PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Fourth session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 33rd MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 24 February 1978, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORTIZ de ROZAS (Argentina)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.40 p.m.

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION (continued)

1. Mr. LEPRETTE (France), said that his country had always been deeply committed to the cause of disarmament and recalled that the President of France would himself address the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as proof of his desire to contribute towards achieving genuine and realistic disarmament which satisfied man's aspiration to greater security.

2. His delegation had participated actively in the work of the fourth session of the Preparatory Committee, which had given rise to numerous proposals and very imaginative suggestions. Numerous working papers had been submitted not only by powerful nuclear-weapon States but also by poorer countries which were less at risk but equally concerned to preserve international peace. Clearly, all countries were deeply interested in preparations for the special session.

3. The Preparatory Committee had not only recorded the numerous proposals before it but also tried to classify and simplify them so that they could be incorporated more easily into the final document to be submitted to the special session. However, it had not had sufficient time and resources to complete that task at the current session. His delegation would do all it could to help the Committee to complete it at its fifth session.

4. In response to numerous requests for a working paper which would expand on the views put forward by the French Government at the beginning of the session, his delegation was now submitting a further working paper (A/AC.187/105) to the Committee. That paper did not claim to be exhaustive or to constitute a declaration, programme of action and outline of machinery for disarmament negotiations all in one. Nor was it a counter project. It simply clarified his Government's views on a number of points. First of all, it commented on the negotiating machinery which the special session would be required to set in motion in order to involve the entire international community in the disarmament process. Secondly, it proposed the establishment of an observation satellite agency to control compliance with disarmament agreements. Thirdly, it proposed the establishment of an international fund for disarmament for development to enable the most heavily armed and richer countries to signify their willingness to devote to the purposes of peace and progress a growing proportion of the considerable resources which they had in the past deemed it necessary to devote to military expenditures. Finally, it proposed the establishment of an international institute for research on disarmament which would make available to the international community the necessary technical studies on disarmament problems. He hoped that those proposals would be given full consideration and would be incorporated in the documents to be drafted at the fifth session of the Preparatory Committee.

5. Mr. BLOMBERG (Observer for Finland) said that his delegation was not discouraged by the relatively slow progress being made by the Committee. The
latter could not have been expected to reach agreement on all questions related to
disarmament in such a short time. The work of the Committee had shown a definite
sense of purpose, and it was to be hoped that that sense of purpose would prevail
during the special session and beyond. The relationship between the proliferation
of nuclear explosives and peaceful uses of nuclear energy seemed to be emerging
as one of the central questions in the deliberations of the Preparatory Committee.
In that connexion, universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons would undoubtedly promote the security of all States and would
remove obstacles to broader international co-operation in the nuclear field. The
resolution on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear
energy adopted at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly was an
authoritative statement on those questions and should be adequately reflected in
the documents of the special session.

6. Appropriate and efficient machinery, though no substitute for imaginative
approaches or political will, was clearly a prerequisite for any progress in
respect of disarmament. Proposals had been made to reform existing disarmament
mechanisms, but there was little evidence to suggest that greater progress in
arms control and disarmament would have been achieved using a different kind of
machinery. The present system and its division into deliberative and negotiating
bodies had proved its viability. There might be room for streamlining and
revision, but the procedural and structural arrangements of CCD had not impeded
progress in disarmament negotiations. On the contrary, CCD had produced the
drafts of all multilateral arms control agreements that had been concluded since
the Second World War. CCD was able to function firstly because it operated on
the principle of consensus, secondly because of its basically political composition
and procedural arrangements and thirdly because of its special relationship with
the main deliberative body, the General Assembly of the United Nations. A
fundamental modification of those characteristics would not help the work of CCD.
A thorough discussion of disarmament machinery was obviously called for,
particularly as far as the deliberative elements of that machinery were concerned,
but it should be borne in mind that mere organizational reform could not generate
political will nor could it simplify the intricacies of disarmament questions.

7. There seemed to be broad agreement that some kind of follow-up was essential
if the special session was to be meaningful. It should be borne in mind that
the more successful the special session was in its substantive deliberations the
greater would be the possibility that it would give rise to other assemblies on
disarmament, and in particular a world disarmament conference. In that connexion,
it was essential to ensure the widest possible participation of the world community
in all disarmament efforts.

8. Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) said that the view that the fourth
session of the Preparatory Committee was particularly significant for the outcome
of the special session had been fully justified. Intensive work had been carried
out in the Committee, in the Drafting Group and in the subgroups. The results of
that work required attentive study and analysis. However, the value of what had
been achieved should not be judged by how many passages in the various texts were
or were not enclosed in brackets, but by the agreed intention to draw far-reaching
conclusions on basic disarmament questions. Such questions included the dangers arising from the arms race, particularly from weapons of mass destruction; the growth of efforts to avert the dangers of nuclear war and end the arms race; the increased influence of the United Nations in the field of disarmament; and the increased use of the resources released by disarmament for economic development. Another basic question related to the principle that disarmament measures should not be prejudicial to the security interests of any State. All Members knew how complicated disarmament questions were, for they affected the security of States. Disarmament could be achieved only if the principle of the equal security of States was accepted as fundamental.

9. A certain equilibrium had been reached in military technology and to upset that equilibrium by developing new weapons could only reactivate the arms race. The socialist States were in favour of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. They had no illusions and were prepared to accept agreed partial steps in that direction. The fourth session of the Committee bore witness to the effort to widen the general basis for the disarmament efforts which were required of all States, whether large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear. Upon that effort depended the attainment of the goal of ending the arms race and proceeding to disarmament.

10. In spite of his positive assessment of the Committee's work, he noted that disagreement remained on many important questions. Consensus represented progress wherever it enabled existing disagreements to be overcome. The Committee's work was still partly at the stage where positions had to be compared in order to find an acceptable compromise. The process of comparing views and becoming familiar with the arguments expressed in support of one position or another was itself an essential and important stage of the Committee's work. The time remaining before the fifth session should be used for realistic and responsible reflection on all the problems involved. The sole criterion of success would be the facilitation of effective disarmament measures. That goal could be reached if the Committee continued to be guided by the desire for mutual understanding, constructive effort and respect for the legitimate interests of all participants.

11. Mr. SUCHARIPA (Austria) recalled that at its 27th meeting the Committee, on the proposal of the Austrian delegation, had decided to request the Secretariat to prepare a background paper on verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. He hoped that that paper would be ready very soon, as delegations would need to study it fully before the fifth session.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that the document in question would be ready within a week.

13. Mr. WEILER (United States of America) said that he was aware that some delegations were disappointed at the scant achievements of the current session. Naturally, all delegations would have preferred to see greater progress, but the Committee was, after all, completing its first substantive session, at which many working papers had been submitted, and it was hardly surprising, therefore, that drafting had not progressed significantly. His delegation, for its part, would have preferred to see more progress in removing the square brackets from the draft Declaration, but it realized that its expectations were perhaps premature.
14. His delegation had decided not to submit any working papers to the fourth session, so that it could contribute more flexibly to the Committee's work, for it had realized that as soon as the various national or group papers had been submitted the process of consolidation and conciliation would have to begin. However, its decision did not seem to have promoted the spirit of conciliation which it had intended, as was clear, for instance, from the diversity of opinions expressed in the papers on the draft Declaration. If all parties were prepared to forego their preferences and to work instead for a solution to all the disarmament questions raised in the Declaration, the Committee's final document would be somewhat easier to draft.

15. With regard to the Declaration, the Committee must agree on the principle that the fact that a certain view of a given country was not reflected in the final document did not mean that that view was invalid, as long as the opposite view was not reflected in that document either, but simply meant that as yet no broad consensus had been reached on it. When the Committee resumed its drafting exercise in April, it should also take care to describe matters as they really were. For instance, it could hardly describe as fundamental guiding principles for disarmament negotiations principles which were still shown in square brackets because no agreement had been reached on them.

16. There was an even more difficult problem with the Programme of Action, as work had begun on its drafting immediately after some papers had been submitted and before Governments had completed any serious review of the issue in preparation for the special session. It was easier for some countries to put forward proposals and conclusions than it was for others, as different countries had different responsibilities, but it would be useful if the views put forward at the current session were also taken into account. The final version of the Programme of Action should be drafted only at the special session itself, when Governments' views on how to increase the impetus of disarmament would be known.

