Thirty-seventh session

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 18 November 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary)

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency: [Note]

(a) Note by the Secretary General transmitting the report of the Agency
(b) Draft resolution

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82-63423/A
The meeting was called to order at 11.05 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 14

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:
(a) NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OF THE AGENCY
(A/37/382 and Corr.1)
(b) DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/37/L.29 and Corr.1)

The PRESIDENT: I have pleasure in welcoming the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Hans Blix, to the United Nations General Assembly and I invite him to present the report of the Agency for the year 1981.

Mr. BLIX (Director-General, International Atomic Energy Agency) (IAEA): It is an honour for me to present the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency on its work and to inform the General Assembly of the United Nations about the main developments in the IAEA this year.

The Agency has a very specific mandate, namely, to "seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world" and to "ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose".

The Agency is thus active in several fields of central concern to this Assembly and to Governments everywhere. Nuclear power adds to the world's energy resources. Applications of nuclear science in the field of medicine help to improve health and to protect life and applications in the fields of agriculture and hydrology increase and protect food supply and improve the use of water resources. The Agency's safeguards system operates to provide confidence that nuclear activities and material submitted to the system are not used to produce weapons or other explosive devices.
Before I comment upon the manner in which the Agency is fulfilling these tasks I am bound to note that lately the IAEA has been much in the news, not for its substantive work in these areas but for the controversy which arose at its General Conference regarding the credentials of the delegation of Israel and the subsequent action by the United States to curtail its presence in the IAEA and to suspend payment of contributions, pending a reassessment of its participation in the organization. This issue remains in the forefront of members' interest. There is no doubt that resumed participation by the United States in the IAEA is vitally important for the well-functioning of the organization.

The issue of examination of credentials raises questions of international constitutional law and procedure by no means limited to the IAEA and by no means limited to current events. The emergence in the United Nations of consensus answers to such questions would obviously be of great benefit to the whole United Nations system. They would save technically oriented organizations from controversy in this field and thus enable them to focus on matters in which they can be of maximum use to their members.

While the purpose of the examination of credentials is to ensure that States are properly represented, the political principle of universality of membership is based on the premise that certain objectives can best or even only be achieved through the co-operation of all States. When Governments take the step of setting up a world-wide international organization it is because they see the need for certain functions and activities which cannot be undertaken on an individual or regional basis, but only through the participation of Governments all over the world.
The IAEA was created to fulfil functions that require a universal approach. It was realized that nuclear energy and science could contribute greatly to satisfying the needs of the world population and that this requires an organized framework which seeks to ensure that the transfer of nuclear technology and trade in nuclear materials do not simultaneously contribute to the further spread of nuclear weapons. This is still the common view, and the Agency's central task is to help respond to it on a universal basis.

Creating assurance about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons among States requires international verification of the peaceful use of nuclear installations, namely, safeguards. Such safeguards are normally made a pre-condition of international trade in nuclear materials and installations, a trade which is needed to facilitate the use of nuclear energy.

It is not only this overall task of the IAEA - to promote nuclear energy on a universal basis and to do so under effective safeguards - that requires a world-wide approach. Nuclear energy, to be acceptable to people and to play its important role in an energy-hungry world, must be safe in operation, and the spent fuel must be safely taken care of. Safety is not only a national interest or even a regional one, but a universal one. To respond to this interest and to develop minimum standards of safety, a universal approach is needed. Safety failures anywhere in the world will affect nuclear power everywhere. Success in these respects everywhere will permit nuclear power to play a vital role in filling a substantial part of the world's energy needs.

The year 1982 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the IAEA. The creation of the Agency was proposed in this Assembly on 8 December 1953 by the then President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower. Three years later, again in this Assembly Hall, the Statute of the IAEA was approved, and it entered into force in 1957.

The IAEA's foundation coincided with the beginnings of nuclear power. Since 1957, when three small nuclear power stations had just started operating, nuclear power has grown into a major industry and nuclear science has contributed to our
well-being in innumerable ways. During the same period nuclear weapons have spread from the three nations that possessed them in 1957 to the five nuclear-weapon States of today, and they lie within the technological reach of many more States. Concurrently with this evolution, the tasks confronting the IAEA have grown immensely in complexity, importance and, I dare say, urgency. I should now like to comment in greater detail upon the current work of the IAEA on these tasks.

The promotion of the use of nuclear energy for the generation of electric power is a special responsibility of the Agency. This is hardly a pioneering task any longer. As I said, nuclear power plants have been in operation in some industrial countries for more than 25 years, and 291 nuclear power reactors are now in operation in 24 countries. Last year they generated 9 per cent of the world's electricity. By 1990 they are expected to generate 16 per cent, and by the end of the century perhaps as much as 25 per cent of the world's electricity. This is a very substantial contribution to meeting the world's energy needs. At the same time, it is a contribution to more harmonious relations between States, for it relieves some of the pressure on the limited oil resources of the world. It diversifies the energy resources of the States and decreases their dependence on imports thereby increasing their energy security.

The experience with nuclear power was the subject of a major IAEA Conference last September which permitted member States to pool and review their current knowledge. I should like to mention some of the major conclusions of that large Conference.

First, as I stressed a moment ago, the quantity of energy generated by nuclear power is already very substantial. By 1985 nuclear power will provide the equivalent of over 400 million tons of oil, or approximately the oil production of Saudi Arabia in 1979.
Secondly, nuclear power plants have proved to be very safe in operation during the total 2,800 reactor years we can examine. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly understood that nuclear power does much less damage to man's environment than fossil fuels like coal and oil. Nuclear power does not produce acid rain, it does not release carbon dioxide which might, in time, bring about major climatic change; it does not leave mountains of ash; and does not emit heavy metal deposits. Nuclear energy can only harm the environment if there is a serious accident, while with other sources of energy environmental damage is a normal and practically inevitable concomitant. Indeed, some of the world's most serious environmental problems are linked to these sources of energy, not to nuclear power.

Thirdly, nuclear power has shown itself not only to be safe but also to be a reliable way of generating electricity. The proportion of time in which the average nuclear-power plant is available to produce electricity, that is to say, is not shut down for maintenance, refuelling or other reasons, has turned out to be about the same as that of coal-fired plants and has possibilities of being even further increased. In some countries and for some types of nuclear reactors availability is much higher. This point might need stressing, for while the closing of a nuclear plant for one reason or another is frequently reported in the media, the closing of a coal plant is rarely reported.

Fourthly, nuclear energy has shown itself practically everywhere to be cheaper than any available alternative. In France and the Federal Republic of Germany the cost of nuclear electricity is as low as half that from coal-fired plants.

Against the background of these conclusions and the likelihood that the contributions of such new and renewable sources of energy as solar, wind or other, may not be substantial in the foreseeable future the prospects for nuclear power might have been expected to be brighter than they are at present. Although
in the industrialized countries the only real alternative to nuclear-generated energy is likely to be more expensive coal-generated energy, the nuclear option is facing many obstacles in some of these countries. The overall picture is very mixed. While the operators of existing plants are mostly doing well, manufacturers of new plants in some of the market economies have great problems owing to declining demand for new plants.

