PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

EXISTING PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSALS FOR THE CONDUCT OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Background paper prepared by the Secretariat

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1. **Introduction**

1. By resolution 31/189 B of 21 December 1976, the General Assembly decided to convene a special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978. It further decided to establish a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, composed of 54 Member States appointed by the President of the Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, with the mandate of examining all relevant questions relating to the special session, including its agenda, and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-second session appropriate recommendations thereon.

2. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance, including the provision of essential background information, relevant documents and summary records.

3. At its 2nd meeting on 31 March 1977, the Preparatory Committee requested the Secretariat to begin the preliminary work on certain factual background papers. Included among them was a paper on existing principles and proposals for the conduct of disarmament negotiations.

4. In response to this request of the Preparatory Committee, the Secretariat has prepared this paper, which consists of a compilation of documents - proposals and declarations - submitted or adopted within and outside the United Nations system. It covers the period from 1959 when, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), which was adopted unanimously, the question of general and complete disarmament became the subject of specific proposals and intensive discussions in the United Nations. The list is by no means exhaustive. It includes only the documents most frequently referred to by States in current discussions in the CCD and the General Assembly on the conduct of disarmament negotiations. Other documents which might be relevant in this connexion can be found in the publication "The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970" and its supplement "The United Nations and Disarmament 1970-1975".

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15. The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

16. The Heads of State or Government point out that general and complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes of internal security; and the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories.

17. The participating countries call upon all States in general, and States exploring outer space at present in particular, to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They expressed the hope that the international community will, through collective action, establish an international agency with a view to promote and coordinate the human actions in the field of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

18. The participants in the Conference urge the Great Powers to sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used for the peaceful economic and social development of all mankind. The participating countries also consider that:

(a) The non-aligned Nations should be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament;

(b) All discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the United Nations;

(c) General and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control, the terms of which should include members of non-aligned Nations.

19. The participants in the Conference consider it essential that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by all countries.

20. The participants in the Conference recommend that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to discussion of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament.

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3.

2. Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America

We have the honour to transmit the attached report and document entitled “Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations”. We would be grateful if this letter and its enclosures could be circulated to all Members of the United Nations as a document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Valerian Aleksandrovich ZORIN
Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations

(Signed) Adlai E. STEVENSON
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations

REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

In accordance with their statements of 30 March 1961 at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, the Governments of the United States and the USSR wish to inform the Members of the General Assembly of the results of their exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body, whose composition is to be agreed upon:

1. The exchange of views took place in Washington, D.C., from 19 June to 30 June; in Moscow from 17 July to 29 July; and in New York from 6 September to 19 September 1961.

2. As a result of the exchange of views, the two Governments submit a joint statement of agreed principles which they recommend as guidance for disarmament negotiations when such negotiations are resumed. The text of these agreed principles is attached hereto in the form of a joint statement of the two Governments.

3. The two Governments were not able to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body prior to the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.

Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations

Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced to the General Assembly on 30 March 1961,

Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,

Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959,

Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means,

The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon either States to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles:

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

(a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and

(b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) The disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

(d) The abolition of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, the cessation of military training, and the closing of all military training institutions;

(e) The discontinuance of military expenditures.

4. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.
5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.


Fifteenth Session, A/4879,
PART 1. GENERAL

Article 1

Disarmament obligations

The States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake:

1. To carry out, over a period of five years, general and complete disarmament entailing:
   - The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;
   - The prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;
   - The destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;
   - The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and dismantling of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State;
   - The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;
   - The cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions;
   - The abolition of war ministries, general staffs and their local agencies, and all other military and paramilitary establishments and organizations;
   - The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment and the cessation of their production, except for the production of strictly limited quantities of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;
   - The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or by organizations or private individuals.

2. To retain at their disposal, upon completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of article 37 of the present Treaty.

3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously in three consecutive stages, as set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place after adoption by the International Disarmament Organizaun of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and that any additional verification measures recognized to be necessary for the next stage have been prepared and can be put into operation when appropriate.

4. To carry out all measures of general and complete disarmament in such a way that at no stage of disarmament any State or group of States gains any military advantage and that the security of all States parties to the Treaty is equally safeguarded.

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*USSR Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control*

**PREAMBLE**

The States of the world,

Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the peoples,

Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, especially in the present circumstances of the precipitate development of means of mass annihilation such as nuclear weapons and rocket devices for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society,

Fulfilling the historic mission of saving all the nations from the horrors of war,

Basing themselves on the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and pratical way to fulfil mankind's age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolate peace on earth,

Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilating human beings and of destroying material values,

Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring a further increase in prosperity and socio-economic progress in all countries in the world,

Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, good-neighbourliness, equality of States and peoples, non-interference and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries,

Reaffirming their dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Here resolved to conclude the present Treaty and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article 2

Control obligations

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts II, III and IV of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization composed of all States parties to the Treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in part V of the present Treaty.

4. In all States parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The States parties to the Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time such information on their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the measures of the stage concerned.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall be kept in being and shall exercise supervision over the fulfilment by States of the obligations they have assumed so as to prevent the re-establishment of the military potential of States in any form whatsoever.

Article 3

Obligations to maintain international peace and security

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly confirm their resolve in the course of and after general and complete disarmament:

(a) to base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly coexistence and co-operation;

(b) not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use for this purpose the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;

(c) to strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

2. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia) remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament for any purpose other than the safeguarding of their internal security or the discharge of their obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

PART II. FIRST STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 4

First-stage tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases in alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories and to reduce their armed forces, their conventional armaments and production of such armaments, and their military expenditure.

CHAPTER I

ELIMINATION OF THE MEANS OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN ALIEN TERRITORIES; AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THOSE TERRITORIES; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

A. MEANS OF DELIVERY

Article 5

Elimination of rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons

1. All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical, and piloted aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the third stage.

A strictly limited number of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses under the provisions of article 15 of the present Treaty shall also be retained.

All launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of rockets and piloted aircraft, other than those required for the missiles to be retained under the provisions of this article, shall be completely demolished. All instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of rockets and piloted aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such rockets, piloted aircraft and auxiliary facilities shall be demolished.

2. The production of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. All undertakings or workshops thereof engaged in their production shall be dismantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the production of such items shall be destroyed; the premises of such undertakings as well as general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
4. The production and testing of appropriate rockets for the peaceful exploration of space shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 6
Elimination of military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons

1. All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft and repair and maintenance facilities and storage premises at such airfields shall be rendered inoperable or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such aircraft shall be closed.

2. The production of all military aircraft referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Undertakings or workshops thereof designed for the production of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft or other civilian goods.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Article 7
Elimination of all surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines

1. All surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and submarines of all classes or types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of the above warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and handed over to the merchant marine for peaceful uses.

2. The building of the warships and submarines referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants, wholly or partly designed for the building of such warships and submarines, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Article 8
Elimination of all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons

1. All artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. All auxiliary equipment and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed. Surface storage premises and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire stock of non-nuclear munitions for such artillery systems, whether at gun site or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof shall be destroyed.

2. The production of the artillery systems referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. To this end, all plants or workshops thereof engaged in the production of such systems shall be closed and dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The production of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the production of such munitions shall be completely dismantled and their specialized equipment destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

B. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND TROOPS
IN ALIEN TERRITORIES

Article 9
Dismantling of foreign military bases

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any types. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments existing at such bases and coming under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State which owned the base. All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. The living quarters and auxiliary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory they are located.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to military bases which are used by foreign troops but which may legally belong to the State in whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented with respect to army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other States or groups of States, regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at those bases at the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the organs of military blocs and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment or use of military bases in foreign territories shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to grant military bases for use by foreign troops and to conclude any bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements to this end.

3. The legislatures and Governments of the States parties to the present Treaty shall enact legislation and issue regulations to ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.
Article 10
Withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories

1. Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have troops or military personnel of any nature in foreign territories shall withdraw all such troops and personnel from such territories. All armaments and all installations of a military nature which are located at points where foreign troops are stationed and which come under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing its troops. The living quarters and auxiliary installations previously occupied by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory such troops were stationed.

2. The measures set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces or engaged in the production of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes in foreign territory.

Such persons shall be recalled to the territory of the State of which they are citizens, and all previous treaty obligations, decisions by organs of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to their activities shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to dispatch foreign troops, military personnel or the above-mentioned civilians to foreign territories.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the withdrawal of troops, the destruction of installations and the transfer of the premises referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. The International Disarmament Organization shall also have the right to exercise control over the recall of the civilians referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. The laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 3 of article 9 of the present Treaty shall include provisions prohibiting citizens of States parties to the Treaty from serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities serving military purposes in foreign States.

Chapter II
Reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments and military expenditure; control over such measures

Article 11
Reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels:
United States of America—1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.

[Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.]

2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel released as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in articles 5-10 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

3. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 30 per cent for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

Article 12
Reduction of conventional armaments production

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under articles 5-8 of the present Treaty shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 11 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 13
Reduction of military expenditure

1. The States parties to the present Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the reduction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their production, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories as well as to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 5-12 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on
the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article through its financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the Treaty undertake to grant unimpeded access to the records of central financial institutions concerning the reduction in their budgetary appropriations resulting from the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and to the relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies.

CHAPTER III
MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES

Article 14
Restrictions on the movement of means of delivering nuclear weapons

1. From the beginning of the first stage until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons in accordance with articles 5-8 of the present Treaty, it shall be prohibited for any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space, for warships or military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction to leave their territorial waters or to fly beyond the limits of their national territory.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. The States parties to the Treaty shall provide the International Disarmament Organization with advance information on all launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes provided for in article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as on all movements of military aircraft within their national frontiers and of warships within their territorial waters.

Article 15
Control over launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes

1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article through the establishment, at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings, of inspection teams which shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before its launching.

Article 16
Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons

The States parties to the Treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing such weapons.

The States parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other State into their territories.

Article 17
Prohibition of nuclear tests

The conducting of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited (if such a prohibition has not come into effect under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed).

Article 17a
Measures to reduce the danger of outbreak of war

1. From the commencement of the first stage, large-scale joint military movements or manoeuvres by armed forces of two or more States shall be prohibited.

The States parties to the Treaty agree to give advance notification of large-scale military movements or manoeuvres by their national armed forces within their national frontiers.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions between States or groups of States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them.

3. The States parties to the Treaty agree to establish swift and reliable communication between their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. The measures set forth in this article shall remain in effect after the first stage until the completion of general and complete disarmament.

Article 18
Measures to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security

1. With a view to ensuring that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting States against threats to or breaches of the peace, all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

2. The armed forces specified in the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the States concerned and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength and shall be fully equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, serving under the command of the military authorities of the States concerned, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.
CHAPTER IV
TIME-LIMITS FOR FIRST-STAGE MEASURES; TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND STAGE

Article 19
Time-limits for first-stage measures

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force (in accordance with article 48), within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.

2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be eighteen months.

Article 20
Transition from the first to the second stage

In the course of the last three months of the first stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART III. SECOND STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 21
Second-stage tasks

The States parties to the Treaty shall undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to make a further reduction in their armed forces, conventional armaments and production of such armaments, and military expenditure.

