PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

VIEWS OF MEMBER STATES ON THE AGENDA AND OTHER RELEVANT QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

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1. Our policy on the question of disarmament stems from our belief in the removal of the spectre of war, whether conventional or nuclear, from human society, in order to save mankind from the catastrophes and disasters which may befall it and from the possible destruction of human civilization and human progress in the various fields of civilized development. That is because the major Powers' persistence in producing and developing conventional and nuclear weapons will lead to:

   (a) Multiplication of the threat to international peace and security;
   (b) Heightening of the state of international tension and regional conflicts;
   (c) The recreation of alliance axes in the world;
   (d) An endeavour by States to obtain the best kinds of modern weapons, even at the expense of the well-being of their peoples, in order to confront the dangers threatening them.

2. The well-being of human society is linked to a large extent to economic and psychological factors. It would be better if it were achieved peacefully by use of the vast funds expended on armament. That would end the fever of world economic fluctuation and instability and consequently increase the economic stability of the international market. This would release human society from the factors of the financial inflation from which it currently suffers greatly. The other factor, the psychological factor, lies in the removal of the states of terror and fear from the human psyche by removing these causes for fear which consist in the spectre of nuclear war, nuclear terror and the fate of the world as a consequence of international tensions, particularly on the level of the sensitive relations between the great Powers.
LUXEMBOURG

[Original: French]
[16 April 1981]

1. The second special session will provide the world community with an opportunity to reflect on what has been achieved since 1978 in the field of disarmament and on the reasons why certain measures have not yet been achieved, to analyse the causes of the arms race and to consider further ways to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations approved at the first special session on disarmament.

Luxembourg considers it essential that this second special session should take full advantage of the work done at the first special session, including the work relating to institutional arrangements, which was concluded with the adoption by consensus of a Final Document. For Luxembourg, this continues to be the most comprehensive document on disarmament ever accepted by the world community. Therefore, it would wish that, in accordance with what has been solemnly affirmed by the General Assembly in the preamble of its resolution 35/47, the validity of this document should at the beginning of the second special session be unanimously reaffirmed as one of the basic presuppositions for the work of this second session.

2. In view of the responsibility which all States share for disarmament, Luxembourg trusts that the debates at the second special session will take place in a constructive atmosphere. Rather than merely emphasizing the lack of substantive progress in the field of disarmament, the second special session should, in the opinion of Luxembourg, take into account the complexity of the present international situation. It is only on the basis of a clear analysis of present circumstances that a constructive and forward-looking dialogue can take place on specific disarmament measures.

3. Luxembourg will participate in the second special session and will be guided by the following approach.

4. There is an undiminished, and indeed a growing need for arms control and disarmament. Certain deplorable recent developments threatening international security and increasing tensions in the world cannot change this important fact. A reversal of the arms race would also enhance the possibilities for transferring resources to solving the social and economic problems which are faced by all countries, particularly the poorest ones.
5. Arms control and disarmament cannot be seriously discussed in isolation from security interests; they should meet the specific needs of each region. Precisely because disarmament measures should enhance security, such measures must be verified effectively, make the remaining armaments situation more transparent and, finally, contribute to the strengthening of confidence between the countries concerned. Concrete steps towards building of confidence among States and towards improvement of the methods of verification can help to prepare the ground for reaching arms control agreements. Consequently, instead of being merely declaratory in nature, international discussions on arms control and disarmament should focus on proposals which meet these criteria. The second special session should take this approach to arms control and disarmament efforts as its starting-point.

6. Luxembourg considers that the measures to be adopted in the coming years should take into account the need to avoid the destabilizing effects of the nuclear arms race and to curtail that race, while respecting the principle of undiminished security for all States. An important contribution to this would be concrete, balanced and verifiable limitations on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. High priority should also be accorded to maintaining and, if necessary, strengthening the international non-proliferation régime. An important contribution to both objectives would be successful negotiations with the aim of reaching a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

7. In the opinion of Luxembourg, considerable effort should also be allocated to achieve progress in the negotiations for treaties prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction, and prohibiting the development, production and use of radiological weapons.

