PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Fourth session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 33rd MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 28 April 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.15 a.m.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES RELATED TO THE SPECIAL SESSION, INCLUDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION (continued)

PRINCIPAL DOCUMENT(S) TO BE ADOPTED AT THE SPECIAL SESSION (continued)

1. Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil) said that it would be premature, before the Preparatory Committee had made further progress on the substantive items, for it to issue any specific recommendations on the form, nature and number of documents to be adopted by the second special session. The substantive issues for consideration by the Preparatory Committee could be grouped into three main categories: firstly, matters relating to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, particularly the prevention of nuclear war; secondly, matters connected with the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session; and thirdly, matters pertaining to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. By concentrating on those matters, the Preparatory Committee would be making an invaluable contribution to the success of the special session.

2. The important and urgent issue of the prevention of nuclear war would undoubtedly become one of the focal points of the special session. All Member States therefore awaited with growing interest the replies to be forwarded to the Secretary-General by the nuclear-weapon Powers in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 36/81 B, as well as their specific proposals for concrete measures to avoid the danger of nuclear war. In view of the widespread concern over the matter, his delegation trusted that the nuclear-weapon Powers were ready in the meantime to air their preliminary views within the Preparatory Committee. The Secretariat should circulate their replies as early as possible in order for the report of the Preparatory Committee to the special session to reflect that concern and preferably to contain some practical proposals submitted by States with a special responsibility in the field of disarmament.

3. His delegation attached particular importance to a review of the precise extent to which the Final Document of the first special session had so far been translated into practical action. It believed that the Preparatory Committee should recommend that the second special session should be opened with a clear, simple and unequivocal reaffirmation by all Member States of their adherence to the Final Document as the foundation for further consensus. It also considered that the Preparatory Committee must work out the main lines or even begin drafting the assessment document to be adopted by the second special session at the end of its deliberations. In order to enable the Preparatory Committee to make specific recommendations, delegations should state their views on the matter in the course of the discussion.

4. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was of special relevance to the success of the special session. The fact that the Committee on Disarmament would report directly to the special session on the outcome of its efforts to develop a
draft Programme should not preclude the Preparatory Committee from fulfilling its responsibility to provide the special session with some groundwork on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, particularly when it came to those issues on which the Committee on Disarmament had made little or no progress. For instance, the Preparatory Committee should consider making concrete recommendations on the nature and schedule of the Programme, the introductory part, the form of its adoption and other related points.

5. The approach favoured by his delegation was for the Preparatory Committee to set up an open-ended working group, chaired by the Chairman or one of the Vice-Chairmen, with the task of preparing specific recommendations on each of those three substantive issues for incorporation in its final report. In order to make the best and the most constructive use of the short time available, the Chairman might also conduct consultations on informal arrangements for dealing with the draft chapters of the Programme which needed further elaboration. While it remained flexible in relation to the final arrangements for the organization of work, his delegation was firmly convinced that the Preparatory Committee must concentrate on the substantive aspects of item 4 of its agenda.

6. Mr. SHARMA (Nepal) said that, in a rapidly deteriorating international climate, the special session offered a unique opportunity to break the deadlock over the basic issues of disarmament. In particular, the special session should, at the very outset, reaffirm the continuing validity and importance of the Final Document adopted by the first special session as the foundation for an international disarmament strategy. Although the reasons for non-implementation of the Final Document could not be determined without an in-depth analysis, it was imperative to avoid impairing its comprehensiveness or jeopardizing the broad consensus on which it rested.

7. Since nuclear disarmament would be the focus of the special session, his delegation considered that the growing popular support for a freeze on nuclear weapons was an extremely important development and that the role of an effective world disarmament campaign could not be over-emphasized. His delegation trusted that the special session would treat the critical issue of the prevention of nuclear war in the broadest possible manner so as to ensure compliance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 36/81 B on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. It therefore supported the proposal just made by the representative of Brazil to the effect that the nuclear-weapon States should make their intentions known as soon as possible.

8. Another major challenge for the special session was to bring about negotiations paving the way for the early conclusion of a verifiable and comprehensive test-ban treaty as a first step towards the reduction and ultimate dismantling of nuclear weapons. Discussions must be governed by strict adherence to article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

9. While his delegation believed the existing multilateral disarmament machinery to be adequate, it considered that the workings of the Disarmament Commission and
the Committee on Disarmament would benefit from a thorough review. The centrepiece of the second session however would be the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. A prior exchange of views within the Preparatory Committee itself would contribute towards bridging differences of perception on certain aspects of the Programme, such as its nature, time-frame and other related considerations.

10. As to conventional disarmament, his delegation trusted that it would be given comprehensive rather than fragmentary treatment by the special session, taking into account the special security needs of those countries not parties to any military or security agreements.

