Views of delegations to the Preparatory Committee on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

(Background paper prepared by the Secretariat)

## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. General remarks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Objectives of the Special Session</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Preparatory work for the Special Session</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Agenda</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Organization of work of the Special Session</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Principal document or documents of the Special Session</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

At its sixth meeting on 11 May 1977, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament requested the Secretariat to prepare a document classifying, under various headings, the replies received from Governments pursuant to operative paragraph 3 of resolution 31/189 B (XXXI) of the General Assembly.

At its seventh meeting on 12 May 1977, the Preparatory Committee approved a list of headings to be used by the Secretariat in fulfilling the task assigned to it. At the request of a number of delegations, it was announced by the Chairman that the opinions expressed by delegations during the general debate held by the Committee would be included in a subsequent document.

The present document incorporates, under the various headings, the views of delegations on the agenda and all other relevant questions relating to the Special Session of the General Assembly, as reflected in the summary records of the Committee.
## I. GENERAL REMARKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. GENERAL REMARKS

AUSTRALIA

"s said that the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament provided a unique opportunity to secure progress in arms control and disarmament. It should not be regarded merely as a stepping-stone for the establishment of new disarmament machinery, but should be used as a vehicle for appraising developments to date. It was important that delegations, when identifying the factors which had obstructed disarmament, should be less concerned about apportioning blame to any State or group of States than about making a concerted effort to overcome those obstacles." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p. 2)

AUSTRIA

" recalled that, in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization in 1975, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had deplored the fact that it had not proved possible to halt or limit the arms race in a world increasingly preoccupied with the problems of social justice, hunger, poverty, development and an equitable sharing of resources. Today, that assessment was even more valid. The policy of détente, of which the Austrian Government was a firm advocate, would have credibility only if it produced tangible results in the field of disarmament. It was with those considerations in mind that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, had expressed Austria's full support for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p. 2)

BELGIUM

" The past 20 years had witnessed the growth of the role of the non-aligned world in international affairs. It was satisfactory to note in that connexion that the non-aligned countries had originated the idea of convening a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p. 9)

BRAZIL

" stated that, throughout the years, Brazil had shown its readiness to participate in efforts aimed at promoting the objective of
2.

general and complete disarmament under effective international control, not only in the General Assembly but also in CCD and in other international bodies. Brazil had co-sponsored resolution 31/189 B which had been adopted by the General Assembly by consensus.

The views of the Brazilian Government on the subject of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were set forth in document A/AC.187/49 dated 11 May 1977. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.4)

BULGARIA

" said that the People's Republic of Bulgaria attached great importance to efforts to curb the arms race with the ultimate aim of achieving general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In conjunction with other socialist countries, Bulgaria was doing everything in its power to overcome the obstacles to disarmament in order to achieve decisive results in that area and to bring about the same relaxation of tension in the military field as had been achieved in the political field. Bulgaria would always speak out decisively in favour of the control of the arms race and disarmament.

In recent years, as a result of a process of relaxation of international tension and as a result of international and bilateral agreements, a number of measures had been taken to bring the arms race within established limits. Important negotiations were currently in progress on the adoption of new measures to limit armaments and bring about disarmament. However, although progress had been made towards reducing the danger of a new world conflict, there had been no slowing down of the arms race, which continued to be an obstacle to world peace and security, consumed enormous material resources and adversely affected world economic progress. For those reasons, the limitation of the arms race was a legitimate cause for concern for all nations and peoples and one of the most urgent tasks of the contemporary world. In that connexion, he referred to the proposal of the representative of the USSR concerning the convening of a world disarmament conference. That proposal had received the support of the majority of States Members of the United Nations and also of the Fifth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. In a forum of that size, Governments could, with some hope of success, undertake an examination of all aspects of disarmament questions and take effective measures. Unfortunately, in spite of the numerous General Assembly resolutions supporting the world disarmament conference, it had not been possible to hold the conference thus far, for reasons which were well known. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.10)
suggested it must be remembered that the forthcoming special
session devoted to disarmament had been the solution found by the General Assembly
to try to remedy the resounding failure of the United Nations in the field of
disarmament and the failure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,
which had not yet produced any positive results that might benefit mankind."
(A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

"No matter how hard the General Assembly tried to achieve positive results in
the field of disarmament, its efforts would be futile unless the countries
responsible for the tragedy of the arms race throughout the world showed a will to
co-operate.

In its letter addressed to the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 31/189 B, the Government of Colombia stated that disarmament was in no
way dependent on the will of the Organization as such, or even on that of the vast
majority of its Members; it depended solely on the will of the countries
that manufactured weapons, that had been stockpiling them, that traded in them and that
derived both military and political power and enormous financial profit from that
lethal industry. So long as those countries were unwilling to disarm, to reduce
the rate of weapons production or to place the interests of mankind in general
above their own interests and hunger for power, nothing would be gained, no matter
how many special sessions of the General Assembly or how many world conferences on
disarmament were held."
(A/AC.187/SR.7, p.8)

CUBA

"said that the great majority of mankind had always yearned
eagerly for general and complete disarmament. The growth of the arms race, which
drained away huge resources that should be used to improve the living conditions of
all peoples, was arousing justified alarm throughout the world. Never before had
arms had such destructive power nor had the risk of the destruction of the human
race been so real, for the currently existing nuclear stockpiles had the potential
to destroy the planet earth several times over.

In 1973, the international community had spent $30 million an hour on armies
and weapons, i.e. more than $300 billion a year. The funds thus wasted in four days
could have fed, for a whole year, 200 million children who were the victims of
poverty in various parts of the world. Nevertheless, the arms race continued while
hundreds of millions of human beings lacked the bare essentials of life. That
apparent paradox was inexplicable if one forgot that war and the threat of war had
been and were a fabulous business for powerful imperialist monopolies. The latter were the worst enemies of world peace; they had introduced gross distortions into the economies of a number of capitalist countries, which could apparently find no outlet but in promoting international tension and conflict. Accordingly, universal disarmament could not be achieved without establishing a system of international relations that was based on equality and respect for the rights of all peoples, that excluded all manifestations of a policy of aggression, domination and interference, and that enabled all States, large and small, to develop peacefully, independently and safely.

The present situation called for prompt action. The process of détente should be extended to the military field. In that connexion, Cuba reiterated its support for the proposals contained in the memorandum of 28 September 1976 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. 4

(A/AC.187/SR.13, pp. 5-6)

"His Government attached the greatest importance to the prompt convening of the world disarmament conference, which had been consistently advocated by the non-aligned countries since their first summit conference held in Belgrade. The conference, with the participation of all States, could examine the agenda in proper perspective, giving due attention to all the factors involved. His delegation therefore felt that the world disarmament conference should be given high priority as a separate item on the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, the special session should not be regarded as a substitute for the world conference but should rather be a gateway leading to its early convocation.

The international community could thus advance towards general and complete disarmament in conditions which guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and legitimate rights of all countries and which strengthened the process of international détente, making it irreversible and world-wide." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.6)

CYPRUS

"recalled that there was a close relationship between disarmament and international security. However, for many years the disarmament effort had been kept isolated, with no parallel effort for international security. That isolation had deprived negotiations of the necessary background of international security and of the resulting climate of confidence. The United Nations Charter, particularly Articles 11, 26 and 47, showed the close relationship between disarmament and security. Furthermore, the first resolution adopted by the
United Nations in 1946 had been devoted to disarmament and linked to the question of security. In another early resolution (41 (I)), the General Assembly had asserted that the problem of security was closely connected with that of disarmament. However, subsequent General Assembly resolutions on disarmament in the 1950s had made no mention of international security. The many rounds of negotiations that had followed had yielded no results. High hopes had been raised in 1961 by the McCloy-Zorin joint statement of agreed principles on general and complete disarmament. In the long disarmament negotiations over many years, attention had been focused on the mechanics of disarmament proposals without any parallel effort towards international security. Yet, the joint statement of agreed principles, in article 7, had clearly provided that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments.

At the current stage of disarmament discussions, it must be accepted that the progress on disarmament could not be achieved outside the political context of the world. Effective progress on the problem of the arms race and disarmament would continue to be hampered so long as there was no means of ensuring the security of nations other than dependence on armaments. The functions of the United Nations, and more particularly of the Security Council, for the maintenance of international peace and security would have to come into play.

Co-operative efforts in a climate of confidence were pre-eminently needed in the disarmament endeavour. Such a climate required a framework less antagonistic than that of the outworn concept of balance of power, which was but the extreme of mistrust - short of war. Regrettably, during all those years of disarmament efforts, there had been no diminution of the arms race. The stockpiling of nuclear megatonnage had gone from 6,000 in 1960 to 320,000 in 1968, and it continued to escalate. According to expert opinion, no more than 12,000 megatons in terms of radio-activity alone would be enough to destroy all human life on the American continent and beyond. Thus, the existing stockpiles of hundreds of thousands of megatons could destroy not only all life on the planet but the atmospheric environment that made life possible.¹ (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp. 6-7)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

¹ His delegation was convinced that the special session would demonstrate the readiness of States to put an end to the arms race and would thus represent a concrete step towards general and complete disarmament, which was the goal of all realistic, sensible nations of the world.² (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.7)
6.

DENMARK

It was difficult to achieve disarmament without a climate of trust in the world; in that respect the progress registered in disarmament was a barometer indicating the level of mutual international confidence, which would be enhanced if States permitted international control and effective verification when undertaking commitments for disarmament. The world had to become a place where the force of argument replaced the argument of force. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)

FRANCE

said that his Government's criticisms of disarmament efforts, as currently conceived and conducted, were well known. However, criticism was not sufficient. That was why his Government - which, as the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in the General Assembly, was prepared to support any proposal aimed at genuine disarmament, i.e. the effective destruction of all types of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, at a reasonable rate of speed and under effective international control - welcomed the convening of a special session devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.2)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

said that the most vital task facing the international community at the present time was to remove the danger of another world war. In the Bucharest Declaration adopted in November 1976, his country, together with the other Warsaw Pact countries, had restated its readiness to co-operate actively with other States to remove that danger. The General Assembly, at its thirty-first session, had adopted a number of important decisions on disarmament and arms control and it was now up to the Preparatory Committee to ensure that efforts to implement those decisions were successful.

His country would do all it could to help guarantee the success of the special session of the General Assembly in creating the conditions for fuller and more effective disarmament and arms control. Political détente had made it possible to adopt international agreements on that subject, and those agreements must now be used to prevent further preparations for war, to promote international peace and security, and to free countries from the expenditure involved in participation in the arms race. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country had already described his Government's precise position on that issue in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 18 March 1977. (A/AC.187/SR.3, p.2)

said that the German Democratic Republic was striving for general and complete disarmament and was ready to exert
the greatest efforts to that end. How that the necessity of halting the arms race and making a start on disarmament was apparent, there was a more favourable climate for the adoption of concrete measures to that end. The United Nations had a special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security by implementing the decisions of its various organs.** (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)

"It was a fact that the first partial results in the area of arms limitation and disarmament already existed in the form of bilateral and multilateral agreements. On the other hand, the arms race continued to an increasing extent and the danger of a world war was not eliminated.

The German Democratic Republic had always linked consideration of the problem of arms limitation and disarmament with that of many other questions of world-wide importance, since all were closely bound up with the security of States, and their solution was therefore very complex.** (A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.5-6)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

See II.

HUNGARY

" said that Hungary's support for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was not a matter of subjective decision, but followed from its social system. In every international forum, Hungary had supported attempts aimed at enhancing the cause of disarmament."** (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

INDIA

" said that the United Nations had been established to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and that fulfilment of the other purposes of the Charter depended on ability to guarantee world peace. The purpose of the first resolution of the General Assembly, adopted in January 1946, had been the elimination of atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Despite that, military expenditure was currently of the order of $350 billion, involving a criminal waste of precious natural resources and brain power in a world experiencing hunger and need. Politicians and generals were seriously discussing whether a pre-emptive nuclear strike was not a blessing in disguise. In that game of war, which had developed its own inexorable logic, the chief protagonists displayed a terrifying indifference to the condition of the rest of humanity. Never before in the history of evolution had man possessed the means of destroying all life on earth and the mad logic to justify it. That was not a political question; it was essentially a moral problem.
It was not the first time that India was playing an active role in disarmament questions, for its experience in the matter dated back to the early days of the United Nations. In 1949, India had submitted a draft resolution proposing a Declaration on the duties of States and individuals in respect of the development of atomic energy in such a manner as to ensure the elimination of atomic weapons from national arsenals. In 1950, India had proposed a draft resolution on the establishment of a United Nations fund for reconstruction and development, to be formed of resources released through disarmament measures. In 1960, India had introduced a draft resolution outlining the principles for disarmament negotiations which were incorporated the following year in the McCloy-Zorin Agreement. Since 1962, India had participated continuously and actively in all disarmament organs. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.10)

IRAQ

said that Iraq attached the greatest importance to the question of disarmament, believing that it should be one of the fundamental goals of the United Nations since it was linked with the problem of maintaining international peace and security and could create a suitable atmosphere for promoting international co-operation and accelerating the process of social and economic development, particularly in the developing countries. It was deplorable that, while millions of people were suffering from malnutrition, huge sums of money and tremendous efforts were being wasted on the manufacture of nuclear and other types of destructive weapons. Those resources could and should be used for world economic and social development, especially in the developing countries where they were most needed.

His delegation believed that the United Nations should be at the heart of that process and had therefore joined with other non-aligned countries in sponsoring the resolution calling for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. An appeal for the convening of a special session had been made at the Colombo Summit Conference, and he felt that the proposals made at that time by the non-aligned countries could serve as a fruitful basis for a successful session. He also wished to emphasize that the convening of a special session devoted to disarmament should in no sense represent an alternative to a world disarmament conference.

He observed that the aspirations of the international community for peace and security could not be attained in a vacuum. The granting of independence to peoples under foreign domination, the elimination of racism and colonialism, respect for the sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs would eliminate some of the factors which had led to the resort to arms. Genuine peace and security
could not be achieved unless the strategies aimed at acquiring spheres of influence and world hegemony were eradicated." (A/AC.187/SR.11, pp. 7-8)

ITALY

"said that disarmament depended primarily on the capacity of the international community gradually to eradicate the suspicion, mistrust and lack of understanding which undermined relations between countries. His Government had always done its utmost to improve its relations with the rest of the world and intended to continue that policy and, if possible, to expand it in the field of disarmament. In that spirit, it had from the outset supported the initiative to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and had co-sponsored the resolution on the subject." (A/AC.187/SR.10, pp. 3-4)

JAPAN

"said that if the special session was to achieve its objective - general and complete disarmament - all participating States must remember that political confrontations were counterproductive and that the special session represented a constructive opportunity for deliberations which would lead to concrete disarmament measures." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.3)

Although a number of significant agreements on arms control and disarmament had been concluded in the past two decades, mainly as a result of the efforts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the measures adopted thus far did not seem to have produced sufficient progress. That was due to the fact that, in the past, disarmament negotiations had tended to give priority to preventive and peripheral measures. Accordingly, his Government earnestly hoped that the special session would devote itself to deliberations on crucial and central issues which would lead to the final goal of general and complete disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.3)

MONGOLIA

"said that the views of the Mongolian People's Republic on the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were contained in document A/AC.187/16. As could be seen from that document, the Mongolian People's Republic attached great importance to the special session, which would deal with the urgent problems of halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament.

Determined efforts to control the arms race and achieve general and complete disarmament occupied a prominent place in his country's foreign policy. The
Mongolian People's Republic had sponsored many constructive initiatives and proposals aimed at disarmament. As a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it had played an active part in the preparation of various conventions in the field of disarmament. The arms race had led to the present disturbing situation in which huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons were threatening the very existence of all mankind and technological advances were moving towards the manufacture of increasingly deadly and destructive weapons. Such prospects were inevitably disturbing to all the peoples of the world. The movement for peace and general and complete disarmament had thus assumed international proportions, as could be seen from the World Assembly of peace-loving forces which had been held in Warsaw in May 1977 and in which representatives of 125 countries and more than 50 international organizations had taken part. Representatives of States members of the United Nations should heed the voice of world opinion, which called for the adoption of effective general measures to lay the foundations of lasting world peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

In the opinion of his delegation there was an urgent need to eliminate the danger of a new world war. To that end, maximum use must be made of all positive conditions for the preparation and implementation of effective measures aimed at the reduction and prohibition of the arms race and at disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.8)

NEPAL

Said the fact that the General Assembly resolution convening a special session devoted to disarmament had been adopted by consensus was an indication of the growing willingness of States to participate in disarmament negotiations in a broader forum. The existing bilateral and multilateral forums for negotiations had been unable to achieve any significant results in the field of disarmament, and as a consequence the world was armed to the teeth with the most lethal array of weapons imaginable.

Sensing the urgency and seriousness of the problem, the non-aligned countries had taken a positive step at their fifth summit meeting in Colombo in 1976 and had adopted a resolution calling on the United Nations to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. The General Assembly of the United Nations had subsequently adopted, at its thirty-first session, a resolution to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.3-4)

In conclusion, he wished to point out that many non-governmental organizations had been actively associated for many years with questions relating to disarmament; their knowledge and experience should be utilized and they should be encouraged to continue their useful work. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)
NETHERLANDS

"said that his Government's reply to the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 31/189 B on the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament showed that the Netherlands attached great importance to the problem of disarmament in both the nuclear and the conventional fields. In the United Nations, the Netherlands participated, in CCD and other bodies, in negotiations to bring about a limitation of the arms race, the ultimate goal being general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The special session would provide an opportunity to focus the attention of world public opinion on that question." (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.3)

NEW ZEALAND

"said that his country's support for the convening of a special session was a direct reflection of its concern at the lack of substantive progress on disarmament. The continued proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, of nuclear weapons jeopardized the relaxation of international tension. It was clear that the production and refinement of nuclear weapons could not be halted by bilateral negotiations between super-Powers. The problem was not simply one of maintaining a balance of terror among the leading military Powers. The economic burden of armaments at their present level could not be supported by either the developed or the developing countries.‖ (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.4)

NIGERIA

"said that as a result of the endeavours of the founding members of the non-aligned movement to make known the objectives and perspectives of the group, Africa had remained relatively safe from atomic blasts. Paradoxically, nationalism had recently been increasing at a time when the most serious issues facing mankind could only be resolved through recognition of interdependence. As Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, had said at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the polarization of the world around two power centres, which was the case until recently, was neither conducive to world security and peace nor even beneficial to the national or regional interests of the countries which had been parties to the military alliances of the immediate post-war period.

His delegation was pleased to note that the principles to which he had referred had gained support even outside the ambit of the group and it hoped that the non-aligned movement would become a melting-pot of nationalities. He expressed his appreciation to the delegations of Austria, Sweden, Pakistan, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, and many other countries, which had indicated their willingness to support the movement, and to the many non-governmental organizations which had pledged their unflinching support to the common endeavour to safeguard mankind.