8. The second special session should give particular attention to the considerable increase in conventional armaments. In view of the legitimate right of sovereign States to take measures for their own defence, efforts seem well justified to reduce the present levels of conventional armaments in a number of regions, taking into account the specific conditions of these regions.

9. A number of specific disarmament proposals have been successfully presented to the General Assembly during the last few years by individual States of the European Community. In this connexion, Luxembourg has noted with interest a United Nations study on regional disarmament, and it looks forward to the results of the United Nations studies on confidence-building measures and on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency. Those studies originated from proposals by Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. Luxembourg is very interested in the United Nations study on conventional disarmament, initiated by Denmark and approved by the General Assembly at its
thirty-fifth session. It welcomes the implementation of a proposal by France concerning the establishment of a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Lastly, Luxembourg is interested in the completion of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development and in the activities which have been entrusted to the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts in the field of military budgets, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 35/142 B, which was supported by Luxembourg and its partners in the European Community.

10. As regards the agenda of the second special session, Luxembourg considers that it could be as follows:

I. Procedural questions

II. General debate

III. Review of the implementation of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament:

(a) Discussion of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament

(b) Discussion on recommendations from and follow-up to studies initiated by the first special session on disarmament and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly

(c) Discussion on any other suggestions with regard to disarmament

IV. Present and future institutional arrangements in the field of disarmament

V. Adoption of a resolution or a final report of proceedings which should, inter alia, contain a reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, a comprehensive programme of disarmament and concrete proposals.

MEXICO

Original: Spanish
3 April 1981

1. One of the fundamental items of the agenda of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will undoubtedly have to be the consideration and adoption of a "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". This is clear from the emphasis given by the Assembly to the relevant passages of paragraph 109 of the Final Document of 1978. As we know, after stressing that general and complete disarmament under effective international control "remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament" and noting that "negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament", the paragraph
went on to state: "With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations, including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme".

What is more, the Disarmament Commission, in its recommendations to the General Assembly at the thirty-fifth regular session, which the Assembly endorsed in its resolution 35/152 F of 12 December 1980, recalled that the comprehensive programme for disarmament has been recognized as "an important element in an international disarmament strategy" and should be adopted "no later than the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled for 1982".

2. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance for the special Assembly to adopt and open for signature a treaty, multilaterally negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament, on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. Indeed, this is a question which has been examined by the United Nations for more than a quarter of a century and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 40 resolutions. It is a basic objective in the sphere of disarmament, to whose attainment the Assembly has repeatedly assigned the highest priority. Moreover, on seven different occasions, it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that "the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war".

Finally, it is also appropriate to point out, as the General Assembly has done in its resolution 35/145 A of 12 December 1980, something which we sometimes tend to forget, namely, that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, undertook in that Treaty, almost 20 years ago, "to seek the achievement of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The obvious failure of those States to comply with that undertaking led the Secretary-General to conclude that "if nuclear-weapon tests by the nuclear Povers continue, the future credibility and perhaps even the viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty achieved after such painstaking efforts may be jeopardized". The soundness of that view has been confirmed by the failure of the recent second conference to review the operation of the Treaty.

3. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should serve as a framework for the official launching of the "World Disarmament Campaign". At its thirty-fifth session, the Assembly adopted resolution 33/152 I concerning the organization and financing of that Campaign under United Nations
auspices. The Campaign constitutes an undertaking which could have decisive results in achieving the very important goal defined in the Final Document of the first special session as mobilizing public opinion on behalf of disarmament.

Since Mexico is a member of the Preparatory Committee for the second special session devoted to disarmament, it is the intention of the Mexican Government, through its representative on the Committee, to present the further observations and comments it deems appropriate in the light of the progress of the Preparatory Committee's work.

