General Assembly

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Fourth session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 35th MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 29 April 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES RELATED TO THE SPECIAL SESSION, INCLUDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION (continued)

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENT(S) TO BE ADOPTED AT THE SPECIAL SESSION (continued)

1. Mr. YANGO (Philippines) said that his Government's reply to the Secretary-General, reproduced in document A/AC.206/19, stated that, in its view, the special session should aim at action-oriented disarmament proposals and programmes which would lend themselves readily to adoption by States. His delegation therefore endorsed the proposal to set up a working group to consider the substantive issues. Such a group should be pragmatic in its approach and should identify those areas where there was a realistic chance of international acceptability. In that way, progress could be made in certain areas of the many disarmament proposals that had been put forward. Given current circumstances, he felt that the working group should devote most of its attention to the question of nuclear weapons. The paramount concern of the day was how to prevent a nuclear confrontation. He was sure that the non-governmental organizations participating in the second special session would be even more active and persistent in regard to nuclear disarmament than at the first special session. In addition, he understood that there was to be a major demonstration outside United Nations Headquarters during the special session on 12 June 1982, which would be concerned primarily with nuclear weapons and the popular opposition to their existence and stockpiling and to the threat of their use. The Preparatory Committee must not be indifferent to the voice of the people. If the United Nations was to win their support, it must listen to what they said.

2. In Europe, the United States and Japan (which was the only country to have suffered the consequences of nuclear war so far) there were movements of widespread protest against nuclear weapons and the prospect of nuclear war. The United Nations had paid sufficient lip service to nuclear disarmament already. The Programme of Action adopted at the first special session had given priority to the process of nuclear disarmament and the time had come to match those words with deeds. If the special session could succeed in elaborating agreed proposals for the prevention of nuclear war, it would be a resounding success. In order to do so it would have to rely heavily on the contribution of the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the super-Powers. The General Assembly had already adopted a resolution calling for specific proposals from those Powers on ways of preventing nuclear war. The proposed working group should therefore devote most of its attention to the numerous aspects of that problem and should endeavour to agree on practical proposals which would allay the fears of the people. It might in fact be better to constitute a small subgroup which would devote itself solely to that question. In view of popular developments and protests against the nuclear dilemma, the United Nations could not afford to delay any longer in meeting the challenge forcefully and directly.

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3. Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that his delegation identified itself fully with the views of the members of the European Community on the agenda items under discussion, as put forward by the representative of Belgium. He wished only to express some supplementary ideas and to comment on the contributions made by other delegations in the meantime.

4. Regarding the topics of primary concern to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on which it felt the second special session should focus, he noted that his Government's reply would shortly be distributed to delegations as an addendum to document A/AC.206/19. The reply emphasized that one of the special session's main tasks should be to solemnly reaffirm the Final Document of the first special session. The last three years had proved its importance and value and it should therefore be preserved in its entirety, and its carefully-weighed balance not upset. The second special session should not attempt, nor could it be expected, to produce a document of comparable conceptual significance. However, it would be useful for it to go further into some of the basic aspects of the Final Document and thereby to refine the philosophy of disarmament.

5. The special session would provide a unique vantage point from which to deal with world-wide security concerns at the highest possible level. However, it should not be confused with a regular General Assembly and should be kept free of the vast array of standard resolutions which had become part of the Assembly's annual proceedings. He regretted that one delegation had already announced its intention of bringing to the special session the whole list of items it usually brought to the General Assembly and hoped that that plan would be re-examined.

6. Responding to the wave of concern around the world, the special session's central theme must be peace and the promotion of peace. His delegation was acutely conscious of the responsibility resulting from the world-wide dimensions of security problems. Although nuclear weapons were tremendously important, the special session must not give its attention exclusively to that subject. As spelt out in the Final Document, a balance must be preserved between nuclear and conventional disarmament. The prohibition of the use or threat of force must apply to all weapons, both nuclear and conventional. At the most recent regular session of the General Assembly, his delegation, together with others, had pointed out the contradictions and ambiguities inherent in certain proposals regarding the non-first use of nuclear weapons only, and it would continue to do so. Such proposals, which seemed to serve certain vested interests, risked increasing the danger of war. An example was central Europe, where the adoption of such agreements for non-first use would favour those who had pursued a build-up of conventional weapons.