In welcoming any assistance offered to the non-aligned group, he wished to make it clear that the group had never aspired to be a monolith and that, to the extent that circumstances permitted, its members could have reservations with respect to the group's official working paper or other working papers, which did not pretend to be an immutable blue print, but rather guidelines leading to agreement by consensus.\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.14, p.2)}\)

\textbf{NORWAY}

\textquote{\textbf{\textquotedblright} said that the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament offered a valuable opportunity for focusing global attention on a complex of problems which urgently required re-evaluation, fresh thoughts and, above all, political action. Not only did the arms race represent a threat to peace and to the security of all nations; it also involved an unacceptable waste of resources in a world of poverty and distress. The special session would contribute to a greater understanding and awareness on the part of the public of issues which to an increasing extent were becoming technical questions only fully understood by experts. In that connexion, the non-governmental organizations had an important function to perform.\textbf{\textquotedblleft}}\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.2-3)}\)

\textbf{PAKISTAN}

\textquote{\textbf{\textquotedblright} Consideration of the record of the past 30 years led to the inescapable conclusion that, although a number of noteworthy measures had been taken in the field of disarmament, they had failed to bring the world anywhere near the goal of an international order based on collective security as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, 17 years after the General Assembly had formally declared general and complete disarmament as the goal of the United Nations, military expenditures continued to grow, both qualitatively and quantitatively.\textbf{\textquotedblleft}}\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.7)}\)

Weapons of extreme precision had been added to weapons of mass destruction. Technological developments had given the arms race, particularly between the super-Powers, a self-perpetuating character. The spiral could only be broken by simultaneous endeavours aimed at bringing about a relaxation of tension and disarmament. The real danger facing mankind stemmed from the existence of huge nuclear arsenals and the possibility of their use. The complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the eventual destruction of stockpiles should be the primary goal of action in the field of disarmament.\textbf{\textquotedblright}}
PANAMA

"recalled that on many occasions in the course of the history of mankind attempts had been made to abandon the possession and use of arms. With the increasing sophistication of weapons, the situation had become more alarming and, since the middle of the previous century, efforts to limit and control weapons had multiplied. In that connexion, mention should be made of the three Hague Conferences, the references to the question contained in Wilson's 14 Points and in the Treaty of Versailles, and the initiatives taken by the League of Nations. Both the League's Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and other subsequent attempts had failed dismally.

Since its earliest days, the United Nations had been preoccupied with the question, and the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war had found expression in the preamble to the Charter. Although since then much had been said and written about the subject in the Organization, the results were frankly disappointing. It was unquestionably an almost impossible task, given the number of political and economic interests involved. Nevertheless, despite the frustrations and the deceit of those who spoke of disarmament while secretly manufacturing weapons, despite the fact that the arms trade was excellent business, and despite the lack of trust and the fear that lay at the heart of the situation, general and complete disarmament would ultimately have to come about.

The day was not far distant when third world Governments, aware of the global threat of the arms race and of the fact that the astronomical amounts being spent on the production of, trade in and purchase of weapons could otherwise be used to meet the most basic needs of their peoples, would rebel against that state of affairs and impose an international boycott on arms suppliers.

The arms race was repugnant to the conscience of the world because, in addition to threatening the very existence of mankind, it enabled certain powerfully armed States to establish military bases in other countries and to maintain troops in their territory in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. It kept non-weapons-producing countries in a state of humiliating dependence. In many parts of the world, colonial enclaves and racist régimes maintained themselves by force and the use of arms against the will of indigenous majorities, and the same could perhaps be said with regard to the 14 military bases maintained by one great Power in the Panama Canal Zone. The arms race was often promoted by those who manufactured and traded in arms for profit or by Governments desirous of expanding their sphere of influence or pursuing neo-colonialist interests. Nor should it be forgotten that the manufacture, stockpiling and transport of certain types of arms had an adverse effect on the environment.
He suggested that it might be advisable to have the great Powers provide films on the weapons currently included in their stockpiles for projection during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Such a "document" would be more convincing than many speeches, studies and statistics.

His delegation wished to express its appreciation to those delegations which year after year had worked for the cause of disarmament and, particularly, to the Mexican delegation for its untiring efforts and concrete contributions to that cause. (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp.4-5)

**POLAND**

"said that the Government of Poland had already stated its well-substantiated position on the preparations and agenda for the special session in document A/AC.187/12, submitted in response to the note from the Secretary-General. That position was based on three inseparable political components: first, that the most important and pressing task of the international community was to put an end to the arms race and achieve effective disarmament agreements; secondly, that the imperative need for disarmament was necessitated by considerations of strengthening world security and eliminating the threat of a new world war, and that it represented the basic foundation for ensuring irreversibility of the processes of political détente; thirdly, that progress in limiting the arms race and in disarmament could truly and effectively serve the establishment of a new international economic order. That position derived from the genuine conviction that international relations in the present-day world could only be based on détente and co-operation and that the trends in that direction would continue to develop and take firmer root. It was therefore both feasible and necessary to promote the processes of détente so that they extended to all nations, which implied the elimination of sources of tension and conflict, and so that those processes also extended to new spheres of international endeavour, including, in the first place, the military sphere, which necessarily implied efforts to limit the arms race and achieve progress in disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.7)

**ROMANIA**

"said that the holding of a General Assembly session on disarmament was of special importance, not only because it was the first time in the history of the Organization that Member States would be considering the question of disarmament at a special session but also because the session would be prepared and held at a time when the whole world was endeavouring to institute a new international economic order.

The United Nations was far from having accomplished the mission entrusted to
it on the subject of disarmament, although it had been dealing with the problem since its establishment. Negotiations on disarmament had gradually drifted away from the United Nations and those that were still being conducted under its auspices had, in actual fact, lost their original content. Three decades had elapsed since its foundation and the United Nations was still not exercising direct competence in the matter of negotiations on military disengagement and disarmament. Furthermore, Governments had not taken resolute action to reduce or do away with armaments and make mankind safe from another war. The international conventions and treaties concluded thus far had certainly helped to create a climate of greater understanding, but had not succeeded in curbing the armaments race or ensuring the application of effective disarmament measures. In the present circumstances, which were characterized by immobility in disarmament negotiations, the armaments race had intensified, as had the development, diversification and the stockpiling of nuclear and conventional arsenals. While billions of dollars were being spent on armaments, problems of under-development and economic inequality were worsening. It was clear that the strategy, measures, proposals, approaches, rules and procedures applied so far were not yielding the desired results. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.5)

**SRI LANKA**

recalled that the idea of holding such a session had first arisen at Belgrade in 1961 during the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. The Fifth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in 1976, had revived that proposal because of its deep dissatisfaction and disillusionment at the failure of the various negotiations on disarmament and its conviction that one of the factors contributing to that failure was that such negotiations took place in an exclusive forum. For those reasons, the Conference had felt that it was appropriate to urge the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and had welcomed with great satisfaction the adoption by consensus of General Assembly resolution 31/189 B. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.9)

**SWEDEN**

emphasized the urgent need for the special session devoted to disarmament and her Government's determination to make an active contribution to it. The session should be a starting point for a new phase of joint disarmament efforts aimed at the gradual solution of specific problems within a reasonable time-frame. Sweden had repeatedly stated that the two super-Powers had a special responsibility for the future of the world since their combined armaments amounted to 60 per cent of the world total. Accordingly, substantial early progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union was one of the fundamental ingredients of
world disarmament efforts. As in the case of SALT, progress towards a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban agreement and towards the prohibition of chemical weapons depended ultimately on the mobilization of the necessary political will. Disarmament was a matter of serious concern to every nation, and efforts towards that goal must necessarily be multilateral. Sweden had from the very beginning attached the highest importance to the multilateral disarmament negotiations being conducted within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva.

(A/AC.187/SR.5, p.2)

TUNISIA

said that, since the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, disarmament had been one if not the main concern of the international community. Every year for the past 30 years the General Assembly had reiterated its conviction that the arms race constituted a danger the consequences of which would be catastrophic for all peoples without exception. For many years that concern - it might almost be called obsession - had found expression in many statements, and many solutions to the complex problem of the arms race had been proposed, unfortunately to no great avail. In certain sectors, the negotiations conducted in recent decades had yielded some partial and limited results which fell far short of the objectives the United Nations had set itself.

It had long been said that it was for the nuclear Powers alone to solve the disarmament question and that the achievement of agreement on objectives and on methods of limiting or completely eliminating the danger threatening everyone depended on those Powers alone. In view of the present complexity of the problem, however, and of the interdependence of the interests of peoples, it was vitally important to involve all members of the international community in the search for an effective solution to the arms race, since all had to suffer its consequences.

(A/AC.187/SR.11, p.2)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

At the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union had submitted a memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament in which it had made specific proposals calling, inter alia, for nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the destruction of chemical weapons, prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of military budgets. His delegation was pleased to note that most of the replies from States drew attention to the need for a prompt solution to all those problems. However, it would be unrealistic to expect complex, deep-seated problems like the
ending of the arms race and the achievement of general and complete disarmament to be solved overnight. Experience had shown that the road to disarmament was difficult and complicated and that it called for painstaking negotiations through various channels and in various forums. The existing channels had demonstrated their effectiveness. Complex negotiating machinery had been created in which practical measures for bringing about disarmament and curbing the arms race were discussed and adopted. However, those were complex, many-sided problems; in some cases they called for a bilateral approach, while in others a regional, multilateral action was required. The bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations should play an important role in containing the arms race as in the case of the limitation of strategic arms. Regional negotiations aimed at the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe were being conducted at Vienna, and fruitful negotiations were taking place at Geneva in the Committee on Disarmament. Disarmament problems were discussed every year in the First Committee of the General Assembly. All those different approaches complemented each other and contributed to the over-all work being done in the field of disarmament."

"expressed satisfaction with the constructive nature of the debates and considered that the exchange of ideas would guarantee the success of the preparations for the special session. The adoption of an acceptable draft agenda marked an important achievement of the current session and would lead to positive results. The next step would be to consider the opinions expressed by the various Governments and the nature of the decisions the General Assembly would have to adopt at the special session. In the documents adopted, emphasis would have to be placed on the pressing need to halt the arms race, the need to avoid a third world war, and the dangers inherent in the arms race, which absorbed resources that could be used for other constructive purposes.

Although the concrete results so far achieved were unsatisfactory, it must be acknowledged that some of the conditions necessary for halting the arms race existed. In that context, the relaxation of tension and peaceful coexistence of recent years were conducive to the holding of fruitful discussions. Referring to statements made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Mr. Brezhnev, he said that the negotiations would have a favourable outcome to the extent that the participants demonstrated a genuine desire to consolidate peace and were prepared to reach decisions that would not endanger the interests of some countries or give unilateral advantages to others. The Soviet Union was acting on the basis of those criteria." (A/AC.187/SR.14, pp.3-4)

VENEZUELA

"said that the arms race endangered not only the competing Powers but the whole of mankind. Suffice it to say, as Dr. Alva Myrdal warned, that the plutonium deposits in the hands of the Powers had become a source
of insecurity to the very countries which possessed them. The arms race affected the entire international community, not only because more than $300 billion were spent on it annually, while most people were denied the opportunity to enjoy the advances of science and technology, but also because of the crisis in ideals and constructive proposals which it revealed."

(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.3)

**YUGOSLAVIA**

pledged his delegation's full co-operation in the work of preparing for the special session devoted to disarmament, which, as the Secretary-General had stated in his opening statement, represented a landmark in the search for international peace and understanding. In proposing the convening of a special session, the non-aligned countries had believed that they were expressing the general interest of the entire international community in ending the arms race and in involving all Member States in the search for solutions and agreements which would mark the beginning of the end of the arms race and open the way to general and complete disarmament."

(A/AC.187/SR.3, pp.3-4)

The results of negotiations held so far had related in general to the control of armaments and not to disarmament itself. Furthermore, the existence of the Treaty banning Nuclear-weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water while underground tests were permitted to continue, and the refusal to conclude a treaty on the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests for military purposes, in spite of obligations embodied in the earlier Treaty, pointed to a lack of political readiness on the part of the nuclear Powers to take effective measures to put a stop to the nuclear arms race.

Although Yugoslavia welcomed the efforts exerted by the two leading military Powers and the agreements concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union on the control of strategic armaments, such agreements did not amount to disarmament measures but merely regulated the nuclear arms race, since the conventional weapons race still continued.

Although the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constituted an attempt to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries, that action had not met with success, which was hardly surprising in view of the fact that the leading nuclear Powers had continued to improve and augment the quantity of their nuclear weapons, the number of which had increased fivefold."

(A/AC.187/SR.4, pp.3-4)
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ............... 28
United Kingdom ................................... 28
United States of America ............................ 29
Yugoslavia ........................................... 29
II. OBJECTIVES OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

AUSTRALIA

One of the principal goals of the special session should be the elaboration of a framework within which arms control and disarmament issues could be examined and negotiations conducted. To that end, it was necessary to set out fundamental normative principles. However, those principles should be founded on political reality. For example, States would not be prepared to negotiate disarmament measures unless they felt militarily secure. Another major goal would be the identification of a consensus on the priority measures of arms control and disarmament and the issues of contention within those priority areas. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.2)

AUSTRIA

The Austrian Government was aware that genuine disarmament could be achieved only through the political will of States, which in turn depended on the existence of a climate of mutual confidence and understanding between States and on the active concern of world public opinion. It hoped that the special session would make a real contribution to building up such confidence and would ensure that the problems of disarmament were seen in the proper perspective of the over-all political, social and economic situation. The problems of development and disarmament were closely related, and the two tasks must therefore succeed together or fail together. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.2)

BANGLADESH

considered that the escalating global budget for the maintenance and expansion of the means of destruction, in a world where countless millions of people barely managed to subsist, was sufficient justification for the convening of the special session devoted to disarmament. In the opinion of his Government, the special session afforded a vital opportunity for tackling anew the fundamental problems concerning disarmament, on the basis of equal participation by all States. The most important objective of the special session must be to marshall the political will of all countries, big or small, to give new impetus and stimulus to the disarmament process. A critical element for the success of that catalytic endeavour was education of world public opinion regarding the magnitude and dangers of the arms race and the efforts required to halt it. Success would also depend on the ability of all States to create the necessary climate of mutual confidence and understanding, backed by objective facts and studies that could provide a positive framework and time-phased programme for future action. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.2)
BELGIUM

"...said that the special session should provide the opportunity to implement a comprehensive disarmament programme under which all States, without distinction, would agree to participate in the implementation of recommended measures. The arms race, with its risks of destabilization and its impact on the economic development of States, was currently affecting all regions of the world. Disarmament was becoming an increasingly important matter of concern to all States, although some States, because of the weapons they possessed, had to assume special responsibilities." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)

BRAZIL

See I.

BULGARIA

"...At the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, most delegations, including his own, had supported the resolution on the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, on the understanding that that session was not to take the place of the world disarmament conference but was to be an important stage in the preparation of such a conference.

His delegation's views on the special session were clearly stated in the reply of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the Secretary-General of the United Nations contained in document A/AC.187/36." (A/AC.187/SR.10, pp.10-11)

COLOMBIA

See I.

CUBA

See IV.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"...The convening of the special session was fully in keeping with the preparations for the world disarmament conference and would represent an important stage on the road towards its realization. That position did not conflict with the views..."
expressed regarding the possibility of holding repeated special sessions on disarmament or with the emphasis placed on the need to prepare for the world disarmament conference, which his Government regarded as the only universal platform having the necessary authority to adopt concrete, effective disarmament measures."

(A/AC.187/SR.11, p.7)

DENMARK

"said that the special session represented a valuable means of directing international attention to the arms race and making public opinion aware of the opportunities which existed for disarmament as well as the difficulties involved. Moreover the session should serve as a catalyst for arms control and disarmament negotiations and encourage further negotiations at the global, regional or bilateral level.

At the same time the special session would inevitably focus public attention on the adverse effects which massive arms expenditure had on the economic and social development of nations. Substantial progress in the field of disarmament could lead to the release, for more constructive uses, of vast material and human resources which were currently being devoured for military purposes. The Danish Government included a minister without portfolio, who would devote much of her attention to disarmament while at the same time having the responsibility for development aid."

(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)

FINLAND

"said that two simple principles should be kept constantly in mind. Firstly, as an essential element of détente, arms control and disarmament were imperative for the security of nations. Secondly, disarmament was imperative for the realization of the goals of a new international economic order. The Members of the United Nations had pledged themselves to the creation of that new international economic order. A number of causes of underdevelopment had been identified and agreement had been reached on the structuring of a more equitable world. However, the continued diversion of scarce human and material resources to military ends was seriously threatening the attainment of the goals of development. The special session should reflect an awareness of the organic link between disarmament and security and the necessity of disarmament for development."

(A/AC.187/SR.7, p.5)

FRANCE

"At its September session, the Preparatory Committee would examine the question of a declaration of principles and a programme of action. His delegation
would participate actively in that work, and it wished to emphasize now that one of the main objectives of the special session should be a thorough study of disarmament procedures and structures leading to the establishment of an effective negotiating body which would work in close co-operation with the United Nations. Secondly, although there was obviously a need for nuclear disarmament - and it should be emphasized that that was a problem separate from the cessation of nuclear tests - the fact that nuclear disarmament could not be achieved without parallel progress in conventional disarmament should not be overlooked. Only if there was parallelism between the two spheres would it be possible to avoid the disruption of the strategic balance and the insecurity which might arise during the gradual development of the stages which should characterize such a delicate undertaking.  

(A/AC.187/SR.13, p.2)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

"The resolution on the World Disarmament Conference had been adopted in 1971 and had been confirmed at all subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. A World Disarmament Conference, with the participation of all States, would be a proper representative forum in which broad measures for disarmament could be discussed. The Government of the German Democratic Republic believed that such a conference would have the necessary authority to achieve real progress on the question of disarmament. A session of the General Assembly, or a special session, could not replace a world conference. In the view of the German Democratic Republic, the link between a special session devoted to disarmament and the World Disarmament Conference was that the special session could and should be made an important step in the process of convening a World Disarmament Conference. That position was in keeping with the Colombo Declaration, and he regretted the attempts which had been made to ignore the basic document of the Colombo Conference on so important a question." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)

"Like the other States of the socialist community, the German Democratic Republic felt that the special session should contribute to the solution of disarmament problems." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.6)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

"recalled that his country had co-sponsored the draft resolution whereby it had been decided to hold the special session devoted to disarmament, because it considered that what had so far been achieved in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was only a beginning. The multilateral negotiations concerning disarmament and arms control on a world-wide basis were concentrated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. That
organ was responsible for negotiating draft treaties on the subject, and it was to be hoped that progress would be achieved in Geneva in important areas before the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The objectives of the special session should be viewed against the background of those ongoing efforts. His delegation believed that the special session devoted to disarmament should be held in an atmosphere of co-operation and mutual trust, in order to demonstrate the credibility of world-wide endeavours towards disarmament and arms control.