CHAPTER V
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADILOGICAL WEAPONS; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

Article 22
Elimination of nuclear weapons

1. (a) Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities with the exception of the warheads pertaining to missiles temporarily retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America under article 5, paragraph 1, of this Treaty, shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct reconstitution into weapons and shall form a special stock for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed.

All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished.

(b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct use in nuclear weapons and shall be transferred to the above-mentioned special stocks.

(c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. (a) The production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

(b) The measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all undertakings which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy.

The States parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organization documents pertaining to the extraction and processing of nuclear raw materials and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes.

3. Each State party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, enact legislation completely prohibiting nuclear weapons and making any attempt by individuals or organizations to reconstitute such weapons a criminal offence.

Article 23
Elimination of chemical, biological and radiological weapons

1. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots and storage places, shall be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed (neutralized). All instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons, all special facilities for their transportation, and all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation shall simultaneously be destroyed.

2. The production of all types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories that are wholly or partly engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.
**Chapter VI**

**Further reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments and military expenditures; control over such measures**

**Article 24**

**Further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments**

1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels: United States of America—one million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—one million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees;........[Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.]

The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel previously manning the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under articles 92 and 93 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

2. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 35 per cent from the original levels for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

**Article 25**

**Further reduction of conventional armaments production**

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 24 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall, as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

**Article 26**

**Further reduction of military expenditure**

1. The States parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and the discontinuance of the production of such weapons as well as to the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 22-25 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the second-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. Control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the present Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall also be granted unimpeded access to records concerning the reduction in the budgetary appropriations of States resulting from the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

**Chapter VII**

**Measures to safeguard the security of States**

**Article 27**

**Continued strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security**

The States parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures referred to in article 18 of the present Treaty regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

**Chapter VIII**

**Time-limits for second-stage measures; transition from the second to the third stage**

**Article 28**

**Time-limits for second-stage measures**

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be twenty-four months.

**Article 29**

**Transition from the second to the third stage**

In the course of the last three months of the second stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of this stage.

Measures for the transition from the second to the third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be similar to the corresponding measures for the first stage, as laid down in article 20 of the present Treaty.
PART IV. THIRD STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Article 30
Third-stage tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, fully to disarm all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military machinery of States. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America undertake to complete the total elimination of all the missiles and the nuclear warheads pertaining thereto, which remained at their disposal under article 5, paragraph 1, of this Treaty.

CHAPTER IX
COMPLETION OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE MILITARY MACHINERY OF STATES; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

Article 31
Completion of the elimination of armed forces and conventional armaments

1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall disarm the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserves of each State party to the Treaty shall be completely abolished.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall destroy all types of armaments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the dismantling of troops and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion to peaceful uses of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty.

Article 32
Complete cessation of military production

1. Military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued, with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for the purposes referred to in article 36, paragraph 2, of the present Treaty. The factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the production of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments with national or foreign government undertakings and private firms for the production of armaments, military equipment, munitions and material shall be cancelled.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 33
Abolition of military establishments

1. War ministries, general staffs and all other military and para-military organizations and institutions for the purpose of organizing the military effort of States parties to the Treaty shall be abolished. The States parties to the Treaty shall:
   (a) demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations;
   (b) abrogate all laws, rules and regulations governing the organization of the military effort and the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations;
   (c) destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilization and operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war.

2. The entire process of the abolition of military and para-military institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 34
Abolition of military conscription and military training

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. All establishments and organizations dealing with military training shall simultaneously be disbanded in accordance with article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 35
Prohibition of the appropriation of funds for military purposes

1. The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether by government bodies or private individuals and social organizations, shall be discontinued.

The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.
2. For the purpose of organizing control over the implementation of the provisions of this article, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access to the legislative and budgetary documents of the States parties to the present Treaty.

Article 35a
Elimination of missiles and of nuclear warheads pertaining thereto, retained until the end of the third stage

1. At the end of the third stage, there shall be carried out the elimination of all intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in accordance with the provisions of article 3, paragraph 1, of this Treaty, together with the nuclear warheads, launching devices and guiding systems.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above.

CHAPTER X
MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES AND TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Article 36
Contingents of police (militia)

1. After the complete abolition of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms, to maintain internal order, including the safeguarding of frontiers and the personal security of citizens, and to provide for compliance with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each State party to the Treaty shall be as follows: ..............................................................

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantities of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms, the quotas and types of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and facilities, shall be specified in a special agreement.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said light firearms.

Article 37
Police (militia) units to be made available to the Security Council

1. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, on its request, units from the contingents of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and facilities. The placing of such units at the disposal of the Security Council shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. In order to ensure that urgent military measures may be undertaken, the States parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness those units of their police (militia) contingents which are intended for joint international enforcement action. The size of the units which the States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council as well as the areas where such units are to be stationed shall be specified in agreements to be concluded by those States with the Security Council.

2. The command of the units referred to in paragraph 1 shall be composed of representatives of the three principal groups of States existing in the world on the basis of equal representation. It shall decide all questions by agreement among its members representing all three groups of States.

Article 38
Control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces

1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be under the control of the International Disarmament Organization, which shall verify the reports by States concerning the areas where such contingents are stationed, concerning the strength and armaments of the contingents in each such area, and concerning all movements of substantial contingents of police (militia).

2. For the purpose of ensuring that armed forces and armaments abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament are not re-established, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the States parties to the Treaty.

CHAPTER XI
TIME-LIMITS FOR THIRD-STAGE MEASURES

Article 39

The third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART V. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

Article 40
Functions and main bodies

The International Disarmament Organization to be set up under article 2, paragraph 3, of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organiza-
tion", shall consist of a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference", and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council".

The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

**Article 41**

**The Conference**

1. The Conference shall comprise all States parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year and special sessions, which may be convened by decision of the Council or at the request of a majority of the States parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters connected with the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each State party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament and may make recommendations to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure.

4. The Conference shall:

   (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
   (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;
   (c) Approve the budget recommended by the Council;
   (d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
   (e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with article 47 of the present Treaty;
   (f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
   (g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.

**Article 42**

**The Control Council**

1. The Council shall consist of:

   (a) The five States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;
   (b) Number other States parties to the Treaty, elected by the Conference for a period of two years.

The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world.

2. The Council shall:

   (a) Provide practical guidance for the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set up such bodies at the headquarters of the Organization as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in accordance with the present Treaty;
   (b) Submit to the Conference annual report and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;
   (c) Maintain constant contact with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringements by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty;
   (d) Review the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
   (e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on an international basis so as to ensure that the three principal groups of States existing in the world are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among persons who are recommended by Governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;
   (f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;
   (g) Draw up instructions by which the various control bodies are to be guided in their work;
   (h) Make a prompt study of incoming reports;
   (i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary for control over the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for by the present Treaty;
   (j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

**Article 43**

**Privileges and Immunities**

The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each State party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

**Article 44**

**Finances**

1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be financed from the funds
allocated by the States parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organization shall be drawn up by the Council and approved by the Conference in accordance with article 41, paragraph 4(c), and article 42, paragraph 2(f), of the present Treaty.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditure of the Organization according to the following scale: 

[The agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present article.]

Article 45
Preparatory Commission

Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty, the States represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament shall set up a Preparatory Commission for the purpose of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organization.

PART VI. FINAL CLAUSES

Article 46
Ratification and entry into force

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures within a period of six months from the date of its signature, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat by all the States which are permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by those States that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by [number] non-aligned States.

Article 47
Amendments

Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a conference of all States parties to the Treaty and has been ratified by the States referred to in article 46 of the present Treaty in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

Article 48
Authentic texts

The present Treaty, done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese and Spanish languages, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory States.

In witness WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty.

Done at .................
4. Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world submitted by the United States, 18 April 1962, as subsequently amended

United States: Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World*

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty. The preamble of such a treaty has already been the subject of negotiations and is therefore not submitted as part of this treaty outline.

A. Objectives

1. To ensure that: (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems; and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:
   (a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
   (b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;
   (c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;
   (d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;
   (e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the programme for general and complete disarmament, States would have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

4. To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, States also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of arms and other facilities necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of force.

5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under the disarmament programme would be honored and observed during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors would have unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

B. Principles

The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives are:

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is completed by stages to be carried out within specified time-limits.

2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for all.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrangements would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the disarmament process that agreed levels of arms and armed forces were not exceeded.

4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international co-operation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signature and ratification of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other States as might be agreed. Stage II would begin when all militarily significant States had become Parties to the Treaty and after implementation requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin when all States possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty.

STAGE I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;

2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken;

3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below.

A. Armaments

1. Reduction of Armaments

(a) Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage towards general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by thirty per cent the armaments in each category listed in sub-paragraph (b) below. Each type of armament in the categories listed in sub-paragraph (b) would be reduced by thirty per cent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.

(b) All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative):

(i) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilogrammes or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater.

(Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman missiles, which came within the category description, together with, where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The declared inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the Treaty would be similarly detailed.)

(ii) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 and 40,000 kilogrammes and those missiles not included in category (i) having a range between 300 and 5,000 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(iii) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilogrammes. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(iv) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 and 300 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)
(v) Anti-missile-missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(vi) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile-missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(vii) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(viii) Armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(ix) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(x) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

2. Method of Reduction

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date.

(b) The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during stage I would be carried out during each step.

(c) During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during stage I would be placed in depots under supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(d) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitation or Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

(a) Production of all armaments listed in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during stage I and, by the beginning of stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

(b) The allowances would permit limited production of each type of armament listed in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments, any armament produced within a type would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that type to the end that the 10 per cent reduction in numbers in each type in each step, and the resulting 30 per cent reduction in stage I, would be achieved.

(c) The testing and production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

(d) The expansion of facilities for the production of existing types of armaments and the construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

(e) The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

(f) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties in the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or one per cent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by national Governments in the following categories:

(a) Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.

(b) Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law.

(c) Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission.

3. Method of Reduction

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner:

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.

(b) Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of stage I.
3. Transfer of Fissile Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

(a) Any transfer of fissile materials between States would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

(b) The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

(a) Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:

(1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a State which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;
(2) Not assist any such State in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

(b) Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:

(i) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;
(ii) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

5. Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions

(a) If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.

(b) If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapon test explosions would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

6. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapon stockpiles.

D. OUTER SPACE

1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit

The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

2. Peaceful Co-operation in Space

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased international co-operation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.
3. Notification and Pre-Launch Inspection

With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launchings to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launchings.

4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

E. Military Expenditures

1. Report on Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization at the end of each stage a report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include an itemization of military expenditures.

2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements respecting military expenditures.

F. Reduction of the Risk of War

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following measures:

1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Manoeuvres

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and manoeuvres to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed.

2. Observation Posts

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centres, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases, to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step of stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.

3. Additional Observation Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each step of stage I.

4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between States or groups of States in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.

5. Communications between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary-General.

6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures as might be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.

G. The International Disarmament Organization

1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be established upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

2. Co-operation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to co-operate promptly and fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would verify disarmament measures in accordance with the following principles which would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on verification:
(a) Measures providing for restriction of armaments would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations.

(b) Measures limiting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization. Parties to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties.

(c) Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following:

(i) All parts of the territory to which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to inspection from the beginning of stage I as provided below.

(ii) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.

(iii) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments and forces within the zone. During the verification process, armament and equipment would be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified were conducted, access within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and verification of the zone with the full cooperation of the State being inspected would be carried out with the full cooperation of the State being inspected.