PORTUGAL

[Original: English]
[16 April 1981]

The Second Special Session constitutes the logical and normal continuation of the First Special Session - the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. In the Portuguese Government's opinion, the Final Document adopted by consensus by the Assembly at its Tenth Special Session should provide the framework for this Session.

The ultimate purpose of the Second Special Session must be the consolidation and strengthening of international security. It is essential that the recommendations to member States, that will come out of this Session, be concrete and realistic.

It would seem that the Assembly should have two main objectives:

- A realistic collective reflection on the evolution of the process of Disarmament, particularly since the end of the First Special Session on Disarmament;

- To prepare and adopt recommendations to Member States that will lead to progress in the disarmament field.

The first objective can be attained through a review of the implementation of the recommendations of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. This review should pay attention not only to the concretization of the objectives of the Final Document but also to the main reasons that have precluded bigger progress in this field. It would also be useful to review the activity of the multilateral organs that work on arms control and disarmament, evaluating their efficacy and, when necessary and possible, suggesting ways and means of increasing it.

The second objective may be attained by the careful consideration of the new proposals that Member States will present to the Assembly and also by those proposals included in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session that, given the present realities of the international situation, could contribute to the furthering of the objectives of disarmament.
In the opinion of the Portuguese Government, the agenda of the Second Special Session should include the following items:

- Procedural questions
- General debate
- Review of the implementation of the recommendations of the Tenth Special Session
- Consideration of new proposals
- Approval of a final report.

The general debate will constitute a good opportunity for a first joint appraisal of the global aspects of disarmament.

My Government is of the opinion that the review of the implementation of the recommendations of the Tenth Special Session should be done globally, either by chapters of the Final Document or by groupings of paragraphs with the same subject matter.

As for new proposals, it is important to consider the studies made on the initiative of the United Nations, particularly those whose conclusions make possible the formulation of new proposals in the field of disarmament.

The Portuguese Government is of the opinion that for greater efficiency, the Assembly might establish committees or working groups to deal with certain items in the Agenda (e.g. "Review of the implementation of the recommendations of the Tenth Special Session" and "Consideration of new proposals"). It is important that these committees or working groups should be open to all members of the Assembly, respecting the right of every country to participate in the discussions and negotiations on disarmament as stated in paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session.

A drafting committee could be established later on, to prepare a document (or documents) embodying the decisions of the Plenary. This document (or documents) would then be presented to the Assembly, for approval.

As happened in the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly the rule should be the approval by consensus, particularly in substantive matters. These questions are closely related to the security of States, which means that decisions taken can only have a useful and practical effect if they are accepted by all interested States.

The decisions of the Assembly should be incorporated in the final report of the meeting. If agreement has not been reached over any substantive matter over which, however, it is felt that enough progress has been made, the document should reflect the main tendencies that came forward during the debate. The Government of Portugal sees no need for any attempt to amend or reformulate the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, a very comprehensive document that was accepted by the whole world community.
The Preparatory Committee, created by resolution 35/47, should deal with organizational and procedural matters. The discussion there of substantive matters that could affect the security of States which are not members of the Preparatory Committee is against the principle set down in paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS*

[Original: Russian]
[27 April 1981]

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, this international gathering will be particularly significant because preparations for it are beginning in the context of an international situation which has become seriously complicated.

The continuing build-up of armaments, including the most dangerous kinds - nuclear armaments, is outstripping efforts to curtail this process. The talk on a number of specific arms limitation and disarmament questions have - through no fault at all of the Soviet Union - been interrupted or suspended. This also applies to the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks.

In these conditions, the task of curbing the arms race is becoming increasingly urgent. Everything possible must be done to mobilize States' efforts to achieve practical results in this area.

In the Soviet Union, there is recognition of the rightful role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and appreciation of the contribution being made by the Organization in the search for solutions to the questions involved in the limitation of the arms race and in the achievement of disarmament.