It was important that the special session should help to make international disarmament negotiations more effective, particularly in order to achieve the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In that connexion, the special session could provide a positive impetus for the achievement of international stability and security through balanced measures of disarmament and arms control. (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.2)

HUNGARY

Hungary was convinced that the elimination of the arms race required the common effort of all States, and considered that the best framework for that was a World Disarmament Conference. Some maintained that the holding of that Conference would not be a realistic solution because of the opposition of certain Powers. Recent history has provided many examples of the achievement of goals which had seemed unrealistic a few years earlier. When a number of countries proposed holding a European Conference on Security and Co-operation, for some the proposal had also seemed to be unrealistic; later, however, it was possible to hold the conference. It should be pointed out that the political climate in Europe had improved considerably in recent times and that any progress achieved in the field of disarmament would surely accelerate the process of détente. The World Disarmament Conference would be a new approach in international disarmament negotiations, and Hungary considered it very important that the special session should devote due attention to it and include it as a separate item in the agenda. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

His delegation hoped that the special session would contribute to the improvement of the political climate, which would in turn be reflected in greater progress in the existing disarmament forums. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

INDIA

The special session should deal with nuclear disarmament as a matter of high priority rather than attempt to find answers to all questions. The special session might not be able to do more than stimulate action in certain positive
directions. Depending on its outcome, it might become necessary to hold a series of such special sessions culminating in a world disarmament conference.\textsuperscript{11} (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.10)

IRAN

"The multitude of replies received so far contained numerous ideas and proposals relating to the objectives of the special session; although they were all important, it would be unrealistic to project all of them as goals for the session. It was imperative to determine by a process of selection those areas where there was a reasonable chance of obtaining results. The main objectives of the special session could best be elaborated by taking account of the following current trends: an unrestrained arms race and the growth of nuclear arsenals to an unbelievable level capable of destroying the whole world many times over had made disarmament more than ever an urgent and truly global problem in which the entire world had a vital stake; multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements in the field of arms limitation and control had been of marginal value and had not resulted in the elimination of a single nuclear weapon; there was thus a need for a reassessment of the effects of the arms race on the economic development of all nations, especially the non-nuclear countries and those without significant military power.\textsuperscript{11} (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.4)

IRAQ

See I.

ITALY

"Considering the diversity of the proposals on the objectives of the special session, it was essential to identify those proposals on which agreement was possible and concentrate on the search for a common basic position on those issues. At the same time, while identifying priority objectives for immediate action, the General Assembly should not ignore the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament or the general principles already established by the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. Bearing that in mind, the Italian Government had repeatedly stressed the need for a coherent and comprehensive programme of complete disarmament, and considered that the special session should endeavour to elaborate a far-reaching plan for gradually achieving the total elimination of arms in order to create a world based on détente, understanding, co-operation and on an international security system.\textsuperscript{11}(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.4)

"One should not lose sight of the final goal, namely, the establishment of a new collective international security system within the framework of the United Nations, which was a prerequisite for a more just and equitable political and economic order. What the world community needed for its development was economic and social reform, as well as a better distribution of those human and material resources which currently were absorbed to a disproportionate extent by the arms race." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)
25.

JAPAN

See I.

MEXICO

"...said there seemed to be a consensus that the Assembly should not allow the work of the special session to become a repetition of the debates in the First Committee that the special session was not an appropriate forum for negotiating specific agreements or trying to draw up draft treaties and that it was necessary to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.6)

MONGOLIA

See I.

NEPAL

"...Problems relating to disarmament could not be solved in one or two special sessions of the General Assembly. Everyone knew that the problems were too complex and myriad in nature. But the time had come to tackle the issues squarely rather than to avoid them simply because they were too numerous and complicated. The special session would provide an unprecedented opportunity and a suitable framework for all endeavours to that end." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.4)

"...Disarmament must be linked with economic development. However unpalatable it might be to a few, the truth remained that disarmament could contribute to real development in a great number of countries and benefit the vast majority of mankind while at the same time imparting a sense of international peace and security.

The special session should take up other important questions like the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty, the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zone and the creation of zones of peace. One of the most alarming features of the current situation was the phenomenal growth in conventional arms. The production and development of conventional weapons at present accounted for four fifths of the entire expenditure on armaments. That problem therefore required study, as did the effect of international trade in arms on the growth of conventional arms." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.4)
26.

NETHERLANDS

See I.

NORWAY

See I.

PAKISTAN

"said that it was of crucial importance that the special session should achieve its objectives. Those objectives must be defined with clarity and realism. The success of the session would, of course, depend on the will and resolve of all States in general, and the great Powers and other militarily significant States in particular, to overcome their differences so that meaningful results could be achieved." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.7)

PANAMA

"His delegation reiterated its support for the proposal of the Colombo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries calling for the convening of a world disarmament conference or a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; it supported, in general, all measures favouring the holding of the special session, which should make an important contribution to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the special session, the General Assembly would have to make decisions on such concrete steps as convening a world disarmament conference and demanding that the great Powers destroy their nuclear arsenals under safe and responsible international control." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.5)

PERU

"said that, in view of the high hopes placed in disarmament by the vast majority of the human race, the Preparatory Committee was under an obligation to make every possible effort to ensure that proper preparations were made for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The special session was timely because the arms race had already reached an indescribable level. It was also important because all other efforts to consider the armaments problem in a suitable manner had been partial or had not won general acceptance. The success of the current endeavour would be a victory not for any group or groups of countries but for the whole world community.

His Government believed that, although all States had a responsibility in the task of disarmament, some States had a greater responsibility than others, and that the failure of the claim that the arms race contributed to increased security must be borne in mind in all thinking on the subject." (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp.3-4)
His delegation, like many others, considered that the work of the special session must not be allowed to become merely a repetition of the work of the First Committee; attention should therefore be concentrated on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In that respect, it must be acknowledged that the progress made by the United Nations in the field of disarmament related almost exclusively to side issues. *(A/AC.187/SR.7, p.4)*

"emphasized the urgent need for the special session devoted to disarmament and her Government's determination to make an active contribution to it. The session should be a starting point for a new phase of joint disarmament efforts aimed at the gradual solution of specific problems within a reasonable time-frame. Sweden had repeatedly stated that the two super-Powers had a special responsibility for the future of the world since their combined armaments amounted to 60 per cent of the world total. Accordingly, substantial early progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union was one of the fundamental ingredients of world disarmament efforts. As in the case of SALT, progress towards a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban agreement and towards the prohibition of chemical weapons depended ultimately on the mobilization of the necessary political will. Disarmament was a matter of serious concern to every nation, and efforts towards that goal must necessarily be multilateral. Sweden had from the very beginning attached the highest importance to the multilateral disarmament negotiations being conducted within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva." *(A/AC.187/SR.5, p.2)*

"In the opinion of his delegation, the convening of a special session devoted to disarmament would make it possible to remedy the inadequacies of the methods adopted in recent years. One of the main tasks of the special session was to secure and define a common political will, which alone would make it possible to establish a new international strategy with universal participation. That was why Tunisia supported the idea of the adoption of a declaration on disarmament. That document should not only embody the political undertaking of all Member States to take effective action for disarmament but should also establish the objectives to be achieved and the guiding principles to be followed. The endeavour would succeed only if account was taken of the interests of all, particularly those who had not had an opportunity to express their opinion on that serious matter." *(A/AC.187/SR.11, p.2)*
TURKEY

"said that his delegation fully shared the views of those Governments which considered that the goal of the special session devoted to disarmament was not to negotiate arms control agreements or to resolve outstanding questions immediately, but rather to produce guidelines for future bilateral, multilateral and regional negotiations. His delegation believed that the special session would give significant impetus to those negotiations and would promote and accelerate efforts towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It could also generate greater support for disarmament efforts through a better understanding of the questions relating to disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

"said that the Soviet Union supported the idea of a special session devoted to disarmament because it believed that, if suitably prepared, the session could contribute substantially to the solution of disarmament problems. It was necessary to end the absurd competition regarding armaments, and the Soviet Union for its part was prepared to take all necessary measures to that end, provided that the other parties to the negotiations were also prepared to make their contribution.

Disarmament problems had been discussed at various multilateral and bilateral meetings. In a number of important areas, notable success had been achieved in the reduction of the arms race and effective agreements had been concluded. In general, however, there was no slowing down in the arms race, involving increasingly sophisticated weapons, and the number of States participating in that process was still growing. The special session of the General Assembly should provide a useful international forum for consideration of the existing situation with regard to disarmament. Views could be exchanged and the principal trends could be outlined, and the session could conclude with the adoption of a final political declaration setting out agreed views on the question of disarmament. The adoption of such a document would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the task of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.6, pp. 3-4)

UNITED KINGDOM

(On behalf of the nine members of the European Community)

"In view of the diversity of approaches to disarmament, the special session could hardly be expected to produce instant solutions, but it did offer a unique opportunity for the international community to develop a co-operative approach to the problem, and the nine delegations of the European Community pledged themselves to help ensure that that opportunity was used in a constructive and positive manner." (A/AC.187/SR.2, p.2)
in the reply sent to the Secretary-General in compliance with resolution 31/189 B, the United Kingdom Government had expressed the view that a special session could enhance the prospects for disarmament, provided that it was thoroughly prepared and widely attended, particularly by all significant military Powers. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.8)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Although the agenda approved would probably serve as a useful framework for the work of the special session and the future organization and direction of preparatory work, it must be recognized that it represented only a small fraction of the immense task facing not only members of the Committee but also those countries willing to contribute to the success of the special session. In the coming months it would be necessary to clarify and consolidate objectives, determine the main areas to be examined and reach agreement on the best means of seizing the opportunity provided by the special session to give a strong impetus to disarmament negotiations. That would require intensive preparations at the national level and a broad and sustained pattern of consultations. For its part, the United States would continue its efforts to identify ways in which the special session could lead to an acceleration and broadening of the disarmament process in the light of the pressing need for substantial progress in the field of disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.14, p.3)

YUGOSLAVIA

said that the decision to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had been well received and approved by the whole international community, which had considered it an indispensable step towards the cessation of the arms race and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.4, p.3)

Instead of concentrating on solving major problems, namely, how to prevent qualitative sophistication and territorial spread of nuclear weapons, new tendencies had emerged aimed at limiting the right of all peoples to make use of nuclear energy and technology for the development of their productive forces. In his delegation's view, one of the main tasks of the special session should be to reach political agreement on how to prevent the sophistication and spread of nuclear weapons and how to ensure the free transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under effective international control. His delegation was fully aware of the difficulties arising out of the delicate and complex character of that matter. It had been precisely those aspects of the disarmament issue that had prompted the non-aligned countries to propose the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187.SR.4, p.4)
III. PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION

ALGERIA

"The second phase of the Committee's preparatory work involved the preparation of a declaration of principles on disarmament and of a programme of action. The non-aligned members of the Committee had prepared a working paper which, he hoped, would form the basis for informal talks as a prelude to negotiations. His delegation agreed that the talks should be informal during the period between the end of the current session and 31 August, when the third session was due to start. He regretted that he did not share the views of those delegations which had suggested that the third session should take place after the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had finished its work. It had to be remembered that the dates of the third session had been set by the Committee at the beginning of its first session and that the majority of the Committee members were not members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; most delegations would also be busy with the ad hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, which was scheduled to meet between 12 and 15 September next. Furthermore, he could not accept the idea of the Preparatory Committee becoming a kind of subsidiary organ of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and having to modify its programme of work accordingly. It should also be remembered that the documentation approved by the General Assembly on the basis of the work done by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament included a recommendation that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should submit an annual report to the General Assembly in sufficient time to enable Member States to examine it. He therefore considered that the dates originally set for the third session of the Preparatory Committee should be maintained.

He also considered that, during that session, the Preparatory Committee should concentrate on preparing its provisional report for submission to the General Assembly at its next session." (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp. 8-9).

AUSTRALIA

"The task of the current session of the Preparatory Committee was to establish the framework within which the General Assembly could approach its tasks at the special session and to take initial steps which would facilitate the efficient and timely completion of the necessary preparatory work. His delegation was ready to co-operate fully in the discussions and in the drafting of the essential documents." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p. 3)
AUSTRIA

Agreement on the agenda would make it possible to reach an understanding on the format and character of the final documents of the special session. As its next step, the Committee should try to agree on the broad outlines of the contents of the final documents, perhaps in the form of an annotated agenda, which could then be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. During that work, the Committee should make optimum use of the services of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and should request the Secretariat to provide it with the background information it would need to carry out its task. The expertise of non-governmental organizations and internationally recognized research organizations could also contribute to an understanding of the problems facing the Committee.\(^\text{[A/AC.187/SR.7, p.3]}\)

BANGLADESH

See IV.

BELGIUM

"Belgium had always believed that one of the main reasons why international efforts had come to a standstill was the lack of communication among nuclear States, whose responsibility to the international community should motivate them to seek ways of establishing a dialogue among themselves. It was to be hoped that the special session would help to bring about the conditions - particularly the institutional conditions - which would enable such a dialogue to begin. The Preparatory Committee should bear that objective in mind and prepare documentation which would enable all States to attend and participate in the special session.\(^\text{[A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9]}\)

"For its part, the General Assembly should endeavour to broaden the scope of the measures which could contribute to disarmament. In that connexion, the question of the transfer of conventional weapons should receive closer attention from all States. Similarly, the United States suggestions concerning measures designed to improve the climate of international confidence and to reduce tension should be reflected in the agenda. The Assembly might also consider new working and negotiating methods which had scarcely been tried thus far. In that connexion, his delegation had already drawn attention at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, to the possibilities afforded by a regional approach to disarmament. It was not a question of a regional approach as opposed to a global approach. All such approaches, like any potential bilateral measures, were complementary. It should be
borne in mind that the prospects for agreement on certain aspects of disarmament could vary from one region to another. His delegation intended to propose at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly that a global study of the regional aspects of disarmament should be undertaken.

Meanwhile, the Committee should develop the topic of the regional aspects of disarmament in the documents which it was to prepare for the special session". (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)

As far as the organization of work was concerned, his delegation could agree to an extension of the third session of the Committee, which should soon address itself, in a practical manner, to the substantive questions to be included in the agenda of the special session. With regard to the studies to be undertaken by the Secretariat, as referred to in particular in Mexico's reply to the Secretary-General, the Committee should, in the light of the large volume of documentation already existing on disarmament questions, draw up precise terms of reference which would meet practical considerations and not place an undue burden on the Secretariat. If the Committee carried out its preparatory work adequately, the objectives of the special session might be achieved in a shorter time than that indicated by the representative of Mexico. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.10)

See also VI.

BRAZIL

"With regard to preparations for the special session, he welcomed the preparation by the Secretariat of the background papers in documents A/AC.187/29, 30 and 31, and looked forward to the prompt distribution of the comparative analysis of the comments received pursuant to resolution 31/189 B. However, the Preparatory Committee should not overburden the Secretariat with new requests until it was agreed, after careful study, that the preparation of a new document would clearly serve an immediate purpose in its deliberations." (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp.5-6)

BULGARIA

"His delegation wished to point out that, in setting up the Preparatory Committee, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, whose active work in the area of disarmament was well known, had not been done justice. It was to be hoped that, at the thirty-second session, the General Assembly would remedy that state of affairs and would enable the remaining socialist countries of Eastern Europe to take part in the deliberations of that important body as full members. Bulgaria had participated in the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva
since its inception and was a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. He expressed the hope that the Preparatory Committee would include a recommendation on that question in its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.\^\(\text{3} (\text{A/AC.187/SR.10, p.11})\)

**CUBA**

\^\(\text{3} \) The members of the Preparatory Committee could make an important contributions to the cause of disarmament by ensuring that the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly did not become just another exercise in rhetoric but rather a framework for promoting practical results. To that end, it was essential to observe the principle of consensus in the adoption of decisions and to ensure the equitable participation of all ideologies and groups of States in the preparatory process for the special session. In that connexion, his delegation supported an increase in the representation of the socialist States in the Preparatory Committee and trusted that the General Assembly would take the necessary decisions to put an end to the existing imbalance, which was unfair to that group of States.\^\(\text{3} (\text{A/AC.187/SR.13, p.6})\)

**CYPRUS**

\^\(\text{3} \) As reported in 1961, world military spending had stood at $120 billion annually. By 1970 it had risen to $200 billion - an increase of $80 billion in 10 years. In 1975-1976, it had risen to $300 billion. Expenditure at the present time was estimated at $400 billion, representing a sudden increase of almost $100 billion in one year. Such a tremendous waste of valuable resources, which were needed for the preservation and development of human life but which instead were diverted towards its destruction, in itself represented an economic problem of vast dimensions and linked development directly with disarmament. The arms race and military spending were formidable obstacles to solving development problems. Disarmament, development and international security must be examined together in a highly interdependent world. His delegation therefore proposed formally that the Secretary-General, with the help of consultant experts, should undertake a study on the interrelationship between those three factors.

So that generally acceptable solutions could be reached, all States must participate in consultations which would take into account their views and suggestions. It was therefore essential that formal and informal consultations on the content and drafting of the documents to be adopted by the special session should be conducted on the basis of studies and papers concerning a new approach.

What was needed above all was a return to a modicum of legal order, which ironically had never before fallen to such a low point as at present, in the United Nations era. The road to world legal order lay through international security, which would become a reality only when decisions of the Security Council
were effectively enforced. The interest of Cyprus in legal order and international security was not related only to the present situation in that country. In its first statement in the general debate, in 1960, when Cyprus had become a Member of the United Nations as a newly independent country, his delegation had stressed the need for international security, as stipulated in the Charter, through the establishment of a United Nations force to maintain world peace and security. It was a tragic irony of fate that subsequently Cyprus had become a living example of the lack of international security, even when Security Council decisions had been unanimous. In 1968, Cyprus had submitted a draft resolution proposing a study of the link between disarmament, development and international security. He was gratified to note that the concept of international security as a pre-condition progress disarmament had received support in some of the replies from Member States to the Secretary-General on the subject of the special session. (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp.7-8)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"I said that his Government had been very much interested in becoming a member of an organ as important as the Preparatory Committee. He therefore regretted the fact that, as a result of the inadequate representation of the States of the socialist community, it had not been possible for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to sit on the Committee. His Government felt that the inadequate representation of the socialist countries failed to reflect the important role which those countries played in disarmament talks. He would therefore like to take the opportunity to stress his Government's continuing interest in becoming a full-fledged member of the Preparatory Committee. He hoped that that interest would be taken into consideration during the debate on the special session which would take place at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.6)

FINLAND

"I In the view of his delegation, the preparatory work for the special session should be seen in the context of the ongoing process of negotiations towards arms control and disarmament agreements. The atmosphere and the possibilities of a successful outcome of the session would be greatly enhanced if progress in the negotiations could be achieved before the special session. On the other hand, the agenda should be flexible enough that the work of the special session could be accommodated to results achieved in those negotiations. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.5)

FRANCE

See II.
Because the problems of arms control and disarmament were extremely complex and directly affected the security of States, the Preparatory Committee must adopt a very realistic approach even in its procedural decisions. In that connexion, his country deeply regretted the fact that the Eastern European group of countries was not adequately represented in the Committee despite the major initiatives which it had taken to promote arms control and disarmament. A temporary solution to that state of affairs had been provided by the decision to permit non-members to participate in the work of the Preparatory Committee, but in his view the membership of the Committee should be reviewed by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

In the matter of working procedure, the Preparatory Committee should be guided by the experience of other major United Nations bodies. Certain United Nations committees, as well as the sixth and seventh special sessions of the General Assembly, had applied the principle of consensus. It was particularly desirable to apply that principle when discussing the problems of arms limitation and disarmament, which affected the interests of all peoples. Since the constructive co-operation of all States would be required in order to ensure the success of the special session, the Preparatory Committee should set an example by continuing to work on the basis of consensus. (A/AC.187/SR.3, pp.2-3 and A/AC.187/SR.1-14/Corr.)

During the forthcoming weeks questions directly related to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would be considered in many forums. Disarmament questions would also be considered at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. The outcome of all those discussions should be borne in mind during preparations for the special session. Consequently, only after the thirty-second session would it be possible to make concrete preparations for drawing up a final document of the special session. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.6)

At the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee (A/AC.187/SR.1), his delegation had pointed out that, when the Committee was being set up, the views of the socialist States of Eastern Europe had not been taken into account. Accordingly, it would be appropriate if the question of the composition of the Preparatory Committee was examined at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly with a view to increasing the number of its members. The Committee's report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session should include a recommendation to that effect.