7. The second special session should stress the central significance of the Charter's prohibition of the use or threat of force of any kind. It was made more urgent by the many recent violations of the Charter, the spread of military occupation, invasion, and interference in the internal affairs of States, all of which had led to a deterioration in the international climate and had had a negative effect on disarmament and arms control. The special session should make a determined effort to restore Article 2 (4) of the Charter to its original importance, and should seek to shed more light on the relationship between that article and Article 51 on the principle of collective and individual self-defence.
8. The relationship between disarmament and security already embodied in the Final Document should be discussed further. His delegation looked forward to the important study on that subject, which would be before the special session, discussed in detail. It would also like to see a fuller debate on the concept of balance, which was, in its view, the main principle from which all efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament must start. That balance was an indispensable element in any strategy for safeguarding peace and needed to be brought out, at a time when balance was being endangered by a one-sided and unrestrained build-up of arms. There were four major principles by which disarmament should be governed: balanced results of negotiation, openness and transparency in regard to military potential, verifiability of contractual obligations, and confidence-building. The vital significance of effective measures of international verification for any agreement on disarmament should be stressed. His delegation expected to make a contribution at the second special session on all those principles, with a view to enhancing and refining the common understanding of disarmament and arms control.

9. The proposal to establish a working group to review issues of implementation seemed sensible and practical, and his delegation was ready to participate. It would like substantial progress to be made at the current session of the Preparatory Committee towards drafting a consensus document in preparation for the special session. The document should be concise and balanced; it should provide a sober stocktaking of the achievements of the last three years and a pragmatic evaluation of what could be expected to be achieved in the near future in the various fields of disarmament and arms control. It should, moreover, be forward-looking. The obvious deficiencies in the disarmament process to date should be stated in a factual manner and there should be no useless attributions of blame.

10. His delegation also endorsed the view that useful work could be done at the current session on the Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament. Possible constitutional problems could be overcome by appropriate informal arrangements at the Chairman's discretion. It would be foolish to overlook the opportunity to move the Comprehensive Programme ahead, to eliminate certain controversies, and to facilitate the work of the special session itself. However, the programme should be approached not with a view to solving detailed problems of drafting but rather to addressing those overriding issues which were still unresolved. It was important to arrive at a shared perception of the way in which those major issues should be settled and what the over-all thrust of the Programme should be. Many of the detailed issues could then be solved more easily. Whatever the outcome, it would be wise to leave the report of the Committee on Disarmament on the Comprehensive Programme (CCD/283) as it stood. The Preparatory Committee's own ideas should be put forward very informally.

11. Regarding the format of the Preparatory Committee's report to the special session, he suggested that papers reflecting the results of the Committee's work, or a summary of its discussions, could be annexed to it, thus obviating the need for a detailed treatment of those issues in the body of the report.
12. His delegation took a very positive view of the participation of non-governmental organizations in the special session. It was fully aware of the significant contribution that non-governmental organizations and popular movements could make to the debate. Its only regret was that some countries were conspicuously absent from the list of countries of origin of those NGOs already registered and that some peace movements were actually suppressed in certain member countries. Furthermore, participation in the discussions at the second special session could give many of those organizations additional information on the complex technical and political problems of the multilateral disarmament process, which were often underestimated, and insights into the root causes of the arms race. Following the precedent set at the first special session, therefore, appropriate speaking time should be reserved for a number of representative non-governmental organizations. One such organization was the Rüsselsheim Peace Group from the Federal Republic of Germany which had worked out and circulated a draft Convention on Comprehensive Disarmament and World Peace. While his Government did not fully identify with that initiative, it regarded it as a constructive and thoughtful contribution. It should, of course, remain clear that the second special session was an assembly of States and that Governments would have to bear the sole responsibility for the decisions taken there and for disarmament in general.