In our view, useful work along these lines was done in 1978 at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in the preparation and conduct of which the Soviet Union took a most active part. The Final Document adopted at that session laid a fairly good basis for States' disarmament activities in the years ahead.

The Soviet Union was among the first to respond to the decisions of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and made a number of proposals designed to put an end to the arms race. A generalized statement of these was given in the letter dated 11 April 1980 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the tasks of the second disarmament decade and in the memorandum submitted to the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees". All these proposals, many of which were approved in the United Nations, are still valid.

* Also issued under the symbol A/36/226.
At the recent Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L. I. Brezhnev, put forward a broad selection of new and constructive proposals on questions concerning arms limitation and military détente.

These proposals relate to nuclear missiles and conventional weapons, and land, sea and air forces. They concern the situation in Europe and in the Near, Middle and Far East. Reference is made in them to measures of both a political and military character. All these proposals combine one single aim and one general thrust - to do everything possible to remove peoples from the threat of nuclear war and to preserve peace on earth.

An important role in the implementation of some of the new Soviet proposals could also be played by the United Nations.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament can and should provide further stimulus for talks on the specific and pressing questions of arms limitation and disarmament. It is also important that it should be a landmark on the road to the convening of a World Disarmament Conference.

It is the view of the Soviet Union that the agenda for the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly should provide for a general exchange of views on the position with regard to arms limitation and on the progress made in the implementation of the decisions of the first special session of the General Assembly; a discussion of new initiatives by States Members of the United Nations; and the adoption of the relevant final document or documents.

If all States Members of the United Nations adopt a responsible approach and display the necessary political will, the forthcoming special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be able to make a worthy contribution to the curtailment of the dangerous arms race. This is particularly true of strategic weapons. The Soviet Union, for its part, is prepared to do everything to promote this goal.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Original: English]
[10 April 1981]

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will provide the world community with an opportunity to review what has been achieved since 1978 in the field of disarmament and to consider why progress has been so slow. It could also analyse the causes of the arms race and consider further ways to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations agreed at the first Special Session on Disarmament. The United Kingdom considers it essential that this second Special Session should take full advantage of the work already
done by the first Special Session devoted to disarmament, which concluded with the adoption by consensus of a Final Document. This Final Document continues to be the most comprehensive document on disarmament ever accepted by the world community. The United Kingdom considers that, in accordance with the preamble to resolution 35/47, the validity of this document should be unanimously reaffirmed at the beginning of the second Special Session as one of the starting points for its work.

In view of the responsibility which all States share for disarmament, the United Kingdom trusts that the debates at the second Special Session will take place in a constructive atmosphere. It will serve little purpose simply to emphasize the lack of substantive progress since the second Special Session. The discussions should take into account the full complexity of the present international situation. Only on the basis of a clear understanding of the present situation can a constructive and forward looking dialogue take place on specific disarmament measures.

The United Kingdom will, of course, participate actively in the second Special Session. Its participation will be constructive and forward looking, and will be guided by the following basic approach.

There is an undiminished, indeed growing, need for arms control and disarmament. Recent deplorable events, which have threatened international security and increased tensions cannot change this important fact. A reversal of the arms race would also increase the possibilities for reallocating resources to the social and economic problems which are faced by all countries, particularly the poorest ones.

Discussion of arms control and disarmament must take account of security interests and the specific requirements of each region. Disarmament measures should enhance security. Such measures must be verified effectively, encourage openness on military matters and contribute to the strengthening of confidence between the countries concerned. They can thus help to prepare the ground for specific arms control agreements. International discussions on arms control and disarmament should focus on proposals which meet these criteria, rather than on declaratory measures.

Negotiations to control the growth of nuclear weapons must take into account the need for balanced and undiminished security for all States. An important contribution would be concrete, balanced and verifiable limitations on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. High priority should also be accorded to maintaining and, where necessary, strengthening the international non-proliferation régime. An important contribution to both objectives would be successful negotiations with the aim of reaching a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Considerable effort should also be devoted to achieving progress in the negotiations for treaties prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction as well as the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
The Special Session should give particular attention to the considerable increase in conventional armaments. Taking into account the legitimate right of sovereign States to take measures for their own defence, there seems to be a strong case for reducing the present levels of conventional armaments in a number of regions.