17. The Programme of Action could, however, be improved upon at the fifth session if all delegations realized that disarmament agreements as such could not be negotiated at that session. Detailed descriptions of the measures to be achieved tended to reflect a significant part of the negotiations themselves and in the end the Programme of Action would have to generalize if negotiations were ever to begin. When negotiations could actually be described in detail that meant that a large part of the negotiating task had already been carried out. If the Programme of Action was to provide a realistic outline of how the momentum of disarmament was to be increased and how that increased effort was to be channelled, the Committee would have to choose between certain elements rather than attempt to cover all elements at once, and would have to gain a clearer understanding of the function and purpose of the Programme of Action as compared to work in the longer term on a comprehensive negotiating programme.

18. A number of proposals had also been made at the current session on the role of the United Nations in disarmament and the role of negotiating machinery. Those proposals would have to be discussed very fully and a choice would have to be made among them, as some of them conflicted with others. His delegation would keep an open mind with regard to those proposals, as its prime concern was to ensure that the prospects for effective disarmament were increased and that the integrity of existing machinery was maintained.
19. Mr. POMBEKA (Sri Lanka) said that, while his delegation was aware that relatively little had been achieved at the current session, it was not overly pessimistic. Considerable work had been done and the current session was only a beginning. Conference Room Paper No. 15 did not raise major difficulties. There was a measure of agreement on its content and all that was needed now was agreement on its language.

20. Agreement had been reached on the structure of the draft Declaration. Considerable clarification and negotiation were still required, but there had been a useful exchange of views. The section on review and appraisal had raised certain problems, as anticipated, but it had been discussed fully so that all delegations were now aware of each other's views and he was optimistic that further agreement could be reached.

21. His delegation believed that goals and priorities should be spelt out in full in the relevant section of the Declaration. As to the section on principles, agreement had been reached on 19 principles, although there was still disagreement as to what should constitute principles, since each country had different priorities. He therefore suggested that all countries should consider those principles objectively before the fifth session so that they could at least agree on the set of principles to be included in the final Declaration.

22. There had been substantial agreement at the outset on the Programme of Action, but since then a number of new suggestions had been made. As a result, the Committee's work had been slowed down and all that was now available was a report on all the programmes of action which countries thought should be included in the final document. Document A/AC.187/100 probably gave a better account of the work on the Programme of Action, therefore, than Conference Room Paper No. 15.

23. The question of negotiating machinery had not been covered fully because of lack of time. It had been said that the Committee should not go beyond generalization at that stage, but his delegation believed that there was no point in producing a document that was full of generalizations. Accordingly, although it realized that its suggestion might be premature, it believed that more specific proposals should be put forward. There was enough time before the fifth session for Governments to consider Conference Room Paper No. 15 and to reach a broader consensus, especially in view of the most recent suggestions for negotiating machinery made by delegations such as that of France.

24. When he had introduced the working paper drawn up by the non-aligned countries, he had said that what the Committee needed was not so much working documents and a final declaration as a change in the collective will of its members, in particular the most heavily armed States. He now reiterated that such a change of political will was vital if the Declaration and Programme of Action were to have any force whatsoever and were to reflect the aspirations not only of those countries which had called for a special session devoted to disarmament but also of the general public, which placed such hopes in that session. The Committee should not be satisfied with what it had achieved so far. Informal contacts among delegations at the current session had contributed far more to
greater mutual understanding than had contacts within the Committee itself and his
delegation hoped that some of that understanding would be reflected in the work and
the achievements of the Committee at its fifth session.

25. Mr. JAIPAL (India) said that the time had come for taking stock and
evaluating the work done by the Committee in relation to its over-all objectives.
The Committee had heard the conflicting views of several regional and other groups
and the drafting groups had striven to weld the various elements into a
Declaration and a Programme of Action. His delegation wished to congratulate the
drafting groups for the work which they had accomplished, for although the
preliminary draft bristled with references to unresolved issues in the form of
passages in square brackets, that was because it was perhaps too early to expect
compromises. Agreed formulas might be expected to emerge in some cases at the
fifth session and in others during the special session itself. Much remained to
be done and there were certainly no grounds for complacency.