In the United States 92 orders for nuclear power plants have been cancelled since 1972, and there have been virtually no new orders since 1974. Even so, about one third of the nuclear power plants in operation or under construction throughout the world are in the United States of America, and a very large part of nuclear research takes place in the United States.

In Japan, in France and in Spain, and in some other European countries, nuclear power capacity continues to expand. In 1981, 38 per cent of France's electricity already came from nuclear reactors. Some smaller countries have also reached very high figures: Switzerland, 28 per cent, Belgium, 25 per cent, Sweden, 35 per cent, Finland, 36 per cent, and Bulgaria, 25 per cent.

Most of the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are vigorously building new nuclear power plants and are planning a rapid expansion of nuclear electricity.

In a great many of the developing countries the current electricity demands and grids are too limited to employ the relatively large-sized nuclear reactors currently built, and the infrastructure and skilled manpower to operate and maintain them is often lacking. Only 9 developing countries are now operating or constructing nuclear power plants or have announced that they intend to do so.
In Brazil and Mexico there are delays in the programmes and the same is true of the programmes in India and Pakistan. Yugoslavia has completed its first plant and is selecting the site for a second. Cuba and the Philippines are each building a nuclear power plant and Egypt has announced an ambitious large programme, but has not yet placed any orders. In the Republic of Korea nuclear power also continues to expand.

This is not the place to analyse in detail the reasons why nuclear power is encountering difficulties in several countries, industrial or developing. They differ somewhat from country to country. In many of them the recession has slowed or reversed the growth in electricity demand, so that little new generating capacity of any kind is being ordered. Energy conservation has also been successful in several countries. In some countries opposition from anti-nuclear groups and increasingly complex licensing procedures have almost doubled the time it takes to build a nuclear power plant and the outcome of the licensing process has become uncertain. Coupled with high interest rates, these long lead times have increased the price of electricity from nuclear plants in some countries, including the United States. The psychological and economic effect of the Three Mile Island accident is still felt by the nuclear industry.

The energy crisis is not over. It is just blurred by the present recession and its lowered demands for energy. What can be done better to utilize the potential for energy production through nuclear power must, therefore, be examined. Governments, plant operators and manufacturers can strive to increase public confidence by further improving the excellent safety record of nuclear installations and by learning both from major breakdowns like that at Three Mile Island and from the minor outages that occur in the routine operation of nuclear as well as all other power plants. It is also essential to demonstrate to the public that nuclear waste can be permanently and safely disposed of. Construction times can be shortened by standardization, thereby reducing the interest burden. Smaller plants, better adapted to the needs of developing countries, can be promoted. It is also particularly important that we be able to allay fears that the spread of nuclear power entails the spread of nuclear weapons.
What is the Agency's role in this regard? Confidence in the safety of nuclear power is particularly important. Both the industrial and the developing countries, therefore, have a great stake in ensuring safety.

The IAEA's activity in nuclear power is focused particularly on reactor safety. On request, the IAEA sends missions to Member States to help assess sites for nuclear plants or to advise on their safe operation and to help apply the IAEA's safety standards. The IAEA is now considering operational safety review missions consisting of experienced power experts to review the main aspects of safety of facilities. To foster a full and prompt exchange of information about accidents and unforeseen events at nuclear power plants, the IAEA is launching a world-wide system that will collect, analyse and feed back data and conclusions about such incidents at all nuclear power plants in the IAEA's member States.

It is also essential that all countries with nuclear power programmes, even those with limited programmes, be able to cope effectively with a nuclear emergency, if one should occur. The IAEA is assisting Governments in reviewing and improving their planning for emergencies. Agreements between countries to help each other in the event of an accident are encouraged. The IAEA itself would also serve as a clearing house for emergency assistance.

Hardly any other aspect of nuclear power arouses more public concern than nuclear waste. There would be obvious advantages in regional or international co-operation in dealing with the problems of waste management and disposal. Such co-operation could limit the number of disposal facilities and sites, offer economies of scale and make it unnecessary for countries with smaller nuclear programmes to incur the costs and technical problems associated with constructing and operating their individual facilities. Yet so far it has proved very difficult to secure regional or multinational co-operation in this area. Those and all other current technical issues are due to be dealt with at a large IAEA international Conference on Radioactive Waste Management which is scheduled to take place in Seattle in the United States in May next year. The Conference should also provide an opportunity to show how present waste disposal technology meets the public's concern about the matter.
The IAEA must strive to be relevant to each one of its 112 member States. For many of them both nuclear power and non-proliferation are somewhat distant issues. Their support for and interest in the organization's work are mainly centred on the IAEA's involvement in problems which they regard as vital, namely, food, health and water.

Let me therefore turn to the IAEA programme for the transfer of technology to developing countries. The largest portion of the programme, about 50 per cent, is financed from the Agency's Technical Co-operation Fund, to which voluntary contributions are pledged annually on the basis of indicative targets. For 1981 the target was $13.5 million. Next year it will be $19 million and by 1986 it will rise to $30 million. This means that during the period from 1980 to 1986 the targets are expected to increase by 18 per cent a year. The 1986 target represents a threefold increase over the 1980 figure. As late as 1974 an amount of only about $3 million was raised for the IAEA voluntary fund and comparable amounts had been so raised for several years previously.

Member States have also been able to benefit from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other extrabudgetary funds for technical assistance. As a result, in 1981 the total resources at the IAEA's disposal for technical co-operation projects already amounted to some $30 million. These resources have enabled the Agency and member States to turn to larger, long-term projects which play a more significant role in their economic development. A reduction in UNDP resources would also have negative effects on the Agency's technical assistance.

What is the content of the IAEA co-operation programmes? A certain proportion - between 15 and 20 per cent - goes to projects intended to help developing member States that have introduced or are contemplating introducing nuclear power for electricity generation. During the last four years the IAEA has provided several Governments in developing countries with advice on how to assess their future energy needs and the possible use of nuclear power to cover such needs. Advice has also been given on what they should do to build up the required infrastructure and to train the manpower required for nuclear power programmes. Further, the analytical tools which the IAEA has developed
for assessing the desirable balance of energy programmes have been used by
the World Bank and other financing institutions, and the IAEA's energy data
bank provides substantial support for this work.

The bulk of the IAEA technical co-operation programme has always been
devoted to helping developing countries to introduce the less spectacular
but very practical applications of nuclear science in agriculture, medicine
and hydrology. Some projects are designed to improve crop yields and quality
by using radiation to develop new strains of plants. Radiation has been used
to develop several hundred new crop varieties. About 80 of these, including
new varieties of rice, wheat and oil seeds with larger yields or other
desirable features, have been released by breeders in developing countries and
played their part in the Green Revolution.

An irradiation technique for sterilizing insects has been successfully
used on a very large scale in Central America and will soon be used in a
$25-million project in Egypt to control and, it is hoped, eradicate
the Mediterranean fruit fly, which takes a vast toll of fruit and vegetable
crops. The same techniques are used on a large scale in Nigeria to control
a species of the tsetse fly, which is the vector of sleeping sickness in man and
of a similar disease in livestock. One advantage of these techniques is
that they reduce the need for chemical pesticides which may prove damaging to
the environment.

