PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SECOND
SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

VIEWS OF MEMBER STATES ON THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE
SECOND SPECIAL SESSION

Report of the Secretary-General

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INTRODUCTION

1. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted, under the item entitled "Second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", resolution 36/81 A, the operative part of which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Endorses the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and the recommendations contained therein for the special session, to be held from 7 June to 9 July 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

"2. Endorses also the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee to meet in New York from 26 April to 14 May 1982 in order to continue consideration of substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at the second special session devoted to disarmament, and any remaining organizational and procedural matters;

"3. Expresses its appreciation to the members of the Preparatory Committee for their constructive contribution to its work;

"4. Invites Member States to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1982, further views on the substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session;

"5. Requests all Member States engaged in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues outside the framework of the United Nations to submit appropriate information on such negotiations to the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, before its second session devoted to disarmament;

"6. Requests the Secretary-General to render the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance for the completion of its work."

2. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Secretary-General submits herewith the replies received from Member States concerning their further views on the substantive issues related to the special session, including the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the Assembly at its tenth special session.
REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

BRAZIL

[Original: English]
[31 March 1982]

It is the considered opinion of the Brazilian Government that the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament should be seen by the international community as a whole and the great Powers in particular as a propitious occasion for resuming negotiations that will lead to concrete disarmament measures, putting an end to the climate of confrontation that has characterized the debate between the two military blocs in recent years, both in the United Nations and elsewhere. It was with the objective of setting the basis for a reversal of the present trend as far as the great Powers are concerned that Brazil sponsored resolution 36/81 B, which, in paragraph 1, urges the nuclear States to submit their proposals for the prevention of a nuclear war to the examination of the second special session. We thus hope that the nuclear-weapon States will appear at the second special session disposed to carry on a constructive dialogue, so that the meetings will be prevented from deteriorating into a futile exercise in rhetoric.

We are also hoping for a point-by-point inspection of the international scene, which has progressively deteriorated ever since the first special session on disarmament, thus impeding the implementation of the recommendations adopted by consensus on that occasion. In this context, it is up to the second special session to reaffirm the understanding expressed in the Final Document, to which we subscribed, to the effect that international peace and security are incompatible with economic inequality among peoples, special emphasis being laid on the conclusions drawn by the study on disarmament and development.

The second special session should devote itself to two specific tasks: evaluating the implementation of the recommendations made by the first special session and adopting a comprehensive programme for disarmament. As far as the first task is concerned, it should be pointed out, first of all, that this does not imply re-examining the contents of the Final Document. However, it must necessarily be recorded that there has been no progress in the field of disarmament since the document was adopted almost four years ago. We are obliged to recognize, as well, that in a world of spiralling armaments the absence of progress, in practice, means we are actually losing ground, so that, as of today, the objectives we were aiming toward in the Final Document of 1978 are farther away than ever.

Facing this situation realistically, the process of reviewing the implementation of the recommendations of the first special session should lead to a review of the institutional machinery created in 1978. The background for this review should be provided by paragraph 45 of the Final Document, in which the priority objectives of the process of general and complete disarmament are enumerated. For this purpose, it will be necessary for us to consider with the greatest attention not only the contribution that the negotiating body should continue to make, but also the formulation of eventual guidelines that will reactivate the negotiations on priority items of its agenda, since these
negotiations have been virtually stalemated from the very beginning. We believe that this review of the institutional machinery will result in strengthening the role of the United Nations in conducting disarmament negotiations. Nevertheless such strengthening should not lead to a proliferation or a significant restructuring of the bodies that deal with disarmament, since we are convinced that the difficulties the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission have had in carrying out their assignments are less attributable to possible structural defects than to the attitude of some nuclear-weapon States.

The adoption of the comprehensive programme for disarmament should be undertaken in the context of a critical evaluation of the implementation of the programme of action of the Final Document. We view the comprehensive programme on disarmament as a document that should furnish a broad pattern for future negotiations on disarmament, with flexible time frames, respecting the priorities established by the first special session. We have participated in the negotiations held in the working group on the comprehensive programme on disarmament, under the Committee on Disarmament, and we trust that the results of these negotiations adequately reflect the positions, to which we subscribe, of the group of nations that do not belong to military alliances.

The general positions of Brazil on disarmament in essence coincide with those of the large majority of Member States of the United Nations, particularly as regards the absolute priority we ascribe to nuclear disarmament, beginning with the negotiation of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests. In this context we have insisted on the need to prevent technological advances from being placed at the service of the arms race, and on the promotion of international co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Negotiations on the other disarmament topics should not, in our understanding, obscure this fundamental priority, unequivocally expressed in so many documents and resolutions, and reflecting the aspirations of all peoples without exception. There is no need to reiterate the responsibility that rests with the great Powers for the reversal of the arms race and for nuclear disarmament. Although we are in favour of negotiating processes open to participation by all nations wishing to contribute to the search for viable solutions, we hope that this second session will stimulate the two great Powers to resume substantive bilateral negotiations.

Brazil took part in the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the second special session on disarmament and, at that time, commented on the procedural and substantive aspects of the work to be undertaken by the delegations that will attend the special session to be held next June. We had the occasion to voice our ear that the second special session may become the stage for rhetorical declamations with the result that measures that should already have been adopted will be further postponed until some vague, constantly receding date in the future. In commenting on the holding of the second special session, we express our willingness to help the second special session to accomplish its tasks, and bring about general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as is the manifest desire of the international community.
CUBA

[Original: Spanish]

[22 March 1982]

The Republic of Cuba reaffirms its wholehearted support for the Final Document adopted by the tenth special session on disarmament, having joined in the consensus at that time, and particularly for paragraph 119, which states that a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held. The objectives underlying that idea are closely related to those of paragraph 122, which states that at the earliest appropriate time a world disarmament conference should be convened, with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

The Republic of Cuba has likewise warmly endorsed the draft resolutions relating to the 1982 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament submitted at the thirty-third, thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly and, through its representatives, has taken an active part in the meetings of the Preparatory Committee established to ensure the success of that special session.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is to be held at a time when, in the view of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, the international situation is grave in the extreme and when international peace and security are seriously in jeopardy, owing to the aggressive and war-mongering policy pursued by reactionary forces set against peace and hostile to our peoples, under the leadership of the Government of the United States, whose attitude has become even more negative and inimical to peace and international security since the coming to power of the Reagan Administration.

Against such a background, the second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982 must be a forum in which all the States which make up the international community will bring to the study of the currently difficult and complex international situation the necessary political will to negotiate measures which will effectively implement the agreements reached and the objective set at the tenth special session on disarmament and achieve an advance towards the general and complete disarmament under effective international control called for daily by our peoples.

It is the view of the Government of the Republic of Cuba that the essential task of the special session devoted to disarmament in June/July of this year should be to adopt, by means of a consensus of all States, a series of measures taking as their foundation the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, whose validity as the major policy document on disarmament is unquestionable. Those measures should establish acceptable parameters for the issues involved, in an objective, realistic and balanced manner, taking into consideration the interests of all States and not compromising the security of any State, and impose limitations and subsequent reductions in arms, together with future agreements on bans in specific areas, by means of and as a consequence of the talks or negotiations already going on or any which may be embarked upon at a future date. They should also obtain commitments from all States to strive wholeheartedly towards the central objective of halting...
the arms race, bringing about disarmament and achieving a peace which will be effective in all regions and enjoyed by all peoples, throughout the world.

Thus the Government of the Republic of Cuba regards it as extremely important that the substantive results of the special session devoted to disarmament should include the adoption of a comprehensive programme for disarmament.

Bearing in mind the recommendatory nature of the decisions and resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Government of the Republic of Cuba considers that it would be highly desirable to convene a world conference, with universal participation and with adequate preparation, at an early date following the second special session devoted to disarmament, so as to enable all States to conclude formal and binding agreements on effective disarmament measures.

CYPRUS

[Original: English]
[8 April 1982]

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, meeting in an atmosphere of a worsening world situation and confronted by the lack of any progress towards disarmament, becomes even more crucial and of more vital significance than the one held in 1978.

This session should squarely address itself to the issues in the Final Document of the first special session, take urgently needed steps to improve the current international situation and adopt measures for the effective cessation of the arms race leading to disarmament.

In this respect the Final Document in its Declaration states in paragraph 13: "Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control." ...

In dealing with the problem of priorities, Cyprus has always held, and believes, that there can be no agreed reduction or control of armaments while the arms race goes on. It is not reasonable to expect shedding of arms while the arms race continues unabated and more sophisticated weapons of destruction are produced.