11. His delegation welcomed the decision taken to ensure adequate participation by non-governmental organizations in the second special session in recognition of the considerable value of their role in promoting wider popular awareness of disarmament issues.

12. It was crucial to ensure that the second special session did not lose the momentum generated by the first session and was not turned into a forum for the expression of pious hopes. Judging from past experience, agreement would ultimately be reached on principles, priorities and machinery, but to translate them into concrete action would depend on the political will of the major Powers. It was to be hoped that the special session would be a turning point in efforts to achieve the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

13. Mr. FIELDS (United States of America) thought that the second special session's most useful course would be to turn its attention to effective steps that would help to relax existing international tensions and begin to restore the level of confidence needed to enable the process of arms control negotiation to move forward. The deterioration in the international climate since 1978 was the most important reason why arms control efforts had not prospered since the first special session. Common trust and confidence had been lacking. Instead, there had been repeated resort to the use of force, outside interference in the internal affairs of other States, and a general disregard of Article 2 (4) of the Charter, the bedrock on which international order must rest.

14. Given the technical complexity of modern armaments and their impact on disarmament issues, it was no wonder that little progress towards mutually acceptable agreements had been made, or could be made, without reasonable assurance that recognized norms of international conduct would be adhered to. It was not surprising, therefore, that most countries, including the United States, should be giving due regard to the maintenance of their security through individual and collective means. The first obligation of governments was to provide their citizens with security in order to promote domestic tranquillity. Nevertheless, disarmament efforts had not come to a halt and the importance of arms control to the world's survival made it all the more important that efforts should be redoubled despite the obstacles that existed.
15. The United States believed that progress in arms control could best be achieved through the adoption of specific practical disarmament measures which were limited in scope, aimed at progressively lower levels of armaments and contained adequate provision for verifying compliance.

16. Another major substantive matter which would be before the special session was the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Experience and practice had shown that progress in disarmament could come only through a realistic, step-by-step approach. The Comprehensive Programme should serve both as a guide for action towards disarmament and as a means of measuring progress. It should provide a framework for action, but it should not attempt to dictate specific actions to States or to prescribe time-limits for their achievement. Instead, it should identify measures that required negotiation, state the principles by which those negotiations should be guided, suggest the priorities that should be observed and the procedures for ensuring adequate verification and compliance with the measures to be negotiated, and lastly propose appropriate mechanisms for the review and appraisal of progress in implementation.

17. The decision on the final document or documents to be produced by the second special session should be taken by the special session itself. Clearly, however, it would be logical for such a document to be based on the most important elements of the session's work. For example, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should form part of the document. In addition, it would be logical for it to address the implementation of the recommendations of the Final Document of the first special session. Lastly, it would seem appropriate for it to include a review of disarmament machinery, in other words, of the institutions in the field of disarmament.

18. The United States delegation intended to play an active part in the important work that lay ahead. A grave responsibility rested on all Member States to make sure that the second special session was successful and that it offered a means of facilitating progress in the common effort for the advancement of peace and the impetus which peace could give to disarmament.

19. Mr. HEpburn (Bahamas) said that the term "keystone" which he found most apt to describe the Final Document of the first special session and the word "centrepiece" repeatedly used by earlier speakers in referring to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament gave a good indication of the magnitude of the task ahead. The Final Document on the one hand was a sacrosanct text inspired by the crucial concern that mankind had to choose between either halting the arms race and proceeding to disarmament or facing annihilation, while the purpose of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament on the other hand was to establish a concrete disarmament framework to avert that threat.

20. At the outset when the idea of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament had first been discussed, he had been convinced that it was an over-ambitious venture into which the international community was not ready to consolidate all its past discussions, reports and resolutions. However, in covering such wide-ranging
topics as reductions in military expenditures, strategic arms limitation, disarmament and development and confidence-building steps, not to mention in encompassing the prospect of a disarmed world, it appeared to cater to varying degrees for the needs of all Member States, thus leaving plenty of room for compromise on diverse multilateral, regional and bilateral concerns. Only such a broad, nebulous and complex programme, which did not infringe either the provisions of the Final Document or the interests of Member States, would in fact command universal acceptance.

21. Failure to make any further progress along the road to disarmament would mean that the achievements of the first special session had been in vain. The issues to be debated by the second special session must therefore be made of sterner and more durable stuff. It was surely not idealistic to consider that the recommendations and suggestions made to the second special session should transcend the immediate issues with which the Preparatory Committee had so far been concerned.