Other nuclear science techniques are being used to reduce the need for
artificial fertilizers and to map water resources in arid regions.
Almost 10 years ago the Agency launched a regional co-operation programme to help 11 Asian nations to use nuclear techniques to increase rice and bean production, to preserve food, to treat cancer and to control and improve industrial output. With assistance from Japan and Australia, the programme has steadily expanded. It is now being studied as a possible model by various Latin American countries.

One problem that has beset the nuclear programmes of both developing and developed countries in recent years has been unforeseen and sometimes unilateral changes in the terms on which supplying countries are ready to make available nuclear plants, nuclear fuel and nuclear technology.

On the one hand, the exporting countries wish to be absolutely assured that their exports will not help the spread of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, many importing countries feel that they have demonstrated their determination to forgo nuclear weapons and that, having accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards, they should not be burdened with any additional restrictions. They recall the commitments regarding the transfer of technology in article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The matter has sometimes been seen as a North-South issue. In reality, it is broader. The question of assurance of supplies has also been a bone of contention between industrially advanced countries. The IAEA Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) is trying to build a bridge between the different viewpoints.

This problem was one of the main reasons why in 1977 some non-aligned countries proposed that the United Nations, in co-operation with the IAEA, should hold a Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: a matter which the General Assembly will consider under item 27 of its agenda. I should like to assure the Assembly that the IAEA secretariat will extend its full technical support to the Conference and that it is already actively helping in the preparations.

The Conference could provide developing and other countries with an opportunity to assess realistically both the advantages and the main problems of introducing nuclear power and to examine the ways of and conditions for promoting trade and technology transfers. It could also provide them with a
full picture of the extensive benefits of the application of nuclear science techniques, such as those I have mentioned earlier, in agriculture, medicine, hydrology and industry. Progress made in the IAEA's CAS will be very relevant to the work of the Conference. It is a source of some concern that preparations have not advanced very far for this Conference, which is less than one year away.

I shall now turn to those activities of the IAEA that relate directly to international security.

For the past six years the Secretariat has been able to report to the Agency's Board of Governors that in carrying out the IAEA safeguards it did not detect any discrepancy that would indicate diversion of safeguarded nuclear material or misuse of safeguarded nuclear plants. I am happy to inform the Assembly that, as members will see from paragraph 23 of the Agency's report, the same conclusion was reached last year. This conclusion was subject to one reservation, namely, that pending the installation of certain additional safeguards equipment the IAEA was unable in two cases to perform fully adequate verification. One of the cases concerned has since been resolved in principle and progress has been made in the second, which I hope will soon also be resolved.

On 16 June 1902, at the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, I gave a fairly comprehensive picture of the progress made in impeding the spread of nuclear weapons, the problems that lie ahead, the range and compass of IAEA safeguards, their limitations and achievements, the need to strengthen them and their other possible application as a model or inspiration for agreements in other fields of arms control.

There has been no substantial change in the situation since I spoke here on 16 June. Then, as now, about 90 per cent of the nuclear power plants outside the nuclear-weapon States were under IAEA safeguards. Then, as now, there were five nuclear-weapon States and steadily expanding stocks and sophistication of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. There is an almost equal number of countries besides the nuclear-weapon States which are operating or building unsafeguarded facilities capable of making weapon-usable materials. They have or may soon have the capability to make nuclear weapons if they so decide.
We may now be at a crossroads regarding non-proliferation. The efforts to avoid a further spread of nuclear weapons have been remarkably successful so far. The evolution could now go in a dangerous direction or in a positive direction. If the number of nuclear-weapon States or States having tested nuclear explosive devices were to increase, it could have incalculable consequences for escalation and international security.

On the other hand, it might be possible, through determined efforts, to make progress in assuring no further proliferation and towards securing commitments to this effect, whether through the NPT or otherwise. Significant progress towards nuclear arms control and disarmament would be of importance in discouraging further horizontal proliferation.

Beyond the five nuclear-weapon States and the four "threshold" States, there are perhaps 15 other countries that have the technical capability to make nuclear weapons but have bound themselves by treaty or by policy not to do so. This number will grow with technical capability. It is important to note this. The technical barriers to reaching nuclear-weapon or nuclear-explosive capability have steadily eroded and will continue to do so. This means that to contain the further spread of nuclear weapons we shall become even more dependent on political factors and less and less on technical barriers. Policies should be strengthened which make nations feel that both their security and their nuclear power development are best served by a commitment to non-proliferation. The acceptance of safeguards must be viewed as a measure by which States seek to create confidence in their stated commitments rather than as something imposed upon them, indicating a lack of such confidence.

The safeguards function of the IAEA is unique. Alone among the United Nations agencies, the IAEA is empowered in its statute to perform a verification in loco of important installations. This is of great importance for confidence-building and international security. This work gives rise to its own problems - administrative, budgetary and political. It suffers from inevitable pains owing to its rapid expansion. The Agency is committed to bringing its technical capabilities and resources fully into step with the needs.
While it is important to improve and refine the present safeguards system, it is also essential that the limitations of this system be understood. Unrealistic perceptions and expectations partly explain the criticisms of IAEA safeguards that have appeared. The international community should not ascribe to IAEA safeguards powers which they are inherently incapable of exercising. They cannot tell us anything about the future policies of States nor can they physically prevent any action by a State; but they can give assurance with a high degree of confidence that no diversion of nuclear material is taking place, give early warning if such diversion might be taking place and trigger international action.

They are a unique institution. For the first time in history, sovereign States have agreed that an international organization may carry out systematic inspection of important sensitive installations in their territories. In their relations with each other in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy most nations have thus demonstrated the importance of creating and maintaining this confidence. They have shown a desire to set fears at rest, which gives us some hope for the future.

The safeguards system is still capable of growth. In the first place, it is available for application -- whether in the context of nuclear-free zones or regardless of such zones - to States which have not yet accepted safeguards over all their nuclear activities.
It is also noteworthy that four of the five nuclear-weapon States have invited IAEA to perform safeguards inspections on nuclear installations in their territories. The latest invitation has come from the Soviet Union, which recently declared itself ready to start negotiations about its offer with IAEA. These inspections demonstrate that nuclear-weapon States, too, are prepared to accept inspection in loco of peaceful nuclear activities and that safeguards do not lead to a commercial disadvantage. These precedents have a potential usefulness that should not be overlooked in arms control and disarmament negotiations. The Agency, too, as the technical operator of the only existing global safeguards system, has a potential that is not exhausted and possesses experience that could be drawn upon. A precondition for the full development of that potential and the utilization of that experience is a climate of co-operation and trust within the Agency.

A year ago, when my predecessor, Mr. Sigvard Eklund, made his valedictory address to this Assembly, he stressed that the Agency's competence and responsibilities are of a technical rather than a political nature. His parting message, after many years of successful leadership of the Agency, deserves our attention; and, as far as I am concerned, I shall do what I can to focus the attention of the Agency on those technical atomic issues which are its particular and exclusive concern and which are of immeasurable importance to humanity.

In my own statement at the opening of this year's session of our General Conference - which ended with the events I have reported - I concluded by saying:

"Our best birthday present to the Agency - and our best tribute to those dedicated individuals who participated in its founding, nurtured it in its beginnings and never lost their enthusiasm for its objectives - would be to preserve its reputation as a technical, objective body, to exercise patience and prudence as we address difficult issues, and to concentrate on those areas where we can make the greatest contribution."

