PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE THIRD SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Third session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 16th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 27 January 1988, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

STATEMENTS BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE AND DISARMAMENT RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN said that further statements would now be heard from representatives of non-governmental organizations concerned with disarmament and from representatives of peace and disarmament research institutions.

2. In accordance with a decision of the Preparatory Committee, as subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly at its forty-second session, the Secretariat would be issuing a list of communications received from non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions.

3. Ms. PINEAU (World Association for World Federation) said that the gloomy forecasts regarding the third special session were particularly regrettable, because in one vital area, the strengthening of international legal and security institutions, there might be unprecedented chances for a breakthrough. Referring to the Final Document of the first special session, and paragraphs 110 and 54 in particular, she lamented the lack of progress in that area, which might partially explain why there had been so little progress in disarmament as a whole.

4. The World Association for World Federation recommended that the Preparatory Committee should take the necessary procedural measures to ensure that special attention was devoted to the strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations in disarmament, conflict-resolution and peace-keeping. The subject could be dealt with under item 13 of the provisional agenda for the third special session, and referred to a working group. Discussion should, however, focus on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations, rather than its role. "Capacity" had been the term used by Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev at their December summit.

5. The final document of the third special session should call for the convening of a conference to negotiate the establishment of a new United Nations security system and a stronger international legal order. Such a conference could be convened in the 1990s and, like the Conference on the Law of the Sea, should continue to meet until it produced the treaties establishing a reliable international security system which all nations could trust to protect them from aggression. Such a system would include the following elements: recognition by all States of the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; improvements in United Nations peace-keeping forces as recommended by the Palme Commission's report on common security; and the establishment of a United Nations verification and monitoring organization, which would have an on-site inspection and international satellite-monitoring capability.

6. Nations would not finally disarm until they were convinced that they no longer needed weapons in order to defend their legitimate rights. An alternative had to be found to a system which based national security on weapons. Such an alternative was envisaged in the Charter, which referred to international security based on mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement of disputes. Judicial
settlement of disputes called for a reliable means of law-enforcement, and the alternative as a whole called for a vastly improved United Nations system. The institutions of international security which were essential for a disarmed world would not come into being automatically as weapons were eliminated. Separate negotiations were needed on such institutions, and those negotiations could not wait until after disarmament. As the 1978 Final Document had stated, they must begin immediately, in parallel with disarmament negotiations.

7. Ms. Ulatowska (World Citizens' Assembly) stressed the need for co-operation, which would be crucial for the success of the third special session. In the light of the failure of the second special session, it was important to consider not only which issues would be discussed, but also how they would be discussed, so as to avoid sowing the seeds of conflict and create a climate in which genuine problem-solving could take place. It was also important to think and act in a spirit of co-operation; give serious consideration to all points of view; and seek genuine consensus. Any consensus already reached should remain intact, including the Final Document of the first special session.

8. The preamble to the draft final document of the third special session should include the following sentence:

"Since Nations are interdependent, issues are interrelated and solutions must be sought multilaterally, co-operative thinking, concerted action and the search for genuine consensus are intrinsic to disarmament and a primary responsibility of every Government."

9. Mr. Gaboury (World Federation of Trade Unions) said that the third special session would provide a unique opportunity to carry the campaign for security through disarmament to a new level. There were many reasons for optimism: the historic Final Document of the first special session, which had stood the test of time and needed no revision; the steady progress on a host of disarmament measures over the past decade; the growing consensus in world public opinion on the threat of the arms race; and growing recognition of the close links between disarmament and development. In the international trade-union movement, there was a growing convergence of views on those matters. Trade-unionists were often - and rightly - called idealists. Some might say it was that idealism which had persuaded the Federation to embrace the concept of a nuclear-free world by the year 2000 - first put forward by the Soviet Union in 1986. Others might say it was that idealism which had led the Federation to welcome the INF Treaty. Although the Treaty mandated the destruction of only a tiny fraction of the world's nuclear stockpiles, the historical significance of that commitment must not be underestimated.