13. As far as the concluding documents of the second special session were concerned, he agreed with other delegations that it might be wise to consider the problem at a later stage. Whatever the special session decided, however, the legal nature of its decisions and resolutions could not go beyond what was prescribed in the Charter. Within that framework, however, his delegation would be prepared to look for ways of giving the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament special status commensurate with its great political significance.

14. Mr. SUJA (Czechoslovakia) said that his delegation's position in favour of efforts to bring about disarmament was well known. The second special session would undoubtedly be an important international event which, given certain conditions, would help to stimulate the discussion of urgent questions relating to disarmament. His delegation believed that its most important outcome would be the convening of a well-prepared World Conference to take place after the second special session. In its original reply to the Secretary-General's questionnaire, on 29 April 1981, his Government had stated that the importance of the second special session would undoubtedly increase, given the changing international situation, which was characterized by intensified action by certain countries to subvert international détente and thus to threaten international peace and security. His delegation believed, therefore, together with many others, that the second special session should focus its attention on resolving the most acute problem of the time; in other words, it should consider and adopt practical measures to ward off the growing danger of a nuclear catastrophe.

15. In connexion with the Preparatory Committee's consideration of substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session, he stressed the
importance of the principles embodied in a number of instruments that had been adopted by the General Assembly since the first special session on the initiative of a number of States, including the socialist countries. Those instruments had been aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war, at improving the international climate, at strengthening security and international co-operation, and at activating the ongoing negotiations on disarmament and opening new ones, together with the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session. Those instruments had had a positive effect in countering the efforts of some States to unleash another dangerous round in the arms race. They should be taken fully into account in the Preparatory Committee's work so that the turn of events since the first special session could be correctly appraised and an objective analysis made of the way in which its decisions had been implemented, and so that the second special session could chart a correct course of action on the basis of those instruments.

16. His delegation had submitted a working paper in 1981 on the main tasks of international co-operation that must be accomplished in order to speed up practical progress in the disarmament negotiations (A/AC.206/11). That paper had been based on the Declaration of International Co-operation for Disarmament adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 at his delegation's initiative and with the support of an overwhelming majority of Member States. In resolution 36/92 D, the General Assembly had recommended that the Preparatory Committee should make active use of the Declaration in its preparations for the second special session. His delegation intended to submit a revised version of its paper in the near future. It would emphasize that, in the light of the second special session, new stress should be placed on the importance of the consistent use of the principle of international co-operation, without which no progress could be made in any field of international life, in resolving the complex range of disarmament issues. The new text pointed out a number of current problems directly related to the development of co-operation in the disarmament field. In particular, it stressed the incompatibility of the principle of co-operation with the spreading doctrine that the use of nuclear weapons was admissible and it emphasized the importance of increasing confidence-building measures and of establishing zones of peace in the world's oceans wherever possible, together with maximum restraint on military activities by States belonging to military and political groupings. The responsible and constructive approach of certain States to the initiatives and proposals of other countries was noteworthy, as was their unilateral action in cutting back armaments, in particular nuclear weapons.

17. As a party to the Warsaw Treaty, and given its geographical situation, Czechoslovakia felt directly threatened by the decision to station large numbers of new medium-range nuclear missiles in certain Western European countries. Accordingly, it fully supported the Soviet Union's important proposal to resolve the situation that had been produced on the basis of the mutual security of all parties concerned, and its imposition of a unilateral moratorium on medium-range nuclear missiles in the European portion of the Soviet Union. Those proposals and unilateral measures deserved the support of all Member States. Reaching a mutual understanding on that question would contribute greatly to the success of the second special session.
18. In that connexion, it was important to make the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva more effective, in particular through the speedy completion of the negotiations on agreements for a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and for the prohibition of chemical weapons, and by moving towards a practical solution of the question of the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the reduction and gradual elimination of stockpiles of such weapons, together with guarantees of international security. Given the close link between disarmament and development, there was urgent need for agreement on cutting back military expenditure.