That remains my conviction.
The PRESIDENT: I wish to propose that the list of speakers on this item should be closed at 12 noon today. If I hear no objection it will be so decided.

It was so decided.


Mr. HANDL (Czechoslovakia): On behalf of Italy and Venezuela, which serve as Vice-Chairmen of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and on behalf of my own country, which is the current Chairman of that Board, I have the honour to introduce to the General Assembly the draft resolution contained in document A/37/L.29 and Corr.1 on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the year 1981. A moment ago we had the pleasant opportunity to listen to the statement of the Director-General of the Agency, Mr. Hans Blix. We should like to thank him for presenting the Agency's report in so comprehensive and elucidating a manner, drawing our attention to the most important issues and programmes concerning the further development of IAEA activities in the important field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We wish him much success in his work.

The draft resolution I am presenting consists of seven preambular and three operative paragraphs.

The first two preambular paragraphs are of a procedural nature; they take note, respectively, of the Agency's report submitted to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly and of the statement by the Director-General of IAEA, which provides additional information on developments in the Agency's activities during 1982.

The third preambular paragraph recognizes the relevance for IAEA to promote further the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with its statute and to improve further its technical assistance programmes for the benefit of developing countries.
The fourth preambular paragraph emphasizes the importance of the work of IAEA in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international instruments designed to achieve similar objectives, as well as in improving the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system.

The fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs take note, respectively, of the granting of IAEA membership to Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 36/121 D, adopted last year, and of the useful outcome of the Agency's Conference on Nuclear Power Experience, held last September in Vienna.

The last preambular paragraph refers to the fact that this year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Agency.

Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution takes note of the report submitted by the Agency.

Operative paragraph 2 is devoted to substantive questions of the Agency's activities. It urges all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency and to implement strictly the mandate of its statute. These activities by States are to be directed to promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, to the continued provision of technical assistance and co-operation to developing countries, and to improving the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system.

As usual, the last operative paragraph requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director-General of IAEA the records of the current session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities.

On behalf of the sponsors, I should like to express the conviction that the draft resolution we have submitted provides a constructive and carefully balanced basis for the continued positive development of the work of the Agency in all major directions of its activities, reflecting the views of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, and we hope that it will be adopted by consensus.
We are commemorating this year the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency - an organization which, within the United Nations system, occupies the central place in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That position of importance is due this organization, since it is the only one which deals exclusively with questions pertaining to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy - one of the most progressive sources of energy in general - and, at the same time, with questions of preventing military misuse of this kind of energy, which is potentially most dangerous in its destructive effects on mankind. Over the 25 years of its existence, IAEA has developed into one of the most important and most universal international organizations, with 112 members - and the number is still growing. Czechoslovakia had the opportunity to be among its founding members.

The Czechoslovak delegation has studied very carefully the Agency's report submitted to the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly in document A/37/382. As I have already pointed out, we also listened with keen interest to the inspiring statement by Mr. Hans Blix, Director-General of IAEA, and welcome the steps and measures proposed for the further development of the Agency's activities, mainly in the fields of safeguards, nuclear energy and nuclear safety.
We note with satisfaction that this international organization continues its unceasing efforts concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the search for new ways to assist developing countries in such uses of nuclear energy.

In the current complex international situation, and under the impact of recent international events, an increasingly important role is played by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and consequently an irreplaceable role is also played by the IAEA in the implementation of the relevant provisions of that Treaty through the IAEA system of safeguards. These safeguards represent a generally recognized international system of verification of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which enjoys the due respect and confidence of the States parties to the Treaty. Czechoslovakia consistently supports steps to improve the quality and effectiveness of the safeguards system. On the other hand, it resolutely opposes any attempts that would result in the weakening of that system - a system which is an indispensable instrument for ensuring the attainment of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation régime. The most effective way of reaching that goal would be by universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Notwithstanding that, there are still countries whose positions tend to weaken the non-proliferation régime, considerably increasing the risk of the misuse of nuclear energy. It is therefore most positive to fact that the vast majority of countries want the Non-Proliferation Treaty to serve as an instrument in the process of relaxing tensions in international relations, and as an important guarantee that the nuclear potential will not be misused against mankind.

In this context, the extraordinary importance of the Soviet Union's initiative at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly which resulted in the adoption of the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe is undeniable. Another telling example of good will is the obligation unilaterally assumed by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, as formulated in the message by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It offers further convincing evidence of sincerity in pursuing the goal of preventing a nuclear holocaust.
It is an example of concrete steps which correspond to the most pressing needs of the current complicated international situation and which deserve to be followed.

Also of exceptional significance in this context is the latest Soviet initiative, being considered by the current session, relating to the intensification of efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy. We are convinced that implementation of the measures proposed for the protection of peaceful nuclear installations against any kind of attack and the freezing of the production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, including their carriers, by all nuclear States, as well as halting the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, would give an important impetus to the peaceful development of nuclear energy and reduce the danger of the misuse of nuclear energy against the interests of humanity and thus also reduce the threat of a nuclear war.

The Israeli act of aggression against the nuclear research facility in Iraq in 1981 clearly points to the need to adopt measures designed to prevent similar acts in the future, and further underlines the importance of the task of securing the safe and peaceful development of nuclear energy as a matter of the utmost urgency.

IAEA's activities in the field of technical assistance to, and co-operation with, the developing countries deserve great attention. Czechoslovakia contributes actively to the development and improvement of IAEA's activities in that field and constantly devotes considerable attention to this question. This is attested to by the fact that Czechoslovakia agreed to the adoption of the so-called indicative data for computing the volume of voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund. For 1983 Czechoslovakia will make a contribution in its national currency of almost 2 million Czechoslovak crowns. Apart from the voluntary contribution, the
Czechoslovak Government will provide scholarships for specialists from developing countries for university-level and postgraduate studies. It also hosts on a regular basis specialized events organized by the Agency. It is our position that technical assistance should be provided in the first place to the economically least developed Member States and, in the interest of strengthening the nuclear weapons non-proliferation régime, also to those countries which have acceded to the NPT and have thus placed their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

The Agency assists Member countries in their efforts to secure sufficient amounts of energy, with which are connected questions of the reliability of nuclear power plants, nuclear safety and environmental protection. Czechoslovakia contributes to the development of IAEA programmes in the field of nuclear safety, which it is able to do thanks to the dynamic development of its own nuclear energy generation. Systematic attention is also given to these questions in Czechoslovakia's relations with neighbouring countries. Negotiations have been completed, for instance, on questions of nuclear power plants located in the vicinity of the Czechoslovak-Austrian border. These talks resulted in a draft agreement between Czechoslovakia and Austria, which is to be signed in the near future.

Czechoslovakia has encouraged the development of the International Nuclear Information System from the very beginning of that programme, under which, for more than 10 years now, exchanges of scientific and technical information relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy have been carried out.