In the statement made by Poland on 10 May 1977 (A/AC.187/SR.5), the Secretariat had been requested to provide the Committee with a document listing disarmament proposals officially submitted to the United Nations. That document would present the substance of the proposal, the date and country of submission, and the status of its follow-up. His delegation supported that suggestion, since it felt that
the document would enrich the working documents available to delegations."
(A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.6-7)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

With regard to the immediate purpose of the Preparatory Committee's meetings, efforts should be concentrated on reaching a consensus on the agenda for the special session devoted to disarmament. The proposal submitted at the preceding meeting (A/AC.187/43) provided an excellent basis for discussion." (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.3)

The United Nations Disarmament Centre should be used as rationally as possible to prepare the necessary background material for the next round of meetings of the Committee. That would also assist the preparation of the report which the Committee was to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. No priority areas had yet been developed on which the Secretariat should concentrate, apart from a general assessment of the results so far achieved in disarmament and arms control, and efforts currently being made in that regard. It might also be useful to take into account the references to the relevant subjects made in the replies of States to the Secretary-General and in the statements of delegations in the Preparatory Committee." (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.3)

HUNGARY

"Finally, his delegation considered the preparations for the special session a continuous process and was certain that the General Assembly would renew the mandate of the Preparatory Committee. It trusted that at that time it would be possible to enlarge the Committee in order to accommodate those socialist countries which played an important role in disarmament questions as members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. He requested that the observations of his delegation and of the delegations of other socialist countries on that point should be reflected in the report of the Preparatory Committee to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

IRAN

"said that it was essential to the smooth functioning of the Preparatory Committee and, eventually, of the special session that the Committee should develop a collective theme and agree on a set of generally acceptable objectives for that collective venture." (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.3)

See also VI.
JAPAN

"His delegation commended the non-aligned members of the Committee for their efforts to achieve a balanced formulation of the agenda which had been adopted at the previous meeting (A/AC.187/54) and believed that in all deliberations due consideration should be given to the interests of nuclear-weapon States which were not members of the Preparatory Committee. It hoped that that policy would continue to be followed at all stages of the Committee's work so that all nuclear-weapon States would participate in the special session." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.3)

See also VI.

MEXICO

"As to Governments' statements and suggestions, his delegation viewed as particularly encouraging the opinion expressed by the United States (A/AC.187/17), which had always shown itself to be a staunch defender of the status quo in the matter of international disarmament machinery, to the effect that the special session should be prepared to undertake the necessary improvements in existing machinery and practices and to launch any new organizational steps required for achievement of the goals established at the session.

In his opinion there was no need to establish any subsidiary intersessional bodies of the Committee, since the intervening time would have to be spent analysing the material available and studying the working papers prepared by the Secretariat on future stages of the work; that would not, of course, preclude the continuation of informal talks with a view to the preparation of preliminary drafts, which could be begun in connexion with the Committee's September session." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.8)

"He thanked the Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Björnerstedt, for the willingness of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament to prepare the working papers suggested by the Government of Mexico (A/AC.187/34). He agreed with him concerning paper No. 9 (Analytical list of the agreements concluded in the bilateral talks known by the acronym SALT). His delegation regarded the other working papers as purely descriptive and understood that they called for no value judgement by members of the Secretariat. His delegation had no preference in the matter of priorities and considered that the working papers could be issued in the order which the Centre deemed most appropriate for their preparation." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.8)

See also II.
NEPAL

Success or failure would depend to a large extent on the work done by the Preparatory Committee and the progress achieved in its deliberations. The first task before the Committee was to agree on an agenda for the special session. Once there was agreement on the agenda, it would be much easier to plan the future work of the Committee. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.4)

NEW ZEALAND

While understanding the reasoning behind the adoption of a conservative formulation concerning the participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the Preparatory Committee, the New Zealand delegation reiterated its belief that such organizations had made and could make a distinctive contribution to the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It was confident that they would be able to make a positive contribution to the work of the special session. (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.6)

PAKISTAN

As the special session was unlikely to complete its work in less than four to five weeks, and as very thorough preparations must be made in regard to the proposed declaration of principles and programme of action, it would be useful to arrange for the Preparatory Committee or a working group of the whole to meet between sessions. It would also be appropriate for the Centre for Disarmament, with the assistance of outside experts, to prepare background papers on important issues, a list of which could be drawn up after consultations. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.8)

PERU

"said that, in view of the high hopes placed in disarmament by the vast majority of the human race, the Preparatory Committee was under an obligation to make every possible effort to ensure that proper preparations were made for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.3)

It had been suggested that the Committee should proceed to prepare the principal documents for the special session. His delegation agreed with that proposal since it was clear that the more progress was made in that preliminary stage, the better would be the atmosphere at the special session and the chances for the adoption of final agreements. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.4)
If it was to prove effective, the disarmament process must not only be comprehensive in scope and universal in character but also reflect an agreed, common approach to disarmament on the part of participants. Decision-making by consensus and the equitable participation of all groups of States in the preparatory process were therefore pre-conditions for success. He observed that, because of the mechanical application of a formula which might have been valid in other bodies, the socialist States were seriously underrepresented in the composition of the Preparatory Committee. In disarmament efforts, a proper reflection of the existing world relationship of forces was a consideration that could not be ignored. His delegation therefore hoped that the current imbalance in the Committee would be duly rectified. (A/AC.187/SR.5, pp. 8-9)

His delegation felt that the preparations for the special session and the session itself represented an important step in the over-all disarmament effort. The United Nations had made an outstanding contribution to that effort, and the agendas of successive sessions of the General Assembly had seen dozens of disarmament initiatives submitted by Member States. With a view to profiting from what had been achieved to date, his delegation proposed that, for the next session of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretariat should compile a document listing disarmament proposals officially submitted to the United Nations. The list should present the substance of the proposal, the date and country of submission, and the status of its follow-up. He was convinced that such a document would be very useful both to the Committee and to the special session of the General Assembly. In accordance with its traditional position, his delegation stood ready to participate in the preparations for the special session with a view to ensuring the latter's success. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.9)

See also I.

The special session would need careful preparation, and in that connexion the Committee would have an important part to play, since the guidelines, strategies and documents to be adopted and the future structure of negotiations would largely emerge from its work. It might be said that the special session began with the deliberations of the Committee and, consequently, the Committee had the duty to give the General Assembly the opportunity to adopt clear-cut, specific and constructive documents and to set the disarmament negotiations on the right path. The Committee's activities should be conducted in such a way at to ensure that all interested States could participate in the proceedings and negotiations and that closed groups were avoided. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.6)
The Committee would also have to prepare draft decisions and recommendations on the negotiating machinery providing for the establishment of viable structures with full authority that were also flexible and operated in accordance with democratic working rules and procedures, and allowed for the participation of all States interested in disarmament negotiations.

In order to discharge its functions the Committee must work at a faster pace. One of its first tasks would be the preparation of the provisional agenda for the special session. However, it would also have to begin to prepare drafts for the Declaration, the Programme of Action and documents on negotiating machinery, since any delay in those tasks could jeopardize both quality and content. The Committee would also have to make the maximum use of the time at its disposal. (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.7)

SWEDEN

See IV.

TUNISIA

His delegation endorsed the decision to invite non-governmental organizations directly concerned to participate in the work on disarmament, since they would not only submit useful suggestions and proposals but would also help to create a new awareness in world public opinion, which would constitute the best stimulus in the disarmament process. (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.3)

As to the organization of work, the establishment of an intersessional working group with the task of examining Governments' proposals and formulating recommendations for their consideration by the Preparatory Committee would represent a considerable contribution to the success of the work. (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.3)

TURKEY

His Government had therefore welcomed the decisions taken by the Preparatory Committee relating to the participation of non-governmental organizations in its work.

The Preparatory Committee had an urgent responsibility for the preparations required for the special session, but he would like to stress the important role that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament could play in doing everything possible to produce the necessary background material in time. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)
The next step in the preparatory work would undoubtedly be the elaboration of principles that would constitute the basis for a final political declaration. As the success of the preparatory work would depend on working out, in advance, a text reflecting a consensus on the basic content of such a final document, the Turkish delegation supported the suggestion that a committee of the whole should be established and entrusted with the drafting of that final document. He also supported the idea that the appropriate arrangements should be made for the intersessional work of the Preparatory Committee. (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

His delegation wished to draw attention to the question of the composition of the Preparatory Committee which should reflect the specific tasks to be performed by the Committee and the role played by various States in disarmament negotiations. Unfortunately, the socialist countries, whose efforts and experience in disarmament talks were well known, had been discriminated against in setting up the Preparatory Committee. The system used in distributing seats was that known as the "Economic and Social Council formula", which was not appropriate when it was a question of discussing disarmament problems. The effective efforts made by the Group of Socialist States in dealing with those problems was reflected in the structure of other bodies concerned with disarmament questions. His delegation had therefore reserved the right to propose that at its thirty-second session the General Assembly should assign additional seats to the Socialist group. The Committee should include that recommendation in its report to the thirty-second session of the Assembly.

His delegation was prepared to play a constructive part in the work of the Committee. (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.5)

United Kingdom

said that his delegation warmly welcomed the decision taken by the Committee at its fourth meeting (A/AC.187/SR.4) concerning the participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the Committee, since the subjects under discussion affected the way of life of peoples all over the world. The non-governmental organizations, which reflected public opinion on questions of disarmament, should have the opportunity to make known to delegations their views on the matters under discussion, and it was to be hoped that they would take advantage of the possibilities which the Committee had provided for them. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.7)

As to the future work of the Committee once the agenda for the special session had been agreed, his delegation agreed with the views expressed by the
representative of Sweden at the 5th meeting (A/AC.187/SR.5) to the effect that the primary object of the present session of the Preparatory Committee should be to start action-oriented preparations for the special session so as to lay a basis for other discussions on the substantive issues before the special session itself. The representative of Sweden had also said that by the end of the current session of the Committee a decision should be taken concerning the work to be accomplished during the intersessional period. His delegation further agreed with the statement made by the representative of Romania on 11 May (A/AC.187/SR.6) to the effect that the Committee had the responsibility to complete the preparation of the draft documents of the special session before the session opened. In this regard, his delegation agreed with the suggestions made by the representative of Canada and was also willing to give positive consideration to other proposals concerning ways in which work on the basic documents of the special session could be pursued between the present time and September.\(\) (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.8)

"On the subject of the documentation which the Committee should request the United Nations Centre for Disarmament to provide, he was grateful to the representative of Mexico for his proposal that the Centre should prepare a document summarizing the views of Governments on different aspects of the special session under appropriate headings. For the rest, it would be necessary to proceed with some caution. In the first place, there was the question of finance. The General Assembly at its thirty-first session had allocated the sum of $90,000 for the preparation of background documents for the special session, and he felt that the Secretariat should not be requested to provide material costing more than the sum available. Moreover, the Centre for Disarmament had limited manpower. More important, in requesting the Centre to prepare studies, it was necessary to bear in mind the political implications of those studies. His delegation had a high regard for the impartiality of the Centre for Disarmament and for its ability to deal with potentially difficult subjects in a non-controversial manner. However, it felt that the Centre should not be asked to prepare studies which would require of it political judgements of the sort which international civil servants, who must always remain impartial, should not be asked to make.\(\) (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.7)

"His delegation repeated its pledge to play an active and positive role in the search for a co-operative approach to the problems to be considered both by the Preparatory Committee and at the special session and drew attention to the fact that, in the reply sent to the Secretary-General in compliance with resolution 31/189 B, the United Kingdom Government had expressed the view that a special session could enhance the prospects for disarmament, provided that it was thoroughly prepared and widely attended, particularly by all significant military Powers. Thorough preparation meant that preparations should start as soon as possible, wide and active attendance would be facilitated by a sensible compromise on the question of the agenda. Such a compromise would be an important first step in the achievement of the co-operative approach which was sought.\(\) (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.8)
"Speaking on behalf of the nine members of the European Community, expressed support for the decision to permit delegations which were not members of the Preparatory Committee to take part in its deliberations without the right of vote. The nine members of the European Community also felt that the special session could succeed only if the decisions it adopted had the widest possible support. Decisions made in disregard of the vital interests of States or groups of States would not command the authority necessary to ensure their implementation and could jeopardize a unique opportunity to advance the cause of disarmament. It should therefore be the aim of the members of the Committee and of any sub-committees that might be established to conduct their work so as to be able to reach agreement by consensus." (A/AC.187/SR.2, p.2)

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

"said that his delegation hoped that the work of the Preparatory Committee would give a positive stimulus to United Nations disarmament activities and was determined to work in a spirit of co-operation with all members of the Committee in order to fulfil that hope. He drew the Committee's attention to the recent statement made by the President of the United States on the occasion of his visit to the United Nations, in which he had underlined the commitment of the United States to work towards real progress in arms control and disarmament.

His delegation endorsed the Chairman's remarks concerning the need for decisions to be adopted by consensus both within the Preparatory Committee and at the special session. Disarmament was a highly sensitive issue, and if the special session devoted to disarmament was to lend new impetus to the disarmament process, the decisions of both the Preparatory Committee and the special session must enjoy widespread support, particularly that of the major Powers. The approach adopted by the Chairman would help to promote a spirit of co-operation at the special session." (A/AC.187/SR.3, p.3)

"said that the informal discussions and exchanges of view - which, in the opinion of his delegation, provided the best and most effective means of carrying out the work assigned to the Committee - had led to a consensus on the particular task of the current session, namely, the preparation of a draft agenda for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It was encouraging to note the evidence of willingness on all sides to understand different points of view and make the necessary concessions." (A/AC.187/SR.14, p.3)

"His delegation hoped that the momentum generated at the current session would not be lost and that bilateral, regional and multilateral talks would continue. In
that connexion, it supported the Chairman's proposal that work should be continued on an informal basis between sessions. While it would be necessary for Governments to bear responsibility for decisions in the field of disarmament, the delegation of the United States of America believed that support and ideas should be sought from all available sources. In particular, it believed that private and non-governmental organizations and national and international research institutes could make significant contributions. It hoped such bodies would use their talent and energies to develop ideas for the special session."

(A/AC.187/SR.14, p.3)

See also IV.

**VENEZUELA**

"His delegation was pleased that a consensus had been reached on inviting non-governmental organizations and institutions involved in the field of disarmament to participate in the Committee's deliberations, in view of both the importance of their contributions and the appreciation which that measure implied."

(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.3)

**YUGOSLAVIA**

"In its reply to the Secretary-General, his Government had enumerated the elements which, in its view, should be incorporated in the declaration on disarmament and in the programme of disarmament measures. His delegation would present those questions during the proceedings of the Preparatory Committee, together with proposals concerning the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the negotiating machinery.

With regard to the date of the special session, the organization of further work of the Preparatory Committee and similar questions, his delegation would cooperate closely with the other members of the Preparatory Committee, especially within the Group of non-aligned countries."

(A/AC.187/SR.4, p.4)
## IV. AGENDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. AGENDA

ALGERIA

"expressed the satisfaction of his delegation at the success of the Preparatory Committee in drawing up a draft agenda for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with the approval of all members of the Committee. He was particularly gratified that the draft reflected the views of the Algerian Government, as transmitted to the Secretary-General in its reply (A/AC.187/28), on the lack of adequate progress in disarmament, on the continuation of the arms race and on the need to create conditions favourable to disarmament. In that connexion, his Government attached great importance to the need to establish a climate of confidence between States, through the final resolution of local conflicts, the elimination of the last remnants of colonialism and racism, and the ending of policies of spheres of influence, of interference in the internal affairs of States, and of denial of the right to self-determination of peoples under foreign domination.

His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Committee had decided to include in the agenda a review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament. It considered that the United Nations should assume its natural role of providing leadership and guidance in the field of disarmament and should participate more actively in the disarmament process. It continued to support the convening of a World Disarmament Conference in which all nuclear-weapon States would participate." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p. 8)

AUSTRALIA

"One of the principal goals of the special session should be the elaboration of a framework within which arms control and disarmament issues could be examined and negotiations conducted. To that end, it was necessary to set out fundamental normative principles. However, those principles should be founded on political reality. For example, States would not be prepared to negotiate disarmament measures unless they felt militarily secure. Another major goal would be the identification of a consensus on the priority measures of arms control and disarmament and the issues of contention within those priority areas.

His Government did not believe that the special session would be an appropriate forum for the negotiation of any totally new arms control or arms limitation convention. However completion, by the time the special session convened, of agreements currently under discussion would demonstrate international determination to generate a new momentum in disarmament. More particularly, the Australian
Government, whose position on the desirability of an immediate suspension of nuclear testing and the early negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was well known, had warmly welcomed recent developments which demonstrated a new preparedness to reverse the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that respect it hoped that, by the time the special session commenced, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would either be negotiated, or at least, that agreement would have been reached on the basic elements for such a treaty.

Arms control and disarmament proposals touched directly the first responsibility of all Governments to provide for national security. All States sacrificed resources for military purposes which might otherwise be utilized to enhance the welfare of their citizens. Without ceasing to respect the sincerity of their position, it was essential to stop the endless international spending on more sophisticated weapons in a process which did not result in enhanced security.

Nevertheless, it was not enough for the super-Powers to take the step of achieving a more peaceful world. As they took steps to reverse the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons (and the other nuclear-weapons States had a similar responsibility, even if different quantitatively), other States should demonstrate their own preparedness to take complementary measures to guarantee that nuclear weapons did not become part of their own armouries. If the super-Powers were prepared to show the way by negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty, those States which had still not ratified the non-proliferation treaty should be encouraged to do so. (A/AC.187/SR.10, pp.2-3)

AUSTRIA

The difficulties impeding progress in disarmament, which stemmed from the intricate problems involved, would not disappear by themselves. Accordingly, a thorough and sincere examination of the causes underlying the current stagnation of disarmament negotiations was as necessary as was discussion of the possibility of a new and comprehensive approach to disarmament negotiations leading to the adoption of a balanced programme of action which would ensure the co-ordination of activities carried out on different levels and in different forums in order to obtain an accelerated solution of priority problems. Another topic of the discussions should be the institutional and organizational measures which would allow the United Nations to carry out more effectively its predominant role in the field of disarmament.

The Austrian Government attached special importance to a speedy solution of the various problems posed by the arms race in both the nuclear and the conventional fields. Nuclear disarmament continued to be the most urgent of those problems, and the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, besides being of vital importance to mankind, would facilitate disarmament in other
fields. The credibility of measures to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons hinged in particular upon the willingness of the two leading nuclear-weapon States to agree on effective measures of nuclear disarmament. In that context, the fragile basis of the non-proliferation régime, as demonstrated by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, could not be overlooked. National and international actions prior to the second Conference would be a determining factor for the future of non-proliferation treaties. A related problem was that posed by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and especially by the peaceful use of nuclear explosive devices. The special session should elaborate recommendations on the subject, and the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency should also be strengthened.

The increasing build-up of arsenals of so-called conventional weapons in many parts of the world in recent years was also a cause of great concern to the international community, particularly because it accounted for the greatest proportion of world military expenditures. The solution to that problem called for an exhaustive examination of the political, social and economic reasons underlying it.

The problem of the demilitarization of outer space, which had not yet been completely solved, was a third dimension of disarmament. Although it did not completely eliminate the use of outer space for military purposes, the 1967 Treaty provided that States Parties to the Treaty would use the Moon and other celestial bodies only for peaceful purposes. It was to be hoped that in the future it would be possible to reach agreement on the total demilitarization of outer space. In that connexion, mention must be made of proposals such as that concerning an agreement prohibiting weapons which could destroy the other side's observation satellites and thereby prevent the verification of compliance with arms limits.