10. However, idealism did not preclude realism. It had been said that the choice for workers was between coexistence and no existence. Recognition of that reality had led the Federation to support the International Year of Peace. There could be no winners in an arms race. The international community must urgently establish a comprehensive system of international security, covering the military, political, economic and humanitarian aspects. Disarmament and development had been a theme repeatedly emphasized by the world trade-union movement. It had called for
measures to use the vast sums squandered on arms to finance economic and social
development. Trade-unionists would rather build houses and hospitals than make
coffins or body-bags. The Federation called for intensification of the World
Disarmament Campaign, and suggested that the Department for Disarmament Affairs
should seek new ways of involving the world labour movement actively in that
Campaign.

11. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and
Development had helped to build public support for concrete measures for reducing
military expenditures and using resources for economic and social development. The
INF Treaty had given further momentum to that process. The General Assembly, at
the third special session, could pave the way for a successful Moscow summit and
for a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons.

12. Trade unions agreed that the disarmament process should be taken to its
 logical conclusion: a moratorium on the development and testing of nuclear
weapons; a ban on chemical weapons; and renewed negotiations on reducing
conventional forces. The Federation was confident that the Committee would map out
the road for the accomplishment of those tasks.

13. Mr. JACKSON (World Peace Council) said that with the development of modern
weapons systems, global disarmament had become the most urgent imperative of the
day. There was no alternative.

14. The historic INF Treaty had raised the prospect of three major breakthroughs:
a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons; the prohibition of chemical
weapons; and the limitation of conventional weapons and armed forces. Each
milepost reached on the road to nuclear disarmament meant that additional
resources could be released for economic and social development. The World Peace
Council would do its utmost to support the goals of the third special session and
promote security through disarmament and development.

15. Mr. MANSON (Universal Esperanto Association) said that concerted international
action was needed now that the world's military budget exceeded $1 trillion a year;
three fifths of the world's population were living in poverty, with two fifths
unable to read or write; and 3,500 languages were in use for communication. The
human species had become an endangered one.

16. While some States justified the diversion of resources from development in the
name of security, no nation could afford to separate its people from development.
But more than money was involved in the disarmament-development connection. Basic
education and communication were vital for improving the quality of life. On the
question of communication policies, he said that face-to-face relations and the
sharing of thoughts and feelings through a common language had always been at the
core of the primary institutions of social life. While plurilingualism was an
attractive solution, probably the only realistic one in most countries, the
diffusion of one simple, universal tongue, comprehensible and accessible to all,
might also strengthen national cohesion.
CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES FOR INCORPORATION IN THE DOCUMENT OR DOCUMENTS TO BE ADOPTED AT THE SPECIAL SESSION (continued) (A/42/46)

17. Mr. FAHMY (Egypt) said that the General Assembly, at its third special session devoted to disarmament, should use the Final Document of the first special session as a point of departure. The range of issues to be considered could be grouped under general headings. Under the heading of nuclear weapons, consideration could be given to such questions as negotiations on nuclear disarmament, the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The areas where no progress had been made, as well as those where some success had been achieved, should be clearly defined. Further questions could be dealt with under the following headings: "Other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical weapons)", and "Conventional weapons and the reduction of armed forces". Dealing with the broad range of questions in that way would be more expedient. The emphasis to be given to them could be determined at a later date.

18. The same approach could be applied with respect to item 12 of the provisional agenda for the third special session. Consideration should be given, in that regard, to the continuing development of new types of weapon systems and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. His delegation wished to ensure the success of the third special session, and was prepared to participate in whatever preparatory work was necessary. Nevertheless, any decision to continue the preparatory work should be taken solely on the basis of the degree of progress achieved at the current session of the Preparatory Committee. Although the General Assembly, at the third special session, should itself decide on its subsidiary bodies and the allocation of items, the Preparatory Committee should make recommendations in that regard in order to keep procedural discussion to a minimum at the third special session. Accordingly, the Preparatory Committee should reach agreement on procedural matters and the basic questions to be discussed, if possible, at its current session. Although his delegation agreed on the need for realism and for maintaining consensus, it did not feel that controversial issues should be avoided. In view of the need to give further impetus to the disarmament process, particularly at the multilateral level, a restrictive approach was inappropriate.