22. Work on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was now at a critical point which might perhaps be best illustrated by comparing its successive stages to the process of separating the wheat from the chaff before grinding it into flour and sifting the elusive and most nutritive elements at the bottom of the fanner. The stage had now been reached of refining the views expressed so far in order to arrive at the nucleus for a programme of action. It require intensive informal meetings, in view of the absolute necessity of reaching agreement not on the basis of last-resort makeshift proposals but as the gradual outcome of considered, thoughtful and serious dialogue. In such a charged atmosphere as that currently prevailing, it would be ill-advised for the Preparatory Committee to rely on its traditional eleventh-hour solutions that would be tantamount to achieving a final product in which the waste had not been separated from the substance.

23. His delegation believed that informal working groups should be set up to consider the points at issue and determine the order of priority conducive to action-oriented debates at the second special session, provided the understanding and co-operation of the nuclear-weapon powers, which held the key to the success of the Committee's deliberations, could be secured.

24. Mr. SILOVIC (Yugoslavia) said that one of the main tasks of the Preparatory Committee was to prepare concrete recommendations on the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session. He hoped, therefore, that the informal working group would be able to start work soon. The review should be a comprehensive one and should relate to all parts of the final document of the tenth special session, not just to events and developments between the two sessions; it should also provide answers to various important questions.

25. Another major issue which deserved the Preparatory Committee's particular attention was the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. After initial efforts by the Disarmament Commission and two years of intensive negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, a document had been produced which showed that some progress had
been made. But there was still a long way to go. The Preparatory Committee had a responsibility to contribute to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and should make every effort to do so, in particular by trying to narrow the differences which still existed on such substantive questions as the nature, objectives and time-frame of the Programme. The informal working group could try to build on the results achieved in the Committee on Disarmament. That was another reason for hoping that it would be able to start work soon and that the Committee could formulate recommendations in time to help consideration of the Programme during the special session.

26. With respect to agenda item 5, he agreed that it was still too early to take a decision about the final document or documents of the special session. Such a decision depended on the work of the Preparatory Committee itself and he therefore hoped that time would be allowed for the question to be taken up at a later stage.

27. Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria) said the main task was to concentrate all efforts on halting the arms race and preventing nuclear war. There was now a new element in the international situation in the form of unprecedented public awareness of the danger. Popular support for an end to the arms race and for the initiation of immediate negotiations on reducing weapons of mass destruction provided a unique opportunity to break existing barriers and stimulate action. But that required the political will to solve problems and to seek ways of getting the process of disarmament moving. An important role could be played by a world disarmament campaign using a wide variety of ways and means to mobilize public opinion and generate the necessary political will.

28. The Preparatory Committee should therefore make every effort to facilitate the work of the special session and ensure its success. It should not, however, set its sights too high. All were aware that there were subjects which had been much discussed and on which there was very little chance of compromise before the special session itself. The Preparatory Committee could not do the work of the special session and should not try to draft on such subjects. But it could prepare a general outline of the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the tenth special session, as well as other documents. There were many difficult questions to be answered, but there was also room for substantive work which would greatly assist the special session in drawing up its final documents.

29. With regard to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, he agreed with those who had expressed concern and advised a careful approach in view of the complex and delicate work of the working group in the Committee on Disarmament. It might perhaps be advisable for that group to continue trying to overcome some of the difficulties which remained.

30. Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his country appreciated the role of the United Nations in seeking solutions to the problems of the arms race and disarmament and upholding international peace and security. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament must give a
new impulse to talks on specific problems and be a milestone on the road to
convening a World Disarmament Conference. That was all the more important because
it would take place in a much worse international situation.

31. International relations had reached a clearly defined parting of the ways
between the policy of strengthening peace and developing peaceful co-operation
among all States on the one hand, and the policy of inflaming the international
atmosphere, stepping up the arms race and wrecking normal relations between States
on the other. His country advocated making active use of all existing negotiating
machinery and renewing negotiations which had been broken off through no fault of
its own. It also thought it necessary to start talks on questions about which
there had been none so far but which required solution.

32. The negotiations between his country and the United States of America on
limiting nuclear weapons in Europe were particularly important. His country had
presented a whole package of constructive proposals, unilaterally declared a freeze
on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of its
territory and expressed its willingness to reduce a certain number of its
medium-range missiles as early as 1982 if there was no further sharpening of the
international situation. His country was also making energetic efforts at the
Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe.

33. The role of the Committee on Disarmament had grown substantially as a result
of certain States seeking to divert other negotiations on disarmament problems.
His country was advocating the speedy solution of those problems and the
achievement of tangible results which would reinforce the activity of the
Committee. It was extremely important to intensify the Committee's work on a
number of problems and for it to begin negotiations as soon as possible on such
urgent matters as nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive nuclear test ban,
prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons
and prohibiting the stationing of any kind of weapon in outer space. It was a
matter for satisfaction that the last session of the Committee had finally
succeeded in setting up an ad hoc working group for negotiations on a comprehensive
nuclear test ban, even though that body had a very limited mandate.