If the ultimate goal of disarmament is to be achieved the system for the successful maintenance of international peace and security as provided for by the Charter must be established.

Disarmament cannot be conceivably promoted without setting into motion the system for international security.

As a result of the United Nations being rendered unable since its establishment to provide the system for international peace and security, the /...
international community was led into the doctrines of "balance of power" and "nuclear deterrence", doctrines which are within the concept of the use of force, contrary to the express prohibition of the Charter, and which engender and perpetuate the arms race.

These doctrines, far from being conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security, are totally negative, run counter to the security of States and to the Charter which aims at harmonizing international relations towards collective security and peace.

It has consistently been the position of Cyprus over the years that the Security Council must be given the means for enforcement action in the maintenance of peace and security through the availability of a United Nations force, as called for by the Charter. Speaking at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, on the admission of Cyprus to the United Nations, Ambassador Zenon Rossides said "We look forward to the time when an effective military force at the command of the United Nations will be a guarantee of peace and freedom in the world." Such development, which would act as a catalyst against the arms race, is unfortunately still lacking, and nations do not easily abandon their arms competition or defence needs in a vacuum, without effective safeguards to their security through the United Nations.

The Security Council has the responsibility and the duty to establish the relevant system by proceeding to take measures for enforcing its decisions, in compliance with basic provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

Renewed efforts should also be exerted at the second special session to strictly adhere to the principles of non-use of force in international relations, to peaceful settlement of disputes among States, and for the effective implementation of its resolution. On the latter, Cyprus reiterates its proposal for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions.

The establishment of zones of peace at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zones should be promoted. Cyprus, along with the other non-aligned European and other Mediterranean countries, supports the establishment of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean.

Furthermore, the deliberations in the second special session should seek means to achieve progress on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme for disarmament, and on all other aspects of disarmament where general agreement is possible.

Committed to the goal that general and complete disarmament should become a reality, Cyprus reiterates the proposal made by its President H.E. Mr. Spyros Kyprianou at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, for the complete disarmament and demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus with the presence only of an international police force for as long as necessary to strengthen, if necessary, the sense of security of all Cypriots.
FINLAND

[Original: English]
[31 March 1982]

In its reply to the Secretary-General on 30 March 1981 (A/AC.206/2) Finland put forth its views on the agenda and other relevant questions relating to the second special session on disarmament. Further, a working paper submitted by Finland to the Preparatory Committee of the special session on 11 May 1981 (A/AC.206/12) contained, inter alia, a general assessment of the implementation of the Final Document of the first special session. The working paper was presented with a view to contributing to the preparations of the special session and dealt with the main negotiating processes, both bilateral and multilateral, as well as regional disarmament efforts.

In addition to these substantive views, Finland would like to make the following observations in response to the Secretary-General's note.

The present international situation serves to underline the importance on the forthcoming special session. Policies of confrontation and lack of trust have brought disarmament negotiations to a virtual halt. Arms negotiations are fewer and results almost non-existent. Tension has mounted, and the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, is accelerating and assuming new dimensions technologically, geographically and conceptually.

Because of the prevailing situation, concerted efforts by the international community are urgently needed to arrest the trends of increasing tensions and accelerating arms race. Within the limits of its competence, the General Assembly is, by virtue of its universality, in a unique position to mobilize and unify the opinion of the world community. The institution of special sessions devoted to disarmament has further underlined that role of the General Assembly.

It is not within the purview of the special session to attempt to negotiate concrete disarmament measures. Instead, it should provide generally conceived impetus to arms control and disarmament efforts. For this purpose, the session's approach should therefore be pragmatic, forward-looking and comprehensive. The principle of consensus is essential in that respect.

Important arms control negotiations are under way in Europe concerning both intermediate range nuclear forces and conventional forces. The resumption of talks on limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms is, however, long overdue. Progress before the special session in arms limitation talks, particularly on nuclear arms, would significantly enhance the prospects of the session. It is to be regretted that negotiated results, bilateral or multilateral, are not in sight. It is vital, however, that the agreements so far achieved be preserved and strengthened and that an international consensus on principles, priorities and future measures be further developed. The consensus reached on the Final Document at the first special session is a foundation for this.

/...
On the basis of a review and assessment of the present situation, the main task of the special session will be to design a disarmament strategy for the forthcoming years. The adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, currently under elaboration in the Committee on Disarmament, will obviously be a major component in that task.

As a member of the Preparatory Committee of the special session, Finland has welcomed the progress achieved in the preparations of the special session. The agreement reached on a draft agenda of the session marks a first step towards a successful outcome of the session.

Finland is prepared to give its contribution at the final session of the Preparatory Committee to be held from 26 April to 14 May 1982 to the further consideration of substantive issues and the remaining organizational and procedural matters.

HUNGARY

[Original: English]
[5 April 1982]

Referring to resolution 36/81 A of the United Nations General Assembly on its second special session devoted to disarmament, I should like to inform you of the following:

The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has always attached great importance to disarmament activity within the framework of the United Nations and, according to its possibilities, has endeavoured to promote its effectiveness.

The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978 marked an outstanding stage of this activity. The Final Document, which was adopted by consensus and covered the whole spectrum of disarmament issues, laid down principles and aims which are still valid today.

As a result of the preparatory work to the second special session on disarmament to be held this year, an understanding has been reached concerning a provisional agenda which will allow for consideration and determination of concrete disarmament tasks and measures.

The Hungarian Government expects the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament

- to contribute to removing the danger of war;
- to promote disarmament talks, including the resumption of suspended negotiations;
- to adopt a programme in furtherance of disarmament; and
- to mobilize world public opinion for disarmament.

/...
1. The Hungarian Government believes it to be the most important task of the special session to help ward off the danger of war, especially of a nuclear war.

In our days this is all the more necessary since the policy of imperialism seeking to obtain military superiority serves to increase international tension and the danger of war by its unprecedented nuclear buildup and by dangerous doctrines concerning the use of nuclear weapons.

There exists a reasonable alternative to that course, namely the strengthening of international security through disarmament instead of through arms buildup.

The road of disarmament is not a smooth one, as it affects the fundamental security interests of States, but our age offers no other choice for mankind.

2. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic believes in the need for States to return from the road of confrontation to the road of disarmament negotiations, because elimination of the threat of a nuclear war cannot be imagined otherwise. The Hungarian Government wishes to reaffirm its interest in the promotion of disarmament and in the resumption of the disarmament talks suspended recently. In particular, it attaches paramount importance and significance to the resumption of negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments and on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The Hungarian Government is of the view that promotion of the cause of disarmament is essential not only to the strengthening of international security but also to progress in the solution both of the economic and social tasks of nations and of the global problems of mankind through utilization of the human and material resources to be released by disarmament.

Therefore, promotion of the cause of disarmament is in the interest of all peoples and hence a duty of every Government.

3. The special session should focus attention on elaborating effective disarmament measures, on reaching an understanding to that effect.

The special session should adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament containing co-ordinated measures for the cessation of the arms race and for a stage-by-stage realization of genuine disarmament.

As far as questions of procedure and the disarmament machinery are concerned, the session should keep in view that the failure to make progress in the past period was due not to the shortcomings of the organs dealing with disarmament but to the lack of political will on the part of certain States. Consequently, a radical change is needed not in respect of the organs dealing with disarmament but of summoning the necessary political will.

In the view of the Hungarian Government, the existing disarmament machinery is satisfactory, its structure and functions are equal to the requirements, provide an appropriate framework for disarmament activity in respect of both deliberation and negotiations. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament, within the framework of
the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the Secretariat, adequately fulfils its tasks and effectively promotes the work of both the negotiating organs and the deliberating forums.

The major task is to make a rational and more effective use of these organs, an endeavour which it is hoped will receive sufficient stimulus from the special session.

The session should contribute to the convening of a world disarmament conference, which would be a significant step towards adoption of effective disarmament measures.

4. World public opinion has a great role to play in furthering the cause of disarmament and implementing a comprehensive disarmament programme.

The increase in international tension and the growing danger of war have already motivated action by public opinion in many countries. The special session of the United Nations General Assembly should itself serve to increase public awareness of the danger of the arms race and of the need for effective action against it throughout the world.

This aim may also be served by measures like the launching of a World Disarmament Campaign and a world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, curb the arms race, and for disarmament.

INDIA

[Original: English]

[8 February 1982]

... has the honour to transmit the Government of India's views on the substantive issues related to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and suggestions for the prevention of nuclear war.