19. Mr. JAYASINGHE (Sri Lanka) said that the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace sought to eliminate tension in the Indian Ocean generated by great-Power military confrontation. At the first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly had noted the importance of establishing zones of peace and the contribution such zones could make to strengthening the security of States within the zones and to international peace and security as a whole. At the second special session, the Assembly had further stated that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was of the utmost importance, and that steps should be taken to facilitate preparations for the convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo. Significant progress towards that end had been made by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. General Assembly resolution 42/43 called for the convening of the Conference by 1990.
(Mr. Jayasinghe, Sri Lanka)

20. There was an inseparable link between the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and general and complete disarmament. Accordingly, his delegation proposed that the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace should be included in the list of items for consideration by the General Assembly at the third special session, with a view to the formulation of specific recommendations on the convening of the Colombo Conference and the establishment of the zone of peace.

21. Mr. LAWSON (Togo) said that under item 14 (b) of the provisional agenda for the third special session, consideration should be given to the relationship between disarmament and development. The views expressed in the First Committee during the forty-second session of the General Assembly had demonstrated the heightened awareness of the dynamic relationship between disarmament and development, and the need to promote disarmament for development.

22. At the moment, while overall assistance provided to developing countries amounted to approximately $30 billion, the value of weapons exports from developed countries to developing countries was estimated at about $34 billion. Throughout the world, a total of $1,000 billion was spent annually on arms, 80 per cent of which was for conventional weapons. Furthermore, between 1975 and 1985, 40 per cent of all debts contracted by developing countries were attributable to weapons imports. The attention of the international community had been drawn to the crucial need to break the vicious circle of assistance, indebtedness and weapons expenditures.

23. The final document of the third special session should include precise recommendations on the need to disseminate information on the relationship between disarmament and development, and strengthen the international consensus on that question. It should also include specific measures for releasing and managing resources for development, and setting up a mechanism to evaluate and monitor the implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

24. International public opinion should be further informed about the efforts to promote disarmament for development. The international consensus on the relationship between disarmament and development should be strengthened by an in-depth consideration of that question in multilateral decision-making bodies and at disarmament negotiations. In that regard, close attention should be given to efforts to release resources and identify the advantages of that approach and obstacles in its way. The specific measures to be taken should be carefully considered by the multilateral disarmament bodies on the basis of the studies already carried out in that field. The success of the third special session would depend to a large degree on the common commitment to participate in a dialogue without ideological bias or political and strategic motives.
25. Mr. ALASANIYA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that questions relating to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, could not be fully resolved through bilateral negotiations alone. Multilateral disarmament efforts should be stepped up by making the greatest possible use of all international mechanisms for disarmament and searching for ways to bring about a non-nuclear world, with due regard for the interests of all States. At the third special session, the General Assembly should define specific ways to make greater use of the potential of the United Nations in that regard. The work carried out in that field by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament should be stepped up. His delegation also attached great importance to the role of the Secretary-General in promoting disarmament. In view of the overriding importance of nuclear disarmament, all multilateral forums, particularly the United Nations, should take part in discussing the entire range of issues concerning nuclear weapons.

26. The Organization should play a more active role in the process of nuclear disarmament. Greater use should be made of the potential of the Security Council in elaborating plans for creating a system to limit weapons. A special meeting of the Security Council, possibly at the Foreign Minister level, should be convened in order to discuss objectives in the field of nuclear disarmament. In addition to considering the questions of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, general guidelines to achieve that objective should be laid down and universal guarantees for eliminating nuclear weapons should be elaborated.