26. What separated delegations were differences in approach, for there was
clearly a large measure of agreement on ultimate objectives. There were
fortunately no advocates of nuclear warfare as a means of settling disputes;
furthermore, there was general agreement that nuclear weapons should eventually be
eliminated and that nuclear disarmament should therefore be given high priority.
Differences existed regarding the steps to be taken, and the order in which they
should be taken, in the direction of nuclear disarmament. The non-aligned
countries had indicated their concerns and priorities but it was really for those
Powers which had nuclear weapons to come forward with their own programme of
action, which should be sufficiently realistic and meaningful to assure the rest
of the world that its survival was no longer in danger. He therefore hoped that
the principal nuclear-weapon States would work out agreed immediate steps towards
the goal of nuclear disarmament and also outline the further steps which would be
taken within a foreseeable time-frame. If the super-Powers had faith in nuclear
disarmament, then they should provide concrete evidence on which to base the hope
of mankind's survival in conditions of security rather than in conditions of a
balance of terror. Mankind could not derive the sense of security to which it was
entitled from nuclear-weapon-free zones, from assurances of security to
non-nuclear-weapon States, from a comprehensive test-ban treaty or from
limitations on nuclear weapons. A nuclear holocaust would not respect the
non-combatant States. Some other rational basis had to be found for maintaining
equilibrium and peace in the world.

27. If, for the sake of argument, the principle of mutual deterrence through
nuclear weapons was accepted, one was entitled to ask what would be the minimum
level of deterrence that was adequate to ensure peace and security. If the level
of deterrence in 1960 had been adequate to prevent war, one was entitled to ask
why the level had increased since then. The fact that the nuclear arms race was
continuing space was proof enough that levels of deterrence did not in fact deter
but, on the contrary, intensified the arms race. The validity of the principle of
deterrence was thus not acceptable. A progressive reduction in deterrence levels
was essential as a first step for reducing the risk of nuclear war. There was no
reason why mankind should not be given solemn pledges, possibly unilaterally, of

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non-use of nuclear weapons by those States which had them, pending their final elimination. It might well be necessary to include in such pledges a provision on the non-use of force to change the status quo, or to guarantee that the threat or use of conventional weapons would not be escalated to the point where they might provoke the use of nuclear weapons.

28. World public opinion expected a major break-through towards nuclear disarmament and the responsibility for that lay mainly with the super-Powers. There was no doubt that if the two super-Powers were to provide the right lead, either together or even unilaterally, the other nuclear-weapon States would provide similar assurances. Success therefore depended largely on what the two super-Powers did in the interval before the special session in the way of entering into direct talks, bearing in mind the views and aspirations of others.

29. **Mr. GARCIA ROBLES** (Mexico) said that the accomplishments of the Committee during its fourth session had been sufficient to justify the efforts made. It was generally recognized that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons, were essential for international peace and security and for the economic progress which was to be expected from the new international economic order. In the international strategy of disarmament, it had been generally recognized that the United Nations must occupy the first place.

30. It was clear that the principal difficulties lay in the development of a Programme of Action and in the necessary machinery for its implementation. Notwithstanding the many divergencies of view which had become apparent and which it had not been possible to resolve during the session, he felt confident that a number of the alternatives which appeared in square brackets in Conference Room Paper No. 15 could be eliminated by negotiation. Even then a considerable number would remain. It was essential, therefore, that countries should accelerate their efforts during the next few weeks to reduce the number of alternatives in square brackets. He had no illusions as to the problems involved in the Programme of Action. He continued to believe, however, that the most realistic solution might still be found along the lines of document A/AC.187/89, which had suggested a three-year disarmament plan as a purely transitional measure. That plan contained a short and non-exhaustive list of disarmament measures. Those measures represented only a selection chosen from among the most urgent ones which might realistically be considered capable of being transformed into reality during the three-year period from June 1978 to May 1981. The adoption of such an immediate plan did not, however, mean the abandonment of the long-term goals of the Committee. Provision had been made in document A/AC.187/89 for the development of a more comprehensive, thoroughly negotiated programme within a period of approximately two and a half years.