The United Kingdom has noted with interest the various disarmament studies commissioned since the first Special Session, most of which will be concluded before the second Special Session. Appropriate attention should be given to these.

AGENDA

The United Kingdom proposes the following agenda for the second Special Session.

(i) Procedural questions
(ii) General debate
(iii) Review of the implementation of the programme of action of the Final Document of the first Special Session on Disarmament:
    (a) discussion on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament
    (b) discussion on recommendations from and follow-up to studies initiated by the first Special Session on Disarmament and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly
    (c) discussion on any other suggestions with regard to disarmament
(iv) Present and future institutional arrangements in the field of disarmament
(v) Acceptance of a resolution or a final report of proceedings which should, inter alia, contain a reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first Special Session on Disarmament, an agreed comprehensive programme of disarmament and concrete proposals.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

After the General Debate a Committee of the Whole might be established to deal with Agenda Items III and IV. Agenda Item V might be discussed in a separate committee.
When the United States joined all other members of the United Nations in supporting the convening in 1982 of a Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, it did so in recognition of the importance that the international community attaches to the question of arms control and disarmament. It is a question which involves directly key interests of all nations, including their national security and their economic well-being.

The First Special Session on Disarmament established a basis for progress in international arms limitation. In its final document the international community articulated principles and goals of arms control, adopted a program of action, and set up machinery to deal systematically with arms control issues. In the view of the United States it would be a mistake to utilize the time of the Second Special Session to seek agreement on a similar final document. The product of our intensive discussions and negotiations at the First Special Session remains valid, and it is unlikely that a new effort to go beyond what it contains would prove useful at this time. We are convinced that the goals identified at the last special session were essentially correct and that machinery adequate to the task of furthering multilateral arms control was put in place.

The United States believes that it would be most useful for the Special Session in 1982 to turn its attention to effective steps which could help relax existing international tensions and begin to restore the level of confidence required if the process of arms control negotiation is to move forward. We do not need a further proliferation of proposals and mechanisms, but an evaluation of what practical steps can be taken to create an international climate which would facilitate progress in arms control.

As the Second Special Session on Disarmament convenes, it will be apparent to all participants that progress toward the agreed goals of multilateral arms control has not been as rapid as had been hoped. The reasons are not hard to find. In many respects progress has been limited by the sheer size of the task the international community has set for itself. Other difficulties are the technical complexity of the issues to be resolved and the precedent-setting nature of the agreements that are being sought.

Perhaps most important, however, has been the deterioration in the international climate since 1978. Especially in the security field, little progress toward mutually acceptable agreements can be made without the assurance that at least a set of common goals exists. Unfortunately, the world today is one in which trust and confidence among nations has been shattered in a number of regions. In South Asia the developing nation of Afghanistan has been invaded by its giant neighbor, the Soviet Union, and had its government overthrown and its prime minister murdered. Tens of thousands of Soviet troops still occupy that once non-aligned country against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its
people and the members of the United Nations, while additional thousands remain
poised just across the Soviet border. In Europe the Soviet Union has deployed its
military forces and engaged in political intimidation in such a way as to seriously
threaten the ability of Poland to solve its internal problems free of outside
interference. Other situations could be cited in South East Asia, Africa and
Latin America. Thus the Soviet Union, while proclaiming its devotion to
dismantlement and hypocritically proliferating fictional disarmament proposals, has
seriously jeopardized the possibility of real progress on arms control through its
flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and other solemn international
commitments.

There is other evidence of resort to the use of force or threats of force
in contravention of the Charter, including cases in which Member States of the
United Nations are engaged in active hostilities against each other. All of these
actions obviously impede the arms control process, which cannot be divorced from
the broader political and military behavior of the parties involved. Moreover,
the trend they represent casts doubt on the international community's ability to
deal with its problems through negotiation rather than reliance on force.