2. In India's view, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will need to build on the Final Document of the first special session. The adoption of the Final Document by consensus was a unique, significant and unprecedented development. It is noteworthy that this document covered the whole range of questions in the field of disarmament, and was able to secure the support of the entire membership of the United Nations. The adoption of the Final Document, therefore, marked a truly historic landmark in disarmament efforts, and an epoch-making event in the forging of an international disarmament strategy.

3. The work of the second special session will need to be organized as part of humanity's continuing quest for attaining the internationally agreed goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control with the highest priority being accorded to the objectives of nuclear disarmament and elimination of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
4. Since the existence of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to the very survival of mankind, world public opinion is increasingly veering to the view that the entire disarmament process leading up to the cherished goal of general and complete disarmament would need to be completed within a fixed, short-time duration that should be agreed to in advance. The Soviet and United States draft treaties on general and complete disarmament that had been tabled at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) in Geneva in 1962 had envisaged a maximum total timeframe of 4 years and 9 to 10 years respectively for the entire disarmament process, and there appears no valid reason why the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament, including the highest priority objectives of nuclear disarmament and elimination of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, should be delayed any further.

5. The four basic and inescapable facts about nuclear weapons are:

(i) the existing nuclear armouries already contain large megaton weapons, every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered;

(ii) The present arsenals of nuclear weapons (believed to number 50,000 or so) have an overkill capacity, that is of destroying all life on earth several times over;

(iii) A nuclear war is unthinkable, since the escalation would be immediate and the destruction would be catastrophic. There can be no winners in a nuclear war, since civilized life as we know it will cease to exist anywhere;

(iv) The very existence of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to the survival of mankind, because so long as nuclear weapons are allowed to remain in the armoury of any nation the danger of the use of such weapons by design, accident or miscalculation will be ever present, with the grim prospect of a nuclear holocaust.

6. It become obvious then that in this nuclear age, the struggle for disarmament cannot be waged by the international community on the basis of outmoded concepts, theories or practices of the pre-nuclear-weapon days, which envisaged some kind of balanced regulation or limitation of armaments and which even earlier had proved to be of no avail, since they basically derive from bankrupt notions of balance of power or so-called deterrence) and spheres of influence.

7. It is a matter of grave concern that systematic efforts are nevertheless being made on the basis of erroneous thinking on disarmament in certain influential quarters to change the direction, shift the focus and distort the priorities from nuclear weapons to conventional weapons, from global approach to regional approach, from measures of real disarmament and arms limitation to the so-called confidence-building measures and verification problems, from military alliances to non-aligned countries, and from the huge weapon stockpiles of the great Powers to the legitimate means of defence of small countries. The cause of real disarmament can never be served if such misguided efforts are permitted or tolerated.
8. The focus of the international community must remain on nuclear weapons. This basic consideration has guided India's principal initiatives, namely, in 1954, for the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests; in 1964, for stoppage of all proliferation of nuclear weapons, be it horizontal or vertical; and, in 1978, for the prohibition of any use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament.

9. India would now propose that there should be a freeze on nuclear weapons. Such a freeze would inter alia consist of two inseparable elements, namely (i) a complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and (ii) a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Such a combined step would mean that all nuclear facilities everywhere in the world would become peaceful, and in that event the nuclear-weapon States would not have any reason, excuse or pretext for refusing to accept international safeguards on their own nuclear energy establishment, which they are asking non-nuclear-weapon States to accept on theirs, in the name of the so-called full scope (or complete nuclear fuel cycle) safeguards. Also, in that event, an effective and yet economical safeguards system could be devised on the basis of objective, scientific and non-discriminatory criteria, since it will be applicable to all States. A freeze on nuclear weapons will greatly help in the prevention of nuclear war and will be an outstanding achievement of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

INDONESIA

[Original: English]

[30 March 1982]

1. The substantive items contained in the proposed provisional agenda recommended by the Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, (A/36/49, para. 18, items 8 to 13) cover, by and large, all substantive issues which should be dealt with by the second special session on disarmament.

2. In the context of the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the first special session on disarmament, particularly on the status of negotiations on disarmament as contained in the programme of action, and more particularly on the priorities set out in the programme, and on the consideration of the report of the Committee on Disarmament, it would be worth considering the possibility of the second special session on disarmament making an assessment of the situations which have caused the failure of the international community to make concrete achievements in the implementation of the Programme of Action and the failure of the Committee on Disarmament to initiate disarmament negotiations on nuclear weapons, in spite of the fact that they were accorded the highest priority by the first special session on disarmament. Such an assessment would be useful and necessary in order that the second special session on disarmament would be in a position to make appropriate recommendations and/or decisions of future actions to be taken by the international community.

3. With regard to the comprehensive programme on disarmament, apart from considering and, hopefully, adopting the programme, the second special session on
disarmament may also have to consider and come to agreement on the nature of commitment of States to respect the principles, achieve the objectives and implement the measures envisaged by the programme and, accordingly, agree on the appropriate form of the instrument or instruments for the programme itself and/or the commitment of States aforementioned. In this context, any recommendations that may be made by the Committee on Disarmament should naturally be taken into consideration.

ISRAEL

[Original: English]
[19 March 1982]

Israel welcomes the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It has throughout the years consistently supported significant moves at the United Nations to promote disarmament on a global and regional scale.

The recommendations of the Preparatory Committee concerning the organization of work of the special session emphasized the question of progress in the field of disarmament and the review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session. These issues should be approached from the regional perspective for the following reasons expressed, inter alia, in the Secretary-General's report (A/35/416) entitled "Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament" of 9 October 1980:

1. For the majority of States, the issues of security, military preparedness and disarmament are primarily connected with conditions in their own regions.

2. Regional conflicts contribute to international tension and become a source for security concern of extra-regional States.

3. Regional disarmament can contribute to the promotion of stability, mutual confidence and co-operation within the region and hence facilitate negotiations on some of the areas identified for universal action.

4. Regional disarmament has been recognized as an effective complement to global measures and an important constituent in the step-by-step approach to global disarmament.

Being situated in a regional characterized by tensions and a frantic arms race bearing special relevance to international peace and security, Israel could not fail to pay special attention to the regional approach to disarmament in the Final Document of the tenth special session.

In his address to the thirty-fifth United Nations General Assembly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, stated on 29 September 1980 that "We are prepared to lend a hand in any joint effort to bring about the limitations of arms in our region, which is poised on top of a volcano." Indeed, on a practical level, Israel has given effective testimony to its views by advancing...
proposals for regional measures based on important principles and guidelines specific to the regional approach to disarmament. Israel regards it as imperative that the initiative for regional disarmament and the consultations necessary for reaching this aim originate with the States of the region and that they conduct negotiations with each other. Undertaking such a move would by itself constitute a valuable step in the direction of building much-needed confidence among the States of the region.

In his letter of 3 June 1981 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations proposed the establishment of:

"Regional disarmament commissions, composed of all Member States in the region, the task of which would be to review ideas and proposals for inter-governmental regional agreements on arms reduction and control. These commissions should address themselves, inter alia, to finding appropriate solutions to two specific problems related to a comprehensive programme for disarmament:

(a) To create by common agreement of all Member States of the region the necessary modalities for the limitation of military budgets in conformity with resolution 33/67;

(b) To implement within a regional basis the terms of the decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its tenth special session in paragraph 93 of the Final Document, with reference to confidence-building measures." (A/CN.10/1, p. 28)

Ever since the problem of nuclear armaments was raised in international fora, Israel has consistently supported resolutions aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Over the years, Israel has undertaken serious studies on this subject, particularly with regard to the Middle East. The main question today is whether this objective can effectively be achieved without taking into consideration political problems in general and the situation in the Middle East in particular. Nuclear proliferation cannot simply be inhibited by unilateral acts, since that would solve little in an area which, in addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict, has seen numerous conflicts and constant rivalries and tensions.

In Israel's opinion, the most effective means of preventing the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East is through the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, by adopting the Latin American model (the Tlatelolco Treaty). According to this approach, the initiative for the establishment of such a zone and the consultations necessary for reaching this aim would originate with the States of the region, and the negotiations would be conducted directly among them.

As far as the Middle East is concerned, it is important that, in addition to the implementation of these principles, the geographic limits of the area proposed for a nuclear-weapon-free zone be appropriately defined, in view of the relations between certain States in the Middle East with some States bordering the region. Israel believes that these principles will contribute greatly to the implementation
of a process which will lead to the signing of a treaty binding upon all the States in the region.

Israel has advocated this approach in the annual General Assembly debates since 1974, when the issue was first brought up for discussion in the United Nations.