All States should adopt co-operative measures to put an end to the arms race and to redirect the resources currently being used for it towards social and economic development activities. That also applied to the large percentage of the world's intellectual resources which was diverted to military purposes. That aspect should be a topic for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development scheduled for 1979.\[11 (A/AC.187/SR.7. pp.2-3)

BANGLADESH

Like other countries, Bangladesh also subscribed to the view that one of the serious omissions in the agenda in the past had been the phenomenal growth in the conventional arms race. The real threat to international security continued to emanate from conflicts located in States of the third world. The ramifications of
those problems should also be the subject of discussion and recommendations during the special session devoted to disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.3)

See also VI.

BELGIUM

"For its part, the General Assembly should endeavour to broaden the scope of the measures which could contribute to disarmament. In that connexion, the question of the transfer of conventional weapons should receive closer attention from all States. Similarly, the United States suggestions concerning measures designed to improve the climate of international confidence and to reduce tension should be reflected in the agenda. The Assembly might also consider new working and negotiating methods which had scarcely been tried thus far. In that connexion, his delegation had already drawn attention at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, to the possibilities afforded by a regional approach to disarmament. It was not a question of a regional approach as opposed to a global approach. All such approaches, like any potential bilateral measures, were complementary. It should be borne in mind that the prospects for agreement on certain aspects of disarmament could vary from one region to another. His delegation intended to propose at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly that a global study of the regional aspects of disarmament should be undertaken.

Meanwhile, the Committee should develop the topic of the regional aspects of disarmament in the documents which it was to prepare for the special session." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)

See also VI.

BRAZIL

See VI.

BULGARIA

"As far as the agenda of the special session was concerned, it was very important that it should include, as a separate item, the question of the convening of the world disarmament conference. His delegation believed that, in order to achieve further progress in the disarmament talks, the final documents drawn up by the special session should state clearly that the main objective of the efforts of all States in the field of disarmament
should be general and complete disarmament; should indicate the need for all militarily important States, in particular the nuclear-weapons States, to participate in the negotiations; and should emphasize the importance of the principle of not seeking unilateral advantages or endangering the security of States during the negotiations at the special session and in the taking of decisions. With regard to the priority measures which must be taken in the disarmament field, his delegation considered that the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly deserved special attention. That document set out a realistic and pragmatic programme for joint action by all States on the main disarmament issues. The special session should not take the place of the existing machinery for negotiations on the question of disarmament, but should provide it with new vigour and improve its efficiency.** (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.11)

COLOMBIA

**His delegation was concerned that too much emphasis might be placed on declarations or appraisals of the world disarmament situation and that the participants in the special session might become involved in philosophical discussions that would use up the short time available to them without offering the world any panaceas.** (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

With regard to the draft agenda submitted by the delegation of Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned group in the Preparatory Committee, while it might be useful to carry out a review and appraisal of the present international disarmament situation and to adopt a declaration of principles on disarmament - something which the General Assembly had already done on countless occasions - his delegation felt that item 3 of the draft agenda, namely the adoption of a programme of action on disarmament, was most important and should be the core of the work of the special session. Nothing could be gained from a rhetorical declaration of principles if it was not accompanied by a programme of well-conceived measures for arms limitation. Such measures should be aimed at ending the proliferation of nuclear weapons, limiting conventional weapons, and eliminating incendiary and chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, a mere announcement of such measures would not be sufficient; it would be necessary to prepare background documents on each one and to formulate practical suggestions on them. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)

In discussions of practical measures, the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to eliminate nuclear stockpiles was constantly stressed. But there were other more urgent matters, since the horrible consequences of such weapons made it very unlikely that they would ever be used. On the other hand, the existing traffic and trade in conventional weapons kindled conflicts for profit. Nearly $20 billion were currently being invested in that trade. For example, on the Latin American continent, where large masses of the population were afflicted by the tragedy of underdevelopment, $570 million had been spent on arms in 1975.** (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.8)
CUBA

His Government attached the greatest importance to the prompt convening of the world disarmament conference, which had been consistently advocated by the non-aligned countries since their first summit conference held in 1961 in Belgrade. The conference, with the participation of all States, could examine the agenda in proper perspective, giving due attention to all the factors involved. His delegation therefore felt that the world disarmament conference should be given high priority as a separate item on the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, the special session should not be regarded as a substitute for the world conference but should rather be a gateway leading to its early convocation.

The international community could thus advance towards general and complete disarmament in conditions which guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and legitimate rights of all countries and which strengthened the process of international détente, making it irreversible and world-wide. (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.6)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

His delegation was of the opinion that a number of positive and realistic proposals had already been submitted in connexion with the preparations for the special session. He wished, for example, to draw attention to the Soviet memorandum of 28 September 1976 on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament. The special session should give proper attention to that document, which was in harmony with the goals that the international community hoped to attain through the convening of the special session.

His Government felt that the agenda for the special session should include items on the preparations for the world disarmament conference, on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and on the adoption of a declaration on disarmament. The declaration should set forth basic guidelines on disarmament, the principle of the universality of negotiations, and priorities and guidelines for disarmament negotiations.

It was essential that the special session devoted to disarmament should not weaken or undermine the existing machinery for disarmament talks but, on the contrary, make them more effective. His delegation was in full accord with the view expressed by the representative of the German Democratic Republic (A/AC.187/SR.8) that those organs should not be held responsible for the inadequate progress of the disarmament talks, since they had proved their viability. The blame lay, rather, with a lack of will on the part of States, and that could not be dealt with by organizational measures. The special session should stimulate that will. (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.7)
The question of convening a World Disarmament Conference had been raised in most considerations related to the special session on disarmament. His Government thought that there was ample reason for it; both would aim at focusing the attention of the world community on the problem of disarmament in its entirety. The Finnish Government, like the majority of the Members of the United Nations, was committed to the idea of a world conference on disarmament. Therefore, it was logical to expect that that would be reflected in the proceedings of the special session.\(^{\text{II}}\) (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.5)

"His delegation found it self-evident that the special session would discuss all crucial arms control and disarmament issues. Thus, it should deal with the serious and urgent problem posed by nuclear weapons, including the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the reduction of the existing nuclear-weapon arsenals. The risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons was perhaps the most serious facet of the problem; the session should consider action for the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was another viable approach to check the spread of those weapons. The limitation and elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons and new types of weapons, should also be included in the work of the session. It was also important that the session should tackle other major issues, such as the trade in and transfer of conventional arms. His delegation welcomed the Swedish Government's proposal for a study of the interrelationships between disarmament efforts and economic and social progress, and offered its full co-operation in that undertaking.\(^{\text{II}}\) (A/AC.187/SR.7, pp.5-6)

His Government had made known its views on the work of the special session and the Preparatory Committee in the communication it had addressed to the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 31/189 B, in which it had emphasized in particular that participation in the special session should be universal, with no privileges for any State, regardless of its size and regardless of the responsibilities devolving on it because of the size of its arsenal. It had been stated in the communication that no aspect of disarmament should be excluded from the competence of the special session, which should freely discuss all problems relating to that complicated undertaking without, however, interfering in ongoing negotiations or departing from a subject which must be constantly borne in mind.
The text of the draft provisional agenda submitted by the non-aligned countries (A/AC.187/54), which had been adopted with minor changes at the previous meeting, reflected the concern of its sponsors to establish a broad framework, open to all opinions and in no sense prejudging those views which, in the course of the special session, would form the consensuses hoped for by all.

At its September session, the Preparatory Committee would examine the question of a declaration of principles and a programme of action. His delegation would participate actively in that work, and it wished to emphasize now that one of the main objectives of the special session should be a thorough study of disarmament procedures and structures leading to the establishment of an effective negotiating body which would work in close co-operation with the United Nations. Secondly, although there was obviously a need for nuclear disarmament - and it should be emphasized that that was a problem separate from the cessation of nuclear tests - the fact that nuclear disarmament could not be achieved without parallel progress in conventional disarmament should not be overlooked. Only if there was parallelism between the two spheres would it be possible to avoid the disruption of the strategic balance and the insecurity which might arise during the gradual development of the stages which should characterize such a delicate undertaking. (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.2)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

"The resolution on the World Disarmament Conference had been adopted in 1971 and had been confirmed at all subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. A World Disarmament Conference, with the participation of all States, would be a proper representative forum in which broad measures for disarmament could be discussed. The Government of the German Democratic Republic believed that such a conference would have the necessary authority to achieve real progress on the question of disarmament. A session of the General Assembly, or a special session, could not replace a world conference. In the view of the German Democratic Republic, the link between a special session devoted to disarmament and the World Disarmament Conference was that the special session could and should be made an important step in the process of convening a World Disarmament Conference. That position was in keeping with the Colombo Declaration, and he regretted the attempts which had been made to ignore the basic document of the Colombo Conference on so important a question.

With regard to the agenda for the special session, his delegation considered that it would be inappropriate at the current stage to adopt hard and fast formulations which in fact constituted an assessment of the situation prevailing in the disarmament field. The decisions of the General Assembly should not be anticipated, since there was always a danger of being mistaken."
"It was a fact that the first partial results in the area of arms limitation and disarmament already existed in the form of bilateral and multilateral agreements. On the other hand, the arms race continued to an increasing extent and the danger of a world war was not eliminated". (A/AC.187/SR.8, p-5 and A/AC.187/SR.1-4/Corr.)

The failure of certain bodies to achieve positive results could frequently be explained by the lack of will on the part of States. His delegation hoped that the debate which would take place at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would create an atmosphere conducive to achieving positive agreements in the disarmament field. (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.6)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

the special session should assess the results achieved so far with regard to disarmament and arms control and provide an effective impetus for further discussion, particularly where development tended to be stagnant. The Federal Republic of Germany would therefore be pleased if a consensus could be reached at the special session on the basic elements of the disarmament question and if some guidelines could be given concerning future priorities.

With regard to the issues to be discussed, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany believed that the problems of nuclear and conventional disarmament should receive equal treatment. In addition to the priority subjects of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the discussion might also centre on the whole range of issues connected with a non-proliferation policy, the reduction of armament burdens, regional aspects of disarmament and problems arising from the interrelation between disarmament and economic and social development in the world. (A/AC.187/SR.6, p.2)

See also VI.

HUNGARY

Hungary was convinced that the elimination of the arms race required the common effort of all States, and considered that the best framework for that was a World Disarmament Conference. Some maintained that the holding of that Conference would not be a realistic solution because of the opposition of certain Powers. Recent history has provided many examples of the achievement of goals which had seemed unrealistic a few years earlier. When a number of countries proposed holding a European Conference on Security and Co-operation, for some the proposal had also seemed to be unrealistic; later, however, it was possible to hold the conference. It should be pointed out that the political climate in Europe had improved considerably in recent times and that any progress achieved in the field
of disarmament would surely accelerate the process of détente. The World Disarmament Conference would be a new approach in international disarmament negotiations, and Hungary considered it very important that the special session should devote due attention to it and include it as a separate item in the agenda.

With respect to the agenda of the special session, it was evident that a general debate on disarmament was needed, as well as a realistic appraisal of the present situation, so as to draw correct conclusions for the future. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

In that connexion, it should be stressed that the main task of the special session should be not to replace the existing machinery or forums but to exert a favourable influence on them, since the slow progress in the field of disarmament was not due to "imperfect" machinery but rather to the lack of adequate political will. His delegation hoped that the special session would contribute to the improvement of the political climate, which would in turn be reflected in greater progress in the existing disarmament forums.

The sequence of items on the agenda should be formulated in a logical way, which meant that the adoption of the final document or documents must be the outcome of the whole work of the session. (A/AC.187/SR.7, pp.6-7)

**INDIA**

His delegation hoped that the special session would address itself to the main issue of nuclear disarmament with a sense of realism and urgency. The survival of mankind should never be placed in jeopardy by any weapon. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of indiscriminate destruction should be prohibited as a matter of the highest priority. The doctrine of deterrence, which had led to the existing intolerable situation, should be re-examined with a view to preventing escalation from conventional to nuclear weapons. No solution would be possible unless there was agreement between the nuclear-weapon States.

Since a nuclear war posed a threat to the very survival of mankind, non-nuclear weapon States, particularly the non-aligned could play the role of a non-reacting catalytic agent in disarmament negotiations between the super Powers. However, as all States had a legitimate interest in the outcome of disarmament negotiations between nuclear weapon States, the negotiating machinery should be equipped with conciliatory procedures by which the non-involved States could play a useful role, when necessary.

The complexity of the disarmament question must not be overlooked; that was why the special session should confine itself to discussing concrete and feasible proposals. The nuclear-arms race was economically counterproductive and a threat
to the existence of life on the planet. Yet, because of the doctrine of deterrence, there was a cynical acceptance of the arms race as inevitable. One side should take the risk of unilaterally halting the arms race and the others should be morally obliged to do the same. A halt to the arms race was feasible without the slightest jeopardy to national or collective security. 

The concept of a surprise nuclear attack should be outlawed. Among other confidence-building measures for improving the climate of international peace and security, the two draft treaties on disarmament proposed by the United States of America and the Soviet Union in 1962 should be revised and updated by the authors for the special session.

Besides the moral imperative of peace, the other crying need of humanity was development for all people so that justice and equality could prevail. But the fruits of development were worth noting as long as the danger of the total destruction of life on earth existed. It was to be hoped, therefore, that the special session would, as a matter of priority, take the first steps towards nuclear disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp. 10-11)

IRAN

See VI.

ITALY

At the special session the Assembly should first of all undertake a comprehensive review of the numerous problems which the United Nations was prepared to face in the field of disarmament. It would be necessary in that regard to reach a decision on the nature of the role to be played by the United Nations and on the instruments required to strengthen that role. Secondly, the Assembly should concentrate on the priority issues selected by the Committee. In that connexion, the special session should not indulge in generalized rhetoric or detailed technical negotiations. Above all, it should avoid duplicating the activities of existing fora, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which his Government still viewed as a highly useful negotiating forum, although it was prepared to consider constructive proposals designed to improve its structure, procedures and organization.

Considering the diversity of the proposals on the objectives of the special session, it was essential to identify those proposals on which agreement was possible and concentrate on the search for a common basic position on those issues. At the same time, while identifying priority objectives for immediate action, the General Assembly should not ignore the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament or the general principles already established by the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. Bearing that in mind, the Italian Government had repeatedly stressed
the need for a coherent and comprehensive programme of complete disarmament, and
considered that the special session should endeavour to elaborate a far-reaching
plan for gradually achieving the total elimination of arms in order to create a
world based on détente, understanding, co-operation and on an international security
system.

To begin with, nuclear disarmament measures should be pursued with the greatest
urgency, going ahead with the negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban
(CTB) and with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Arms reduction must
follow a balanced pattern in both the nuclear and conventional weapons sectors.
In the case of conventional weapons, the geographical factor should not be
overlooked. In that connexion he recalled that Italy had proposed that the
Security Council, under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, should set
up a committee, divided into regional sub-committees with the participation of
major arms suppliers and purchasing Powers from each region, with the task of
maintaining conventional weaponry at the lowest possible level. Furthermore, in
order to lay the groundwork for the establishment of those subsidiary bodies, one
could envisage the possibility of setting up parallel but separate regional
committees or groups comprising the recipient countries. An agreement on the
elimination of chemical weapons should also be actively pursued as a matter of the
greatest urgency. A successful conclusion to the current negotiations in Geneva,
in time for the special session, would be a major contribution to progress in the
field of disarmament.\(^{(1)}\) (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.4)

\(^{(1)}\) Although a number of significant agreements on arms control and disarmament
had been concluded in the past two decades, mainly as a result of the efforts of
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the measures adopted thus far did
not seem to have produced sufficient progress. That was due to the fact that, in
the past, disarmament negotiations had tended to give priority to preventive and
peripheral measures. Accordingly, his Government earnestly hoped that the special
session would devote itself to deliberations on crucial and central issues which
would lead to the final goal of general and complete disarmament. Hence, in its
reply to the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 31/189 B, his Government
had stated that at the special session high priority should be given to such
issues as cessation of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of nuclear
armaments, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the prohibition of chemical weapons,
regulation of the international transfer of conventional weapons and the reduction
of military budgets.

Nuclear disarmament was unquestionably the crux of the disarmament problem.
As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Japan was
convinced that if the Treaty was to be effectively implemented universal accession
to it was essential; at the same time, however, no effort should be spared to rectify the inequality inherent in the fact that the Treaty granted a special status to nuclear-weapon States. The special session would be an appropriate time for the nuclear-weapon States to acknowledge their grave responsibility for nuclear disarmament and to adopt measures aimed at halting the nuclear arms race and reducing nuclear stockpiles; otherwise, the régime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty could not be maintained permanently. As a first step, it was urgently necessary to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which would pave the way for prohibition of the development and improvement of nuclear weapons.

The special importance of nuclear disarmament should not divert attention from the struggle for conventional disarmament, for the recent acceleration in international transfers of conventional weapons would not only intensify existing conflicts but also increase the danger that new disputes would arise in many parts of the world. A great many countries had expressed the view that that matter should be carefully examined at the special session, and his delegation felt that a common stand in favour of giving more attention to the question of conventional disarmament had developed. The special session should therefore place the utmost emphasis on measures to move forward in stages towards the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and towards the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. (A/AC.187/SR.13, pp.3-4)

MEXICO

The working paper submitted by the non-aligned countries had the advantage of clearly and concisely defining both the subject-matter and the fundamental purpose of the special session. In his view, that purpose was twofold. On the one hand, the aim was to conduct a debate on disarmament with the participation of all States Members of the United Nations and with the breadth, depth and high level of representation that the subject deserved. The purpose of the debate would be to review and appraise the present international situation in light of the urgent need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, the continuation of the arms race and the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security, and economic development, and the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament, including the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference, according to the draft agenda submitted by the non-aligned countries (A/AC.187/43) and slightly modified during informal talks. Furthermore, the debate must not be reduced to an academic exercise; that was why express reference was made to the adoption of two instruments that would include all the conclusions of the preparatory studies and the deliberations of the Assembly, avoiding unnecessary fragmentation. Those instruments would be a declaration on disarmament and a programme of action on disarmament. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.6)
As to Governments' statements and suggestions, his delegation viewed as particularly encouraging the opinion expressed by the United States (A/AC.187/17), which had always shown itself to be a staunch defender of the status quo in the matter of international disarmament machinery, to the effect that the special session should be prepared to undertake the necessary improvements in existing machinery and practices and to launch any new organizational steps required for achievement of the goals established at the session. II (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.8)

See also VI.

MONGOLIA

The problem of disarmament was connected with economic and social development, particularly in developing countries. The question of disarmament was a world problem affecting all States without distinction, and the appropriate solutions to that problem could only be adopted within the context of a world disarmament conference, which would constitute a suitable forum. The special session should discuss the convening of such a conference as a separate item.

In its reply to the Secretary-General his Government had expressed support for the recommendation adopted at the Fifth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in August 1976 at Colombo, to the effect that the agenda of the special session should include an item on the convening of a world disarmament conference. It was to be hoped that that recommendation would be duly reflected in the agenda of the special session. II (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.9)

The special session should, above all, make a thorough analysis of activities being conducted in the field of disarmament. In the absence of an objective analysis of that kind it would be difficult to establish guidelines for future talks and negotiations on disarmament. The time had come for those nuclear Powers that had refrained from taking specific measures in the matter to join in the efforts of the international community to limit the arms race and bring about disarmament. If all States without distinction, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, large or small, assumed the obligation not to resort to the use or threat of force, the climate of international trust would improve and that would facilitate the solution of the problem of disarmament.

