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Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

AGENDA ITEM 70

General and complete disarmament (A/4218, A/4219, A/C.1/818) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) recalled three important facts which the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had not mentioned in his statement at the previous meeting.

2. First, there were the negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union which had been going on at Geneva since October 1958 and were aimed at stopping all tests of nuclear weapons. While several very important issues were still to be met, the amount of agreement already achieved was encouraging.

3. Secondly, on the proposal of the United States, experts from ten Powers had met at Geneva late in 1958 to discuss the techniques of safeguard against surprise attack. Even though no agreement had been reached, the very fact that such a conference had taken place was evidence that the problem of surprise attack was recognized as overwhelmingly important; and the results of that conference, as set out in document A/4078, would undoubtedly make future efforts more fruitful.

4. Thirdly, the United States, France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom had agreed on the establishment of a ten-nation Disarmament Committee which, early in 1960, would resume general disarmament negotiations and would undoubtedly consider the proposals made at the current session of the General Assembly by the USSR and the United Kingdom. The establishment of that Committee had been welcomed by the Disarmament Commission.

5. Describing the attitude of the United States towards the Soviet proposal, he said that the United States unreservedly supported, and had always supported, the greatest possible amount of controlled disarmament. In any disarmament programme, adequate inspection and control must be built into the system, so that both sides would at every stage have full knowledge of the reduction in armaments which the other side was effecting. That was essential if fear, suspicion, increased danger of war were to be eliminated.

6. The general assurances given by the Soviet representative at the previous meeting had provided little enlightenment as to what inspection and control the Soviet Union would accept. The United States hoped that the Soviet Union would submit a plan for inspection and control to the new Committee; there could not be 100 per cent disarmament with only 10 per cent inspection.

7. Perfectionism must not, of course, be carried to the point of rejecting useful ideas. The United States had made many concrete proposals in the past for both comprehensive and partial disarmament; it was at present making a thorough review of disarmament in the light of present-day technology, and was ready to examine any equitable proposal in which provision was made for a system of control. In that connexion it was unfortunate that, despite the efforts of the experts from the Western democracies, the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack had resulted in no agreement, owing to the two sides’ radically different conceptions of what it was to accomplish; the achievement of tangible results with regard to the technical problems would have laid a sound basis for subsequent political negotiations.

8. The United States continued to believe that technical considerations could not be by-passed if ways were to be found of reducing the dangers of massive surprise attack; but it was prepared, if necessary, to join in dealing with the technical issues concurrently with a discussion of the political problems. The forthcoming ten-nation negotiations seemed to offer such an opportunity.

9. On the other hand, there was cause for satisfaction in the progress of the negotiations on the ending of nuclear tests. For the first time since 1946, it had been possible to progress from generalities to the process of drafting a treaty. First, the Soviet Union had admitted the basic principle that the obligation to stop nuclear weapons testing and the establishment of the control systems must go hand in hand. Secondly, it had been agreed that the treaty would remain in effect so long as the obligations which it imposed were being fully observed; the United States and the United Kingdom no longer insisted that continuation of the test ban be year-by-year and dependent upon progress toward general disarmament. Thirdly, agreement had been reached on the broad outlines of an organizational structure for the control system, and on the selection of Vienna as the headquarters of the proposed control commission. Fourthly, agreement in principle had been reached that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be allowed. Fifthly, the specific wording of seventeen treaty articles and a preamble had been agreed upon. Sixthly, it had been agreed that the treaty would be open for adherence by other nations and that the common objective was to establish a world-wide control system. Seventhly, the treaty provisions would be reviewed periodically. Finally, scientists representing the three Powers had arrived at agreed technical conclusions on ways and means of detecting explosions of certain kinds.
10. Turning next to the more important of the issues which remained unsettled, he referred to the question of the composition of the international staff at the control posts which were to be set up throughout the world. The Soviet Union had now agreed to the stationing of ten or eleven foreign specialists at each control post, where the technical personnel would number about thirty. The Western Powers had proposed that one third of each control post be made up of nationals of the United States and the United Kingdom, one third of nationals of the Soviet Union and one third of specialists from countries other than those three, and that the post chief not be a national of the host country. If the aim was a world-wide control system, participation by other Members of the United Nations would have to be provided for.