At the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Israel joined the consensus in favour of resolution 35/147 entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". In addition, in the same year, Israel introduced resolution A/C.1/35/L.8, which called upon all States of the Middle East and non-nuclear-weapon States adjacent to the region "to convene at the earliest possible date a conference with a view to negotiating a multilateral treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East".

That Israeli initiative inspired wide-ranging support. Delegates representing a broad political spectrum expressed encouragement and praise for what was termed "a constructive contribution" by Israel to this critical area. Moreover, several prominent delegates - recognized leaders in the field of disarmament - paid tribute to Israel's draft resolution.

Although fully aware of the wide dissensions existing among Member States in the region, Israel repeated its readiness to negotiate freely and directly with the States of the region the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The Permanent Representative of Israel put forward additional suggestions on these issues in his letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in June and October 1981 (A/36/315 and A/36/630).

In the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, on 30 July 1980, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, stated as follows:

"Such direct negotiations, involving all the States of the region can be commenced at any time, in any place, without any pre-conditions."

In conclusion, Israel suggests that the second special session on disarmament express its support for the regional approach to disarmament. As far as the Middle East is concerned, it would make a major contribution to the welfare, stability and peace of that region, as well as to international peace and security, by endorsing the principle of direct negotiations and by urging all States to respond to existing constructive initiatives in the field of disarmament.

ITALY

[Original: English]
[24 March 1982]

... some further Italian views on the substantive issues related to the UNGA SSOD II, in addition to those already expressed on March 1981 and contained in document A/AC.206/2 (p. 32-35).
Concerning point 9 of the provisional agenda of the second special session on disarmament, dealing with the "Review of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament", Italy confirms her opinion that, rather than merely emphasizing the lack of substantial progress in the field of disarmament, the second special session should take into full account the complexities of the present international situation and reflect on the reasons why certain measures could not yet be implemented. It should also analyse the causes of the arms race and consider further ways and means to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations agreed upon at the first special session on disarmament.

As a matter of fact, Italy believes that it is only on the basis of a clear understanding of the current international circumstances that a constructive and forward-looking dialogue on specific disarmament measures can take place. In this connexion, Italy deems it essential to stress vigorously at the second special session the highly negative effects produced on the international climate and on mutual confidence - which is an indispensable condition for fostering the disarmament process - by the increasing number of serious violations of the principles of the United Nations Charter, such as invasions, permanent military occupations, gross interferences in the domestic affairs of other States, coercion of fundamental human rights.

At the same time, Italy reaffirms that such threats to international security and increasing tensions in the world make more than even central the need for arms control and disarmament. In this perspective, while stressing the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament as a fundamental goal of the second special session, Italy also attaches the greatest importance to the realistic and concrete initiatives that Member States might introduce during the session, including proposals regarding ways and means to strengthen both the effectiveness of the multilateral disarmament machinery and the role played in this field by the United Nations.

Consistent with her traditional approach to disarmament issues, Italy reaffirms her belief that, in order to enhance security and contribute to the strengthening of confidence between countries, the compliance with disarmament obligations must be verified effectively and that the verification of arms control measures should contribute to enhance transparency of the remaining armaments situation and of military activities, in general. Italy considers, inter alia, that the second special session should contribute effectively to achieve progress in this direction, giving to the United Nations an important role to play in the field of verification of disarmament agreements and by appropriate measures designed to improve the rationalization and the efficiency of the present United Nations disarmament machinery.

Indeed, concrete steps towards the enhancement of the transparency of military potentials and the building of confidence among States can greatly help to create favourable conditions for reaching arms control agreements, particularly those of highest priority. Among them, Italy stresses the extreme importance she attaches to:
- Significant progress in balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, in full respect of the principle of undiminished security of all States;

- Successful negotiations with the aim of reaching a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;

- The maintenance and possible improvement of the non-proliferation régime;

- Significant progress in negotiations for treaties prohibiting chemical weapons;

- Possible reductions of the present levels of conventional armaments in a number of regions, while taking into due account the specific conditions of those regions as well as the legitimate right of all States to ensure their own defence and security;

- Urgent development of appropriate, effective and verifiable arrangements, to prevent, as a matter of priority, the development, testing and putting into orbit of anti-satellite systems - which actually represent the most alarming factor of a possible arms race in outer space - taking into account the highly destabilizing effect of systems designed either to interfere with the verification and observation activities of satellites, or even to disable and destroy such satellites, whose role is essential to enhance transparency and confidence-building among nations.

Italy confirms her high appreciation for the results of the United Nations studies on "regional disarmament", on "confidence-building measures" and on the establishment of an "international satellite-monitoring agency", which are able to make a great contribution to further progress towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as for the study on the "relationship between disarmament and development", which raises the fundamental problem of the transfer of resources from military purposes to the economical and social development of States, in particular developing countries. Furthermore, Italy stresses her particular interest in the United Nations study on "conventional disarmament", already approved by the General Assembly, as well as for the activities the Secretary-General is carrying out, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts, in the field of comparability and verification of military budgets, which represents the essential pre-condition for their possible, agreed reductions on the basis of the principle of undiminished security for all States.

Finally, as far as point 14 of the provisional agenda of the second special session is concerned, Italy considers that the Final Document of the first special session continues to be the most comprehensive statement on disarmament ever accepted by the international community. Its validity, therefore, should be fully reaffirmed by the second special session and remain the basis for further developments. To avoid ambiguities in this most crucial area the results of that session should not be incorporated in a second "Final Document", but take rather the form of "decisions and resolutions" of the second special session. Naturally, among such documents, particular pre-eminence should be given to the adoption of the comprehensive programme on disarmament.
A. General considerations

The Norwegian Government intends to participate actively in the work of the second special session with a view to make it a successful one.

The work of the second special session is facilitated by the existence of the consensus Final Document from the first special session which should serve as a guide for the work of the second session.

The second special session provides the Member States of the United Nations with an opportunity to reaffirm the agreement reached in the Final Document of the first special session; to examine the extent to which its goals have been achieved and to consider what can be done to facilitate its implementation in the years to come, taking into account the achievements and developments since 1978.

The expectations created by the first special session of real progress in the field of disarmament have not been fulfilled. Political developments, the continuing arms race and the development in weapons technology give reason for deep concern. This enhances the importance of the second special session devoted to disarmament.

In this connexion forward-looking considerations of new initiatives deserve more attention than the review of the past. The deliberations might focus in particular on the conclusions of relevant United Nations studies and the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

B. United Nations studies

The United Nations studies provide an important contribution as a basis for further deliberations at the second special session. Some preliminary comments are offered on the following studies:

- The study on the relationship between disarmament and development.

Norway took part in the United Nations study on disarmament and development and intends to work actively for the promotion of and effective follow-up of the study's recommendations.

Norway attaches special importance to the recommendation calling for more comprehensive data from all countries on the military use of resources and arms transfers. This recommendation should be considered in the light of the work which has already been undertaken within the United Nations in regard to a standardized system on reporting on military expenditures.
In regard to the recommendation on conversion, we agree with the necessity of advance planning in order to facilitate release of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes. This question should be further considered by the General Assembly with a view to promoting an exchange of views as to the various countries' experience in regard to conversion. The proposal to establish an international fund for development deserves further investigation.

- The study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.

Norway welcomes the Secretary-General's report on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament and feels that those questions should occupy an important place in the deliberations during the second special session. The work-load of the First Committee and the tasks and functions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission should be reviewed. The question of increasing the capacity of and of strengthening the role of the Centre for Disarmament is another important issue. The role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Research, as well as the relationship between them, should also be considered. The membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be reviewed.

- The study on a World Disarmament Campaign.

A World Disarmament Campaign deserves, in the view of the Norwegian Government, the support of the States Members of the United Nations, of the United Nations system as well as of governmental and non-governmental organizations. A well-informed public opinion in the field of disarmament is an indispensable asset in the efforts towards the establishment of more stable and secure relationships between States at lower levels of armaments.

Norway shares the views expressed in the Secretary-General's report on a World Disarmament Campaign that there is a need to involve as many segments of the world's population as possible in the campaign and to outline the catalytic part that the United Nations could play on a world-wide basis in a balanced, factual and objective manner.

While it is clear that neither Member States nor the United Nations should impose their own views on world public opinion, it is the responsibility of the Member States and thereby of the United Nations system to make available as much factual information as possible about all the vital issues related to disarmament.

C. The comprehensive programme of disarmament

Norway strongly supports the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. A balanced and forward-looking comprehensive programme would provide a useful guideline for future action in the arms control and disarmament field and represent a valuable extension of the Programme of Action of the first special session. It should thus reflect the principles and priorities laid down in the Final Document of the first special session, as well as the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.
The Norwegian Government attaches particular importance to have the following elements included in such a programme:

- The threat from nuclear weapons constitutes the primary challenge and has to receive priority attention.