A positive role in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was undoubtedly played by the International Conference on Nuclear Power Experience, held directly before the twenty-sixth General Conference of IAEA, and by the round-table discussion which coincided with the opening of the General Conference, and which dealt with the role of nuclear energy in complex energy plans, in both of which Czechoslovakia took an active part.
As a member of the Preparatory Committee, Czechoslovakia participates actively in the resolution of questions connected with the convening of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. We trust that IAEA will get all that is needed for the good preparation and holding of that Conference, which can contribute significantly to and play an important role in the further development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the questions of international co-operation are dealt with comprehensively, with due regard for the need to strengthen the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime and to ensure strict observance and application of the system of safeguards.

The Agency's report and the statement of its Director General, Mr. Hans Blix, attest to the fact that in its 25 years of existence this important international organization has carried out its mandate actively and successfully, and that it continues to do so in today's complicated conditions. Its ability to continue to do so demands realism, political good will and the determination of all the members of the Agency and all the Members of the United Nations to put an end to nuclear armaments and to avert the danger of a nuclear catastrophe, and thus to ensure that the entire potential of nuclear energy is used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of all mankind. There is no lack of such determination on the part of Czechoslovakia and the other countries of the socialist community. In this spirit, we are prepared to continue to contribute actively to the Agency's activities.
Mr. MICHAELSEN (Denmark): On behalf of the 10 member States of the European Community, I should like to thank the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for his interesting and informative annual report on the Agency's work in 1981.

Also, I should like to express my appreciation of the comments that the Director-General has made on the developments in the Agency during 1982. We were particularly pleased to hear his remarks on the need for an atmosphere of co-operation in the Agency. IAEA has a long record of concentrating on the real issues within its mandate and avoiding confrontation over extraneous political topics. This is what has made it an effective organization.

However, attempts in recent years to withhold acceptance of the credentials of member States for reasons which are not in accordance with the statute and the rules of procedure have, in the opinion of the Ten, the effect of generating an atmosphere of divisive controversy detrimental to the conduct of the Agency's work and contrary to its aims and purposes. The Ten find this to be unfortunate and share the view, also expressed by the Director-General, that the political principle of universality of membership is based on the premise that the Agency's functions require a universal approach and that its objectives can be achieved only through the co-operation of all States. Our Governments trust that the attempts to which I have referred, and other developments, will strengthen the determination of all parties to take fully into consideration the special nature of the Agency and to reduce the level of political controversy so that full attention and priority can be given to those specialized matters falling within the Agency's mandate.

Turning to the annual report for 1981, I should like first of all to express the full support of the 10 member States of the European Community for IAEA's objectives of enlarging the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and of reducing the risk of proliferation.

It is noted in the annual report that in 1981 the share of nuclear power in the world's total electricity production rose to 9 per cent and is expected to reach 20 per cent by the end of the decade. This gives us reason to expect that IAEA will have an increasing role to play as an international
mechanism for interaction between Governments. This will be the case particularly for the three main concerns of the public in connection with the use of nuclear power; these concerns, as pointed out in the Agency's annual report, are the safety of nuclear reactors, the disposal of radioactive waste and the risk of nuclear proliferation.

The Ten are confident that the growing involvement of the IAEA in the field of nuclear safety will prove most useful, and we are convinced that new initiatives in this field, such as the decision to issue an annual review of nuclear safety, may make important contributions to improved safety.

Of no less importance will be efforts to find satisfactory and convincing solutions to the problems connected with the management and disposal of radioactive waste. The Agency can and should play a leading role in pooling and publishing information on new technical solutions in this field.

During the last decade the IAEA safeguards system has developed rapidly and has become a corner-stone in international nuclear co-operation by verifying compliance with commitments made and, on a wider scale, by creating confidence on a global basis between countries. It may be taken as a sign of a greater public awareness of the role of the safeguards system that it was made the subject of more detailed comments last year. At the same time, however, events occurred that represented an attack on the safeguards system.

The Ten would like to reaffirm their confidence in the IAEA safeguards system and their support for the acceptance by all Member States of IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. We recognize the need for continuously improving safeguards efficiency and the desirability of a geographical extension of the safeguards inspection coverage.

In its report for 1981, the Agency concludes that the nuclear material under its safeguards remained in peaceful activities or was otherwise adequately accounted for. Yet in certain cases the Agency, pending implementation of some technical measures, did not find itself in a position to perform adequate verification. This situation is one of grave concern, and we consequently urge that it be remedied soon.

We appeal to those non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear facilities which are not under IAEA safeguards to put such facilities under safeguards in order to strengthen endeavours to prevent proliferation.
The importance which the member States of the European Community attach to the Agency's regulatory activities is attached equally to the Agency's promotional programmes, in particular the technical co-operation programme. In spite of serious budgetary constraints at the national level, the Ten continue to support the programme and note with satisfaction that the total resources available for technical assistance in 1981 rose by more than 15 per cent, to 225 million. Besides contributing to the technical assistance fund, a number of the 10 member States of the European Community have also made substantial sources of funds available, as well as assistance in kind.

We reaffirm our belief that the voluntary nature of contributions to the technical assistance fund has proved compatible with the desire for predictable and assured funds for technical assistance. The existence of an annual target and indicative planning figures for subsequent years has indeed led to a continued increase in the size of the technical assistance fund.

The developing countries also derive particular benefits from the Agency's activities in the application of nuclear science in the fields of agriculture and medicine. We appreciate the continuing role of the Agency in those fields, as well as in the field of nuclear physics through the very important activities carried out by the international centre at Trieste.

It is the firm wish of the Ten and the Community that the close co-operation that exists between the Agency and the European Community continue to develop in the field of safeguards and in other fields of peaceful nuclear activities of common interest.

The close relationship between assurance of non-proliferation and assurance of supplies has proved fundamental in many deliberations on measures to facilitate international nuclear trade and co-operation. In the work undertaken in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, the recognition of this relationship will be a decisive factor in the efforts to achieve a substantial result. The Ten also hope that the important work of the Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage will be pursued and that a positive outcome will be achieved.

Since we discussed this item at the last session of the General Assembly, IAEA has passed two noteworthy landmarks. First, the Agency has a new Director General, Mr. Hans Blix. I should like in this Assembly to welcome Mr. Blix to this very important and challenging function and to pledge our full support and co-operation in his tasks. We are confident of his ability to manage the IAEA satisfactorily during the years to come.
Secondly, in July 1982 the IAEA completed the first quarter of a century of its existence. We see this as a proof of the Agency's ability effectively to take charge of the many, often difficult, tasks that have been entrusted to it during the past 25 years.

In the years to come the tasks of the Agency are not likely to become any less difficult. It is therefore of the utmost importance that all States strive for effective and harmonious co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency. Only by avoiding confrontation can we achieve our common goals of promoting the use of nuclear energy and science for peaceful purposes.

Mr. BLUM (Israel): My delegation wishes to draw the attention of the General Assembly to a matter of both principle and legal substance, pertaining to Israel, which came up during the last General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and which is of the utmost significance for the very nature and future of the IAEA. I am referring to the decision adopted by the twenty-sixth session of the IAEA General Conference to reject the credentials of the Israel delegation and thereby prevent it from participating in the Conference. That decision was both arbitrary and discriminatory. It was designed to deny an IAEA member one of its basic rights.

