PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE THIRD SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Third session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 13th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 26 January 1988, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES FOR INCORPORATION IN THE DOCUMENT OR DOCUMENTS TO BE ADOPTED AT THE SPECIAL SESSION (continued)

1. Mr. HUCKE (German Democratic Republic) said that recent developments, and particularly the signing by the Soviet Union and the United States of a treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles, would have an impact on the preparation and organization of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The treaty constituted a milestone on the road to a nuclear-weapon-free world and was indicative of the growing realization that more weapons did not mean more security.

2. Some resistance to the recent disarmament initiatives was apparent in the calls for compensation for the intermediate-range missiles which the United States was to eliminate and an integrated long-term strategy for NATO that would actually perpetuate nuclear deterrence. The production of binary weapons also threatened the positive atmosphere currently prevailing in disarmament negotiations. However, the forty-second session of the General Assembly had demonstrated that a number of positions and concepts shared by various States and groups of States could form an important basis for the substantive preparation of the special session devoted to disarmament, as could be seen from the provisional agenda agreed for that session. Despite the profound differences of opinion which continued to exist on many substantive issues, political will should be exercised so that various interests could be balanced and the session could meet all countries' expectations.

3. The German Democratic Republic was ready to consider and discuss constructively all substantive and procedural proposals regarding the special session and urged that the Secretariat should begin preparing the required background material for the session immediately. Documents should be substantive and meaningful, highlighting developments in the field of disarmament since 1982, including negotiations and regional initiatives. The draft final document should focus on such urgent measures as: a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States, in strict compliance with the ABM Treaty; measures to prevent an arms race in outer space; measures to bring about a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; the prohibition of chemical weapons; conventional disarmament; and the development of greater openness, predictability and transparency in the military field. The strengthening of international security should also be discussed. His delegation attached particular importance to regional measures, such as the establishment of nuclear- and chemical-weapon-free zones, as a means by which States lacking weapons of mass destruction could help to end the arms race.

4. Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway) said that the third special session should concentrate on a limited number of substantive items, and its final document should be relatively short and should emphasize the main political message of the session. The Final Document of the first special session would play an important part in the work of the third special session. At the same time, however, the debate at the third special session should relate directly to current disarmament problems.
5. The third special session should examine the problems related to nuclear disarmament with a view to facilitating current disarmament efforts. In the multilateral context, that could best be done by emphasizing the need for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Such a ban would be verifiable and would create a foundation for further nuclear disarmament. Further, the special session should address the need for the speedy conclusion of a treaty embodying a global ban on chemical weapons, and should emphasize the international community's interest in preventing the arms race from spreading to outer space. Conventional disarmament and confidence-building measures must receive increased attention at the multilateral level, and the session should examine the problems of verification and openness. Lastly, the organization and effectiveness of United Nations disarmament machinery should be reviewed and, in that context, the question of the admission of new members to the Conference on Disarmament should be considered.

6. Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia) said that, given the current favourable international climate, the forthcoming special session should provide an opportunity for progress towards an international disarmament strategy.

7. The special session should give fresh impetus to ongoing negotiations, assess past and present developments in that area, identify ways of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, consider the implementation of the programme of action adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and adopt a programme of action for the future. Its immediate task would be to facilitate negotiations on priority disarmament issues, particularly nuclear disarmament, and to pave the way for agreement on issues that had been the subject of negotiations for some time.

8. The concluding document might consist of three parts. First, it could review developments over the past six years. Second, it could seek a novel approach to the disarmament process and disarmament negotiations proceeding from the premise that rivalry and a spiralling arms race were no basis for a lasting peace. Third, it should contain a programme of action which would elaborate on the basic tasks outlined in the Final Document of the first special session and establish realistic disarmament goals in respect of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, prevention of the arms race in outer space and reduction of armed forces. It should accentuate issues such as verification, compliance with agreements and confidence-building measures and give due importance to the strengthening of the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and to the promotion of effective multilateral machinery.

9. Ms. RASI (Finland) said that the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should serve as the basis for the final document of the third special session. The primary goals remained the prevention of nuclear war, nuclear disarmament, the strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the total elimination of chemical weapons.

10. Finland had previously suggested three topics for the agenda of the third special session: conventional disarmament, naval confidence-building measures, and
the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. For several years, conventional disarmament had been the subject of regional negotiations, especially in Europe. A regional approach was often the most realistic one, but it could be complemented by global consideration of the issue.

11. The naval arms race had been an issue in the Disarmament Commission for several years. Naval armaments should be dealt with not as a separate item but in the general context of the balance of forces and their structure. An appropriate approach to naval armaments could be through confidence-building measures.