- Top priority must be given to preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons in a horizontal as well as vertical sense.

- In this connexion agreements which will result in substantial reduction in the arsenals and deployments of strategic nuclear arms are of central importance. The nuclear-weapon States carry not only the responsibility, but a true obligation to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and arsenals.

- A comprehensive test ban is a cardinal measure for halting the nuclear arms race. A comprehensive test-ban agreement would also constitute a non-discriminatory instrument of essential relevance to the promotion of non-proliferation. By concluding such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States would take a significant step in the direction of meeting their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

- The question of assuring the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States should receive a satisfactory solution. Those States that are not parties to alliance security guarantees, and which have renounced their option to acquire nuclear weapons, have a legitimate claim to guarantees against being attacked or threatened by attack with nuclear weapons.

- Intensified efforts are needed to reach agreement on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction. The progress that has been made in the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Working Group on chemical weapons is welcomed. It is noted with satisfaction that the Committee has succeeded in arriving at a consensus decision on a new mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group which has been given the responsibility to elaborate a multilateral chemical weapons convention.

D. Paragraph 125 of the Final Document

In connexion with the proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document Norway wishes to draw attention to proposal 125 (g). This concerns the proposal that countries adopt procedures for assessing the impact of major weapons procurements and military programmes on arms control and disarmament.

The idea of restricting the arms race in its genesis was reflected in paragraph 93 (b) of the Final Document of the first special session by a recommendation that States assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements.
The Norwegian Government believes that it would serve to increase confidence among States if Governments demonstrate their ability and resolve to assess the long-term and short-term impact on arms control and disarmament efforts when making national decisions on major weapons procurements and other defence measures. For the purpose of these kinds of evaluations, it might prove helpful if special procedures for impact analysis and assessments, involving the various branches of national expertise and authority, were established as part of the decision-making process of all countries.

PHILIPPINES

[Original: English]
[8 March 1982]

The Philippine Government prefers that the General Assembly special session on disarmament devote particular attention and priority to those disarmament and related proposals contained in document A/AC.206/15 of 21 September 1981 which have strong or realistic chances of international acceptability, as well as those which merit immediate implementation, and that the thrust of the present session be towards adopting action-oriented disarmament proposals and programmes that readily lend themselves to bilateral or regional adoption by concerned parties.

SWEDEN

[Original: English]
[31 March 1982]

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Introductory remarks

The idea to convene the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament originated from increasing impatience at the absence of significant results in the disarmament negotiations. Many countries, in particular the non-aligned and neutral ones, were at the time deeply concerned about the accelerating arms race - particularly in the nuclear field - and the international situation in general. The striking contradiction between the need to stop the arms race and the standstill in disarmament efforts for a new approach which could set in motion a process of genuine disarmament.

To heed this demand the first special session was held in the early summer of 1978. It constitutes a landmark in the history of disarmament negotiations. It was the most representative international meeting ever convened to consider the most urgent and important international issue of our time.

A considerable number of States were for the first time actively involved in disarmament deliberations.

Of particular significance was the fact that following the session two nuclear-weapon States - China and France - seized the opportunity to join multilateral negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament.

The main achievement of the first special session was its Final Document of which the operative part, the Programme of Action, contains a well balanced and generally accepted strategy for future disarmament efforts.

For the second special session on disarmament the 1978 Final Document stands out as the appropriate starting-point. An important task of this session must be to make a comprehensive assessment to the extent to which the principles, priorities and objectives of this document have been translated into concrete action.

Considering developments of the past few years, it is necessary to conclude that the provisions on disarmament measures contained in the Final Document have not been complied with in a satisfactory manner. The almost total absence of positive results and an unabated arms race do not in any way correspond to the high hopes and expectations created by the unanimous adoption of the Final Document.

The political climate has meanwhile deteriorated, particularly in the relations between the two super-Powers, which keep the entire world hostage to their nuclear arsenals. It is a fact that the world today faces an international
situation which is in many respects more unfavourable than the one prevailing before the first special session.

The military expenditures of the super-Powers are rising at an alarming pace. But heavy increases are also discernible for many other States, including some from the developing world. Nuclear arsenals are continuously expanded beyond any rational need, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Nuclear warfighting doctrines are eroding the deterrent concept, may lead to erroneous conclusions about the prospects of fighting, or even winning, nuclear wars and may precipitate the use of nuclear weapons. Military research and technology are taking new directions which seriously aggravate the problem of arms limitation and disarmament. This is true for nuclear delivery systems and for chemical weapons, to mention two important examples. The arms race is now also moving into the deep seas and into outer space.

Increased efforts are called for in order to initiate negotiations on limitations and reductions of armed forces and conventional weapons. Such conventional armaments account for the bulk of world military expenditures. The Swedish Government considers it important to prepare the ground for future negotiations in this field. It therefore attaches great importance to the study which the Secretary-General has been requested to carry out on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.

One new feature in the disarmament context is the emerging wave of popular protest against nuclear armaments and perilous theories and doctrines for their use. The Swedish Government considers this growing popular awareness of the dangers inherent in the militarization of societies and of the intolerable contradiction between the urgency of disarmament and the absence of results as an encouraging feature of the present situation. It constitutes an expression of genuine and legitimate concern about the arms race and the inability of political leaders to reverse the current ominous trend.

The implementation of the envisaged World Disarmament Campaign as an instrument to spread factual and objective information on the arms race and efforts of disarmament assumes particular significance.

While believing that an assessment of the international situation and the implementation of the Final Document is called for, the Swedish Government holds that the main task of the second special session on disarmament is to set in motion a genuine disarmament process. The session must be action-oriented and concentrate on issues susceptible to stimulate future disarmament efforts. It is essential to induce an awareness that disarmament is in the national security interest of all nations and that it is a pre-condition for further sustainable economic and social development.

Among questions of particular interest for future disarmament negotiations figure the following:
1. **Nuclear disarmament, including a comprehensive test-ban treaty**

The most urgent task in the field of disarmament is to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. The main responsibility to set the nuclear disarmament process in motion rests with the nuclear weapon States, particularly the two super-Powers which possess the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons. It is a matter of concern to the Swedish Government that negotiations on nuclear weapon issues have not yet been initiated in the Committee on Disarmament although the item has been on its agenda since 1979.

The negotiations on theatre nuclear forces, which were initiated last November, by necessity cover only a limited number of issues. Their political and symbolic value is nevertheless enormous. It is thus essential that they proceed in a constructive manner and that they soon yield concrete results through the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on Eurostrategic nuclear systems.

However, as a result of technological development nuclear-weapon systems are becoming increasingly interlinked. This tends to blur the distinction between tactical, intermediate range and central strategic systems. If eventual results of the talks on theatre nuclear forces are to have real significance, they must subsequently be broadened to cover other categories of nuclear weapons. A particular effort should be made to start negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe with the aim of initially reducing the existing manifestly oversized arsenals and ultimately bringing about their elimination. The Swedish Government is of the view that many of these weapons, be they neutron or other, are of doubtful practical military applicability and if used, represent clear dangers of nuclear escalation.

The negotiations on theatre nuclear forces must be seen in the wider context of strategic nuclear weapons. It is therefore of great importance to resume talks on limitations and reductions of such weapons and to build upon the results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II).

Considering the direct relevance of nuclear weapons, in particular tactical and intermediate, and their delivery systems to all European peoples, it is desirable that negotiating forums be established which are open to general European participation. For this reason, among others, the Swedish Government supports the early convening of a conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

The realization of a multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty would constitute a particularly important nuclear arms control measure. Such a treaty would render more difficult the further improvement of existing capabilities as well as the attainment of nuclear explosive capability in additional States, the Committee on Disarmament has so far been prevented from initiating real negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban issue. The second special session on disarmament should urgently call for an early start of multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations.

As desired by the vast majority of States specific measures should be considered to prevent the further spread of nuclear explosive capability. In
particular the acceptance of full-scope safeguards as a necessary condition for the supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology should be reflected in the decisions of the second special session.

2. **Prevention of nuclear war**

   Only complete nuclear disarmament provides real protection against the nuclear threat. Until this goal has been reached, it might be useful to consider certain technical arrangements in order to reduce the risk of outbreak of a nuclear war. There is always a possibility that sheer technical malfunction or human failure could cause such a war. Some efforts have been made to reduce such risks, i.e. the establishment of direct communications links (hot line), measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war (accident measures), the Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on Prevention of Nuclear War and certain provisions of the SALT agreements. In the absence of tangible results in nuclear disarmament the non-nuclear-weapon States have a right to expect the nuclear-weapon States to declare at the special session what further steps they are prepared to take in order to alleviate the risk of nuclear war. It is important that all nuclear-weapon States comply with the consensus resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session in this matter (resolution 36/81 B).