The votes taken by the plenary General Conference following the injection by Iraq of a political issue into the credentials procedure of a technical agency established for well-defined purposes amounted to a political act aimed at preventing the participation of a member State in the General Conference. Resolution GC (XXVI)/404 is thus incompatible with the Agency's statute and the General Conference's rules of procedure. That decision, adopted by the General Conference of the IAEA on a measure which does not fall within the objectives and functions assigned to the Agency and which is contrary to its constitutional instruments, does not become lawful simply because a majority of States voted in favour of it. Numbers cannot cure a lack of constitutional competence. Since the decision not to accept the credentials of the Israel delegation has no legal basis, it is therefore ultra vires.

On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the IAEA the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Menachem Begin, expressed Israel's great appreciation of the excellent performance of the IAEA in the many complex
responsible entrusted to it. In his message of 6 September 1981 on behalf of the Government of Israel, the Prime Minister expressed his confidence that the IAEA would continue to safeguard and promote the principles, objectives and ideas envisaged by its founders. This is indeed an expression of Israel's support for the Agency and its statutory functions.

Israel strongly believes that the IAEA should be allowed to maintain the unique position it has developed from its inception within the family of international organizations. The IAEA should be allowed to discharge its duties loyally and effectively within the limits of the mandate defined for it by the international community.

However, an indispensable condition for its effectiveness and moral authority is that this important agency should avoid politicization and remain dedicated to the technical and professional aims for which it was established.

Mr. Fischer (Austria): We have all heard Mr. Blix's comprehensive and helpful introduction of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the calendar year 1981, as well as his most informative updating of that report with regard to this year's major developments in the field of nuclear energy and the relevant activities of the Agency. The Austrian delegation wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the Director General for his important contribution to our debate.

The present political and economic crisis in international relations has in recent weeks also cast a shadow over the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this situation I would like to reaffirm once again Austria's full support for the Agency and emphasize the importance we attach to its activities. In its 25 years of existence the IAEA has assumed a key role in promoting the peaceful uses of the atom and in preventing the misuse of nuclear technology for military purposes. At a time of the increasing spread of nuclear technology to all regions and of mounting international tensions, the IAEA's safeguards activities are ever more crucial for the maintenance of the international non-proliferation regime. The worsening economic conditions call also for a fuller use of the various non-conventional forms of technology, including that of nuclear energy. In view of these constantly growing challenges we cannot afford to put the Agency's future at risk. On the contrary, we must strive to enhance its role and to develop and strengthen its activities.
I should like now to comment on some of the aspects of the IAEA's work.

Technical co-operation and assistance to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear techniques are among the most important functions of the Agency. Apart from the activities in areas such as atomic energy development, nuclear physics and the mining of nuclear materials, we are observing with special interest the fast-expanding range of application of isotopes and radiation. From agriculture to medicine, to ecology, there appears to be hardly a field where nuclear techniques cannot be beneficially employed. But this valuable work of the IAEA can be continued and further developed only if adequate financial resources are available. At the General Conference last September, the Austrian delegation pledged for 1983 a voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance Fund in the amount of $US136,000. This represents an increase of $US21,600 over our contribution for 1982.

The danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons remains an issue of paramount importance. Because of the signs of strain and tension in the non-proliferation régime and the fact that a number of States with significant nuclear activities remain outside the system, we must renew our efforts to strengthen the barriers against a further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
An important element of these efforts is the dialogue between supplier and recipient States in the Committee on Assurances of Supply. We hope that these endeavours will lead to a generally accepted code of conduct for trade and technology exchanges in the nuclear field. Secure supplies and stable availability of nuclear materials, technologies and services are urgently needed, not only by developing countries but also by those industrialized countries lacking a complete fuel cycle. The United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, scheduled to take place in Geneva next summer, should also contribute to this end.

I would like to emphasize, however, that any improvement in the area of supplies must not take place at the expense of international security and has to be accompanied by measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. Over the past year we have witnessed an intensive and at times heated discussion on the Agency's safeguard activities. We believe that a sober and realistic assessment of the overall record confirms the reliability of the control system. We have full confidence in the Agency's capacity to adjust it to the growing demands of the future. Since this requires assembling the best experts available and enhancing the efficiency of the inspectorate, Austria has supported the restructuring of the safeguards department even though this involves additional expenditures.

I should like to turn now to the issue of nuclear safety, another important element in the Agency's mandate. It has become more and more apparent in recent years that the future of nuclear power as a major energy source depends largely on the ability to deal satisfactorily with the safety issues of nuclear power plants and on the development of adequate arrangements for the disposal of nuclear waste. Since solutions to these problems can only be found through international co-operation, my delegation attaches great importance to the relevant programmes of the IAEA.
Mr. Fischer (Austria)

We note with satisfaction that the programme for nuclear safety standards has been further improved and that new safety guides have been issued. Austria greatly values its participation in the technical review of these safety standards, not least because it provides an opportunity for Austrian experts to keep up with the latest scientific and technical developments in this field.

Waste management is without doubt one of the most crucial issues for the future development of nuclear power. Experts tell us that the problem is solved from a technological point of view, but that the construction of the necessary facilities is not yet economically feasible, mainly because of the relatively small amount of waste thus far produced. On the other hand, it is also true that the lack of such facilities contributes to public resistance to the use of nuclear power, which in turn creates delays in nuclear energy programmes. In this situation, Austria feels that we should consider whether establishing a demonstration facility for the disposal of nuclear waste might not be a way to break this vicious circle. To allay fears that the facility might become the waste dump for the entire world, it might be necessary to limit its use exclusively to the storage of waste from the national nuclear programme of the country in which the facility would be sited. International co-operation in that regard could include financial and technical aid for the establishment of such a facility in return for sharing the data and expertise resulting from its operation.

Since 1979 Austria has been acting upon an initiative to facilitate co-operation between neighbouring countries concerning the trans-frontier aspects of nuclear power stations. We understand that an international advisory group on the question of mutual assistance in cases of nuclear accidents has discussed some elements of this problem. We hope that in due course all other aspects will be dealt with as well. In this context, I would like to note with some satisfaction that negotiations on an agreement between the Republic of Austria...
and Czechoslovakia on questions of mutual interest in connection with nuclear facilities have been successfully completed and that the agreement was signed today in Vienna. Similar talks have been initiated with Yugoslavia.

In conclusion, I wish to reaffirm that Austria, conscious of its special responsibilities as the host country, will continue to make every effort to facilitate the Agency's activities and to contribute to the speedy and efficient solution of any problems which may arise. Finally, I would like to express our appreciation of the outstanding co-operation and assistance which Austria receives from the Agency.

Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt): (interpretation from Arabic): At the outset, I would like to offer the thanks and congratulations of the delegation of Egypt to Mr. Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his valuable and comprehensive introduction of the Agency's first report since his assumption of his post last December. A careful examination of that report clearly shows the magnitude of the efforts expended in the Agency's various fields of activity and in coping with the problems that impede its work. The delegation of Egypt follows those efforts with close attention, and we wish the Director General every success in his task.