(iv) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

(v) By the end of stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty.

4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization

(a) The International Disarmament Organization would have:

(i) A General Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty;

(ii) A Control Council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory Powers as permanent members and certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and

(iii) An Administrator who would administer the International Disarmament Organization under the direction of the Control Council and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the International Disarmament Organization.

(b) The General Conference and the Control Council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary.

5. Functions of the General Conference

The General Conference would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

(a) Electing non-permanent members to the Control Council;

(b) Approving certain accessions to the Treaty;

(c) Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the Control Council;

(d) Approving agreements between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations and other international organizations;

(e) Approving the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

(f) Requesting and receiving reports from the Control Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the Control Council;

(g) Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations;

(h) Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council;

(i) Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(j) Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by the Parties to the Treaty;

(k) Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or disarmament in general.

6. Functions of the Control Council

The Control Council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

(a) Recommending appointment of the Administrator;

(b) Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty;

(c) Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the Administrator;

(d) Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements;

(e) Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements;
(f) Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

(g) Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(h) Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions to the Treaty;

(i) Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or to disarmament in general.

7. Functions of the Administrator

The Administrator would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

(a) Administering the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the International Disarmament Organization;

(b) Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by the verification arrangements;

(c) Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

(d) Making reports to the Control Council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements.

8. Privileges and Immunities

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory of each of the parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex to the Treaty.

9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations

(a) The International Disarmament Organization, being established within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and the Administrator of the International Disarmament Organization would consult with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.

(b) The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organization.

(c) Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the International Disarmament Organization, which would consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.

Note. The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations.

II. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Obligations Concerning Threat or Use of Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type—including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare—contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Rules of International Conduct

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in sub-paragraph (a) would also study methods of assuring States against indirect aggression or subversion.

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other State, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.

4. Maintenance of International Peace and Security

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

5. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during stage I for the establishment in stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

(a) Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;

(b) Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;

(c) Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations
Peace Force in stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

6. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Observation Corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

I. TRANSITION

1. During the last three months of stage I, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of stage I:
   (a) All undertakings to be carried out in stage I had been carried out;
   (b) All preparations required for stage II had been made; and
   (c) All militarily significant States had become parties to the treaty.

2. Transition from stage I to stage II would take place at the end of stage I or at the end of any period of extension of stage I, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

3. If, at the end of stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

STAGE II

Stage II would begin upon the transition from stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.

During stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during stage I;

2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below;

3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during stage II;

4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which had during stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by 30 per cent would during stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in stage I, section A, sub-paragraph 1(b), by 50 per cent of the inventory existing at the end of stage I.

(b) Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during stage I would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 65 per cent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by 30 per cent in stage I.

2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in sub-paragraph (b) below, and would during stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 50 per cent.

(b) All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):

(i) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).

(ii) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations by types).

(iii) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometres (declarations by types).

(iv) Mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber of less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).

(v) Specified types of unarmoured personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types).

(vi) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types).

(vii) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by types).

(viii) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).

(c) Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in stage I, section A, sub-paragraph 1(b), and in sub-paragraph (b) above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of stage II.

3. Method of Reduction

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in stage I, section A, paragraph 2.
4. Limitation on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of stage II.

(b) The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed annual quotas.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

(d) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in an annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify activities subject to the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that locations.

5. Additional Measures

(a) In the light of their examination during stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:

(i) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(ii) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels 50 per cent below those existing at the beginning of stage II.

(iii) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(b) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(c) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained levels of activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during stage I would further reduce their force levels.

(f) Force levels in the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels 50 per cent below the levels agreed for the end of stage I.

(ii) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels agreed for the end of stage I to levels which would not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of stage II.

(b) Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during stage I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other Parties which had reduced their force levels during stage I as well as stage II. In no case would such agreed levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of stage II.

(c) Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel in the categories set forth in section B, paragraph 2, of stage I.

2. Method of Reduction

The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in section B, paragraph 3, of stage I.

3. Additional Measures

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty.

C. Nuclear weapons

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In the light of their examination during stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types, and nature of utilization of all their fissile materials.

(b) The Parties in the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissile materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the State to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissile materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.

(d) Production or refurbishment of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissile materials would be subject to agreed limitations.

(e) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(f) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.
2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes

To facilitate verification during stage III that no nuclear weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissile materials for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialization would be carried out with the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures.

E. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

In the light of the examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in stage I for this purpose. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after stage II.

F. THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the measures undertaken in stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in section G, paragraph 3, of stage I.

G. MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

(a) In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes.

2. Rules of International Conduct

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization initiated in stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin stage III.

(b) In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure States against indirect aggression and subversion.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during stage I would come into being within the first year of stage II and would be progressively strengthened during stage II.

4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangements for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

5. National Legislation

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for non-compliance.

II. TRANSITION

1. During the last three months of stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of stage II:

(a) All undertakings to be carried out in stage II had been carried out;

(b) All preparations required for stage III had been made; and

(c) All States possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty.

2. Transition from stage II to stage III would take place at the end of stage II or at the end of any periods of extension of stage II, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

3. If, at the end of stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member
or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

STAGE III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.

During stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:
1. To continue all obligations undertaken during stages I and II;
2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of stage III;
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

A. ARMAMENTS

1. Reduction of Armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of stage II.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

(a) Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied research, development, production, and testing of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all other facilities for such purposes.

(b) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(c) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

II. ARMED FORCES

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

To the end that upon completion of stage III they would have at their disposal only forces and organizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force.

3. Other Limitations

The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military establishments or military service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In light of the steps taken in stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the
military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

2. Method of Reduction
(a) The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses during stage III would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.
(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and facilities.

E. Research and Development of Military Significance

1. Reporting Requirement
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to stage III:
(a) The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance.
(b) The Control Council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the Treaty.
(c) The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) above.

2. International Co-operation
The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international co-operation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel.

F. Reduction of the Risk of War

1. Improved Measures
In the light of the stage II examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after stage III.

2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces
The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in stages I and II.

G. International Disarmament Organization
The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity: (1) to verify the measures undertaken in stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in section G, paragraph 3, of stage I so that by the end of stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of stage III.

H. Measures to Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace

1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes
The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

2. Rules of International Conduct
The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided in stage II and by any other agreed procedure.

3. United Nations Peace Force
The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no State could challenge it.

I. Completion of Stage III

1. At the end of the time period agreed for stage III, the Control Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in stage III had been carried out.
2. Such determination would be made by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If an affirmative determination were made, stage III would be deemed completed.
3. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether such undertakings had been carried out and would vote upon the question in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.
4. After the completion of stage III, the obligations undertaken in stages I, II and III would continue.
GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL STAGES

1. *Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty*

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty after a specified period of time.

2. *Interim Agreement*

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation of stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

3. *Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession and Entry into Force of the Treaty*

(a) The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession, by all States Members of the United Nations or members of its specialized agencies.

(b) Any other State which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Control Council.

(c) The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by ....... States, including the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following States: .........

(d) In order to assure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant States would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.

(e) The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other States or authorities to accede to the Treaty.

(f) The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes.

(g) A Depositary Government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depositary. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depositary.

4. *Finance*

(a) In order to meet the financial obligations of the International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organization's expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.

(b) The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organization.

5. *Authentic Texts*

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.

United States: Draft Articles V and VI-XII of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World

Article V

1. *Reduction of Armaments*

(a) Each of the following Parties: ..... agrees to reduce its armaments in stage I in accordance with the provisions of this article.

(b) Each Party named in sub-paragraph (a) above, with the exceptions provided in the annex on stage I armaments reductions, shall reduce the number of its armaments in each of the types listed in that annex by not less than 30 per cent of the number of such armaments existing at the beginning of stage I.

(c) Each Party named in sub-paragraph (a) above agrees not to retain at the end of stage I any armaments of the types listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions in excess of the number of such armaments existing at the beginning of stage I less the number of such armaments required to be reduced in stage I by such Party under this article.

2. *Method of Reduction*

(a) Each Party to this Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization, within ...... days after the beginning of stage I, a declaration setting forth inventories of the numbers of its armaments, existing at the beginning of stage I, in each type listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions. The form of such declaration shall be in accordance with the requirements set forth in that annex.

(b) The reductions of armaments required by this article shall be accomplished in three consecutive steps, each consisting of one year. Each Party named in paragraph 1 of this article shall:

(i) reduce, by the end of the first step, the number of its armaments in each type by not less than one-third of the number of such armaments required to be reduced by such Party in stage I, and

(ii) reduce, by the end of the second step, the number of its armaments in each type by not less than two-thirds of the number of such armaments required to be reduced by such Party in stage I.

By the end of the third step, each Party named in paragraph 1 of this article shall complete the reductions of armaments it is required to make in stage I.

(c) Each step shall be divided into two consecutive parts, each consisting of six months. In the first part of each step, each Party named in paragraph 1 of this article shall deposit the armaments which it is required to reduce in that step in depots under the supervision of the International Disarmament...
Organization. During the second part of each step, the designated armaments shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization.

(d) The number, location, establishment and operation of depots, and the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of armaments, shall be in accordance with the provisions of the annex on stage I armaments reductions and with rules adopted by the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with article

3. Limitations on Production and Test Armaments

(a) Each Party to this Treaty shall limit its production of armaments of the types listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions in accordance with the table of production allowances contained in that annex. For each armament produced during stage I, an existing armament of the same type as that produced, in addition to the armaments required to be reduced in the absence of production, shall be deposited in a depot under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization and disposed of in accordance with paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (c) of this article, so that the reductions required in stage I may be achieved and so that no Party may, after the beginning of stage I, increase the number of its armaments in any type listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions.

(b) Each Party to this Treaty, shall, from the beginning of stage I, limit its production of parts and assemblies usable in any type of armament listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions in accordance with the provisions of that annex.

(c) No Party shall, after the beginning of stage I, expand its facilities for the production of any type of armament listed in the annex on stage I armaments reductions, or construct or equip facilities for the production of any type of armament which it has not produced prior to the beginning of stage I.

(d) No Party shall, from the beginning of stage I, test or produce any type of armament which it has not tested and produced prior to the beginning of stage I.

(e) Each Party to this Treaty shall, after the beginning of stage I, limit flight testing of missiles in accordance with the table in the annex on stage I armaments reductions.

4. Verification

The obligations set forth in this article shall be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the annex on verification.

Article VI
Production and Use of Fissionable Material for Nuclear Weapons

1. Each Party to this Treaty shall:
   (a) Halt, prohibit and prevent the production, at facilities under its jurisdiction or control, of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons;
   (b) Halt, prohibit and prevent the use in nuclear weapons of all fissionable material produced after the beginning of stage I; and
   (c) Refrain from... causing, encouraging, or in any way assisting or participating in, the production anywhere of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

2. Each Party shall limit the production, at facilities under its jurisdiction or control, of fissionable material for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons in accordance with the table of allowances set forth in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament.

3. Each Party shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization declarations within ... days after the beginning of stage I and thereafter every ... which shall list: (a) the name, location, and production capacity of each facility under its jurisdiction or control capable of producing or processing fissionable material and (b) the amounts and types of fissionable material being produced at each such facility. The form of such declarations shall be in accordance with the requirements set forth in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament.