11. With regard to the voting procedure to be used by the control commission, the Soviet Union continued to demand a veto over budgetary, administrative and economic matters, but its position on the veto in certain other cases was not entirely clear. The Western Powers had stated their unwillingness to subject the day-to-day operations of the system to the veto.

12. The final and by far the most important question was that of inspection. As it was impossible to distinguish between the seismic signals produced by a nuclear explosion and those produced by earthquakes, which occurred in great numbers throughout the world, the only way to identify the cause of such signals would be in many instances, to go to the spot and conduct an inspection. According to the August 1955 report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests (A/3897), the number of disturbances the cause of which could not be identified on the basis of control-post readings would be very high. Further underground nuclear explosions conducted by the United States had indicated that the problem of identifying underground events was more difficult than had previously been believed. The United States had presented those data to the Conference and, in addition, had suggested that scientists from the three Powers should examine the question of improved control instruments and of the possibilities of muffling nuclear explosions artificially. The Soviet Union had not yet consented to such a technical discussion, despite its great importance.

13. The United States thought that the data accumulated since the report of the Conference should be discussed and a decision taken as to what, if any, improvement were to be made in the system before the precise level of inspection needed to ensure adequate control was decided upon. There was no need for every unidentified event to be inspected, but there must be some reasonable relation between the number of inspections and the number of unidentified events recorded by the system's instruments.

14. The President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, had stated in a letter dated 5 May 1959 addressed to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrouchtchev, that if it proved impossible to reach early agreement on all aspects of a comprehensive test ban, that need not result in complete failure of the negotiations: a start could be made by registering and putting into effect agreements looking toward the permanent discontinuance of all nuclear weapons tests in phases, expanding the agreements as rapidly as corresponding measures of control could be incorporated in the treaty. President Eisenhower had proposed the taking of the first step of an agreed suspension of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere up to the greatest height to which effective controls could under present circumstances be extended. That first step would immediately reduce the fears of fall-out, which had been so frequently expressed.

15. The United States was eager for progress towards disarmament which would produce savings that could be spent to improve the lot of mankind. But all progress must be dependent on detailed answers to the following three questions: What type of international police force should be established to preserve international peace and security? What principles of international law should govern the use of such a force? What internal security forces, in precise terms, would be required by the nations of the world if existing armaments were abolished?

16. The United States would welcome the views of members of the Committee on how the complex and important questions, together with other practical problems, might best be studied; it welcomed the Soviet Union's expression of willingness to seek progress through limited steps and, for its part, was willing and anxious to move forward on any aspect of the problem, including the following points: reducing the threat of surprise attack; gaining experience in the actual operation of workable systems of international control; lightening the general weight of all armaments, both nuclear and other types; and—first in priority because nearest to realization—a controlled cessation of nuclear tests.

17. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) fully supported the proposal for general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet delegation, a proposal which had attracted the attention of the world public and had had a radical effect on the course of the fourteenth session. He stressed the dangers involved in the armaments race: the military budgets of the member countries of NATO had more than tripled between 1949 and 1959, at a time when science had invented incredibly destructive devices. Moreover, personnel and resources were being diverted from peaceful activities, and that simply resulted in the maintenance of a war psychosis and the spread of distrust between nations. No lasting peace was possible under those circumstances: a conflict could be started by a mistake, or a technical defect, or an arbitrary act. By reducing distances and conquering outer space, modern technology had made the threat hanging over the world even more horrible, and the need to remove it even more urgent.

18. The theory of the so-called balance in armaments had proved harmful to the cause of peace, which could be guaranteed only by disarmament. Fortunately, recent events, and particularly the recent visit of Mr. Khrouchtchev to the United States, had shown that the restoration of confidence was feasible. The realistic and specific proposals of the Soviet Government (A/4219) would make it possible to succeed where all negotiations carried on before and since the Second World War had failed.

19. The measures of control proposed—the establishment of an international body composed of representatives of all countries, and the possibility of submitting to the Security Council and the General Assembly all cases in which the provisions of the treaty to be concluded were violated—offered every
possible guarantee of effectiveness. The Western Powers had always used the question of control as a means for hampering negotiations on disarmament; but the socialist countries had never ceased to recommend the adoption of effective measures of control, always provided that they corresponded to the stage reached in disarmament. If that condition were not met, control would merely serve as a pretext for military reconnaissance and could only increase international tension.

