussion on the subject. This was acceptable to the socialist countries as well as to almost all the countries of Western Europe. However, just because of the refusal of one or two of the countries in this group even to discuss the subject, the Conference on Disarmament remained paralysed on this issue also. Thus when we suggested a negotiating mandate on issues fit for negotiations, it was rejected on the ground of its being unrealistic and premature. On the other hand, when we suggest non-negotiating mandates, it is rejected on the alleged apprehension that the discussion would be polemical. This shows that the soundness, logic and timeliness of the mandate are hardly considerations for these few countries which decide what to discuss, not on the merits of the issue or the text of the mandate but on the basis of their own political considerations and strategic interests. In the process, it is the prestige of the multilateral forum and the cause of disarmament which suffer.

Some countries maintain that the bilateral framework is the best means for the super-Powers to undertake negotiations. Since the negotiations between the super-Powers broke down, all proposals for taking up some of these negotiations in the multilateral forum of the Conference on Disarmament have been resisted on the ground that efforts must continue to be focused on the resumption of bilateral talks. The net outcome is that today there are neither bilateral nor multilateral negotiations on any of the burning issues of disarmament.

And what was the nature and course of the bilateral negotiations when they were actually taking place? There was no tangible correlation between the reality of the nuclear weapon stockpiles and the threat posed by them, on the one hand, and the very limited scope of the negotiations, on the other. Moreover, this kind of negotiations totally ignored the fact that the security and survival of all the Member States of the United Nations were at stake. The nuclear-weapon Powers engaged in the negotiations refused to accept any accountability with regard to the scope and nature of the negotiations before the international community. In the Joint Appeal of 22 May 1984 made by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania it was stated:
(Mr. Dubey, India)

"As leaders of nations, Member States of the United Nations, we have a commitment to take constructive actions towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. The people we represent are no less threatened by nuclear war than the citizens of the nuclear-weapon States. It is primarily the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, but this problem is too important to be left to those States alone."

The prevention of nuclear war and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament must necessarily engage the priority attention of this Committee. The Final Document adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament clearly attaches the highest priority to nuclear weapons in disarmament negotiations. It states that:

"Removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day." (A/62-10/4, para. 18)

The Seventh Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in New Delhi in 1983, declared that the greatest peril facing the world today was the threat to the survival of mankind from nuclear war. We are now familiar with the findings made public last year of the famous studies of eminent scientists of both East and West that the use of even the minimum number of weapons necessary to inflict a disabling first strike would bring about a global climatic catastrophe in the form of a nuclear winter. Even the nuclear-weapon Powers do not challenge the validity of these findings. Most tragically, however, they are engaged also in driving home to their people the inescapability of this frightful prospect. In a pamphlet recently brought out by the Natural Resources Defence Council under the title "Nuclear Winter, Silent Spring", it is stated that "a major nuclear conflict would rip to shreds the very fabric of nature; it would be the ultimate arrogant act of a single one of the earth's millions of species".

These concerns were fully reflected in the Appeal launched by the six leaders, who urged the nuclear-weapon States as a necessary first step to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, to be immediately followed by a substantial reduction in nuclear forces. They emphasized that the first step must be followed by a continuing programme of arms reduction leading to general and complete disarmament, accompanied by measures to strengthen the United Nations system and to ensure an urgently needed transfer of substantial
resources from the arms race into social and economic development. The essential goal must be to reduce and eliminate the risk of war between nations. The six nations' peace Appeal has received the overwhelming support of the international community. The Appeal represents a significant step towards mobilizing wider world support for the objectives of the non-aligned countries with regard to disarmament issues, as set out at the Seventh Summit Conference in New Delhi.

There is no doubt that the single most important contributory factor for the nuclear arms race has been the doctrine of deterrence. This doctrine is morally flawed, based as it is on fear and suspicion and the presumption of a perpetual division of the world into two hostile camps. Moreover, it has been used only to justify the development of any and every new and more dangerous nuclear weapon. The recent developments in the nuclear arms race have further demonstrated, if any demonstration was needed, the irrationality and untenability of this doctrine. The advocates of the new anti-ballistic missile system have justified the development of these weapon systems on the ground of the inefficacy of the offensive nuclear weapons as a deterrent and they have argued that the deterrence of the offensive system can be restored and strengthened only in conjunction with a defensive system.

One may ask: what is the verifiable difference between the maintenance of nuclear weapons as a deterrent and their maintenance for waging a nuclear war? In our view, the doctrine of deterrence is nothing more than a rationalization for the continued development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons. People all over the world must be enabled to grasp the serious and far-reaching implications of this doctrine if we are at all going to give nuclear disarmament a chance.
In this connection we are encouraged that the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies has recommended in its report that a study on deterrence and its implications for disarmament and the arms race, negotiated arms reduction and international security and other related matters be mandated by the General Assembly. We hope this recommendation will be taken up seriously by our Committee and that the Secretary-General will be requested to take up the study with the assistance of governmental experts, as recommended by the Advisory Board.

In the present state of complete stalemate in disarmament negotiations our only hope for the future rests with the public opinion forums, peace movements and demonstrations against nuclear war. Recently there has been a tendency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies to belittle and discredit these forums of public opinion and peace movements. In this connection it is important to remind ourselves that the tenacity of purpose of these movements and the overwhelming weight of the spontaneous reaction of the common people against the horror of nuclear war has already had some effect on the policies of nuclear-weapon Powers. For example, the glib claims that were frequently made in the early 1980s about the ability to wage a limited or controlled nuclear war seem to have been quietly withdrawn. We are now also hearing it pronounced repeatedly at various levels in the nuclear-weapon States and their allies that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". It is quite a different matter that weapons are still being fashioned and doctrines are still being propounded which are inexorably leading us towards a nuclear holocaust. Ordinary people in all walks of life, and not only the discerning experts, have joined these movements in expressing their grave concern about the impending perils of a nuclear war.

The latest issue of *The Sunday Times* published the results of a survey conducted among 561 children at a comprehensive school in Bristol, in England, which shows that 91 per cent of the children think that they would not survive in a nuclear holocaust, 30 per cent think that a nuclear war is likely to happen in their lifetime, 21 per cent think that one could happen at any moment and 45 per cent said that the thought of nuclear war was actually affecting how they felt about making career and marriage plans. According to 80 per cent of the children, their Government is not doing enough to remove the threat of nuclear war.

As Mr. Jerome B. Wiesner, former Science Adviser to two United States Presidents, has stated:
"The arms race can only be stopped by an aroused citizenry confident in its views and prepared to challenge the many myths and misconceptions about nuclear war ...".

Here I should like to reiterate what our Prime Minister stated in her keynote address to the seventh non-aligned summit: "The Non-Aligned Movement is history's biggest peace movement". (A/38/132, p. 147)

The latest developments with regard to the proposed weapons systems in outer space are integral to the already precarious conditions created by the nuclear arms race on earth. It is difficult for us to ignore the dedicated and determined efforts now under way to achieve a technological breakthrough which will make possible the development of space-based ballistic missile defence systems. There is no certainty yet that a foolproof defence system against ballistic missiles would be technologically feasible. Even the survival of 1 per cent of the offensive nuclear weapons through the defensive layers would be adequate to bring about a global nuclear winter. There is also a real possibility that the process of development of these weapons systems may itself trigger a nuclear war. The super-Power which has developed the defensive system may decide that it can knock out the missile forces of the other side on the first strike, while protecting its own forces from retaliation. On the other hand, the super-Power which is lagging behind may be provoked into a panicky pre-emptive nuclear attack, leading to nuclear war. The estimated expenditure for such a system - as much as a trillion dollars for the development of these weapons by only one super-Power - might very well inflict a crippling blow on the already crisis-ridden world economy.

Finally, the development of these weapons systems will almost certainly culminate in total armament, including both offensive and defensive weapons, on the land, on the seas and in outer space. It is still within the powers of those two States and the international community to put an end to this mistaken adventure before we come to the point of no return.

This is indeed a crucial issue before the First Committee and we must make every effort at this session to initiate a move towards the prevention of the arms race in outer space. The principal reason why the Conference on Disarmament could not initiate any negotiations on this issue was that a number of countries which had voted in the General Assembly in favour of undertaking negotiations with a view
to reaching an agreement or agreements decided to go back on their commitment when the matter came before the Conference on Disarmament and persisted in their refusal to accept any negotiating mandate for an ad hoc committee on the subject.