27. The United Nations had a particular responsibility with regard to the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The international community must continue to focus its attention on that question, and progress must be made with due account taken of the bilateral negotiations under way. In view of the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space, the Soviet Union had proposed the establishment of a world space organization, which, under the auspices of the United Nations, would monitor efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space and co-ordinate the peaceful uses of outer space. Further work was necessary in order to complete the draft convention on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons before the beginning of the third special session. Reducing the level of non-nuclear weapons was also a question which required concerted international effort.

28. It was gratifying to note that the Committee on Disarmament had made certain progress in discussing the expanding naval arms race. Agreement must be broadened in that area, and the search for mutually advantageous solutions should be expanded. In that connection, his country was not opposed to discussing confidence-building measures and the security of sea lanes as a first step towards negotiations.

29. The Soviet Union favoured strict verification in order to ensure unswerving compliance with agreements at all stages of disarmament. In that regard, he noted with satisfaction the calls for the creation of a universal verification mechanism within the framework of the United Nations. The Secretary-General had an important role to play in monitoring compliance with agreements to eliminate chemical
(Mr. Alasaniya, USSR)

weapons, and could investigate cases of the use of such weapons. There was increasing understanding of the fact that the arms race not only undermined security, but also impeded development. A constructive discussion of the relationship between disarmament and development and the adoption of practical measures in that regard at the third special session could strengthen the authority of the United Nations in promoting development through disarmament.

30. The General Assembly could entrust the Secretary-General with the task of submitting to it an annual report on the process of disarmament and the implementation of relevant resolutions, particularly those adopted on the basis of consensus. The Norwegian proposal to raise the level of political participation at meetings of the main United Nations bodies should be given further consideration. The Soviet Union supported the view that the Secretary-General should be given maximum support and assistance by all States, and also favoured the proposal put forward by the United Kingdom and other Western countries concerning the comprehensive consideration of disarmament resolutions and the need to reduce their number. Particular attention should be given to the proposal to ensure the implementation of resolutions, decisions and declarations adopted on the basis of consensus. In that connection, he stressed the need to implement the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

31. The Conference on Disarmament should conduct its work on a year-round basis with two or three recesses, and should become a universal forum for negotiations on disarmament. The Soviet Union had proposed a concrete programme for ensuring the effectiveness of negotiations and stepping up the search for solutions to the problems considered at the Conference. Questions relating to the reduction of nuclear weapons should be at the centre of its work.

32. Mr. BARKER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that the reduction of nuclear stockpiles should figure prominently on the list of elements under consideration. There had been encouraging developments in that area in recent months with regard to United States and Soviet land-based missile systems with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometres. His delegation had every hope that the process of agreed and verifiable destruction of nuclear-weapon systems that had been set in motion by the United States-Soviet agreement would continue and expand to cover other weapons systems as well. Moreover, in the field of chemical weapons, the Federal Republic of Germany was glad to note that the ongoing Geneva negotiations were approaching the ultimate goal of prohibition, elimination and destruction of such weapons. It was sure that the General Assembly would want to refer to that encouraging development at the special session. A third area of major importance was the reduction of conventional forces and armaments in the interest of arriving at conventional stability in a given region to ensure a secure, comprehensive and verifiable balance of forces at lower levels. As far as Europe was concerned, negotiations with exactly that goal in mind for the whole area from the Atlantic to the Urals were taking shape. However, a reduction in conventional military potentials was a requirement outside Europe as well.
33. He also wished to address the question of guidelines or overall considerations that were applicable to the specific disarmament efforts that he had just mentioned. Confidence-building was a key to any agreement on limitations or reductions. The 35 European and North American States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe had set a precedent by agreeing, at Stockholm in September 1986, on a whole range of binding measures concerning confidence-building and greater transparency. The implementation of the Stockholm agreement had led to greater openness and transparency in the military field, and hence to greater predictability. Since the Federal Republic of Germany believed that confidence-building in the military field was important and beneficial outside Europe as well, it had put a considerable amount of effort into drawing up, in the context of the Disarmament Commission, a catalogue of guidelines for confidence-building measures that could be applied on a global or regional scale. It hoped that that document could be finalized soon. It was confident that at the third special session, the General Assembly would have something to say about verification, which was a particular facet of confidence-building, keeping in mind that verification had to be geared specifically to whichever disarmament agreement it was going to accompany.