12. The third special session should closely scrutinize the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. There were promising possibilities for enhancing the role of the Organization in the field of verification and the practical implementation of confidence-building measures.

13. Mr. FERM (Sweden) said that the highest priority at the third special session should be the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The recent INF treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States should serve as a starting point for the process of nuclear disarmament. A 50-per-cent reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the major nuclear-weapon States would be another significant step. Tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere should be reduced promptly and completely abolished as soon as possible. Nuclear disarmament efforts must not be undermined by parallel qualitative improvements of nuclear-weapon systems through continued nuclear testing and technological developments.

14. Action should be taken to guide the multilateral discussions on nuclear-weapon issues in the 1990s. One way of achieving that objective would be to undertake a new and comprehensive study on nuclear weapons which would include recent developments in military technology as well as the various political, legal and scientific implications of nuclear weapons.

15. Naval armaments and disarmament should also be considered at the special session. The deployment of nuclear weapons at sea, the risk of incidents, and the lack of disarmament or confidence-building measures concerning sea areas merited further examination at the special session.

16. Increased attention should be given to conventional disarmament. In many parts of the world, conventional war posed an immediate threat to international peace and security. Negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe could be initiated in the near future in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. At the special session, conventional disarmament should be discussed from many different perspectives, including principles and guidelines for confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament.

17. Sweden attached great importance to the question of disarmament and development, and welcomed the inclusion of that item in the agenda of the special session. A number of proposals had been made regarding international verification and the possibilities of enhancing the role of the United Nations in that field. The Disarmament Commission had begun promising work on the elaboration of
principles of verification. In the recently adopted Stockholm Declaration, six Heads of State and Government had recognized the need for an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework for ensuring peace and security, during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear-weapon-free world.

18. Mr. SCHIAFER (Peru) said that at the current session open consultations should prevail over factionalism and isolated meetings.

19. The arms reduction agreement between the super-Powers and the prospects for the conclusion of a multilateral convention on chemical weapons were positive signs. If the third special session was to meet the challenges before it, its work must be based on the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. In many cases, the principles in that 1978 document and its Programme of Action had not been implemented owing to unwillingness on the part of certain States. In that connection, the role of the United Nations must be strengthened, and its various disarmament forums better co-ordinated.

20. United Nations disarmament machinery was hampered by certain States' narrow concepts of security and disarmament. For that reason, any consensus at the third special session must be realistic and include certain fundamental elements, if it was to be translated into action. The third special session would also have to expedite the process of nuclear disarmament, proceeding on genuine, negotiated bases and taking advantage of the recent climate of openness and confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union. To that end, multilateral and bilateral negotiation processes must be more closely co-ordinated in order to guarantee the implementation of agreements. Verification machinery must be set up within the framework of the United Nations. The third special session should also ensure the successful outcome of the negotiations called for in resolutions of the forty-second General Assembly.

21. Progress in the field of disarmament did not mean that the arms race should be transferred to other dimensions. Special attention must be given to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There was no justification for the lack of progress by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, due to the absence of political will on the part of certain States. The third special session would have the urgent task of implementing General Assembly resolutions concerning the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee.

22. Disarmament and development must be another focus of the third special session. The question not only involved the distribution of resources, but was also rooted in an overall perception of security. It was time to abandon narrow militarist concepts of security, which had only destabilized international relations, eroded confidence and caused the arms race to spiral. In that spirit, Peru had made conscious efforts to reduce its military budget and build mutual confidence with its neighbours. The third special session must heed the implications of non-military threats to security and take further measures on the basis of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. Resources released in the disarmament process...
must be reallocated to development and improvement of the standard of living of the world's peoples, especially in the developing countries.

23. General and complete disarmament was a harmonious process, in which efforts towards nuclear, conventional, and regional disarmament must proceed simultaneously.

24. Mr. TEJA (India) said that the document to be produced by the third special session should seek to strengthen the role of multilateralism in disarmament efforts and uphold the principles agreed in 1978. The document would be more effective if it focused on a few major issues, and more informative for the public at large if it outlined differences in principle and approach between States.

25. The priorities set forth in the 1978 Final Document had not been implemented for lack of political will and favourable circumstances. The situation had changed, but negotiations were still not taking place in a multilateral forum and the United Nations was not fully playing its role. The special session should lend support to an integrated multilateral verification system, proposed recently by six nations in Stockholm, which would be overseen by the United Nations. While the question of nuclear weapons should take priority at the session, it was particularly urgent for the question of the arms race in outer space to be debated in a multinational forum. It was also important to make progress at the multilateral level on the elimination of chemical and conventional weapons.