We can hardly afford the luxury of devoting the limited and precious time available to this Committee to less important matters and partial measures of disarmament in a situation in which our work on the most crucial issues of disarmament remains paralysed. Our delegation, for instance, will not support proposals which, disregarding the reality of the existence of massive arsenals of nuclear weapons in the possession of the nuclear-weapon States, call for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in arbitrarily selected regions. The findings last year of the eminent panel of scientists that a nuclear war fought on even a minimum scale would lead to a nuclear winter make it impossible to believe that a group of non-nuclear-weapon States falling within a nuclear-weapon-free zone can really feel a sense of security when the nuclear-weapon Powers are continuing to build up their weapons and deploy them wherever they like. So long as the nuclear-weapon Powers insist on ensuring their security by using, if necessary, nuclear weapons, in complete disregard of the security of non-nuclear nations, no place on earth is safe, regardless of whether or not it has been declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Prevention of nuclear war remains the issue of the highest priority facing mankind. This cannot be equated or confused with the objective of containing or preventing conventional wars. My delegation is against all wars, nuclear or conventional. However, the repeated reference to the dangers of a conventional war in the context of discussion on the prevention of nuclear war by those very States which believe in the first use of nuclear weapons is nothing but an attempt to deaden both the sensitivities and the intelligence of their peoples about the nature of the nuclear apocalypse.

There is also a tendency on the part of those States to refer frequently to the expenditure being incurred by the developing countries on conventional weapons. Given their own choice, very few of the developing countries would opt for such expenditure. More often than not they are obliged to incur expenditure on conventional arms in order to cope with a security environment exacerbated by the great Powers in pursuit of their strategic interests in the regions to which those
countries belong. Moreover, there is no comparison between the hundreds of billions of dollars being spent by the largest nuclear-weapon Powers on their defence and the amount the developing countries of the world are obliged to spend for their security in an increasingly tension-prone and unstable international environment which is not of their making. To give only one example, the expenditure of the nuclear-weapon States on so-called civil defence from a nuclear attack is far in excess of the expenditure on conventional weapons by any country of the developing world.

In this connection my delegation remains committed to the early convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean as a necessary step in the implementation of the 1971 Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Over the years the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean has been working towards the implementation of the Declaration, with varying degrees of interest from the Powers most responsible for the steady deterioration of the security climate in the area.
As a result of the dilatory tactics adopted by some, the dates for the convening of the conference scheduled to have been held in Colombo in 1981 are yet to be finalized. We have reached a stage where no time frame at all can be considered for the convening of the conference. A number of pre-conditions are sought to be imposed before such a conference is convened. During 1984 the non-aligned countries have undertaken serious efforts to complete the necessary preparatory work for the convening of the conference. We hope that members of the Ad Hoc Committee will display the necessary political will and address themselves to this question in a constructive manner to allow the opening of the conference in Colombo during 1985 as scheduled.

The failure to stop the arms race has serious implications in sheer economic terms alone. The insane pursuit of the illusion of security based on the concept of balance or parity has brought the major nuclear-weapon Powers to spend astronomical sums on their armament budgets. It is forgotten that nothing has greater potential for destroying their societies and their socio-economic systems than the staggering expenditure on the stockpiling of these doomsday weapons. The arms race has never been a sound economic proposition. Now that global arms expenditure is about to exceed a trillion dollars, it is high time that its economic consequences be clearly brought out and debated at the political level.

We therefore regard the proposal to hold an international conference on disarmament and development as a timely initiative. The massive and constantly increasing military expenditure of the major military Powers has already started having serious adverse effects on their own domestic economies and, through the interrelationship characterizing the world economy, on the global micro-economic variables. The military expenditure of these Powers has started affecting competitiveness in the non-military sectors of their economies by diverting for military purposes resources which would otherwise have flowed to these sectors. This is reflected in a secular trend of decline in productivity in these sectors, the ever-present potential for inflation and a slackening of the overall growth of these economies. These countries are also finding it difficult to mobilize adequate resources for the rationalization and modernization of the declining sectors of their industries. Some recent studies have shown that those industrialized countries which have been spending less on armaments are more competitive in the high technology areas. This factor, rooted in the present high
level of military expenditure, is very much at the back of our minds when we refer to the structural deficiencies responsible for the present global economic crisis. It is believed that the recovery in many developed countries is unlikely to be sustained and become broad-based until these factors, among others, are addressed effectively.

The implications of these developments for the world monetary and trading system and particularly for the development of the developing countries are indeed very serious. Protectionist measures have been proliferating to shelter uncompetitive sectors. This, in turn, has led to the erosion of the world trading system and the dismemberment of world trade.

The adverse effects for the world economy of the military expenditure of the major nuclear Powers are also transmitted through their monetary and fiscal policies. Military expenditure has been one of the major factors responsible for the structural budget deficits, which in turn are responsible for the maintenance of high rates of interest in a major nuclear-weapon State. These high rates of interest have compounded the debt-servicing problems of the developing countries and have come in the way of the spread of the economic recovery to other developed countries.

It is, therefore, important to discuss the entire gamut of issues relating to these developments on a high political level and derive appropriate conclusions from them. There is a need to make a fundamental political assessment of the actual dimensions of the problem. An international conference on disarmament and development will eminently serve these purposes.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is repeatedly cited by the nuclear-weapon States and their allies as the panacea for all the problems of the nuclear arms race. While saying so, these States do not even mention the vertical proliferation of the most dangerous type that has taken place during the 16 years since the Treaty entered into force. The warning given by India and the other States which subsequently decided not to become parties to this Treaty that the Treaty should impose clear-cut and specific obligations on the nuclear-weapon States for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, was not heeded at that time. As a result, the Treaty turned out to be a charter for vertical proliferation. India and other States opted out of the Treaty because of the blatantly discriminatory treatment under it to nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Since the Treaty came
into force, not a single non-nuclear-weapon State has acquired nuclear weapons, whereas the nuclear-weapon States themselves have carried on unhindered vertical and geographical proliferation of their weapons system. The gratuitous advice being repeatedly given by the nuclear-weapon States and their allies to the non-signatory States to adhere to that Treaty is nothing but an attempt to divert attention from the seriousness and the danger of the nuclear-arms race in which they are engaged. We should also like to ask whether stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States does not amount to a form of proliferation and hence a violation of the NPT. Instances have also come to light where a nuclear-weapon State has transferred its civilian nuclear material for weapon development to another nuclear-weapon State and thereby given additional momentum to the nuclear arms race.

We have reached a stage in the nuclear-arms race where we must go back to first principles and ask ourselves certain fundamental questions. Can nuclear weapons be considered a legitimate means of waging war? Does not nuclear war transcend the domain of politics and enter the realm of crime against humanity? By what authority, under what international legal framework, have the nuclear-weapon States and their allies the right to wage nuclear war when they know that it will destroy both combatants and non-combatants? If nuclear war can never be won and if it must never be fought, then why are not nuclear weapons eliminated, before their use either accidentally or through the very momentum of the nuclear-arms race results in the annihilation of the entire human civilization? The answer to these questions inevitably leads to the conclusion that nuclear weapons serve no purpose at all. These weapons are, therefore, illegal and their use a crime against humanity.

The first step towards the prevention of nuclear war and the halting of the nuclear-arms race is completely to ban the use of these weapons under any circumstances, through specific legal obligations assumed by all nuclear-weapon Powers. This is what India proposed at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and this is what has since been recommended by the General Assembly with an overwhelming majority. The immediate effect of the signing by the nuclear-weapon Powers of a treaty forswearing the use of nuclear weapons will be a reduction of the fear hanging over mankind. It will come as a relief to an anguished and frightened world. Moreover, by formally abandoning the
right to use these weapons, the nuclear-weapon Powers will see the logic of seriously undertaking negotiations for their complete elimination.

Another logical conclusion flowing from the realization of the utter futility and the evil nature of the nuclear arsenals should be for the nuclear-weapon Powers to apply an immediate freeze on these weapons and to proceed to deep reductions in their nuclear arsenals with a view to their complete elimination. Proposals for a freeze on nuclear weapons have received the widest endorsement by Governments and peoples alike. The arguments advanced by some nuclear-weapon States and their allies against a nuclear-weapon freeze are not at all convincing.
(Mr. Dubey, India)

It is, first of all, argued that a freeze is unacceptable because it will perpetuate the existing imbalance. We should like to submit that it is pointless to talk about balance or parity when each side already has overkill capacity. Another argument given against proposals for a nuclear freeze is that its verification would raise insuperable problems. We do not understand why the same means which can verify reductions in nuclear-weapon control cannot be used also to verify compliance with a freeze. Conversely, the same State which is allegedly capable of sustaining a secret production of nuclear weapons while observing the freeze can do so even while accepting a negotiated reduction of nuclear weapons.

This Committee cannot be deterred by the prevailing state of stalemate and sense of despondency. The present climate of international tension should, if at all, be an additional reason for this Committee to recommend measures which can restore confidence and trust among nations and prepare the ground for the adoption of immediate and urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament. Our universal forum, the General Assembly, represents the conscience of mankind. And the clear verdict of this conscience is that nuclear war must be prevented and its threat must be averted. The people all over the world are looking up to the United Nations to suggest ways and means and provide the necessary impetus to achieve this goal. It is the historic task of this Committee to live up to this expectation.

Mr. LAUTENSCHLAGER (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation has already had an opportunity to express its gratification on the accession of Ambassador Souza e Silva to the chairmanship of the First Committee. On my part, I wish to associate myself warmly with these earlier words of congratulation.