Article VII
Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other Than Use in Nuclear Weapons

1. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree that each of them shall, during stage I, transfer to depots, as stated in paragraph 2 of this article, specified amounts of weapons-grade U-235 from its stock of such U-235 in existence at the beginning of stage I, in order to transfer such amounts to use other than in nuclear weapons. The United States of America shall transfer not less than ... kilograms of weapons-grade U-235. For the purposes of this article "weapons-grade U-235" means the U-235 contained in metal of which at least 90 per cent of the weight is U-235.

2. Transfers pursuant to this article shall take place at depots under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. The schedule of transfers, the location, establishment and operation of depots, and the safeguard procedures to be observed in making the transfers, in withdrawing transferred material from depots, and in transporting, handling and utilizing such material after withdrawal shall be as provided in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament and in rules adopted by the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with article . . . .

3. The Party owning any transferred material prior to transfer shall continue to own it after transfer, subject to the limitations contained in this article, and may withdraw such material for any purpose other than use in nuclear weapons, providing it submits to the International Disarmament Organization prior to withdrawal a statement setting forth the purpose of the withdrawal, the amount of material needed for such purpose, and the time and place at which such material will be used.

Article VIII
Transfer of Fissionable Material for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

1. No Party to this Treaty shall transfer, or permit any individual or association under its jurisdiction or control to transfer, to any other State, or to
any individual or association under the jurisdiction or control of such other State, fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

2. Any transfer of fissionable material not prohibited by this article, and the transportation, handling, and utilization of such material after such transfer, shall be subject to the safeguard procedures provided in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament and in rules adopted by the Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with article . . . .

Article IX
Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties agree that:

1. Any Party to the Treaty which has manufactured, or which at any time manufactured a nuclear weapon before [an agreed date];
   (a) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a State which has not manufactured a nuclear weapon before [an agreed date];
   (b) Not assist any such State in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

2. Any Party to the Treaty which has not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the [agreed date] shall:
   (a) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;
   (b) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

Article X
Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions

The Parties to this Treaty agree to be bound by the provisions of the "Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments", which is set forth in the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament.

Article XI
Preparation for Stages II and III

The Parties to this Treaty agree to examine unresolved questions related to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles and, in the light of this examination, shall agree upon arrangements for the accomplishment of such reduction and elimination.

Article XII
Verification

The obligations set forth in this part of this Treaty shall be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, the annex on stage I nuclear disarmament, and the annex on verification.
5. The Programme for Peace and International Co-operation
(Chapter VII), adopted at the Second Non-Aligned Summit
Conference, Cairo, 5-10 October 1964* 

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT;
PEACEFUL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY,
PROHIBITION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON
TESTS, ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE
ZONES, PREVENTION OF DISSEMINATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ABOLITION
OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Conference emphasizes the paramount importance
of disarmament as one of the basic problems of
the contemporary world, and stresses the necessity of
reaching immediate and practical solutions which would
free mankind from the danger of war and from a sense
of insecurity.

The Conference notes with concern that the continuing
arms race and the tremendous advances that have been
made in the production of weapons of mass destruction
and their stockpiling threaten the world with armed
conflict and annihilation. The Conference urges the great
Powers to take new and urgent steps toward achieving
general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.

The Conference regrets that despite the efforts of the
members of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament,
and in particular those of the non-aligned countries, the
results have not been satisfactory. It urges the great
Powers, in cooperation with the other members of that
Committee, to renew their efforts with determination
with a view to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on
general and complete disarmament.

The Conference calls upon all States to accede to the
Moscow treaty partially banning the testing of nuclear
weapons, and to abide by its provisions in the interests
of peace and the welfare of humanity.

The Conference urges the extension of the Moscow
Treaty so as to include underground tests, and the dis-
continuance of such tests pending the extension of the
agreement.

The Conference urges the speedy conclusion of agree-
ments on various other partial and collateral measures
of disarmament proposed by the members of the 18-
Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The Conference appeals to the Great Powers to take
the lead in giving effect to decisive and immediate
measures which would make possible substantial reduc-
tions in their military budgets.

The Conference requests the Great Powers to abstain
from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear
weapons and their by-products among those States which
do not at present possess them. It underlines the great
danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and
urges all States, particularly those possessing nuclear
weapons, to conclude non-dissemination agreements and
to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation
of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

As part of these efforts, the Heads of State or Govern-
ment declare their own readiness not to produce, acquire
or test any nuclear weapons, and call on all countries
including those who have not subscribed to the Moscow
Treaty to enter into a similar undertaking and to take
the necessary steps to prevent their territories, ports

and airfields from being used by nuclear powers for the
deployment or disposition of nuclear weapons. This
undertaking should be the subject of a treaty to be
concluded in an international Conference convened under
the auspices of the United Nations and open to accession
by all States. The Conference further calls upon all nu-
clear Powers to observe the spirit of this declaration.

The Conference welcomes the agreement of the Great
Powers not to sit in outer space nuclear or other wea-
pons of mass destruction and expresses its conviction
that it is necessary to conclude an international treaty
prohibiting the utilisation of outer space for military
purposes. The Conference urges full international coo-
peration in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The Conference requests those States which have
succeeded in exploring outer space, to exchange and dis-
seminate information related to the research they have
carried out in this field, so that scientific progress for
the peaceful utilisation of outer space be of common
benefit to all. The Conference is of the view that for
this purpose an international conference should be con-
vened at an appropriate time.

The Conference considers that the declaration by
African States regarding the de-nuclearization of Africa
the aspirations of the Latin American countries to de-
nuclearize their continent and the various proposals par-
taining to the de-nuclearization of areas in Europe and
Asia are steps in the right direction because they assist
in consolidating international peace and security and
lessening international tensions.

The Conference recommends the establishment of
de-nuclearized zones covering these and other areas and
the oceans of the world, particularly those which have
been hitherto free from nuclear weapons, in accordance
with the desires expressed by the States and peoples
concerned.

The Conference also requests the nuclear Powers to
respect these de-nuclearized zones.

The Conference is convinced that the convening of
a world disarmament conference under the auspices of
the United Nations to which all countries would be in-
vited, would provide powerful support to the efforts which
are being made to set in motion the process of disarma-
ment and for securing the further and steady development
of this process.

The Conference therefore urges the participating
countries to take, at the forthcoming General Assembly
of the United Nations, all the necessary steps for the
holding of such a conference and of any other special
conference for the conclusion of special agreements on
certain measures of disarmament.

The Conference urges all nations to join in the coo-
perate development of the peaceful use of atomic energy
for the benefit of all mankind; and in particular to study
the development of atomic power and other technical
aspects in which international cooperation might be most
effectively accomplished through the free flow of vital
scientific information.

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6. Working paper containing some introductory remarks on steps toward a comprehensive disarmament programme submitted by the Netherlands

1. In resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 by which the General Assembly endorsed the agreement reached on the composition of the INDC, it was recommended that the new Disarmament Committee should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Committee should in its work take into account, inter alia, paragraph 8 of the aforementioned principles.

2. Paragraph 8 of the agreed principles stipulates that efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme for general and complete disarmament has been achieved. Furthermore, efforts should be undertaken to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

3. Since then progress has been made first and foremost in the field of collateral measures. But for reasons which are well known the hope that the main task of the Committee could be dealt with without interruption, "as a matter of the utmost urgency" (Res. 1722 (XVI)), remained unfulfilled.

In the course of its existence the Committee "gradually concentrated more of its efforts on the partial and confidence-building, or collateral measures of disarmament, as they are usually called, than on general and complete disarmament".*/ This trend is discernible in the Provisional Agenda of work of the Committee, adopted in August 1968. Likewise, in its report to the XXIVth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee recognizes "the relationship of the various measures already achieved and those currently being considered toward the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

*/ CCD/276, 24 February 1970.

*/ The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1965, chap. 6, p. 115.
4. Mainly as a result of the initiatives of the Romanian delegation (ENDC/PV.400) and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the XXIVth session of the General Assembly declared the seventies as a Disarmament Decade. Disarmament and social and economic development are the main objectives of all mankind for the coming years.

5. In the relevant resolution the General Assembly endorses the view that general and complete disarmament is the ultimate goal. Toward that end, the Assembly requests this Committee:

1. to continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching the widest possible agreement on collateral measures;

2. to work out a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects on the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, which would provide the Committee with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations.

6. In its last report to the General Assembly the Committee expressed its conviction of the continued need to give highest priority in its work to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, with due consideration to maintaining a balance among various measures to prevent armament, to limit armament and of disarmament. As regards the first category some measure of success has been achieved.

7. As to the second the most hopeful event during the Committee's past session was the announcement in Moscow and Washington that discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles would start shortly.

The Netherlands delegation fully shares the opinion that the strategic arms limitation talks, which had a promising beginning, are of the utmost importance. They may create a new and more rational relationship in the strategic balance of the two super-powers. Their successful outcome would certainly facilitate the conclusion of further measures in the field of armaments limitation and ultimately of disarmament.
8. This should not imply, however, that no efforts are to be made in the meantime to further new agreements on such other measures. Although it is understood that there is a close relationship and interdependence between SALT and a comprehensive test ban, the Netherlands Delegation is nevertheless of the opinion that early preparatory work for a close international co-operation in the seismological field should continue to receive high priority in this context. Without prejudice to the eventual shaping of a verification system in a comprehensive test ban treaty, methods of seismological detection and identification will in any case constitute a fundamental element of such a system. Therefore, the Netherlands Delegation attaches great importance to the implementation and follow-up of the General Assembly Resolution on a world-wide exchange of seismological data.

It remains of the opinion that the question of a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes should be examined more closely by the Committee (CCD/PV.432).

9. The Netherlands Delegation shares the view of the Italian Delegation as expressed in documents ENDC/245 and ENDC/263 that pending final results of the bilateral talks on vertical non-proliferation new and continued efforts should be made to prevent horizontal proliferation. During this session of the Committee the curtain on the Disarmament Decade could be raised by reaching agreement on the final text of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

10. Measures of non-arms and arms limitation certainly contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual confidence, which may pave the way to reach the final objective of general and complete disarmament. But apart from being an aid to "confidence-building", such measures have, of course, also an intrinsic merit of their own. They should not be limited to the nuclear field.

Much time of this Committee will certainly be devoted to the conclusion of new agreements regarding chemical and biological warfare.

Within the framework of the Disarmament Decade, efforts should also be made to reduce and eliminate conventional arms races. In this respect attention should be paid to the increasing build-up of arsenals and to the international trade in conventional armaments. The S.I.P.R.I. Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament gives an alarming picture of the dangers involved.
11. Finally, with regard to the third category mentioned in paragraph 6, it would appear that concrete negotiations on real disarmament measures can only start fruitfully, when the preparatory phase of partial measures and confidence building has been sufficiently successful.

This, however, does not exclude that during the preparatory phase attention be devoted to the problems of general and complete disarmament. In this respect the joint statement of agreed principles still serves its purpose of being a guideline for the disarmament process as a whole. Nevertheless, as suggested by the Italian Delegation in ENDC/245, it might be considered whether this statement could be suitably supplemented. In the opinion of the Netherlands Delegation this should preferably be done in the form of an additional formulation rather than as a restatement of those principles, thus leaving the standing and validity of the joint declaration of 1961 itself intact.

12. The implementation of a comprehensive programme in the field of arms control and disarmament is closely linked with further developments and progress in the overall political world situation. The three cornerstones are: Disarmament, International Security and Peace.