19. Regarding the principal document or documents to be adopted at the special session, his delegation agreed that the number and format should be left to the special session itself to decide. As far as their substance was concerned, it continued to believe that it was desirable to have an objective evaluation of the way in which the recommendations and decisions of the first special session had been implemented.

20. The proposal to set up one or more open-ended working groups of the Preparatory Committee seemed reasonable, provided the work was correctly distributed and the mandate of the groups agreed upon. In his delegation's view, the basic thrust of their work should be to elaborate the structure and the component parts of a final document which would review the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session. On the question of the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, it felt that any working group should proceed unofficially, concentrating on agreeing on a basic approach and direction. His delegation endorsed the view of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic and others on that point, and agreed that work should start as soon as possible.

21. Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland) stressed the importance for the Preparatory Committee to give sufficient attention to those aspects of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which still needed further elaboration, since the principal task of the special session would be to design a disarmament strategy for the forthcoming years. His delegation was in favour of making an early start, as a matter of priority, in drafting any other substantive document for consideration by the special session and therefore supported the Chairman's proposal to set up a working group on the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session. In that connexion, the Preparatory Committee might wish to refer to the working paper circulated by his delegation in document A/AC.206/11 containing a comprehensive review and assessment of the main disarmament negotiations. In addition to its views on the preparations for the special session in document A/AC.206/19, on 21 April 1982 Finland had also submitted its views to the Secretary-General on the prevention of nuclear war in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 36/81 B.

22. Mr. LIE (Norway), elaborating on some of the views which his delegation had expressed in its reply to the Secretary-General, said that the lack of any real progress on disarmament since the first special session, combined with recent
(Mr. Lie, Norway)

political developments, the continuing arms race and advances in weapons technology, lent heightened importance to the second special session. Against that background, deliberations might focus on forward-looking proposals, such as the conclusions of United Nations disarmament studies and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and on new initiatives rather than on a review of the past. Norway having taken part in the study on the relationship between disarmament and development, intended to promote its recommendations and believed that such studies would make an important contribution to the work of the Preparatory Committee.

23. His delegation welcomed the Secretary-General's report on institutional disarmament arrangements and felt that they should be given due emphasis by the special session. Other matters which required consideration were the workload of the First Committee, the tasks and functions of the Disarmament Commission, the question of strengthening the role of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, the role of both the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Research and their interrelationship, and finally the membership of the Committee on Disarmament.

24. To turn to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a balanced and forward-looking programme reflecting the principles and priorities set forth in the Final Document of the first special session and in the Declaration proclaiming the Second Disarmament Decade would provide useful guidelines for future arms control and disarmament.

25. The primary challenge however was to prevent a further proliferation of nuclear weapons as a matter of top priority. Central to that issue was the conclusion of agreements on substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals and in the deployment of strategic and nuclear arms, as well as on a comprehensive test ban. A satisfactory solution must also be found to assure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, intensive efforts were needed to reach agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

26. Finally, further consideration should be given to the proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document, particularly proposal 125 (g) to the effect that countries should adopt procedures for assessing the impact of major weapon procurement and military programmes on arms control and disarmament. More attention might also be devoted to evaluating the impact of disarmament and arms control proposals on security.

27. Mr. MAUNA (Indonesia) said that consideration of substantive issues constituted the most important task of the Preparatory Committee, which had a great responsibility to ensure the success of the special session.

28. His delegation fully supported the establishment of a working group to prepare the draft framework for the assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session. That draft should fully reflect the fact that, far from any tangible progress having been made, there had actually been setbacks in both arms control and disarmament and that many of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session remained a dead letter. The only
grounds for hope lay in the agreement reached on the prohibition of certain conventional weapons which inflicted indiscriminate suffering. On the one hand, the unprecedented escalation of the nuclear-arms race had aroused popular awareness, while on the other, negotiations had failed to keep pace not only with rapid advances in weapons technology but also with the aspirations of the international community to achieve meaningful progress. The draft should therefore clearly indicate the progress, if any, achieved so far and the causes for the failure to make any proper headway.