31. In conclusion he would like to make a twofold recommendation. First, all States in the Committee should try to eliminate the maximum number of alternatives in square brackets. Second, it was clearly impossible in the present context to produce a draft Programme of Action which would meet with universal acceptance; efforts should therefore be made to achieve more modest goals in the shorter term by concentrating on recommendations which would have a wider degree of acceptance.
32. Mr. BENSMAIL (Algeria), Rapporteur, introducing Conference Room Paper No. 15 containing the draft final document, said that, in part I of the document, relating to the Preamble, the use of brackets reflected the positions of different groups, but it was to be hoped that many of those brackets could be eliminated at the following session of the Preparatory Committee. With respect to part III of the document, relating to the Programme of Action, not much progress had been achieved because of the lack of time, but a useful exchange of views had taken place. It should be noted that the drafting group had not been able to consider the question of the order in which the various sections of part III should be included in the final document, and the order in which they were included in Conference Room Paper No. 15 should not be regarded as a recommendation by the working group as to the order or importance of the sections in question. In sections I–III of part III the brackets indicated passages that had given rise to problems, whereas in sections IV–VIII they indicated merely that parallel versions existed. Part IV of the document had not been examined in depth because of the lack of time and was therefore largely a compilation of the proposals that had been submitted. It should also be noted that in parts II and III of the document, the titles and subtitles used in Conference Room Paper No. 15 were intended merely to help the Preparatory Committee in its discussions.

33. With respect to part IV, in paragraph 10 (iii) (c), the words "interested non-CCD members to participate in, including arrangements for" should be inserted after the words "other arrangements for". In the same paragraph, the last sentence should be enclosed in double brackets. In paragraph 10 (vii), the sentence "The CCD should carry on discussions and development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament." should be inserted at the end of the paragraph. In paragraph 13, the brackets in the third and fourth lines should be deleted.

34. Several delegations had requested that Conference Room Paper No. 15 should be translated into the other working languages of the United Nations.

35. The CHAIRMAN said that conference room papers were not official United Nations documents and were not normally translated. However, because of the importance of Conference Room Paper No. 15, he was sure that the Secretary-General would be prepared to authorize the translation, although the document's unofficial status would remain unchanged. The translations, if authorized, might be available in the course of the following week.

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

36. Mr. MARTIN (Director, Radio and Visual Services Division), in reply to a question raised by the representative of the United States at the 32nd meeting, said that the film in question was a project of the Office of Public Information within the terms of its general mandate from the General Assembly to increase public awareness of the issue of nuclear disarmament. Production of the film had involved lengthy research for suitable material. It was timely in relation to the special session although it had not originally been intended to be part of the promotional effort for that session. Events preceding the special session would be given full informational coverage. Normally OPI documentaries were kept available for a number of years. The film in question might, however, require revision if its lifetime was to extend beyond the special session. Perhaps a trailer could be added at the end of the film to inform the audience regarding the special session.
37. Mr. WEITLER (United States of America) said he understood that the producer of the film had at one time included a reference to the special session but that it had been subsequently struck from the film. He requested that a reference to the special session should be spliced into the film.

38. Mr. MARTIN (Director, Radio and Visual Services Division) said that no material had been included in the film and subsequently withdrawn. The Office of Public Information would consider the request of the representative of the United States but he could not announce a decision at that meeting.

39. Mr. WEITLER (United States of America) said that he would pursue the question through other channels.

40. Mr. FALASE (Nigeria) said that, if there was agreement that the special session represented the culmination of the hopes and fears of world public opinion on the question of nuclear war, then clearly that special session should be the theme of the film.

41. Mr. HARRY (Australia) said that his delegation shared the concern of the representative of the United States that any film issued by the United Nations on the question of disarmament should include a reference to the special session. His delegation thought that a solution could be found by adding a leader or trailer to the film. While he appreciated the difficulty of the Office of Public Information, there was clearly a need for a fine film to be shown in connexion with the special session and subsequently distributed for general use.

42. Mr. MARTIN (Director, Radio and Visual Services Division) said that what was involved was not a technical but a cost problem. The film had been planned for completion a year earlier and was to have covered the period from the first atomic bomb until the present day. After the special session, another film would probably be necessary. He would be glad to pursue discussions with representatives and would therefore delay distribution of the film until a decision had been reached.

43. The CHAIRMAN said that he agreed with the suggestion which had been made by the representative of the Office of Public Information. The film could be used during the special session and subsequently, with an appropriate trailer added, in different United Nations Information Centres throughout the world.

ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

44. The CHAIRMAN said that 29 May, Memorial Day, was an official United Nations holiday, but since such a large number of delegations wished to speak in the general debate, he suggested that the Committee recommend to the General Assembly that it should hold a morning meeting on that day to be devoted to the general debate.