On 19 October the representative of Ireland made a comprehensive statement on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community. My delegation identifies itself with that statement and I should like to elaborate on it and add further perspectives.

In his report to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General characterized the past year as one of tensions between the super-Powers. He described the absence of progress in the sphere of disarmament and arms control as a consequence of an increase in those tensions. This, he stated, also heightened the fear of a nuclear confrontation. Similar concerns have been expressed in many statements made in plenary Assembly and in the First Committee. It is true that the latest disputes between East and West have also added to the strain in the sensitive area of disarmament and arms control.
The broad-ranging dialogue between East and West on arms control, which embraces all aspects of the military balance of power, has been drastically curtailed. No nuclear-arms control negotiations have taken place since the Soviet Union unilaterally broke off the negotiations with the United States on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the strategic arms reduction talks (START) just under a year ago. The ongoing negotiations on other issues have brought only limited progress. At the last annual session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament it was not possible to reach agreement on various important procedural questions.

The First Committee, conceived as the universal forum for the global debate on security and disarmament, was drawn into the East-West controversy. Questions concerning the security of Asia, Africa and Latin America have been neglected. This is regrettable, but it must not be allowed to divert us from our task. Precisely in a phase when East-West relations have deteriorated, mainly as a result of differences in the assessment of security issues, intensive efforts to achieve disarmament and arms control are more necessary than ever. In order to act responsibly one must not succumb to a general feeling of pessimism. After all, the facts do not justify the assumption of a general "crisis" in the field of arms control.

First, even under the recent strains and tensions, the dialogue between East and West and especially the arms control dialogue has not stopped altogether. Negotiations have gone on, there have been new initiatives, and an important new forum has been established in the form of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

Secondly, we welcome the resumption of talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union at the highest level. In his address here a few weeks ago the President of the United States reaffirmed his country's willingness for constructive negotiations with the Soviet Union. If his proposals materialize, especially regarding a resumption of the negotiations on nuclear-arms control, this would open up new perspectives for a fruitful dialogue on all aspects of arms control. We hope that the Soviet Union will seize this opportunity to return to the negotiating table for a substantive East-West dialogue in the interest of all nations of the world. In this respect we derive some measure of encouragement from the views of General Secretary Chernenko as published on 17 October. Also, my
delegation hopes that Ambassador Trojanovsky's statement before this Committee signals a more co-operative disposition towards ensuring an effective and businesslike process of arms-control negotiations.

Thirdly, new and urgent arms-control tasks are beginning to emerge. This is true in particular of the negotiations on arms control in outer space, which, in the light of prevailing anxieties, have been termed particularly urgent at this session in the General Assembly and in this Committee.

It is in this context that one has to see the point made by the ten member States of the European Community in their statement to this Committee, namely, that the present difficulties in the East-West relationship and in the sphere of arms control and disarmament are neither unavoidable nor irreversible.

Our attempts to achieve progress towards arms control and disarmament will involve a tremendous effort. Anyone who tries to convey the impression by proposals appealing to the public that there are quick and easy solutions in this field is only showing that he either lacks the expertise or is not being honest about the situation. What is needed, rather, is the determination and patience to take many small steps. There can be no alternative to this, considering the crucial importance which all nations have to attach to the preservation of their security, and considering their means of doing so. As in the past, nations still believe that to keep their security intact they have to take steps to defend it, either alone or in league with others. We can term this understanding of security autonomous or, if we like, antagonistic. For the foreseeable future, autonomous efforts to defend one's security will continue to be necessary, but they will no longer be sufficient in themselves.

In an age when even what are initially limited military conflicts can lead to unimaginable destruction and assume huge, perhaps global dimensions, war has to be ruled out as a means of pursuing national interests. Preventing any kind of war has become the first commandment for all members of the community of nations. This is a question of practical compliance with the prohibition of the threat or use of force as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. It would not be sufficient merely to repeat one's adherence to that prohibition. All nations must rather, in our view, orientate their military conduct - and the size of their armaments - to this goal.
At the same time there must be increasing awareness that, in an age in which the prevention of any war is a fundamental requirement, security can be ensured only through common endeavours. Efforts to ensure military security must be interwoven in a network of concrete agreements designed to ensure balanced and verifiable reductions of armaments to the lowest possible level and to strengthen mutual confidence. We are called upon to help to ensure that this new awareness of the need for co-operation in the interests of security manifests itself in the policies pursued by our countries. The foremost objective of the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is peace in freedom. Octavio Paz, the Mexican author who was awarded the peace prize of the German Book Trade Association on 7 October, said in his acceptance speech in Frankfurt that peace and freedom are indissolubly linked together and that to keep them apart would be to succumb to the blackmail of totalitarianism and in the end lose both.

The peace policy of the Federal Republic of Germany rests on democratic legitimization and hence on a system of checks and balances which, as we know from history, has proved to be a reliable barrier to the misuse of power and the quest for military supremacy. It is not least the bitter experience of our recent history that has shown us this way.

The defence policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and its membership in the Atlantic alliance are consistent with the comprehensive ban on the use of force embodied in the United Nations Charter. The alliance is purely defensive and threatens no one. Its sole purpose is to prevent its members from being subjected to force or exposed to political pressure. None of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. The military precautions of the alliance are aimed not at supremacy but at the establishment of a military balance sufficient to deter aggression and to render threats ineffective. But we also realize that even greater efforts are needed to safeguard peace. The alliance's Washington statement of 31 May 1984 stated: "Military strength alone cannot guarantee a peaceful future." For this reason, disarmament and arms control are integral parts of our security policy in the Alliance, and for this reason also we are intensively involved in efforts to preserve the security of all with ever-fewer weapons. This can be achieved only by agreements which provide for a balanced, militarily significant and reliably verifiable reduction of armaments.
In his address to the General Assembly on 26 September, Foreign Minister Genscher stated:

"... negotiations must take place. This principle must apply everywhere and in respect of all weapons. No weapons system must be accepted. No one may consider only his own security interests; the legitimate interests of others must also be acknowledged. No one may seek security at the expense of others." (A/39/PV.8, pp. 16-17)

These postulates are consistent with the demands which have to be made on security and peace policy in our time. They do not require anything unacceptable from either side. They point the direction in which we can all move together.

At this juncture I should like to enlarge on my earlier remark that the situation regarding arms control does not justify a pessimistic outlook.

The negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a convention to secure a universal, complete and reliably verifiable ban on chemical weapons are now at an advanced stage. Progress has been made this year in particular, not least through the introduction of a comprehensive American draft and important proposals from the Soviet Union and a number of Western and non-aligned countries. My Government has also made various contributions, including several working papers and a workshop held in the Federal Republic on the problems of verification in respect of the destruction of chemical weapons. During the Conference's 1984 session the eventual structure of a convention has emerged and proposals for important parts have already been formulated. With the 1984 final report submitted to the Geneva Working Group on Chemical Weapons, we now have a reference document which contains agreed texts and alternative formulations where positions diverge. This result will prove most valuable for the Conference's further work. But the work itself will have to be intensified if early and substantial progress is to be made in the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention. A special effort is required by all Member States at the Disarmament Conference, especially in the negotiations on verification.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany therefore appeals to all countries represented at that Conference to do all they can to ensure that chemical weapons are banished from the face of the earth forever.

A major initiative in the dialogue between East and West this year has been the opening of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm. As a part of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process and with a mandate approved in Madrid by all CSCE participating States, the Stockholm Conference has the specific task of strengthening by means of confidence-building measures the military basis of security in Europe and improving the pre-conditions for progressive arms control and disarmament agreements. In line with that mandate, the huge task in Stockholm is to give effect and expression to the prohibition of the use of force embodied in the United Nations Charter by agreeing on concrete, militarily significant and verifiable measures to be applied throughout Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The CSCE mandate rejects any unilateral conception of security in that it says that negotiations must be conducted on the basis of equal respect for the security interests of all participating States. Any claim to absolute security for one's own country - at the expense of the security of others - is incompatible with this.

The West submitted specific proposals in Stockholm at an early stage. Their object is to reduce the danger of a surprise attack, to diminish the possibility of political blackmail through military strength and to exclude misinterpretations and misunderstandings that could lead to conflict. Agreement on such measures would reduce mistrust, build the necessary confidence and thus help to stabilize the military situation in Europe. In our view this perspective offers a great opportunity for the first phase of the CDE.
The conventional supremacy of the Warsaw Pact is a factor of instability in the security equation in Europe which is causing us great concern. The Vienna conference on mutual and balanced force reductions is the only forum in which concrete and detailed negotiations are being conducted with a view to achieving parity of force strengths in central Europe at a lower level. Those negotiations therefore continue to be of central importance to my Government.

The most important approximation of positions to date is the agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact on target figures for future force strengths. The measures necessary to achieve those targets will have to be precisely defined and agreed upon. And the observance of treaty obligations must be subject to reliable verification.