The Soviet Union's memorandum of 27 September 1976 contained a full programme of measures in the field of disarmament. The practical measures proposed in that document on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the prohibition of proliferation of nuclear weapons and their gradual elimination, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the prohibition of the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass
destruction, etc. were of great interest. Both the measures proposed by the Soviet Union and those proposed by other countries could form a reasonable basis for agreement on practical disarmament measures. *(A/AC.187/SR.9, p.9)*

**NEPAL**

Although not exhaustive, the four items enumerated in document A/AC.187/43, submitted by Ambassador Amerasinghe on behalf of the non-aligned group, covered by and large the main areas that the special session would have to concentrate on. As pointed out in that document, the special session should proceed with the review and appraisal of the present international situation and the causes underlying the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, since such a stock-taking would make it possible to correct mistakes and chart a future course of action with greater prospects of success.

Disarmament must be linked with economic development. However unpleasant it might be to a few, the truth remained that disarmament could contribute to real development in a great number of countries and benefit the vast majority of mankind while at the same time imparting a sense of international peace and security.

The special session should take up other important questions like the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty, the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zone and the creation of zones of peace. One of the most alarming features of the current situation was the phenomenal growth in conventional arms. The production and development of conventional weapons at present accounted for four fifths of the entire expenditure on armaments. That problem therefore required study, as did the effect of international trade in arms on the growth of conventional arms. *(A/AC.187/SR.8, p.4)*

"It supported the convening of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all major Powers, including the nuclear Powers." *(A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)*

**NETHERLANDS**

"His delegation hoped that an agenda for the special session would be drawn up and that it would reflect the political will of Governments to give new importance to United Nations efforts and other international efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control.

Referring to the excessive increase in conventional armaments, he said that there was no justification for the fact that both in the industrialized countries and in the developing countries scarce resources were being used to obtain arms in quantities beyond those required for national security. The special session
should attach particular importance to the problem of the considerable expansion in the conventional arms trade, which absorbed means that could have contributed to the economic and social well-being of mankind.

Problems related to arms control and disarmament were connected with problems in other fields, such as economics and sociology. There was a relationship between development and disarmament: although they constituted separate aims, substantial progress in disarmament would favourably affect the economic development of the developing countries and enhance prospects for a new international economic order. In that connexion, the Netherlands supported the Swedish proposal that the United Nations should undertake a study on the subject of the interrelationship between disarmament and economic and social progress. Such a study would not only be a follow-up to the excellent work previously done on that subject but would also take into account the results of the sixth and seventh special sessions. In particular, it could deal with the following issues: the effects of arms control and disarmament measures on the release of financial resources, including determination of the extent to which a system could be devised whereby resources released would be used not only for national development but also for purposes of international development; the release of human resources, including discussion of whether persons employed in the armaments industry could be easily transferred to other industries and whether there should be national or international efforts to assist companies and workers in the conversion from arms manufacture to peaceful applications; the release of technological resources, including how technological know-how in the manufacture of arms could be switched to peaceful uses; the release of material resources, including examination of the fact that, whereas the release of such resources had immediate beneficial effect, it could produce negative effects for certain developing countries as a result of the drop in demand for certain materials for which there would be no immediate use in peaceful applications. It would also be necessary to study the effects of the arms race in terms of macroeconomic phenomena, including economic growth, inflation and employment. Another very important aspect was that of security. It was obvious that any country's development reached an optimum level to the extent that it felt secure from external threats. Genuine progress in international disarmament and arms control would create a favourable climate for economic growth. Although quantification was difficult, various qualitative aspects of the relationship between security and development could be studied.\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.11, pp.3-4)}\)

NEW ZEALAND

In New Zealand's view, the overwhelming priority of the special session must be nuclear disarmament. A further major step towards nuclear disarmament following the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty was overdue. The next logical step was a comprehensive test-ban treaty, for which the General Assembly had been calling with increasing urgency for a number of years. If a
draft comprehensive test-ban treaty were to be prepared and ready for signature at the special session, that would in itself guarantee the session's success. The acceptance of a small number of general principles would facilitate the negotiation of such a treaty. Those general considerations included the following: (i) while it was obviously desirable for all nuclear-weapon States to participate from the beginning in the drafting of a treaty, the fact that one or more nuclear-weapon States might not be ready to do so did not constitute a reason for delaying the drafting of a treaty; (ii) there should be provision for verification which permitted a reasonable degree of certainty regarding all nuclear explosions of significant size. The verification issue was important, but should not provide a pretext for putting off the political task of negotiating a treaty; (iii) a comprehensive test-ban treaty must provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. It had yet to be proved that the benefits - if there were any - to be derived from such experiments were likely to outweigh the political and environmental problems they created.

There was no justification for delaying the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty beyond 1977. His delegation trusted that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would give first priority to that task, in order to allow for the completion of a draft treaty by the time the special session was held. Opening the treaty for signature at that time would generate maximum pressure for early ratification. The conclusion of that treaty would be an important step towards limiting vertical proliferation, but it was to be hoped that in the interval before the special session bilateral agreements would be concluded between the Governments possessing the most advanced nuclear-weapon systems. Such agreements should encompass actual reductions in the numbers of weapons in existing arsenals as well as prohibition of the development of new types of weapons.

No less important than the limitation of vertical proliferation were steps to halt horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Further ratifications of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially by potential nuclear-weapon States, and more effective controls on the supply of nuclear materials and nuclear technology which could be used to produce nuclear weapons, were urgently required. New Zealand would actively support proposals designed to secure those objectives while continuing to permit access to materials and technology required for the production of electric power through nuclear fission.

High priority should continue to be accorded to efforts to prohibit the use of inhumane weapons. New Zealand welcomed indications that agreement on a treaty to prohibit chemical weapons was within reach and that such a treaty would be opened for signature by the time the special session was held.

New Zealand shared the widespread concern at the political and economic ill effects of a spreading arms race in conventional weapons. In its view, the principal arms producers should exercise restraint in responding to excessive
demands and deny arms to States whose Governments engaged in the systematic violation of human rights. A United Nations study should be undertaken as soon as possible of all aspects of the problem of arms sales and his Government would continue to support initiatives to that end. Of fundamental importance in that regard was the need to release resources for social and economic development particularly in the third world countries.

It was apparent that one special session of the General Assembly would not be able to formulate a wide range of new disarmament measures; however, if one or more major disarmament agreements were opened for signature at the time of the special session, the possibility of ratification would be increased. In addition, the special session should adopt a general declaration on disarmament and a programme of action. Likewise, a review of the United Nations disarmament machinery was an essential part of the task of the session. New Zealand recognized the need for a relatively small negotiating body, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but at the same time it shared the dissatisfaction that had been expressed with that body's record. Nevertheless, during the current year CCD had shown signs that it was concentrating on issues of greater importance than in the past and was keeping United Nations Members better informed of the progress of its deliberations. New Zealand's approach to any proposed alteration of the existing machinery was a pragmatic one: it was disposed to judge by results. The special session would provide the opportunity to do so and if, before the convening of the special session, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was unable to reach agreement on those important issues, New Zealand would not rule out the possibility of seeking new methods of negotiation including, if necessary, the establishment of a new negotiating forum.11 (A/AC.187/SR.11, pp.4-6)
be more profitable for countries to remain outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons than to ratify it, and that whole cargoes of uranium could disappear for clandestine uses.

In conclusion, he said that the world should not wait for a catastrophe before deciding that the time had come to reach a viable global agreement on nuclear weapons. It was intolerable that, according to reports, some 500,000 scientists in the United States and some 900,000 in the Soviet Union were engaged in research geared to war, when some of their knowledge could more profitably be used in studying the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in the developing world. (A/AC.187/SR.14, pp.2-3)

NORWAY

There now seemed to exist general agreement on the basic elements of the agenda for the special session, and he appealed to delegations to finalize that agreement so that the Committee could move on to other areas of activity.

Norway felt that disarmament issues should be viewed in a broad political context, and it would be particularly important to consider them also from a resource and development perspective. In that connexion, Norway would regard the preparation of a United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and economic and social development, in the context of a new international economic order, as a valuable contribution.

Regarding specific arms control and disarmament questions, his delegation, like many others, felt that the special session should prepare a realistic programme of action. There seemed to be general agreement that the question of nuclear proliferation, vertical as well as horizontal, should be given priority.

Norway supported the idea that the agenda of the special session should include the question of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It would seem natural, as a first step, to base its work on the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. He considered the following measures to be of particular importance: improving the methods of work of the First Committee of the General Assembly in disarmament matters; improving existing United Nations facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues; increased use of in-depth studies of the arms race, disarmament and related matters, and strengthening of the resources of the United Nations Secretariat.

With regard to negotiations on general and complete disarmament, Norway had always emphasized the particular importance of the participation of all nuclear-
weapon States, whether in CCD, in the special session or in an eventual World Disarmament Conference. Such a conference would not be meaningful unless all militarily important States took part, especially all nuclear Powers. However, that did not seem to be a realistic prospect at present.\footnote{(A/AC.187/SR.8, p.3)}

**PAKISTAN**

In the opinion of his delegation, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, urgent action should be taken in three areas: first, agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on a substantial reduction in the size of their nuclear arsenals and strategic delivery systems; second, agreement to refrain from further sophistication of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; and, third, an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States.

Pakistan agreed that nuclear disarmament measures could not be considered in isolation from the problem of the high level of conventional armaments. There was thus an urgent need for the conclusion of specific agreements aimed at the reduction of conventional weapons, particularly those at the disposal of the two power alliances. In the opinion of his delegation, such reductions would not endanger, but would rather enhance, their security and would, furthermore, release vast resources which could be used for the betterment of the peoples of the countries concerned. In that context, he favoured the Swedish proposal that a new study should be made on the connexion between disarmament and economic development in all its aspects.

The special session must, of course, examine the problem of ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack or the threat of such attack. The ultimate aim must be the establishment of a system of positive guarantees, in other words, the system of collective security envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. Pakistan considered that the special session could make progress on that issue on the basis of paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 31/189 C. Moreover, the non-nuclear-weapon States, which constituted the vast majority of the Members of the United Nations, should take the opportunity provided by the special session to show that they were prepared to take regional security measures against the nuclear danger. In that context, Pakistan supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace and reiterated its support for the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Referring to the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, he said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA system of safeguards proved that States were willing to accept certain restrictions on their freedom of action in the interest of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world.
A viable system could not be based on the assumption that there could be a monopoly in the field of knowledge and technology or by making arbitrary distinctions. The most effective measure to restrain both vertical and horizontal proliferation would be a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. His delegation considered that, a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests should not be made conditional on its acceptance by all nuclear-weapon States.

Pakistan accepted the broad list of items contained in the draft agenda submitted by the group of non-aligned countries, but suggested that consideration should be given to another item or subitem entitled "Adoption of agreements on disarmament" since, by the time of the special session, a comprehensive test ban treaty and a treaty banning chemical weapons might be ready.11 (A/AC.187/SR.10, pp.7-8)

PERU

The Preparatory Committee had before it a draft agenda submitted by the delegation of Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned countries. The adoption of an agenda in agreement with other groups of countries appeared to be very near and his delegation welcomed that first agreement, which would enable progress to be made on other important questions.11 (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.4)

See also VI.

POLAND

The Government of Poland had supported the idea of holding a special General Assembly session devoted to disarmament, because it was an incentive for mobilizing the efforts of Governments towards more meaningful disarmament measures. In that connexion there was a direct relationship between the special session and the world disarmament conference, the idea of which had originated with the non-aligned countries and had subsequently been proposed in the General Assembly by the Soviet Union. In view of those considerations the agenda for the special session should include: (1) a general debate on disarmament; (2) preparations for the holding of a world disarmament conference; (3) the function of United Nations in the field of disarmament; and (4) the adoption of the final document or documents.

In fact, Poland's position coincided with that of the non-aligned countries regarding other aspects of the special session and of disarmament. For example, it was important that the special session should discuss the military, political, economic and social consequences of the arms race and define the relationship between disarmament, development and the restructuring of international economic relations, especially since the arms race was increasingly obstructing mankind's progress. In the Soviet memorandum of 28 September 1976, a comprehensive programme of action had been submitted which took account of the world situation and the ideas put forward in the Colombo Political Declaration which could be
useful for the work of the Committee.

It was to be hoped that at the special session consideration would be given to a wide range of issues in the field of nuclear disarmament, and to measures to put an end to the armaments race and limit armed forces and conventional armaments. The special session should take account at the same time of the basic security requirements of all States. In the view of the Polish Government, progress could only be made if the approach to disarmament was based on realistic premises, namely on the principles of undiminished security of every State, respect for inadmissibility of unilateral military advantages, universality of disarmament, effective limitation and reduction of military potentials, strict adherence to and full implementation of accepted obligations, refraining from actions detrimental to disarmament efforts and the adoption of global and regional measures to promote further strengthening of détente and growth of international confidence.

Given those conditions, one could envisage the possibility of viable agreements for prohibiting the use and production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, reducing their number and finally eliminating them. Those objectives would be furthered by agreements on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the banning and destruction of chemical weapons, the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones, and effective action to consolidate the non-proliferation régime.

One prerequisite for meaningful progress in that regard was the universality of disarmament processes. Without underestimating the role, capacities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon States, it must be borne in mind that disarmament was an historic necessity, incumbent upon all States without exception, and that States large and small, developed and developing alike should make their contribution to disarmament. It was therefore essential that all States should participate not only at the discussion stage but also in the implementation of disarmament measures.** (A/AC.187/SR.5, pp.8-9)

**ROMANIA

In a position paper circulated at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, Romania had submitted its views and specific proposals on a disarmament programme. It had also stated that it was in favour of holding a world disarmament conference.** (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.6)

** The agenda for the special session should be clear and precise and be strictly linked to the subject-matter, so as to show the dangers of the armaments race and the short-comings in the negotiations held so far on the subject, and an effort should be made to outline measures to be adopted in the future. The agenda should include the following items: consideration of the situation created in the field
of nuclear and conventional armaments and the status and results of the negotations on disarmament; measures to be adopted by the United Nations to ensure that disarmament negotations could start moving, so that viable agreements could be concluded leading to general and complete disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament; and the function of the United Nations in the disarmament field.

The Declaration should set forth the principles governing disarmament negotations, their objectives and priorities, the strategy and the tactics for all action relating to disarmament.

The Programme of Action, covering various phases, should contain concrete measures to promote confidence and co-operation among States.\(^{II}(A/AC.187/SR.5, \text{pp.6-7})\)

**SPAIN** said all countries were agreed that the agenda should include a general debate, during which the progress made in disarmament would be assessed, the adoption of a declaration of principles on disarmament, the adoption of a programme of action on the subject, and a study of the machinery that could be used in the context of the United Nations in order to achieve progress in all aspects of disarmament.\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.7, \text{p.4})}\)

Obviously, the first point the Committee must settle was the content of the agenda of the special session. In that connexion, the document submitted by the delegation of Sri Lanka on behalf of the group of non-aligned countries constituted an excellent basis for negotiation, since it reflected the views of a large number of Member States. The list of items should not, however, be exhaustive, since Member States were probably interested in dealing with other aspects of disarmament. As his delegation had indicated in document A/AC.187/9, it might be important to have an agenda item providing an opportunity for careful consideration and possible recommendation of drafts prepared by United Nations negotiating bodies which were ready for adoption.

The agenda should also give priority to the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear arms and to effective measures to deal with the problem, without, however, affecting the access of non-nuclear-weapon countries to the technology and raw materials needed for peaceful nuclear activities under an effective system of international safeguards. The establishment of zones of peace and denuclearized zones should also be studied, as well as the possibility of extending such zones to other geographical regions.\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.7, \text{pp.4-5})}\)

**SRI LANKA**

The first item on the agenda proposed by the Group of Non-Aligned Countries
called for review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, since the non-aligned countries believed that that situation was seriously affecting international conditions in general. In that connexion, emphasis should be placed on the close link between economic development and disarmament, which the non-aligned countries regarded as extremely important. It was no secret that the inflation currently afflicting the world was the result of the huge sums spent on armaments. Although the non-aligned countries did not believe that the resources released by a reduction in arms expenditure should necessarily be used to promote economic development through assistance to the developing countries, they felt that doing so would benefit both the developed and the developing countries.

. In proposing the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo, had referred to three main subjects which should be dealt with at that session, namely, the problem of disarmament, the drawing up of a set of priorities and recommendations, and the convening of a world disarmament conference as part of the international machinery of negotiations on that subject. In conclusion, he stated that the Group of Non-Aligned Countries was always prepared to hold consultations with other States or groups of States belonging to the Committee and hoped that through such consultations it would be possible to reach a consensus on the agenda with a view to avoiding lengthy debates which would take up the limited time available to the Committee.

(A/AC.187/SR.5, p.10)

SWEDEN

Early agreement on a draft agenda would facilitate the work of the Preparatory Committee. Her delegation felt that the agenda of the special session should be drafted in broad terms which indicated the type of action that the session was expected to take. The session should not devote too much time to an evaluation of past developments; if there was a real desire to achieve results, it should concentrate on future action. The views of delegations on the events which had led to the present situation could be recorded in a general debate but should not be the subject of lengthy negotiations. Towards the end of the present session of the Committee, a decision should be taken on the intersessional work that was to be done. It was essential to maintain the momentum created by the General Assembly's decision to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. The preparation of drafts of the final documents should start as soon as possible.

Sweden's reply to the note of the Secretary-General (A/AC.187/19) gave an account of her Government's thinking on issues of substance relating to disarmament. It was largely modelled on the structure of the informal paper prepared by a number of non-aligned countries. The reply contained comments on a possible declaration of principles which would provide a new basis for the efforts of the
international community in the field of disarmament, a programme of action which would give highest priority to nuclear disarmament, and, finally, organizational measures for the future, particularly with regard to the urgent problem of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conventional arms build up in many parts of the world, involving ever more sophisticated weapons, was also cause for concern.

At the same time, she wished to stress the weight given in the Swedish reply to the need to clarify, in as concrete terms as possible, certain important aspects of the interrelationship between disarmament efforts and economic and social progress. Sweden proposed that the United Nations should undertake a new study of the subject which would deal in greater detail with certain very complex questions such as the effect of military spending on economic growth, inflation, the balance of trade, the supply of raw materials and other aspects of the economy. The study should also examine methods to be employed for a well-planned, controlled conversion of resources now being used for military production.

Her Government felt that the success of the special session could be ensured only through effective follow-up action on the decisions and recommendations adopted at the session. In that connexion, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be given an increased opportunity to carry out studies and information activities in the disarmament field. With regard to the possibility of convening a world disarmament conference, her Government had concluded that the prospects for convening such a conference with the participation of all the permanent members of the Security Council were unfortunately not very promising at the present time. The fact that her Government had proposed the convening of another special session devoted to disarmament after a period of three to five years should be viewed in the light of that assessment. *(A/AC.187/SR.5, pp.2-3)*

See also VII.