During our last session several delegations referred to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2454 (XXIII) requesting this Committee to renew its effort to make progress toward general and complete disarmament. The Netherlands Delegation is of the opinion that during the preliminary phase studies could take place on the question of general and complete disarmament. The Indian Delegation (ENDC/PV.404) called on the United States and the USSR to submit revised versions of their draft treaties concerning general and complete disarmament. The Polish Delegation (ENDC/PV.406) proposed more specifically that the two Co-Chairmen prepare a new draft for the first stage of disarmament. An alternative approach might also be considered by the Committee, namely to start with an examination of the characteristics and requirements of the final stage of a process of general and complete disarmament. On the basis of such a study it could be tried subsequently to trace out a route along which this final stage can be reached. A similar method was proposed by the Swedish Delegation as far back as 1964 (ENDC/PV.202). Perhaps it could offer the advantage of getting a better insight in the political requirements and structural needs of a disarming world.
13. The consideration of a comprehensive programme inevitably raises the questions of priorities and deadlines. In this connexion reference should be made to the proposal of Sweden (ENDC/PV.397) for "balanced package deals" and of India for a "selective approach" (ENDC/PV.404).

It is, of course, in the nature of things, when there is a whole range of topics, to establish some sort of order of priorities. However, in the opinion of the Netherlands delegation such a list can only be of a very tentative character. It should be flexible and may be subject to change - as has already been shown in the past - in as much as the political realities of the moment require. One should not overlook that the "partial measures" which have been adopted or are now under discussion, are, in fact, elements of different stages of the proposals for general and complete disarmament.

The very character of negotiations on arms control and disarmament is ill suited to set any meaningful timetables in the context of a "Decade". It remains to be seen what the net result will be at the end of the ten year period. No amount of pressure, nor the best efforts of the Committee to meet certain "target" dates can alter that fact. It is unlikely that a precise schedule and fixed time spans would be helpful in achieving the very goal we are trying to reach. It would therefore be undesirable to establish too rigid a programme of work or to assume that it will be possible strictly to adhere to any particular pattern.

Of course, it is a quite different matter to agree on a certain sequence of measures, to be carried out within specified periods of time, in a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament.
7. Working paper on comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Italy  

The Italian delegation considers that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should increase its efforts to give effect to resolution 2602 E concerning the question of general and complete disarmament adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session.

The part of that resolution which seems to us most faithfully to reflect the arguments presented in the United Nations by a large number of countries wishing to give a fresh impetus to the disarmament negotiations is to be found in paragraph 4 of the operative part.

The instructions given in that paragraph are closely related to the proposals for the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Italy at Geneva at the two preceding sessions of the Conference (see Working Papers ENDC/245 of 21 April 1969 and ENDC/263 of 23 August 1969).

With a view to facilitating the opening of a highly desirable discussion on this comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Italian delegation, as members of the Conference are aware, has at the present session taken the initiative of organizing contacts with a number of other interested delegations with the idea of engaging in exchanges of view such as may give rise to a basic plan for possible subsequent discussion by the Conference.

The Italian delegation has already described, in its statement of 2 July 1970, the nature and characteristics of the outline which was jointly prepared, and which is reproduced below.

"Preliminary considerations representing, in general terms, the views of a number of delegations with which the delegation of Italy has been in consultation.

A. Goal, principles and mandates

United Nations General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 and the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), endorsed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), represent the basis for disarmament negotiations and for new efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Draft treaties on general and complete disarmament were presented in 1962 by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Add.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and Add.1-3). Several countries suggested that these draft treaties could be revised and brought up to date.

*/ CCD/309, 19 August 1970
United Nations General Resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: '.... to work out .... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations ....' (CCD/275).

Both in the Agreed Principles and in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) it is recognized that negotiations should continue with a view to reaching agreements on partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

B. Main elements of the programme

Progress in disarmament is not an isolated matter but is intimately connected with and influenced by problems of international peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In order to establish the international climate of confidence and good will necessary for progress, specific measures to build up confidence should urgently be agreed upon, including special studies on certain subjects.

While progress is being made to build up confidence, the States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should engage themselves to negotiate meaningful measures to prevent and limit armament as well as measures of disarmament, taking into account, inter alia, the special studies mentioned above.

In the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control through measures to prevent and limit armament as well as through measures of disarmament, there should be a balance among these categories of measures.

C. Phases of the programme

The need for flexibility has been generally recognized. The highest priority should be accorded to measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. Taking into account the Agreed Principles and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions mentioned above, and further taking into account agreements already achieved on collateral measures, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should envisage dealing in successive phases with the main elements mentioned under the second paragraph. An attempt should be made to decide upon these various phases and to outline the possible content of each phase.

A review of the programme of disarmament could take place each year in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

D. General considerations

Various problems closely related to disarmament negotiations would have to be examined. The following points were tentatively singled out for further discussion and elaboration: priorities, balance, verification, regional arrangements, universal participation, public opinion and methods of work.
The Italian delegation considers that this document should be exhaustively discussed by the Conference, and it wishes that all delegations would contribute to the consideration of the problem dealt with. For its part, and to facilitate the development of the ideas summarily expressed in the text, we should like to present our observations on some main points and, in particular, on Section B, entitled "Main elements of the programme":

In our opinion, the Conference should adopt a programme to guide its work and future negotiations, as recommended by the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution. The programme, in the preparation of which all governments members of the Conference should participate, might include the items indicated in the text prepared by the interested delegations. These items come under Section B and may be summarized as follows:

- measures for increasing international confidence;
- studies on particular points;
- measures to prevent and limit armament;
- disarmament measures;
- general and complete disarmament.

Each of the items in this list might provide the basis for the subsequent more thorough consideration which is necessary for establishing the programme.

(1) Measures for increasing international confidence

The development of the international situation and the improvement of confidence among States will obviously have a direct and favourable effect on the work of the Conference. The Conference should and can, however, contribute to the increase in international confidence by adopting a programme of work defining its undertakings and aims.

(2) Studies

The Italian delegation believes that, with a view to helping to create favourable conditions for negotiations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might now initiate programmes of studies relating to the question of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. Negotiations might also benefit from a preliminary work which would provide necessary clarification of certain important aspects of that question.
In connexion with the above programmes, the Conference might in particular examine the following points in depth:

(a) Relationship between nuclear disarmament and the beginning of reductions in conventional means of warfare;

(b) Determination of the geographical areas within which the first reductions in conventional means of warfare would take place. In other words, the Conference should address itself to the question whether the first "round" of reductions affecting armed forces and conventional armaments should be global in scope and apply to all States without distinction or whether it should initially apply only to some States. In the latter case, it would be necessary to study the criteria to be used for determining the States to which this first "round" of reductions would apply. Such States might be the principal world military Powers, or they might be States determined on the basis of a criterion that provides for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in a particular regional context. Before negotiations began, it would be necessary to clarify this important question of principle, for it is on the answer to this question that the political dimensions of the problem will depend. The nature of the negotiations would vary in more than one respect depending on whether the reductions to be negotiated applied to more or less numerous States and whether those reductions would be partial or global. (It should be noted, by the way, that the United States draft treaty on general and complete disarmament provided that the first phase of the reductions would be applicable only to some of the States parties to the treaty);

(c) Elaboration of technical criteria necessary for the implementation of reductions (categories of armaments to be reduced, levels, initial declarations, unit of measurement to be used in reductions, extent of reductions, creation of a disarmament organization, verifications, etc.);

(d) Relationship between armament reductions and controls.

(3) Measures to prevent and limit armament

This concerns mainly the "collateral" measures to which the Conference has devoted most of its efforts since the start of the discussions concerning the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament of 1962. Negotiations on these collateral measures were moreover envisaged in paragraph 8 of the USSR-United States Joint Statement of 1961. In spite of the fact that the procedure of negotiating collateral measures has caused certain imbalances which are not insignificant, it
has had positive results, as is shown by the conclusion of some important international agreements. These collateral measures have, in addition, made another positive contribution: that of reviving hope for the resumption of discussions on general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, the Italian delegation feels that the Conference should make a maximum effort to pursue negotiations on measures designed to prevent and limit armament. Among such measures, and apart from those which are now the subject of active negotiations (denuclearization of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and prohibition of chemical and biological weapons), the most important and most urgent are the following: cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. In the opinion of the Italian delegation, the Conference, in adopting its programme of work, should expressly confirm the fact that it is giving priority to negotiations relating to these two measures so necessary to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

(4) **Disarmament measures**

The Italian delegation would like to reaffirm that the *raison d'être* of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is to negotiate disarmament measures, i.e. effective reductions of armed force and armaments. Such negotiations must begin as soon as possible. They could obviously be facilitated by the creation of an international climate of increased confidence and by the completion of the studies referred to above. Although it would be difficult to fix a precise time-limit for the start of these negotiations, we feel that it would be extremely useful if a specific commitment on the subject were assumed now. This would have the important result of reassuring public opinion, which is demanding more effective action by the CCD on disarmament. Such a commitment would be an incentive to Governments to take the necessary decisions, an incentive that would be strengthened if the commitment were assumed collectively by the States members of the Committee on Disarmament, which is the competent body for disarmament negotiations.

Accordingly, at the time it adopts its own programme, the CCD should - in the opinion of the Italian delegation - give expression to the commitment of its States members to open negotiations on a first "round" of reductions of armed forces and armaments. This would better ensure a balance among the various categories: preventive, limitative and effective measures of disarmament.

(5) **General and complete disarmament**

General and complete disarmament is the final goal of all CCD negotiations; and that has recently been confirmed by General Assembly resolution 2602 E. Consequently, a re-examination of general and complete disarmament plans by the CCD, as suggested by
Some delegations, should reflect the will of the States members of the CCD to pursue that objective. So far as the Italian delegation is concerned, it believes that it will be necessary for the CCD to bear in mind past experience so as to be able to resume the discussion on new bases. With that in view, and taking as its point of departure the USSR-United States General Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961, the CCD might adopt a more articulated directive for the elaboration of a "programme" in line with that joint statement. A single treaty could hardly govern the implementation of the process of disarmament in all its phases. The "programme" should therefore serve as an overall agreement whose purpose would be to lay down in broad outline the approach to general and complete disarmament: it might envisage the conclusion of a series of treaties or agreements relating to the various phases of effective implementation of disarmament. This would avoid the rigidity inherent in a single treaty and the difficulty of discussing problems which are not ready for negotiation. At the same time, it would maintain the concept of a prior commitment with respect to the evolution of the whole process, in its successive phases.

As regards the nature of the programme which the CCD should adopt, the Italian delegation feels that it should be both a programme of work and a commitment: a programme of work with respect to negotiations on the categories of measures being examined and to the suggested studies on international disarmament, and a commitment to open negotiations on a first round of reductions of armed force and armaments.

Finally, as to the form of the programme, we might consider, among other solutions, a joint statement of the Governments members of the CCD or, more simply, the adoption by the CCD of its own programme of work.
8. Resolution on disarmament, adopted at the Third Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Lusaka, 8-10 September 1970*

1. Conscious of the threat to mankind posed by the ever-spiralling arms race, especially in view of the existing large stockpiles of and impending new qualitative advance in the ever more devastating nature of nuclear armaments, the Heads of State or Government reaffirm their conviction expressed at the Belgrade and Cairo Summit Conferences of Non-Aligned countries, that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the most imperative and urgent need of the international community today.