3. **Military research and development**

   Military research and development programmes (R&D) have become an increasingly important factor in the over-all arms race. These programmes account for enormous financial and intellectual resources. In 1981 at least $40 billion in government spending alone were used for this purpose. It is estimated that 20 per cent of all scientists and technicians in the world are involved in military programmes. The major military powers spend 10-15 per cent of their military budgets on R&D. Even so, it is evident that the role of military R&D in fuelling the arms race by far exceeds their share of total military expenditures.

   It has, for example, long been obvious that the arms competition is shifting from a quantitative to a qualitative pattern. Military R&D play a decisive role in this process; today's projects become tomorrow's expensive and constantly more sophisticated weapons. New scientific and technological developments are rapidly incorporated into new weapons and defence systems. Innovation is driven at a fast pace for fear of falling behind in the military-technological competition.

   It has long been recognized that there is an urgent need to come to grips with this process. Over the years a number of ideas and proposals on possible solutions have been discussed.

   One possible approach is to try to achieve international agreements on well defined measures in specific areas as has been the case *inter alia* with the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (biological weapons Convention), the Convention on the Prohibition of Military and Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Treaty) and some of the limits agreed upon in the
SALT II Treaty. Another complementary line of action is to preclude certain types of military exploitation of specific geographic areas, as has been done with respect to the Antarctic, the sea-bed and outer space. In this context should be noted the possibility to establish procedures whereby new weapons and military programmes are made the subject of analysis as to their impact on arms limitation and disarmament.

The most effective and therefore the most desirable approach would be to agree on general measures designated to assess and curtail such military R&D and technology which have a strong impact on the arms race. Efforts in this direction will, however, encounter many difficulties and obstacles. Among them is the problem to obtain sufficiently reliable and complete data and information on current plans and programmes from all countries of interest in this context and to verify any agreements to limit them.

The Swedish Government nevertheless considers that it would be of great interest to intensify efforts to achieve a common understanding of the role of military R&D both for fuelling the arms race and for its possible potential to improve national and international means of verification. Due to the dynamics of the military exploitation of R&D, time is a crucial factor. It is now essential to focus attention on this matter in order to prepare the ground for further substantive consideration. The special session offers an opportunity for initiating discussions and study of the many complex questions related to the process of military R&D and its implications for disarmament negotiations.

4. Verification, in particular in relation to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and reductions of military expenditures

Adequate verification and monitoring of international disarmament and arms control agreement has for long been a central issue, the importance of which keeps increasing. For certain types of agreements, verification has proved to be a major stumbling-block; in other cases deficient verification and consultation mechanisms have raised serious doubts about the application of existing agreements. Furthermore, new weapons technologies may contribute to more effective and non-intrusive verification techniques. It seems safe to claim that no major arms control agreement is likely to be accepted by States unless they feel confident that their security needs have been adequately met by the inclusion of stringent and unequivocal verification measures in such agreements.

International arms control and disarmament agreements must include international verification measures which in principle give States the right and the possibility to participate in the verification process.

As to the question of verification of the comprehensive test-ban treaty the seismic expert group working under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament is well under way in developing an international system for the seismic monitoring of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is also possible to identify certain nuclear explosions by analysing samples of airborne radioactivity. There exist today a number of stations around the world where such analyses are carried out. It would be a useful complement to other verification methods to organize these and future
stations in an international system for the detection of airborne radio-activity from nuclear explosions.

The availability of reliable data on military expenditures is essential as a basis for disarmament negotiations and for the development of adequate measures for international verification of agreements. A standardized system for the international reporting of military expenditures was adopted by the General Assembly in 1980. Reporting has already started and should be continued on an annual basis with the participation of a larger number of States representing different economic and budgeting systems.

A special group of experts entrusted, inter alia, with the task of examining the question of comparing and verifying military expenditures, has recently delivered its report. Some of its main conclusions are:

(a) That the reporting instrument represents a viable and practical means for international reporting of military expenditures;

(b) That for comparison purposes there is a need for constructing military price deflators and military purchasing power parities; the construction of such deflators and parities would involve a common understanding among participating States but given such understanding it should be possible to resolve the technical problems in a way satisfactory to all parties;

(c) That the successful demonstration of the feasibility of constructing military price indexes and purchasing power parities for different States would contribute much to preparing the ground for future negotiations on the reduction of military expenditures;

(d) That in the case of an agreement on the reduction of military expenditures a verification system will be necessary in order to provide assurances that all parities are in compliance with the agreement. In fact a variety of means will probably be required and reliable assessments may involve a relatively high degree of political understanding and confidence.

According to the Swedish Government, it is of utmost importance to continue the work carried out so far with a view to improving the ground for future negotiations. This work has, however, now reached a stage where it cannot be efficiently carried much further by help of experts alone. An increasing political involvement on the part of Member States and their Governments is called for.

In view of this the Swedish Government shares the conclusions made by the Expert Group that military price deflators and purchasing power parities should be constructed with an active participation by Member States. This would facilitate comparisons of military expenditures and thereby promote bilateral and/or multilateral discussions or negotiations among Member States concerning both the technical and political problems connected with agreements to reduce military expenditures.
5. **Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons Convention**

The bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons Convention constitutes an important example on an international disarmament agreement concluded without the inclusion of a satisfactory complaints and verification mechanism.

At the 1980 Review Conference of the Convention, efforts were made to improve the complaints procedure of the Convention in order to ensure that a permanent consultative machinery should be available to all States parties to consider allegations of possible violations of the Convention and for fact-finding purposes. A partial improvement was achieved in that the Conference agreed to make an interpretation of the Convention to the effect that its provisions concerning consultation and co-operation on any problem which might arise in relation to the objective or in the application of the provisions of the Convention is considered to include *inter alia* the right of any State party to request that a consultative meeting open to all States parties be convened at expert level. The Conference also stated that the question of the adequacy of article V be further considered at an appropriate time.

The Swedish Government wishes to confirm its view that it is desirable to further consider the whole question of the adequacy of the complaints procedure of the Convention. As reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, an effective mechanism should be based on a combination of national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other to provide a system that would ensure the effective implementation of the Convention.

In this context the role of the Security Council in carrying out investigations into complaints, in accordance with article VI of the Convention should be noted. In reviewing the complaints procedure it should also be essential to obtain reassurances that permanent members of the Security Council would not prevent an investigation or, alternatively, that the initiation of an investigation would be decided upon by the Security Council in a manner prescribed for procedural matters.

It is recommended that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should consider inviting the Depositary States of the bacteriological weapons Convention to convene a special conference as soon as possible to establish a permanently available, objective and non-discriminatory verification and complaints procedure applicable to the Convention and that it should invite the Conference so convened to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the results achieved.

6. **Disarmament and development**

Some present trends in armaments and military doctrines pose increasing threats to all nations and peoples. The very physical threat to the security of nations is compounded by the world economic disorder. Unemployment, inflation, problems of accessibility of strategic raw materials, monetary disorder, lagging economic and social development in the developing world and a crisis of the main
production systems in the world aggravate national and global security. The Swedish Government shares with concern the words of grave warning, unanimously expressed by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts of the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, that the world now stands at a crossroads; it can either continue the arms race or move towards a more sustainable international economic and political order. "It cannot do both". (A/35/356 of 5 October 1981).

Sweden will together with other interested Member States, seek effective implementation and follow-up of the disarmament/development report. The report substantiates that military budgets are dead-end expenditures in all kinds of economies, be they market, centrally planned, or mixed. Military expenditures do not foster growth. Through its inflationary effects and the general economic and political malaise to which it contributes, military spending inhibits the capital investment required for development.

Through the drain on the most valuable research talents and funds, military R&D restrains productivity gains and distorts growth in science and technology. The report shows that military outlays are among the least efficient kinds of public spending. The military sector drains away funds that could relieve poverty and distress. The very size and nature of military spending heightens tensions, reduces security and underpins the systems which makes even more arms necessary.

In spite of these far-reaching conclusions, most Governments shy away from public cost accounting, assessments of the short- and long-term economic and social costs attributable to their military preparations, make no analyses of the benefits that would be derived from the reallocation of military resources, following disarmament, to address economic and social problems on the national level and to reduce the gap in income between industrialized and developing countries. In fact, most countries, among them some major participants in the arms race, provide very little useful information at all.