34. In between its two special sessions devoted to disarmament, the General
Assembly had adopted a number of important resolutions on various aspects of
disarmament. Those resolutions should all find reflection in the final document or
documents to be adopted by the forthcoming special session. His country also
attached great importance to the part played by the world public in averting the
threat of war and curbing the arms race. The disarmament movement was playing a
substantial part in creating the necessary conditions for States to take practical
steps to limit armaments and strengthen the political guarantees of peace. The
activities of peace-loving forces were acquiring great importance in the current
difficult international situation. That too should be duly reflected in the final
document or documents of the special session.
35. As for the work of the Preparatory Committee, attention should focus on drawing up a draft document for the special session's agenda item 9. The final text would of course be put together by the special session itself, but the Committee could agree on its structure, its component parts and its approximate length. It would be a good idea to try to formulate some parts of the document, for example, the part relating to the state of disarmament negotiations. Another important question was what shape the final document or documents should take. Some thought that the only final document should be the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament; many others took the view that the Programme should be only one component of the final document, but that raised the question of what the other component should be. Some thought that the special session should adopt several final documents, while others said that the Preparatory Committee need not concern itself with such matters. In his delegation's view, answers to those questions should be provided by the Preparatory Committee. After agreeing on the nature of the final document or documents, the Committee could also try to draw up provisional drafts for parts of them. There was not much time, so he supported the proposal to set up a working group or working groups as soon as possible. But before doing that, the Committee should agree clearly and precisely what the working group or groups and the Preparatory Committee as a whole were to prepare.

36. **Mr. MOUSSAOUI** (Algeria) said that his delegation endorsed much that had already been said by other members of the non-aligned group regarding the forthcoming Special Session itself. The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament remained the collective credo. Despite its inadequacies, it had been accepted by all States and contained many important ideas and fundamental principles governing the common task of disarmament. It should therefore be retained, while being at the same time consolidated and developed. The second special session should not question what had already been achieved but should rather seek out, define and adopt concrete measures that would promote the implementation of the Final Document.

37. Since all delegations were convinced of the Final Document's value, the Committee's first exercise should be to seek out the real cause of its non-implementation. It was only through a careful review of the accomplishments and failure of the last four years that the true lessons could be drawn and new measures defined.

38. The reasons for the non-implementation of the Final Document were many and varied. The Preparatory Committee, however, should concentrate on what was essential. In his delegation's view, two reasons were paramount. The first was the absence of any political will to embark seriously on disarmament. The melancholy impression after the efforts of the last few years was that certain quarters were more interested in maintaining the status quo than in finding a solution for the crucial questions of the time. Moreover, that status quo was increasingly being perpetuated through an ever-larger accumulation of ever-more dangerous weapons. The second reason was related to the nature of the disarmament measures themselves and in particular the content of the Final Document. The measures were too general, which made them inoperative, and the recommendations...
(Mr. Moussaoui, Algeria)

were too vague which made them easy to ignore. If the common objective, therefore, was to strengthen the Final Document, the validity of its content must be reaffirmed and a commitment made to its implementation. First of all, the nuclear powers must make a political commitment to work towards disarmament. Such a genuine political will would imply the acceptance of specific measures, forming part of a specific time-table, leading through successive phases and stages to the final goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Finally, to ensure that they were scrupulously implemented, the measures should be made binding. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament was thus vitally important not only to the success or failure of the Special Session but to the whole disarmament process.

39. The Algerian delegation did not regard the current deterioration in the international situation as serious grounds for blocking or postponing action which could and should be taken at once. On the contrary, it made it all the more important to act. The increasing danger made it more than ever necessary to seek out substantive solutions for the chronic and structural problems of the arms race and for avoiding a nuclear catastrophe. The idea of a nuclear freeze was timely, provided that it was taken as a point of departure and a guarantee offered that further steps would be taken.

40. As far as the work of the Preparatory Committee itself was concerned, since most procedural matters had been settled the Committee should devote itself to substantive preparations for the special session. A consensus could be achieved on the few organizational matters left pending through consultations and the good offices of the Bureau without lengthy debate. Accordingly, his delegation thought that, for the time being, it would be inadvisable to discuss the nature or the number of the principal document or documents to be adopted at the special session. An examination of the substance, and official and unofficial exchanges of views on the various aspects of the Committee's work, would help not only to clarify ideas but also to bring them closer together. The Algerian delegation was therefore in favour of concentrating on item 4 of the Committee's agenda. Theoretically, an exhaustive analysis would require a review of all the items on the special session's provisional agenda. Realistically, however, the Committee should concentrate on the most important points, namely the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The results of the Preparatory Committee's work would have to be passed on to the special session. In that connexion, flexibility with regard to its methods of work could be useful for making progress but it must not prove an obstacle later to consideration of the fruits of its labours.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.