29. His delegation also believed that intensive consultations would be useful on certain aspects of the text of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which would be the centrepiece of the special session, in order to facilitate its work.

30. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that the special session should explore certain fundamental premises of the disarmament issue. In essence, the special session should be devoted to the halting of the arms race. No arms regulation or reduction would ever be achieved as long as the arms race continued unabated. To speak of disarmament without halting the arms race was to fly in the face of the most elementary logic.

31. In fact, mankind appeared to have forsaken wisdom and logic by embracing, in a United Nations era, the principle of "might is right" of a bygone age. Moreover, to borrow the words of T. S. Eliot, it had lost its wisdom in too much knowledge and its knowledge in too much information. The report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was a mirror of the Disarmament Committee and of the wider conflicts in a world guided by power and domination through the use of force. It was nonsensical to assume that efforts at disarmament would provide a way of halting the arms race. That was putting the cart before the horse. Particularly significant, moreover, in an international climate of hostility and mistrust, was the prevailing disregard of paragraph 13 of the Final Document (third paragraph of the Declaration) to the effect that a genuine and lasting peace could only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, followed by disarmament measures.

32. The chief task of the special session must therefore be to investigate the root causes of the arms race. The main cause was the lack of any United Nations security system as an alternative to the concept of security obtained through arms competition. The balance of power or parity of forces as a means of security was a negation of the Charter, the purpose of which was to replace arbitrariness and force by reason and justice. The world must abandon the concept of weapons parity, so outdated in a nuclear age, in order to halt the arms race. The special session must go deeply into those problems and seek their effective solution before it was too late. To repeat what had been done for over three decades in the Committee on Disarmament and other forums would be an excercise in futility, particularly if the second session failed to look into that central issue of the lack of an international security system. It was paramount to acknowledge that, on the one hand, effective disarmament was contingent on putting a stop to the arms race,
(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

while on the other, the arms race would never be halted unless the alternative to the recourse to armed force embodied in the international security system spelt out both in the Charter and in the Final Document of the first special session were actually brought into effect.

33. One concept much bandied about as a prerequisite for halting and reversing the arms race was the lack of political will. Concurrence of political will was necessary for actual disarmament agreements but not for measures to comply with the Charter system of international security, which was a solemn commitment and a binding obligation that all nations had assumed on signing the Charter. The only course by which the international community could halt the arms race and achieve effective disarmament was therefore strict adherence to the provisions of the Charter for the implementation of an international security system.

34. Mr. STENBJERRE (Denmark) pointed out that since Denmark had just submitted its written reply to the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 36/81 B, he would simply stress that the current international climate made it imperative to continue a dialogue on concrete and verifiable disarmament measures, particularly on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. However, the importance of conventional disarmament must not be overlooked. His delegation also agreed with the Chairman's proposal to set up an open-ended working group on the review of the final document and trusted that the consultations on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would yield concrete results.

35. Mr. VASILYEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his country's position on the basic questions confronting the second special session on disarmament was set out in document A/AC.206/2/Add.2 of 5 May 1981. Today, the active implementation of proposals pointing to constructive ways of reducing the threat of war, deepening détente and curbing the arms race was of primary importance for the fate of mankind. There were such proposals in the Programme for Peace in the 1980s and other Soviet initiatives which opened up possibilities of solving complicated international problems, in particular the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons and of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

36. The special session should call for the speediest possible renewal of negotiations on strategic arms limitation and completion of the negotiations in Geneva on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The final document of the first special session and other General Assembly resolutions had indicated both specific paths to general and complete disarmament and partial measures to that end. If all States adopted a responsible approach and showed political goodwill, it would be possible to set new targets for the solution of international problems. The documents of the special session should confirm and develop the various resolutions already adopted by the General Assembly on different aspects of disarmament.