Sweden will seek to promote fuller and more systematic information on the military use of human and material resources, on the economic and social costs of military expenditures, and on the benefits, particularly for developing countries, that would be derived from disarmament.

Sweden will co-operate with other Member States in sharing the results of experiences and preparations for conversion. It proposes that the matter of conversion from military to civilian production be addressed by the General Assembly every three or four years, starting with the forty-first session of the General Assembly in 1986.

As an example it could be mentioned that a Committee, appointed by the Swedish Government, in co-operation with regional and local authorities as well as with management and trade union organizations recently investigated Sweden's military aircraft industry with the aim of enabling it to adapt to an increasingly civilian market. Another Governmental Committee has recently completed a study on ways of gradually transforming military industrial capacity for civilian purposes.
Sweden supports the view expressed in the report that the disarmament/development perspective should be incorporated in concrete and practical ways in the ongoing activities of the United Nations system.

7. **Military utilization of the sea-bed**

The rapid pace of technological development, both as regards weapons of mass destruction and other weapons has resulted in an expanding military utilization of the ocean depths and the sea-bed. The first step to control this development was taken in the 1971 sea-bed Treaty, which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

At the first Review Conference of the Treaty, held in 1977, it was decided that a second review conference be held in 1982 or, in any case, not later than 1984. The Swedish Government holds that a second review conference should be convened in 1983.

The first Review Conference recognized the need to keep under continuing review such technological developments which affect the operation of the Treaty. The conference invited the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc expert group for this purpose, but this recommendation was not implemented. In the view of the Swedish Government, the Committee on Disarmament should, in consultation with States parties to the Treaty, consider examining relevant technological developments with the assistance of experts.

The major military Powers are the most advanced in ocean technology and therefore have a special responsibility to contribute by making available a survey on relevant technical information. Such a survey would provide background for an evaluation whether developments of new technologies already present, or might be expected to present, increased risks for an arms race on the sea-bed, be it nuclear or conventional.

Civilian technological development for extracting natural resources on the sea-bed or in the ocean depths continues. This development is important also with respect to the possibilities of placing weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed or the ocean floor and to discover such emplacement. It should be given attention in the military context. The second special session on disarmament is thus invited to consider the question of the military utilization of the sea-bed and to formulate the appropriate recommendations for the convening of a second review conference of the sea-bed Treaty.

8. **The naval arms race**

The naval arms race has attracted relatively little attention in disarmament negotiations and only a few measures have been agreed upon after the Second World War.

Best known are the limitations on ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) agreed in SALT I and SALT II. Related to these agreements is the Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union

The major military Powers bear the main responsibility for the technological development of the means for naval warfare. To a large extent it is a product of their mutual competition and rivalry, one particularly noteworthy and potentially destabilizing element being their intensive efforts to achieve an anti-submarine warfare capability aimed at neutralizing the adversary's bases (second strike capability). But new technologies are gradually influencing the navies of smaller countries as well.

In addition to new naval warfare technologies the capability for large-scale and rapid transportation of troops by means of special vessels or ordinary ships, as well as the strength and range of amphibious forces have increased considerably.

Present naval, amphibious and sea-transportation capabilities provide the major power blocs with increasing possibilities to project, at short notice, considerable military force in most parts of the world. Gunboat diplomacy, invasion and closing of strategic sea lanes by mines is now possible at short notice, with greater precision and on a larger scale than ever before.

The following measures, inter alia, could be discussed and studied:

- Establishment of sanctuaries for SLBM submarines. The purpose would be to ensure the invulnerability of an agreed number of such submarines and thus promote the stability of the nuclear balance.

- Application of confidence-building measures within agreed sea areas, for instance the limitation of naval and amphibious manoeuvres, limitation or prohibition of deployment of nuclear-weapons carriers in certain areas or limitation of general naval presence. The purpose would be to reduce tension, build confidence and limit the presence of military forces in the areas.

- Limitations of surface ship forces, amphibious forces and special military transportation vessels of the major power blocs. The purpose would be to establish a naval balance at a lower level and to put general limitations on the capabilities for gunboat diplomacy and power projection.

- Multilateralization of the bilateral United States-USSR prevention of incidents Agreement.

9. **Prevention of an arms race in outer space**

Twenty-five years after the start of the space age, the peaceful uses of outer space are already manifold and bring great benefits in areas such as communication, navigation, meteorology, remote sensing of the earth and others. Simultaneously, however, military applications for the same or other purposes have assumed increasing importance. In fact the vast majority of satellites launched in the last two decades have had a military mission.
To an extent, such as in the field of reconnaissance, military satellites have had a stabilizing effect, since they have allowed more accurate and more complete information about the military potential of other States and of conflict situations in various parts of the world.

As a result, such national use of satellites has become an established feature of arms control agreements.

Satellites for other military uses, for instance in communication and navigation, are increasingly becoming integral parts of the total terrestrial, naval and aerial warfare capability of the space Powers. Thus, on the one hand, these satellites enhance their military capability, but, on the other, they also make them more dependent on space-based systems for a variety of purposes and more suspicious about the space potential and intentions of the adversary. This tends to create a demand for protection of one's own vulnerable space capacity and an offensive potential against the space resources of the other side. Thus, the basis is laid for increased efforts to establish an anti-satellite (ASAT) capacity, which might lead to the development of a capacity for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) warfare in outer space, possibly through the use of high energy laser and/or particle beam weapons.

These trends are disturbing. They could severely hamper or endanger the very considerable civilian use of outer space for a variety of purposes, both international and national. They could, furthermore, become destabilizing as far as the super-Power nuclear weapon relationship is concerned. This may lead to a wasteful and futile arms race in outer space, which could easily become unmanageable.

The Swedish Government welcomes the fact that, on the basis of existing international treaties as well as the recommendations of the first special session, proposals are now being made with a view to ensuring the exclusively peaceful use of outer space. The following issues and questions, in particular, would seem to be relevant in this context:

(a) Existing treaties such as the 1968 outer space Treaty and the 1972 ABM Treaty contain certain prohibitions and restrictions on outer space warfare, but it should be investigated to what extent they cover other current and expected development in this field.

(b) Should one aim at restricting or prohibiting military satellites for general warfare purposes (communication, command, control, reconnaissance, navigation, etc.)? Such satellite systems would mostly and increasingly be an integral part of terrestrial warfare systems. To a certain extent they have important stabilizing functions. One should ask whether a valid distinction can be made between such military systems and civilian purpose satellites.

(c) How should the question of dual purpose satellites be addressed, such as, for instance satellites for military and civilian communications?
(d) Should negotiations first concentrate on restricting ASAT systems? Should they in such a case encompass both ASATs attacking from Earth and from a position in outer space?

(e) Should all research, development, production and testing of relevant systems mentioned under (b), (c) and (d), be prohibited?

(f) Should, as an alternative to the aforementioned suggestions on restricting and prohibiting satellite weapon systems, the emphasis be on a restriction or prohibition of certain kinds of activities characterized as interference with or attacks on space objects both from space itself and from Earth? (This approach, if pursued in isolation, presupposes an acceptance of existing or future military purpose satellites. To be acceptable as a balanced approach, it might have to be combined with a restriction on certain types of such satellites.)

(g) Although ABM systems are already partly restricted in the USSR-United States ABM Treaty of 1972, it would seem advisable to initiate international discussion also on developments in the ABM (BMD – ballistic missile defence) field and its likely consequences for outer space.

(h) Efforts should be made to increase the transparency of national and international space activities through an improved and more comprehensive United Nations notification procedure.

(i) The possibilities of implementing proposals for an international satellite monitoring agency should be further investigated.

The second special session should consider the question of the arms race in outer space and make appropriate recommendations taking into account relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99).

Among other things, the second special session should invite the leading space Powers to resume their bilateral talks on the matter with a view to concluding appropriate agreements. It is known that considerable efforts have been and are being made to develop ASAT systems. Such systems have already been tested in outer space. Important resources have also been committed to study and develop technologies for space-based ABM systems. If unchecked the development in this field would accelerate into another ruinous and destabilizing arms race. The international community and the space Powers themselves should make a determined effort to forestall such unnecessary developments through the conclusions of one or more agreements further limiting the military use of outer space and banning ASAT and ABM warfare. Multilateral negotiation, within the Committee on Disarmament or other appropriate forums, should complement such bilateral action through the conclusion of corresponding international agreements.

10. Particularly inhumane weapons

to Have Indiscriminate Effects reached agreement on a Convention and three Protocols relating to the use of three categories of conventional weaponry: non-detectable fragments, land-mines and booby traps and incendiary weapons.