**TUNISIA**

It would also be useful to draw up a comprehensive list of the various aspects of the arms race including, for example, those directly affecting the countries of the third world. In that connexion, Tunisia endorsed the Swedish delegation's proposal that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should make a comprehensive study of the effects of the arms race on economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

The danger that the special session would merely turn into a repetition of the debates of the First Committee of the General Assembly must be avoided. A new political consensus must be formulated which would make it possible to adopt concrete and realistic measures. In view of the difficulty of the task, the possibility of a second special session must not be ruled out; in any case, there remained the World Disarmament Conference, the convening of which had been supported by most Member States, including Tunisia. *(A/AC.187/SR.11, pp.2-3)*

See also VI.
TURKEY

"As measures relating to disarmament must enjoy the support of the great majority of States, the agenda for the special session, as well as the final document, should reflect the broadest possible agreement. His delegation hoped that the ongoing consultations regarding the draft agenda submitted by the non-aligned members would shortly result in a compromise text." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.6)

See also VI.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

"Effective solutions to disarmament problems could be worked out only in a universal forum with the necessary machinery for adopting practical viable decisions that took the interests of all States into account. That could be accomplished within the framework of a world disarmament conference. At every session since 1971, the General Assembly had called for the convening of such a conference, and the idea had won active support at various meetings of the non-aligned countries. In August 1976, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries in Colombo had proposed that the agenda of the special session devoted to disarmament should include an item on the convening of a world disarmament conference. His delegation was pleased to note that the convening of such a conference was receiving support in the replies submitted by States to the Secretary-General. Among the countries which had taken that position were Algeria, Poland, Venezuela, Spain; the German Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Syria, Finland and Mexico. The question of convening a world disarmament conference had thus become universal in nature, and one of the main tasks of the special session was to decide on measures for preparing and holding the conference, which should be the next, decisive stage in the solution of disarmament problems." (A/AC.187/SR.6, pp.4-5)

See also VI.

UNITED KINGDOM

"On the subject of the agenda of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, he felt that the wording of the agenda should not be prejudicial to the points of view of any particular State or group of States. Therefore, with regard to item 1, which would consist of a general debate, his delegation did not favour language which appeared to make a judgement in regard to the present disarmament situation or attempted to single out some aspects of the
special session's deliberations as being more significant than others. Similarly, with regard to item 4, his delegation felt it inappropriate to single out specific proposals concerning international disarmament machinery, since that could endanger the prospects of active participation by all members in the work of the special session. Such selection would amount to discrimination. His delegation hoped that the special session would result in broad agreement on disarmament machinery and the means by which the work of the special session should be followed up. The special session was still a year away and it was not appropriate in 1977 to prejudge decisions which the special session was to consider in 1978."

(A/AC.187/SR.8, p.7)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

"Although the agenda approved would probably serve as a useful framework for the work of the special session and the future organization and direction of preparatory work, it must be recognized that it represented only a small fraction of the immense task facing not only members of the Committee but also those countries willing to contribute to the success of the special session. In the coming months it would be necessary to clarify and consolidate objectives, determine the main areas to be examined and reach agreement on the best means of seizing the opportunity provided by the special session to give a strong impetus to disarmament negotiations. That would require intensive preparations at the national level and a broad and sustained pattern of consultations. For its part, the United States would continue its endeavours to identify ways in which the special session could lead to an acceleration and broadening of the disarmament process in the light of the pressing need for substantial progress in the field of disarmament."

(A/AC.187/SR.14, p.3)

VENEZUELA

"Venezuela had participated actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and supported the Conference so long as all the nuclear Powers took part in it. However, while believing that the subject of its convening could be discussed at the special session, his delegation felt that the session should not be a mere milestone on the road to the World Disarmament Conference. Instead, it hoped that at the special session the General Assembly would duly study the various aspects of the arms race and its economic and social consequences and achieve positive results, such as the adoption of a set of principles and a programme of action which would constitute progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under international control. It should also reaffirm the right of all States and, in particular, non-nuclear-weapon States, to access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes because, in view of the energy problems confronting the world, the possibility of using atomic energy could not easily be discounted." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.3)
YUGOSLAVIA

"His Government felt that the agenda of the special session should be conceived in broad terms and include four fundamental items, namely, a general debate, preparation and adoption of a declaration on disarmament, preparation and adoption of a programme of disarmament measures, and the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The question of convening a world disarmament conference could also be considered within that context." (A/AC.187/SR.4, p.4)

See also VI.
V. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"As to the question of the decisions to be adopted by the special session, his Government believed that the individual responsibility of all States Members of the United Nations - and, in particular, that of the nuclear Powers - would be expressed in the form of decisions. He therefore presumed that the principle of consensus would prevail at the special session, thus eliminating the possibility that only certain countries or groups of countries would accept its decisions." (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.7)

DENMARK

"As regards the organization of the work of the special session, his Government had emphasized, in its reply to the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution A/RES/31/189 B, that the general debate should leave sufficient time for thorough consideration of specific proposals. In any case such main committees as were established should be able to begin their work without waiting for the conclusion of the general debate." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)

FRANCE

See IV.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

"With regard to the immediate purpose of the Preparatory Committee's meetings, efforts should be concentrated on reaching a consensus on the agenda for the special session devoted to disarmament. The proposal submitted at the preceding meeting (A/AC.187/43) provided an excellent basis for discussion. His delegation would prefer a committee of the whole to be established in order to draft a final political declaration reflecting the consensus of the international community on the future course of international disarmament efforts and negotiations. In its view, that committee of the whole would also be the most appropriate body of the special session to discuss possible improvements in the structure of disarmament institutions and their mechanisms, taking into consideration the need to maintain the negotiating capacity of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. If necessary, the committee of the whole could establish ad hoc groups to consider special problems."
74.

"In connexion with the suggestions made concerning the organization of the special session, it should be borne in mind that the problems of disarmament were so closely interrelated, and even the consideration of structural problems was so closely linked with the task of defining priorities, that it was difficult to see how co-ordinated work could be done in several committees which lacked the cohesion of one single body." (A/AC.187/SR.6, pp.2-3)

ITALY

"At the special session the Assembly should first of all undertake a comprehensive review of the numerous problems which the United Nations was prepared to face in the field of disarmament. It would be necessary in that regard to reach a decision on the nature of the role to be played by the United Nations and on the instruments required to strengthen that role. Secondly, the Assembly should concentrate on the priority issues selected by the Committee. In that connexion, the special session should not indulge in generalized rhetoric or detailed technical negotiations. Above all, it should avoid duplicating the activities of existing fora, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which his Government still viewed as a highly useful negotiating forum, although it was prepared to consider constructive proposals designed to improve its structure, procedures and organization." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.4)

MEXICO

"Referring to some matters that had already been discussed, he expressed the view that the special session should ideally last from six to eight weeks, since there would be no justification for summoning nearly 150 Members to a special session that would merely rubber-stamp the drafts prepared by a body such as the Preparatory Committee, which represented slightly more than one third of the membership of the Organization. Naturally, if the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament completed a draft treaty on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests that had the support of the two super-Powers and of the other members of that body, the treaty could be opened for signature during the special session even though that was not the purpose of the special session. The completion of the draft treaty appeared to be a possibility in light of the statements made a year previously at United Nations Headquarters by the current President of the United States and of the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 15 February 1977." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.7)

See also II.
NEPAL

"In conclusion, he wished to point out that many non-governmental organizations had been actively associated for many years with questions relating to disarmament; their knowledge and experience should be utilized and they should be encouraged to continue their useful work." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)

NEW ZEALAND

"While understanding the reasoning behind the adoption of a conservative formulation concerning the participation of non-governmental organizations in the work of the Preparatory Committee, the New Zealand delegation reiterated its belief that such organizations had made and could make a distinctive contribution to the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It was confident that they would be able to make a positive contribution to the work of the special session." (A/AC.187/SR.11, p.6)

SWEDEN

See IV.

TUNISIA

See IV.

UNITED KINGDOM

See III.
VI. PRINCIPAL DOCUMENT OR DOCUMENTS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI. PRINCIPAL DOCUMENT OR DOCUMENTS OF THE SPECIAL SESSION

ALGERIA

See III.

AUSTRALIA

See IV.

BANGLADESH

There appeared to be an emerging consensus regarding the need to have a general declaration on disarmament, the main focus of which would be an evaluation of past endeavours, a set of practical guidelines and principles reflecting the common denominator of international consciousness and the incorporation of the major objectives desired.

His Government believed that the irrevocable link between security and economic development was of cardinal importance, since peace and prosperity were indivisible. He also stressed that considerations of national security were incompatible with disarmament, so long as no international security system existed. The real issue of disarmament, therefore, hinged on the balance between national insecurity and the degree of international trust that could be collectively reinforced.

The crucial role of the United Nations in the process could never be over-estimated; nor could the need to channel resources freed by disarmament measures towards the effective promotion of the social and economic progress of humanity, particularly in the developing countries. Equally important was the recognition of the right of all States to free and equal access to technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Among the most important principles governing future disarmament negotiations was the recognition that progress towards disarmament was the responsibility of all States, individually and collectively. Nevertheless, it was the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to participate in and implement disarmament measures, and also to guarantee that they would not resort to the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons against other States and in particular against non-nuclear-weapon countries.
Disarmament was intimately related to the search for a new international political and economic order based on mutual trust and justice, on the principle of equal security for all States, on the recognition of national independence and on international co-operation.

The acid test of the Preparatory Committee, and indeed of the special session itself, would be its ability to formulate a programme of action oriented recommendations, incorporating specific and achievable objectives and with machinery for co-ordinating, reviewing and following up action - a programme that was flexible and realistic enough to command the widest support.

Among the basic ingredients of such a programme, the highest priority must be given to measures pertaining to nuclear disarmament, the containment of vertical proliferation, including cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. Equally important were efforts to contain horizontal proliferation, by increasing the credibility of measures towards that end. Closely related to those questions were problems posed by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy their accessibility to all nations under effective international safeguards and the avoidance of dangers connected with nuclear explosive devices. His Government was vitally interested in measures to strengthen regional and subregional co-operation, in order to encourage the relaxation of tension and the settlement of disputes on the basis of friendship and recognition of equal sovereignty. Such collateral disarmament measures as the creation of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones were particularly important. Another area of vital interest was the generation of resources for peace through a more rational use of the vast sums wasted on the arms race. He therefore fully supported the proposal submitted by Sweden for a United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament efforts and economic and social progress. (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp.2-3)

BELGIUM

said that the special session should provide the opportunity to implement a comprehensive disarmament programme under which all States, without distinction, would agree to participate in the implementation of recommended measures. The arms race, with its risks of destabilization and its impact on the economic development of States, was currently affecting all regions of the world. Disarmament was becoming an increasingly important matter of concern to all States, although some States, because of the weapons they possessed, had to assume special responsibilities.

The General Assembly, in the proposed declaration, should emphasize the universality and parallelism of the activities to be undertaken, without necessarily selecting one field of action for absolute priority in relation to the others. In disarmament matters, the method of selecting
priority fields and questions had often resulted in the long neglect of entire sectors in which useful efforts and activities could have been undertaken. The scope was broad enough to permit the preparation of a comprehensive programme in which activities would be carried out side by side, without prejudice to the special responsibilities of certain States, particularly the nuclear States.

Belgium had always believed that one of the main reasons why international efforts had come to a standstill was the lack of communication among nuclear States, whose responsibility to the international community should motivate them to seek ways of establishing a dialogue among themselves. It was to be hoped that the special session would help to bring about the conditions – particularly the institutional conditions – which would enable such a dialogue to begin. The Preparatory Committee should bear that objective in mind and prepare documentation which would enable all States to attend and participate in the special session. *(A/AC.187/SR.10, p.9)*

**BRAZIL**

In that reply, addressed to the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 31/189 B, the Government of Brazil had envisaged the adoption by the special session of two basic documents: the first would be a political declaration of principles and guidelines for future negotiations on disarmament, and the second would be a programme of action for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The declaration of principles and guidelines should, in the view of his delegation, include the following essential elements: first, the international community should give maximum priority to negotiating efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament; second, disarmament measures should be correlated with the preservation and strengthening of international security in order to avoid the creation of military imbalances which might, during the negotiation process, jeopardize international peace; third, the principle that responsibilities and obligations should be balanced must prevail in the field of disarmament; furthermore, obligations should not be discriminatory in nature; fourth, new international confidence-building measures or measures of non-armament should be accompanied by truly significant steps in the field of real disarmament; fifth, the verification system should be an integral element of agreements on disarmament and should be implemented by the adoption of adequate methods, both at the national and international levels; sixth, all States, including those possessing nuclear weapons, should participate on an equal footing in international negotiations on disarmament; seventh, international efforts on chemical weapons should proceed at an accelerated pace, along with efforts to deal with weapons of mass destruction, arms which caused unnecessary suffering and those which were particularly inhumane; eighth, all countries must have free access to peaceful technologies both in the
nuclear and other fields, with standardized non-discriminatory and universal safeguards. The system of safeguards should be applied equally to all States and should be extended, whenever necessary, to cover new advances in technological research and development. None of these measures, however, should permit unwarranted interference in the sovereignty of States or threaten scientific, technological or economic development for essentially peaceful purposes; ninth, firm commitments should be made to apply significant portions of the savings derived from disarmament measures to the promotion of economic development in less developed areas. Those commitments would facilitate the establishment of a new international economic order; tenth, the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States should rest on concrete commitments on the part of the nuclear weapon States, such as the commitment to respect denuclearized zones and zones of peace, positive guarantees on the part of nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to denuclearized zones, and an agreed programme of measures for general and complete disarmament, elaborated on non-discriminatory bases and with special regard to the interests of developing countries.

With regard to the second of the final documents of the special session, his delegation was of the opinion that the programme of action should accord the highest priority to negotiations on effective measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, with particular reference to a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban, to the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons, to the ending of the process of research and development of new types of nuclear weapons and to the freezing of production of fissionable material for military purposes. The programme of action should also refer to negotiations on chemical weapons, on new weapons of mass destruction and on conventional weapons.  "(A/AC.187/SR.9, pp.4-6)

COLOMBIA

With regard to the draft agenda submitted by the delegation of Sri Lanka on behalf of the non-aligned group in the Preparatory Committee, while it might be useful to carry out a review and appraisal of the present international disarmament situation and to adopt a declaration of principles on disarmament - something which the General Assembly had already done on countless occasions - his delegation felt that item 3 of the draft agenda, namely the adoption of a programme of action on disarmament, was most important and should be the core of the work of the special session. Nothing could be gained from a rhetorical declaration of principles if it was not accompanied by a programme of well-conceived measures for arms limitation. Such measures should be aimed at ending the proliferation of nuclear weapons, limiting conventional weapons, and eliminating incendiary and chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, a mere announcement of such measures would not be sufficient; it would be necessary to prepare background documents on each one and to formulate practical suggestions on them." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.7)
80.

CYPRUS

"So that generally acceptable solutions could be reached, all States must participate in consultations which would take into account their views and suggestions. It was therefore essential that formal and informal consultations on the content and drafting of the documents to be adopted by the special session should be conducted on the basis of studies and papers concerning a new approach." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.8)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

See IV.

DENMARK

"Besides formulating a declaration on disarmament, it should be the main purpose of the session to identify the fields in which action should be taken and to establish priorities. He wished to draw particular attention to the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and also to the conclusion of a treaty for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It was clear that progress in the SALT negotiations would create a climate which would facilitate the finding of solutions for the nuclear issues he had mentioned. Those problems should not, however, be given exclusive attention to the detriment of efforts for curbing the conventional arms race. Recipient countries within a given region might help to further conventional arms control." (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.5)

FRANCE

See IV.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

"Even if the special session merely established principles, that would nevertheless constitute a new step in the desired direction. The final documents might contain something more than mere principles, since proposals already existed with regard to curtailment of the nuclear arms race, prohibition of nuclear tests, banning and destruction of chemical weapons, prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. In that connexion, the memorandum on questions of ending the arms race
and disarmament, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in September 1976 (A/31/232), deserved detailed study.

As to the final document or documents, there was a need for prior study of the replies sent by Governments to the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 31/189 B. He regretted to note that fewer than half of all Member States had submitted replies. \[^{(A/AC.187/8, p.6)}\]

See also III.

**GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF**

See IV.

**HUNGARY**

The need for achieving concrete results in the field of disarmament was unquestionable, but they could be achieved only if the basic document respected certain principles, such as the need for States to take into account each other's security interests, the exclusion of unilateral military advantages for any State or group of States, and the universality of disarmament both in the geographical sense and in the sense of types of weapons.

The sequence of items on the agenda should be formulated in a logical way, which meant that the adoption of the final document or documents must be the outcome of the whole work of the session. \[^{(A/AC.187/7, p.7)}\]

**IRAN**

There seemed to be a measure of agreement among most Member States as to the format within which the objectives of the special session could be achieved. In that connexion, the adoption of a declaration of principles and a programme of action was widely regarded as of cardinal importance. The Preparatory Committee should seek to direct its attention as soon as possible to the elaboration of an outline of those two basic documents.

The declaration should embody a set of guiding principles and contain, in broadly acceptable, clear terms, the essentials of a new approach to the
complicated problem of disarmament. It should reflect current trends and realities and should re-emphasize old but still valid assumptions. It should cite the basic premises which underlay the decision to convene a special session, and it should provide a general framework for the substantive and institutional approaches necessary for action.

Although general and complete disarmament was the ultimate goal, short-term and immediate objectives should not be ignored. The necessary attention should be given to controlling the growth of armaments and also to the underlying sources of insecurity and the continuing conflicts and threats which created the demand for weapons. In preparing a declaration of principles, account should be taken of technological and political changes and of new economic realities, thoughts and trends. In a document intended to provide directions for follow-up measures, a broad outline of priorities was an essential element. Of no less importance was reasonable, realistic consideration of the varying degrees of responsibility of different countries on the basis of priorities in the field of disarmament.

A programme of action was a logical concomitant of a declaration of principles, and it was in the programme of action that the value of the special session would be determined. The desired aim was obviously not a hasty agreement on abstract priorities or a rigid programme and schedule of action. It was recognized that the implementation of any programme of action in that field was influenced by political and security considerations of the highest order and that an international atmosphere of distrust, in which goodwill and a willingness to co-operate were lacking, would hardly be conducive to meaningful efforts to achieve disarmament. The programme of action should reflect those realities and offer a reasonable, balanced approach embodying the fundamental interests of the international community.

In the identification of particular areas of arms limitation where action was required and in the establishment of priorities for future negotiations, the following considerations seemed to be of particular importance: there seemed to be a measure of general agreement that nuclear arms limitation and reduction should be given the highest priority and should be pursued with the greatest urgency; all areas of nuclear arms control and, in particular, a comprehensive nuclear test ban called for careful attention at the special session; consideration should be given to the possibility of strengthening the non-proliferation regime by re-emphasizing the fundamental elements of the non-proliferation treaty, which included horizontal and vertical proliferation and the vital area of the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Other matters of concern were the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
The programme of action should also deal with a number of other important issues, such as other weapons of mass destruction, confidence-building measures, the regulation of conventional armaments and review of disarmament machinery. His delegation would, when appropriate, express detailed and more specific views on those issues. (A/AC.187/SR.5, pp. 4-5)

JAPAN

His delegation felt that in future the Preparatory Committee should concentrate its attention on the formulation of the final documents, namely a declaration of principles and guidelines and a programme of action. The declaration should be adopted by consensus, with the support of all nuclear-weapon States. The programme of action should be comprehensive and integrated and should provide a broad and flexible framework for future work. It should be broad enough to ensure that account was taken of the concerns of all countries and flexible enough to permit the adoption of realistic and concrete measures in the immediate future and in the medium and long term, according to priorities. The programme should aim at giving world public opinion a broad, organic picture of concrete tasks in the field of disarmament, to be executed in successive stages but without a rigid time-table. (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.3)

MEXICO

"The debate must not be reduced to an academic exercise; that was why express reference was made to the adoption of two instruments that would include all the conclusions of the preparatory studies and the deliberations of the Assembly, avoiding unnecessary fragmentation. Those instruments would be a declaration on disarmament and a programme of action on disarmament.