37. The special session should give a new impulse to the holding of a World Disarmament Conference and, if possible, establish a provisional date for it. The special session would also have to pay considerable attention to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and stimulate constructive collective efforts for the renewal and intensification of those disarmament negotiations which had been broken off.
38. So far as the organizational work of the Preparatory Committee was concerned, his delegation supported the establishment of an informal working group to consider matters of substance. His country would make every effort to facilitate preparations for the session itself.

39. Mr. BIRBAUM (Austria) said that the deterioration in East-West relations soon after the first special session had not only caused severe setbacks in disarmament negotiations but had also resulted in a stepping up of the arms race and in renewed emphasis on military power in international relations at the expense of pressing social and economic concerns.

40. One advantage however which the second special session would have over the first was the growing popular awareness of the dangers inherent in the arms race and the urgency of effective disarmament. The mobilization of public opinion would not only ensure proper media coverage but would also increase its chances for some measure of success. It would thus be the responsibility of the second special session to translate that public awareness into a new impetus for disarmament.

41. His delegation supported the setting up of a working group to prepare the outline and discuss the substance of a text on the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session and trusted that it would avoid all the pitfalls involved in such a task and refrain from either pre-empting the work of future historians or acting as a policeman in search of the culprit who had sabotaged the disarmament process. Instead, it should concentrate on a careful analysis of the underlying causes for the poor level of implementation of the Final Document in a pragmatic and forward-looking manner so as to lay the groundwork for future more effective decisions.

42. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would be one of the central elements of the special session and should therefore be discussed by the Preparatory Committee. Such a course would have the added advantage of giving those countries which were not members of the Committee on Disarmament an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the points at issue, provided it were open to all interested delegations. For those not yet familiar with the intricacies of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, it might be useful if the Chairman of the Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament could introduce it in order to outline the most important outstanding issues.

43. Mrs. JONES (Liberia) said it was reassuring that the United Nations had already lasted 17 years longer than the League of Nations but alarming that it had not learned the lesson of the League's failure, which had been brought about by the inability of the major Powers to establish adequate peace-keeping machinery. It would be the task of the second special session devoted to disarmament to find solutions to the psychological factors which caused men to distrust and fear one another. The development and production of nuclear weapons were a result of those psychological factors and engaged vast efforts and resources. It should be the aim of the disarmament programme at the United Nations to match and counter the efforts of the makers of nuclear weapons. One means to that end might be the establishment
of an open-ended, standing working group on disarmament. Without such efforts to counter the arms race, there was a danger that technological developments would eventually lead to the death and destruction of the earth. Her Government would support all disarmament efforts.

44. Mr. KORNEENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said his delegation attached great importance to the successful preparation and holding of the second special session, whose aim must be to promote effective disarmament measures and to mobilize world public opinion against the arms race. It was also important that the session should be a milestone on the road to a World Disarmament Conference.

45. The special session should focus its attention on additional efforts to avert the threat of nuclear war along the lines of such recent Soviet proposals as those to reduce theatre nuclear weapons in Europe and suspend the deployment of new missiles. The problem of curbing the arms race and averting nuclear war could be solved only through negotiations and it was therefore necessary to use every available channel and to renew or begin talks on all topical disarmament problems. The special session must play an important part in stimulating such negotiations, paying particular attention to implementation of the resolutions which the General Assembly had adopted on a wide range of disarmament subjects since the first special session.

46. All those resolutions would naturally have to be taken into consideration by the special session, especially since there had been no concrete negotiations on some of the most important questions to date. Many of the resolutions had called for businesslike negotiations and for a transition from words to deeds in the disarmament field.

47. So far as organizational work was concerned, the Preparatory Committee had to prepare a draft covering the special session's agenda item 9, for which it still remained to define the format, structure etc. His delegation agreed with the proposal to establish a working group or groups with clearly defined tasks. It would also be appropriate to settle the question of the final document or documents of the special session, and to pay some attention to the organizational problems of the special session itself so as to enable it to make the best use of its time.