Limited though it was, this agreement constitutes important progress, particularly from the point of view of international humanitarian law, but also to some extent as a contribution to arms control and disarmament.

The agreement was opened for signature on 10 April 1981, and has since then been signed by 50 States. However, for the agreement to become a viable force in armed conflict it is also very important that its early entry into force be secured. This requires 20 ratifications. Sweden for its part ratifies the agreement in the spring of 1982.

All States are therefore urged to rapidly ratify and to become parties to the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

The United Nations Conference did not achieve full progress on all issues before it:

The restrictions on incendiary weapons are incomplete. They do not provide any protection to combatants and neither do they completely prohibit the use of incendiaries in populated areas.

The Conference did adopt unanimously a resolution in which States are requested to exercise the utmost care in the development of small calibre weapon systems so as to avoid an unnecessary escalation in the injurious effects of such systems. Regrettably, however, there was not complete agreement on the establishment of criteria for measuring the wounding effects of projectile energy transfer to the human body or on the application of a standard test to measure such effects, including internationally agreed limits to the wounding power of small calibre projectiles.

A number of other existing weapons were discussed but not regulated, due to lack of agreement and time. New types of weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, will, no doubt, appear.

Among the issues which were only partly dealt with was the question of material remnants of war (in the Protocol on land-mines). Such remnants have grave and long-lasting effects, particularly as they strike civilians who accidentally come across them. There has been considerable reluctance to deal with this problem internationally, since questions of responsibility and compensation have tended to become stumbling blocks for agreements. In Sweden's view, efforts in this field should concentrate on arriving at agreements within the United Nations context for establishing appropriate machinery for practical assistance to war-stricken countries for the removal of various kinds of remnants of war. The useful work performed already by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) should be continued and concluded. The matter could usefully be studied also in the disarmament context and in the further development of international humanitarian law.
In the light of the above, the rules on amendment and the adoption of new rules in the Convention assume particular importance.

It is recalled, in this context, that a review conference may be called five years after the entry into force of the Convention, it being stated, however, that at least 18 States parties must be in favour of such review.

Such action should include both a review of the adequacy of existing rules and to search for new agreement to restrict or prohibit the use of such existing or new weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

11. **Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament**

In the history of disarmament negotiations, a number of proposals have been made for the creation of an international institution for disarmament. During the preparations for the first special session on disarmament several delegations commented on this matter.

The Swedish Foreign Minister, in a statement before the First Committee on 29 October 1979, suggested that the possibilities of establishing a United Nations disarmament organization be studied in a comprehensive manner. The General Assembly decided in the same year to carry out a study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.

The position of the Swedish Government on this matter was presented to the group of experts carrying out the study and was to a certain degree reflected in their report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session (A/36/392). Sweden called for the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament Agency organized to meet the priorities and more ambitious goals that the United Nations should set for the 1980s and beyond. The Swedish position in no way implied a criticism of the present United Nations Disarmament Centre.

The United Nations Disarmament Agency should have an independent position within the United Nations system, but would report directly to the General Assembly. It should facilitate co-ordination of disarmament activities within the United Nations system and assist Governments in the drafting of common programmes and in the achievement of agreed options in arms control and disarmament. Its function would include services for deliberation, negotiation, implementation, verification, information, research and study, disarmament and development - in co-operation with other competent offices of the Secretariat - and training. It would also ensure that the work programme which will be agreed by the second special session be matched by adequate Secretariat resources. In this context, the role and administrative-organizational framework of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should also receive careful attention.

The United Nations expert study contains a number of useful comments on these matters but does not recommend specific action in the direction suggested by Sweden. It is, therefore, suggested that the second special session should devote further attention to the matter with a view to taking certain action to strengthen...
the United Nations disarmament machinery. It is recommended that the General Assembly should decide in principle to establish a United Nations Disarmament Agency, and that it should request the Secretary-General to work out a concrete proposal on the practical implementation, organization, staffing, etc. of such an agency, bearing in mind inter alia that the Agency should have sufficient resources, that it should have an independent position within the United Nations system, that it should have a governing body elected by the General Assembly and adequate regular funding to be able to undertake the work requested by Member States, and that it should report directly to the General Assembly.

12. Comprehensive programme of disarmament

The Comprehensive programme of disarmament which is being drafted by the Committee on Disarmament includes practically all issues on the disarmament agenda. It will undoubtedly be a centre-piece of the second special session on disarmament and of decisive importance for the outcome of the session as a whole. The Swedish Government has presented its detailed views on the programme in the course of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament and intends to revert to the matter during the second special session, basing itself inter alia on the comments and suggestions made in this paper.

TURKEY

[Original: English]

[29 March 1982]

The views and the general approach of the Turkish Government related to the preparations of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were stated in our reply reproduced in the Secretary General's report of 15 April 1981, (A/AC.206/2). As of today, they still remain valid.

Having studied the relevant part of the 1981 report of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly, we deem it necessary to clarify one particular point mentioned briefly in the last paragraph of our reply.

Article 12 of the provisional agenda of the second session on disarmament endorsed by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session deals with the growing need of enhancing the effectiveness of international machinery in the field of disarmament. In this context it should be borne in mind that during the first special session on disarmament it was agreed upon and stated very clearly in the Final Document that "The membership of the Committee on Disarmament will be reviewed at regular intervals." (Resolution S-10/2, sect. III, para. 120). Later on, during the thirty-third, thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly, the first review of the membership of the Committee was deferred to the second special session on disarmament, through the adoption by overwhelming majorities and without objection of three successive resolutions, namely resolutions 33/91 G, 35/156 E and 36/97 J.

It seems obvious that the four years that have elapsed since the first special session on disarmament can be considered as a reasonable interval, on the basis of
the informal understanding previously reached and taking into account the pace and methods of work of the Committee on Disarmament during the last four years, for the said review to become all the more urgent, necessary and timely.

The Turkish Government is well aware of the fact that some delegations participating in the work of the Committee on Disarmament "were of the view that there was no strong reason at the moment for modifying the present membership". (A/36/27, para. 19). We would like to remind those delegations of paragraph 28 of the Final Document:

"All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their effective participation." (Resolution S-10/2, sect. II, para. 28).

The Turkish Government is of the opinion that to devise some innovative working methods and to proceed through some organizational readjustments such as bringing a new impetus by the participation of new members willing to contribute to the negotiations may help the Committee on Disarmament at least in saving valuable time and in devoting its attention entirely to substantive negotiation.

The Turkish Government is confident that in dealing with its extremely important and vital tasks, the second special session on disarmament will not also fail to comply with the wishes of States desirous of taking an active part in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing and, accordingly, will make the necessary organizational and procedural readjustments, following appropriate consultations among its Member States.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Original: English]
[8 April 1982]

The United Kingdom attaches importance to the second special session as an opportunity for the international community to discuss matters relating to disarmament and security; to analyse problems; to review progress and to indicate where efforts might best be directed in the future. The United Kingdom hopes that, through realistic and constructive debate, the second special session will act as a spur and a stimulus to negotiations already in progress.

Progress in disarmament negotiations has been disappointingly slow. This is a reflection of the fact that effective arms control needs a degree of international confidence which is unlikely to be found when a neutral and non-aligned country has
been invaded and occupied by a member of the United Nations, contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. International confidence has also been damaged by events in Poland, where foreign pressure has led to the suspension of civil rights. The United Kingdom expresses the hope that the second special session will assist in rebuilding lost confidence so that equitable, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements can be negotiated.

The United Kingdom draws attention to its address on behalf of the Ten Member States of the European Community to the First Committee at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly in which it gave full support to a number of specific negotiations currently under way or in prospect.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament will make an important contribution to determining future disarmament activities. The United Kingdom, together with four other members of the Committee on Disarmament, made a major contribution to the discussion of this subject during 1981 by tabling a draft programme for consideration. In the view of the United Kingdom, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should envisage the conclusion of specific disarmament measures already under negotiation and provide a realistic and flexible framework of possible future disarmament measures, together with a statement of the principles which should govern the negotiation of those measures.

One of the crucial aspects of any arms control agreement is verification. In an attempt to clarify some of the problems relating to the verification of a chemical weapons convention, currently under discussion in the Committee on Disarmament, the United Kingdom has tabled a paper which it hopes will help to move those discussions forward.

The United Kingdom takes this opportunity to assure the Secretary-General that it will play a full and active part in the second special session. The United Kingdom will lend its support to all efforts to negotiate equitable, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, so that international security may be maintained at lower levels of cost and armaments.