PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Second session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 6 May 1981, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADEMIJI (Nigeria)

CONTENTS

Consideration of views concerning the agenda of the second special session of
the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (continued)

Consideration of views on other relevant questions relating to the second special
session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, including the organization
of work of the session (continued)

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should
be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They
should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Chief, Official
Records Editing Section, Department of Conference Services, room A-3550,
866 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the record of the meetings of this session will be
consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the
session.

81-55878
The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

CONSIDERATION OF VIEWS CONCERNING THE AGENDA OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF VIEWS ON OTHER RELEVANT QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE SESSION (continued)

1. Mr. DE LA FUENTE (Peru) recalled that during the thirty-fifth General Assembly session a number of speakers in the First Committee had criticized the total absence of progress on disarmament since the first special session of the Assembly on the subject and had agreed that the substantive Programme of Action set out in the Final Document of that special session had not been put into effect. In fact, the situation had deteriorated as the arms race continued, spurred on by the growing rivalry between the super-Powers, as weapons became more sophisticated daily, and outer space increasingly came to be regarded as a place for military confrontation, while the Test Ban Treaty remained a fond hope and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons grew weaker day by day. The only piece of encouraging news was that talks might begin between the United States and the Soviet Union on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.

2. The lack of political will, on the part of the super-Powers, to work towards goals they had agreed on by consensus was mostly to blame. The world continued to depend on the outmoded doctrine of strategic nuclear balance, which combined détente, deterrence and luck in unknown proportions and which only served to intensify the climate of international insecurity, making non-nuclear countries theoretical, and at times actual, targets of strategic rivalry. An alternative kind of international security based on pragmatic, concerted international efforts, mutually agreed programmes and balanced defence and security policies must be found to check and then counteract current moves to upgrade weapons. The major Powers and the non-nuclear countries must work together in a balanced manner. It could not be assumed that nuclear disarmament was the responsibility of the nuclear-Power countries and conventional disarmament that of the rest; for the nuclear-weapon States were also those with the most daunting arsenals of conventional weapons. Moreover, disarmament would have to take place gradually, with responsibilities appropriately divided among all States and with a suitable degree of security ensured for each. Only when significant advances had been made towards strategic nuclear disarmament would progress on conventional weapons at the regional and bilateral levels gain sufficient additional impetus to be able to assist in replacing the balance of terror with a new international security system.

3. There must be a concerted effort to make the public aware of the need to redefine the concept of "security" in terms of coexistence, stripping it of the connotations of political, economic or strategic superiority normally associated with the term. The United Nations had a legitimate part to play in that respect, as did non-governmental organizations. His Government also believed that the development of confidence-building measures should be a continuing process and that States should take every opportunity to promote such measures by whatever means they found appropriate. In the current circumstances, confidence-building should be given priority by the international community.

/...
4. The second special session also should be designed to stimulate political determination to attain specific disarmament targets, since the majority of the commitments set out in the Final Document from the first special session had not been fulfilled. It should seek to provide the public with extensive information and seek public support for disarmament; and it should expand the disarmament infrastructure, involving a larger number of political leaders and non-governmental bodies, while stepping up negotiations on bilateral and multilateral treaties concerning disarmament in both number and intensity. It was also important to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament such as was being discussed by a Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament. The session should concentrate on two specific, high-priority topics: negotiations on strategic weapons, including, as a provisional measure, adherence to the terms of the unratified Salt II treaty, and a comprehensive test-ban treaty linked to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Other points which could be considered in the same light included additional steps to prevent the use of outer space for military purposes, including a ban on anti-satellite weapons; the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; agreement on nuclear forces in Europe; guarantees for non-nuclear States, including a treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States; better ratification procedures, including the possibility of United Nations verification by use of satellites; treaties banning radiation and chemical weapons; an agreed and balanced reduction in conventional weapons, armed forces and military budgets; restrictions on the transfer of certain conventional weapons; and confidence-building measures.

5. There were, however, other methods of tackling the same problem. They included voluntary acceptance of informal restrictions; the introduction of non-binding standards or codes of conduct governing disarmament and security; moratoriums on nuclear tests; independent moves by countries or groups of countries, such as temporary weapons reductions; confidence-building measures to reduce tension and the risk of beginning wars in error; and the adoption of decisions on national security with an eye to their impact on neighbouring countries.

6. In view of the broad consensus among the international community for convening the second special session, all delegations were under an obligation to spare no effort in making proper preparations.

7. Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) said that the constant accumulation of weapons, the race to produce new, more sophisticated and destructive types, and unprecedented growth in military expenditure heightened insecurity and imposed an intolerable burden on all nations. The international situation was becoming increasingly tense, but delegations should not be discouraged; rather, they should redouble their efforts to bring about disarmament. The detailed preparations for the second special session devoted to disarmament occupied a prime position among such efforts. It was vital for all States to demonstrate their political will and a sense of responsibility in the preparatory process so as to secure a radical move towards disarmament.

8. All States, especially the major military States, must avoid steps that would increase their military spending and arsenals, as well as any other action that
might further aggravate the international situation. The prospects held out by
the Final Document of the first special session had not, unfortunately, been
realized; the second special session should therefore be geared to restoring
confidence in the feasibility of disarmament and to initiating genuine negotiations
on the limitation and reduction of military spending, armed forces and armaments.

9. The special session should therefore begin by making a concerted assessment
of the state of implementation of the Final Document from the first special session.
It must realistically indicate the seriousness of the armaments situation and the
resulting threat to peace and international security - even the survival of
mankind - as well as the fact that the goals set in the Programme of Action
adopted at the first special session had still to be attained. The aim of the
exercise would be to determine what course future action should follow. The
adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to set priorities and
co-ordinate disarmament efforts should also be on the agenda. The session should
be able to consider and adopt a series of specific measures currently under
negotiation, such as a nuclear-test ban and safeguards for non-nuclear States,
together with bans on other weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and
radiation weapons, and it should agree on principles opening the way to
international accords on the reduction of military spending, particularly by the
major military States. Negotiations should be stepped up in such bilateral and
multilateral negotiating bodies as the Committee on Disarmament and the United
Nations Disarmament Commission, and the agenda for the session should also provide
an opportunity to consider suggestions from Member States on the implementation of
the Programme of Action adopted at the first special session, the programme for
the second Disarmament Decade, and the attainment of other related objectives.

10. The problem of disarmament had to be considered in conjunction with other
major problems confronting mankind, first among them being development and
international security. The studies on such aspects, which would be submitted to
the special session, should provide new ideas and suggestions for promoting
disarmament.

11. One topic of concern should be efforts to mobilize public opinion as a major
means of influencing Governments in favour of disarmament moves. It had never
been more important to ensure that world public opinion was kept abreast of events
and could work to improve the international political climate, reduce and eradicate
the danger of war, and press for real steps towards arms reduction.

12. The special session should enhance the role of the United Nations in all
matters relating to disarmament, and one of its aims should be to strengthen the
framework of disarmament discussions and negotiations, making them more democratic
and efficient in their preparation and adoption of agreements, general guidelines
and effective disarmament measures. The documents to be adopted by the session
should derive logically from the agenda and from the common approach to be defined
jointly by delegations.

13. The actual organization of the session's work should take second place to the
attainment of the goals set, while providing a suitable framework for the detailed
consideration of the agenda and the proposals and suggestions submitted for consideration. All States should be enabled to take part in the session, in accordance with the democratic principles and rules tried and tested at the first special session and in other multilateral negotiations. States would have to show an understanding of and receptiveness to other countries' positions, and — most important of all — self-restraint in the growth of their own military spending and other arms-related measures. Otherwise, the special session could face defeat before it even began.

14. **Mr. Wagenmakers** (Netherlands) said, on behalf of the member States of the European Communities, that the Ten were in broad agreement over the agenda and other relevant questions relating to the second special session as a result of their political co-operation based on a shared perception of the current arms control and disarmament situation. In view of the responsibility which all States shared for disarmament, the special session should take into account the full complexity of the current international situation rather than merely emphasizing the lack of substantive progress in the field of disarmament. There was a growing need for arms control and disarmament; recent deplorable developments which threatened international security could not change that important fact. Security and economic considerations would both have to be taken into account; for example, there was a need to increase the possibilities of solving the social and economic problems facing the world, particularly the developing countries, through a reversal of the arms race. The Ten also considered that arms control and disarmament could not successfully be discussed in isolation from security interests. Disarmament measures must be effectively verified, making the residual armaments situation clearer and contributing to the strengthening of confidence between the countries concerned. The Ten accordingly were in favour of discussions on arms control and disarmament which focused on proposals meeting that criterion, rather than being merely declaratory.

15. The Ten considered that the agenda for the special session should embrace procedural questions; a general debate, in which they expected delegations to consider the current and future implementation of the Programme of Action set out in the Final Document of the first special session; then, in a committee of the whole, discussions on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, recommendations derived from studies initiated by the first special session and subsequent General Assembly sessions, and other suggestions on disarmament; then discussions on present and future institutional arrangements in the field of disarmament; and, finally, the acceptance of a resolution or final report of the proceedings which should, *inter alia*, contain a reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, an agreed comprehensive programme of disarmament, and concrete proposals on specific items.

The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.