On 19 April of this year in Vienna the West submitted a new proposal concerning both the reduction process itself and the question of verification. If the East takes up our suggestions we ought to have a good basis for progress.

New perspectives for arms control and disarmament open up when we turn our attention to outer space. In the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty the international community has proclaimed mankind's common interest in the progressive research and use of space for peaceful purposes. We endorse that interest and believe that the nations of the world should co-operate as closely as possible in this field in particular. However, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the use of outer space is also of considerable and growing importance from the security aspect. Satellites are already performing important functions in this respect in reconnaissance, early warning, the transmission of news and navigation. They belong to the important "national technical means" which make it possible to monitor the observance of arms control agreements. Thus the existing satellites are playing an important, indeed indispensable role for strategic stability. Those very countries which accuse others of wanting to militarize space employ a large proportion of their satellites for military purposes. They even have an operational anti-satellite system. The "demilitarization of space" therefore proves to be a catchword which, if anything, obscures rather than elucidates the complicated reality.

Let us instead concentrate on specific, verifiable rules that will enhance stability and prevent an arms race in space. A good basis for this would be those already in existence, the most important of which I should like to recall briefly.

The ban on the use of force contained in the United Nations Charter also applies to space missiles, which come under national sovereignty.
The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space and the use of celestial bodies for the installation of military facilities, the testing of weapons or the conduct of military manoeuvres.

A number of arms control agreements prohibit the disruption of national technical means of verification. These also include verification by satellites.

The United States-Soviet Union Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibits the testing and stationing of space-based anti-missile systems.

These agreements need to be developed further. Particularly necessary and realizable in the near future are additional arrangements to ensure the protection of satellites. Here an attempt should be made to agree on a verifiable arrangement regarding anti-satellite systems so as to increase stability and strengthen mutual confidence.

Other anti-missile systems stationed in outer space constitute a problem which should be addressed now although such weapons are in a stage of development well short of operational maturity. This offers a great opportunity for preventive arms control. Talks should therefore be started now between those countries already researching such systems, with the following aims: exchange of information to avoid misunderstandings about each other's plans; early identification of possibilities of bringing such systems within the scope of arms control; and finally, initiation of agreements designed to increase the stability of the strategic balance of power and to lead to a substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals.

We welcomed the fact that already in 1983 the United States proposed to the Soviet Union intergovernmental talks on new anti-missile systems. We would be even more pleased if the two sides were soon to enter into a dialogue on a broader range of subjects. It is regrettable that the Soviet Union, having proposed bilateral negotiations on 29 June last, then tied this proposal to conditions which made it impossible to launch the negotiations as scheduled. We hope that in the near future the Soviet Union will muster enough flexibility to enable the subject of arms control in outer space to be discussed bilaterally as well.

Parallel to this, the multilateral debate on this topic, especially within the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, remains highly significant. We shall continue to play an active part and favour the setting up of a special working group for this agenda item.
If the United States-Soviet Union negotiations we have called for on outer space questions are actually to lead to more stability and the reduction of nuclear arsenals, they will also have to take account of the aim of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons.

In this context, the question as to which forums should be created for this purpose is, in the final analysis, of secondary importance. What matters is that no State evades its obligation under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to negotiate on nuclear weapons. Nearly a year has passed since the Soviet Union walked away from the conference table. Divergent positions are a reason for holding negotiations, not for opposing them. Only those can evade such negotiations who refuse to endorse the basic principles recognized up until now: in the age of nuclear-weapons war can no longer be a means of achieving political ends; the possession of nuclear weapons can therefore only serve to prevent any kind of war; thus neither side should aspire to supremacy; in fact, the aim should be to reduce nuclear arsenals to the lowest possible level by means of balanced and verifiable negotiated results.

We continue to adhere to these principles. As in the past, we also want to resolve by negotiations the problem which the Soviet build-up of intermediate-range nuclear weapons has created for Western Europe and other neighbouring regions of the Soviet Union. Every American intermediate-range missile currently deployed in Europe can be dismantled again as soon as this is made possible by a balanced, negotiated result. The United States is still willing to negotiate on the basis of these principles on both intermediate-range nuclear weapons and intercontinental strategic systems. We hope that the Soviet Union, too, will soon show the same readiness.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany sees in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons a major achievement of arms control policy. That Treaty, to which 124 countries have so far acceded, has proved to be an effective instrument in preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. My Government therefore considers that every effort should be made to secure the integrity and continued application of all sections of that Treaty beyond 1995 as well. It would be a step of great significance if the Review Conference scheduled for 1985 could end with a consensus on this point.
Great importance should be given to a comprehensive nuclear test ban in connection with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which signatory States gave an undertaking to pursue nuclear disarmament. However, the observance of a comprehensive test ban must be reliably verifiable.

In an age in which security has become a global problem as a result of mutual dependencies and dynamic developments in the field of weapons technology, the third world must play a bigger role in the dialogue on security. The growing interdependence of nations and regions calls for efforts in all parts of the world to help to foster confidence, co-operation and stability. Instability in one part of the world can cause instability elsewhere. Conversely, if stability is achieved in one region there is a better chance of this also happening elsewhere. From this perspective, the efforts to maintain peace and stability in Europe also have significance for other regions.

We are convinced that special importance attaches to confidence-building measures within the framework of a global dialogue on security. In the long term, peace and security must be based on mutual confidence. Fear of military threat, mistrust and misunderstandings can be overcome by a process of specific and continuous confidence-building among States. Confidence-building measures do not of themselves constitute disarmament; their objectives are openness and improved exchanges of information in the military sphere. But they can increase the readiness to enter into negotiations and initiate concrete disarmament steps by eliminating the fear of military aggression and increasing understanding of the intentions of other countries.

In terms of applying confidence-building measures in the global framework, we deem it an important step forward that the great majority of members at this year's session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission approved the concept proposed in the Chairman's draft. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany intends to continue the discussion of this subject at the next session in 1986.

The participation of the non-aligned countries in building new, global structures to safeguard peace enhances their role in this process. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement was an important step by those countries to bring their weight to bear in the world. It is already contributing considerably towards global stability. We are ready for an intensive dialogue on security which will be more constructive the more we all strive to supply relevant information and present unprejudiced judgements. We have the firm intention of using this dialogue to
deepen our understanding of the security interests of others, just as we trust that our efforts to safeguard peace and stability will be viewed without prejudice. Through open discussion, through respect for the legitimate security interests of all nations and regions, and through our efforts to build confidence, we can help to give disarmament and arms control a real chance and ensure that the ban on the use of force expressed in the United Nations Charter will have universal effect.

If there is readiness for this on all sides we shall, in a spirit of common responsibility, be serving the aim of lasting and equitable peace.

Mr. GBEGO (Ghana): Let me begin this afternoon's presentation by extending to the Chairman, as well as the other officers of the Committee, the customary but sincere congratulations of my delegation on his election to preside over our deliberations in this Committee. His deep knowledge of the issues at stake gives us full assurance that he is more than equal to the formidable task placed on his shoulders.

When we met in this Committee at the last session of the General Assembly we were unanimous at least in our assessment of one thing, and that was that the international climate was in a serious and dangerous state of deterioration. A whole year has since passed, and it is regrettable that there has been no appreciable change in that situation.

In fact it is in the fields of disarmament and international security, with which we are primarily concerned in this Committee, that the most disappointing and frustrating effects of this chill in international relations can be felt. In the words of the Secretary-General, the past year, like the year before, has indeed been:

"... a time of great-Power tension accentuated by a lack of progress in disarmament and arms control which has heightened fears of nuclear confrontation ...". (A/39/1, p. 2)

The most spectacular example of this deplorable state of affairs was of course the break-off of the bilateral negotiations on the strategic arms reduction talks at Geneva.

There were of course others, perhaps less sensational but no less damaging in their effects on the international political atmosphere. One such example is the outcome of the Disarmament Commission, over which I had the honour to preside in May-June of this year. The report of that session - which we shall have the opportunity to consider in greater detail at a later stage - does indeed make
depressing reading. On none of the items on the agenda was a consensus really reached. In some instances even positions that had been agreed upon at previous meetings were called into question and eroded. The result was that the Disarmament Commission in the end had to content itself with a compilation of irreconcilable proposals for recommendation and could not formulate any agreed positive proposals in its report to the General Assembly at this session.

With the exception of the modest progress achieved in respect of negotiations for a ban on chemical weapons, the picture that emerged from the last session of the Conference on Disarmament, held at Geneva in July-August of this year, was no less bleak. Indeed, the Conference has been aptly described as one that may be remembered for the issues it failed to consider rather than for those that it did. None of the items on the agenda received substantive treatment and the meeting ended in procedural wrangles. We cannot agree more with the view that the Conference on Disarmament should be turned into another deliberative body. Its responsibility must continue to be to engage in substantive negotiations and the same mandate must devolve on its individual committees.
Against this disappointing background the reality of the risk of nuclear war looms even larger than before. It cannot be repeated often enough that the very existence of mankind is ever more threatened by the prospect of a nuclear war each day that we spend in acrimonious and confrontational arguments over the nuclear-arms race and related disarmament and security issues instead of engaging in serious and purposeful negotiations for agreements that will avert the grim danger facing the world.