26. Under item 9 of the provisional agenda, the special session should review not only positive bilateral developments, but also negative trends in the qualitative aspects of the arms race. During the review, it would be important to identify principles that could be incorporated in a final document. Under item 10, there was no need to review the principles contained in the 1978 Final Document, which had already been accepted by the international community. Work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD) should be concluded.

27. The formulation of item 12 should not be changed. That was the only new item proposed for the third special session. It was central to the question of disarmament, for the arms race would never be controlled without an assessment of the technology which made it possible. Item 12 must be accorded due attention and conclusions reached should be followed up.

28. The Preparatory Committee should provide the third special session with a document or, at the very least, an outline which the Assembly could elaborate further.

29. Mr. AZIKWE (Nigeria) said that organizational and procedural matters must not delay the real work of the Preparatory Committee. Nor must national, group or sectional interests undermine disarmament efforts. While the 1978 Final Document remained largely unimplemented, the threats posed by the arms race had greatly increased. Nuclear testing and research and development programmes continued. Above all, the arms race was being extended into outer space.
30. The INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and the ongoing talks in Geneva gave cause for optimism, but the treaty remained to be ratified. Bilateral measures alone would not solve the problems of the arms race. Rather, bilateral and multilateral measures must complement each other.

31. The 1978 Final Document, however important, must be supplemented and reinforced in the light of recent developments. One important addition would be provisions on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. As it stood, States which had voluntarily relinquished the nuclear option were increasingly vulnerable and non-nuclear-weapon States were acquiring nuclear capability.

32. The central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament must be strengthened. The Disarmament Commission and Conference on Disarmament had proved incapable of implementing the 1978 Programme of Action. The Conference, for example, had not elaborated a single treaty on disarmament since its inception in 1979. It could not even agree on a negotiating mandate for any of its priority agenda items on nuclear disarmament. The situation clearly underscored the need to review the Conference's working methods.

33. The World Disarmament Campaign had been very successful and should be intensified. In the field of training, education and information, the programme of fellowships on disarmament, geared to diplomats from developing countries, had been outstanding. Both the number of fellowships and the length of the programme should be maintained.

34. Mr. EDIS (United Kingdom) associated himself with the statement made at the previous meeting by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the Twelve.

35. The third special session would provide an opportunity for a balanced and constructive assessment of all aspects of arms control and disarmament, in which all views should be accorded due attention.

36. Unlike the second special session, the third session should be a success. Not only were the preparations well advanced but also the auguries for the session were more favourable than they had been in 1982. Considerable progress had been made in recent years - both bilaterally, as evidenced by the recent agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons and by ongoing negotiations between the two Powers, and multilaterally. The vitally important Non-Proliferation Treaty had been successfully reviewed in 1985 by its States parties, as had the Biological Weapons Convention and great strides had been made in the Conference on Disarmament towards a convention banning the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. On the regional scale, a significant start had been made on dealing with conventional armaments.

37. The special session should give positive encouragement and support to all those developments and should also recognize and consolidate the growing common ground of practical measures and principles which should underlie disarmament and
arms control efforts. Such common ground included recognition of the relationship between nuclear and conventional arms control, the vital importance of effective verification provisions, the need for complete compliance with existing agreements, the importance of objective and freely available information on military matters and the significance of the regional approach.

38. There would of course remain areas in which there were sincere differences of view and approach. Such differences should be respected and, if necessary, accommodated in the final outcome of the special session.

39. Mr. YAMADA (Japan) said that the recently-concluded agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union and the ongoing negotiations between the two Powers in Geneva provided a favourable political environment for the special session. There was no reason why the special session should not be successful, provided that the goal set for it was not overambitious. It would be better to build on what had been achieved rather than to reopen issues that had been discussed in the past.

40. He expressed the hope that the special session would result in the adoption by consensus of a short document comprising three parts. First, an assessment of developments, consisting of an objective description of breakthroughs, accomplishments and pending issues concerning arms control and disarmament. Second, a strategy or guidelines for the future; for that it would be necessary to identify a limited number of disarmament issues from which practical results could be expected and on which efforts would therefore be focused. In his view, the priority issues should include progress towards a nuclear-test-ban treaty, balanced reductions of conventional forces, elimination of chemical weapons and the development of verification provisions. Third, a discussion of the role of multilateral disarmament forums and how they should be co-ordinated and complement bilateral disarmament efforts. In that connection, it would be necessary to review the functioning of the Disarmament Commission. He expressed the hope that the Preparatory Committee could agree by consensus on the framework of such a document and that any differences of view could be reflected in an annex to the document.