48. Mr. KABIA (Sierra Leone) said that in the period since the first special session devoted to disarmament there had been an unprecedented arms race, especially in the production of nuclear weapons which threatened the world with annihilation. A particular cause for concern was the fallacious idea that it might be possible to fight and win a limited nuclear war. The second special session should therefore concentrate on finding ways of halting the arms race and preventing the stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space. It should also seek to halt and reverse the production of chemical weapons.
49. His delegation supported the United Nations study of the relationship between disarmament and development. The vast resources expended on arms needed to be devoted instead to economic and social development. His delegation also advocated measures to eradicate chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular of Africa which should be a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

50. He believed that the United Nations had a crucial role to play in all disarmament-related activities and negotiations and advocated that the role of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament in that respect should be increased. He also supported the proposal that the Committee should establish a working group to assess achievements in the disarmament field since the first special session.

51. Mr. RAHHALI (Morocco) said his country attached great significance to the second special session as an opportunity to achieve highly desirable aims. The current meetings of the Preparatory Committee would be particularly important since it now had to study substantive matters and draft recommendations to assist the special session in its work. His delegation therefore agreed with the proposal for an open-ended working group to assume that responsibility and to consider, in particular, the present status of disarmament negotiations, as required by the final document of the first special session.

52. Among the many questions to be considered, two of the more important related to improving the United Nations bodies concerned with disarmament and to carrying out studies in the disarmament field. As far as the first was concerned, it was necessary to consolidate the United Nations role in the field of disarmament by giving it the means necessary to fulfil it. Among the studies, those relating to disarmament and development and to institutional arrangements in the disarmament field were of particular interest.

53. The second special session had to adopt a practical programme which would enable the international community to mobilize its efforts and achieve the aims set by the final document of the first special session. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was particularly important in that respect and every effort must be made to help the special session to formulate what would be one of its most significant documents. As far as the question of the final document or documents of the special session was concerned, he believed that it might be settled more easily after progress had been made on agenda item 4. He therefore thought that it should be taken up again towards the end of the Preparatory Committee's session.

54. The CHAIRMAN said that, in the absence of further speakers, consideration of agenda items 4 and 5 had now been concluded. The exchange of views had shown a wide measure of agreement on the bureau's recommendations. There was still work to be done on agenda item 4 but that could be undertaken in the working group.
(The Chairman)

55. Many speakers had emphasized the need to reaffirm the validity of the first special session's Final Document and several had suggested that the review of implementation should embrace all its parts. That approach would perhaps ensure a balanced assessment and enable the working group to pay attention to the priorities listed in the final document's programme of action, in particular the importance of matters relating to the nuclear-arms race. Some had thought that matter so important that it should be dealt with separately, but if the working group bore in mind the priority attached to nuclear weapons and disarmament in the Final Document of the First Special Session, it would be able to take account of the views of those who had expressed particular concern. The aim of the working group should be to produce at least the outline of a draft which the Preparatory Committee could submit to the special session to assist its review of the situation in the disarmament field.

56. As for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there seemed to be agreement that it would constitute the most important element in the work of the special session and that the Preparatory Committee should therefore do all it could to assist the consideration of that item. There had been reference to the work already done on the Comprehensive Programme by the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament but it was not the business of the Preparatory Committee to rewrite the document prepared by that body which was itself to be submitted to the special session. However, given the importance of the Comprehensive Programme, a procedure could perhaps be devised which would enable the Preparatory Committee to assist in making adequate preparations for its consideration. The bureau hoped to be able to make specific proposals soon.

57. So far as agenda item 5 was concerned, various views had been expressed on the form the final document or documents of the special session should take but there was a general lack of enthusiasm to discuss the subject yet. Time was clearly needed for further reflection and the Committee would revert to the subject during the last week of its current session.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.