The frantic and frenzied search for superiority in nuclear weapons, devices and systems of ever more complex and bewildering sophistication, accuracy and devastation is not just a fruitless and pointless waste of valuable resources, but engenders in the rest of us a deepening sense of helplessness and insecurity.

Each reach for superiority by one side or the other is nothing but an obvious illusion because it will inevitably be followed by the side which feels itself disadvantaged by that very action striving in turn for parity at the very least. Nothing but the collective political will of Governments and peoples around the world can bring an end to this maddening chase after superiority, and unless it stops and stops soon, mankind is almost certain to be wiped out from the face of the earth. The worst is that it may happen not by design or intent, but by sheer accident or by the careless miscalculations of those who are reckless enough to think the unthinkable thought of engaging in a limited nuclear war or even winning such a war. These are well-known words, but they bear repetition in face of the unprecedented threat to the human species.

It is the very survival of the human race that is at stake. It is for this reason that we fully endorse the call for an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons. Our fate is willy-nilly bound up with those who possess such deadly weapons and may be tempted to use them. Since they exercise such power of life and death over us, they must at least listen to our pleas for a return to sanity.

If nuclear-weapon States genuinely believe in the search for real peace and security, they should openly commit themselves not to be the first to resort to the use of nuclear arms.

They could and should do even more to reassure the rest of the world of their good faith and intentions by initiating urgent negotiations to bring into being a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. We fail to understand the logic in manufacturing, much less testing, any such weapons if they are really not intended ever to be used.
(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

It is not just the testing of nuclear weapons that should cease without delay but the nuclear-arms race itself must also cease forthwith. Nor should any effort be spared to bring about not merely a reduction in nuclear arsenals, but also general and complete nuclear disarmament as early as possible.

We fail to see how the prevention of nuclear war can be helped in any way by extending the arms race into outer space. That is a development which would add an even more frightening and riskier dimension and complexity to an already difficult and hardly controllable situation. We vehemently denounce any attempt to deploy weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, in outer space, as an illegal invasion of what should remain the common preserve and heritage of mankind. The mastery of outer space should be exploited only for peaceful purposes of benefit to the human race and not be the source of its destruction through the emplacement of nuclear weapons in space.

We appeal to all those States, in particular the super-Powers, that have the means and technology to place weapons and other harmful devices in space to enter into negotiations for an early agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space. The failure of the Conference on Disarmament to embark on substantive negotiations is one of the major disappointments of its last session in Geneva.

We in Africa share with the rest of humanity a common instinct for survival and the enjoyment of life to its fullest. It is for this reason that we have sought and will continue to seek to participate fully in all efforts by the international community to achieve disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament. We lag behind in economic development and technological advancement, and no one can have a greater stake than we do in the preservation of the world from nuclear destruction. We need the assurance of peace and security so that our energies and resources can be devoted to the social transformation and improvement of the quality of life of our societies. We do not need to be forced into diverting our meagre resources into a wasteful acquisition of arms and weapons.

We believe that the best interests of all nations will be served not by escalating the arms race, but by disarmament and the progressive allocation of resources released from the armaments sector to peaceful and developmental purposes. There is a direct and obvious link between disarmament and development. It is imperative that this link should be emphasized. There are those who would deny its existence or see in it nothing more than another attempt by the developing countries to wrest more aid from the developed countries.
(Mr. Gbeho, Ghana)

Yet the development we are talking about is not just that of the developing countries; it is also the further improvement of the quality of life that would be made possible in the developed world when vast sums of money and human resources are devoted not to the manufacture and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, but to the amelioration and expansion of social services.

Progress can be founded only on peace and security, and it is in this belief that member States of the Organization of African Unity in a historic declaration in 1964 committed themselves to the denuclearization of Africa, to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons. But Africa's ardent desire to live in peace and to remain a nuclear-free zone has not been respected. South Africa has been assisted with the necessary funds and technology to acquire nuclear capability. The very advocates of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are the ones which have set it aside and endowed South Africa with nuclear capability for purely economic and racial reasons. They have, moreover, failed to oblige South Africa to place its nuclear programme under International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. It is obvious that South Africa will use its nuclear capability to entrench its obnoxious apartheid system at home and to coerce its neighbours across its borders. Those who are aiding racist South Africa to acquire nuclear capability bear a grave responsibility therefore for the undermining of peace and security not only in Africa, but in the world as a whole.

In conclusion let me state that I have tried to draw attention in my brief statement to some of the major issues in the field of disarmament and security which require urgent action by the international community. We need urgent measures to prevent a nuclear war. We need a nuclear-weapons freeze urgently. We need disarmament more than ever before, and we need an urgent end to be put to the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly to aggressive countries like apartheid South Africa.
Mr. GAUCI (Malta): You, Sir, set the right tone for our debate in your opening statement. I compliment you and the other officers of the Committee on your unanimous election, wish you success and pledge you my fullest co-operation.

We share the general view that the situation as regards the arms race, particularly its nuclear dimension, is precarious. In fact, as we shall endeavour to explain later, we feel we are once again at a critical crossroads—more critical than ever before.

Previous speakers have ably stressed the macabre statistics that should shake nations out of the callous complacency often conveyed by strategists, but I shall refrain from repeating this theme since constant repetition seems to be dulling the impact which the appalling situation should engender. The symbolic gesture by the students of Brown University provides a stark reminder of the flawed heritage which our youth refuses to inherit.

I shall not, either, attempt to apportion blame, for that would only add to the sterility of the debate, which has become a traditional hallmark of the arguments between the two military alliances and which, unfortunately, is already beginning to feature in our present proceedings; nor shall I make more than a passing mention of the detailed position my delegation has advanced in the past, because pure repetition is only boring.

Instead, I encourage the Committee this year at least to attempt soberly to appraise the efforts invested in arms control negotiations over the past 12 years and to single out some conclusions on which it is to be hoped we can all agree, so that we may be guided by them in the further efforts still required to cope with the even more precarious future looming ahead. This is in any case what I propose to do, in layman's language and within the modest means available to my delegation.

For this purpose I have singled out 1972 as a base year, not because the situation was then tolerable but because at that time at least détente was in vogue and there had been what was then considered an important breakthrough in the nuclear arms race, namely, the acceptance by the two super-Powers that their strategic relationship should be based on the concept of "relative parity" and "sufficiency". Twelve years is also—to use the same words, but in a much more benign way—long enough to enable us to derive some conclusions and sufficiently representative to serve as a good guide for comparison.

I do not wish there to be any misunderstanding on this point, though. The year 1972 was itself far from perfect. For Malta— as for many others—the final
objective was then, and remains now, general and complete disarmament under effective international control and, as I shall also briefly explain later, we ourselves are proud to have worked for that objective in practice and not merely in declarations.

From our analysis of the past 12 years it seems to my delegation that unfortunately at the present time the two super-Powers, in their disarmament negotiations, have steered themselves into a rut from which they need help to extricate themselves.

There are now encouraging signs that they themselves have realized this predicament and we - all of us - have a responsibility to encourage this new, hopeful recognition.

We can do this best by seeking the common ground between the two Powers and building on it, not by meekly siding with one or the other according to our respective ideological persuasions but rather by objectively analysing past performance, giving credit where credit is due, so as to encourage increased progress, and also, if necessary, criticizing the errors we can discern in past behaviour, so as to discourage repetition of similar errors of omission or commission in the future.

On the positive side, and from the present stage of disarmament negotiations, I hope we can reach the following conclusions.

First, the world cannot afford to discard the outcome - however limited - of the tremendous resources that have been expended in these negotiations, and consequently the provisions of the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), which have largely been respected by both sides even though the agreement itself is unratified and about to expire, could be tacitly extended for a period of, say, two to three years unless in the mean time they have been superseded or complemented by even more comprehensive agreements. An extension would at least have the merit of improving the political climate and providing a breathing space for more energetic efforts.

Secondly, we can all welcome the recent agreement between the two super-Powers to improve their direct emergency communications systems. My delegation went into this matter in considerable depth last year and pointed out grave dangers arising from failure or faults in these communications systems. Some more have been recorded again this year. We are glad therefore that this concern has been taken
up by the major Powers. While welcoming these improvements we recognize that still more needs to be done and that in any case this exercise is dealing only with means, without tackling causes. Nevertheless, on balance it represents a small and positive step forward and for that reason alone is a source of mild encouragement, especially against manifest lack of progress elsewhere.

A third favourable factor is represented by advances in the means of verifying seismic data. The two super-Powers should be pressed further to accept a comprehensive test ban. Minor explosions which can still defy detection would probably be of limited military significance.

A fourth encouraging element is that recognition of the need for adequate provisions for verification of agreements is gaining strength and is now no longer considered anathema, as it was when this idea was first raised. More and more in recent proposals an element of verification has been included, even by the side hitherto least receptive to the objective benefits that would arise from proven assurances of compliance with agreements concluded – especially so, I might add, when claims of infringements have been made by both sides.