20. The adoption of the Soviet proposals would mean that no State would possess the means of waging war. As there would be nothing to conceal, the problem of control would assume a completely new character. The acceptance of those proposals would be a turning-point in the history of international relations. Disputes would be settled around the conference table. The criterion to be applied in assessing the advantages of the various social systems would be economic competition and emulation in meeting the material, social, cultural and intellectual needs of the people. States' standing in the world would be measured solely by their contribution towards the progress of mankind.

21. The implementation of the Soviet proposals would be of enormous importance for the fate of Europe. German militarism, which had launched two world wars within one generation, was re-emerging, on the model created by Hitler, in the Federal Republic of Germany. The militarist and revanchist circles in that republic were trying to obtain nuclear weapons for their army and to establish military bases and depots on the territory of several western European States; and they considered themselves strong enough to make no secret of their aggressive designs against the socialist countries and of their claims to parts of the territories of their allies in NATO. Quite recently, gigantic military manoeuvres had been carried out by United States units armed with atomic guns, hard by the Czechoslovak border. Manoeuvres based on the principle of attacks and air raids against Czechoslovak territory had taken place in the Federal Republic of Germany, and Czechoslovakia's air space had been repeatedly violated by military aircraft. The adoption of the Soviet formula would therefore mean, for the Czechoslovak and other peoples of Europe, the removal of a threat which was daily taking more definite shape.

22. Disarmament would also have immense significance in the economic field, as it would release millions of workers and vast material resources for work in the service of the nations' prosperity. A single modern fighter aircraft cost the United States taxpayer fifty times as much as one of those used during the Second World War. Certain bombers cost their weight in gold.

23. The under-developed countries would derive immense advantages from general and complete disarmament. The money saved would make it possible to build dams, new factories, hospitals, and scientific and cultural institutions. The arrears in the development of many countries, due to colonialism, could be made up and the acceleration of their economic development would enable them to attain effective independence. Moreover, the threat of military intervention by the colonizing Powers would cease to weigh upon the colonies and the recently liberated peoples.

24. The Soviet proposals were clear evidence of the fact that the main objectives of that socialist country's foreign policy were the ensuring of mankind's peaceful development and the abolition of war as a means of settling international disputes. The USSR had also proposed partial measures which might be taken if the Western Powers rejected the plan for general and complete disarmament. Those proposals likewise were fully supported by the Czechoslovak Government. At a time when Governments were being expected to reach agreement in the field of disarmament, no steps should be taken which would cause further deterioration in the prevailing situation or create conditions unfavourable for further negotiations. It was therefore deplorable that the United States and Turkey should have concluded an agreement for the construction of launching pads for medium-range rockets on Turkish territory. The United States Press had published maps showing that all the European people's democracies, the European territory of the Soviet Union and the major part of Central Asia were within the range of the rockets which could be launched from those stations. That agreement was an obvious attempt to aggravate tensions and to create the greatest possible obstacles to future negotiations on disarmament. It was significant that it should have been concluded at a time when the United Nations was opening its discussion on the USSR's disarmament proposal.

25. In its declaration of 26 September 1959, the Czechoslovak Government had identified itself fully with the position of the Soviet Government. The Czechoslovak people had, by a number of meetings, resolutions and messages, expressed its great enthusiasm for the Soviet proposals. The Czechoslovak Government would accordingly do everything in its power to ensure that effect was given to those proposals. It had always endeavoured to make the greatest possible contribution to disarmament: from 1955 to 1958 the Czechoslovak armed forces had been reduced, in three stages, by 64,000 men; Czechoslovakia had adopted an Act on the Protection of Peace; it had taken part in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests and in the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack; and it had accepted membership in the new ten-nation Disarmament Committee. Negotiations on disarmament must not serve as a pretext for postponing agreement on the immediate and permanent suspension of all nuclear weapons tests. His delegation welcomed the progress made in that field, and appreciated the great efforts put forth by the Soviet Union during the Geneva negotiations. It hoped that the Western Powers would abandon their unrealistic demands which had so far prevented the conclusion of an agreement on that issue.

26. The Czechoslovak delegation had noted with satisfaction that representatives of a number of countries with different social systems had recognized the value of the Soviet proposals. It hoped that the General Assembly would pay to them the great attention which they deserved.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.