Draft programme of action

Australie, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland: working paper

I. GENERAL

The States Members of the United Nations at the eighth special session of the General Assembly solemnly affirm that their ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. They recognize that this goal requires an increase in international confidence and security to remove the incentive for States to acquire weapons and to encourage them to reduce these from present levels. The States Members therefore believe that a serious worldwide disarmament strategy must be accompanied by a greater and sustained effort to eliminate the sources of tension and injustice in the world and to increase the effectiveness of international machinery in the United Nations and elsewhere for the peaceful settlement of disputes; to uphold the international rule of law; and to promote the political, civil, social and economic rights of man. This strategy should take into account not only the quantitative but also the qualitative aspect of disarmament, and should result in the release of resources for the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of humanity particularly in the developing countries.

This programme of action sets out in chapter II priority negotiations for completion over the next few years. In addition it proposes concurrent measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress towards general and complete disarmament. It gives practical effect to the principles set down in the Declaration on Disarmament. A prerequisite for a successful disarmament strategy is the adherence of all States to existing arms control and disarmament agreements.
II. IMMEDIATE MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. In the nuclear field, in which the nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility, the realization of the central objectives of preventing both horizontal and vertical proliferation by:

   The halting and the reversal of the nuclear-arms race in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions; especially by a second strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed urgently by further strategic arms negotiations with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons;

   The earliest conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, which should be adhered to as soon as possible by all States, particularly all nuclear-weapon States and should contain verification provisions giving maximum confidence that no party would conduct clandestine tests;

   Further measures to develop an international consensus on the strengthening and consolidation of the nuclear-non-proliferation régime, based primarily on adherence of all States to the NPT and on the system of safeguards of the IAEA. Measures to be pursued should include assistance to the IAEA in its attempts to strengthen its safeguards system; the application of IAEA safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities; agreement on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials; study and possible development of alternative and more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies; an examination of the possibility of giving a suitable international character to appropriate nuclear-fuel-cycle operations, and to effective measures for the control of plutonium in civil nuclear programmes; and support for the work currently being undertaken in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. These measures should be designed to facilitate international access to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and take account of the particular needs of the developing countries in this area, as well as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

   The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones suitable to specific conditions in the regions concerned through agreement between all the States in the region and with effective co-operation from nuclear-weapon States.

2. Assurances, as appropriate, by nuclear-weapon States designed to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack.

3. Other weapons of mass destruction:

   A convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and regulating their destruction;

   A convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

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Continuing review of the question of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles with a view to consideration of agreements on the prohibition of any new weapons which may be identified.

4. Conventional weapons and armed forces:

Agreements or other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis for placing restrictions on the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional weapons;

Conventions prohibiting or limiting the future use in armed conflict of certain conventional weapons which may be indiscriminate in their effects or may cause unnecessary suffering;

Agreements or other measures on a regional basis, aiming at strengthening peace and security, in particular urgent efforts to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe.

5. The measures listed above should form part of a balanced programme of disarmament and provide for adequate verification including, if appropriate, the possibility of on-site inspection. Verification provisions should be so designed as to ensure the effectiveness of agreements and to enhance mutual confidence.
III. THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE

In addition to undertaking the specific arms control and disarmament tasks described above, the States Members of the United Nations, in order to strengthen international confidence and deepen the dialogue between those involved in defence matters in different countries, should:

1. Support the Secretary-General in his efforts further to strengthen the expertise and capability of the United Nations to play its essential role as a catalyst in the disarmament process;

2. Encourage the further discussion and development by the CCD of a comprehensive programme for disarmament;

3. Publish detailed information about their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries;

4. Supply full information on military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized reporting of such budgets as a step toward verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure;

5. Assess the possible implications of military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament;

6. Seek to restrain the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons, utilizing all means which could lead to bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures of control, limitation and balanced reduction of such armaments;

7. Accept adequate provisions of international control as appropriate to facilitate the conclusion and effectiveness of disarmament agreements;

8. Stimulate public awareness of disarmament issues by:

   Publicizing the final documents of the special session, in particular through non-governmental organizations, mass media and educational systems,

   Facilitating public access to information on disarmament questions,

   Improving mechanisms for the dissemination of relevant United Nations publications, and

   Encouraging study and research on disarmament;

9. Take the following actions to increase confidence between States bilaterally, regionally or world-wide:
To inform States, on a regional basis, and in accordance with regionally established criteria, 21 days or more in advance about their intention to carry out major military movements or manoeuvres;

To invite observers from States on a regional basis to manoeuvres and encourage military visits and exchanges of all kinds on a reciprocal basis;

To improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict due to misunderstanding or miscalculation.
IV. STUDIES TO FACILITATE FURTHER MEASURES

In order to facilitate further steps in disarmament and parallel measures to promote international peace and security, the Secretary-General is requested to carry out studies relating to:

1. The strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes to enable it to anticipate and resolve international crises;

2. Ways of limiting the build-up of conventional weapons, regionally and throughout the world, taking into account all relevant aspects, inter alia:

   The international transfer of conventional weapons;

   The possibility of reciprocal limitation of the level and types of conventional weapons;

   The proposal for a United Nations register of weapons transfers;

3. The relationship between disarmament and development to be initiated as soon as possible after the special session. The terms of reference of this study should be on the basis of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts;

4. All regional aspects of disarmament, including further measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis;

5. The possible contribution to confidence-building among States of technical measures such as demilitarized zones, zones of limited forces and surveillance and early warning systems which could be used as appropriate in areas of tension; and on the use of some of these measures in the verification of arms control agreements.

V. IMPLEMENTATION

All States undertake to work toward the fulfilment of this programme, and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document.