45. Mr. JAY (Canada), supported by Mr. MOHAEER (Iran), said that delegations which had already asked to inscribe their names on the list of speakers for 29 May should be given priority.
46. The CHAIRMAN said that the point raised by the representatives of Canada and Iran would be taken into account. If he heard no objections, he would take it the Committee agreed to recommend to the General Assembly that it hold a morning meeting on 29 May 1978.

47. It was so decided.

ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE AT ITS FIFTH SESSION

48. The CHAIRMAN said that the Bureau had met to discuss the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee at its fifth session, and had reached a consensus on several points. Firstly, it recommended that the fifth session should begin on 4 April instead of 10 April 1978. The closing date should remain unchanged in order to ensure that Governments had enough time to study the relevant documents before the special session. Secondly, the Bureau had decided that the method of work used at the fourth session should be retained for the fifth session. In other words, plenary meetings would be limited to three per week, whereas the drafting group would have seven meetings per week. The number of plenary meetings could be further reduced if necessary. Thirdly, the Bureau thought it important that delegations to the fifth session should be represented at the negotiating level so that agreement could be reached on most of the various texts. In that connexion, he appealed to delegations involved in the drafting process to be flexible so that as many brackets as possible could be removed from the texts. Fourthly, the Bureau recommended that delegations should enter into informal negotiations before the fifth session in order to try to reach agreement on the texts.

49. If he heard no objection, he would take it the Committee agreed to advance the opening date of its fifth session to 4 April 1978.

50. It was so decided.

51. Mr. WEILB (United States of America) said that his delegation did not believe that, at the present stage, a drafting group exercise was necessarily the best way to achieve progress on the Programme of Action and on machinery for negotiations. While he agreed that the group should work at the negotiating level, it would be best to begin with contact group activity on a smaller scale before involving everyone in drafting group meetings. He agreed that it would be desirable to have government contacts in the interim period.

52. The CHAIRMAN said that the view of the representative of the United States was not incompatible with his own. The holding of drafting group meetings was not a barrier to smaller contact group meetings among delegations, which were, indeed, desirable. When outlining the programme of work, he had meant to make clear that efforts should be concentrated on negotiation before drafting began. General debate in plenary meetings should be avoided, as the different views were already well known. By emphasizing the negotiating nature of work in the drafting group and its subgroups, progress could be made towards the drafting of actual texts.

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53. The Bureau had considered the matter of the role of the non-governmental organizations in the work of the special session. Its majority recommendation was that the participation of the non-governmental organizations should be considered and decided at the April session. The present view of the Bureau was that, should it be decided to assign one day to representatives of non-governmental organizations, they should not be heard in a plenary meeting. Because of the time constraints and the large number of non-governmental organizations involved, it would be desirable for them to select their representatives in advance, and report to the Preparatory Committee at its April session which representatives had been chosen. The Secretariat was already making arrangements to assign places to the non-governmental organizations at plenary and committee meetings of the special session, and an announcement on those arrangements would be made at the April session when the item on non-governmental organizations was considered. He therefore assumed that it was agreed to take up the item further at that time.

54. It was so decided.

55. The CHAIRMAN said that the Preparatory Committee had decided to recommend that the special session should set up a single plenary Committee, with as many subsidiary organs as were considered appropriate. There had been no recommendation on the other powers of the Committee, but if the rules of procedure of General Assembly committees were adhered to, the Committee would require one Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and one Rapporteur. The Bureau considered that there were two alternatives: at the special session, the Committee could select one Chairman, three Vice-Chairmen and one Rapporteur, to ensure representation from all geographical regions, or it could adhere to the present composition of the Bureau of the Preparatory Committee by electing one Chairman, eight Vice-Chairmen and one Rapporteur. The Bureau did not expect to be re-elected in full with its present composition, but he wished to point out that in the Preparatory Committee it had functioned well, its number enabling all geographical regions to be represented. The members of the Committee could consider both alternatives before deciding the matter at the April session.

56. It had been suggested that the Secretariat, either alone or in consultation with the Chairman, should prepare an initial introductory draft to be used as a guide for debate. The draft could be presented to the Committee during the first days of the April session.

CLOSURE OF THE SESSION

57. After expressing his gratitude to the officers and members of the Committee, and to others concerned, the Chairman declared the session closed.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.