2. The Conference welcomes the designation of the 1970's as the 'Disarmament Decade'. The participating countries are determined to spare no efforts with a view to ensuring the success of the Disarmament Decade. They will cooperate closely among themselves and with other like-minded countries to help in the drawing-up of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Conference is of the opinion that the following general order of priorities should be followed in drawing-up this programme:

(i) Measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, such as a cut-off in the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and its transfer to peaceful uses, a stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban, reduction and destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons;

(ii) Other measures of priority in the disarmament field; an agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of Chemical and Biological (Bacteriological) weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of all nations, etc.;

(iii) Non-arms or confidence-building measures, such as a convention on the non-use of weapons, demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond an agreed limit, the establishment of nuclear free zones etc.

3. The participating States feel that it may be useful to convene a World Disarmament Conference at an appropriate time open for participation to all States.

4. An essential confidence-building measure for ensuring progress in the field of disarmament is a firm commitment assumed through an international agreement, binding and universal in character, not to resort to force and not to intervene in any manner whatsoever and under any circumstances in the internal affairs of other States.

5. The Conference is aware of the tremendous contribution which the technology of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including peaceful nuclear explosions, can make to the economy of the developing world. It is of the opinion that the benefits of this technology should be available to all States without any discrimination.

6. The Conference notes the conclusion of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, and the Agreement on the Return of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects launched into Outer Space. The participating countries declare that the Outer Space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. They deplore the fact that, despite repeated directives of the UN General Assembly, the Convention on the liability for damage caused by objects launched into outer space has not been finalised so far, and call upon all States, in particular the Space powers, to cooperate in facilitating agreement in this connection.

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*/ A/SPC/L.181.
INTRODUCTION

The present comprehensive programme of disarmament has been elaborated in compliance with the request made by the General Assembly in resolution 2602 E (XXIV) approved on 16 December 1969, by which it declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade.

In the light of the contents of that resolution it would seem fully justified to state that the request of the General Assembly implies that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should embrace not only the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but all negotiations and other acts on this matter, in whatever forum and form they may take place, and that the programme should include effective procedures in order to facilitate the co-ordination of such activities and ensure that the United Nations General Assembly be kept informed on their progress so as to permit it the proper performance of its functions, including the constant evaluation of the situation.

It seems advisable to point out that the term "disarmament" is used here in the same manner as it has been in the various forums of the United Nations, that is, as a generic term which encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, the limitation, the reduction or the elimination of armaments, or the reduction of military forces.

I. OBJECTIVE

The aim of the comprehensive programme is to achieve tangible progress in order that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control may become a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and economic and social progress are attained.

II. PRINCIPLES

1. The measures in the comprehensive programme should be carried out in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament
Negotiations of September 1961; taking into account the obligations undertaken in various treaties on disarmament and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and all new elements and possibilities in this area.

2. The highest priority should be given to disarmament measures dealing with nuclear and chemical and biological weapons.

3. The problem of general and complete disarmament should be given intensive treatment, parallel to the negotiations of partial disarmament measures, including measures to prevent and limit armaments and measures to reduce armaments, in order to facilitate further clarification of positions and possibilities, including the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America respectively, or the submission of new proposals.

4. The principle of balanced disarmament should be kept in mind. It concerns both a numerical decrease of men in arms and types of arms to prefixed levels, and packages of disarmament measures by which an over-all balance is achieved that is judged by all parties to be satisfactory in the light of their own security. Particular efforts will have to be undertaken by militarily important Powers in order to reduce the gap that exists between them and other countries. It is understood that the final solution of the limitation and reduction of conventional armaments can only be obtained within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

5. Verification methods form an indispensable part of disarmament measures. When elaborating such methods it must be recognized that a 100 per cent certainty can never be obtained by any such system. A single method of control is rarely sufficient. As a rule, a combination of several methods should be employed, mutually reinforcing one another in order to achieve the necessary assurances that a certain disarmament measure is being observed by all parties.

6. The comprehensive programme is correlated with other United Nations programmes for peace-keeping and international security. Progress in the former should not, however, be made dependent on progress in the latter and vice versa.

7. The necessity should be kept in mind of avoiding, when concluding disarmament agreements, any adverse effects on the scientific, technological or economic future of nations.
8. A substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

9. In disarmament agreements every effort should be made not to prejudge or prejudice juridical or other unresolved issues in any outside field.

10. Concerted efforts should be made to associate militarily significant States, in particular all nuclear-weapon Powers, with the negotiations for disarmament.

11. The United Nations, which has specific responsibility for disarmament under the Charter, should be kept informed of all efforts thereon, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral.

12. Public opinion should be given adequate information about armament and disarmament, so that it might bring its influence to bear on the strengthening of disarmament efforts.

III. ELEMENTS AND PHASES OF THE PROGRAMME

A. Disarmament treaties in force or in preparation

1. The results achieved so far in the disarmament field and the agreements anticipated for the immediate future consist of partial or collateral measures, facilitating and forming part of the final aim of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such results consist mainly of the following treaties:

   (a) The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925;

   (b) The Antarctic Treaty of 1959;

   (c) The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of 1963;

   (d) The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 1967;

   (e) The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and its two additional Protocols of 1967;

   (f) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968.
Particular attention should be paid to the fulfilment of the obligations arising from these treaties, to the review conference provided for in some of them, and, when that is the case, to the adoption of measures intended to complete them.

2. Efforts and negotiations to reach agreement at an early stage of the Disarmament Decade on treaties and conventions whose contents have been for some time under consideration by the General Assembly, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other competent international forums should be urgently intensified. This work has included consideration of:
   (a) The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of such weapons;
   (b) Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof; and
   (c) The ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests.

B. Other measures of disarmament

1. Prevention and limitation of armaments

The possibilities of giving effect as soon as possible to the measures specified below should be the object of persistent scrutiny and negotiation.

(a) Nuclear weapons
   (i) A moratorium or, cessation of testing and deploying new strategic nuclear-weapon systems;
   (ii) The cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes and the transfer of existing stocks to civilian uses;
   (iii) A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons;
   (iv) The conclusion of regional agreements for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon free-zones;
   (v) A solution of the problem concerning the prohibition of the use of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons.
(b) Conventional armaments and armed forces

(i) Further prohibitions of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof;
(ii) The establishment of ceilings on the level and types of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces;
(iii) Restrictions on the creation of foreign military bases and the stationing of troops and military equipment in foreign territories;
(iv) Convening of regional conferences at the initiative of the States of the region for the prevention and limitation of armaments.

2. Reduction of all armaments, armed forces and military expenditures

At the appropriate stage in the disarmament negotiations, ways and means of carrying out the following measures should be thoroughly explored and actively negotiated:

(a) Gradual reductions in nuclear armaments;
(b) Gradual reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces;
(c) The conclusion of regional non-aggression, security and disarmament treaties at the initiative of the States concerned;
(d) Gradual withdrawal of troops and bases from foreign territories;
(e) Reduction in military expenditures.

3. Elimination of armaments

In accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 1961, the final stage of the comprehensive programme should be the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, providing for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to levels required for the maintenance of internal order and for international peace-keeping.

IV. PEACE-KEEPING AND SECURITY

1. It is recognized that there is a close interrelationship among disarmament, international security, the peaceful settlement of disputes and a climate of confidence.
2. During the period of the negotiations for the disarmament measures listed above, there should be parallel negotiations in the appropriate forums for the establishment or development of United Nations peace-making and peace-keeping machinery and procedures in order to increase and ensure the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. Agreement on such measures will facilitate the success of disarmament efforts, just as the adoption of disarmament measures will create favourable conditions for the strengthening of international security. Nevertheless, as has already been pointed out above, progress in one of these categories of measures should not be made dependent on progress in the other, and vice versa.

V. PROCEDURE

1. The General Assembly should consider annually the progress made in the implementation of the comprehensive programme. Every three years, the General Assembly should review the comprehensive programme and revise it as warranted. This will entail an evaluation of the over-all situation in the field of disarmament and a comparison between the development in regard to armaments and disarmament. The United Nations Disarmament Commission might be reactivated and entrusted with a part of this task.

2. The practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of expert consultants, authoritative studies on concrete questions relating to the arms race and disarmament should be continued.

3. The advisability of carrying out studies by qualified groups of experts on specific problems of disarmament, which warrant it, should be carefully explored in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

4. There should be more conferences and scientific exchanges among scientists and experts from various countries on the problem of the arms race and disarmament.

5. Universities and academic institutes should be encouraged to establish continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race, military expenditures and disarmament.

6. The increased exchanges and publications of relevant information and data should lead to greater openness, to the establishment of greater confidence among States and increased knowledge and interest in these matters among the public.

7. The feasibility of convening, in due time and after appropriate preparatory work, a world disarmament conference of all States should be thoroughly studied.
10. Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament, Questions relating to disarmament, Final Act adopted at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1 August 1975, Helsinki

II

Questions relating to disarmament

The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

...
11. Political declaration (Chapter XVII), adopted at the
Fifth Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Colombo, 16-19 August 1976*

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XVII. DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY

135. The Conference expressed its conviction that universal peace and security can be assured only by general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, under effective international control and that essential measures to that end should include the complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests pending, the conclusion of a test ban treaty, an unequivocal renunciation of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and the elimination of arsenals of all such weapons.

136. The Conference declared that the arms race is inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving the New International Economic Order in view of the urgent need to divert the resources utilised for the acceleration of the arms race towards socio-economic development, particularly of the developing countries.

137. The Conference urged all states to accelerate negotiations, with a view to securing, as rapidly as possible and within the context of the Diplomatic Conference which will hold a meeting in Geneva next year, the prohibition of certain conventional weapons of an indiscriminate or cruel nature, particularly the prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons.

138. The Conference reiterated the urgent need to adopt effective measures leading to the convening of a World Disarmament Conference.

139. The Conference also recommended in the meantime, that Members of the Non-Aligned movement request the holding of a Special Session of the General Assembly as early as possible and not later than 1978. The Agenda of the Special Session should include:

a. a review of the problem of disarmament,

b. the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament,

c. the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference.

140. The Conference emphasized the necessity to strengthen international peace and security and ratified their firm decision to reinforce solidarity and mutual assistance among the Non-Aligned Countries in order to confront more effectively threats, pressures, aggressions and other political or economic actions directed against them by imperialism.

141. In this sense, the Conference recalled that Resolution No. 3 concerning economic security and collective action adopted at the 4th Summit Conference in Algiers remains fully in force, as do the measures indicated in the strategy of the Lima Programme, whose aim is to guarantee full exercise of their sovereignty and independent development processes particularly in the case of aggressions, pressures or coercion.

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*/ A/31/197, 8 September 1976.
12. Memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union */

Under the new historic conditions in which international détente is making itself felt to an ever-greater degree and people everywhere entertain increasing hopes for the establishment of lasting peace, the Soviet Union, guided by the foreign policy programme of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, renews its appeal to all States Members of the United Nations, to all the States of the world, to redouble their efforts towards solving the problem which is greatest in scope and significance in contemporary relations among States - the problem of ending the arms race and disarmament.

No task confronting mankind today is more urgent. "Today, this objective is more vital than ever", declared L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. "Mankind is tired of sitting upon mountains of arms, yet the arms race, spurred on by aggressive imperialist circles, is becoming more intensive."