41. Finally, he stressed the need to ensure broad participation of high-level government officials at the session and participation by representatives outside governments.

42. Mr. TANASIE (Romania) said that the special session must reconfirm the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, since the principles and disarmament strategy outlined therein had lost none of their relevance. It should also promote a new approach to disarmament problems and give priority to nuclear disarmament.

43. Second, because of the favourable climate created by the recently concluded treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, it should give impetus to disarmament negotiations at all levels. Third, it should adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In that connection, he proposed that the Preparatory Committee should appeal to the Conference on Disarmament to speed up negotiations...
concerning the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament so that it could be submitted to the special session. Fourth, the special session should strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, giving the Organization more direct responsibility for discussing, negotiating and verifying disarmament measures. Fifth, it should intensify negotiations within the context of the Conference on Disarmament and ensure that the Conference focused on the preparation of specific agreements. To that end ad hoc negotiating committees should be established; they should remain in operation until they completed the task assigned to them. At the same time, the role of the Secretary-General should be enhanced so that he could help to overcome difficulties which might arise during disarmament negotiations. The special session could also decide to establish a disarmament agency within the United Nations system to co-ordinate all negotiating forums and to monitor disarmament measures. Sixth, it could encourage the adoption, within the context of the United Nations, of measures to support and promote regional disarmament efforts. Such measures might include establishment of nuclear- and chemical-weapon-free zones and the organization of negotiations concerning conventional disarmament in Europe. Seventh, it should endorse some of the recommendations included in the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The session must also consider in depth how to stop scientific and technological developments from being used for military purposes and how to prevent the arms race from extending to outer space.

44. **Mr. Akalovsky** (United States of America) agreed that recent positive developments in arms control were likely to have a favourable effect on the special session. Those developments included the recent signing of a treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and developments on more general but fundamental issues relevant to arms control. There were also signs of emerging recognition that a general easing of tensions in the world must accompany arms control measures in order for arms control to be effective. In short, there was an opportunity for writing a new page in arms control history.

45. Accordingly, it was necessary to try to build on the positive trends. Numerous aspects of issues in which such trends were evident had yet to be developed and agreed upon. The enlargement of general areas of consensus would be a most significant contribution of the special session to the enhancement of international security and stability. However, the special session was not a negotiating body where political differences on specific arms control proposals could be resolved. In that connection, his delegation was disturbed by suggestions concerning what should be agreed elements for the consideration of substantive issues, since everyone knew them to be a priori controversial. Experience had shown that to proceed in that manner would guarantee failure.

46. His delegation had been encouraged to hear that many delegations felt that the concluding document should be brief, forward-looking and should reflect current realities. The suggestion that texts should be appended to the document did not seem advisable, since that would be a time-consuming, complex and possibly contentious procedure. The success of the special session would be measured by the degree to which it could contribute to practical efforts to enhance international
security and stability. Accordingly, efforts should be focused on delineating broad agreed elements that would provide the structure for an eventual concluding document and thus facilitate productive functioning of such working groups as might be established at the special session.

47. Mr. Alatas (Indonesia) said his delegation fully concurred with the suggestions made by the Chairman regarding the organizational structure and modalities of the special session and the use of further consultations to settle outstanding procedural questions. He also welcomed the adoption of a new item for the provisional agenda for the special session entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development, in the light of the action programme adopted at the International Conference".

48. In the 10 years since the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament had laid the foundation for an international disarmament strategy, the arms race had continued to escalate none the less. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should therefore serve as a timely source of inspiration to the international community and build on the achievements and dynamic processes launched by the two previous special sessions on that subject.

49. The provisional agenda for the session provided a sufficiently broad framework for doing so. It was important that the General Assembly should appraise the current international situation and assess the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of previous special sessions. However, time should not be spent on bemoaning past failures or indulging in recriminations. Furthermore, his delegation would resolutely oppose any tampering with or "updating" of the Final Document of the first special session. The General Assembly should adopt a forward-looking, concrete and result-oriented approach towards the forthcoming session; his delegation attached particular importance to the discussions to be held under item 12 of the provisional agenda.

50. The impact of rapid technological progress on the build-up of weapons and the disarmament process should be given special emphasis at the session. Such progress had blurred the distinction between offensive and defensive weapon systems and the levels of danger posed by nuclear and conventional weapons. The relentless pursuit of superiority had pushed the arms race into new areas such as outer space and the world's seas, and had caused the development of new weapons to outpace negotiations for arms limitation.