A fifth conclusion is that the work done on a convention on chemical weapons is also, according to our understanding, at an advanced stage and further progress appears to be in prospect. Because allegations of the actual use of chemical weapons are gaining ground, a ban on their use is all the more urgent. Let me recall here that a computer calculation carried out recently showed that the ratio of civilian to military casualties for chemical weapons is 20 to 1, a proportion even more ghastly than that for battlefield nuclear weapons, which is calculated at 8 to 1 in the same study.
A sixth encouraging element is that, even though communication between the two super-Powers has turned from cold to frigid, yet some minor agreements were negotiated and, under pressure of a rising tide of public revulsion against the arms race, proposals are still being advanced. What is perhaps even more important is that ideas favouring the escalation of the arms race are coming under closer scrutiny than ever before. This is not surprising, perhaps, considering the tremendous financial outlays being requested. But the objections do not arise from financial considerations alone.

Perhaps the most significant element is that this year one of the major Powers has come to the conclusion that "it is precisely concrete deeds, not verbal assurances, that can lead to normalizing the situation". My delegation welcomes this new insight, and stresses its political importance in the same forceful manner as we did when we joined this Organization exactly 20 years ago.

This to my delegation would suggest that, as a corollary, in future we can expect that suggestions and proposals for disarmament negotiations will no longer be merely declaratory in nature and will include specific provisions guaranteeing compliance, and that the deeds of the proponents will match their words.

If we extend this logic further, we might even consider reviewing the agenda of the First Committee to see whether we have not inherited too many items during the last decade or so, most of which fall into the category of mere declarations and which in essence only provide a way of discussing the same complex subject under different headings, which is a pure waste of precious time.

These are some of the main positive elements which offer us most encouragement and which I trust will be covered adequately by the draft resolutions put forward. I hope I may also be allowed to pinpoint a few demonstrable conclusions deriving from past negotiations which can be utilized in future to discourage repetition of past errors.

The first is that it is less difficult to prevent development of weapons systems when they are still in the feasibility stage than it is to prevent deployment of the weapons once the systems have been developed.

The second is that the notion of using potential deployment of weapons systems as "bargaining chips" in arms reduction talks is unproductive in terms of securing agreements - and unfortunately overproductive in the arms build-up.

The third is that advanced weapons systems deployment by one side will inevitably subsequently be developed by the other, and hence will only lead to the perpetuation of the arms race, without guaranteeing stability.
(Mr. Gauci, Malta)

The fourth is that military adventurism in different parts of the world has had severely adverse repercussions on international relations, as well as on arms control talks, even during the heady days of détente.

The fifth is that more arms for one side, whether conventional or nuclear, inevitably means more arms for both, and a vicious circle is introduced from which grave consequences have occurred in the past and will recur in future.

The sixth is that the vast majority of countries do not wish to encourage or be embroiled in East-West confrontation, or to be swamped by the military blandishments of either side. This aloofness is to the advantage of the countries concerned, of the super-Powers themselves and of course of the prospects of peace.

The seventh is that no side can convincingly use two diametrically opposed arguments to arrive at the same conclusion. To be specific, on the issue of cruise missiles, one side argued that since it was ahead it would not favour a moratorium on development and deployment. Subsequently, the same side claimed that, since it considered itself behind in anti-satellite weapons, it could similarly not agree to a moratorium as this would give an unfair advantage to the other side. We all know the unfortunate results of this kind of argumentation.

The eighth is that a proposal does not become acceptable merely through constant repetition by like-minded delegations. A process of give and take is essential.

It occurs to me, in this connection, to suggest that it might be useful if for once the side advancing its strongly-held point of view would consider for a moment how it would react if the other side put over that same point of view. It would also be useful if the views of vitally interested third parties were seriously considered. The action-reaction phenomenon would perhaps not be so unpredictable in future, but would on the contrary tend to stabilize first and subsequently change direction downwards, instead of showing the ever-increasing upward spiral of the past decade, when nuclear warheads have approximately trebled in number.

A few thoughts on procedure would not be out of place. The world simply cannot afford the luxury of delay or interruption in bilateral arms control talks. It is evident that negotiations on nuclear disarmament deserve the highest priority, should be resumed and should proceed in good faith without interruptions. Delay has already been detrimental. Similarly, these talks are too important to become political footballs within and between nations. And here, in this Committee, if we could discard repetitive discussion, if we could reduce the
number of quasi-identical items and also the number of resolutions, we should all benefit and the public at large might be better informed and more supportive of our work.

These are the main points that I can think of. They are by no means exclusive and are in no particular order of priority, but I make them in an honest attempt to be fair and constructive. Many others could no doubt be added. I repeat that at this critical phase the least we can do is see what went wrong in the past, try to learn from our mistakes and avoid repeating them in the future. I say this because, if the past 12 years have been difficult and rather barren of results, the years ahead until the end of this century are fraught with even greater dangers and look very bleak.

The past 12 years have demonstrated, for instance, that the two super-Powers are able to ignore their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to rationalize the agreed "sufficiency" of 1972 into the alleged insufficiency of 1980 - a complete contradiction in terms and reversal of positions. The heavy increase in the nuclear arsenals by both sides has been rationalized as a search for stable parity, when both parity and sufficiency were - as I mentioned before - tacitly agreed already to have been attained in 1972, on what most of us then described as a dangerously high plateau of nuclear arms.

The question may legitimately be asked whether, once "sufficiency" and "parity" have in practice become devoid of any significance, it is to be feared that the very basis on which the nuclear balance was founded - the concept of deterrence - may also have suffered a similar fate.

The signs are indeed ominous; often the answer is clouded in uncertainty. Official terms and public statements have recently stretched the concept of deterrence to cover also the initiation and control of, and even the ability to prevail in, a nuclear exchange.

In addition, international relations have deteriorated and the number has increased of situations throughout the world in which an outbreak of hostilities between the two military alliances could occur - in fact a nuclear alert has been declared on more than one occasion.
Little or nothing is being done to defuse these situations; on the contrary, they are being fuelled by vast supplies of sophisticated military equipment, backed by the major Powers and carrying with them the inevitable risk of escalation and larger confrontation.

Equally evident, military technology advances unchecked, particularly through improvements in accuracy and the miniaturization of nuclear warheads, speed and mobility of delivery systems, anti-submarine warfare capabilities, defence against ballistic missiles, anti-satellite weapons and laser beams.

The technological advances are mind-boggling, and indeed it is doubtful whether the human mind can any longer control these complex and bewilderingly fast systems. They were originally intended and devised to increase options and project solutions, but they are now turning into an uncontrollable problem of their own.

And yet we all know that these complex systems are no stronger than their weakest link. They are susceptible to scientifically induced electronic tampering and interruption, and even to natural atmospheric phenomena.

Against the present international background, it is indeed tragic that the best technical means of verification are themselves being considered as subject to potential attack, in clear contradiction of the need for adequate and safe verification systems, and in another departure therefore from stated objectives. Satellites play a critical role in the command, control and communications systems, and an anti-satellite capability by one side would seriously impair a country's capability to "see" what the other side is doing, especially under crisis conditions, even to the extent of each side being rendered unable to control their retaliatory forces. This could be an exceptionally unstable development and might even induce one side or the other to strike first in a crisis before its own satellites are destroyed.

Present anti-satellite developments are at a relatively crude and elemental stage. Before actual capability to destroy satellites in high orbit is reached, development should be stopped now, as otherwise the dreaded militarization of outer space will have begun. Let us at least benefit from one lesson of the past.

Therefore, my delegation repeats the plea it has made for several years now, that these revolutionary technological advances should be harnessed in the interests of verification for peace.

Just two centuries ago, when the only contact across the Atlantic was by ship, requiring weeks, certain considerations were advanced to warrant the declaration of independence, which had such far-reaching historical repercussions. "We hold these
truths to be self-evident..." was the bold and confident assertion then. Today, missiles can traverse the Atlantic through space within minutes with deadly accuracy, and lethal power. The available evidence seems to suggest that self-interest throughout the world today demands an enlightened declaration of inter-dependence.

The truth of the matter, the only sober outcome of any objective analysis, is that we have reached a stage and an age when to speak of national security based on nuclear weaponry at the expense of possible international extermination, is no longer feasible. The time, on the contrary, has now come to speak of, and to work for, common security in this planet.

There is special significance in the forthcoming fortieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, but none perhaps so important as the recognition by its Members, 40 years later, that life on this planet can only survive through a collective effort by all Members, and in the recognition that we have a common responsibility to work for our common survival through the United Nations, since our very existence is at stake.

Permit me to observe, with the passion that comes from conviction, that where there is a will there is a way. Malta is dedicated to peace, disarmament, development and co-operation through the United Nations. Not only do we, and have we, advocated these objectives, but we actually work for their attainment in practice. As soon as we gained our full independence we started our forward march.