In that context, unnecessary fragmentation should be avoided and an effort should be made to ensure that all the conclusions and provisions were contained in the two aforementioned documents. Thus, the declaration on disarmament would spell out all the most relevant and significant principles on the subject, such as the following: all peoples of the world had a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations; general and complete disarmament under effective international control should be the ultimate goal of mankind; gradual progress towards that goal required the conclusion of partial agreement on genuine disarmament measures; the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons leading to their total elimination should be given the highest priority among such measures; the reduction and elimination of other weapons of mass destruction should also be given high priority; the international transfer of conventional weapons should be restricted and regulated; international verification was essential to many disarmament
measures and the use of a combination of various verification methods provided the best guarantees; the declaration of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace was one of the most effective means of disarmament available to all non-nuclear weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States should faithfully comply with their obligations, as set forth in the definition approved by the General Assembly, towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and the States belonging to those zones; the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and of other militarily important States would be a commendable disarmament measure; although there was a close relationship between disarmament and international peace and security, on the one hand, and disarmament and development on the other, progress in one of those areas should not be conditional upon progress in the other; the growing arms race and the resulting waste of resources were incompatible with the decisions of the United Nations aimed at establishing a new international economic order based on justice and equity; a considerable portion of the resources released by the adoption of disarmament measures should be devoted primarily to promoting the economic and social development of the developing countries; in accordance with the Charter and with countless General Assembly resolutions, the United Nations had a vital role and responsibility in the field of disarmament and it should therefore keep abreast of all measures taken in the field of disarmament, whether they be unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral; the United Nations machinery for deliberations should be strengthened by the institutionalization of a World Disarmament Conference on terms acceptable to all Member States; the appropriate changes should be made in the organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to allow China and France to participate in its work; world public opinion should be adequately informed of the progress of work in the field of disarmament, in order that it might use its influence to intensify efforts to achieve positive results; non-governmental organizations recognized by the United Nations should have all the documentation they needed to carry out their complementary work effectively.

A similar description, though much more extensive and detailed, could be made of the possible contents of the programme of action. (A/AC.187/SR.9, pp.6-7)

MONGOLIA

The disarmament programme was a complex and delicate issue since the national security of all States was at stake. Hence, the document or documents approved by the special session should include the principle that the security of States must not be endangered. The special session should strengthen and enhance the efficacy of existing machinery for dealing with disarmament questions. (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.9)
NEPAL

"Having reviewed and discussed the existing situation, the special session should draw up and adopt a declaration of principles on disarmament, along with a comprehensive programme of action in that field. There seemed to be a broad degree of agreement on that point." (A/AC.187/SR.8, pp.4-5)

NEW ZEALAND

See IV

PAKISTAN

See II and IV

PERU

The special session must establish the broad objectives and the most important guidelines for future action. Substantive principles for disarmament must be compiled and identified. Requirements for action must be stipulated. Finally, decisions must be adopted so that the United Nations could play its appropriate role in the field of disarmament.

In the outline of action and the establishment of priorities, vital importance must be attached to the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests, to respect for nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace and other appropriate measures.

It had been suggested that the Committee should proceed to prepare the principal documents for the special session. His delegation agreed with that proposal since it was clear that the more progress was made in that preliminary stage, the better would be the atmosphere at the special session and the chances for the adoption of final agreements."(A/AC.187/SR.9, p.4)

ROMANIA

"The agenda for the special session should be clear and precise and be strictly linked to the subject-matter, so as to show the dangers of the armaments race and the short-comings in the negotiations held so far on the subject, and an effort should be made to outline measures to be adopted in the future. The agenda should include the following items: consideration of the situation created in the field of nuclear and conventional armaments and the status and results of the negotiations on disarmament; measures to be adopted by the United Nations to ensure that disarmament negotiations could start moving, so that viable agreements could be concluded leading to general and complete disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament; and the function of the United Nations in the disarmament field.

The Declaration should set forth the principles governing disarmament negotiations, their objectives and priorities, the strategy and the tactics for all action relating to disarmament.

The Programme of Action, covering various phases, should contain concrete measures to promote confidence and co-operation among States."(A/AC.187/SR.5, pp.6-7)
His delegation felt that the adoption of a general political declaration would be very useful and that, among the principles which should be reflected in such a document, stress should be placed on the relationship between disarmament and international security at the global and regional levels. The declaration should also take into account a just apportionment of obligations among countries in matters of nuclear and conventional disarmament. There was no doubt that greater obligations devolved upon those States which possessed nuclear arms and whose enormous arsenals constituted a major threat to world peace. Another basic principle which should be reflected was the effects of the immense costs of an unrestrained arms race on the economic development of the entire international community.

The principle of equality of States and the right of all to participate in the measures which would be adopted for the eventual achievement of general and complete disarmament should also be taken into account." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.4)

If the entire international community was to participate in discussion of the disarmament problem, it was essential to reach an agreement on the principles which were to govern the matter. The non-aligned countries therefore gave high priority to the adoption of a declaration of principles on disarmament and to its logical corollary, a programme of action which would make those principles effective. Experience showed that the United Nations as a whole did not play an important role in discussions of disarmament, and the non-aligned countries believed that that situation should be brought to an end." (A/AC.187/SR.5, p.10)

Early agreement on a draft agenda would facilitate the work of the Preparatory Committee. Her delegation felt that the agenda of the special session should be drafted in broad terms which indicated the type of action that the session was expected to take. The session should not devote too much time to an evaluation of past developments: if there was a real desire to achieve results, it should concentrate on future action. The views of delegations on the events which had led to the present situation could be recorded in a general debate but should not be the subject of lengthy negotiations. Towards the end of the present session of the Committee, a decision should be taken on the intersessional work that was to be done. It was essential to maintain the momentum created by the General Assembly's decision to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. The
preparation of drafts of the final documents should start as soon as possible.

Sweden's reply to the note of the Secretary-General (A/AC.187/19) gave an account of her Government's thinking on issues of substance relating to disarmament. It was largely modelled on the structure of the informal paper prepared by a number of non-aligned countries. The reply contained comments on a possible declaration of principles which would provide a new basis for the efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament, a programme of action which would give highest priority to nuclear disarmament, and, finally, organizational measures for the future, particularly with regard to the urgent problem of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conventional arms build up in many parts of the world, involving ever more sophisticated weapons, was also cause for concern. (A/AC.187/SR.5, pp.2-3)

TUNISIA

"In the opinion of his delegation, the convening of a special session devoted to disarmament would make it possible to remedy the inadequacies of the methods adopted in recent years. One of the main tasks of the special session was to secure and define a common political will, which alone would make it possible to establish a new international strategy with universal participation. That was why Tunisia supported the idea of the adoption of a declaration on disarmament. That document should not only embody the political undertaking of all Member States to take effective action for disarmament but should also establish the objectives to be achieved and the guiding principles to be followed. The endeavour would succeed only if account was taken of the interests of all, particularly those who had not had an opportunity to express their opinion on that serious matter."

(A/AC.187/SR.11, p.2)

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The special session of the General Assembly should provide a useful international forum for consideration of the existing situation with regard to disarmament. Views could be exchanged and the principal trends could be outlined, and the session could conclude with the adoption of a final political declaration setting out agreed views on the question of disarmament. The adoption of such a document would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the task of disarmament.

In their replies, many States proposed that the special session should formulate broad basic principles to guide disarmament negotiations. His delegation would not be opposed to seeing the special session discuss and perhaps draft a number of declarations of principles. In particular, it would be useful to reaffirm that the main purpose of all disarmament efforts should be the achievement of general and complete disarmament and to emphasize the need for participation in negotiations by all States, particularly the nuclear Powers, and for the enunciation
of basic principles such as the principle that no one should seek to obtain unilateral advantage or threaten the security of any State. (A/AC.187/6R.6, pp.3-4)

Agreements concluded in recent years on limitation of the arms race were of great importance for progress towards disarmament. Their importance was such that they should be reflected in the final documents of the special session. They included agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of nuclear weapons and limitation of strategic arms, negotiations on the banning of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor. Negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were also vitally important, as were the conventions on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and other agreements on the reduction of armaments. On 18 May, at Geneva, a large number of States had signed the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. That represented an important step towards strengthening the peace and security of peoples and safeguarding the environment.

It should be emphasized in the final documents prepared by the special session that inter-State discussions were taking place on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Negotiations on further reductions of strategic weapons were continuing between the USSR and the United States, as were talks on the reduction of military forces and armaments in Central Europe. Participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe had undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In the United Nations, consideration was being given to the question of a universal treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the principal approaches to the solution of the problem of disarmament at the current stage of international relations should be stated in the resolutions of the special session. States should be encouraged to pursue the basic and final objective of all disarmament efforts, namely, general and complete disarmament under strict international control, since that was the only way in which mankind could be guaranteed universal peace and security on a lasting and firm basis.

From that standpoint, all States had an obligation to progress towards the achievement of concrete goals, taking every possible opportunity to prohibit and eliminate existing types of weapons, to prevent the manufacture of new systems of weapons of mass destruction, to keep entire regions of the world out of the arms race, and to reach agreement in other areas.

One of the main prerequisites for success in disarmament agreements should
be the principle of allowing the greatest possible number of States, particularly nuclear States and those with the most powerful weapons and forces, to participate in the talks and in the adoption of measures. As for nuclear disarmament, the participation of all the nuclear Powers was absolutely essential.

Measures to solve the problems of the arms race and disarmament should not in any way jeopardize the security of States. If that principle was violated or if any attempt was made to obtain undue unilateral advantages, the effectiveness of negotiations for the adoption of viable agreements could not be guaranteed.

It was also important that the decisions to be taken by the special session should include provisions concerning the use of the resources released as a result of disarmament measures for the improvement and well-being of mankind, the accomplishment of the main tasks facing mankind, such as the war against hunger, disease and illiteracy, and the solution of social, energy and ecological problems, as well as for the economic progress of the developing countries.

The special session should establish guidelines for States in their disarmament efforts. In that connexion, the USSR had submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session a memorandum setting forth several measures that could be taken to solve the problems faced by mankind in the field of disarmament. Above all, it was essential to achieve the cessation of the nuclear-arms race. Nuclear disarmament measures should include the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the supply of such weapons to the armed forces of States, as well as the reduction of existing stockpiles and, as a final goal, their complete destruction.

The question of the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, which also represented a threat to peoples, should be considered simultaneously with the question of nuclear disarmament.

One of the priority measures to be taken in the prohibition of the nuclear-arms race was the general and complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. Another important task was the strengthening of the system for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was important to enhance the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by making it genuinely universal and by reinforcing the IAEA system of safeguards. It was essential to ensure that international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes did not become a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The special session should also take decisions concerning the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons so as to prevent scientific and technological
advances from being used for destructive purposes. Similarly, practical measures should be taken for the reduction and limitation of aircraft, artillery, tanks and other types of conventional weapons.

The adoption of regional measures of military détente and disarmament, such as the establishment of zones of peace in various regions, in particular in the Indian Ocean, would make a substantial contribution to the limitation of the arms race and to disarmament by eliminating foreign military bases and by prohibiting the shipping of nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean.

The reduction of military budgets was one of the most powerful means for limiting the arms race. The resources thus released could be devoted to furthering the economic and social progress of peoples, particularly those of the developing countries.

The USSR was prepared to take into account the opinions of other States on those and other matters and to take an active part in the formulation of constructive decisions. The existing negotiation machinery should be maintained, as it had already proved effective. At the special session, special attention should be given to the adoption of further measures for the convening of the World Disarmament Conference, in accordance with the agreement to include an item on the convening of the World Disarmament Conference in the agenda of the special session.  \( \text{A/AC.187/SR.14, pp.4-6} \)

**UNITED KINGDOM**

As to the future work of the Committee once the agenda for the special session had been agreed, his delegation agreed with the views expressed by the representative of Sweden at the 5th meeting (A/AC.137/SR.5) to the effect that the primary object of the present session of the Preparatory Committee should be to start action oriented preparations for the special session so as to lay a basis for other discussions on the substantive issues before the special session itself. The representative of Sweden had also said that by the end of the current session of the Committee a decision should be taken concerning the work to be accomplished during the intersessional period. His delegation further agreed with the statement made by the representative of Romania on 11 May (A/AC.187/SR.6) to the effect that the Committee had the responsibility to complete the preparation of the draft documents of the special session before the session opened. In this regard, his delegation agreed with the suggestions made by the representative of Canada and was also willing to give positive consideration to other proposals concerning ways in which work on the basic documents of the special session could be pursued between the present time and September.  \( \text{A/AC.187/SR.8, p.8} \)
The special session should appraise the current status of the problem of disarmament, the results of negotiations, the consequences for and dangers to the process of détente constituted by the continuation of the arms race, and its consequences for the economic and social development of the international community, and should reach agreement on a programme of measures which would effectively solve some basic problems of disarmament and ensure greater and over-all involvement of the United Nations in that field. For that purpose, it was essential to agree on the measures to be implemented jointly, on the measures to be implemented by each State individually, in keeping with their position and responsibility vis-à-vis the international community, and on the negotiating machinery. (A/AC.187/SR.4, p.4)

See also III.
VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

ALGERIA

"His delegation noted with satisfaction that the Committee had decided to include in the agenda a review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament. It considered that the United Nations should assume its natural role of providing leadership and guidance in the field of disarmament and should participate more actively in the disarmament process. It continued to support the convening of a World Disarmament Conference in which all nuclear-weapon States would participate." (A/AC.187/SR.13, p.8)

AUSTRIA

"Another topic of the discussions should be the institutional and organizational measures which would allow the United Nations to carry out more effectively its predominant role in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.2)

BANGLADESH

"So far as institutional and follow-up measures were concerned, he strongly supported the strengthening of the central role of the United Nations in the disarmament process. He agreed that attention should be devoted to streamlining and restructuring the working methods of existing bodies, such as CCD, in order to make them more representative and also to link them more intimately with the General Assembly." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.3)

FINLAND

"The relatively slow progress in disarmament negotiations was mainly due to the inherent complexity of the problem rather than to the lack of adequate machinery and procedures either within the framework of the United Nations or outside it. At the same time, improvements should be made in the existing mechanisms and procedures so as to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

See I.
HUNGARY

"With respect to the agenda of the special session, it was evident that a general debate on disarmament was needed, as well as a realistic appraisal of the present situation, so as to draw correct conclusions for the future. While reviewing the role of the United Nations and that of the existing machinery in the field of disarmament, one should keep in mind the proven usefulness and the so far unused capacities of that machinery. (A/AC.187/SR.7, p.6)

IRAQ

See I.

ITALY

See IV.

MEXICO

"In accordance with the Charter and with countless General Assembly resolutions, the United Nations had a vital role and responsibility in the field of disarmament and it should therefore keep abreast of all measures taken in the field of disarmament, whether they be unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral; the United Nations machinery for deliberations should be strengthened by the institutionalization of a World Disarmament Conference on terms acceptable to all Member States; the appropriate changes should be made in the organization and procedures of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in order to allow China and France to participate in its work; world public opinion should be adequately informed of the progress of work in the field of disarmament, in order that it might use its influence to intensify efforts to achieve positive results; non-governmental organizations recognized by the United Nations should have all the documentation they needed to carry out their complementary work effectively." (A/AC.187/SR.9, p.7)

NEPAL

"A major area for consideration should be the machinery for disarmament. His delegation considered that the United Nations should play an increasingly active role in the field of disarmament." (A/AC.187/SR.8, p.5)
NEW ZEALAND

See IV.

NORWAY

Norway supported the idea that the agenda of the special session should include the question of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It would seem natural, as a first step, to base its work on the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session. He considered the following measures to be of particular importance: improving the methods of work of the First Committee of the General Assembly in disarmament matters; improving existing United Nations facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues; increased use of in-depth studies of the arms race, disarmament and related matters, and strengthening of the resources of the United Nations Secretariat.\(^\) (A/AC.187/SR.8, p. 3)

POLAND

Poland was determined to persist in its efforts to promote disarmament on all planes, including the United Nations, which had an important role to play in that field. Nothing should be done to weaken existing disarmament machinery whose establishment had taken three decades.\(^\) (A/AC.187/SR.5, p. 7)

ROMANIA

The time had come to make radical changes in disarmament negotiations and in proposed approaches and measures, as well as in the machinery for the conduct of negotiations. The United Nations certainly had special responsibilities and competence in the matter. The President of Romania, Mr. Ceausescu, had stated that the special United Nations session on disarmament should make it possible to move towards the adoption of concrete disarmament measures and, first and foremost, nuclear disarmament.\(^\) (A/AC.187/SR.5, p. 6)

The time had come for disarmament talks to be placed under the auspices of the United Nations, and held in forums open to all States and under the control of world public opinion. In order to discharge its fundamental duty of defending the peace and security of peoples, the United Nations should exert its authority in matters relating to negotiations on disarmament and the adoption of appropriate
measures, as well as on the supervision of their implementation. The first General Assembly session on disarmament would have a very important function, since it would be the forum for the adoption of decisions vital to international peace and security. Principles, decisions and measures would be adopted to institute a new era of negotiations, the era of real and concrete disarmament, under strict and effective international control.\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.5, \ p.6)}\)

**SPAIN**

"The special session was an excellent opportunity to study the United Nations negotiating machinery on disarmament and to consider possibilities for restructuring it. The United Nations had a guiding role to play in that field. The links should therefore be strengthened between the United Nations and certain organs such as CCD, whose work was extremely useful but which was not in a position adequately to bring together the views of all the members of the international community. Finally, consideration should be given to the possibility of the General Assembly's holding further special sessions so as to continue to serve as an effective instrument in the cause of disarmament."\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.7, \ p.5)}\)

**SRI LANKA**

See VI.

**SWEDEN**

"Sweden proposed that the United Nations should undertake a new study of the subject which would deal in greater detail with certain very complex questions such as the effect of military spending on economic growth, inflation, the balance of trade, the supply of raw materials and other aspects of the economy. The study should also examine methods to be employed for a well-planned, controlled conversion of resources now being used for military production.

Her Government felt that the success of the special session could be ensured only through effective follow-up action on the decisions and recommendations adopted at the session. In that connexion, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be given an increased opportunity to carry out studies and information activities in the disarmament field. With regard to the possibility of convening a world disarmament conference, her Government had concluded that the prospects for convening such a conference with the participation of all the permanent members of the Security Council were unfortunately not very promising at the present time. The fact that her Government had proposed the convening of another special session devoted to disarmament after a period of three to five years should be viewed in the light of that assessment."\(^{(A/AC.187/SR.5, \ p.3)}\)
He reaffirmed the need for the United Nations, through the Centre for Disarmament, to launch a wide-ranging public information campaign concerning the grave dangers of the arms race and its economic and social consequences. Furthermore, his country felt that the proposal by certain delegations that the First Committee of the General Assembly should deal solely with questions relating to disarmament and international security was a positive one.\textsuperscript{11} (A/AC.187/SR.10, p.3)

\textbf{YUGOSLAVIA}

See IV.