An arms race in the nuclear age is fraught with a far more serious threat to the life of the peoples than at any time in the past. Modern weapons are thousands of times more powerful than any of those used in wars of earlier periods. The destruction of Hiroshima - the first victim of the use of nuclear weapons - lives in the memory of the peoples as a horrible tragedy. But nowadays States possess such types of these weapons and possess them in such quantities that hundreds, and even thousands, of cities like Hiroshima could be destroyed. One modern nuclear warhead has a destructive power exceeding that of all explosives used by States in the Second World War. Yet weapons of mass destruction continue to develop, absorbing the latest achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, and they are ever growing in quantity.

It is an utterly false concept which justifies the arms race by alleging that the "balance of fear" is indeed a safeguard for peace. An official report by United Nations experts, world famous scholars, admits with full justice that each new step in the development of weapons of mass destruction entails a new and still more ominous degree of uncertainty and increased danger. The arms race provides security for no one.

Another thing is also obvious. If the arms race is not stopped, it will inevitably set up a barrier to the strengthening of political détente in relations between States. This is why an increasing number of States recognize the need for supplementing political détente with efforts towards reducing military confrontation and facilitating disarmament. The States that participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe unanimously came out in favour of such a policy.

The arms race is inconsistent with the interests and the will of the peoples. Only the militarists and the military-industrial complex stand to gain from it. The arms race consumes the vital resources of countries and deprives the peoples of a considerable and ever-growing proportion of the wealth created by their labour.

*/ A/31/232, 28 September 1976. Letter dated 28 September 1976 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General under the General Assembly item entitled "General and Complete Disarmament".
According to United Nations data, the world as a whole now spends about $300 billion a year on armaments, i.e., $1 million every two minutes. This considerably exceeds the entire national income of the developing countries of Asia and Africa. In the modern world, it costs on the average 60 times less to educate a child for creative endeavour than to teach a soldier the ABC's of destruction. And more and more States are being drawn into the arms race.

The continuance of the arms race hampers the solution of such urgent problems common to all mankind as the development of essentially new sources of energy, extensive exploration and use of the oceans and outer space, prevention of disastrous changes in the environment, and the eradication of disease, hunger and cultural backwardness. For all this to be done, enormous investments are needed, and it is impossible to mobilize sufficient resources without putting an end to the competition in armaments.

Thus, the problem confronting mankind today is as follows: either the arms race will be stopped and States will embark on disarmament, reducing step by step the threat of military conflict and releasing more and more material and intellectual resources for the purposes of economic and social development, or the gigantic war-preparations machine will consume an ever-greater amount of resources vitally needed by people, while the shadow of the catastrophe of war will loom larger and larger over all nations.

For any State desirous of safeguarding the security of its people and of creating the most favourable opportunities for their advancement along the road of progress, for any politician conscious of his responsibility for world developments, and for any sensible person, there can only be one alternative: to do everything that can be done to bring about disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. This is not a simple task, for in working out any measure in the field of disarmament, States have to take decisions on matters having a direct bearing on their national security and must carefully weigh the various political, strategic, technological and military factors. However, it is well known that the failure to put an end to the arms race is not due to these difficulties.

The main obstacle is the resistance of the forces of imperialism. This obstacle finds its principal support in monopolistic quarters for which the arms race brings in thousands of millions of dollars in profits. Another obstacle is the cold-war policy of political parties and groups which will not abandon their foolhardy designs to resolve the historical confrontation of the two social systems by force. Also desirous of impeding the resolution of disarmament problems are those who cynically assert that mankind's future can most easily be built on radioactive ruins, who, in pursuit of the narrow objectives of their great-Power policy, which are alien to the interests of the peoples, are ready to doom even their own people to mass annihilation in another world war.

These forces would not stop at any means of deception in the attempt to complicate the question of the cessation of the arms race and to hamper the struggle of the peoples for disarmament. These include shameless slander directed at the policies of States advocating disarmament, and specious reasoning about the lust for power inherent in man and about human rights and fundamental freedoms, with the aim of covering up the most inhuman and brutal activity of all - the manufacture of weapons for the annihilation of people.
However, there is not, nor can there be, any doubt about the real possibility of overcoming the opposition of the opponents of disarmament. In these, our times, the alignment of forces in international politics is not at all in their favour. The socialist States, whose social and political character rules out any kind of interest in war and armaments, are resolutely and persistently striving to bring about the cessation of the arms race. The non-aligned movement is also in favour of disarmament. Statesmen and politicians of widely differing countries throughout the world are becoming more keenly aware of the fact that in the nuclear age a military conflict is fraught with exceedingly grave consequences and that the interests of security demand the curbing of the arms race and not its further intensification. The voice of public opinion is becoming louder and more confident in demanding the early adoption of effective measures to this end.

The possibility of solving the disarmament problem has been convincingly demonstrated by the fact that in recent years certain steps of this kind have indeed been taken. Although these are but first steps and are limited in scope, they are of great importance.

These are the Soviet-United States agreements for preventing nuclear war and reducing the risk of its accidental outbreak and for the limitation of strategic arms, as well as the agreement between the Soviet Union and France on the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

These are the measures for limiting the nuclear arms race, including the treaties on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests; on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space, on celestial bodies, on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Talks are now in progress on a long-term Soviet-United States agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and the successful completion of these talks would be a major new contribution to the consolidation of international peace and security.

These are also the international convention on the prohibition of the development and production and the destruction of stockpiles of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, which is already in force, and the convention on the prohibition of military and any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, the discussions on which are nearing completion.

And, finally, these are the efforts being made to ease military confrontation in different parts of the world. Of special importance in this connexion are, unquestionably, the negotiations now going on regarding the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the area where the most powerful groups of NATO and Warsaw Treaty armed forces are concentrated. Having recently advanced new proposals aimed at moving these negotiations forward, the participating socialist countries are now expecting reciprocal steps from their counterparts.
The Soviet Union's proposal for the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations is now getting broad support. The purpose of this initiative is, through the joint effort of States, to make the principle of the non-use of force embodied in the United Nations Charter an integral part of the practical policies of States and an effective rule of international life. The use of both nuclear and conventional weapons should be completely excluded from relations between States.

Thus, at the present time new prerequisites, both political and material, for more resolute progress towards ending the arms race and towards disarmament are now taking shape. In the past, including the years preceding the Second World War and the first post-war decades, such prerequisites did not exist. They do exist now. It is the duty of all States to make the utmost use of them in the interests of international peace and security and in the interest of the peoples.

The Soviet Union is prepared, as it has been in the past, to conduct negotiations on the most radical disarmament measures, going even so far as general and complete disarmament. It is prepared, in concert with its Warsaw Treaty allies, to take steps for the reciprocal dismantling of counterbalancing military-political groupings of States or, to begin with, of their military organizations. If not all parties are prepared to set about realizing these objectives at once, they should do so gradually, step by step. What is most important is to move on from discussions on ending the arms race to practical action.

An analysis of the present world political and strategic situation, of the trends and prospects for the future and of the material and technological factors determining the nature and form of the arms race leads to the conclusion that under present conditions the main areas for co-ordinated action by States in the field of disarmament are the following.

1. **Cessation of the nuclear arms race, reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons**

In a situation in which nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind, complete nuclear disarmament becomes the most important measure.

The Soviet Union has always favoured the banning of nuclear weapons and their exclusion from the arsenals of States. It worked for this when nuclear weapons had just appeared. At that time the stockpiles of such weapons were not large and it was relatively easier to agree on their prohibition and elimination. Now that nuclear weapons have grown into a huge complex of types and systems of means of destruction, diverse in purpose, capacity and ways of delivering nuclear charges to the target, the problem of eliminating them has become much more difficult. But it can be solved in the present situation as well.
The first thing necessary for this purpose is to stop the arms race, that is, to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons, equipping the armed forces of States with them, developing and constructing new models and types of such weapons. At the same time, or immediately after that, reductions in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons should commence, with the transfer of nuclear materials thus released to peaceful sectors of the economy. The ultimate goal of the reduction should be the complete elimination of all types of nuclear weapons - strategic and tactical, offensive and defensive. Along with the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear charges, warheads and bombs, there should be a reduction of their means of delivery.

Naturally, simultaneously with nuclear disarmament, measures should be taken for the limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and armaments of conventional types, which also pose a considerable threat to the world's peoples.

It is evident that nuclear disarmament can be achieved only if all States possessing nuclear weapons take part in it. It is inconceivable that some nuclear Powers should be moving ahead towards eliminating their nuclear weapons while others are stockpiling and perfecting them. Therefore all nuclear Powers should participate in nuclear disarmament negotiations. As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared, as has been already stated by the Soviet side, to sit down at any time at the negotiating table together with all the other nuclear Powers for a comprehensive discussion of the nuclear disarmament problem in its full scope and for a joint elaboration of concrete ways of its practical solution. The Soviet Union has no objection to non-nuclear Powers also taking part in such negotiations, since all countries and all the peoples of the world are interested in nuclear disarmament.

2. Prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests

An important issue, on the solution of which the cessation of the arms race largely depends, is the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. This problem should be tackled without waiting for the outcome of negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament.

The prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons will put an end to their qualitative improvement and prevent the emergence of new types of such weapons. The Moscow Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of underground tests have only partially solved this problem. Furthermore, two nuclear Powers out of five have not acceded to the Moscow Treaty, and one of them, China, still continues to carry out nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere.
The time has now come to bring the task of stopping nuclear-weapon tests to a conclusion. Conditions are quite ripe for that, in particular as a result of the signing between the USSR and the United States of a treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, establishing such a procedure for carrying out peaceful explosions as will preclude their use for perfecting nuclear weapons.

As is known, in 1975 the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, that is, a treaty prohibiting the conduct of nuclear test explosions in all environments and by all States. The draft of such a treaty was submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations at that time, and a year has already passed since the General Assembly declared itself in favour of holding concrete negotiations to reach agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. However, owing to the negative stand taken by some nuclear Powers, such negotiations have not started. It is necessary to begin them promptly.

It is a known fact that the question of stopping underground nuclear tests was complicated by certain States which artificially exaggerated the problem of supervision. It was persistently alleged, in particular, that it was impossible without on-site inspections to tell natural seismic phenomena (earthquakes) from similar phenomena caused by underground nuclear explosions, and that therefore, it was impossible to verify whether States were complying with their obligations with regard to the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. Most experts never accepted that view, believing that national technical means and the international exchange of seismic data were sufficient to verify compliance with a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. With the development of technology for detecting and identifying seismic phenomena, this view now enjoys practically unanimous support among scientists. However, even now some States suggest providing for the possibility of on-site inspection of actual circumstances if there is doubt as to compliance with obligations to stop underground nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union is convinced that no particular difficulties should arise in elaborating such a compromise basis for an agreement as would ensure a voluntary framework for taking decisions relating to on-site ascertaining of relevant circumstances and, at the same time, impart confidence to all parties to the treaty that the obligations are complied with. The Soviet Union stands ready to participate in a search for a universally acceptable understanding on this basis.
3. **Consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

It is quite clear that the threat of nuclear war would immeasurably increase if other States which at present do not possess nuclear weapons were to become involved in the process of developing and stockpiling such weapons. It is not difficult to imagine the consequences that would be brought about by the development of a situation in which the arsenals of parties in conflict in one region or another included nuclear weapons as well.

Hence the effective prevention of a further spread of nuclear weapons is essential. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which about 100 States have become parties, has achieved a great deal in this regard. The obligation to renounce the proliferation of nuclear weapons is now a rule of international law.