34. Another guideline that should figure prominently in the list of elements should deal with the security of States, as protected by the Charter of the United Nations. Disarmament was not an end in itself. Its importance was defined by the degree to which it contributed to the security of all parties concerned. Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the capability of States for military invasion was one goal that illustrated that point. That goal did not necessarily represent a disarmament measure in the strict sense of the word, but it unquestionably enhanced the security of the States concerned.

35. Mr. HU Xiaodi (China), referring to item 10 of the provisional agenda of the third special session, said that the principles set forth in the Final Document of the first special session remained highly relevant. At the third special session, the General Assembly should therefore reaffirm that Document's significance, while reflecting the new situation that had developed over the past 10 years. In the light of the new circumstances, the General Assembly should formulate new principles and objectives, where necessary. The principle that the States with the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals had a special responsibility for disarmament should be further elaborated in the final document of the third special session, on the basis of the Final Document of the first special session.

36. There had been encouraging progress in the field of disarmament since 1978, but much remained to be done, particularly with regard to the nuclear-arms race. The international community must seize the opportunity afforded by the third special session to consider the danger of an arms race in outer space.

37. With regard to item 10 (c) of the provisional agenda of the third special session, China noted that over the past three years, the number of resolutions adopted by the United Nations on arms limitation and disarmament had not increased, as it had earlier, but had in fact decreased somewhat. However, the number of
resolutions adopted by consensus had increased in that period. That was a trend that should be continued at the third special session, particularly where priority disarmament issues were concerned. With regard to item 10 (d), at the third special session the General Assembly should call upon participants in bilateral and regional negotiations periodically to inform multilateral organizations of the progress made in the negotiations in question.

38. Mr. OGRYSKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), referring to item 14 of the provisional agenda for the third special session, said that it was essential to inform world public opinion in a comprehensive and objective manner about the social and economic consequences of the arms race and the relationship between disarmament and development. Such information would promote openness, mutual understanding and trust among States.

39. Certain mass information media were still spreading ideas which ran counter to the goals of disarmament and international security, and impeded the establishment of a favourable psychological climate for peaceful relations among States. In that connection, his delegation felt that the Committee on Information, the Department of Public Information and United Nations information centres, together with the Department for Disarmament Affairs, should step up their efforts to promote broad international support for the objectives of disarmament, development and security, by focusing on those questions in their work and conducting information activities and campaigns.

40. Agreement could be reached on a large number of practical measures, including a world information programme conducted under the auspices of the United Nations to promote international understanding. Information on steps taken by countries at the national and international levels to promote disarmament could be an important element of such a programme.

41. Information activities, including those carried out within the United Nations, should focus attention on such issues as the danger of nuclear war, the negative social and economic consequences of the arms race, and the advantages to be gained from halting the arms race, reducing military budgets and using the resources thus released for development purposes.

42. The Ukrainian SSR was quite active in that regard. Its mass media provided ample information on practical activities carried out in conjunction with the World Disarmament Campaign and the International Year of Peace. His delegation would put forward concrete proposals on item 14 of the provisional agenda for consideration by the appropriate working group. It hoped that the United Nations and the mass media would make a significant contribution to creating a favourable international political atmosphere based on trust and mutual understanding.
43. Mr. CHOCHAN (Pakistan) said that his delegation wished first of all to express its views on item 12 of the provisional agenda for the third special session.

44. In recent years, regional disarmament had gained increasing currency and attention. The regional dimension of disarmament merited much attention, both in the nuclear and in the conventional field. A collective endeavour by the smaller countries to restrain the arms race and to promote their own security was an indispensable corollary to their advocacy of global disarmament. Unlike major Powers, smaller countries acquired armaments in response to threats emanating from neighbouring countries within their region. Therefore, in a regional approach, the diverse problems and perspectives of States could be given appropriate consideration. Such an approach could facilitate the evolution of remedial measures that were suitable for specific regional situations. It could take into account the interaction among the regional countries, as well as between them and external Powers.