At home, what little military expenditure we had was reduced and eliminated. We even cheerfully assumed enormous economic dislocation so as to remove at home all previous employment and revenue from military facilities, and in fact converted those same military facilities - airfields, harbours, ammunition storage depots and impregnable fortifications - to exclusively peaceful use in the service of commerce, communications and tourism for the benefit of all. This is now firmly written as a practical achievement in the annals of Malta's national history, and it is an irreversible process.

At the United Nations, we applied the principles of partnership, hard work and international law to introduce, to foster, and eventually to codify the utilization of the resources of the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes, and as the common heritage of mankind. This, too, is part of international history, and a bright chapter in the history of the United Nations.

The Mediterranean region this year witnessed for the first time in history a meeting at Ministerial level in Valletta of all the regional members of the
Non-Aligned Movement, and, also for the first time, a common declaration emerged, which does not minimize difficulties but seriously and resolutely embarks on collective efforts for their solution. Here, a new chapter of Mediterranean history is about to unfold, as I hope to explain at a later stage when we take up this item.

In the Security Council, during Malta's two-year tenure, we invariably worked for consensus and concerted effort in finding common ground. For two years in succession, we pressed for discussion on strengthening the Organization, and we were asked to prepare a negotiated text showing the results of our collective efforts. In this we succeeded. We kept the wheels of great-Power co-operation lubricated under trying times, with limited but practical results. We also made detailed presentations of innovative ways in which the Council could prevent the conflicts of the future.

Now that a new light is dawning on the horizon, as partners, and in the name of that which we hold most sacred, can we not all resolutely work together, determined to transform the future, so that our children will no longer face the bitter choice between individual or collective suicide through the menace of a nuclear holocaust?

We do not have much time. But this year we should start on a revitalized search for common security, through the United Nations; on its fortieth anniversary we can announce, loud and clear, that we will do much better in future than has been the case in the past. For this, the surge of public opinion is fully behind us.

Mr. ESSY (Ivory Coast) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the delegation of the Ivory Coast I should like to congratulate you on your well-deserved election to the chairmanship of the First Committee.

My delegation is all the more pleased on your election in that you are the representative of a country with which the Ivory Coast maintains excellent relations of good-neighbourliness, since your country and mine are separated in fact only by the Atlantic Ocean; these sound relations have permitted us, in the framework of South-South co-operation, to bring about concrete achievements for the mutual benefit of our peoples, whose cultural links are well known to all.
Your competence and your deep knowledge of disarmament issues, Sir, guarantee the success of our deliberations and of the consideration of the complex issues on the agenda.

I should like also to extend our warm congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador Tom Eric Vraalsen, who last year so ably guided the work of the Committee.

Soon we shall be celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations Charter, that is to say, 40 years of peace since the end of the Second World War. The world has thus been able to enjoy a period of peace twice as long as that between the First World War and the Second World War.

However, according to estimates, the number of nuclear weapons deployed around the world on the territories of nuclear-weapon States and other States as well as on the high seas is put at 50,000.

Thus the capacity that States have acquired to blow up the world 100 times over is what most seriously threatens the security of all mankind today. This inordinate accumulation of weapons of all kinds gives us a feeling today of growing insecurity rather than security in the world.

Given the current international situation which is characterized by fear and suspicion, what do we see?

We see that the efforts that have been made bilaterally and internationally with a view to halting the nuclear-arms race and reducing the risk of war have met with only relative success so far.

Bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers remain suspended.

At the international level, three forums remain open: in Stockholm, between the countries that signed the Helsinki Charter; in Vienna, on the reduction of forces in Europe; and, finally, in Geneva, the Conference on Disarmament.

These multilateral efforts at least have the merit of remaining in existence and maintaining the dialogue that has been broken off at the bilateral level. But, despite the existence of a number of documents and texts, on the basis of which serious negotiations could have led to positive results, we must acknowledge that these forums in the present international situation could not bring tangible results.

Unfortunately, this situation will continue so long as special attention is not given to the improvement of international relations, in particular relations between the two super-Powers.
The experience of recent years has shown that disarmament issues cannot be totally divorced from improvement of the international political climate. Disarmament is thus more and more difficult because of its effect on the security concerns of States as perceived by the States concerned. Disarmament is, therefore, difficult because of its political, economic, social and military implications.

The mutual suspicion between the super-Powers and the absence of dialogue today are responsible for the successive failures we are experiencing. For example, this mistrust prevents the resumption of talks on the Euro-missiles whereas the General Assembly in one of its resolutions invited the two parties to these negotiations to resume them as soon as possible and without pre-conditions.

Against this background, the delegation of the Ivory Coast can only welcome the high-level meetings that have taken place recently between leaders of the two super-Powers. Nothing should be neglected or taken lightly in seeking ideas that might revive dialogue between Powers in order to create an atmosphere suitable for true negotiations. This is why my delegation welcomes equally the proposals to institutionalize high-level meetings between leaders of the two super-Powers similar to the arrangement which already exists between one of the super-Powers and the European States. We welcome also the proposal for exchanges of observers and experts in areas relating to nuclear weapons.

This improvement in international relations, upon which all progress in disarmament depends, is in turn a product of the behaviour of States large and small which should ensure that their acts will not create a threat to the security of others but rather elicit their confidence. Peace is not merely a word; it is above all a matter of behavior.

This behavior by States can clearly be fostered by the adoption of confidence-building measures. The nuclear-arms race has accelerated as a result of the unilateral decisions taken by States in the name of international security. Without prejudicing the security of States in this context of over-armament, unilateral measures of self-limitation might initiate a de-escalation, thus reversing the arms race and creating a climate of mutual trust likely to foster new negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

In the history of relations among States, there are many instances of measures unilaterally taken by nuclear-weapon States that have made it possible in certain cases to draw up international or regional treaties.
Therefore the unilateral decision of the Soviet Union of 31 March 1958 to call a halt to its nuclear tests, like the initiative of the United States taken on 10 June 1963 to put an end to nuclear tests in the atmosphere, made it possible in 1958 to arrive at a tripartite moratorium on nuclear tests and to conclude the partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty.

That is why in the present context my delegation attaches primary importance to the results of General Assembly resolution 38/183 J of 20 December 1983 which called for the preparation of a study

"...on ways and means that seem advisable for stimulating the adoption of unilateral nuclear disarmament measures which, without prejudice to the security of States, would come to promote and complement bilateral and multilateral negotiations in this sphere." (resolution 38/183 J)

Consideration by the super-Powers of the recommendations emerging from the group of governmental experts on this subject might be a test of the commendable intentions expressed recently by the super-Powers in the sphere of disarmament.

Unilateral nuclear-disarmament measures are but a part of the full range of confidence-building measures. The elaboration of such measures is an essential element in the process of promoting general and complete disarmament.

That was rightly perceived by the General Assembly, which in resolution 38/73 A of 15 December last requested the Disarmament Commission to continue and conclude at its 1984 session the consideration of the item, "Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level".

My delegation regrets that at the end of its deliberations the Disarmament Commission was unable to achieve satisfactory results. However, we should note that the importance of this question was increasingly recognized by the delegations taking part in the work of the Commission, whose mandate on the matter we hope will be renewed by the Assembly on the recommendation of our Committee.
Another area of disarmament in which progress requires even more mutual confidence is clearly that of the reduction of military budgets. Consideration of this question was on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission once again this year. Unfortunately, the profoundly divergent positions taken made it impossible to reach specific results.

In the view of my delegation, the reduction of military budgets should be based on appropriate comparability and verification procedures. The use of a standard international reporting instrument is indispensable, because for the moment at least it is the only way to ensure the transparency and comparability of the military expenditures of States. The use of such an instrument, of course, depends on the good faith of the partners using it and also on their mutual confidence.

We are firmly convinced that a gradual reduction of military spending on a mutually agreed basis, without prejudice to the security of any State, would contribute significantly to curbing the arms race and make it possible for the resources now used for military purposes to be used for economic and social progress, particularly of the developing countries. Here we touch upon the question of the link between disarmament and development, to which my country attaches great importance. It is unanimously admitted that only general and complete disarmament would make it possible to release additional resources for development undertakings. We are aware, of course, that despite the efforts of the international community general and complete disarmament, is a difficult goal to reach. The proposals and counter-proposals in this area indicate that we should not expect encouraging results in the near future.

Meanwhile, however, the critical economic situation of developing countries continues to deteriorate, added to which there is increasing hunger and the poverty that leads to political instability, external interference and international tension. To face this situation with its potential for explosions of violence which could spread and thus create a threat to international peace and security, it is urgently necessary to release resources immediately for the developing countries.

In this regard, the delegation of the Ivory Coast supports the working paper submitted by the French delegation at the last session of the Disarmament Commission clearly indicating how it would be possible to make a reality of this relationship between disarmament and development.
(Mr. Essy, Ivory Coast)

We also endorse the conclusions in the report on the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development. This states, in particular, that

"The establishment of a disarmament fund for development is desirable as a means of giving tangible expression to the recognized link between disarmament and development and starting the process of transferring to development the resources that are now allocated to armaments ...". (A/39/229, para. 47 (a)).