Egypt's interest in the activities of the IAEA and in its important and effective role in assuring and developing the peaceful applications of nuclear energy began with the Agency's establishment in 1957. That interest has steadily increased because of Egypt's need to develop its own nuclear programme and to construct nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes to assist in its development. Such reactors are expected to have a total capacity of 8,000 megawatts by the year 2000. In that regard, Egypt concluded bilateral agreements with the United States of America, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom during the years 1981 and 1982.
Egypt attaches great importance to the important contribution and assistance that can be provided by the IAEA in numerous fields related to this programme: in the areas of technological and technical training, the ensuring of nuclear safety and the selection of appropriate sites for reactors. We hope to increase the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation as this has proved to be cost-effective, hence the growing importance of the use by developing countries of nuclear energy in generating the electricity that is so necessary for the processes of development. This was also referred to by the Director General of the Agency in his statement.

In speaking about the role of the IAEA in technical co-operation and assistance, I should like to commend in particular its role in the eradication of the Mediterranean fruit fly in Egypt, under the project bearing that name, the costs of which have mounted to $25 million. Egypt was particularly pleased to receive the Director General of the Agency last October when project "Eradication of Mediterranean fruit fly" was actually put into operation.

The potential role of the Agency in the area of technical assistance and co-operation is extremely important. Therefore maximum efforts should be made and maximum contributions provided to enable the Agency to fulfil its function in such a way as to enhance and develop its role and ensure that the developing countries benefit from the activities of the Agency, not only in the nuclear field but also in the fields of science, medicine, agriculture and research.

Egypt, within the framework of the Group of 77 in Vienna, has always sought to reaffirm the importance of technical assistance for developing countries. In line with this, we believe that support should be given to the programme of technical co-operation and assistance in accordance with its importance, especially for the developing countries. We welcome the increase in contributions to the Technical Assistance Fund, but, according to the annual report of the Agency, the contributions failed to reach the target for 1981. In addition to the insufficiency of assistance sources, whether in kind or through the United Nations Development Programme, and in view of the fact that no real progress in this regard is expected in the near future, any real increase in the Agency's resources for funding the technical co-operation activities is largely dependent on increases in the resources of the Technical Assistance Fund. We hope therefore that voluntary contributions to that Fund will be increased so as to enable the Agency to undertake the activities in this area.
which is of such vital importance to developing States. In this regard I should like to express our appreciation of the efforts exerted by the Director General of the Agency to mobilize additional sources of finance for programmes of technical assistance to the developing countries and our support for his view that technical assistance should cover wider fields and larger-scale projects.

Egypt does not oppose the reorganization of the Agency's safeguards system, as proposed by the Director General, but we feel that this should not be done at the expense of the programmes of technical assistance provided by the Agency. In this connection, we believe that the zero-growth or near-zero-growth budget policy must not be applied to the technical assistance provided by the Agency or to its other development activities. As a developing country, Egypt believes that this is a just and fair demand, since technical assistance was one of the main reasons for the establishment of the Agency. In 1957 the technical assistance programme began modestly; it has developed with the passage of time but still has a long way to go. This fact is acknowledged by all the organs of the Agency, in particular by the Board of Governors, and was recently reaffirmed in the relevant resolutions of the twenty-sixth General Conference. The developing countries have always felt that attention should be focused on the fact that the technical assistance provided by the Agency is insufficient, unpredictable and uncertain because the sources of funding are not assured. This is in fact the main reason for the insistence that the resolutions of the General Conference should provide for the funding of technical assistance from the regular budget of the Agency or from sources which enjoy the same degree of reliability and predictability.

With regard to the role of the Agency in helping countries that are about to introduce nuclear programmes examine the various possibilities and alternatives open to them, we reaffirm our previous position to the effect that the Agency must not confine itself to nuclear energy but must also study the various options available, so as to enable the State to choose the most appropriate and useful one, since nuclear energy is not an end in itself. The decision to introduce it should be taken only if it is the best and most cost-effective option from the point of view of its impact on the process of development. In this regard I should like to reiterate that we welcome the Director General's plan to expand the training programme, in particular as from 1983, for nationals of developing countries, so that those countries may have skilled technicians with the experience necessary for the implementation of nuclear programmes in each country.
I should now like to proceed to comment on the activities of the IAEA concerning international security. I shall begin by referring to Egypt's commitment to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which it acceded in 1981. Egypt ratified the safeguards agreement with the Agency last October since it is convinced of the importance of the role played by the Agency in operating the safeguards system with regard to the nuclear activities of both States parties to the Treaty and those States which have not yet acceded to the Treaty.
This proves that the Agency can play an important part in the conclusion of similar agreements. We have already referred to this in the statement by the Egyptian delegation on disarmament items in the First Committee, in particular in relation to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. When we said that the IAEA could play an effective, positive role in the area of disarmament and the control of armaments following its success in connection with the implementation of the NPT. That success has demonstrated the possibilities and capabilities of the Agency, which could be harnessed for use in several fields.

The development of nuclear energy and its use for peaceful purposes are adversely affected by the escalation of the nuclear arms race and the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, with all the danger that entails for the whole of mankind. The nuclear arms race arouses public concern about the use of nuclear energy even for peaceful purposes. Therefore, if the peaceful application of nuclear energy and peaceful nuclear activities are to have any credibility, the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, must be stopped.

We share the concern of the Director General of the Agency about the possible increase in the number of States possessing the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons and explosive devices, which could lead to further nuclear proliferation. We agree with him that we may now be at a crossroads as regards proliferation or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hence this issue depends on political, not on technical, factors. Therefore, we must support policies that encourage States in the belief that their security and the development of their nuclear potential lie in their commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we view the safeguards system referred to by the Director General in his statement as a procedure likely to create a climate of confidence among countries. This is a constructive and important measure which gives hope for the future. That system, which is available to all States regardless of their position in relation to the NPT, is now the only system of international safeguards.

Therefore, the Agency, as the technical operator of this system, should have the benefit of a climate of co-operation and confidence to enable it to harness all its ability and potential, not only in the area of non-proliferation but, as we have already mentioned, in negotiations on disarmament and the reduction of armaments.
Finally, Egypt joins all the other advocates of the need to give strong support to the IAEA, thus enabling it to carry out the duties and functions assigned to it.

Mr. Komives (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation has studied with keen interest and great attention the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 1981, which gives a true picture of the Agency's important and multiple activities. At the outset, I should like to express my delegation's thanks and appreciation to the Director General, Mr. Blix, for his valuable and thought-provoking introductory statement.

The Hungarian delegation is of the view that the IAEA, which recently celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary, has, on the whole, measured up to the challenge of the considerable demands which were and are made of the organization. It has forged fruitful relations and has won great prestige within the family of international organizations. The two main lines of its activity - namely, the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime and verification of safeguards agreements - have acquired particular importance in our age, when mankind is increasingly relying on nuclear energy and at the same time living in the shadow of the threat of a nuclear conflict.

I consider that the significance of the IAEA is not truly reflected by the number of its members, because nearly one third of the States Members of the United Nations have not yet acceded to that organization. I do not consider it my task to seek the underlying causes of this situation, but I am all the more pleased to welcome Namibia to membership of the IAEA.

I have just referred to the threat of a nuclear world war. Those in the leading circles of imperialism, with the intention of achieving military superiority, have set out to draw up and implement programmes for an unprecedented nuclear arms build-up. My Government resolutely condemns such plans, which waste huge material and intellectual resources and increase the danger of a nuclear war.