45. Resolute efforts were also necessary to check the escalation in conventional armaments and military forces in various parts of the world. The growing destructive potential of sophisticated conventional armaments was bound to blur the distinction between a conventional and a nuclear conflict. Smaller nations could not delay the pursuit of mutual arms restraint. In each region, a conscious and phased process could be evolved, tailored to its specific requirements to promote security for all the regional States at the lowest possible level of armaments.

46. Various forms of action could be envisaged for such a process of regional arms control. Firstly, consideration could be given to steps that could be taken to build mutual trust and confidence. Broader commitments of non-aggression and non-use of force would be equally helpful in fostering mutual confidence. It would also be useful for the regional States to clarify their respective security objectives and doctrines and exchange information on arms procurements and on force levels. Secondly, efforts to resolve outstanding disputes or to clear up misunderstandings were an essential component of a regional arms-control process. Thirdly, once a degree of mutual confidence had been created, the regional States could evolve a joint and co-ordinated position regarding external threats to the region, including the presence of foreign forces in their vicinity. Fourthly, the regional parties could endeavour to establish a mutually acceptable military equilibrium among themselves. Lastly, appropriate institutions and mechanisms could be established at the regional level.

47. The regional approach to disarmament could substantially strengthen the non-aligned and developing countries' security, and thus contribute to international peace and security. It could help to reduce the involvement of such States in the global nuclear- and conventional-arms race, and thus reduce the extent to which they were vulnerable to external influence and interference. It would also prevent the diversion of scarce resources from economic and social development.
48. Turning to item 13 of the provisional agenda for the third special session, he said that although multilateral forums would be called upon in the future to play an increasingly important role in the disarmament process, the United Nations machinery for multilateral disarmament negotiations had not been allowed to achieve its full potential. The working methods of the bodies concerned had, in part, also contributed to the lack of progress in multilateral disarmament. The third special session would provide an opportunity to revitalize and refine the role of the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and the entire United Nations machinery. The Conference on Disarmament was capable of successfully negotiating most important disarmament accords, but its procedures should be made more flexible. It should have the option of negotiating some agreements without the participation of one of more of its members, and its procedures must allow, for the purposes of specific negotiations, participation by non-member States directly concerned with the subject of the negotiations. Such procedures would be useful in promoting agreements on regional arms control and disarmament, confidence-building measures or partial or interim measures. Moreover, even bilateral or trilateral negotiations could be pursued by the interested States under the umbrella of the Conference on Disarmament. In all such cases, the Conference on Disarmament would receive reports about such negotiations, provide the negotiating States with guidance, and approve the outcome of the negotiations. The Conference on Disarmament should place greater emphasis on conducting negotiations on specific priority items on its agenda, and should reduce the time allotted to discussions of a general nature. To enhance such a focus on negotiations, each year the Conference on Disarmament might select a few priority items for intensive negotiations.

49. The First Committee's work should be modified in the light of past experience and emerging trends. That Committee's objectives should be: identification of the issues and areas for negotiations (bilateral, regional or multilateral); elaboration of guidelines or principles for negotiation on various issues; annual or periodic review of negotiations in specific areas; and proposals for studies and discussions on new areas for and fresh approaches to arms control and disarmament. Consideration should be given to a number of changes in the First Committee's working methods and procedures. The general debate in that Committee should be sharply curtailed. Discussion should be related to specific items or groups of items on the agenda. Under each item, the Secretariat should identify the major developments that had taken place, including any recommendations made by the Disarmament Commission. Draft resolutions on each item should be submitted prior to discussion of such items in the Committee. Lastly, more time should be allowed for informal consultations among interested delegations on various draft resolutions, and procedures might be established for that purpose. In particular, sponsors of draft resolutions on the same item should be required to make all possible efforts to reconcile and consolidate them before they were presented for a vote.