It must, however, be taken into account that not all nuclear Powers have yet become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Some non-nuclear States which are capable, in view of their industrial and technological level, of developing nuclear weapons of their own are also refusing to become parties to it. It is important, therefore, to make the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons genuinely universal. The Soviet Union supports all the decisions adopted in this respect by the United Nations.

In the interests of consolidating the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons it is also necessary to take actions of another kind. It is well known that in the process of their operation nuclear power plants produce and accumulate as a "by-product" a fissionable material - plutonium - which can be used for manufacturing nuclear weapons. With the development of international trade in nuclear materials, equipment and technology, possibilities of this kind will increase, including those of the States which have not assumed obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is obvious that the States which supply nuclear materials, equipment and technology bear special responsibility in this connexion. Strict safeguards are needed to prevent international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy from becoming a channel for spreading nuclear weapons. This is not a question of commerce but a question of policy, a question of international security.

The Soviet Union is also firmly in favour of perfecting in every possible way the system of supervision over nuclear installations and materials that is exercised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is ready to co-operate with all interested States to this end.
4. Prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons

Following the conclusion of the convention banning bacteriological weapons, the task of completely prohibiting and eliminating another dangerous category of weapons of mass destruction - chemical weapons - has become especially pressing. The use of such weapons as far back as the years of the First World War caused grave suffering and mass deaths. Since that time, however, chemical warfare technology has made great strides. New types of chemical weapons threatening people with still more agonizing death have been developed. Radical improvements have also been made in the means of delivery of chemical weapons, which can now be used not only in combat areas, that is, against the armed forces of the other side, but also against the civilian population in vital centres of States.

The Soviet Union, together with many other countries, has long proposed that agreement should be reached on the prohibition and elimination of all chemical means of warfare. This problem should be solved radically and by a single action, as was the case with bacteriological weapons. However, the negotiations on this subject, which have already been going on for several years, still fail to offer prospects of such a comprehensive solution. A question that arises in this connexion concerns the possibility of starting with agreement on the prohibition and elimination of the most dangerous, lethal types of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to seek such a solution as well. A substantial contribution to this end could be the implementation of the Soviet-United States accord on a joint initiative to conclude a convention on the most dangerous, lethal chemical means of warfare.

Supervision of compliance with the prohibition of chemical weapons should be based on national means. In this respect there exists a positive precedent in the convention banning bacteriological weapons. At the same time, the Soviet Union is ready to examine the possibility of using additional supervision procedures and, in particular, to discuss methods of verifying the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons which are to be excluded from the arsenals of States.

There is not, and there cannot be, any reason for delay on the question of banning chemical weapons. What is needed is a demonstration of the political will and desire to reach generally acceptable agreement.

5. Prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction

Scientific and technological progress poses the pressing problem of preventing the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. New types of weapons may appear even in the foreseeable future and may become commensurate in destructive capability with nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons, or even surpass them.

At present there are no limitations whatsoever on the use of science for such purposes. This means that the most unexpected developments, whose consequences cannot be foreseen, may occur at any time. The danger is great, and it is necessary to find means to avert it.
It was precisely these considerations that guided the Soviet Union when it proposed in 1975 the conclusion of an international agreement which would prevent the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. As is known, negotiations in this matter are already under way, which is a positive factor. In the course of the negotiations it has become desirable to specify the object of the prohibition, that is, define new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union is ready to propose an approach which would include among new types of weapons of mass destruction any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action - according to the method of use and the targets to be attacked or the nature of their impact. Some examples are ray weapons capable of affecting blood and intracellular plasma, infrasound weapons designed to damage internal organs and affect human behaviour, or genetic weapons whose use would affect the mechanism of heredity. If we take into account the fact that the forward march of science never stops, it is not difficult to realize that possibilities for the development of even more dangerous types of weapons may emerge in the future.

New systems of weapons of mass destruction should not be developed either for new types of such weapons or for those types of weapons which are based on scientific principles already in use but whose characteristics can be made even more dangerous by introducing new technical elements of combat or support means. In this context, aero-space systems of nuclear weapons using transport space ships as a basis may serve as an example.

The question of the prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction is an important and timely one; it embraces an essential aspect of the whole problem of disarmament and prevention of war. Negotiations on this question should be given top priority.

6. Reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

Nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction unquestionably pose the greatest threat to mankind. But can anyone forget how many millions of human lives have been lost as a result of the use of so-called conventional armaments? Even in the period since the Second World War the destructive power of these weapons has increased manyfold. A modern tank is a weapon many times more deadly than a tank of the 1940s. The same is true of artillery, small arms and, of course, aircraft.

The military conflicts which have taken place in various parts of the world in recent years have shown the tragic consequences for people of the use of new models of conventional weapons and the vast destruction of material values which they cause.
Thus, past experience confronts States with the task of taking practical measures to reduce the number of aircraft, artillery, tanks and other modern types of conventional armaments as well as armed forces equipped with those weapons. Since the Second World War, the Soviet Union has repeatedly made concrete proposals in this regard. It has cited specific figures for ceilings on the strength of the armed forces of major States and has expressed willingness to conduct negotiations on the matter both within the framework of a programme of general complete disarmament and as a separate measure covering major States. These proposals have not been accepted. Even now, however, the Soviet Union is prepared to conduct negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments. Given a desire for this on the part of all States possessing powerful armed forces, such negotiations could lead to positive results and to constructive agreements.

Similarly, the Soviet Union considers it desirable that new efforts should be made at the international level to bring about the elimination of all military bases in foreign territory and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territory. The United Nations has, in many of its forums, expressed itself in very definite terms in favour of a solution to this problem both on a global scale and in relation to individual continents. However, no progress has been made in this regard—a fact which cannot but cause concern. The Soviet Union is, as before, prepared to co-operate actively and constructively in solving this problem.

7. Zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions

In recent years, States in various parts of the world have been ever more insistent in raising the question of carrying out regional measures of military détente and have particularly stressed that Powers which do not belong to a given region should not build up their armed forces or establish military bases there.

Thus, the coastal States of the Indian Ocean are expressing concern at the fact that some States which are geographically very remote from the region are expanding their military bases there and increasing their military presence. Regarding such actions as a threat to their independence and security, these countries are putting forward the idea of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union regards this proposal with understanding.

Obviously, the key question here is to ensure that there are no foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean, that bases which have been established there are dismantled and that no new bases are established. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it never has and does not now intend to build military bases in the Indian Ocean.

In resolving the question of foreign military bases along these lines, the Soviet Union would be prepared to join with other Powers in seeking ways to reduce on a reciprocal basis the military activities of non-coastal States in the Indian Ocean and in the regions directly adjacent to it. Naturally, measures of this kind must take fully into account the generally recognized rules of international
law regarding freedom of navigation on the high seas and the need for commercial stops at the ports of coastal States as well as for research. This question is of great importance to the Soviet Union, since virtually the only sea route navigable all the year round which links the European part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East passes through the Indian Ocean.

The coastal States of the Indian Ocean are in favour of holding an international conference to discuss practical measures for transforming the region into a zone of peace. The Soviet Union would be prepared to consider the question of its attitude towards the convening of such a conference in the light of the considerations set out above.

The Mediterranean is another region where military tensions, particularly in connexion with the Middle East conflict, have at times reached dangerous proportions. With a view to reducing these tensions, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States some time ago that an agreement should be reached on the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of Soviet and United States ships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons. This proposal still holds good, and it is in the interests of all States whose security in one way or another depends on the situation in the Mediterranean to work for its implementation.

The problem of military détente has great immediacy for the Middle East. The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed itself in favour of halting the arms race in the Middle East within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

In various parts of the world, interested States are putting forward proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones. That reflects their desire for effective limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and for a lessening of the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union supports such proposals. It is prepared to co-operate in their implementation, having regard, of course, to what is possible in any given region where it is proposed to establish a denuclearized zone. It is important that such zones should actually be free of nuclear weapons and that the relevant agreements should contain no loop-holes and should be fully consistent with the generally recognized rules of international law.

8. **Reduction of military budgets**

One promising approach to halting the arms race and to disarmament is the reduction of the military budgets of States. The resources thus released could be utilized for the economic and social progress of peoples and for accelerating the rate of economic growth, ensuring employment, developing new sources of energy, solving the food problem, combating disease and building new schools and universities.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward proposals for reducing military budgets and has, by its actions, set an example in that regard. Several years ago,
it proposed that agreement should be reached on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. This proposal was approved by the United Nations General Assembly, but so far it has not been implemented because of opposition by those States which are stubbornly pursuing a policy of increasing military expenditure.

The Soviet Union is prepared to take a flexible position regarding the specific figure with which a reduction of military budgets would begin. A figure greater or smaller than 10 per cent could be agreed upon as a first step for 1977. What is important, however, is that this question should as soon as possible become the subject of businesslike negotiations between the States concerned. The present steady growth of military expenditure by many States can and must give way to the practice of systematically reducing that expenditure.

9. Negotiations on halting the arms race and on disarmament are being conducted in various forms: on a bilateral basis, particularly where States with the greatest military and war industry potential are concerned; within particular groups of States directly concerned, including negotiations at the regional level; in special bodies set up to discuss the disarmament problem as a whole or individual aspects of it and composed of States representing the major political groupings and geographical areas of the present-day world. Each year, questions relating to disarmament are given a prominent place in the work of the United Nations General Assembly.

On the whole, these various types of negotiations and discussions have proved their usefulness. They will unquestionably be used in the future as well. At the same time, the achievement of radical changes in dealing with the problem of disarmament, which affects the interests of all States without exception, requires consideration of it in the broadest and most authoritative possible international forum.

Such a forum must, first of all, be truly universal, and all States must be represented in it; secondly, it must provide an opportunity for examining the whole range of disarmament questions with the necessary expertise, with due regard for all circumstances and in the necessary detail; thirdly, it must be given the power to take effective decisions.

These prerequisites would be met by convening a World Disarmament Conference, and the Soviet Union continues to believe that such a conference should be held.

A special session of the United Nations General Assembly could also be an appropriate forum for discussing disarmament questions in all their scope, for deciding through joint efforts on the ways and means of resolving them and for working out a long-term programme of practical measures. In order to ensure that its results amount to something more than decisions containing general provisions in favour of disarmament of the kind with which the archives of the United Nations are already overflowing, such a special session of the General Assembly and the manner in which it is organized must not be routine in nature. It should be a very
particular kind of session. It should be prepared, organized and held in such a way as to ensure a break-through in solving the problems of disarmament. All its work should fully reflect the high responsibility of all States in the world and, in particular, of the major Powers which possess the most powerful armaments and armed forces.

The holding of a special session of the General Assembly should not, of course, push aside the question of a World Disarmament Conference.

The Soviet Union conceives of the convening of such a session as an interim stage which should, by its decisions, prepare the way for a broad and far-reaching review of the problem of disarmament at the World Conference. The session should not be burdened with strict time limitations or with the procedure normally followed at General Assembly sessions, including special sessions.

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Those are the views which the Soviet Union deems it necessary to bring to the attention of all States Members of the United Nations and of all States in the world. The Soviet Union hopes that these views, which are inspired by concern for peace and the security of peoples, by a desire to further mankind's advance along the path towards halting the arms race and towards disarmament, will be carefully considered by all States and will be helpful in achieving practical results in dealing with this historic task that faces mankind.