Much was said at the special session in 1978 and has been said since about
the dangers of the arms race. But arms control cannot proceed in a vacuum.
Unfortunately, despite admirable intentions and fine words heard from all quarters
at the First Special Session, the Soviet Union has proceeded at an alarming pace
to build up its military capacity to levels far greater than required for national
defense or justified by the arms levels of any potential adversary. The fact
that others, including the United States, are now acting to redress the balance
and ensure their own defenses should cause neither surprise nor criticism.

The United States has long held the view that progress in arms control can
best be achieved through the adoption of a series of specific practical measures,
limited in scope. We have also consistently emphasized the importance of adequate
verification because we are certain that confidence in the arms control process can
only be maintained through an ability realistically to assure that agreements
are being honored, and that concerned states are prepared to consult and
co-operate whenever questions of compliance arise. We believe that the need for
such an approach is even more apparent in the current situation when the essential
first step is to defuse suspicion and restore confidence in the effectiveness of a
co-operative effort.

In the United States view every arms control agreement must include
provisions for adequately verifying compliance. There are a number of ways to
ensure adequate verification, and the provisions will vary according to the nature
of the agreement; what is effective in one case may fall far short of providing
the necessary assurance in another case. But effective verification is an
essential feature if an agreement is to achieve its objective of enhancing the
security of the parties and thus contribute to the maintenance of international
peace and security. Agreements which lack this essential underpinning, on the
other hand, could undermine confidence and prove to be destabilizing. To cite
just one example, the reports of the use of chemical weapons in ongoing conflicts

/...
and the existence of large stocks of such weapons demonstrate clearly that systematic verification will have to be part of any future chemical weapons prohibition. Given the importance of the subject, the United States believes that the need for effective verification in all areas of arms control should be given the most serious attention at the Assembly's special session in 1982.

The United States expects all nations to fulfill their treaty obligations and will continue to insist upon strict compliance with existing and future arms control treaties and agreements. One purpose is to promote better international trust and confidence in arms control agreements and to restore integrity and viability to the arms control negotiating process. We are confident that other nations will want to assist in this effort to seek better compliance, adequate verification and effective means for building confidence.

In this connexion, it would contribute significantly to increasing confidence among nations if there were a greater openness concerning such matters as military expenditures and activities. It is to be hoped that the special session will be able to encourage moves in this direction on the part of those governments that have shown little willingness up to now to increase the international community's and their own publics' access to such information.

Moreover, the United States supports properly designed confidence-building measures that, in the light of particular regional security situations, would help to ease tension and increase international security in times of crisis and would, in particular, provide more reliable assurance against surprise attack or military intimidation.

In sum, the United States remains committed to the proposition that enhanced security for all can be obtained through effective, verifiable agreements seeking progressively lower levels of armament. Our support for a careful, step-by-step approach toward these objectives, and our concern over the destructive effects on the arms control process when force is used or threatened in international relations, are evidence of our commitment to this process.

The success of the special session in the view of the United States, will depend in large measure on the degree to which we engage ourselves in serious, orderly and realistic consideration of the many complex issues that confront us and eschew the rhetorical, the impractical, and the superficial. The interests of none of us are served nor our countries rendered more secure by the substitution of declaratory and propagandistic proposals for balanced, stabilizing and verifiable measures that offer genuine prospects of being effective. Nor would we permit ourselves to gloss over our legitimate differences of view on difficult issues in a mistaken attempt to give the appearance of resolving problems which in fact remain.

The United States is currently reviewing all elements of United States security policy, including those arms control and disarmament issues that will be addressed at the General Assembly's special session in 1982. The United States will approach the special session in light of this review and looks forward to joining with other delegations in the Assembly in the search for ways to make genuine progress toward the goal of strengthening international peace and security through realistic and effective arms control.