Without prejudice to other proposals, the delegation of the Ivory Coast believes that initially the money for this fund should be provided on a voluntary basis by the militarily and economically important countries, especially the two super-Powers. A favourable decision to this effect from those countries could only contribute to the rapid establishment of the fund. The world, especially the developing world, expects from the two super-Powers decisions that will encourage works of peace, life and development, not of death and destruction.

Mr. QIAN Jiadong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): First of all, allow me, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, warmly to congratulate Mr. Souza e Silva on his election to the chairmanship of the First Committee of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. His outstanding ability, rich experience and devotion to disarmament are well known in both New York and Geneva. We are also glad to note that good relations have developed in recent years between Brazil, the country he represents, and China. In discharging his duties, he can count on the full co-operation of our delegation and we sincerely wish him success. My congratulations also go to the other officers of the Committee on the assumption of their important posts. I should also like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation and gratitude to Mr. Vraalsen of Norway for the excellent manner in which he presided over the proceedings of the First Committee at the last session of the General Assembly.

It is nearly 40 years since the founding of the United Nations. Having experienced the manifold tragedies and tremendous horrors of the unprecedented holocaust of the Second World War, the peace-loving countries and peoples of the world were determined "... to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security" and "... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind".
This common wish of the world's people constituted the very basis on which the United Nations was founded. It was enshrined in the preamble to the United Nations Charter as the fundamental purpose of this international Organization.

For 40 years the peace-loving countries and peoples have made tireless efforts to achieve this lofty objective. Regrettably, the purposes and principles contained in the United Nations Charter remain to this day far from being translated into reality. The much-desired sense of security is still lacking in the present-day world.

Over the past year, in particular, as a result of the rivalry and confrontation between the super-Powers, the world has witnessed even greater tension and turbulence in the international situation and a further escalation in the arms race between those Powers. With the suspension of their nuclear disarmament negotiations, both sides have stepped up their deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, thus aggravating the military confrontation there. Their arms expansion and war preparations in Asia, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and other regions have also been intensified. They have not only quickened the tempo of their research and development of various types of new weapons, but also frequently organized large-scale military manoeuvres. What has caused special concern is the increasing risk of their extending the arms race to outer space, which, if unchecked, will bring about the danger of turning tranquil outer space into a fourth theatre of war, after the theatres of land, sea and air. All this has inevitably cast on our planet an ominous shadow of a new world war, even a nuclear war, threatening the survival of the entire human race.

In the face of such complex and unpropitious international developments, the representatives of various countries, with anxieties and expectations, have come to the United Nations to discuss problems besetting the people of the world, to identify the root cause of international tensions and to seek ways and means to halt the arms race, reduce armaments and safeguard peace and security. Our Committee bears a special responsibility in this regard.

The question that concerns people most is the prevention of a nuclear war and the reduction of nuclear armaments. However, it is precisely on this most important question that people are most disappointed and dissatisfied. In Geneva, multilateral disarmament negotiations have been going on for 22 years without any substantial progress in matters relating to nuclear weapons. The 1984 session of
the Conference on Disarmament failed even to establish any ad hoc committees under the agenda items concerning nuclear disarmament, let alone conduct any meaningful negotiations. This state of affairs must not continue any longer. The people of the world demand genuine and effective disarmament. We must not let them down. In this regard, the two super-Powers, which possess over 95 per cent of the world's total nuclear weaponry, should, above all, shoulder their special responsibilities in real earnest.

The small quantity of nuclear weapons China possesses is solely for the purpose of self-defence. However, as a nuclear State, China will never shirk its responsibility concerning nuclear disarmament. We have always stood for nuclear disarmaments. We support the just demand of the people of the world for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the prevention of a nuclear war. We support all reasonable views and proposals which help promote nuclear disarmament and maintain world peace. As is known to all, back in 1964 China unilaterally undertook the commitment at no time and in no circumstances to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It also unconditionally pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free zones. We do not favour or encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We support the efforts of countries in all regions to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace on a voluntary basis in the light of their own specific conditions.

In order to advance the process of nuclear disarmament, China has put forward proposals of its own on many occasions. At the current session of the General Assembly our Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, in most succinct and explicit terms, summed up China's position in the following three basic points:
"First, our fundamental position is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. Secondly, as a practical step towards nuclear disarmament, we propose that, after the Soviet Union and the United States have taken the lead in putting an end to testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear weapons and have agreed on substantially reducing their nuclear arsenals, a broadly representative international conference should be convened with the participation of all nuclear States to work out together concrete measures for further nuclear disarmament. Thirdly, before all this materializes, for the sake of reducing the threat of nuclear war and showing good faith in nuclear disarmament, all nuclear States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and unconditionally pledge not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free zones and should reach agreement on mutual non-use of nuclear weapons."

Moreover, in view of the present situation, Foreign Minister Wu emphasized that:

"... it is of great urgency to demand that the two nuclear Powers stop their nuclear arms race, halt the deployment of new intermediate-range missiles, resume negotiations on nuclear disarmament and reduce and destroy those nuclear missiles already deployed in Europe, Asia and elsewhere ..."

(A/39/PV.8, p. 31)

The aforementioned proposals are based on the current state of world armaments and the realities of the present international situation and have taken into account the interests of all countries concerned. They are, we believe, reasonable and feasible.

In seeking effective ways and means for the prevention of a nuclear war and nuclear disarmament, we deem it necessary to highlight also the importance of halting the outer space arms race and the conventional arms race. The two questions are closely interrelated with nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war.

The arms race now going on between the super-Powers in outer space is in fact an extension and development of their nuclear-arms race. It is bound to lead to an even more complicated situation of alternate escalation in which each side would try to outdo the other in the race between offensive weapons systems and between
defensive systems, as well as between the two kinds of weapons systems. In the face of such a prospect, the peoples of the world cannot but feel greatly disturbed. To stem this trend, therefore, has become another salient and urgent task in the field of disarmament. For this reason, the Chinese delegation has submitted a draft resolution under the agenda item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", proposing that agreement be reached as early as possible on the prohibition of research, testing, development, production, deployment and use of all outer space weapons, leading ultimately to the destruction of all existing outer space weapons systems.

As in the case of nuclear disarmament, the two super-Powers which possess enormous outer space capabilities should undoubtedly also bear a special responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the common interests of the peoples of the whole world, including the American and Soviet peoples, we hope that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament will set up an ad hoc committee as a matter of priority and urgency next year to undertake negotiations on preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. We also hope that the proposals and counter-proposals of recent months between the USSR and the United States of America for holding talks on the outer space issue are not meant to cover up their outer space arms expansion or to shift on to each other the responsibility for obstructing negotiations and that the talks will eventually take place and yield positive results.

In recent years conventional weapons have not only increased in quantity but they have also improved tremendously in quality, with killing and destructive capabilities going far beyond the imagination. Conventional wars are not only realities of the day; they also entail the risk of escalating into a nuclear war. The conventional and nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers are two major inseparable parts of their total military strengths. In addition to reducing their nuclear weapons, they should, as a mutually related and complementary measure, substantially cut their conventional weapons, especially heavy offensive weapons.

Chemical and biological weapons are weapons of mass destruction that the peoples of the world hold in bitter abhorrence. China, once a victim of those weapons, has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of those savage weapons. Over the years the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has done a considerable amount of work relating to the item on the prohibition of
chemical weapons, and certain progress has been achieved. But there still exist sharp differences on some important issues. There is still a long way to go before a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons can be concluded. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament will maintain the momentum on this question, accelerate the process of negotiations and reach an early agreement. The Chinese delegation will continue to take an active part in the negotiations and make its own contribution.

In his report on the work of the Organization to the current session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations rightly pointed out that disarmament and the limitation of armaments are one of the three major elements for stabilizing the international order. This is a reflection of the fervent desire and common demand of the peoples of the world. Whether or not real progress can be achieved in disarmament and the limitation of armaments depends on whether or not the super-Powers, which bear special responsibilities, have the political will and good faith to do it. In order to achieve genuine disarmament, it is imperative to urge the super-Powers to change their course of action, abandon their policies of contending for world hegemony from positions of strength, ease their strained relations and start negotiations in earnest.

China loves peace and yearns for peace. In his report on the work of the Government at the Chinese National People's Congress, on 15 May 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang clearly stated the following:

"To safeguard world peace is the primary objective of China's foreign policy. We will work unwaveringly to help to ease international tensions, halt the arms race, realize disarmament and prevent a world war ... China will never seek hegemony ... China will develop its relations with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence ..."

In spite of the difficulties that lie ahead in the course of safeguarding world peace and achieving détente and disarmament, we are convinced that as long as the peoples of all countries strengthen their unity, adhere to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and persist in their efforts to oppose all forms of hegemonism and power politics, it is possible to maintain world peace and prevent the outbreak of a new world war.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.