51. Even as the signing of the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) treaty by the two super-Powers was being welcomed, those countries and their military alliances were planning a wide array of new short-range weapon systems to fill the gap purportedly created by the treaty. Equally disturbing were discussions of accelerated deployment of a new generation of cruise missiles and tactical weapons and the formulation of competing strategies for the European theatre. As such developments in fact increased the danger of nuclear war and the likelihood of an error or technological malfunction, it was of the utmost importance that the third special session should devote particular attention to them.
52. The special session should also focus on the dangerously neglected issue of the naval arms race and naval arms reduction and disarmament. Notwithstanding the protestations of some major naval powers, the arms race at sea not only existed but threatened regional and international security. Moreover, half a century had elapsed since the last multilateral negotiations on naval arms limitations had been held. Taking as a basis the work on naval disarmament done thus far by the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, the General Assembly might begin consideration of the topic by defining certain principles and basic understandings and formulating more concrete guidelines for future negotiations.

53. While the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament in all its aspects should remain the priority issue for discussion at the third special session, attention should also be focused on such urgent questions as the banning of chemical weapons and nuclear testing, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the crucial issue of verification of compliance with bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements. It was also to be hoped that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would be finalized and adopted. Finally, his delegation hoped that the General Assembly would be able to agree, in the context of item 13 of the provisional agenda, on the need to enhance and strengthen the role of the Organization in the field of disarmament.

54. Mr. Krasulín (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that one of the principal tasks of the third special session should be to formulate a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The concept of security through disarmament should guide the work of the session.

55. The session should consolidate and broaden the international community's support for the conclusion of agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles as the beginning of the process of nuclear disarmament. The first priority in the disarmament field was for the USSR and the United States to work out an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons and, at the same time, to reconfirm the 1972 ABM treaty. Another priority was to achieve substantive progress in the prohibition of chemical weapons. Work should be completed on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, if possible by the beginning of the third special session. The last priority issue related to negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces.

56. The special session could focus attention on the preparation of a solid basis for the multilateral disarmament process. Taking account of the current negotiations between the USSR and the United States, the special session could express its interest in the speedy completion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

57. One of the most important ways of creating confidence was the adoption of adequate and effective measures for monitoring the implementation of disarmament agreements. Recently, tangible progress had been achieved in that area. The third special session should consolidate and build upon such encouraging progress. Greater attention should be given to measures to ensure openness in the military sphere with a view to increasing confidence in the military and political fields.
58. The special session should devote attention to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. It should consider the results of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and take steps to implement the decisions of that Conference. The special session should also consider how to enhance the effectiveness of multilateral disarmament machinery.

59. The final document of the special session should be short but concise and should reaffirm the need for multilateral efforts in specific areas of disarmament. The document should be adopted by consensus and should reflect the interests of all parties in a balanced manner.

60. Finally, the general public should be given the opportunity to take an active part in the special session.

61. Mr. BUTLER (Australia) noted that the first task of the Preparatory Committee was to recommend an agenda for the third special session. While his delegation endorsed the thrust of the proposed provisional agenda, it believed that an item must be included that would allow consideration of the relationship between the allocation of resources for weapons and the global and national economies.

62. Once the agenda had been finalized, the Committee must agree on the machinery that would allow the special session to function. His delegation supported the emerging consensus for the establishment of three working groups and hoped that agenda items would be allocated to those groups in a rational manner.

63. Finally, with regard to the final declaration or concluding statement of the special session, he believed that its main elements ought to be agreed by the Committee. The final document should be as brief, yet useful, as possible and should comprise three main parts: a review of past efforts in the field of disarmament, including the unique consensus reached at the first special session, and subsequent developments; a look at the future, which would highlight the main tasks facing the international community in the field of disarmament through the end of the twentieth century, rather than constitute a specific plan of action; and a brief review of the existing multilateral disarmament machinery.

64. In the section dealing with the future, which his delegation considered the most important section, the Assembly's principal task would be to redefine what could and should be done through the multilateral process. It was important that the agenda for future action should be realistic.

65. Finally, he stressed the importance of and need for consensus in the work of the special session, given that the field of disarmament and arms control was not one in which the will of the small group of states could be imposed on the rest of the international community. Working by consensus would provide an opportunity for co-operation and a harmonization of views which all States Members of the United Nations were committed to seek. His delegation would do everything it could to foster such a consensus.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.