50. The Disarmament Commission could contribute to the successful discharge of the First Committee's responsibilities in the following manner: It should operate primarily as a Steering Committee for the First Committee; its main functions...
should be to recommend the guidelines or principles for specific negotiations and to conduct the review of the negotiating process in specific areas; it need not repeat consideration of the same issues annually; its sessions should be held closer to the sessions of the General Assembly, so that its conclusions and recommendations were relevant and timely. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament could play an increasingly important role in the deliberative and negotiating forums. The Secretary-General's reports should be shorter, should identify the outstanding issues and should contain clear and categorical recommendations. The deliberations and reports of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should be more futuristic, and the Board could identify new issues and opportunities for arms control and disarmament. Its deliberations should receive substantive inputs from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

51. Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico), referring to the provisional agenda for the third special session, said that no difficulties should arise where consideration of items 1 to 10 and item 14 was concerned. He shared the view that item 11 should be referred to the Conference on Disarmament, at least at its forthcoming session. The General Assembly could thus focus its attention on the remaining agenda items at the third special session.

52. Mr. Jaeger (Denmark) said that his delegation fully supported the statement made by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany on the work of the Preparatory Committee and the third special session. With respect to the substantive issues that should be incorporated in the document or documents to be adopted at the special session, conventional disarmament, at the global and regional levels, was essential to the establishment of effective and verifiable arms-control machinery that would lead to increased security at the lowest possible level of forces.

53. The basic principles that should underlie initiatives to promote conventional disarmament had been set forth in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, and further refined in the United Nations Study on Conventional Disarmament. The Disarmament Commission, at its 1987 session, had begun to consider the question of conventional disarmament, and, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 42/38 E, would continue its consideration at its 1988 session with a view to identifying arms-reduction measures.

54. The third special session, building on those earlier initiatives, would offer an important opportunity to further develop consensus on conventional disarmament. The General Assembly, at the session, should also consider the vital issue of a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

55. Mr. Alatas (Indonesia) said that every effort should be made to ensure that the final document to be adopted at the third special session contained constructive proposals. The document might consist of three parts. The first part would comprise an honest and objective appraisal of what had so far been achieved, avoiding recriminations. The second part should reflect recent developments and

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refer to specific topics on which agreement was possible, including nuclear disarmament and the elimination of chemical weapons. The Preparatory Committee should negotiate chapeaux, the precise content of which would be elaborated later. The third part of the final document could contain an assessment of the United Nations role in disarmament and of ways of improving the effectiveness of disarmament machinery, as well as a review of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

56. Mr. VASILYEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the adoption of the Final Document at the first special session devoted to disarmament had been of great significance in terms of promoting security through disarmament, but it was now necessary to strengthen the main provisions of the Document. The General Assembly, at the third special session, should note the recent positive trends towards curbing the arms race and strengthening international security. The agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States had made a real contribution in that respect, and had opened up the prospect of agreement on other disarmament issues, all of which should have a positive impact on the special session. Similarly, the measures adopted at Stockholm on confidence-building and security in Europe had demonstrated that concrete results could be attained with the requisite political will.

57. The Assembly should welcome the recent progress towards eliminating nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction, and the unilateral initiatives designed to stop nuclear-weapon tests and the militarization of outer space. Steps had also been taken at the regional level to reduce military confrontation and establish nuclear-weapon- and chemical-weapon-free zones.

58. A purposeful approach should be taken at the third special session. The final document should be concise and indicate the main factors that would lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world and foster trust among nations. The time had come to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons, ban such weapons from outer space, end nuclear tests, limit conventional weapons and armed forces, and prohibit chemical weapons. Qualitative limits should be placed on weapons development so that new scientific principles would not be applied to the waging of war.

59. It was gratifying that non-governmental organizations were involved in the disarmament process. Public opinion should be given more opportunity to contribute to disarmament.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.