My Government attaches special importance to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, it welcomes the fact that the number of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rose to 116 during 1981 and continued to increase in 1982. It is an equally welcome fact that at the end of 1981 a safeguards agreement was in force in relation to 87 States, including 12 States
not parties to the Treaty. At the same time, I note with regret the statement in
the IAEA report that 39 of the non-nuclear-weapon States which have acceded to
the NPT have not yet concluded the safeguards agreement provided for in the Treaty.

In the present extremely tense international situation, my delegation feels
deeply disturbed at the statement in the report that in some non-nuclear-weapon
States only a few installations are under Agency safeguards, and
"... these did not include certain facilities in operation or under
construction with a capability of making weapons-grade material"
(A/37/382, para. 21)

and that
"... in certain cases in non-nuclear-weapon States the Agency was not
in a position, pending implementation of certain technical measures
proposed by the Agency, to perform adequate verification". (ibid., para. 23)

Yet the fact that in the non-nuclear-weapon States 98 per cent of nuclear
facilities were subjected to Agency safeguards control at the end of 1981 is of
supreme importance and is eloquent proof of how responsible and delicate tasks have
been entrusted to the Agency by the Member States.

Against this background we can see all the more clearly the gravity and peril
of the act committed by Israel, which, by its totally unjustifiable air raid on
the Iraqi nuclear facility, wanted to discredit specifically the NPT and the
Agency's safeguards system. The attack also constituted a grave violation of the
Agency's statute. The General Conference of the IAEA last September was compelled
to take up this issue again, owing, inter alia, to Israel's continuing failure to
comply with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

Instead of dwelling on this matter, I should like to recall my Government's
support for the Soviet draft resolution which states that an attack on nuclear
installations serving peaceful purposes, even if it is carried out with the use of
conventional weapons, shall, just like the use of nuclear weapons, be deemed to
constitute the gravest crime against humanity.
I have mentioned promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as the other main line of the Agency's activity. My delegation is of the view that the Agency is successfully accomplishing its tasks in this field as well. At the same time, however, the international community is raising new expectations, as is also shown by the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which is scheduled to take place in 1983. I am confident that the IAEA will be equal to the principles and purposes of its statute in participating in the preparation and the successful holding of that Conference.

I should like to note on this score that the Conference is not mandated to define specific tasks for the Agency in follow-up activities.

Fundamental to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is the need to place nuclear supply on a stable and long-term basis. My delegation trusts that the Committee on Assurances of Supply will make a successful contribution to the solution of this problem. While recognizing the right of all States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to assured nuclear supply, I should add that this should proceed in such a way as not to impair but to enhance the operation of an effective non-proliferation régime with strict observance of its provisions.

My delegation considers that the Agency is making good use of its resources. The voluntary contributions of Member States grow from year to year, which could be considered an achievement in our world, faced as it is with economic difficulties. There is no doubt that a world-wide economic expansion and the elimination of discrimination in international economic co-operation, including an end to the present policies of embargo and boycott, would provide a more stable basis for regular and considerable increases in the Technical Assistance Fund than would measures seeking to replace voluntary contributions by some sort of diktat. The commitment to support technical assistance activities cannot be viewed in isolation from actual economic possibilities. No sovereign Government with a sense of responsibility for its people can afford to take that course.

As in previous years, I should like to take this opportunity to reaffirm that the Hungarian Government extends its full support to the activities of the
IAEA. Nuclear energy will be playing an increasing role in the energy supply of Hungary. In compliance with obligations undertaken in international agreements, it will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. It must serve the interests of the society as a whole and its use will be allowed only with primary and maximum attention to the security of human life and human environment, as provided for in the Hungarian Nuclear Energy Act. In order to ensure regard for these purposes, my country accordingly participates in co-operation in nuclear science and technology within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as well as in international co-operation within the framework of the IAEA.

In conclusion, I should like to express to the Director-General of the IAEA, Mr. Blix, and his staff the Hungarian People's Republic's appreciation of the excellent work done in the last year also. My delegation hopes that the Agency will continue to be a reliable instrument for developing international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and will further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

In connection with the difficulties the Agency is facing, I should like to express my delegation's hope that they will be solved soon, in the interests of all.

Finally, the Hungarian delegation lends its full support to draft resolution A/37/L.29 and Corr.1, submitted by the delegations of Czechoslovakia, Italy and Venezuela and introduced by the representative of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. STRULAK (Poland): The annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 1981 is a document of great interest and high importance. It touches upon problems vital to the contemporary world -- those connected with the use of the potent energies of the atom in a way that will ensure for the nations both peaceful existence and development. The Agency has been involved in this formidable task for a quarter of a century now and, we believe, cannot but be commended for its truly great achievements. For almost a year now it has had Mr. Hans Blix as Director-General, and the Polish delegation would like to congratulate him on guiding the IAEA with the necessary consistency, as well as with admirable energy and vision.
In the present international situation, characterized by the all-pervading and growing menace of nuclear war, we tend to attach the greatest importance to those activities of the IAEA which concern the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the safeguards system in particular. It is certainly gratifying to note the increased number of nuclear installations - 98 per cent - outside those in the nuclear-weapon States, that are now covered by this system, including in countries that signed new safeguards agreements with the Agency last year. Of special significance is the move of the Soviet Union to place its peaceful nuclear installations under Agency safeguards.

But the IAEA report also indicates that in some non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the NPT safeguards do not cover certain facilities, whether in operation or under construction, with a capability of making weapons-grade material. The well-established danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not, therefore, prevented and, in order to eliminate it, it is necessary to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system and make it more effective. This point was again stressed by Mr. Blix in his enlightening statement at the beginning of this meeting.
Apart from the obviously necessary constant improvement in safeguards techniques, this requires, first of all, universal application of full-scope safeguards, as only this can give assurance that all nuclear activities in a country are of a peaceful nature.

While speaking of difficulties in instituting a meaningful IAEA universal safeguards system that would help effectively to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, we are compelled to point to a State whose acts and policies have openly threatened the régime of non-proliferation and international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the very functioning of IAEA. Only two days ago this General Assembly again had to condemn Israel in connection with its armed attack on Iraqi nuclear installations and its subsequent policy, and to demand that it withdraw forthwith its threat to repeat such an attack against nuclear facilities. The sharp reaction of the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth General Conferences of IAEA against Israel in this connection is fully understandable.

As seen from its annual report, the Agency successfully continued in 1981 its statutory activities in the application of nuclear techniques for peaceful purposes and technical co-operation, including assistance to developing countries. These latter activities grew noticeably, making use of increased resources, including voluntary contributions, in which Poland, too, continued to participate.

It is indeed commendable that the Agency was able at the same time to conduct its multiple, varied activities, as reported, "within stringent budgetary limits" (A/37/382 and Corr.1, annex, para. 1)

While I have referred only briefly to but a few aspects of IAEA's work, Poland continues to support the whole range of its activities as depicted in the report, and above all its crucial role in preventing, through the safeguards system, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Since these tasks are duly reflected in the three-Power draft resolution (A/37/L.29 and Corr.1) introduced this morning by the representative of Czechoslovakia, the Polish delegation will vote for it.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.